NSI Publications
NSI Publications are publications from our professional and technical staff for research efforts sponsored by our government clients (e.g., SMA), conferences, academic journals and other forums.
Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)
Executive Summary
Data
Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Italy were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2014 and 2010.
Results
Income data provided by the World Bank and occupational data provided by ILO tell similar narratives of a risk acceptant Italian population. The two datasets show that the Italian population is overall very risk acceptant and individuals or occupations attaining more wealth than others are on average more acceptant of risk.
Significance for Risk Taking and Stability
Italy’s risk acceptant population combined with weak economic performance may be fueling a wave of conservative sentiment that has allowed Russia and China to sign economic deals with Rome that worry other EU nations (Poggetti, 2018; Isachenkov, 2018). This coincides with a recent political surge in Italy’s Eurosceptic population, which has occurred due to the country’s weak economic performance and lack of job opportunities for future generations (Pew Research Center, 2017; Lovene, 2018).
Implications for US Interests
Italy’s risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US’ interest of keeping Russia and China out of EU and NATO politics. Italy and the US have maintained a friendly and cooperative relationship in combatting global terrorism, natural disasters including Ebola, and joint humanitarian aid including in Libya (US Department of State, 2019). However, if Russia and China can use a friendly relationship with Italy to insert their own interests into EU politics and decision making, it will greatly threaten a wide range of joint US- EU security interests (Poggetti, 2018; Isachenkov, 2018).
Implications for China’s Interests
China recently signed an economic deal that lays the groundwork for eventually bringing the BRI to Italy (Poggetti, 2018). This opens a vast new array of opportunities for China as Italy is the largest economy to date to sign a BRI deal and is an EU and NATO member state. The downward projecting Italian economy and its slim economic opportunities (especially for the younger population), combined with Italy’s risk acceptant population, grants China the potential for furthering its influence not just into Italy, but also into the EU (Grant, 2019).
Implications for Russia’s Interests
Italy’s risk acceptant population presents a large potential opportunity for Russia as it has ridden a wave of Euroscepticism and weak Italian economic performance to sign multiple economic deals (Isachenkov, 2018). Isachenkov points out that Russia sees the potential for continuing this trend, as former Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte acknowledged Russia as a member of Europe and said that an open dialogue with Russia on European issues is something that should be positive for the economic and political evolution of Europe.
Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)
Executive Summary
Data
Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Japan were analyzed: 2008 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and Japanese income by occupation data from 2015.
Results
Both the income data provided by the World Bank and the occupational data provided by Japan’s federal government show a mildly risk acceptant population. Both datasets indicate that the highest earning incomes and wealthiest Japanese citizens are the most risk acceptant.
Significance for Risk Taking and Stability
Japan has a low level of inequality and high level of stability when compared to most countries, buffering any potential grievances from risk acceptant members of the country. However, its slowing economic growth and warming governmental ties to its regional adversary (i.e., China) leave Japan vulnerable to Chinese influence (Kaneko, 2018; Duchatel, 2018). Japan’s homogenous population and small wealth gap make social fissures in Japan minimal and unlikely to threaten overall state stability (World Atlas, 2019; Koike, 2015).
Implications for US Interests
The United States has a long-standing relationship with Japan built on strong economic and security ties, with a recent emphasis on North Korean denuclearization and confronting Chinese military movement past its sovereign borders (Stokes, 2015). New trade deals that exclude the US, as well as some warming of relations with China and Russia pose a slight threat to US interests, this is especially true with interests surrounding foreign direct investment (Cimino-Isaacs & Williams, 2019). However, Japan’s stability and its overall positive relationship with the US keep the risk level to US interests low.
Implications for China’s Interests
While China’s political and economic interests and opportunities in Japan are growing they are still weak following years of anti-Japanese policies, which include threatening access to valuable Rare Earth minerals that are crucial to Japan’s developed economy (Fisher, 2013). However, Japan is still China’s largest destination of goods in the region (OEC, 2017). China and Japan are beginning to re-establish full political communication, which was something that the two countries have not enjoyed over the last seven years (Duchatel, 2018).
Implications for Russia’s Interests
Japan’s risk acceptant population gives Russia the potential to increase its involvement in the Asian Pacific and warm ties with one the US’ strongest allies (Kireeva, 2018). While progress has been made by Russia to better Russo-Japanese relations, Russia’s ties to China and Japan’s ties to the US remain a significant barrier for furthered Japan-Russian relations (Streltsov, 2016). While Japan’s relations to the US represents a strategic barrier, Russia’s increased economic relationship with Japan corresponds with its overall strategy to avoid economic dependence on its adversaries—specifically in the European Union—by looking toward East Asian markets and lessening its economic vulnerability.
Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Tactics of Competing Powers Over the Coming Decade – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Bogdan Belei (Harvard University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Steve S. Sin (University of Maryland START), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)
Question of Focus
[Q2] What kinetic (e.g., weapon systems) and non-kinetic (e.g., disinformation campaigns, financial market manipulation, political tampering) tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-six Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what kinetic and non-kinetic tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to challenge the United States and its interests over the coming decade.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)
Executive Summary
Data
Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Nigeria were analyzed: 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2013 USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores.
Results
Nigeria has a largely risk acceptant population based on inequality and cross-cutting rural/urban, ethno- religious, and elite/common cleavages. The result is a population vulnerable to ambition, distrust, and grievance at all levels. These grievances are well-manipulated by elites in the country’s main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. These cleavages threaten economic growth and political stability in Africa’s most populous nation that has the continent’s largest economy. Nigeria is also a major oil producer, making it an attractive target for influence by world powers.
Significance for Risk Taking and Stability
The levels of inequality indicate a highly risk acceptant population; Nigerians are a population primed for taking risks. Synergies between ethno-religious, rural/urban, and educated elite/commoner cleavages and risk acceptance present a political volatility situation that threatens trade and economic growth.
Implications for US Interests
The US is heavily vested in Nigeria, especially in its oil industry but also in Nigeria’s political influence on the African continent. Inequality-fueled instability threatens this interest.
Implications for China’s Interests
China shares much the same economic and political interests in Nigeria as the US, and therefore is equally threatened by instability.
Implications for Russia’s Interests
Russia is much less vested in Nigeria but has sought influence at least through support of a potential nuclear industry in the country. This interest is also threatened by Nigeria’s instability.
Potential for a China-Russia and/or US-China-Russia Alliance – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Paul J. Bolt (US Air Force Academy), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Dr. Steve Tsang (University of London), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q9] Are there any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against US interests, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there are any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against the US, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Power Under Parity – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Paul I. Bernstein (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics)
Question of Focus
[Q10] What are the long-term implications for the US of adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia rather than military dominance?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fourteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors contemplate strategic parity and the implications of the United States adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Regional Competitors in the Great Power Context – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Ken Gause (CNA), Dr. Mark N. Katz (George Mason University), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)
Question of Focus
[Q7] How can the US defend its interests against regional competitors (e.g., Iran, North Korea) in ways complementary to US strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia, while not undercutting other US interests?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of nine Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can defend its interests against regional competitors in ways complementary to United States strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Russia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis
Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)
Executive Summary
Data
Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Russia were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and income by occupation statistics gathered by the Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service for years 2005 and 2016.
Results
Russia’s population was found to be risk acceptant across all three datasets that were analyzed. Even though Russia suffers from both internal and external threats as well as a large income gap, its Arrow- Pratt score is higher than the median for all countries.
Significance for Risk Taking and Stability
Russia suffers from internal instability, high amounts of corruption, a large wage gap, and right-wing violence from nationalistic or white-supremacy organizations (Walker, 2017; Due Enstad, 2017). The threat of terrorism emanating from returning Islamic State fighters adds to Russian national security concerns as well (Berman, 2017). These factors combined with the risk acceptance of Russia’s population, create the potential for future, increased instability.
Implications for US Interests
The US and Russia have some overlapping interests, such as maintaining a stable world economy and counter terrorism (Smith & Twardowski, 2017). However, Russia’s aggressive, expansionist and revisionist policies toward the US and the Western worldview, is a major source of conflict (Graham & Blackwill, 2011). The relative lack of an economic relationship and the confrontational political past between Russia and the US weakens US economic interests. Russia’s risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to advance its interest of seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s central government undermined from within.
Implications for China’s Interests
China’s relationship with Russia is that of a cooperative partner (Dobbins, Shatz, & Wyne, 2019). Over the last decade China and Russia have accelerated their relationship to include increased economic cooperation, joint military exercises, and the backing of anti-US allies in regional conflicts. The risk acceptant nature of Russia’s populace poses an indirect threat to China and its interests, as a large civil upheaval would likely weaken its largest global political ally. However, it is unlikely that any new regime in Russia would be pro-US as 74% of the Russian population has an unfavorable view of the US (Poushter, 2018).
Implications for Russia’s Interests
Russia’s interests revolve around revising the global geopolitical landscape, earning Russia the international respect of a great power, and fostering unity among its population (Gurganus, 2018). Its population suffers from high wealth inequality, which exacerbates racial and ethnic fissures that often turn violent (Novokmet, Piketty; Zucman, 2017). The violence that Russia suffers from right-wing nationalistic groups is a constant threat to national security. Russian President Vladimir Putin follows his predecessors’ views of aggressive Russian advancement and nationalistic policies as the best way to protect both Russia’s sovereign borders and its national interests1 (Gurganus, 2018).
Russia’s Sentimental Revisionist Approach to Competition and Conflict – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q4] How does Russia perceive the continuum of conflict? How does Russia plan for, operate within, and manage risk within the competitive space? From the Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management? What are the implications of those differences for senior political and military decision makers in the US?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of seven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict and how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the competitive space.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Russian Strategic Intentions
Authors | Editors: Arquilla, J. (Naval Postgraduate School); Borshchevskaya, A. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Devyatkin, P. (The Arctic Institute); Dyet, A. (U.S. Army, J5-Policy USCENTCOM); Ellis, R.E. (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Goure, D. (Lexington Institute); Kamp, A. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Kangas, R. (National Defense University); Katz, M. (George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government); Koven, B. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Lamoreaux, J. (Brigham Young University- Idaho); Laruelle, M. (George Washington University); Marsh, C. (Special Operations Research Association); Person, R. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Pyatkov, R. (HAF/A3K CHECKMATE); Schindler, J. (The Locarno Group); Severin, M. (UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Siegle, J. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University); Spalding, R. (U.S. Air Force); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute); Werchan, J. (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.)
Executive Summary
This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict, in direct response to a series of questions posed by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Twenty-three experts contributed to this white paper and provided wide-ranging assessments of Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-five chapters, as described below. This summary reports some of the white paper’s high-level findings, but it is no substitute for a careful read of the individual contributions.
There is broad consensus among the contributors that Russian President Vladimir Putin is indeed adhering to a global grand strategy, which aims to achieve the following goals:
- Reclaim and secure Russia’s influence over former Soviet nations
- Regain worldwide recognition as a “great power”
- Portray itself as a reliable actor, a key regional powerbroker, and a successful mediator (Katz; Borshchevskaya) in order to gain economic, military, and political influence over nations worldwide and to refine the liberalist rules and norms that currently govern the world order (Lamoreaux)
According to Dr. Robert Person, these goals are motivated by Russia’s deep-seated geopolitical insecurity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to find its place in the global community, which has left the leadership with a lingering desire to regain the influence and power that it once had. In particular, Russia seeks to regain its influence over former Soviet states, which it claims are in its rightful “sphere of influence” (Lamoreaux; Person; Marsh). As a result, one of the United States’ core goals, namely promoting and protecting the international liberal order, comes into contention with the goals of Russia’s grand strategy. This underpins the Kremlin’s belief that it must contain and constrain US influence and activities in Europe and elsewhere across the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s contribution suggests, the Russian leadership’s worldview is zero-sum; it believes that in order for Russia to win, the US must lose. However, Dr. Christopher Marsh’s contribution suggests that this world view is not necessarily shared by the Russian population or its elite. As evidenced by the range of “gray zone” activities it engages in, a number of the expert contributors argue that the Russian leadership sees itself as at war with the US and the West as a whole. From a Russian perspective, this war is not total, but rather, it is fundamental (Goure)—a type of “war” that is at odds with the general US understanding of warfare. Russia believes that there is no unacceptable or illegitimate form of deterrence, compellence, or escalation management (Goure). It also does not believe in the continuum of conflict that the US has constructed. Like Russia’s perception of its competition with the US, its perception of conflict is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To fight and win this war, Russia believes that the successful integration of all instruments of state power (Goure), as well as the orchestrated employment of non-military and military means to deter and compel (Flynn), are paramount. Furthermore, Russian military concepts include options for employing preemptive force to induce shock and dissuade an adversary from conducting military operations and to compel a de-escalation of hostilities (Flynn). The authors observe that Russia’s strategies are continuously evolving and expect that the discrepancy between the Russian and the US understanding of “conflict” and “war” will continue to grow, leading to a higher risk of escalation in future situations involving both nations.
Overall, Russia’s influence abroad is growing, and the Kremlin has mastered the use of “hybrid warfare” in driving Russia’s foreign policy (Lamoreaux). Russia utilizes a variety of gray zone tactics around the globe. These include the use of paramilitary forces and other proxies, interference in political processes, economic and energy exploitation (particularly in Africa), espionage, and media and propaganda manipulation. Putin is also adept at blending military and civilian elements for maximum impact (Weitz).
The specific tactics of hybrid warfare that Russia uses vary by region. In Europe, for example, Russia has utilized propaganda, an increasing dependence on external energy resources, and political manipulation to achieve its primary goals (Schindler; Lamoreaux). In contrast, in the Middle East and Africa— important sources of minerals and other natural resources from a Russian perspective1— Russia has primarily utilized economic exploitation tools (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Central Asia, Russia maintains a much more limited presence, due to China’s geographic proximity and the current levels of economic and security engagement by other regional actors (Kangas). Nevertheless, Russia does retain influence in the Central Asia, as a result of its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to the region (Laruelle; Dyet). Likewise, in Latin America, Russia lacks a sufficient amount of deployable resources to fully implement its strategy or to extend its influence very far (Ellis). However, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp observe, Russia makes up for its shortcomings by engaging in episodic and reactive endeavors to disrupt US influence in the region.
Although Russian tactics vary significantly, in all regions of the world energy has been a key source of Russian power and influence (Weitz; Lamoreaux; Borshchevskaya; Devyatkin; Pyatkov; Werchan). Globally, many countries have developed a strong relationship with Russia when it comes to energy. Russia’s energy priorities extend worldwide, and European nations in particular have become dependent on Russia for access to these resources. Africa and the Arctic have also become significant as Russia looks to exploit opportunities for energy-related commerce.
Despite the strength of Russia’s growing influence abroad and the diverse array of gray zone tactics it uses to achieve its strategic goals, the US can still limit the results of this grand strategy. There is broad consensus among the contributors that countering Russian provocations will require the use of all instruments of national power. In particular, US success will be reliant both on its ability to influence populations, states, and non-state actors, and on its ability to minimize Russia’s influence on these actors (Bragg). Creating effective narratives in each of the regions covered in this white paper will be critical for achieving this goal (Kangas; Bragg). Furthermore, the US can counter specific Russian gray zone activities, such as diversifying energy sources to reduce European nations’ dependence on Russia (Pyatkov; Werchan) and counteracting propaganda by creating both resilient democratic institutions and populations abroad, particularly in Europe (Pyatkov). Finally, it is imperative that the US establishes a consensus definition of “gray zone” (Bragg) and reevaluates old paradigms defining war and peace, as we enter a “new era of international politics which is defined by shades of gray” (Weitz). Once defined, a federal agency dedicated to gray zone activities may be required in order to implement a true whole of government approach to combatting Russian influence activities abroad (Werchan).
Report Overview
This white paper has been separated into five parts:
Part I analyzes the key sources of motivation or interests that drive Russian global competitive activities and strategy. This part also addresses the fundamental issues being contested and how these issues impact enduring US national interests.
Part II examines, from a Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and/or escalation management. Part II also evaluates how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict, as well as how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the gray zone. Lastly, Part II assesses the implications of the differences between US and Russian thinking for senior political and military decision makers.
Part III identifies actions the Russians are undertaking in the Gray Zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.
Part IV identifies potential actions that the US could employ either proactively or in response to provocative Russian activities in the gray zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.
Part V highlights capabilities that the US requires to effectively respond to actions the Russians are undertaking in the gray zone.
Part I. What Drives Russia’s Global Interests and Strategy?
Chapter 1: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux identifies three motivations underpinning Russian grand strategy: (1) for the country to be recognized as a great power with its own distinct sphere of influence; (2) the Russian elite perception that Russia has a moral right to predominance within “its” sphere of influence; and (3) the desire to see US global influence curbed and, if possible, scaled back.
Chapter 2: Using the military’s traditional understanding of “strategy” as the coordinated integration of ends, ways, and means, Dr. Robert Person explicates Russian grand strategy. The main “end” of Russian grand strategy in the 21st century is establishing is a “Yalta 2.0,” in which Russia enjoys an uncontested sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, broadcasts Russian voice and influence globally, and establishes reliable constraints on American globe-trotting and regime-change activities. Russia’s ways can be described as one of “asymmetric balancing” through gray zone challenges to prevent uncontested US influence from setting the global agenda. Russia’s means, Person argues, expanded with the oil boom, allowing critical investments and increases in defense spending to be made.
Chapter 3: Using survey data, Dr. Thomas Sherlock shows that neither the Russian mass public, nor Russia elites, believe that the West, particularly the United States, poses a critical military or political danger to the Russian state or regime. While both elites and members of the mass public are supportive of restoring Russia’s great power status, they often define a great power and its priorities more in terms of domestic socio-economic development than in the production and demonstration of hard power. These perspectives increasingly come into conflict with those of Kremlin.
Chapter 4: Dr. Richard Weitz explores key motivations and interests driving Russian global competitive activities and strategies. He discusses how Russian strategists adeptly select gray zone tools optimized to their objectives. These tools often include paramilitary forces, economic and energy exploitation, and media and propaganda manipulation. He suggests that Washington must reevaluate old paradigms between war and peace to maintain strategic primacy in this new era of international politics that is defined by shades of gray.
Chapter 5: Dr. Christopher Marsh takes on one of the most significant questions surrounding Russian foreign policy: whether president Vladimir Putin has an overarching strategy. In his paper, he describes Putin’s grand strategy for Russia and the world. He also analyzes each of Russia’s interests and to what degree they pose a threat to vital US national interests.
Part II. How Does Russia Perceive Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, and the Continuum of Conflict?
Chapter 6: Dr. Daniel Goure argues that according to Russian strategic thought, Russia is already at war with the West. There is no separate concept of gray zone: war is not total, but it is fundamental to the Russian perspective. It follows that Russia’s ability to manage risk in the so-called gray zone is a function of its successful integration of all the instruments of state power.
Chapter 7: Mr. Daniel J. Flynn describes Russian coercive strategies involving the orchestrated employment of nonmilitary and military means to deter and compel the United States prior to and after any outbreak of hostilities. The risk to the US is that these strategies increase the risk of miscalculation and escalation during a future crisis involving the United States.
Part III. What Gray Zone Actions Are Russia Undertaking Across the Globe?
Chapter 8: Dr. John Schindler identifies Russian activities in Europe within a historical and ideological framework. In doing so, he identifies key similarities and differences between the Putin regime and Tsarist Russia, as well as the regime and the Soviet Union. Present day Russian institutions and religious discourse are examined, and Dr. Schindler predicts that the Kremlin will act aggressively in a number of domains, including the few in which it holds an advantage against the United States and its allies. He suggests that a near-term future of “Special War” (i.e. low-level operations that fall below the threshold of declared war) will be the Russian modus operandi and cautions US and allied policymakers to guard against such actions.
Chapter 9: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux explains that the list of Russian activities in Europe remains long and complex, and the means that the Kremlin uses to sow instability span geopolitics, economics, diplomacy, and military domains. In this chapter, Dr. Lamoreaux pays special attention to Russia’s ability to propagate societal discord, particularly through Russian-linked populations in the Baltic States. These populations, whether active or passive participants in a campaign, are vulnerable to Russian actions aimed at weakening social cohesion in these states. Short of each side grudgingly accepting the other’s claims on the continent (which is improbable), Russia and the West are likely to be locked in at some level of competition for the near future.
Chapter 10: Dr. Marlene Laruelle states that, despite a more crowded field of large states vying for influence in Central Asia, Russia still retains a prime position as “first among equals,” due to its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to states in the region. To wit, Russia can exercise remunerative, punitive, and ideological power over the states within the bloc. It has tried to develop its diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with states in the region, with varying degrees of success. Even though the space for great powers to exert influence has become more crowded, because of relatively recent overtures by China and the United States, this region is not necessarily a site of zero-sum statist competition, due to shared objectives by these great powers.
Chapter 11: Dr. Mark N. Katz explains that, although the United States and Russia share a number of objectives in the Middle East, the means by which Russia seeks to achieve these objectives will likely continue to bring it into conflict with the United States. The Kremlin has purported itself as a reliable interlocutor and partner to Middle Eastern nations, some of whom fear wavering commitment by the United States recently. Animated largely by fears of a restive Muslim population that could end up within his borders, in addition to economic and prestige concerns, Vladimir Putin has been conducting deft diplomacy within the region. However, his strategy is vulnerable to shocks to the system and may not be able to withstand Arab Spring/Color Revolution-style uprisings within the region.
Chapter 12: Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya highlights Russia’s series of multi-faceted outreach initiatives in Africa. Through economic, military, and other means, Russia is creating an intentional dependence among North Africa’s military, political leaders and businessmen on continuous Russian support. For more autocratic regimes, Russia’s support is intended to provide a shield against Western influence in the area through forming alliances with the country’s strongmen, while serving as an intermediary for local conflict resolution. Russia’s key interests include gaining and protecting access to the Mediterranean coast, while exploiting opportunities for energy and trade. The intent of these efforts is increased political leverage, rather than a genuine resolution for the people of North Africa.
Chapter 13: Ms. Malin Severin argues that Russia believes that it is currently engaged in a multi- faceted conflict with the West, and is constrained by Western policies and actions. As such, Russia has established several footholds in Africa. The Russian presence goes beyond seeking natural resources; Russia has placed private military contractors and advisors into several African regimes, including the Central African Republic, among others. These actions reflect a strategy similar to that revealed through Russian activities in the Ukraine and Syria, and involvement is likely to increase as the US potentially takes steps to limit Western presence in Africa.
Chapter 14: Dr. R. Evan Ellis explains that Russian activity in Latin America, while constrained by resources and geopolitical events, has been historically focused on the Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes, although it is not limited solely to those regimes. By attempting to create both economic and military footholds, Russia seeks opportunities to expand its influence in the region. Despite setbacks due to regional events, Russia is likely to continue to explore ways to leverage and exploit opportunities for increasing both its military and economic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Chapter 15: Mr. Pavel Devyatkin writes that Russia’s activities in the Arctic have included more multilateral cooperation, and have been focused on securing access for northern shipping routes and energy extraction. The formation of the Arctic Council between Russia and other Arctic countries has enabled cooperation on resolution of territorial claims, as well as oil spill and search-and-rescue operations. Strategically, the Arctic region plays a significant role in Russia’s energy, economic, and defense priorities, as evidenced by the size and activities of the Northern Fleet, as well as frequent mention in Russian published doctrine.
Part IV. How Should the US Counteract Russian Gray Zone Activities Across the Globe?
Chapter 16: Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov discusses potential global actions to counter provocative Russian activities. The US National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls out Russian actions to undermine NATO and modify European and Middle Eastern security and economic organizations in its favor (National Defense Strategy summary, p. 2). Countering Russian provocations requires all instruments of national power, and US responses can be both proactive and reactive. Proactively, the United States can strengthen its allies’ and partners’ democratic systems of governance, while reducing their dependence on Russian energy through diversification of energy sources. To counter Russian military proxies, the United States can increase the capabilities of allies and partners. Meanwhile, Russian threats to use force can be mitigated by demonstrating US resolve and capability to deter and defeat Russian aggression.
Chapter 17: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux focuses on countering Russian influence in the Baltic States. He writes that Russian influence in Europe happens primarily through “hybrid warfare” techniques. To counter this, the United States ought to take steps to strengthen economic, political, and societal liberalism across Europe. Economic and political liberalism both create strong states, capable of providing the institutions necessary for societal liberalism. Societal liberalism, when it is upheld by the rule of law, helps create a more diverse, yet united, populace that is more committed to the state and its basic institutions, and less likely to be influenced by outside sources (in this case, Russia).
Chapter 18: Dr. Roger Kangas recommends a US approach to Russian activities across Central Asia. He begins by discussing the particular difficulties of Central Asia, geopoltically. Among the sub- regions of the world, the area of Central Asia is one of the more difficult regions to outline clear actions for the US, simply because of the advantages that other large powers have, due to geographic proximity and current rates of economic and security engagement. Given this geopolitical reality in Central Asia, the US has a limited role to play. If the “tools of engagement” are exercised consistently and clearly, the US can have a positive influence in the region. The countries collectively chafe at that notion they are part of a “Russian Near Abroad.” Officials and analysts from the region repeatedly discuss the need to choose their future paths of engagement, whether in terms of multi-vectored security relations or diversifying trade and export/import routes. These signals can be addressed by US policies and actions. The refrain from needing the US to act as a “balancer” is heard from such actors, as well as many in the Washington, DC think tank community that focus on Central Asia. To do this, the US must be able to shape its own narrative in the region, combatting a rather vitriolic Russian message that paints the US in a negative light.
Chapter 19: Dr. Robert Spalding III discusses how the US role with regard to Russia should be to continue to engage European allies to take the lead for balancing in Europe. The allies’ goal should be deterrence. At the same time, the US should bilaterally engage Russia to peel them away from China’s orbit. The US can work with Russia in ways that improve the US-Russia relationship without detracting from European efforts to balance and deter. This can be applied by engaging with Russia in other regional or functional domains that do not detract from European efforts to deter.
Chapter 20: MAJ Adam Dyet argues that, while the breakup of the Soviet Union presented the US with new engagement opportunities in Central Asia, options to expand US influence in the area remain limited. He argues that despite Central Asian ire at Russian activities in Ukraine, Russian influence in the area remains high, and US policy makers should take a carefully moderated approach to engagement in Central Asia. Suggestions of diplomatic, security, and economic activities that the US could undertake are offered, as are cautions about treading over long-standing Russian red lines.
Chapter 21: MAJ Adam Dyet discusses a variety of ways in which the United States can respond to Russian gray zone activities in the Middle East—the balance of which, he argues, are directly tied to Russian strategic culture and a worldview based in a history of invasion and military encirclement.
Chapter 22: Dr. Joseph Siegle discusses Russian interests in Africa, namely access to natural resources and new markets for Russian goods, including weapons. He argues that, as a result, Russia has tended to support autocratic or uninclusive regimes, giving the US an opportunity to distinguish itself in Africa by pursuing an assertive policy against individual corrupt leaders and positive engagement, while also supporting democratic reforms.
Chapter 23: Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp explain that Russia’s activities in Latin America have largely been an extension of its efforts to operate within the gray zone between overt military conflict and normal peacetime operations. In Latin America, the Kremlin has engaged in electoral meddling and targeted disinformation campaigns in order to impose costs on adversaries. In Mexico, Russian media had vocally supported a chosen candidate, and observers noted activity by bots and trolls in support of that candidate’s agenda. In Colombia, Russia had long supplied arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist insurgency, but since the group’s recent peace deal with the Colombian government, the Kremlin may need to change tactics in order to maintain influence therein. Colombia’s complex political dynamics, nevertheless, provides a fertile ground for Russian activities, spanning electoral meddling, mass media disinformation, and hardliners within the FARC.
Part V. What Capabilities Does the US Need to Effectively Respond to Russian Gray Zone Activities?
Chapter 24: Dr. Belinda Bragg provides a summary of findings from an SMA project on gray zone conflict, noting the importance of honing a clear definition of the “competitive zone” within which gray activities occur. She also notes that an effective US response to these activities requires added capabilities to both influence foreign populations and block the efforts of others to manipulate popular sentiment.
Chapter 25: Mr. Jason Werchan argues that Russia’s form of governance gives it “significant flexibility” and an advantage over the US when it comes to gray zone activities. The US needs a true whole-of-government approach to counter Russia in this area. Werchan suggests that the US government should identify a lead federal agency for US activities in the gray zone. He also encourages the development of the US’s “capability to effectively foster distrust and unease between the Russia Federation and China,” as well as US efforts to reduce European dependence on Russian energy resources.