SMA hosted a panel discussion as part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series, entitled “Harnessing Futures and Foresighting Techniques – Using Methods, Approaches, and Multidisciplinary Teams to Understand the Strategic Implications of COVID,” featuring Prof. Rebecca Braun (Professor of Modern Languages and Creative Futures, Lancaster University, UK), Mr. Andrew Curry (Director of Futures, School of International Futures (SOIF)), and Mr. Philip Tovey (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)). The moderator was Ms. Nicole Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA INSS/PRISM Speaker Series, entitled “Geoeconomics and the Emerging World Order: The Power of the U.S. Dollar.” This brief was presented by the Honorable Jack Lew (Former United States Secretary of the Treasury, White House Chief of Staff, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget).

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series, entitled “China 2050: Preparing for an Ascendant China.” The speakers included Dr. Andrew Scobell (RAND) and Mr. Cortez Cooper (RAND). Dr. Scobell began his portion of the brief by discussing long-term competition between the US and China, more specifically focusing on China’s “grand strategy” and why studying it can be an effective method in analyzing long-term competition with China. He explained that China views threats from other states, particularly the US, as the biggest risks to its national security. Dr. Scobell then identified four successive grand strategies that China has developed over time—“revolution,” “recovery,” “building comprehensive national power (CNP),” and, in today’s age, “rejuvenation.” He elaborated that China is not only interested in developing its hard power, but its soft power as well. This is because China believes that an effective combination of hard and soft power will be beneficial in advancing its grand strategy. Next, Mr. Cooper discussed the importance of China’s grand strategy—more specifically, the organization of its subgoals in its various areas of national governance. He also presented a series of “alternative futures” that he, Dr. Scobell, and their report coauthors identified. These alternative futures are possible routes through which China’s strategies may adapt in the future and included “triumphant China,” “ascendant China,” “stagnant China,” and “imploding China.” Mr. Cooper stressed the importance of rebalancing and restructuring within China’s grand strategy but elaborated that there are not necessarily any signs of significant reform at this time. He then went on to explain how these possible alternative futures may impact China’s relationship with the US. Mr. Cooper expressed that his outlook was not necessarily optimistic in that regard and suggested that there would be significant collision between the US and China in the face of long-term competition.

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series, entitled “Alternative Futures of Geopolitical Competition in a Post-COVID-19 World (Part II of II).” The panelists included Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, PhD (US Air Force AF/AFAC), Ms. Vera Zakem (Technology for Global Security), and Mr. Shannon McGurk (Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch).

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. The panelists included Dr. David Bray, Dr. Matthew Burrows, Dr. Divya Chander, and Dr. Jason Matheny (All from The Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center, Strategic Foresight Initiative, and Center for Security and Emerging Technology).

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. The panelists included Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis (US Air Force AF/A5AC), Mr. Jason Schenker (The Futurist Institute & Prestige Economics), Ms. Kara Cunzeman (The Aerospace Corporation), and Dr. Marwa Maziad (Middle East Institute & University of Washington).Lt Col Sotiriadis began by discussing the aims of the Global Futures Report and the four futures framework used throughout. He stated that the primary purpose of this report is to reveal the power of harnessing strategic foresight when thinking about the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic. Strategic foresight, Lt Col Sotiriadis explained, is anticipatory thinking designed to support decision making. He then argued that we (as a society) trade in the currency of uncertainty, and we must become inherently comfortable operating in an uncertain environment without the “definitive” conclusions we often search for. Consequently, he and his report coauthors sought to address how alternative futures can defy accepted probabilities and affect baseline assumptions. Lt Col Sotiriadis also stressed the need to adopt a systems-based approach to futures thinking, to recognize that everyone is a futurist, and to embrace analytic complexity in one’s thought processes. To conclude, Lt Col Sotiriadis presented four futures that he and his report coauthors examined in the context of a variety of potential areas of disruption, ranging from space to supply chains to fault lines in the Middle East. These scenarios included: 1) Transformation (“From Biohegemony to Biosupremacy”), 2) Systemic Collapse (“The New Warring States Period”), 3) Discipline (“Authoritarian Regionalism”), and 4) Continued Growth (“Endemic Disruption”).

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oliver Kaplan (University of Denver) and Dr. Jonathan Moyer (University of Denver) as part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Moyer presented their research on how the COVID-19 pandemic and its second-, third-, and fourth-order effects may increase the probability of armed internal conflict. Dr. Kaplan predicted that there will be a 56% increase in conflicts through 2022 (approximately 13 additional conflicts), most of which will be concentrated in Africa, South America, and/or Central Asia. Additionally, Dr. Kaplan stated that different states will experience instability for different reasons and with different causal processes. He further explained that COVID-19 has provided a challenging environment of increased poverty, weakened states, and health issues that makes armed conflict more likely and exacerbates the effects of current ongoing conflicts. Dr. Kaplan then presented his and Dr. Moyer’s findings on overall post-pandemic global fragility from 2020-2022, highlighting that countries experiencing armed conflict in 2018 will continue to remain unstable due to the aftermath of COVID-19. Their findings also showed an increased probability of conflicts igniting in certain regions (Africa, in particular) as a result of the pandemic, all of which were calculated using a political instability task force dataset that categorizes revolutionary and ethnic wars. Next, Dr. Moyer discussed the model he and Dr. Kaplan used in their research­—the International Futures Model—in further detail. Through his research, Dr. Moyer identified macro-level indicators that anticipate internal conflicts, including GDP, mixed regimes, states discrimination, and trade. These indicators play into the International Futures Model, which simulates global development at a national level and displays how long-term development patterns work. The model that Dr. Moyer displayed during this brief shows the dynamic effects across health, government, and demographic systems, while contrasting pre-COVID and post-COVID growth rates, as well. He then emphasized this tool’s usefulness in broadening a state’s perspective and drawing it away from narrow probabilistic models in order to better understand and anticipate the drivers of state fragility. Next, Dr. Kaplan expanded on the quantitative part of his and Dr. Moyer’s research and the results of 50 cases studies they examined on fragility conflicts. Their results concluded that “economic stability and challenges” was the most frequently cited explanation for state fragility, along with “horizontal inequality” and “international intervention.” Dr. Kaplan also cited some real-world examples to show how his and Dr. Moyer’s model can be useful when analyzing various conflicts, including the ongoing crisis in Yemen and the recent explosion in Lebanon. To conclude, Dr. Kaplan provided specific policy recommendations for how to mitigate the pandemic now and prevent conflicts in the future, including funding the World Health Organization (WHO) to address first-order effects, tailoring COVID-19 response to higher-risk countries, and addressing “sparks” that could ignite COVID-related conflicts before they occur.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Sir David Omand (King’s College, London/Former Director of GCHQ) as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. Sir David began by stating that the first order national security problems as a result of COVID-19 are easy to predict; however, the second and third order problems for national security are harder to predict and thus are important to consider and plan for now. Consequently, he advised that the US and UK governments expand their scope of what issues are considered “national security” issues to prepare for future hazards. Sir David argued that because of COVID-19, malign actors have had more opportunities to exploit disruption and cause trouble. Moreover, COVID-19 has affected the global economy (and continues to do so), as it has led to a one third contraction in US GDP and the deepest recession in a century in the UK. He suggested that a government’s definition of national security should to take into account both natural hazards and external threats to create a stronger form of protection for its citizens. Sir David continued by advocating the expansion of the mission boundaries of the US and UK intelligence communities, armed forces, and defense communities from their traditional definitions to defend from extreme acts of nature in addition to internal and external threats. He also discussed the psychological aspect of national security and the necessity of public trust in government while risks are being mitigated. He argued that when that trust is present, normal life can continue freely and with civilian confidence in the processes in place. However, Sir David stated that although the UK has faith in its government’s response to certain threats (e.g., jihadist threats), when it comes to COVID-19, there is a state of national insecurity. He emphasized that a lesson that the UK government must learn from the pandemic is to establish trustworthiness in quiet times rather than in times of crisis. Next, Sir David discussed the importance of clarity in doctrine followed for civil emergencies and mirroring the same decentralized decision making used in situations involving external threats. He outlined a system of crisis management and decision making that he recommended civil analysts and policy makers use called SEES. He stated that situational awareness, explanation and estimation, and strategic notice (SEES) are all necessary to mitigate risks in real time and prepare for risks in the future. In addition, Sir David underscored the utility of “warning” senior leaders if there are significant risks or errors happening in policy making. To conclude, Sir David reiterated that national security needs to be redefined to include natural hazards, as well as external threats, and reemphasized the psychological importance of public trust in government.

SMA hosted a speaker series with Dr. Craig Whiteside (US Naval War College) and Dr. Haroro Ingram (George Washington University) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Whiteside began by discussing the global influence and resilience of the Islamic State, highlighting its continued presence despite the death of its physical caliphate. He also stated that in the age of great power competition between the US, China, and Russia, many scholars think small ideological competitors will no longer be significant. However, Dr. Whiteside argued that this has not been the case thus far. He explained that the security environment is not bipolar, and the Islamic State is continuing to redefine and shape local conflicts to serve its larger goals. Furthermore, he claimed that the Islamic State will weaponize a change in the international global order, if it is altered from the way we know it today. Dr. Whiteside continued by describing the Islamic State as a transnational enterprise and discussing the global network that stems from this empire. He emphasized that the Islamic State has learned to operate this global enterprise quite effectively over time; it has become well-organized, well-financed, and technologically savvy. However, in contrast, Dr. Whiteside identified two strategic dilemmas that the Islamic State faces. These include itslack of a master plan and most of its operations’ dependency on waiting for the right opportunity to strike. To conclude his remarks, Dr. Whiteside discussed the importance of understanding insurgency doctrine and how it influences the Islamic State’s strategy on three pillars: continual stabs, cumulative attrition, and consolidation/empowerment. Dr. Ingram continued the speaker session by discussing how the Islamic State’s simple strategic principles, operational approaches, and ideological concepts have evolved over time, both in concept and in practice. He argued that understanding these things is the best way to project assessments of the Islamic State into the future and that observing its history helps one develop nuanced understandings of its ideology that may aid these assessments. Dr. Ingram then provided three main ideas to take away from the presentation. He first argued that great power competition matters to the Islamic State, based on its rhetoric, how it thinks of global issues, and how it pursues its goals. Secondly, he suggested that anti-Islamic State efforts are complementary with great power competition when considering global partnerships and allied support. To conclude, Dr. Ingram argued that American leadership matters on the global stage with regards to maintaining pressure on the Islamic State and building global partnerships to counter its influence.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Péczeli first stated that the main role of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is for the current administration to assess the threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next five to ten years, and align the country’s nuclear forces accordingly. She elaborated that, depending on the time and which administration was in office, the threats and challenges of the time and the scope of the NPR differ. Furthermore, the NPR is only the “tip of the iceberg” regarding US nuclear guidance because it is the only substantive document that individuals can access in the unclassified domain; the actual employment guidelines and operational capabilities behind US nuclear guidance are classified and much more complex. Dr. Péczeli proceeded to provide a brief history of each NPR to date. President Clinton’s NPR in 1994 focused on deterrence requirements in a post-Cold War period. She stated that the main threats the US faced at the time were conventional threats from the former Soviet Union, as well as Russian nuclear weapons in other countries. Dr. Péczeli claimed that a large accomplishment from this NPR that holds significance today is the extension of the 1992 nuclear testing moratorium and navigation guidelines regarding how to maintain a nuclear arsenal without conducting underground tests. President Bush’s NPR from 2001 was similar to Clinton’s in that it focused on employment decisions and deterrence needs. However, Dr. Péczeli emphasized that Bush’s NPR included all the components of effective deterrence, including nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defense, and infrastructure. Because there was no longer a bipolar system of threats to the US, the growing spectrum of contingency plans and the importance of arms control became pillars of this NPR. President Obama’s NPR from 2010 was extremely transparent and a true interagency review, as it kept allies involved and willing to buy in. Obama navigated the balance between the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and maintaining a secure and effective nuclear arsenal. Dr. Péczeli suggested that this NPR also laid some of the framework for President Trump’s NPR, as the threats emerging relied on strategic stability with Russia and China, two countries in which the US is competing with in 2018. Next, Dr. Péczeli outlined some of the main similarities between the NPRs, including a testing moratorium, deciding against a “no first use” policy, and continuing investments in the modernization of nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure. She also identified some of the primary differences between these policies, including the difference in transparency and interagency involvement, the formal and informal approaches to arms control, and the strategic stability vs. competition declaratory policies. To conclude, Dr. Péczeli stated that as the security environment changes to face different challenges, there have been many different approaches and shifts of focus, but there has also been also a great degree of continuity on three levels: declaratory policy, force structure, and operational policy.