NSI Publications

Serbia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Serbia were analyzed: Serbian state data on monthly income by occupation for 2018, and International Labor Organization (ILO) data on income by occupation for the years 2016 and 2014.

Results

Serbia’s population is highly risk acceptant. Occupations that earn higher incomes are more to take risks due to the high reward of maintaining or increasing their socioeconomic status within Serbian society (Imas, 2016). The risk acceptance of the wealthier and poorer classes is exacerbated by political pressure from major international powers, internal economic issues, and social cleavages that refuse to allow old prejudices and conflicts to die. These long-lasting cleavages have the potential to incur violent outbursts and see a devolution back into a state of civil war (UNPD, 2018; CRS report, 2018).

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Serbia has the potential to control the flow of displaced refugees into Europe. Furthermore, it has strong cultural and geopolitical connections to Russia. For these reasons, the United States, Western Europe, China, and Russia all take special interest in Serbian stability. The great powers attempt to influence Serbia using humanitarian aid, infrastructure investments, and more covert means through media and propaganda (CRS report, 2018; Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019; Nalaeva, 2016). Low economic achievement and a precarious relationship with the self-proclaimed independent state of Kosovo has only aggravated ethnic and societal tensions in recent years, causing a rising fear that Serbian society may devolve back into the violence it experienced in the 1990s (CRS, 2018). This scenario would place Serbian civilians in a position where they must take extreme risks amid sinking Serbian stability, and the data analyzed in this study indicate that they may very well be in a risk acceptant decision frame.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an increased interest in Serbia, which has grown from a socialist state and perpetrator of genocide to a democratic government and potential EU member state (CRS, 2018). However, ethnic tensions still lie under the surface of Serbian society and contribute to social discrimination and an ongoing socioeconomic crisis (UNPD, 2018). The United States’ main interests are in supporting its allies in the EU and NATO as they seek to counter Russian influence by creating a stable and politically democratic Balkan region (CRS, 2018). To meet this goal, the United States has given millions of dollars in financial and humanitarian aid to Serbia. Serbia’s risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US’ interests should economically frustrated ethnic Serbs turn their frustrations toward minorities and destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has fewer immediate interests in Serbia than Russia and Western European countries. Instead its interests lie in potential future economic and political aspirations for China, both in the Balkans and beyond into central Europe (Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019). Several Chinese infrastructure projects, which include the high-speed railway from Belgrade to Budapest and two separate construction projects on Serbia’s corridor 11 highway, rely upon future Serbian social stability (Dimitrijević, 2017). Serbia has been incredibly receptive of China’s infrastructure projects going as far as to suggest China open a joint infrastructure office with Budapest. Since its business sector has been receptive of economic overtures from Beijing, Serbia’s risk acceptant population gives the leadership in China an opportunity if it is able to break ground on its Belt and Road initiative, providing more economic opportunities for the Serbian population.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russian interests in Serbia are based upon its ethnic and cultural ties to Slavic nations that follow Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Russia considers itself a protector of Serbia and other Balkan States due to these cultural connections (CRS, 2018). Russia views the EU and NATO’s interaction within Serbia as a direct affront to its sovereign rights, and its ability to interact economically and politically within Eastern Europe. While Russia’s interests in Serbia remain mostly political, it has used economic and media tools (such as Serbia’s reliance on Russian energy, and Russia’s posturing as a pan-Slavic Orthodox Christian defender), to counteract the United States’ and Western Europe’s interaction in the country (Bugajski, 2018). Serbia’s risk acceptant population is both a risk and an opportunity for Russia. This is due to its population’s ability to sway the direction of Serbia’s government that could either align itself with the EU and NATO or Russia in the future based off of perceived potential gains.

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Statistical Modeling of Risk and Political Instability in the Influence Environment – An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Authors | Editors: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.); Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Success in the global competition between the US, China, and Russia may be determined by a country’s ability to influence the world’s populations. A population’s aspirations and grievances can drive national security problems for all three powers when frustrated aspirations and grievances lead to state instability, terrorism, or other challenges such as unwanted or unmanaged migration. In accordance with the questions posed in the J39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Great Power Competition tasking, this study is intended to address the following issues through the use of country-level global statistical modeling, including identifying or anticipating:

• Where aggrieved populations are likely to exist globally and how they may be operationalized against US interests.
• The effects of global climate change on state stability.
• The forms of instability that may challenge US interests (political instability, autocratic regimes, violent extremism, adversarial proxies).
• The causes and effects of mass migration.

Previous academic research was used as the starting point for this study, and it was challenged to approximate the data challenges of intelligence analysis as well as to re-test earlier findings and update models by considering new and potentially relevant variables. Three statistical models (political stability, terrorism, and migration) were developed under these conditions to address the J39 questions. The key findings were:

• Political instability is driven by hunger, risk acceptant elites, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, weak democracy, mountainous terrain, economic isolation, and ethnic division.
• Terrorism is fueled by large populations, ties to MENA oil producers, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, economic isolation, and a risk acceptant middle class.
• Migration from undeveloped countries is driven by hunger, a youth bulge, homicide and political oppression, and
• Migration to developed countries is driven by permissive immigration policies and the attraction of national wealth.

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The Character of Global Competition and Conflict, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Barry B. Hughes (University of Denver), Dr. Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Dr. William C. Wohlforth (Dartmouth College), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)

Question of Focus

[Q1] How will the character of global competition and conflict change over the next decade, and which emerging global trends and conditions will drive this change? What are the implications of expected future global conditions for developing integrated US strategy and plans to defend US interests over both short- and long- term timeframes?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-eight Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the character of global competition and conflict will change over the next decade, and the implications of those changes on United States policy and planning.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Types and Locations of Challenges to US Interests, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Colonel Kris Bauman (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Raphael S. Cohen (RAND Corporation), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Stuart J. Kaufman (University of Delaware), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Dr. Laura Silver (Pew Research Center), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)

Question of Focus

[Q5] In which regions should the US expect significant challenges to its interests over the coming decade? What form will these challenges take (e.g., poor/instable governance, rising hegemons, aggrieved populations, violent non-state actors, external influence operations, etc.) and which US interests will these challenges most likely impact?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eighteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors assess the types and locations of significant challenges to US interests that will emerge over the coming decade.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

United Kingdom Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in United Kingdom were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2017 and 2011.

Results

Income data form the World Bank and occupational data from ILO indicate that the United Kingdom is highly risk acceptant. Despite this similarity, the relationship between wealth attainment and risk acceptance between the two sources is different. The World Bank data indicates a country in which the individuals who make the highest incomes are the least risk averse. while the data from ILO shows a positive relationship between the average income for an occupation and an increase in risk aversion.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The United Kingdom’s propensity for risk taking can be currently observed through the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, which is planned to take place later in 2019 (BBC, 2019). However, the impact Brexit will have on stability and the UK and its institutions is still unknown as it has been delayed repeatedly.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an important relationship with the United Kingdom as it has been a long time ideological and political ally against autocratic states including Russia. The US also holds the UK as a strategically important player due to its current position in the EU (Belin, 2019). The United Kingdom has been a US ally in its activities outside of Europe against Chinese encroachment into the South China Sea. Despite this, economic changes from the UK leaving the EU will occur within the next year, challenging the US-UK relationship. The scope and impact of these changes has yet to be understood. The economic changes that will occur have far reaching implications because of the large trade between the US and UK (United States Trade Representatives, 2019). Much more important than their trade relationship is their political partnership, both strategically with respect to security/coalition issues and with respect to soft power (Belin, 2019). The UK’s risk acceptant population is a risk to the US interests because this population has chosen disruptive political and economic changes that may destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China sees a post-EU United Kingdom as a potential economic partner. The UK’s planned exit from the EU has led to Chinese economic overtures, suggesting a potential free-trade deal and the connection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to London (Johnson, 2019). China and the UK have little political differences with one other than the UK’s joint military operations with the US (Kelly, 2019). Despite the UK’s close ties to the US, its risk acceptant population gives China an opportunity to increase its standings politically and economically as it looks to extend its BRI to London (Johnson, 2019).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has little direct influence within the United Kingdom. Other than their historic ties as two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the two countries are fundamentally at odds with each other on an ideological level (House of Commons, 2017). While the upcoming Brexit may offer the opportunity to soften Russian-UK relations, it is unlikely to cause wide ranging or deep changes. Despite the unlikelihood of changes in Russia and the UK’s relationship the UK’s risk acceptant population provides Russia an opportunity, as Brexit will weaken the UK’s connection to the EU.

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United States Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Four datasets on wealth and status distribution in the United States were analyzed: 2016, 2010, and 2007 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2017 US Bureau of Labor statistics income deciles.

Results

Overall the population of the US is highly risk acceptant, with peaks among the poor and the wealthiest. Furthermore, recent economic volatility has caused middle class Americans to lose wealth, which has not been regained, placing them in a loss averse and therefore risk accepting decision frame. The wealthy have been able to regain wealth lost during the Great Recession. However, their regained wealth has been in the form of more uncertain and volatile income versus traditional rents from capital ownership, possibly sustaining their high level of risk acceptance.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The entire American population is arguably risk acceptant, or in the case of the middle class, loss averse. These conditions imply political risk taking across the social spectrum.

Implications for US Interests

Political partisanship, social unrest, and economic volatility are likely to decrease trust in the political system and lead to protest and major shifts in the priorities of political parties.

Implications for China’s Interests

Given the close economic ties between China and the US, volatility in American markets could jeopardize some Chinese economic interests. However, given the great power competition for global influence between the countries, losses in economic power and increased social division within the US likely play into Chinese interests and objectives.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Given Russia’s desire to see a weakened US and democratic institutions worldwide, economic inequality, volatility, partisanship and social discord in the US presents Russia with opportunities to use cleavages between socio-economic classes to further weaken the nation.

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Venezuela Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Venezuela were analyzed: 2006 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 Venezuelan Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) data on income by occupational category.

Results

Income data provided by the World Bank (2006) and occupational data from ENCOVI (2014), shows a Venezuelan population that is extremely risk acceptant with a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -7.15, the second highest in the world.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Venezuela’s lowest and highest socioeconomic classes are extremely risk acceptant. The Venezuelan political and economic crisis is causing a shortage of living essentials for most of its population (Garcia- Navarro, 2016). How most of its population lives is in stark contrast to those working in the petroleum industries, or political elites who enjoy a high quality of living from low-priced goods and luxury items purchased from the black market.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has strong security interests in Venezuela but has little direct influence over what occurs in the country while President Maduro remains in power (Neghaiwi, 2019). Instead, the United States relies on economic sanctions to place political pressure on President Maduro in the hopes of seeing him removed from office. The US supports the opposition leader Juan Guaido’s claim to the presidency. While President Maduro retains his power, the US must rely on Switzerland, which has been acting as a conduit between the US and President Maduro, to represent US interests. The extremely risk acceptant segments of Venezuelan society indicate that turmoil will continue between aggrieved constituencies supportive of Maduro and Guaido and across socioeconomic classes.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has sunk billions of dollars into Venezuela in the form of financial aid (Rendon, 2018). If President Maduro retains his power, China will retain a tremendous ally in Latin America that it will be able to control through debt (Sigalos, 2019). However, if President Maduro is replaced by Guaido, then China stands to lose much of the money it has loaned Venezuela as well as access to cheap oil. The continued turmoil presents a dynamic situation from which China may either benefit if Maduro retains power or lose of Guaido prevails.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has invested money and military personnel in Venezuela on a smaller scale than China, however its desired end is also to see President Maduro retain his power (Sigalos, 2019). Russia’s interaction with Latin America is partially driven in response to the US and NATO activity in the Balkans and former Soviet republics. Sigalos also states that this is a part of a larger economic strategy that is contingent on Russia growing its markets outside of countries in the European, Union including investments in Venezuela’s petroleum industry (Lowe & Sagdiev, 2019). To both of these ends, if President Maduro secures his presidency, then Russia will gain an important political ally in the region and access to cheap petroleum. As with China, Russia’s interests hang in the balance while a highly divided, discontented and risky accepting population supports their political rivals.

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Using Narratives to Shape Chinese and Russian Behavior – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Authors | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Nicholas Michelsen (King’s College, London), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Dr. Laura Roselle (Elon University), Dr. Scott Ruston (Arizona State University), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q12] What are the elements of a narrative that lends coherence to United States military activities and can help shape Chinese and Russian behaviors?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can use narratives to lend coherence to its military activities and shape Chinese and Russian behavior.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

[Q9] What are the biggest hindrances to a successful relationship between the private and government space sectors? How can these be minimized? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

January, 2018

Summary Response

The 33 individuals or teams that provided input represent large, medium, and small/start-up space companies;4 USG civil space agencies; academia; think tanks; and professional organizations. Four of these are non-US voices (Australia, Canada, Italy, and Norway.)

The consensus view among the expert contributors to this report is that a successful and sustained government- commercial relationship in the space domain is as essential for achieving US national security goals as it is for achieving commercial profits.5 At present, however, contributors see the ways in which US civil and National Security Space (NSS) operate as barring the attributes that make for an attractive business environment, including: a) clear requirements and data exchange between government and commercial partners, b) persistent and predictable funding and cash flow, c) non onerous and consistently implemented export controls, and d) synchronization of internal government agendas and decision making with regard to space.

The following sections discuss four themes related to US public and private space sector relations (i.e., US civil and National Security Space and the commercial sector) that emerge in the input provided by the expert contributors. While one of the themes focuses on positive aspects of the relationship, the other three themes focus on types of barriers—namely, red tape, culture, and organization of the bureaucracy. The frequency of mentions for each of these themes, as well as for specific examples of each given by the contributors, is summarized in the Figure below. These themes are discussed in greater detail below. It should be noted that, unless specified, there was no association between an expert’s views and his or her professional affiliation. The barriers and mitigation options discussed here were identified as much by NSS and US civil space voices as by commercial and scholarly ones.

First, the Good News…

Although the question of focus prompted experts to address hindrances, nearly a third (30%) of the contributors feel that relations between US public and private space sectors are fairly good. In fact, even among contributors who see significant barriers, several identify specific organizations and programs as exemplars of ways to make USG space a more attractive and accessible business environment.6 NASA is the governmental organization that is most frequently cited as having made progress in cutting red tape and developing innovative ways to work with commercial actors. The FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation is the second most cited, followed by NOAA and then finally, some programs at NGA.7

The Barriers

The majority (70%) of expert contributors mentioned at least one of three types of important barriers that hinder relations between the commercial sector and US National Security Space. “Red Tape” refers to barriers imposed by USG regulatory and acquisition/contracting processes. “Culture” captures barriers that contributors suggest arise from the different goals, expectations, and cultures of the NSS and commercial space communities. Finally, “Organization of Bureaucracy” addresses impediments that result from the organization and structure of the US bureaucracy.

#1: Red Tape

What are described as opaque, convoluted, and slow US regulatory and acquisition/contracting processes are the hindrances that are most frequently mentioned by contributors.

The Barriers

In a sentiment echoed by other contributors, Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK suggests that problems with space acquisition do not just reside within bureaucratic machines, but often emerge at the outset from “a poor requirements process—[the NSS] can’t decide what it wants.” Dr. George C. Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration offers a reason for why this is so: “the nature of the DoD organizational structure, namely lots of people can say ‘no,’ but no one’s empowered to say ‘yes’.”

What is the impact on the commercial sector? In short, the effect is increased costs of doing business with NSS. When acquisition and contracting processes are difficult to navigate, involve so many steps, and require extended periods to reach contract award, the transaction costs of working with the USG can become higher than the value of the work itself—a negative business case that is extremely difficult to defend to shareholders and investors. Lengthy periods of uncertainty involved in securing work with NSS also increase financial risk to companies who must spend up-front capital to pursue NSS work.8 Smaller companies may experience additional barriers. Three contributions from small or start-up businesses find that current acquisition processes may benefit “entrenched interests” and make it difficult for smaller firms to compete with larger, better-known prime contractors.9 Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland sees the issue as reciprocal—that is, the “creakiness/complexity of the acquisition process at DoD and NASA” also makes it harder for the USG to find and work with smaller companies.

While contributors were sympathetic to the necessity of government oversight of dual-use technologies with national security implications, many believe that this oversight is overly restrictive, unfair to US firms, and/or prone to what Joshua Hampson of the Niskanen Center tags as the “capriciousness and opaqueness” of decisions about export controls.10 More than half of the expert responses mention inconsistently implemented, “burdensome” and/or “outdated” mandatory Federal Acquisition egulation (FAR) requirements, International Traffics in Arms Regulation (ITAR), and other compliance requirements as major barriers to successful relations between public and private sector space. There are two inevitable results of restrictive export controls. First, activities such as moving space- related items from general export controls to ITAR put US companies at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors, and create a situation that eventually will incentivize companies to leave the US for areas with more lenient controls.12 Second, as Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) argues, a restrictive environment invites competition from foreign governments eager to attract business away from the US.

#2: Cultural Differences

What experts saw as “cultural” barriers to government-commercial partnerships in the space domain were attitudes and behaviors rooted in the different agendas, priorities, motives, incentive structures, and varying speeds of operations of government and commercial space. Contributors described two specific sources of culture clashes: differences in expectations about the operational environment, and different concepts of information sharing and control.

One critical difference between government and commercial space, unsurprisingly, emanates from the varying operational environments in which each side finds itself. In one example, Hampson observes that the private- and public-sector funding environments “do not neatly overlap.” He points out that even small changes in program funding can strain relations between the government and the private sector. Pressure on businesses to produce revenue—or at least the real possibility of it—to investors and directors as quickly as possible can be stymied by the deliberate pace of the NSS funding processes and decision cycles. In addition, government planning on the single fiscal year is simply out of alignment with commercial investment planning which, by necessity, requires longer lead times (e.g., for staffing- up, engaging capital investment, etc.) than does government planning. This mismatch can be lethal to all but the largest and most mature firms. For smaller, or “new space” innovators, this discrepancy can “de- incentivize entering the market or working with the US government” (Hampson).13 Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy)14 concurs that misunderstanding of commercial funding requirements is a major reason that companies often do not even consider the USG in their business planning. Simply put, the NSS business environment is too slow and thus too risky for the “aggressive go-to-market” strategies that drive many of these privately-funded enterprises.

A number of experts remarked on barriers generated by government versus commercial expectations regarding the control of all facets of space capabilities, systems, and development. An area in which the government culture of “control” appears particularly harmful is the control of information. This includes what experts identified as the tendency of NSS organizations to expect unidirectional information flows from commercial to government but not the other way around. Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) and Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation) are critical of the government’s lack of transparency and tendency for “over-classification” of space-related information. As an example of the former, Dr. T.S. Kelso of Analytical Graphics, Inc. recounts his experience with tracking data disseminated by the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) to commercial space; he notes that this data often is delayed, of questionable veracity, and/or incomplete. He says, “we constantly run into this kind of situation where the government is trying to protect processes or capabilities or systems or whatever it happens to be…but at the same time, we are putting hundreds of satellites that DoD relies on for things like communications at risk because we could think we understand the situation and actually maneuver into a collision rather than avoid one.” In a similar vein, the ViaSat, Inc. team comments on a recent statement by the Secretary of the Air Force on barring proprietary interfaces with government systems. They argue that declarations such as these illustrate a key government misunderstanding of the commercial sector, and should be the foci of efforts to find mutually beneficial common ground.

Nield describes the USG as committed to a “deeply ingrained habit of doing things the way we’ve always done them.” A number of experts identify the ironic result: The standard steps taken by the government to protect NSS systems could generate increased risk to those assets; an effect that these experts expect will only worsen as the space environment becomes more crowded. Contributors argue that ultimately, the key difficulty to overcome in the name of partnership is the reluctance of the NSS community to amend its standard procedures for fear of yielding control to other elements of the USG or the commercial sector.<,p>

Dr. Edythe Weeks of Webster University offers a slightly different view of the impact of culture clashes between public and private sector space. Rather than taking sides—or assigning the government most of the blame—Dr. Weeks characterizes the (ultimately self-defeating) conflict between the “myths” of commercial versus government space as one over “who knows the best way.” Commercial space, she argues, believes that it can produce space capabilities smaller, better, and faster than can government space. Given this ethic, it is not surprising to uncover commercial sector frustrations with a government space enterprise that it perceives as following a slower, less effective path. This commercial-government ‘mythology,’ encourages commercial space and the US public to “forget” the significant role played by the government in setting the legal conditions, funding innovative research and development, and purchasing services that underwrite commercial space. The mythology also diverts Congressional attention from the critical role of US government space, with the ironic effect of reducing budget appropriations for public sector space programs. This creates a negative cycle which lies at the heart of much of the budget uncertainty about which commercial actors complain.

#3: Bureaucratic Organization and Structure

The final category of hindrances mentioned by contributors has more to do with the practices and structure of the federal government than with the DoD or the NSS, specifically. Key issues mentioned by the expert contributors were the insufficient staffing and underfunding of US government space as a whole, as well as the legal requirements and other elements of the NSS acquisition process that are outside direct DoD input or control. Examples of the latter include the particularities of Congressional processes that can cause unanticipated roadblocks in program funding; or White House policy and priority changes that can change significantly from one election to the other. Robert Cabana of the NASA-Kennedy Space Center cites deficient policy synchronization among USG space agencies as adding to the confusion felt by firms that may want to do business with the USG. Hitchens in turn identifies the “lack of a clear policy on export controls [as] slowing the licensing process” for commercial space. Finally, Faulconer Consulting Group15 argues that many of the issues are the result of not having clearly established the government’s role relative to commercial space, asking, “Is the US Government client, manufacturer, or regulator?” They further point out the source of conflict: As one of the largest potential investors in the space sector, work done by government agencies is often in direct competition with “what the commercial providers can provide,” while at other times, the government is “purely the customer purchasing commercial services.”

Actions to Minimize Hindrances

If it is agreed that fostering a healthy, globally competitive commercial space sector is not at odds with US national security requirements but is itself a key requirement, then middle ground solutions must be found. To do so effectively requires taking an accounting of where the points of tension are. As such, tensions between commercial and government requirements, together with some steps for mitigating each, are summarized in the table below.

Contributors mentioned the need to “streamline,” “update,” and “reform” both acquisition and regulatory practices by taking steps to make them more transparent, lowering transaction costs to businesses associated with lengthy proposal writing and processing times, and facilitating access to businesses beyond the “old space” firms with which the NSS community currently partners. The majority of recommendations involved expanding the sizes and types of solicitations and funding vehicles available for space acquisition (e.g., increased use of Broad Agency Announcements [BAAs]; Small Business Innovation Research awards [SBIRs]; fixed-price contracts, competitions, demonstrations, and prizes; and space act agreements) to allow the government to leverage private sector investment and capabilities while reducing bureaucratic costs.16 Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin offers several suggestions to facilitate progress, including increasing funding for federal regulatory agencies so that they might be fully-staffed, offering workers incentives for good performance, and modifying personnel policies to attract the best talent to the USG.

Contributors

Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Anonymous Launch Executive; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA-Kennedy Space Center); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Michael Gold (Space Systems Loral); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA Headquarters); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global, Inc.; Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author | Editor: Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

This white paper deals with broad topic of assessing options to gain better understanding of the subjective world of populations we need to interface and relate to. How can we reliably anticipate behavior patterns? Our challenge is gaining the most accurate and useful information for commanders and other agencies for planning purposes. Who are the right people to try to influence to achieve strategic goals (individuals and/or groups). Which behaviors are we targeting? Why do people display those particular behaviors? Finally, how do we coordinate operations to drive the desired behaviors? We cannot rely entirely on social media (we must blend it with other intelligence), even though it can be an important contributor. This White Paper is intended to provide recommendations for planning methodologies, technological approaches, and required expertise.

Contributors

Brig Gen Alexus G. Grynkewich (Joint Staff), Dr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan (Joint Staff), Mr. Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Col. Scott K. Thomson (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)), Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III (NDU), LTC (Dr.) Gregory S. Seese (JHU-APL), LTC (Dr.) Rafael E. Linera (USASOC), Mr. Erinn McQuagge (Northop Grumman), Ms. Patricia DeGennaro (TRADOC G2), Mr. Randy Munch (TRADOC G2), Dr. Diane DiEuliis (NDU), Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown), Dr. Ian McCulloh (John Hopkins), Ms. Laurie McCulloh (Fielding), Dr. Jason Spitaletta (JHU-APL), Dr. Nicholas D. Wright (Univ. Birmingham, UK), Dr. Margeret Hall (UNO), Dr. Gina Ligon (UNO), Ms. Clara Braun (UNO), Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE), Mr. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr), Ms. Sophia Moskalenko (Bryn Mawr), Mr. Tom McCauley (Univ. Rochester), Mr. Dan Foy (Gallup), Mr. Chris Stewart (Gallup), Dr. Linda Durnell (Fielding), Dr. Garry Hare (Fielding), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services), Mr. Mark Polyak (Ipsos Public Affairs), Dr. David C. Ellis (Joint Special Operations Univ.), Dr. Katie Ziemer (Ipsos Public Affairs), Mr. Howard Simkin (USASOC G9), and Dr. William D. Casebeer (Lockheed Martin ATL)