NSI Publications

South Asia II: NSI Pathway Indicators–Pakistan’s Future: Analysis of the Fragmentation and Muddling Through Hypotheses.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, Dr. Belinda Bragg, Danielle Brickman, Sarah Canna, Abigail  Desjardins, George Popp, Robert Popp, and Richard Williams (NSI, Inc).

This report supported SMA’s Geopolitical Stability in South Asia project. For additional information, please visit the South Asia project page.

This report explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical futures for the nation of Pakistan–Fragmentation and Muddling through. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along, the pathways, tested these against historical cases, refined our characterizations of the paths, and then applied these to look at Pakistan from today forward.

NSI’s contribution to the futures portion of the South Asia SMA Follow-on effort explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical Pakistani futures–national Fragmentation and Muddling. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along, the pathways, tested these against historical cases, refined our characterizations of the paths, and then applied these to look at Pakistan from today forward. At any point we might observe, in a state such as Pakistan, evidence consistent with any number of future pathways. For this reason, our approach was not to determine solely which path Pakistan is on, but where the balance of the evidence lies–which path may be dominant—and then search for indications and warnings (I&W) of what we should expect to see as further evidence of that path. The general paths provide a framework that easily could be applied to assess conditions in any state: for example, where Turkey is relative to a fragmentation outcome or whether Afghanistan is moving forward or slipping backward in political, economic, and social development.

NSI first defined and delineated the Fragmentation and Muddling pathways, and then identified a set of primary economic, social, and political markers drawing on empirical analysis and theoretical work. We then undertook a series of structured case studies to identify and distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions for each pathway and to identify the most likely temporal orderings along each path. This research provided us with a descriptive analysis of each of the pathways: their necessary antecedent conditions, catalyzing events that propelled movement down a pathway, markers associated with that pathway, and any buffers or barriers that acted as roadblocks to further progression toward a fragmentation or muddling outcome.

This report first presents the findings of our analysis of Pakistan’s current position on the fragmentation and muddling pathways. This includes indicators and warnings (I&W) of further movement along each pathway, both those that signal increasing instability and those that suggest a strengthening of state social and political institutions and conditions. The second section of the report provides greater detail regarding the definition of each of the pathways and their associated markers. The third section presents an overview of the findings from our structured case study analyses that informed the development of the final marker lists for each pathway. Detailed case study summaries and analysis are provided in the appendix to this report.

Summary of Results

Since Pakistan’s loss of East Pakistan (current day Bangladesh) in 1971, a number of Pakistan scholars and observers have warned of further fragmentation of the state. Causes cited range from internal social cleavages to a nefarious U.S. government plot to weaken Pakistan (Choussedovsky, 2012). A second school of thought, however, proposes that Pakistan’s future will be characterized by “Muddling through”—that is, achieving neither positive political, economic, and social growth nor complete failure in these areas. This report identifies indications and warning measures associated with these two potential future pathways for the state of Pakistan.

At any point we might observe, in a state such as Pakistan, evidence consistent with multiple future pathways. For this reason, our approach was not to determine which single path Pakistan might be on but to

1. use the data to suggest which might be the dominant path;
2. use the general path models to highlight key political, economic, and social “pathway markers” as indicators of movement along one path; and
3. provide suggestions of what conditions and events analysts should watch for in terms of further evidence of that path.

Below are summaries of the key findings of this study. The full pathway models and analyses of these in the case of Pakistan appear in the main body of this report.

Finding 1: Fragmentation

While most of the precipitating conditions are present, fragmentation of the Pakistani state is not imminent.

Nearly all of the antecedent conditions, necessary conditions, and important pathway markers for fragmentation are present in Pakistan today: state sovereignty contested violently by insurgent groups (e.g., in Balochistan, the FATA, and Kashmir); enduring disputes between geographically-associated social, ethnic, and economic groups; publically expressed conflict among elites in a country where political rivalries are numerous and intensely regional; and some public discontent over how the state is run. What explains Pakistan’s failure to fragment?

First, the absence of either a suitably catalyzing event or a willing external sponsor blocks the emergence of a single group with sufficient capacity to defeat the Pakistani state and break away successfully. Second, internal buffers— including institutional weaknesses at the provincial level that hinders attempts to devolve power and emerging signs of the Sharif government’s willingness to negotiate grievances with groups in FATA and Balochistan—serve as important buffers to fragmentation; however, most importantly, the external existential threat posed by India persists as a uniquely powerful and credible impetus for Pakistan’s disparate parts to remain united behind a common identity and narrative of victimization.

I&W for movement toward fragmentation

• A catalyzing event such as the 1970 cyclone in Bangladesh or publication of the Awami League’s Six-Point Program
• The appearance of a sponsor willing to provide the financial and/or security support to enable a group to break away from the central government (Pakistan’s status as a nuclear state may have raised the cost of this activity for neighboring states)
• The removal of buffers manifest for example in increased repression by the government; unwillingness to negotiate with disaffected groups; and normalized relations with India that weaken common narratives of Pakistani national identity and strengthen or incentivize regional identities

Finding 2: Muddling

Overall, the dominant trajectory of social and political development is slow decline (“Muddling Down”); although, there are signs that improvement is possible. Economically, the overall trajectory is flat (“Muddling through”) in large part due to the downward pull of political and social markers.

Political Markers: As of the date of this report (October 2013), data on political markers suggest that political development in Pakistan is on a downward path as nearly all of the key “Muddling Down” path markers—contested national sovereignty; weak and ineffective governing institutions; a weak and often biased justice system; uneven and insufficient internal revenue generation; contested civilian, military and judicial roles; limited provision of government services; and politics heavily influenced by corruption and patronage—are both present and substantial. Moreover, many of these path markers are quite well established at levels that presage continued deterioration. For example, Pakistan’s decades-long experience with weak governing institutions, biased justice, and uneven provision of services persistently weakens popular support for, and grants of, legitimacy to the government, which further weakens institutions and provision of services. In another example, fewer than one million Pakistanis (0.7% of the population) filed income taxes in 2001. At that time, the Taskforce on Tax Reform noted that “if taxes relative to GDP do not increase significantly, without new levies, Pakistan cannot be governed effectively, essential public services cannot be delivered, and high inflation cannot be avoided” (Taskforce on Reform of Tax Administration, 2001). However, tax revenues cannot be increased unless the tax base is increased or tax evasion is eliminated. More than ten years later, the government has failed to introduce general sales tax reform, raise energy prices, or reduce subsidies in the power sector, all of which would significantly increase government revenues (The World Bank, 2011).

I&W for further decline toward political instability

• Evidence that governing institutions are remaining weak and ineffective—such as increasing public criticism of and protest against the government and the call for better and/or more equitably distributed services such as energy and education—suggest that satisfaction with and loyalty to the government is receding leaves open space for radicalized political actors that would not necessarily seek liberalized and stable governance
• Strengthening of sub-national identities and/or alliances among insurgent, opposition, or grievance groups

I&W for reversal of the political “Muddling Down” trajectory

• Government efforts to apply rule of law fairly across all groups and significant reductions in human rights abuses by the state
• Consistent and adequate internal revenue generation and continued improvement in representation of minority views
• Resolution of internal sovereignty challenges

Economic Markers: Despite continued poor conditions and difficulties with economic planning and management, economically, Pakistan appears to be on the cusp between slow decline (“Muddling Down”) and a flat trajectory (“Muddling through”). Many of the markers common to economic “Muddling Down” pathways are present and significant in Pakistan. However, there are also important markers of slow but positive economic development (“Muddling Up”) to suggest an overall “Muddling through” trajectory. Even as several markers show continued deterioration over time or remain stagnant at detrimental levels, others show positive signs of improvement and buffers to complete economic failure appear to play a key role.

GDP growth appears to be on the decline, if somewhat unevenly. Real GDP growth has averaged only 3% over the last four years and has been on a volatile negative course since the early 1980s. Some growth spurts, like the one from 2004-2007, saw growth averages over 7%, but overall Pakistan’s economic growth has been insufficient, relative to its population growth (The IMF estimates that 7% GDP over an extended period is needed to absorb Pakistan’s nearly 2 million new labor market entrants each year IMF 2012). The result is high underemployment, unpaid employment, informal employment, and employment abroad: none of which maximize the productivity of Pakistan’s human capital.

Poor economic management, limited foreign investment, and a reliance on foreign aid/loans are also significant markers for Muddling Down in Pakistan.2 At the same time, Pakistan’s reliance on international aid has remained high and Pakistan ranks in the bottom third of 185 countries surveyed on ease of doing business there primarily due to its poor record on enforcing business regulations (World Bank, 2011). For example, Pakistan introduced a patent law in 2000, but does not have an effective system in place to prevent the issuance of marketing approvals for copies of patented pharmaceutical products. Pakistan authorities continue efforts to uphold intellectual property rights, but the country remains on the priority watch list of the U.S. Trade Representative (U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, 2013).

Despite the frequency of markers of a “Muddling Down” pathway, current economic conditions in Pakistan also include important markers of positive growth. For example, while insufficient energy resources hamper the economy, Pakistan boasts transportation infrastructure and irrigation systems adequate to support fundamental commerce in agriculture and manufacturing. The challenge is to maintain the infrastructure that exists and to expand these networks going forward. Pakistan also has relatively low unemployment rates, even if official numbers are artificially suppressed by sizable employment in the informal economy. Although Pakistan’s economy is not widely diverse, commodity prices for primary exports, like cotton, have grown. Continued improvements for these markers could help to reduce Pakistan’s reliance on foreign aid to balance its accounts. Finally, it is also encouraging to note that, even though inefficiencies of enforcement and management appear to be restricting the formal economy, Pakistan has sought to meet World Trade Organization expectations by creating appropriate regulations and policies that foster growth, making the prospects for future growth and

Muddling Up more favorable. To date, economic failure in Pakistan appears to have been buffered significantly by a thriving informal economy that provides access to jobs and alternative regulations or services that ensure supplemental productivity alongside the formal economy.

I&W for movement toward economic collapse

• Evidence showing that financial institutions continue to weaken
• Precipitous reduction or loss of alternative funding sources
• Continued government budget deficits
• Deterioration of transport, water, electricity infrastructure, and security, leading to capital flight and loss of foreign investment

I&W for movement toward economic development

• Diversification and growth in industrial production
• Reduced losses and business expenditures related to corruption
• Continued improvements in representation and governing legitimacy

Social Markers: The majority of the path markers for social disintegration are both present and significant in the case of Pakistan. Additionally, many of the markers show continued deterioration over time or remain stagnant at detrimental levels. However, unlike political and economic Muddling, Pakistan faces significant barriers to positive development (“Muddling Up”) in the social sphere. As of October 2013, only two of the path markers, but nearly all of the barriers commonly associated with positive societal development, are present in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s trajectory of socially “Muddling Down” is driven largely by its entrenched social divisions and high degree of cleavage between both religious and ethnic groups. For the most part, its provinces are distinct ethnic enclaves; its cities mirror the same divisions by neighborhood. Both Urdu and English are recognized as official languages, but Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi are all dominant languages in their respective provinces. In addition to the distinct ethnic makeup of the provinces, Pakistan has three semi-autonomous regions: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the disputed territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The FATA has no representation in the National Assembly and Kashmir resembles an area under martial law, with strict Pakistani government oversight and heavy military presence.

In light of these circumstances, violent political action and terrorism are common, particularly in the FATA and Balochistan, where the Pakistani Taliban and related groups espousing Islamic extremism and Baloch nationalist insurgents respectively have openly engaged in conflict with the Pakistani Army for more than five years. In both cases, the government is perceived as illegitimate for its inability to provide equal access to goods and services or proportional representation in decision-making. For example, Balochis have a long-standing grievance that their province provides 36% of Pakistan’s natural gas supply, yet piped gas is only available to four of Balochistan’s 28 districts (International Crisis Group, 2006). As the violence that characterizes these frontier areas is also present as a microcosm in urban areas, with Karachi being the prime example, organized criminal outfits such as D-Company and the Lyari gangs have taken advantage and also contribute to high crime rates in the cities.

With Punjabis, Sindhis, and Muhajirs holding the majority of political power nationally and operating exclusive patronage networks, Pashtuns and Balochis, among others, have played the part of the marginalized in Pakistani society either through institutionalized discrimination (biased justice and under-representation) or through relative deprivation (fewer resources allocated for development). According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI), between 1980 and 2012 Pakistan’s HDI rose by 1.3% annually from 0.337 to 0.515 today, which gives the country a rank of 146 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.357 in 1980 to 0.558 today, placing Pakistan below the regional average (UNDP, n.d.). Balochistan and the predominantly Pashtun province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) have the highest poverty rates based on the government’s most recent Socio-Economic Living Standard Measurement Survey (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2011).

In addition to these social cleavages and socio-economic inequalities, markers for out-group focused religious extremism and violence are also present in Pakistan. Various degrees of Islamic extremism in particular can be found across the FATA, Balochistan, Kashmir, and other areas of the country, influenced by wealthy Arab donors to seminaries and mosques or local sectarian leaders. Though a majority of Pakistanis adheres to the teachings of Sunni Islam, some Shi’a Islam and Christian communities also exist. Violent clashes between extremists in these sects are not uncommon.

Despite entrenched cleavages and widespread insecurity, there are some markers for social Muddling Up. Most notably, upward social mobility is significant and present. Pakistan’s middle class has experienced steady growth, signaling an increase in opportunity for many. Further, though overall poverty levels remain high, Pakistan has the inherent capacity to meet the basic needs of its population with more effective and efficient application of effort. Pakistan’s largest cities are also examples of relatively positive ethnic integration and present notional models for achieving more tolerance in peripheral areas.

As with political Muddling and Fragmentation, the most significant buffer to social disintegration or continued Muddling Down in Pakistan appears to be the perceived presence of an external threat, which creates a common national identity to trump religious, ethnic, or regional ones. In Pakistan, the common perceived external threat is most often India (Balochistan and Kashmir), but in certain social contexts (the FATA) may also be the United States, due to frequent drone strikes. Should the willingness of the current Sharif government to negotiate with Baloch nationalists and Islamic insurgents in the FATA lead to real dialogue and institutional action that addresses the grievances of those who see themselves as marginalized, ethnic cleavages may soften and perceived inequality or relative deprivation may subside, as well as give extremists less credibility. Mitigating or removing these kinds of barriers could be the first step towards socially Muddling Up in Pakistan.

I&W for movement toward social collapse

• Further institutionalization of discrimination or marginalization of particular groups
• Continued rise in crime and violent dispute resolution

I&W for movement toward social development

• Expansion of social norm barring out-group focused violence
• Major social groups no longer perceive marginalization or discrimination and have equal access to public goods
• Safe and relatively secure environment, low crime
• Sustained economic growth

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7th Annual SMA Conference: Over a Decade into the 21st Century…What Now? What Next?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. & Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The 7th Annual Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Conference was held at Joint Base Andrews from 13-14 November 2013. The conference was focused on global megatrends and their implications in all spheres of national security. It is no exaggeration to state that the world today is a very different place than it was barely 12 years ago when the war against al Qaida and its affiliates began. As we move forward, continuing advances in various spheres such as the sociotechnical world will present both challenges and opportunities. The conference examined these and related themes and highlighted new insights from the social and neurosciences.

As in previous years, the conference addressed the needs of the Geographical Commands. Representatives from the Commands discussed their pressing needs and key operational requirements so that SMA’s wide network of experts could assist in identifying capabilities that match these needs.

Findings from Panel Discussions

Guest speaker Brig. Gen. David B. Béen, Deputy Director, Special Actions and Operations, J-3, spoke about the unique ability of SMA to bring together representatives from a diverse community—including from the DOD, academia, industry, media, etc.—to address core requirements of the Combatant Commands (COCOMS). This community can help the DOD succeed in its main duties: 1) being mindful of future threats to the United States and 2) exploiting emerging opportunities to make the world a more stable place. The DOD has a responsibility to engage in rigorous analysis, informed debate, and top-flight research with partners. Members of the SMA support community also bear certain responsibility to build relationships, learn more about operational needs, and apply their considerable talent to help operators achieve mission success.

Guest speaker Mr. Earl Wyatt, Rapid Fielding Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, spoke about the need to bring various resources from across the government, industry, and academia to bear on DOD’s objectives. The force of the future will be leaner, more agile, more flexible, and technologically advanced. While U.S. forces will be called on to do more with less, this is not a down time for innovation; it is a challenge to do more with less. The DOD will be particularly challenged to engage in innovative thinking to mitigate threats in nonkinetic ways. Partner capacity will be key to this conversation. The DOD is moving toward a more balanced prototyping portfolio to include developmental as well as operational prototyping to provide a hedge against technical uncertainty or unanticipated threats; enhance interoperability and reduce lifecycle costs; and explore the realm of the possible without commitment of follow-on procurement.

Guest speaker Mr. Ben Riley, Rapid Fielding Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, spoke about the value SMA provides to the DOD by bringing together a diverse group of academic and technical perspectives on difficult problems. However, the DOD still needs to open its aperture more widely to encounter new ideas and perspectives. In a time of resource constraint, there is a tendency to circle the wagons around traditional defense programs, but it is important to continue to engage in rigorous, innovative, and unexpected thinking to meet the commanders’ needs.

Keynote speaker, LTG Michael Flynn, Director, DIA, spoke about accelerating change in the defense intelligence community. The two big challenges facing the defense intelligence community are skyrocketing demand and resource reduction. In order to meet the two challenges, the DIA needs to restructure and adapt. The DIA needs a new model to prepare the foundation that provides U.S. forces with agility, flexibility, and resiliency. The USG must be prepared for unknown, highly complex, uncertain environments. One failure of the last decade has been our limited ability to understand the operational environment, which led to mismatch in resources and capabilities. This failure needs correction in order to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

Panel One discussed the use of religious engagement by the United States to improve global prospects for peace. It is important that the USG engages the full realm of social actors when trying to understand operational environments. Within this group, religious leaders are some of the most influential actors—specifically in Muslim communities. In many cases, religious leaders are more credible than the highest-ranking political officials in that community are. U.S. organizations like the Special Envoy to the OIC have committed to religious engagement in areas including healthcare, maternal health campaigns, religious freedoms, and countering violent extremism. The panel agreed that the commitment by the United States to continued religious engagement in these areas and beyond is crucial. Furthermore, the United States must ensure that its religious engagement efforts are viewed as legitimate by the local communities in the places where the religious engagement is taking place.

Panel Two discussed four significant megatrends likely to emerge in the next decade: demographic change, resource stress, further diffusion of power, and individual empowerment. There are two particularly relevant projections that support the diffusion of power megatrend: 1) by 2030, Asia will have surpassed the United States and Europe in power and size while Europe, Japan, and Russia continue to decline, and 2) by 2030, the international system will transition from hegemony to multi-polarity. With regard to the resource stress megatrend, competition and scarcity involving natural resources are emerging as security threats for the United States and its allies. U.S. allies are particularly vulnerable to natural resource shock. The perfect storm involves youth bulge, unemployment, ability to organization through information technology, and a food shock. Furthermore, the convergence of multiple trends means individuals and groups are angrier and more dangerous. With regard to demographics, the most relevant finding for the USG is that the ratio between young adults and older adults in some of the world’s most unstable regions is declining, which statistically suggests greater stability and democracy in the coming decades. However, some of the countries that the USG is, or has been, most involved in still have high fertility rates and very youthful populations.

Panel Three examined the current era and why it is special. First, it has produced an increasing number of mega-issues. Mega-issues are not simply larger public policy issues; they are significantly different from issues of the past. There are two primary mega-issues facing the current era: mega-disasters and megacities. The mega-issues of today are challenging because the currently existing policy is not designed to deal with this magnitude of challenge. Furthermore, other issues facing the current era—such as under-development, ethnic diversity, regime stability, etc.—can only be addressed through collective action and a global perspective. However, this is quite difficult because many of these issues are viewed differently throughout the world. Finally, it is important to be careful when trying to compare different eras in different times. Analysts today are likely biased in thinking that the current era is unique because they are living in it. This era may be unique, but it is not

Panel Four reviewed the role of social sciences in national security as well as validation and validity concepts. Understanding and utilization of social sciences is critical for DOD operations in the 21st century. Social science uses theory to understand intentions and to explain causal links between actions and outcomes. We need an entire spectrum of social science disciplines (economics, sociology, communications, history, etc.) to understand complex problems. From an operational viewpoint, a set of validated social science theories are a good foundation for building a framework capable of informing decision-making. However, social science theories are often not validated for specific military decision- making processes. Thus, it is dangerous for operators to treat a discipline’s theories as fact without first consulting with scientists familiar with the limits of those theories. There is a mismatch between the defense and social science culture. One necessary way to bridge the divide is to train and develop a cadre of military social scientists.

The Feedback from Commands Panel provided an opportunity for representatives from the commands to discuss their pressing needs and key operational requirements. First, all of the commands emphasized the need for greater cooperation within the DOD as well as the whole of government. Building relationships with non-traditional and non-government entities, like those attending the SMA conference today, are increasingly important in a resource constrained environment. USNORTHCOM identified countering threat networks as its primary operational focus. Therefore, it is imperative for DOD to invest in interagency collaboration and provide support to law enforcement partners in combating transnational organized crime. This will provide for a better understanding complex, transdimensional networks. PACOM has the most diverse portfolio of all of the COCOMs; therefore, its requirements range from nuclear deterrence, counterterrorism, geo-political stability, transnational crime, natural disaster response, cyber security, and human trafficking. PACOM’s chief objective is to stay in steady state operations while strengthening relationships with countries in its area of responsibility (AOR). AFRICOM faces multiple challenges as well including terrorism, weak governance, natural resource management, illicit trafficking, humanitarian assistance, training, border security, maritime security, and defense institution building. AFRICOM relies on soft levers of power to address many of these issues. CENTCOM is facing new threats (threat financing, supporting rule of law, etc.) that traditional military forces have not had to face. These threats require a multi-layered solution that relies on cooperation, liaison, and engagement with non-traditional partners. SOCOM’s challenges include an uncertain future, volatile trends, redistribution of power, and the increasing role of non-state actors (NSAs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Other threatening trends include youth bulges, shifting demographics, and urbanization. Globalization and accelerated change place pressure of the system making the scale of the problem worse. SOCOM will meet its challenges by strengthening its global soft power network. This means increasing the capacity of allies, partners, and the interagency community to respond to the world’s problems. SOUTHCOM’s mission sets include counternarcotics trafficking, counter TCO, and disaster response. SOUTHCOM has always operated with resource constraints. It has developed strong interagency partnerships to compensate.

Panel Five discussed the “new” face of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The continually evolving strategic environment, coupled with the ascendant role of TCOs, necessitates a comprehensive understanding of these organizations. TCOs represent a globally networked national security threat and pose a real and present risk to the safety and security of Americans and their partners across the globe. The TCOs of today are profit driven organizations. One of the key challenges in combatting TCOs is to identify the illicit networks and finance organizations that are the oxygen of a TCO. TCOs are sophisticated organizations that are constantly evolving and trying to combat them is becoming more difficult. Often times, legislation does not keep up with the sophistication and evolution of these TCOs and their tactics. It is imperative that legislation continues to evolve as the TCOs become more sophisticated. Furthermore, when combatting TCOs, it is essential that a collaboration effort exist between the defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and other interagency partners. The United States must continue to build the capacity and capabilities of its partners and the interagency community in combatting the TCO threat.

Invited speaker Brig Gen Timothy Fay, JS/J33, noted that during the Feedback from COCOMs panel, none of the representatives mentioned nuclear deterrence, yet it is one area where the DOD needs SMA’s help. One of the biggest challenges of nuclear deterrence is the lack of articulate, informed, rigorous discussion and research. For example, little effort has been applied to understanding the illicit networks that built many of today’s nuclear programs such as that of Pakistan and North Korea. Urban legends—such as that the United States no longer needs or uses its nuclear arsenal—continue to drive the debate. Strategic weapons are made for deterrence, not deployment. We use these weapons every day. They are effective and a part of our adversary’s decision calculus. Another challenge facing the DOD today is how to further adapt policy and strategy in alignment with a smaller arsenal and a more uncertain world environment. SMA has done some great work to contribute to this conversation, but there is a lot more that needs to be done.

Panel Six discussed the sociotechnical world and its new era of disruption and opportunities for innovation. The rapid and continual coevolution of the social and technological sectors is creating a globally pervasive sociotechnical ecosystem. The current security problems facing the United States are social change problems. As a result, it is crucial to understand the full social realm—narratives, networks, interests, identities, vocabularies, desires, and disgusts. Cultural dynamics drive the evolution of technologies as much as the actual technological problem. Connectedness is a new dynamic that is crucial and underpins the current era. Connectedness is what makes mega-issues and mega-events possible. When talking about the framing of problems on a global scale, it is the awareness of the problem that makes it mega, and connectedness increases overall awareness. The operational environment is constantly evolving. The question becomes, how does the United States operate in this changing environment, and what does this change mean for stability? Stability needs to be defined as the ability to adapt to a changing situation. The new status quo is that there is no status quo.

Invited speaker, Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, spoke about the intersection of national security and universal principles. He argued that universal principles do not exist; context matters. Some saying the admonition not to kill is a universal principle, but killing to defend oneself is permissible. He further argued that the assumption that rationality guides decision-making is also flawed; man can reason his way through anything. Instead, people rely on hinge beliefs—practices that define a culture. Not knowing or understanding a partner’s or adversary’s hinge beliefs puts one at a disadvantage from the beginning. The search for universal principles is debilitating to our ability to come up with a coherent national security strategy.

Panel Seven examined the importance of understanding megacities in the 21st century. Megacities are rapidly growing and changing population centers where urbanization often far outstrips the ability of governments to enforce rule of law and provide basic socio- economic services such as clean water, sanitation, etc. As a consequence of these deficiencies, these densely populated urban areas can become spawning grounds for public resentment, criminal activity, and political radicalization, which is a national security concern for U.S. policymakers. Understanding megacities is crucial. Urban areas are the key terrain of the future. Developing world megacities thus far have been surprisingly resilient, but the potential for a natural disaster or threat to sovereignty from a non-state actor loom. Megacities are new phenomena and must be understood for future U.S. defense and diplomacy actions. A significant challenge to understanding megacities is the sheer amount of data that is involved in the process of understanding, making interagency collaboration and information sharing key. A method for making sense of all of this data and visualizing it clearly needs to be created. There is a need for a planning support framework for understanding megacities—a model that marries the benefits of rigorous critical thinking with the applied setting in which planners and operators work. A method needs to be developed for fusing these two aspects together to produce a more holistic understanding of megacities.

Panel Eight explored long- and short-term regional and sub-regional stability in South Asia and the Western Pacific region. Panelists argued that the division of South Asia into two COCOM AORs makes it difficult for analysts and planners to address transboundary concerns. Furthermore, analysis must take place at the regional or sub-regional level. India is a rising power, but it is cautious not to be seen as a counterbalance to China. India wants regional balance, participation in the region’s strategic dialogue, and translation of dialogue into actual cooperation. Countries in Asia are concerned about what the future presence of the USG in the region will be given budgetary constraints and China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. Countries in Asia will still look to the United States for security, but they will also begin diversifying.

Panel Nine discussed neuroscience and its implications for national security operations. The Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative is a new research effort started by President Obama to revolutionize the understanding of the human brain by accelerating the development and application of innovative technologies. Approximately $100 million will be invested for scientific research during FY 2014 as part of the BRAIN initiative, which will be led by the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The study of the brain is important because it is the wellspring of human behavior. In the national security domain, especially, there should be an interest in understanding the brain because it is part of the ecology that drives human behavior that is important to national security. Neuroscience allows us to access and engage the brain. This insight into the brain is beneficial for the healthcare, public life, global relations, and public defense realms. It is clear that neuroscience represents a viable science and technology pursuit for the next 10 to 20 years. Areas for growth that need to be developed over this timeframe with respect to understanding the brain include improving the understanding of how the brain recognizes problems, influences culture, and functions in groups.

In conclusion, LTC Matthew Yandura thanked the panelists, moderators, and conference attendees for another successful SMA annual conference. He encouraged participants to build on relationships formed during this conference. There has to be value in relationships or conferences like this go away. The military community should remember that they are not just recipients of this scholarship and research; they are part of the community in service of this nation.

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Over a Decade Later…What Now? What Next? A Multi-Layer Assessment of Terrorism in its Current and Future Manifestation

Author | Editor: Cabayan, H. (Joint Staff), Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc), Yandura, M., Sitterle, V. (Georgia Tech), Canna, S. & Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

This report marries contemporary social science theory, applied research, and operational experience to provide a range of perspectives on terrorism to challenge the reader to ask better, more relevant questions.

This white paper is a follow-on report to a recent publication entitled “Over a Decade Later…What Now? What Next? A Multi-Layer Assessment of Terrorism in its Current and Future Manifestation.” 2 The previous paper was primarily an analytical product intended to provide insight into what current social science research and over a decade of practical experience suggest regarding the most effective counterterror strategies. It was based on comments made during multiple, semi-structured telephone interview sessions conducted between 06 May and 12 June 2013. The current white paper includes a series of articles by authors who participated in the previous white paper. These articles expand on the main themes raised in the previous report and cover topics ranging from strategic and adaptive considerations of terrorism to analytical considerations.

The various contributors to this volume advance insights that are summarized below:

1. There is a body of research relating the strategic application of systems thinking, complexity theory, and complex adaptive systems theory to strategic planning in business and a variety of organizational constructs. These have implications in the deliberate planning of regional and global strategies and, critically, to our current counterterrorism strategy.
2. We frequently seek clarity by way of attributing political or particular ideological reasons and affiliations behind terror acts when such attribution is really viewing the present and future through the lens of the past. Looking forward, real resilience requires having a narrative of our own that projects a purpose beyond responding to adversity. Furthermore, we will continue to be perplexed by the enemy in our counterterrorism strategy as long as we are unclear as to our own purpose and direction.
3. The convergence of rapidly advancing scientific sectors (biotech, nanotech, energy, materials, etc.) combined with the availability of CBCT (Cyber-Based Communication Technology) could produce an entirely new generation of threat capabilities. The evolving socio-technical ecosystem is transforming temporal and spatial characteristics from individual to trans-State behaviors, simultaneously creating new paradigms for emergence and support of terror activities on a global scale.
4. As terrorism adapts to the market place, we need to move from “terrorist” towards an understanding of market entry and risk mitigation. The “cost” of terror and of counterterror activities is an increasingly important perspective. Turning the lens on ourselves, we need to ask what it will take to compete, to grow, and to expand our own market share, and re-establish our national identity as a global consumer brand of choice.
5. There is a need for much better psychosocial intelligence on foreign public opinion regarding key issues. Open-source intelligence can be used to provide such intelligence for counterterrorism. Findings from on-going efforts highlight the importance of testing theories and hypotheses about the bases of terrorism and political violence with statistical data on people’s attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, and other characteristics.
6. Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) of activist, militant, and terrorist groups has demonstrated the usefulness of such analyses to assess groups’ acceptance of, and proneness to, violence. An approach based on this concept and using measures of integrative cognitive complexity from discourse analysis has been operationalized and proven successful for primary prevention. Efforts are underway for deploying this capability on the Internet.
7. Lone-actor terrorists have been relatively rare thus far. They may, however, exhibit personality and social traits that would support a useful profile, unlike group-based terrorists who vary in a myriad of ways. Recent research suggests two possible profiles of lone-actor terrorists: the disconnected-disordered and caring-compelled profiles.
8. Similarly, there is presently no empirically based psychological or demographic profile of individuals that perpetrate terrorist acts indicating a predisposition toward joining violent extremist organizations. Based on what limited empirical evidence is available, however, a set of individual psychological risk factors for individual radicalization may be proposed. While more study is needed before these may be established as firm indicators, these individual-level attributes may provide a starting point toward profiling individual willingness to participate in or perpetrate political violence.
9. There are a myriad of theories and frameworks to explain why and how individuals may radicalize to violence, and many shortcomings remain that limit the validity and generalizability of the findings. Advances in qualitative methodologies offer a framework for improving the understanding of the complexity inherent in the phenomena of radicalization and non- radicalization. Improved understanding of the multiple potential pathways into radicalism and terrorism should lead to better-tailored CVE (countering violent extremism) policies that are more effective and efficient.
10. There is a need to build teams—Joint and Interagency (and community) partners—to understand the information that comes from complex environments in order to organize counterterror practices in ways that inform and influence the behavior of friends and adversaries.

Brief Topic Overviews

Rethinking Counterterrorism: The Need for Systemic Strategic Planning and a Strategic Campaign to Address Violent Islamist Extremism that Manifests Itself in Terrorist Acts–CAPT Wayne Porter (NPS): There is a body of research related to strategic planning in an uncertain and dynamic environment. This research includes, among other topics, analyses of the strategic planning and thinking process, organizations and strategic change, multi-national corporation strategic planning in times of turbulence and uncertainty, backcasting for strategic planning of sustainable development, cognitive biases on strategic planning, and sensemaking in the boundaries of stability and instability, order and chaos. Further research is needed, though, in analyzing the potential benefit of employing methods of system thinking and complexity in the deliberate planning of regional and global strategies. Critically, this applies to our current counterterrorism strategy and the phenomenon of ideologically based violent extremism. While this paper focuses primarily on radical Islamist extremism, the concepts discussed apply equally to any ideologically based extremist network seeking to employ terrorism.

War on Terror or a Search for Meaning?—Dr. Bill Durodié, Professor & Program Head, Conflict Analysis & Management Programs, School of Humanitarian Studies, Royal Roads University: The events of 9/11 necessitated a response. What shape that took was determined by the meaning attributed to those events, in its turn influenced by the mood of the times. Unfortunately, these latter elements reflected the sense of confusion that gripped the West in the aftermath of the Cold War. This paper argues that we will continue to be perplexed by the enemy in the war on terror so long as we are unclear as to our own purpose and direction. Indeed, the perpetrators of such acts today appear more influenced by Western dystopianism than Eastern mysticism. Real resilience requires having a narrative of our own that projects a purpose beyond responding to adversity.

Technology, Society, and the Adaptive Nature of Terrorism: Implications for Counterterror–Dr. Valerie Sitterle (Georgia Tech), Dr. Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez (NPS), Maj David Blair (Harvard University): As technology continues to advance and increasingly permeate society, generating violence that makes a societal group feel vulnerable is not difficult. Generating the desired interpretation of that violence is hard, however, and is critical to the coupling we need between future U.S. counterterrorism (CT) and information operations (IO) strategy. This latter space, with all of its socio-technical nuances, is where threats we classify as “terrorists” have excelled. This paper will begin by explaining the nature and importance of socio-technical complexity and its relevance to terroristic adaptation. A true socio- technical confluence perspective, distinct from the traditional view that treats the dimensions as distinct elements that happen to coexist, promotes awareness of active and passive influences that exist bi- directionally between the social and technological elements. The cyber realm then becomes both a means through which terroristic attacks are conducted or directly targeted and an ecosystem. In this latter view, individual and community (up to state and even trans-state) patterns of organization are transformed via completely new paradigms across temporal and spatial scales of communication and information sharing across societal sectors. This has significant ramifications for emergence of terror cells, their coordination, and passive support of their activities in a global scale. Behavior of terror cells in this complex environment may be more intuitively understood from an entrepreneurial business model analogy, which naturally expands into a consideration of the multiple dimensions associated with both conducting terror and striving to build protective measures against it. Since adaptation is a hallmark of living systems, the U.S. cannot stifle innovative advances by a terroristic adversary through reliance on a static U.S. counterterror strategy. Rather, the U.S. must lead disruptive innovation in order to drive strategic surprise and strain the capacity of these threat groups to adapt.

Market Economies and the Collision of Narratives…Approaching Terrorism Through Branding and Marketing Methodologies–Mr. Scott Kesterson, Asymmetric Warfare Group: Terrorism has become a global franchised business, and, in terms of brands, al-Qa’ida (AQ) is king. Their brand has come to guarantee global positioning, brand name recognition, easy recruiting, as well as abundant financial resourcing. With the loss of Osama bin Laden, however, al-Qa’ida’s brand supremacy is now vulnerable to new tiers of competition; their brand that could have been characterized by adaptability, innovation, and persistence has suffered a loss of consumer confidence. As terrorism adapts to the market place, our conversations need to move from “terrorist” towards an understanding of market entry, branding, and risk mitigation. What are the market factors that create brand durability for terrorism? What are the value propositions that these markets are responding to? What are the market elements that allow for growth and the ability to franchise? Turning the lens on ourselves, we then need to ask what it will take to compete, to grow, and to expand our own market share and re-establish our national identity as a global consumer brand of choice.

Counterterrorism and Muslim Public Opinion–Dr. David R. Mandel (DRDC Toronto): A widely shared view is that counterterrorism must address the psychosocial and cultural aspects of Islamic violent extremism if it is to succeed strategically. Another is that we need much better psychosocial intelligence (what might be called PSYINT) on Muslim public opinion regarding key issues. In this paper, the author draws on open source polling data collected from large numbers of Muslim citizens in multiple predominantly Muslim states, as well as in Israel and the Palestinian territories, over multiple post-9/11 years in order to assess the current counterterrorism climate and anticipate its future. Original analysis of polling data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project was conducted for the 2011 calendar year. The analytic exercise illustrates how open source intelligence (OSINT) can be used to provide PSYINT for counterterrorism. The findings, many of which were counterintuitive, highlight the importance of testing theories and hypotheses about the bases of terrorism and political violence with statistical data on people’s attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, and other characteristics. The exercise also underscores how much work could be done with the available data. The present report merely illustrates some types of analyses that could be conducted in the service of improving defense and security through behavioral science.

Can Thematic Content Analysis Separate the Pyramid of Ideas from the Pyramid of Action? A Comparison Among Different Degrees of Commitment to Violence–Dr. Peter Suedfeld, Mr. Ryan W. Cross, and Mr. Carson Logan (The University of British Columbia): The publicly accessible messages of 15 extremist groups were coded by Thematic Content Analysis (TCA). Orientations toward violence included activist, militant, and terrorist groups; their goals derived from animal rights, Islamist, territorial, or white supremacist ideologies. TCA is a set of scientifically rigorous methods for converting running text into quantitative data, analyzable by standard statistics. A measure of cognitive integrative complexity (IC) showed significant declines across groups as they increased in their acceptance of violence, higher power imagery for terrorist compared to the other groups, and high importance among terrorists on the values of self-direction (autonomy), character (virtue, sincerity, honor), and benevolence (caring for those close to oneself). The results demonstrate the usefulness of IC coding to assess groups’ acceptance of, and proneness to, violence.

Prevention of Violent Extremism Based on Promoting Value Complexity, Informed by Neuroscience and Deployed on the Internet–Drs. Sara Savage and Jose Liht (University of Cambridge, UK): Researchers in counterterrorism are in a knowledge arms race that seeks to utilize the internet as a site for engaging with extremism and to harness neuroscience to inform counterterrorism strategies that can be deployed on-line. An approach to broad-based primary prevention that operationalizes Dr. Peter Suedfeld’s construct of integrative complexity (IC), developed by Savage & Liht at the University of Cambridge, leverages value complexity as a means to increase the complexity of thinking about issues of potential cleavage between Muslim and British/western identities. The IC model shows significant empirical results (using integrative complexity and values coding) across three different cultural groups exposed to AQ-related extremism, intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts, respectively. The IC approach is suitable for deploying on the Internet. Integrative complexity has two aspects: differentiation and integration. Differentiation regarding issues exploited by extremists will be supported through a range of balanced, even-handed film clips of influential Muslim viewpoints linked with vetted websites covering viewpoints such as: a) Caliphate, b) Conservative/Salafi, c) Muslim Engaged with the West, and d) Hardline/extremist views. This approach relativizes extremist opinion without provoking reactance. Graphic and video game learning activities will help users to ‘ladder down’ to the values that underlie the different viewpoints so that participants learn to find trade-offs between values in conflict and larger integrative frameworks, thus leveraging the complexity with which they think about issues that radicalisers exploit. This develops pro-social conflict skills and neutralizes the mobilizing impact of extremist opinion. The paper concludes with a research design to neuro-image the impact of the IC approach when operationalised on-line. This neuroscience research will augment the significant cognitive and social psychological data already supporting the IC approach. A project to develop an on-line version of the IC model Being Muslim Being British is planned in the UK.

Lone-actor Terrorists: Two Possible Profiles–Drs. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (Bryn Mawr College): Research has shown that group-based terrorists vary in many ways; there is no useful profile of group-based terrorists. Lone-actor terrorists are relatively rare but may have personality and social characteristics that would support a useful profile. This paper will review recent research to suggest two possible profiles of lone-actor terrorists: the disconnected-disordered profile and the caring-compelled profile.

Psychological Risk Factors of Terrorism–Maj. Jason Spitaletta (Johns Hopkins University):
Counterterrorism is not necessarily about combating a phenomenon or its’ tactical manifestation, rather it is countering those who perpetrate the associated acts. There is no empirically based psychological or demographic profile of such a person that would indicate a predisposition toward joining violent extremist organizations. There are, however, environmental, social, and individual characteristics whose presence may increase the likelihood of participating in an act of terrorism. What follows are a proposed set of individual psychological risk factors for individual radicalization. The behaviors or attributes described merely point to a possible increase in the willingness to participate in or actual perpetration of political violence. While derived from the limited available empirical evidence, additional research is still required to validate these risk factors and ultimately establish them as indicators and warnings of terrorist behavior.

Leveraging Advances in Qualitative Methodology to Analyze Radicalization: Dr. Peter S. Henne, Mr. Jonathan Kennedy, Dr. John P. Sawyer, and Mr. Gary A. Ackerman (DHS/START Consortium/University of Maryland): The dearth of scholarly work on radicalization at the turn of the century has been replaced with a plethora of frameworks and theories to explain why and how individuals radicalize to extremist violence. This dizzying menu of explanations often makes it difficult for scholars and policymakers to assess how the many hypothesized causes across various levels of analysis interact with each other to produce a wide range of radicalization outcomes. Worse yet, the inferential power, and thus the policy applicability, of these studies are severely limited by the failure to identify and study the proper population of “negative cases.” Fortunately, there have been a number of qualitative methodological advances that can be used to bring greater structure to our understanding of radicalization. Specifically, this paper explores how the use of typological theories, two-level concepts, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and the possibility principle can serve as the starting point for integrating extant knowledge about radicalization and serve as a conceptual “first-step” to organize theories and evidence in preparation for a quantitative study.

Mechanics of the Toolbox: CVE Practice and Inform & Influence Activities–Mr. Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool, Tactical Decision-making Research Group): Public and practitioner discourse on countering violent extremism (CVE) speaks of “countering ideology” without providing the specific mechanics of how such a process would work. This article demonstrates how that is best achieved in a manner that respects the various mandates in which both the state and “other” cultural constructs interact with one another. As one definition of Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) has it, the Commander is to build teams—Joint and Interagency (and community) partners—to understand the information that comes from complex environments in order to influence the behavior of friends and adversaries.

Contributing Authors

Mr. Gary Ackerman (DHS/START Consortium, University of Maryland); Brig Gen David Béen (Deputy Director for Global Operations, J39); Maj David Blair (Harvard University); Mr. Ryan Cross (University of British Columbia); Dr. Bill Durodié (Royal Roads University); LTG Mike Flynn (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency); Dr. Peter Henne (DHS/START Consortium, University of Maryland); Mr. Jonathan Kennedy (DHS/START Consortium, University of Maryland); Mr. Scott Kesterson (Asymmetric Warfare Group); Dr. Jose Liht (University of Cambridge, UK); Mr. Carson Logan (University of British Columbia); Dr. David Mandel (DRDC Toronto); Dr. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr College); Dr. Sophia Moskalenko (Bryn Mawr College); Dr. Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez (Naval Postgraduate School); CAPT Wayne Porter (Naval Postgraduate School); Dr. Sara Savage (ICthinking® Research Group); Dr. John Sawyer (DHS/START Consortium, University of Maryland); Mr. Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool); Dr. Valerie Sitterle (Georgia Tech); Maj. Jason Spitaletta (Johns Hopkins University); Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia)

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South Asia Stability Assessment Academic Consortium.

Author | Editor: Popp, G., Canna, S. & St. Claire, C. (NSI, Inc).

This report supported SMA’s Geopolitical Stability in South Asia project. For additional information, please visit the South Asia project page.

The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) office provides planning support to the Combatant Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi- disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across the United States Government (USG) and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD (R&E)/RFD/RRTO.

The Minerva Research Initiative is a university-based research program which aims to provide deeper understanding of the social and cultural forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S. Started by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to foster stronger connections between the Department of Defense and the academic social science community, its core is fundamental research, driven by some of the Nation’s leading political and social scientists, to understand sources of present and future conflict. An increasingly important secondary role of the Minerva program is more short term: not to focus funded basic research on solving applied problems, but to connect decision makers to talented pools of academics whose research has given them relevant subject matter expertise.

Over the last several months, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) and Minerva Research Initiative worked to convene an Academic Consortium to complement the South Asia Stability project. The objective of the project is to develop options for promoting geopolitical stability in South Asia in light of continuing regional rivalries, the eventual withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from Afghanistan, and the preponderance of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the region. Deterrence of multiple, possible crisis scenarios is a central aspect of the effort. Members of the Consortium contribute knowledge and expertise either via short papers on topics of concern to the operational community or via webinars in support of the SMA office. The analyses of the effects of potential U.S. actions and associated risk assessments produced by this effort are intended to assist and inform USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, and JS planners/operators and others interested in stability and instability factors in South Asia.

The Consortium presentations reported in this document were geared toward the Approaches to Countering Instability component of the larger South Asia effort that explored the internal and external sources of stability and instability as well as options for mitigating negative trends. In addition to their value as stand-along pieces, consortium insights were used as inputs to a number of the South Asia Stability project’s sub-tasks including a Stability Risk Assessment event conducted by Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) with input from Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL), as well as the Pakistan Stability Model (PAK-StaM) analyses of the main economic, social, and political drivers of stability and instability in Pakistan.

Executive Summary

The Academic Consortium webinars were held in August 2012 on behalf of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) South Asia Stability project. The effort seeks to elicit knowledge about topics of interest to the operational community in support of the SMA South Asia Stability project. Academic Consortium presenters include Dr. Joseph Nye, Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Dr. Martha Crenshaw, and Dr. Jocelyne Cesari.

Joseph Nye

Dr. Joseph Nye is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former Dean of the Kennedy School and is a member of the Aspen Institute’s U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue1 group. He spoke to members of the SMA team via teleconference on 15 October 2012.

Dr. Nye’s discussion focused on strategic stability in South Asia given regional economic decline, the drawdown of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, shifting demographics in Pakistan, and the growing size and decentralization of the Pakistan nuclear stockpile. His points are briefly summarized below.

• ?The main concern in South Asia is no longer Pakistan’s relationship with India or any other external actor, but the future of the Pakistani state and society itself. Not only has Pakistan’s government and economy declined over recent years, the population is moving from a relatively pluralistic, Sufi-oriented society with a strong secular element to a more extreme, Salafi-oriented society.
• ?These changes give rise to new concerns about Pakistan’s ability to maintain control of its growing, increasingly decentralized nuclear weapons program.
• ?The drawdown of ISAF forces in Afghanistan will have some effect on the strategic balance in South Asia, but it is not clear whether Pakistan, India, China, or even Iran will attempt to fill in the power vacuum.
• ?Slow economic growth in India is troublesome for regional stability. The question of how to get economic growth in India back to 8-9 percent and keep it there is critical to India’s, and the region’s, stability.

Sumit Ganguly

Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University, presented a talk on the prospects of stability in South Asia on 9 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project’s Academic Consortium.

Dr. Ganguly’s presentation on the prospects of stability in South Asia focused on systemic, national, and decision-making factors and their likely impact on regional stability in South Asia. Among other matters, Dr. Ganguly discussed the impending U.S. drawdown of forces in Afghanistan; the growth and possible assertion of Chinese military power; political developments within India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and leadership challenges in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Dr. Ganguly concluded with a discussion of the implications of these developments for U.S. policy toward the region. Key findings from Dr. Ganguly’s presentation are listed below.

• The implications of the United States drawdown in Afghanistan and a greater assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China in the Indian Ocean will be the two most important systemic factors impinging on regional security in South Asia in the foreseeable future.
• There are a number of national-level factors throughout South Asia that will have an important impact on regional stability. These national factors include the future of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations, Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, India’s quest for ballistic missile defense, the plight of the Rohingya minority in Burma (Myanmar), the resurgence of Hindu- Muslim discord in India, and the resurrection of the Maoist movement throughout India.
• There are four potential leadership factors in South Asia that could have important consequences for stability in the region. These leadership factors include the looming transition of leadership in Bangladesh, the major challenges for Pakistani President Zardari in Pakistan, the shaky status of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in Nepal, and the uncertain prospects of the coalition regime in India.
• To assist in preventing instability in South Asia, United States policy must take serious consideration into how the U.S. carries out its withdrawal from Afghanistan and must also ensure that the government of India does not neglect the critical policy choices of its future.

Kanishkan Sathasivam

Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Salem State University, presented a talk entitled, “Does Pakistan Have a Foreign Policy?” on 13 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project’s Academic Consortium.

Dr. Sathasivam’s presentation argued that in the post-9/11 regional strategic context, Pakistan does not have an identifiable, coherent foreign policy or foreign policy-making framework. Pakistan’s current foreign policy essentially consists of a series of ad hoc policy decisions that have been reactive to regional strategic conditions and events. Furthermore, given its inability to generate a contemporary foreign policy-making framework, Pakistan has fallen back on its perceived historic grievances as the fundamental basis for these ad hoc foreign policy decisions.

Martha Crenshaw

Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University, presented an effort to map al Qaeda affiliates and analyze implications of these groups for stability in Pakistan on 17 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project’s Academic Consortium.

Dr. Crenshaw’s presentation introduced and explained the maps of terrorist organizations that have been developed as a reference tool for researchers. The purpose of the mapping project is to identify patterns in the evolution of terrorist organizations, specify their causes and consequences, and analyze the development of al Qaeda and its cohort in a comprehensive comparative framework. These maps identified patterns in the evolution of militant organizations since the 1970s and provide interactive visual representations of the groups over time. Countries that are or will be mapped are Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria/Maghreb, Pakistan, Colombia, the Philippines, the Palestinian resistance movement, Italy and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, and Northern Ireland. The maps that have been completed thus far by Dr. Crenshaw and her team include Iraq, Somalia, Pakistani Al Qaeda affiliates, and Italy. Dr. Crenshaw spoke about the Pakistan map and its implication for regional stability. Key findings and insights from this presentation are listed below.

• Pakistan is one of the most complicated, dense, and volatile landscapes of militant organizations
• Some of the complexity is due to the interaction of sectarian, jihadist, nationalist, and separatist militant groups
• State sponsorship creates rivalries between these groups
• Recently, controlling these groups has become harder now that they have established themselves as independent from their state sponsors

Jocelyne Cesari

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, Harvard University, presented a brief on state and society relations and their influence on the political stability of Pakistan on 20 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project’s Academic Consortium.

Jocelyne Cesari’s Minerva research addressed an unexamined dimension in the politicization of Islam, that is, state actions and policies vis-à-vis religion in general and Islam in particular. Politicization in this context is broader than Islamism and encompasses the following.

• Nationalization of Islamic institutions and personnel
• Usage of Islamic references in political competition by state actors and opponents (Islamism)
• Religiously-motivated social unrest or violence
• Internationalization of Islam-orientated political movements or conflicts

The research adopted an institutional approach to Islam in order to introduce state actions and policies into the analysis of political influence of cultural and religious changes at both the domestic and international levels. Institutionalization refers to the way new socio- political situations are translated into the creation or adaptation of formal institutions such as constitutions, laws, and administrative bodies and agencies. This translation is salient over two matters: hegemonic status granted to on religion and state’s regulations of religions. Hegemonic status refers to legal and political privileges provided to one religion over the others, usually the dominant religion.

Dr. Cesari’s research showed that legal privileges characterize the majority of Muslim countries, where legal and political rights have generally been granted to the dominant orientation of Islam and highlights the correlation between institutionalization of Islam and politicization of religion. The political consequence is that religious norms become the substratum of social norms and political cultures in most of Muslim majority countries, as illustrated in the evolution of Pakistan from a State for Muslims to an Islamic State. In particular, Dr. Cesari’s research shows that the hegemonic status of religion increases social and political violence across regions and religions. Such a political and social violence can affect regional stability. Due to the hegemonic nature of Sunni Islam, and the increasing Islamicization of the legal system, religious minorities and women are becoming increasingly vulnerable. Freedom of speech is more and more restricted to conform to a more “Islamically correct” public space. When in public spaces, citizens are cautious of what they say and how they act, in large part due to possible consequences from some religious actors that are rarely sanctioned by the Government. It is unclear how these restrictions will affect domestic and regional stability but it does create ground for political actors acting on religious ground.

Dr. Cesari noted that urbanization and the role of media must also be considered when analyzing the current situation in Pakistan. Recently, more Pakistanis are moving to cities which will ultimately weaken tribal legitimacy which has played an important role in the stability of the political system until now. New political players are emerging on the political scene, which may in turn threaten the traditional political and military elite. Additionally, media out of State control could be used as alternative forums to express opinions and discontent, further destabilizing the current system.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Joseph Nye, Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Dr. Jocelyn Cesari

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National Security Challenges: Insights from Social, Neurobiological, and Complexity Sciences.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc), Cabayan, H. (Joint Staff), Casebeer, W. (DARPA), Desjardins, A. (NSI, Inc), DiEuliis, D. (HHS), Ehlschlaeger, C. (ERDC), Lyle, D. (USAF) & Rice, C. (USA/TRADOC).

This White Volume assesses U.S. long term national security challenges, employing a global perspective that accounts for the changing political, economic, social, and psychological profiles of populations, and the rapid changes they experience in a globally connected information en- vironment. It addresses many of the key national security challenges iden- tified by LTG Flynn in the Preface. The collection of essays explores future population-centric national security challenges through the lens of the lat- est research from the social, neurological, and complexity sciences. The papers emphasize “enduring” long term themes that are focused on the in- teractions of populations and their environments. They are not U.S.- centric, but multi-perspective and examine underlying long term phenom- ena.

The target audiences are planners, operators, and policy makers. With them in mind, the articles are intentionally kept short and written to stand alone. All the contributors have done their best to make their articles easi- ly accessible.

This white paper addresses many of the key national security challenges identified by LTG Flynn in the Preface, including the following:

1. The threat environment is highly asymmetric, amorphous, complex, rapidly changing and uncertain.
2. There is need for speed and flexibility in U.S. intelligence gathering and decision making.
3. Current analytic deficiencies arise from the Cold War structure and in- sularity of the IC, complexity of the environment, and how we currently think about threats.
4. New thinking needs to consider populations as important actors (e.g., mobilization via social media, etc.) and the social and resource inequi- ties and grievances that spawn conflict.
5. Following the end of the Cold War, the expected “peace dividend” has failed to materialize; the U.S. has experienced an era of persistent conflict

General Flynn’s remarks suggest a number of specific challenges to ana- lysts and planners:

1. Reevaluate our concept of what constitutes a “threat” in the current and evolving world environment both from a U.S. and foreign perspec- tive.
2. Expand the sources of information used to understand the environ- ment.
3. Consider the population of an area as an important actor; also, assess outside entities within the periphery of destabilization that have the ability to leverage support to insurgent groups, which will negatively effect U.S. operations.
4. Be proactive; focus on the causes and precursors of conflict rather than solely war and conflict.
5. Learn to understand and respond flexibly and faster; be more “adap- tive” and forward thinking.

The overriding theme in this White Volume is how best to assess U.S. long term national security challenges, employing a global perspective that ac- counts for the changing political, economic, social, and psychological pro- files of populations, and the rapid changes they experience in a globally connected information environment.

The target audiences for this White Volume are planners, operators, and policy makers. With them in mind, the articles are intentionally kept short and written to stand alone. All the contributors have done their best to make their articles easily accessible. The papers emphasize “enduring” long term themes that are focused on the interactions of populations and their environments. They are not U.S.-centric, but multi-perspective and examine underlying long term phenomena.

In describing these long term challenges, it is important to remember that we are dealing primarily with human behavior rather than physical phe- nomena. Methods involving mechanistic approaches and point predictions will not be feasible; rather we will describe techniques to map out ranges of possible futures. The difficulties are increased because security threats are global in scale and must be anticipated as far in advance of a crisis as possible. Multidisciplinary approaches are called for and validation of models may be difficult, costly, or in some cases impossible.

This collection of essays explores future population-centric national secu- rity challenges through the lens of the latest research from the social, neu- rological, and complexity sciences. The first section, Populations in their Environments: Factors Impacting the Fragility of “Peace,” argues that an understanding of a population’s propensity for social and political conflict is not possible without an appreciation of how its needs and interests re- late to and are affected by the physical environment. The second section, Global Patterns and Trends in Armed Conflict: Evidence and Theories, describes recent and ongoing research on historical patterns and trends in armed conflict, which have documented a systemic decline in armed vio- lence worldwide since the end of the Cold War, even as the U.S. has expe- rienced an “era of persistent conflict.” The third section, Neurobiological, Cognitive and Social Science Insights on Radicalization and Mobilization to Violence discusses the neurological and cognitive drivers of the social behaviors that propel people to radicalize and pursue violence. The fourth section, Seeing the World As it Is: Complex Adaptive Systems Approaches as Multi-source, Multi-input Integrators discusses the potential of complexity science to help us combine insights from the other disciplines into a coherent system of understanding, and apply this framework directly to the challenges military planners face. The fifth section, written by Admiral James Stavridis and Dr. Evelyn Farkas, speaks to the importance of partnership and collaboration between public and private organizations to achieve mutually desired security outcomes. Finally, Dr. William Casebeer from DARPA provides an epilogue considering insights from the first two sections and how the complexity sciences might be employed to address the challenges faced by strategic thinkers, military analysts and planners, and decision makers.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Janice Adelman (NSI), Mr. Azad Amir-ghessemi (PERTAN Inc), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Dr. Greg Berns (Emory University), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI), Mr. David A. Browne (PACOM), Dr. Emile Bruneau (MIT), Mr. Jeffery Burkhalter (USA/ERDC), Mr. William Busch (EUCOM), Dr. Hriar Cabayan (OSD), Dr. Bill Casebeer (DARPA), Ms. Abigail Chapman (NSI), Dr. Joan Chiao (Northwestern University), Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (George Mason University), Dr. Eric Dimperio (USA/ERDC), Dr. Diane DiEuliis (HHS), Ms. Marina Drigo (PERTAN Inc), Mr. Patrick Edwards (USA/ERDC), Dr. Charles R. Ehlschlaeger (USA/ERDC), Dr. Evelyn Farkas (EUCOM), LTG Michael Flynn (DIA), Dr. James Giordano (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies), Dr. Peter Hatemi (Penn State University), Dr. Cullen S. Hendrix (College of William & Mary), Mr. Eric A. Knudson (PACOM), Mr. Joseph T. Lee (PACOM), Mr. Kalev Leetaru (University of Illinois at Urbana), Lt Col David Lyle (USAF), Dr. Rose McDermott (Brown University), Ms. Shana McLean (EUCOM), LTC (Dr.) Rob Neff (SOCOM), Dr. Anthony Olcott, COL (Dr.) Christopher Rate (SOCOM), Dr. Christopher Rice (USA/TRADOC), ADM James Stavridis (EUCOM)

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Pak-StaM Analysis Drivers of Stability & Instability in Pakistan.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, et al.  (NSI, Inc).

This report supported SMA’s Geopolitical Stability in South Asia project. For additional information, please visit the South Asia project page.

This report addresses a number of key questions regarding the factors that underpin stability and instability in Pakistan. In particular: Which are the factors that most significantly contribute to governing, economic, and social stability in Pakistan? Are there factors commonly associated with stability that have no effect or have divergent effects on stability in Pakistan? What are the primary effect dependencies among factors? Is the effect of specific factors likely to change with time?

Pakistan sits at the center of South Asian regional security dynamics. Each of its several international borders has been both the cause of inter-state dispute and the site of militarized conflict. There are high levels of crime, violence, and sectarian conflict, and the writ of the state is challenged in many areas of the country. Porous borders facilitate organized crime, and militant activity further challenges state control and threatens the physical security and wellbeing of the Pakistani people. Investment (both government and private) in the weakly institutionalized, corrupt, and aid-dependent formal economy is insufficient to keep up with population growth, let alone enable Pakistan to reach its Millennium Development Goals. Finally, weak civilian governance, and a strongly politicized military blurs the lines of de jure authority.

Yet, despite these significant problems and frequent predictions of imminent failure of the Pakistani state, Pakistan persists. Struggles over division of authority between the judiciary and elected leaders have weakened but not toppled the civilian government, or triggered a military coup. While militants continue to challenge the writ of the state, they have not succeeded in fracturing Pakistan or establishing uncontested control. Discussion of the causes of Pakistan’s problems, and prescriptions for their cure are plentiful; however, there is less to be found on the factors that have enabled the Pakistani state and people to survive these challenges. Addressing the question of why Pakistan has not failed is equally important if we are to develop a complete picture of Pakistan’s current situation and future trajectory. This requires us to determine not only the factors that drive instability, but also those that buffer stability.

The following report addresses a number of key questions regarding the factors that underpin stability and instability in Pakistan. In particular:

• Which are the factors that most significantly contribute to governing, economic, and social stability in Pakistan?
• Are there factors commonly associated with stability that have no effect or have divergent effects on stability in Pakistan?
• What are the primary effect dependencies among factors?
• Is the effect of specific factors likely to change with time?

The analysis uses a conceptual model of state stability—the StaM—to systematically identify the drivers of instability as well as the areas of resilience in Pakistan. We find that while there are evident drivers of instability, there are also less immediately evident areas of resilience that buffer the stability of the state of Pakistan and its people. Moreover, the factors that appear to underpin Pakistan’s resilience to collapse are closely linked to those that may promote instability in the longer term. That is, it appears that, for Pakistan, shorter-term stabilizers can easily become destabilizers in the longer term. Conversely, there are factors that disrupt to the status quo, and can appear destabilizing, but are in fact an essential part of generating the structural changes Pakistan needs to achieve long-term stability. Accounting for both the short-term and long-term effects of various drivers of stability is essential for understanding their full implications for stability.

The remainder of this chapter provides a brief introduction to the StaM and our analysis of Pakistan. Development and analysis of the model specified to Pakistan–the Pak-StaM–illuminated several factors that appear to be pivotal to stability conditions in Pakistan. Each subsequent chapter explores the short and longer-term implications of a critical domestic factor identified as driving stability conditions in Pakistan including:

1. the grey economy;
2. formal foreign remittances;
3. patronage;
4. weak civilian institutions;
5. education; and
6. access to information.

The Stability Model (StaM)

A well-founded conceptual framework is an essential tool for any systematic analysis, especially when dealing with a concept as complex and interdependent as state stability. Whether acknowledged or not, all analyses are conducted in reference to some theory or implicit mental model. A conceptual model is simply a formal articulation of this same process. By specifying the factors that contribute to a phenomenon and the relationships between them, conceptual models help the analyst to check the logic, consistency, and comprehensiveness of the explanation and to understand not only what might occur but why, and what might be done to either encourage or impede it.

For the purposes of the analyses described in the following chapters, the overall durability (versus fracture) of a nation-state is defined as a compound function of its political, economic, and social stability. Each of these is performance-based where the political system is able to

• maintain a degree of legitimacy, political performance, and/or the coercive power necessary to retain internal control;
• sustain sufficient growth in the economic system (formal or informal) to support the minimal needs of the majority of citizens (i.e., the average growth rate in productivity exceeds the growth rate in population); and
• ensure that social cleavages do not result in violent ethnic or sectarian conflict.

The analysis of stability and instability drivers in Pakistan presented here employs the Stability Model (StaM) as an organizing framework for assessing political stability over the mid- to longer-term. According to the generic StaM,3 overall state stability arises from three necessary, but not sufficient, dimensions: economic stability, social stability, and governing stability. The definitions of these dimensions and their disaggregation are based on a wide range of academic and applied research and theory (including anthropology, international relations, comparative politics, social psychology, and economics).

Before using the StaM to assess stability dynamics in a specific context, further specification and tailoring of the model to that state or region is required. To begin the search for key drivers of stability and instability in Pakistan, analysts used the generic model as a set of assertions or hypotheses about political, economic, and social dynamics to guide their search for Pakistan-specific data. In an iterative process, researchers used the model’s organizing structure and the predicted relations within and across dimensions (governing, economic, and social stability) to gain insight into complex stability dynamics that characterize Pakistan. In all, over 1000 unclassified sources were used to tailor the generic StaM for Pakistan. These included: quantitative data on political processes, popular perceptions and opinion, and economic and financial flows; extensive area expert elicitation; current research on social, ethnic, economic and political and institutional cultures in Pakistan; social geography; and assessment of authority and political transitions through Pakistani history.

As information was gathered, three types of alterations were made to the generic model. This tailoring process, beginning with the generic model in Figure i-1, generated the specified Pakistan model shown in Figure i-2. The first step involved adjusting, adding, or eliminating factors shown in the generic StaM to align with the Pakistan context. For example, to account for its strong political influence, the Pakistani military was added to the generic model as a political actor with its own source of legitimacy in competition with civilian governors and interests. In the generic model, the role and performance of the military is incorporated under rule of law and national security. It was also necessary to distinguish explicitly between internally and externally generated revenue, as Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid and loans to provide public services. The second type of alteration involved further disaggregating the generic factors to capture their state-specific nature (e.g., the components that constitute quality of life from the perspective of Pakistani culture, rather than U.S. culture). Finally, researchers considered whether the between-factors relationships anticipated by the generic model existed in the same way, or indeed at all, in the Pakistan context and confirmed or redrew these connections accordingly.

Once the model was tailored, and concepts defined for the Pakistan context, analysts set about the more complex task of assessing the extent to which each if these drove instability or provided a buffer to stability. This process led to the identification of the six major determinants of stability that form the structure of this report: the grey economy, formal foreign remittances, patronage, weak civilian institutions, education, and access to information. “Following the thread” of each of these factors through the model allowed us to build a picture of how these dominant factors affected stability within and across dimensions and over time. Using the model to follow stability implications in this way provides a number of benefits to the analyst and planner.

1. Cross dimensional analysis accounts for the interactive complexity of state stability and provides better insight into the dynamics driving the complex macro system that is Pakistani state and society.
2. By distinguishing between short and longer-term effects, the Pak-StaM can help analysts identify situations (e.g., patronage) that may buffer stability in the short-term, but ultimately block many of the structural changes required for longer-term stability.
3. The ability to account for domestic stability effects of regional actors enables detailed mapping of the regional influences on Pakistan’s stability. Where specifically do the interests of regional actors affect stability in Pakistan? In addition, is it possible to map the effects of external actors’ interests on Pakistan’s domestic dynamics?6
4. The StaM suggests a new perspective on how we think about stability and change in countries such as Pakistan. In particular, the United States Government (USG) needs to recognize that not all short-term instability is bad. In fact, short-term disruption is the likely result of the very structural changes–social, political and economic—Pakistan needs in order to achieve longer- term stability and development.

Caveats

The StaM is not a computational model; it presents a conceptual map intended to help trace and describe complex and multi-dimensional relationships. Even the generic StaM is highly complex and incorporates multiple theories from diverse disciplines. Although theory is sufficiently well developed and tested to create computational models of discrete sections of the StaM, compiling these into a single computational model of the entire StaM would require the imposition of a great number of assumptions regarding the relative weighting and interactions between the components. We currently lack the theoretical and empirical knowledge to model with any level of confidence. For similar reasons, there is no precisely delineated scale of time in the model.

Our “short term” and “long term” are better understood as “current” and “sometime in the future, all else being equal and given current patterns.” Neither the StaM nor the data available are sufficient to make definitive, point-predictive assessments of where things are going in Pakistan (e.g., as a time- series regression analysis on economic data or sales figures) other than to say, “if things stay the same, x is the most likely outcome” or “if y changes, z is the most likely outcome.” Nearly all of the effects in the Pak-StaM are interconnected and highly conditional. To predict what might happen on the basis of what we see now would require more assumptions, including the absence of any significant changes in factors in the period under study, than it is reasonable to make.

Contributing Authors

Belinda Bragg, Danette Brickman, Sarah Canna, George Popp, Alex Stephenson, Richard Williams (NSI)

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Breaking the Fear Barrier: How Fear Destroys Companies from the Inside Out, and What to Do About It

“Hmmm, maybe we could both go and strangle your boss? … Small wonder then that Breaking the Fear Barrier ends with a call for courage by business leaders, moral traits seldom taught in the nation’s B-Schools. . . . With bailouts and bankruptcies becoming routine, which leadership model would you prefer: Lehman Brothers or Seal Team Six?”

Business literature—that neverending quest for Mammon’s innermost secrets—was under heavy attack recently as our local Borders Books morphed into a going-out-of-business sale. A well-ordered setting where one might linger over books and coffee suddenly resembled a fire sale. Business books were remaindered by 30 percent; but even those ghostwritten by newsbiz honeys like Maria Bartiromo and Christine Romans attracted few buyers.

Painful as they are, recessions provide opportune moments to ask provocative questions. Among them: What is behind the deep malaise now disquieting American business? According to Tom Rieger, a consultant with the Gallup organization, fear is the uninvited guest at the corporate banquet—though few are willing to discuss it openly.

“Fear destroys companies. More specifically, fear leads companies to destroy themselves.” While the specifics vary as widely as corporate cultures, the symptoms are depressingly common: “. . . bureaucracy, inefficiency, low morale and, ultimately, failure.”

Breaking the Fear Barrier is Mr. Rieger’s first book, one that grew out of his work with Gallup after the usual array of analytical metrics, procedures, and systems failed to uncover underlying subtleties. In 145 clearly written pages—easy weekend reading—Tom Rieger exposes the truths instinctively understood by everyone but seldom admitted in polite company. In his calculus, “fear of loss” and an “endemic sense of entitlement” are the root causes of dog-eat-dog competition and bureaucratic in-fighting for everything from pay and promotion to budgets and big offices.

While fear underlies everything, parochialism, territorial conquest, and empire-building are the sedimentary bedrock of every bureaucratic structure. Although these dry bones may appear dead, fear barriers exist for a reason. Admiral Hyman Rickover is approvingly quoted, “If you’re going to sin, sin against God, not the bureaucracy. God will forgive you but the bureaucracy won’t.”

In one of his book’s more compelling examples, Mr. Rieger succinctly shows that customer service is becoming a lost art because of hyper-controls imposed by nervous corporate bureaucrats. “No company . . . wants to hire brainless robots . . . (Y)et all too often companies script every word and deed of frontline employees, not allowing them to make any decisions while holding them solely responsible for their results.” Worst of all: demanding that customer service representatives smile mindlessly through every encounter which—good or bad—always ends with, “Is there anything else I can do to help you?” Hmmm, maybe we could both go and strangle your boss?

This lack of empowerment at lower levels also costs time and money because information-sharing and bold innovations designed to win loyal customers are unlikely when workers are treated like prisoners. “Shockingly, one out of every two American workers is a prisoner.”

Mr. Rieger sketches out a kind of 12-step program to set them free, with “rules audits” and decentralized decision-making helping to offset empire-building and short-term thinking. It was a bit worrisome that the book’s best example of these reforms is Lenovo, the Chinese computer giant. From humble beginnings, Lenovo grew like Topsy but later stagnated until its chairman came out of retirement to set things right. “Lenovo is all of my life. When it looked like my life is threatened, I had to come out to defend it.”

Such draconian measures require courage as well as foresight—a suspicion that the smartest guys in the room may not be all that bright or an understanding that no company is really too big to fail. The problem is that these bet-the-company tests are becoming daily occurrences as the Second Information Revolution relentlessly pits entrenched hierarchies against aggressive networks in the race for innovation and survival.

Small wonder then that Breaking the Fear Barrier ends with a call for courage by business leaders, moral traits seldom taught in the nation’s B-Schools. Perhaps for that reason, the book’s final example of turn-around leadership is notional rather than historical.

Mr. Rieger’s research includes seven years of “Barrier Analysis” as a Gallup consultant as well as almost 50 other sources cited in his book—probably a record given the prevailing standards of business literature. But he might have acquired even weightier ammunition by tapping into the classics of Max Weber, whose 19th century writings about the “trained incapacity” of workers in a bureaucracy are still relevant today.

And because the author’s background suggests some familiarity with defense issues, his future writings might also consider the adaptation of military hierarchies—where bureaucratic intimidation occasionally becomes an art form— to the band of brothers engaged in life-and-death struggles with relentlessly adaptive insurgent networks.

With bailouts and bankruptcies becoming routine, which leadership model would you prefer: Lehman Brothers or Seal Team Six?

Kenneth Allard is a former army colonel, West Point faculty member, and dean of the National War College. For almost a decade he served as an on-air military analyst with NBC News, is the author of four books, and is an occasional contributor to the The Daily Beast.

For a copy of the book, see: Breaking The Fear Barrier.

5th Annual SMA Conference.

Author | Editor: Canna, S. & Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The 5th Annual Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Conference was held at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland from 29-30 November 2011. The SMA program is prioritized by the Joint Staff and executed by ASD (R&E) RFD. The focus of the SMA Conference was on influence strategies of state and non-state actors as well as the impact of the social and neurobiological sciences on key aspects of national security. The conference also hosted special sessions on geospatial applications, influence and deterrence in cyber space, and complex adaptive systems. Each session was designed to draw on diverse perspectives and insights from across the United States Government (USG), industry, and academia as well as from around the globe.

The Joint Staff, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), has developed a proven methodology merging multi-agency expertise and information to address complex operational requirements that call for multi-disciplinary approaches utilizing skill sets not normally present within any one service/agency. The SMA process uses robust multi-agency collaboration leveraging intellectual/analytical rigor to examine factual/empirical evidence with the focus on synthesizing existing knowledge.The end product consists of actionable strategies and recommendations, which can then be used by planners to support Course of Action (COA) Development.

LTG Michael Flynn, Assistant Director for National Intelligence, provided the keynote speech that covered the changing threat environment, which is creating new demands on the intelligence community and requiring a critical look at the many dimensions of the complex, human-dominated world. He provided four core insights into this complex environment.

1. The threat environment is highly asymmetric, amorphous, complex, rapidly changing, and uncertain.
2. There is a greater need for speed and flexibility in US intelligence gathering and decision making
3. Current analytic deficiencies arise from the Cold War structure and insularity of the intelligence community, complexity of the environment, and how we currently think about threats
4. New thinking needs to consider populations as important actors (e.g., mobilization via social media, etc.) and the social and resource inequities and grievances that spawn conflict

A significant portion of the conference focused on soliciting and discussing the needs of the Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to inform how the SMA program can best support the operational community. The panel was moderated by BG Mike Nagata, JS J37 DDSO, and drew on the experiences and insights of various representatives from across the Combatant Commands. The panelists are listed below.

• BG Mike Nagata, JS, J37, DDSO (moderator)
• COL Carl Trout, JS, J7
• Mr. Aaron Meyer, PACOM
• CAPT Todd Veazie, SOCOM
• Mr. Marty Drake, CENTCOM
• LTC Gerald Scott, JS, J3
• Mr. Roger Baty, NORTHCOM
• LtCol Scott Tielemans, CENTCOM
• Mr. Juan Hurtado, SOUTHCOM
• Master Chief Dave Cooper, SOCOM
• LtCol (Dr.) Rob Renfro, CENTCOM

Several key themes emerged from the panel discussion.

1. Issues and questions from the operational community must be well framed to ensure analytic responses meet the COCOMs’ needs. Answers are only as good as the question asked.
2. The operation community needs tools and models to aid complex planning and decision- making. These tools and models need to be able to
   • Deal with complexity and uncertainty;
   • Incorporate various perspectives;
   • Operate dynamically and across multiple dimensions;
   • Be easily and quickly learned;
   • Focus left of boom;
   • Help operators to better understand others as well as ourselves; and g. Make information more digestible through better visualization.
3. Officers need to be trained how to use social science tools so that they will feel comfortable employing these decisions and planning aids to maximize operational success.
4. Solutions to complex national security issues, particularly with regard to population-centric challenges, should be sought from a broad community of potential contributors including academia, industry, think tanks, and other non-traditional sources. A community, or communities, of interest must be built and sustained.
5. Cyber threats have the potential to alter the types of problems the operational community faces in the future. They are a potential game changer.
6. Building and fostering personal relationships across militaries and governments is the key to success when operating left of boom.

The panelists agreed that programs, like SMA, that seek solutions to the nation’s complex strategic issues using rigorous, diverse analytic methods drawn from a large community of government and non-government contributors provide a template for 21st Century strategic thinking.

The Influencing State and Non-State Actors session consisted of a two-part introduction followed by three panels. The session’s objective was to explore and discuss the fundamentals of analytic approaches for deriving and assessing actions to influence and deterring state and non-state actors. The first part of the introduction explored the methodological and conceptual challenges of tackling an extraordinarily complex dynamic problem space that consists of a wide range of actors (e.g., nuclear powers, failing states, non-state organizations, virtual actors), U.S. objectives (deterrence, assurance, defeat, counter-terror, non-proliferation), competing interests, and anticipated and unanticipated effects. Maj. Gen. Joseph Reynes, AJFC, Netherlands, supplemented this conceptual discussion with a view of the real world practicalities of thinking about and conducting deterrence and influence operations.

Panel One, moderated by Mr. Pat McKenna, STRATCOM, reviewed recent efforts on behalf of various COCOMs to envision the complex system of state and non-state actors and their interests that must be considered in nearly any analysis in support of deterrence or influence operations. Discussion centered around critical, but often inadequately defined, basic concepts and language of deterrence and influence. Panel Two,, moderated by Mr. Dan Flynn, ODNI, focused on the practical questions of generating sufficient relevant data and the use of appropriate, creative analytic techniques (e.g., crowdsourcing, war gaming, simulation and computer-based modeling) for developing influence and deterrence operations COAs. Panel Three, moderated by Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI, discussed the prospects for developing readily accessible tools and models to help operators tackle the dynamic threat environments faced by the U.S. while avoiding unfavorable and unintended consequences. Further discussion touched upon the real-world impediments to including modeling and other multi-input analyses in (non-kinetic) effects planning.

Mr. Pat McKenna summarized the key insights from Panels One, Two, and Three.

• The nation can prepare for the future, but it cannot predict it.
• Operational environments are much more complex today than they were in the past.
• The threat is constantly evolving and the threat environment is becoming more complex.
• The U.S. needs to be agile.
• No single model can capture all of the complexities; there is no universal method.
• Analysts are trying to provide insights not solutions.
• Ultimately, analysts, modelers, and planners are providing information to enhance decision-making.

Mr. McKenna then noted the challenges that arose throughout the discussions. These challenges are listed below.

• There is a need to focus on being left of boom.
• It is important to determine how to balance agility versus comprehensiveness.
• Investments need to be made in the analytic community even with shrinking budgets.
• It is crucial to have critical thinking people and utilizing multi-disciplinary approaches.
• There is a need to obtain more complete data and determine how to know if it is authoritative and unbiased.
• Authoritative data must be incorporated into models.
• Techniques that are not singularly focused must continue to be used.
• Deterrence must be balanced in terms of other forms of influence.
• The integration of multiple tools must occur.
• There is a need to determine if tools are valid and the proper ways to deal with uncertainty within these tools.

A session on Geospatial Applications for Population Centric Assessments, moderated by Ms. Elizabeth Lyon, OSD, and Dr. Bert Davis, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), examined geospatial data, geospatial methods (including data collection), and geospatial applications for defining place including elements such as the physical and social environments and factors leading to understand stability and security in places that are either currently stable, transitioning, or in conflict.

Additional panels were held throughout the conference to provide further perspectives and insights. The panel on Implications of Recent Advances in Social, Cognitive, and Neurobiological Sciences to National Security, moderated by Dr. Diane DiEuliis, NIH and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), discussed cutting edge scientific research in the areas of political violence, radicalization, and deterrence. The panel examined how recent scientific discoveries might inform our understanding of violence in general and, more specifically, issues of national security relating to political violence. Dr. Bill Casebeer summarized the key findings and insights from the Neurobiology panel.

• Neurobiological research helps the operational community understand the mechanisms that underlie higher order phenomena
• The amygdala plays a key role in response to threats
  • Emotional triggers can be subconscious
  • Out-group members trigger more amygdala activation than in-group members
• Disinhibition contagion is a neurobiological process, which can result in friendly fire
  • Leader fires first and releases the inhibition of others to use force
  • Understanding neurobiological processes will help the DoD formulated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to limit collateral damage
• Narratives and stories are important psychologically and neurobiologically; they…
  • Influence how one remembers things and helps humans make judgments about who it is permissible to kill
  • Could have implications for influence campaigns

The panel on Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO) Neurobiology Pilot Effort, moderated by Ms. Abigail Chapman, NSI, discussed results from the quick turnaround effort designed to provide a multi-method, multi-disciplinary exploration of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The panel on Influence and Deterrence in Cyber Space, moderated by Dr. William Casebeer, DARPA, addressed the core questions facing the operational community today with regard to influence and deterrence in cyberspace. The panel on Complex Adaptive Systems, moderated by Lt Col David Lyle, United States Air Force (USAF), examined the importance of understanding human complexity in the operational environment. The panel further discussed ways in which visualizations inspired by complex science innovations could help to combine and present vast amounts of complex data in new formats, helping the observer intuitively understand the key nodes, linkages, and dynamics of complex systems of all kinds.

The proceedings with all slides and videos will be posted on the SMA SharePoint site (https://nsiteam.net/x_sma/default.aspx). If you do not have an account, you can register for one by going to https://nsiteam.net/newAcct. If you already have an account and cannot recall your password, please visit this URL: https://nsiteam.net/reset.

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A Guide to Analytic Techniques for Nuclear Strategy Analysis.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. & Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.

Using the CANS software1, an analyst first starts with a question. They then select the appropriate level of analysis and the availability and type of data for answering that question. The application highlights the analytic techniques that may be used to help answer the question. The analyst can read a brief description of the technique and the resources are required to implement a research design using that technique. The analyst may also read an in-depth write up of how to use the technique in the context of nuclear deterrence, and in some instances examples of the application of the technique to the CANS problem space. This guide is a compilation of all the write-ups produced for the CANS software. These write-ups fall into two categories:

PART 1: Generic technique write-ups

These focus on a particular analytic technique. These provide the reader with a thorough introduction to a specific analytic technique. They are intended to provide enough information to enable the reader to determine the utility and practicality of that technique to problem they wish to examine. They are not intended as a guide for the application of that technique.

At the end of each write-up is a requirements section that discusses the data, time, tools, cost, skill set and expertise required to implement such a technique. For the purposes of comparison a coding scheme (outlined below) was developed to provide user with a way of comparing between different techniques.

PART 2: Examples of the application of modeling techniques to the CANS problem space

As part of the CANS effort various modeling and analysis projects were undertaken. These were designed to both demonstrate the utility of a specific technique to the nuclear strategy context and provide further insight into relevant questions. As well as providing detailed reports of their efforts, contributors to the CANS modeling effort also provided brief write- ups of their work for the CANS Software.

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Attribute Tradeoff Model (ATOM): Model and Software Documentation.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B., Orlina, E. & Salwen, M. (NSI, Inc).

The ATOM model seeks to link discrete and measurable force posture attributes (such as flexibility, sustainability and reach) to such broad concepts as deterrence and counter proliferation in a systematic and meaningful way.

Given New Start, the Administration’s interest in “nuclear zero” and a budget-constrained environment, analysts are likely to receive greater numbers of requests for comparison of the capacity of various force postures and structures to achieve nuclear policy goals. At present, no theoretically grounded and systematic method exists for comparing how well specific (attribute- based) force postures support specific policy objectives. In the nuclear context, the central policy objectives identified by the Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy CANS project are strategic stability, counter proliferation, deterrence, assurance and defeat.

ATOM relies on an assessment process that first analyzes a problem structure from complex concepts to more basic and directly measurable elements and then synthesizes the evaluation of those basic elements through the structure so that alternatives may be assessed not only on the basics, but on the high-order concepts as well. The first challenge raised by this task is determining how to link discrete and measurable force posture attributes (such as flexibility, sustainability and reach) to such broad concepts as deterrence and counter proliferation in a systematic and meaningful way. ATOM achieves this by creating a theoretical model that decomposes these high-level policy objectives into their basic elements, and then links individual force posture attributes to these specific elements (see Figure 1). The theoretical model draws on an extensive academic and policy literature to determine the set of elements for specific policy objectives.

The second challenge is to derive assessments with respect to high-level concepts such as policy objectives from the evaluation of the more basic elements of the model decomposition such as force posture attributes. There are many algorithms designed to aid in this process—what is often referred to as multi-attribute decision analysis—and ATOM includes two that have been instantiated into its software. A fuller description of these algorithms appears below in the ATOM Software Overview section of this document.

The ATOM software is composed of two parts: (1) a Java-based Structure Authoring Tool that provides users a graphical interface for decomposing the problem space and; (2) An R-based Decision Support Engine (DSE) that aggregates the assessment of force posture alternatives through to policy objectives, cost and risk. In essence the software takes the model and represents it graphically in the form of tree diagrams that clearly map the breakdown of individual policy objectives and the link between policy elements and force posture attributes. This relational information is then used by the DSE to assess the relative strengths of specific force postures for achieving individual or multiple policy objectives.

ATOM, as presented in this guide, therefore, should be thought of as two related, but distinct products. The first is the theoretical model, which is specific to the nuclear policy context; the second is the software, which, although developed to deal with this specific model, is in itself content-free. The Structure Authoring Tool and DSE can be used to render a detailed decomposition and analysis of any problem space of interest to the analyst, from nuclear policy to which motorcycle to buy. It is our expectation that for analysts interested in the nuclear policy problem space there will be very little need to change the current instantiation of the theoretical model. Two possible exceptions to this would be modifications of the edge weightings (which are currently all set at 1.0, implying equal weighting of each child node) and additional linkages between specific policy elements and force posture attributes. The majority of input will be done in the DSE, with the comparison of specific force postures (represented by their ratings across the 13 meta attributes taken from STRATCOM’s existing analysis structure) across different combinations of policy objectives.

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