SMA hosted a panel with Mr. Michael A. Clark (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM), Ms. Kayse Jansen (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD), Mr. Robert C. Jones (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM), Ms. Lesley Kucharski (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Robert M. Toguchi (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC), Col David W. Walker (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5), and Ms. Michele K. Wolfe (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

The Russian military has used coercive signaling as a tool to compel and deter the US and its allies in Eastern Europe. Dr. Charap clarified that the study was completed before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it focuses on Russian actions below the threshold of kinetic force. These coercive actions have been increasing in frequency since 2014 and can be classified as low-level incidents, including violations of air or maritime space. Some incidents were simply the result of high amounts of traffic by the Russian military along its borders, particularly the flyway between St. Petersburg and Leningrad. Other instances, including the interception of US-B52 bombers by a Russian Su-27 fighter jet, are interpreted as being more targeted and aggressive. In this instance, voice recordings of the Russian fighter pilot and its commanders were attained and used to prove that it intercepted the US bomber intentionally and outside of Russian air space.

How a war between the US and China over Taiwan’s sovereignty would develop is a frequently debated subject by scholars and military leaders as China continues to deny the island nation’s autonomy. War games are an integral part of how decision makers develop their grand strategy; however, war games are a far cry from actual warfare, Dr. Heath stated. Dr. Heath and his RAND colleagues instead analyzed academic literature and Chinese documents in order to examine how a US-China conflict over Taiwan would occur at both a high and low intensity. The intensity refers to how aggressively China and the US would attack each other’s armed forces inside and outside of the theater. Dr. Heath stated that if any military conflict between the US and China were to occur, it would be a) long lasting, b) multidimensional, and c) transcontinental. Furthermore, regardless of the war’s intensity, the outcome would heavily influence who the global political and economic leader will be.

Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operating in the Sahel have perpetrated long-lasting insurgencies for more than a decade, causing widespread loss of life and regional instability. These insurgencies have also weakened regional governments’ ability to provide basic goods and services to their citizens. Dr. Boukhars stated that West African states are preparing for their own insurgencies, blaming their proximity to the Sahel region and the worsening insecurity and violent extremism there. He emphasized that a contributing factor to the contagion of violent extremism in Africa is countries’ unwillingness to be introspective. States frequently blame their stability issues on their proximity to others with existing insurgencies. However, internal dynamics that weaken government trust and aggravate social grievances are strong antecedents of insurgencies themselves. Efforts by governments to cut the financial flows of VEOs (e.g., closing certain markets and restricting the movements of pastoralists), for example, usually hurt their own civilians’ livelihoods.

The techno-globalist world that we once lived in is now being pulled back. What we are witnessing is not a technological divorce, but rather a reduction in the technological interdependence between the US and China. There are two primary ways in which the US government has reduced its technological interdependence with China. One method is the use of defensive controls (e.g., export controls, visa limits, investment screenings), and the other is the use of offensive controls (e.g., Chips Act, Inflation Reduction Act). In 2022, the US government has taken much more of an offensive approach than ever before. Traditional defensive tools used by the US have also been greatly intensified and implemented in new ways against China, and a series of new defensive tools have been developed as well.

The 2022 release of the US National Defense Strategy (NDS) gives an in-depth look into the prioritization of US national security concerns and capabilities. Dr. Posen argued that it is where the military meets politics. He wishes that the NDS was more descriptive in some areas, including who the US’s partners and allies are and clearer definitions of deterrence by punishment and denial. The initial statements in the new NDS emphasize the need for prioritizing operations, threats, and resource allocation. However, Dr. Posen believes that the paper loses its focus on prioritization quickly. This prioritization needed to be further emphasized because the document discusses the importance of assisting US allies and partners with the resources they need for deterrence.

The sample size of communication campaigns in support of military objectives—like the deradicalization of a population—is small. However, there is a large sample of case studies focusing on communication campaigns in support of public health initiatives. Communication campaigns assisting public health initiatives are not perfectly analogous to those made in assistance of military operations, but Dr. Helmus argued that examining their findings and best practices can still be helpful. When looking at the few communication campaigns targeting a population for security measures, the results are promising. One key example highlighting this success is a campaign in Nigeria that focuses on deradicalization and changing the perception of kidnap victims.

Innovation in research and development is often preceded by changes in how researchers think about the world around them. Dr. Sullivan discussed how synergy between academics and workers in the field helped create a more innovative culture in his own company, Oceanit. He emphasized that time spent in the field is crucial for researchers to truly understand what a client needs. Even when a company believes it understands the client’s needs, there can always be surprises, which Dr. Sullivan compared to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rise from comedian to wartime leader. Providing further context, Dr. Sullivan stated that Oceanit works across many sectors, including energy, aerospace, and engineering consultation. The company consistently collaborates with 70 universities and many different companies, such as Shell, as well.

The creation of a computational model that encapsulates the increasingly complex and overwhelming world as multiple systems that can be measured empirically could have strong implications for civilian and military decision makers. NSI Inc. and SMA are currently working on such a model that is expanding on prior research conducted by TRADOC G-2. NSI has expanded on TRADOC’s original 24 exploitable conditions to create the Global Exploitable Conditions Model (GECM) as part of the Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project for the US Joint Staff. Dr. Kuznar stated that while GECM is supported by a large corpus of qualitative research, a computational model has been built to empirically test it through network and system dynamics. GECM contains 17 subsystems that are comprised of 124 nodes and 829 edges where nodes connect. This model is the starting point for all of NSI’s research during the AFOE project.

North Korea poses many military threats to its neighbor, South Korea, including a massive artillery barrage on its capital city, Seoul. A conventional artillery barrage would destroy infrastructure and threaten the lives of civilians living in the metropolitan area. Dr. Press and Dr. Anderson built a model, mapping the loss of civilian life during three specific scenarios: a) a surprise attack by North Korea during peacetime, b) a North Korean attack during a military crisis, and c) a preemptive US and South Korean attack. To determine the total loss of civilian casualties, the model considers the known number of North Korean artillery batteries, their predicted rate of fire, and their predicted overall effectiveness among other variables. Dr. Press estimated that North Korea has around 300 artillery batteries that can currently bombard Seoul.