SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jacqueline Schneider (US Naval War College) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard (Center for International Security and Cooperation [CISAC] at Stanford University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Ms. Ven Bruusgaard began the session by providing reasons why studying Russian nuclear strategy is important. She introduced the four iterations of Russian declaratory nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War (occurring in 1993, 2000, 2010, and 2014), identifying their major features and changes across versions.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Matt Kroenig (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Kroenig began the session by posing the question “What kind of nuclear posture does the United States need to protect itself and its allies?”

After the Cold War, despite many warning symbols from Russia (e.g., President Vladimir Putin’s election in 1999, the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014), Germany and the rest of Europe entered a state of complacency regarding a potential Russian threat to Western security, energy, and hard power. Dr. Dorondo explained that successive German chancellors adopted a rosy vision of the nation’s future—a carbon-neutral Germany within a peaceful Europe. In the process, the nuclear power generation sector of Germany’s economy would be phased out, coal would no longer be used, and natural gas production would contribute to a new socioeconomic vision of the future. In part due to the lack of a perceived threat from Russia, German limited its military spending.

On August 2, 2022, US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, Taiwan, triggering a series of Chinese military activities around the island. These activities presented an opportunity to observe how China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might conduct a future blockade of Taiwan. Prof. Lockyer argued that China’s public display of these exercises was intentional. China sought to convey a strategic message to nations across the globe that China could implement such a blockade; therefore, Taiwan should be hesitant to take any further actions towards independence. This recent example illustrates how sea power can serve as an incredibly flexible tool and shape the strategic environment as a deterrence strategy.

China is modernizing its nuclear forces which is routine for modern nuclear countries; however, the speed and acceleration of China’s modernization is alarming Western leaders and scholars. Ms. Bradley commented that by growing its nuclear forces, China is creating nuclear capabilities to match their geopolitical ambitions, including regional hegemony. As China increases its nuclear capabilities, its adversaries will need to increase their levels of deterrence to maintain the geopolitical status quo. The characteristics of China’s nuclear deterrence can be described as focused, limited, and defensive. Historically, China has maintained a ‘no first strike’ policy. As it increases its nuclear capabilities, this policy may change. Its recent escalation of its nuclear forces represents a change in its nuclear strategy, not its security environment.

The world is undergoing an era of nuclear transition while the mechanisms normally used to control these transitions are being placed under stress. Moreover, technological, geopolitical, and normative changes can influence the nuclear ecosystem and how actors handle nuclear threats and understand nuclear technology. Mr. Futter argued that this nuclear transition is a global and multifaceted phenomenon. He separated nuclear transitions into three-time frames: a) the first nuclear age (1945-1990), b) the second nuclear age (1990s-2014), and c) the third nuclear age (2018-present). These ages are defined by actors’ policy choices and the number of actors acquiring nuclear power.

Dr. Pettyjohn explained that nuclear deterrence is frequently examined in the context of a bilateral competition rather than a multipolar competition between three or more nuclear capable states.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Michelle Black (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska Omaha; Director for Workforce Development and Education, National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology and Education (NCITE); Research Fellow, National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska; Co-Editor, Space and Defense Journal) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Series.

Russia’s and China’s status as near-peer nuclear competitors with the US is changing the reality of what a military conflict would look like.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Session.

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Dr. Arnold Dupuy (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)), Dr. Ion Iftimie (Central European University, Vienna, Austria), Dr. Daniel Nussbaum (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Naval Postgraduate School), and Mr. Paul Michael Wihbey (Georgetown University and Institute on the Geopolitics of Energy), as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, entitled “Protection’s Price: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in US Alliances.” The speaker was Dr. Brian Blankenship (University of Miami).Dr. Blankenship began his presentation by discussing the conditions under which the United States is more or less likely to be successful in persuading its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Concerns about burden-sharing in US alliances are not new; many US presidents have made this issue a priority. On the other hand, these efforts have had varying levels of success. In some cases, US policymakers have been successful in their attempts to encourage allies to spend more on defense, as in the case of Jimmy Carter and South Korean defense spending. By contrast, US pressure has been less successful in other cases. For example, Lyndon Johnson attempted to pressure Great Britain into maintaining its military presence in the Middle East, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. According to Dr. Blankenship, conventional wisdom demonstrated that burden-sharing is quite difficult to achieve in asymmetric alliances between great powers and their smaller allies. US troop presence is conducive to free-riding by allies. In other words, allies lack incentives when the US has such a dominant presence worldwide.

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, featuring Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University).Dr. Dorondo began his presentation by discussing the tumultuous time that nations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are experiencing, while highlighting the political evolutions occurring in the US, the EU, and NATO. In Germany, 2021 holds a number of important state elections and a national election in which a new chancellor will be elected. However, Dr. Dorondo argued that it is important to bear in mind that any doubt about nuclear sharing in Germany as we approach the 2021 electoral year is nothing new. That said, it is also imperative to consider the necessity for nuclear sharing in support of transatlantic cooperation. Germany and other Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in NATO have a vested interest in what is sometimes called “nuclear decoupling” from the US. Theoretically speaking, the European states within NATO and the EU could achieve strategic autonomy logistically; however, there is not significant enough collective will to establish that strategic autonomy, Dr. Dorondo argued. He then stressed that the US and NATO must continue not only to deter but also assure and reassure in all domains.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ashley Townshend (University of Sydney), Dr. David Santoro (Pacific Forum), and Dr. Brendan Thomas-Noone (University of Sydney) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Our speakers focused on the US-Australia Indo-Pacific deterrence dialogue, specifically with regards to China and conventional deterrence.

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Amb. Ronald F. Lehman II (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) and Maj Gen (Ret) Bill Chambers (Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Michael Horowitz (University of Pennsylvania) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Horowitz began by explaining how nuclear technologies are shaping global politics. He used the global telegraph program, the Cuban missile crisis, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the Chinese proliferation of drones as examples. He then focused on automation, autonomy, and artificial intelligence (AI). Dr. Horowitz defined AI as “the use of computers to simulate human behavior that requires intelligence.” AI is also broad, multi-purpose, dual use, and has a low barrier to entry. There are various methods of AI (e.g., symbolic vs. connectionist, machine learning, neural networks) and types of AI (e.g., narrow, general intelligence, superintelligence). Furthermore, AI is an enabler rather than a weapon. AI can direct physical objects, process data, and perform overall information management, but it is not a gun, nor is it a plane. The implication of this is that AI can be used for much broader purposes than military technologies. Next, Dr. Horowitz explained that individuals pursue autonomy and AI for their speed, precision, bandwidth/hacking capabilities, and decision making assistance. AI also has its downsides, however. Autonomous systems can be “brittle” (i.e., limited in terms of their potential areas of operation and requiring an immense amount of training). One must be weary of automation bias and trusting machines/algorithms too much to avoid making mistakes as well. Dr. Horowitz added that if a nation is already confident in its second-strike capabilities, over-trusting a machine is not necessarily worth the brittleness risks.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Eric Gomez (Cato Institute) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Gomez began by discussing the present state and future of US missile defense. He explained that the US has both a homeland missile defense system, which protects the continental US from intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a regional missile defense system, which protects relatively small areas from shorter-range threats. Its regional missile defense system currently has more reliable testing records than does its homeland defense system. He then stated that the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) reveals a wholesale expansion of the US’s missile defense architecture, in addition to greater integration of homeland and regional missile defense assets. Dr. Gomez then highlighted the implications of US missile defense on adversary threat perceptions. Russia and China do not view missile defense as a unique or siloed program; instead, they both see it as a component of broader US military strategy. Being cognizant of this can help US decision makers understand threat perceptions and the action/reaction cycles that are generated or accelerated by missile defense, according to Dr. Gomez. Moreover, missile defense is a component of great power competition, and adversary threat perceptions can become reality; thus, it is important for the US to understand Russian and Chinese threat perceptions. Next, Dr. Gomez explained that missile defense is neither inherently stabilizing nor inherently destabilizing. Its implications for nuclear stability flow from two factors: 1) how missile defense factors into a state’s broader approach to nuclear deterrence and 2) the strategies that other countries adopt to counteract the threat posed by growing missile defenses arrayed against them. He then stated that steady expansion of US missile defense architecture fosters destabilizing counter strategies by great power rivals without providing the ability to protect the US from the consequences of that spiral. Furthermore, the 2019 MDR plan may not accelerate the slide into nuclear instability, but it definitely won’t stop it. Consequently, missile defense and nuclear stability can get the US into trouble, but it can’t get it out. To conclude, Dr. Gomez spoke about how the US can balance missile defense and stability, highlighting that restraining US homeland missile defense capabilities should reduce great power adversaries’ “use or lose” pressure while making it harder for them to initiate limited, regional conflicts.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dean Wilkening (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Dr. Wilkening spoke about hypersonic weapons, crisis instability, and arms race instability. He began by defining ‘crisis instability’ as any action that makes escalation (across the nuclear threshold) harder to control and significantly reduces the effectiveness of a major power’s nuclear deterrent. He then defined ‘arms race instability’ as any action that stimulates an action-reaction arms competition. Dr. Wilkening proceeded to introduce hypersonic vehicles into the discussion. He classified ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and hypersonic cruise missiles as hypersonic weapons and highlighted two main missions for US hypersonic weapons: 1) penetrate advanced integrated air defense systems and 2) hold time-critical targets at risk. These uses of hypersonic weapons, however, can lead to arms race instability and/or crisis instability. Dr. Wilkening explained that arms race instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from Russia and/or China modernizing their land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), investing in alternatives, or launching on warning or under attack. Crisis instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from a compressed timeline, leading to less careful decision making, misperceptions, misunderstandings, miscommunication, and/or an increased chance for accidental or unauthorized attacks. Nuclear, warhead, and target ambiguity also play a role in making attack assessment difficult when performing hypersonic maneuvers. Lastly, Dr. Wilkening explained that the choice to use “long-range” or “tactical” weapons could lead to false perceptions of escalation. To conclude, Dr. Wilkening discussed how strategic instability can be avoided and presented a series of questions to ponder regarding to hypersonic weapons and strategic stability, including: 1) Will hypersonic weapons lead to offense dominance in strike warfare?; 2) How should the US balance the demands of conventional warfare with the need to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China?; and 3) How much strategic warning is prudent to assume for conflicts with Russia and China?

A hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Damon Coletta (US Air Force Academy) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Mr. Coletta discussed game theory’s application to modern deterrence. He began by explaining the basics of game theory, highlighting that it evolves out of market-level analysis and adopts a set of economic assumptions regarding payoffs and strategy. He then stated that, when applied to deterrence, game theory can be used to assess whether there is an instrumental rationality behind an adversary’s actions, as well as what their rationality and/or preferences might be.

SMA hosted speaker session presented by MAJ Andrew Webb (US Army) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Series.

In this talk, Dr. Kertzer focused on the psychology of resolve in international politics. Resolve is the ability to stand firm while others back down.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Krista Langeland (RAND) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Bueno de Mesquita began by stating that although the US and its allies have tremendous cyber capacity, practitioners tend to believe that their strategic thinking is lagging behind.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dotan Haim (Dartmouth College) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Haim argued that the strength of civilian social networks, as well as the amount of information on government credibility received from the surrounding area, dictate whether counterinsurgency will be effective in a particular locality.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Maorong Jiang (Creighton University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Daniel Altman (Georgia State University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Andrew Futter (University of Leicester) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Futter highlighted his research on cyber threats and nuclear weapons.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Adam Stulburg (Georgia Institute of Technology) and Dr. Lawrence Rubin (Georgia Institute of Technology) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. John Warden (Institute for Defense Analyses) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jared Dunnmon (Stanford University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Dunnmon began his presentation by discussing the challenges for 21st century nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3), as well as the US’s increasing reliance on space-based NC3. He identified potential NC3 vulnerabilities in both outer space and cyber space and explained a few major classes of exploitable flaws in these domains. He proceeded to describe various technological tools currently being developed for risk mitigation and policy tools that “adapt old rules to new domains.” Dr. Dunnmon concluded his presentation by talking through a scenario (an Advanced Extremely High Frequency [AEHF] satellite malfunction) and offering his concluding thoughts.