NSI Publications

[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of eighteen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider political, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region. This summary first highlights the conditions most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation, and then details several non-proliferation regimes and the contributors’ assessments of whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

Conditions Conducive to Non-Proliferation in the Asia Pacific Region

Two key conditions emerge from the expert contributor response as particularly conducive to nonproliferation in the Asia Pacific region: the presence of a multilateral regional security dialogue, and providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees.

A Multilateral Regional Security Dialogue and Framework

The condition most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific is the establishment of a multilateral regional security dialogue and framework that encompasses both key regional actors and international organizations. Such an Asia Pacific regional security architecture would have to consider important regional non-proliferation issues, including the region’s principal proliferation concerns regarding the DPRK’s acquisition and export of nuclear technology, materials, and expertise, as well as other regional concerns relating to illicit nuclear proliferation activities.1 Approaching these key regional non-proliferation matters within a formal multilateral regional security dialogue and framework, contributors suggest, is a fundamental prerequisite for any real progression toward developing a regional non-proliferation regime.2 Ultimately, as Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University explains, an Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regime is more likely to materialize as a corollary of a formal multilateral regional security architecture than as something that emerges spontaneously.

Political, Economic, and Security Assurances and Guarantees

Providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees is also frequently cited by contributors as a condition conducive to non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific region. Contributors diverge, however, on what they perceive to be the best approach to providing such assurances and
guarantees, as well as in the types of assurances and guarantees they suggest.

Some contributors advocate for economic assurances and guarantees above all else. Ken Gause of CNA and Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, believe that the best way to reinforce regional non-proliferation with the DPRK is through enhanced economic measures, rather than enhanced security measures. Gause contends that if the DPRK is properly compensated in terms of economic and security guarantees, there will be no real reason for the regime to proliferate (i.e., the regime would not want to risk being caught, nor would it want to risk having to further sacrifice elements of its nuclear program as punishment). Kulacki maintains that creating and advancing a clear pathway for economic development in the DPRK is the condition most conducive to regional non-proliferation, as DPRK proliferation activities, he argues, are driven by economic needs, not political ambitions. Ultimately, Gause and Kulacki agree that regional actors may be able to extract compromises or concessions from the DPRK on regional non-proliferation reinforcement and verification initiatives in exchange for economic assistance.

Other contributors advocate for a combination of political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees. Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, for example, highlights political stability, diminished security threats, and steady economic growth as regional conditions that are conducive to non-proliferation. He believes that making serious progress toward all three conditions would be quite desirable to the DPRK and may foster regional cooperation and integration, which, he contends, would also be conducive to regional non-proliferation. Dr. Cindy Vestergaard of the Stimson Center similarly assesses that providing a combination of political, security, and economic assurances is conducive to regional non-proliferation. She highlights strengthening regional relations and decreasing regional tensions as such political measures; developing comprehensive security safeguard agreements
and, notably, DPRK disarmament4 as such security conditions; and implementing trade-related safeguard agreements and oversight mechanisms (i.e., establishing provisions on the trade of nuclear material and technology as part of regional nuclear cooperation agreements) as such economic measures. Finally,
Anthony Rinna of Sino-NK highlights targeted bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly as a means of shifting current DPRK capabilities away from military use and toward peaceful civilian use, as a condition that is both conducive to regional non-proliferation and fundamental to enforcing any eventual regional non-proliferation regime.

Enforcing a Non-Proliferation Regime in the Asia Pacific Region

Contributors also reflect on more specific non-proliferation regimes, considering both existing and potential non-proliferation regimes and whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Several contributors reflect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and whether it could be reinforced in the Asia Pacific region. The NPT is an international treaty, with 191 state signatories, that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. The treaty forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states (Article I) and the receipt or possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states (Article II).8 With such a foundational international non-proliferation regime already in place, it is reasonable to wonder why it has not been enforced in the case of the DPRK. One issue with attempting to enforce the NPT with the DPRK, and in the Asia Pacific region more broadly, contributors explain, is that while all other countries in the region are parties to the NPT, the DPRK is not.9 Consequently, as Vestergaard argues, there ultimately cannot be a strong non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region as long as the DPRK remains outside of the NPT and the international system of nuclear safeguards.

The most straightforward condition for enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region, therefore, may be convincing the DPRK to rejoin the NPT. Knopf reminds us, however, that the role of international organizations in verifying and, therefore, reinforcing non-proliferation commitments cannot be discounted. If the DPRK were to commit to rejoining the NPT, it would also have to commit to allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify compliance, and ultimately enable it to function as a confidence-building mechanism between the key parties. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies believes that this may be the ideal outcome in terms of enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region. He cautions, however, that because the DPRK has failed several times in the past to live up to commitments to not develop nuclear weapons, there may be significant skepticism regarding any future DPRK commitment to rejoin or adhere to the NPT. Therefore, as O’Neil suggests, the utility of an international non-proliferation regime such as the NPT may be limited in the case of the DPRK and the Asia Pacific region. Contributors generally agree, however, that the NPT regime does offer a useful legal and political framework and point of reference for any efforts to develop of a new regional non-proliferation regime tailored to the Asia Pacific.

An Asia Pacific Regional Non-Proliferation Regime

Contributors also reflect on potential alternative options for developing enforceable regional nonproliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Ankit Panda of The Diplomat and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center highlight what may be fundamental conditions for achieving any enforceable non-proliferation regime in the region. According to Sun, the international community would have to embrace the DPRK as a normalized member of the international community and, at the same time, the DPRK would have to embrace full IAEA safeguards. Panda echoes this assessment, expounding that, once such progress is made (i.e., the US determines that it will have to live with a nuclear-armed DPRK in the short-term), the US should endeavor to incorporate the DPRK into contemporary non-proliferation regimes. He warns that doing so may be challenging, however, as the DPRK is inherently skeptical of invasive arms control regimes.

Contributors offer several potential Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regimes for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine believes that an Asian Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Council (ANNTRC) could be established to form the basis for a non-proliferation regime amongst the regional states, the UN, and both nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states that have a stake in the region. Such a council, he explains, could initially serve as a forum for discussions relating to issues and concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and as a template for constructive conflict avoidance, resolution, or containment, and could eventually be broadened to include nonnuclear-related security and stability issues. Joshua Pollack of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies envisions a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NEANWFZ) Treaty that aims to establish non-transfer commitments as a potential enforceable regional non-proliferation regime. Conceding that non-proliferation commitments are difficult to verify, he believes that a regime that includes stronger assurances against the transfer of weapons could offer a more practical and achievable approach to verifying commitments relating to the cessation of fissile-material production. Finally, Platte presents a regional non-proliferation regime that incorporates measures to target aspects of the DPRK’s nuclear program from both the supply-side (e.g., sanctions on nuclear weapons-applicable materials and technology) and the demand-side (e.g., reducing the desire for nuclear weapons; ensuring alternative, non-nuclear revenue streams; and decreasing the demand for nuclear technology and expertise among
potential foreign customers).13 Reinforcement of such a non-proliferation regime, he contends, will first require strong enforcement of supply-side measures (i.e., sanctions), which he acknowledges are imperfect, and will then require strong enforcement of demand-side measures, which if not appropriately addressed, he explains, may enable the DPRK to exploit the imperfections in the supply-side measures.

Other contributors focus on conditions conducive to reinforcing potential regional non-proliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University believes that reinforcing any DPRK commitment to non-proliferation requires, above all else, strong enforcement capabilities (e.g., strong intelligence capabilities to detect export attempts and regional cooperation to interdict such attempts). Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers a similar assessment, arguing that any significant reinforcement will require an expanded, more binding, and more enforceable version of the Proliferation Security Initiative to include both China and India, as well as improved intelligence, investigation, and detection agreements among key regional actors. He warns, however, that achieving such conditions may require additional funding from the UN and/or participant nations, a more formal oversight structure, and greater transparency. Robert Shaw of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies and Kelly Wadsworth of the University of Pittsburgh argue that establishing strong export control measures is essential to reinforcing regional non-proliferation. Finally, however, Brig Gen Robert Spalding of the United States Air Force offers an alternative perspective and a word of caution, warning that China may play spoiler to any US efforts to reinforce regional non-proliferation. China does not view proliferation as a threat, he contends, but rather as an opportunity to further weaken the US and, therefore, should be expected to enable nuclear proliferation as a means of creating continuing challenges for the US to solve.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, SinoNK; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Robert Shaw, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Cindy Vestergaard, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q12] Will major commercial space entities likely serve as disruptors or solid partners in terms of state national security interests? In the short-term (5-10 years), mid-term (15-20 years), and long-term (25+ years)? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

There was considerable variation in how the expert contributors interpreted this question, and in their assessments of the future relationship between commercial and government space enterprises. While the contributors who saw commercial entities as solid partners of the government were, with one exception, representatives of commercial space, respondents from think tank, commercial, and government communities tended to view commercial actors as potential disruptors (39%). However, the majority response among the expert contributors overall (44%) was that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners.

There are two lines of reasoning for this argument. First, based on the perspective that “disruptions” can have positive as well as negative consequences, some contributors saw disruptive actors as potentially valuable allies to government. Second, others argued that technologies or actions that may be disruptive in the short-term can evolve into ordinary or standard practices in the longer-term.3 The contributors also warn, however, that whether commercial space is ultimately a disruptor or a solid partner in space will in large part depend on how the United States government (USG) decides to respond..

Furthermore, commercial actors’ organizational advantages with respect to innovation make it likely that they will become the dominant actors in space in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security interests will be largely determined by how the USG deals with these changes. There are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector, and relying on its capabilities and services, reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. If the USG attempts to limit or control commercial space actors to the point that they cannot meet their own objectives, there is nothing to prevent them from moving their endeavors to another country. This would effectively remove all but the most indirect or extreme forms of influence the USG has, and position commercial space actors to become a significant disruptor of US security interests.

Disruptors, Disruption, and Drivers

Contributors identified disruptors as actors whose behaviors and innovations trigger broad change in a system. In the context of this report’s question of focus, a commercial disruptor is a company that significantly alters (for good or for bad) the ability of the US to achieve its national security space objectives. A disruption changes the nature of the relationship between the USG and commercial space actors. The potential for disruption is determined by the extent to which USG and commercial space are dependent on, or can determine, the activities of the other. Of course, the emergence of a commercial space sector is, in and of itself, a disruption to USG dominance in space activity and technology. The question is: to what effect?.

The Impact of Private Capital

The nature of the relationship between the commercial sector and the US national security community is changing rapidly, and suggests that we may be on the cusp of a major disruption in the way US space has operated for the last 60 years. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, the emergence of “angel investors and venture capitalists wanting to make huge profits” by investing in new commercial space activities has been a major driver of this change. Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit calls out “new space” start-ups, in particular, as potential disruptors as they both increase their capacities for rapid innovation and become less dependent on the USG for operating funds. It is interesting to note that this is happening at the same that the USG is increasingly looking to the commercial sector for services and innovation. As such, Joshua Hampson of the Niskanen Center believes that, 25+ years from now, the USG “may be more reliant on commercial providers for capabilities than those entities will be on the government for funding.”

The availability of private capital to commercial space could spur additional disruptions in the space service provider-user relationship. Namely, if commercial entities rather than the USG are the ones developing and operating cutting-edge space capabilities, USG attempts to regulate the sale and transfer of those capabilities is likely to become both a more complex and more contentious issue than it is today. Simply put, the interests of commercial entities—in other words, their profitability-centric business agendas—cannot be assumed to be in complete accord with the USG’s national security
objectives.

Regulation as Disruption

Several contributors comment on the impact of USG commercial regulations as a type of perennial disruptor,5 which if lifted will increase innovativeness and growth in private space sector. The ViaSat, Inc. contributors note that while the USG has “directed” space innovation until recently, today more innovation is occurring in areas in which the government has had significantly less involvement (e.g., ground segments of space systems like ATMs, etc.). They make this point in reference to USG-controlled GPS, arguing that, “since the start, the USG has gone through GPS-1 and now GPS-3. In a 35 [to] 40-year period, we’ve had three generations of space innovation. On the ground, we’ve had an infinite number of innovations.” The contributors from ViaSat, Inc. do concede that some government direction is not a bad thing, but stress that there must be “a balance of the mix” between commercial requirements for profitability and USG concern with regulating access to high-tech capabilities.

Sources of Disruption in the Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term

In addition to discussing what might make an actor a potential disruptor, contributors emphasize the need to consider what is being disrupted, and how that disruption could affect US national security objectives. Table 1 above provides a summary of space-related capabilities in which disruption and/or private-government partnership is currently happening or expected to occur.

Short- to Medium-Term

Access to and Control of Information

Dr. John Karpiscak III of the United States Army Geospatial Center identifies information as one of the critical commodities that the US will struggle to control in the coming decades. Contributors highlight three particular struggles involving space: information ownership and control, data collection, and space situational awareness (SSA). Karpiscak III discusses the challenges with data ownership and management, in terms of the extent to which commercial space entities will maintain control over who accesses their data or whether they “can be coerced, manipulated, or incentivized [by the USG] to share data with friendlies and deny access to, say, gray or red forces.” Several contributors6 also identify advances in commercial information collection and processing, including remote sensing, as potential disruptors to current practices as they make what today may be considered classified information available in the public domain. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson of the United States Air Force Academy notes that SSA capabilities operated and owned by private companies could transfer tracking of space objects from being done “largely by a government-heavy regime to being done by some regime that’s now entirely private.”

The contributors differ, however, in their assessments of the degree to which these developments will challenge or ease the ability of the US to achieve its national security objectives. Several contributors7 see the improvements in commercial remote sensing as a potential solution to government needs. While Deborah Westphal of Toffler Associates and Karpiscak III acknowledge the potential benefit of this, they also raise concern about the loss of information control it implies. Finally, Dr. Damon Coletta of the United States Air Force Academy suggests that wider access to high-resolution imagery may “disrupt the safety of troops on the ground if suddenly a raft of competing state entities suddenly had access to levels of resolution that only the US government had beforehand.”

Medium- to Long-Term

Infrastructure

In the medium- to long-term, contributors suggest that increases in the amount of infrastructure (both in space and on the ground) could serve as an additional source of disruption. Karpiscak III argues that developments in commercial launch capabilities could make it possible for nearly anyone to launch items into space, without necessarily having to gain “anyone’s permission or consent.” Inevitably, as more actors access space, the amount of infrastructure in space will increase as well (Hitchens; Nield). Increased infrastructure will in turn stimulate the development of space-based power and transportation for on-orbit servicing (Nield; Weeden), as well as increased maneuverability (Jackson). Finally, while expanded infrastructure in space is identified as a potential source of disruption, the implications for US national security are not always clear. This may be because many of the capabilities discussed by the contributors are dual-use technologies, which many of the contributors identify as posing challenges for national security.

Long-Term

Harder to Tell

Perhaps not surprisingly, the contributors were less specific about potential sources of disruption beyond the next 25 years. Resource extraction and debris removal were the only specific capabilities mentioned in this timeframe (Hampson; Hitchens). As Karpiscak III points out: “If you look at rates of technological advance in a lot of the world economies and developments like cellphones and tablets, it’s very difficult to predict a lot of this.”

Despite this uncertainty, many contributors expect time itself to have an effect on the potential for disruption. When considering the system change aspect of disruption,10 most contributors believe that the sources and magnitude of disruptions will diminish over time as markets and commercial entities expand and mature. However, when focusing on the control aspect of disruption, Hampson sees the expansion of the commercial space sector as likely to increase disruption. He suggests that “a contemporary model exists in the computing/software industry today” where, although “companies cannot disregard US policy, [they] are large enough to…lobby against policies they disagree with and independent enough in funding to take their views to the public.”

Building Solid Partnerships

Table 1 above clearly demonstrates considerable variation in the contributors’ evaluations of the potential for government-commercial partnerships across both time and specific capabilities. This variation relates closely to the idea that innovation is intrinsically linked to disruption. The USG benefits from the innovations produced by disruptors (Jah; Rossettini), yet the more successful these actors are, the less controllable they, and their capabilities, become..

Benefits of Collaboration

Strong partnerships and collaboration are built on mutual interest. A good percentage of USG objectives in space involve national security and defense, whereas for commercial actors a business and regulatory environment that allows profitability is critical (Hampson; Stadter). Looking further out into the future, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin suggests that the near-term establishment of routine partnerships could help decrease the extent of disruption in the longer-term. Hampson predicts that, as the orbital environment becomes busier and riskier, commercial actors will be motivated to partner with the USG to reduce the risk of “being placed under burdensome restrictions by causing problems.” Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College posits that, as the value of economic activities such as space mining and the number of US citizens in space increase, “[t]here will be a very strong push for national security services to be extended toward US citizens and their property in space, and a push to make the independent space corps look more like the US Coast and US Navy, with a strong emphasis on safety of navigation for licit commerce.”

Barriers to Collaboration

Several contributors12 indicate that commercial actors want to partner with the USG, but that barriers to solid partnerships do exist. On the government side, contributors point to regulation and security concerns (Faulconer Consulting Group; Hitchens); organizational impediments (Garretson); and lack of outreach to, and communication with, the commercial sector (Weeden). The need for profitability, and the freedom to sell their technology (Armor; Stadter), are mentioned as disincentives for commercial actors to work with the USG. On top of this, the lines of communication between the USG and commercial space sector are weak, as is the understanding of the other’s objectives and constraints (Garreston; Stadter).

Implications of Failure

If national security constraints impede the development of new technologies, as Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland believes has already happened with remote sensing and SAR, innovative commercial actors may abandon the US. Dr. George Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration points out that this is something that “we ignore at our peril because, again, the capability is going to be out there in the rest of the world. If the US chooses not to take advantage of it, we’re likely to be left behind,” a view echoed by Jim Norman of NASA. Even if companies do not relocate out of the US, we should not forget Hampson’s point that, over time, commercial space actors will likely become large enough to wield influence over policy and public opinion. Both of these outcomes would signal a loss of USG influence over some activities in the space domain.

The Verdict

Considering the contributors’ responses as a whole, it appears that “disruption” is considered a necessary part of the development of space capabilities and activities. Commercial actors’ organizational advantages with respect to innovation make it likely that they will become the dominant actors in space in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security interests will be largely determined by how the USG deals with these changes. There are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector, and relying on its capabilities and services, reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. If the USG attempts to limit or control them to the point that they cannot meet their objectives, there is nothing to prevent them from moving their endeavors to another country. This would effectively remove all but the most indirect or extreme forms of influence the USG has, and position commercial space actors to become a significant disruptor of US security interests.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA Headquarters); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy.); Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.); Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); and LTG (RET) Bob Elder (George Mason University)

Summary of Findings

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI and Dr. Robert Elder, GMU

The following are key findings from eleven quantitative, qualitative, and simulation studies conducted for the 2017-2018 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Space Project requested by the Headquarters Air Force (HAF/A3) in cooperation with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).

Commercial vs. National Security Space

• The National Security Space (NSS) community and its potential commercial space partners think about space differently, have different agendas, and different perspectives on responsibility for space activities and which partner “is in the driver’s seat.”
• In the US and elsewhere, National Security Space is rapidly becoming a minority player in the space environment. Commercial satellites significantly outnumber those operated primarily for military purposes.
• US national security and the profitability of commercial space are indelibly linked.
• The USG and commercial space must establish a clear and integrated set of national security and commercial space objectives, along with a strategy for achieving these.
• The ways in which US civil and National Security Space (NSS) operates presently is at odds with the attributes that make for an attractive business environment.

Resiliency of Space Services

• Commercial satellite capabilities offer resiliency for military operations and increased stability during crises, reducing the benefit of pre-emptive attacks on satellites.

Space as a Conflict Domain

• Space operations are significantly more important for expeditionary military operations than for defense of the homeland.
• Space operations provide information services for use by all domains, so it is critical that operators in other domains understand what it means to “operate in space,” the time scales in space operations, etc.
• Because space has been seen as “separate” or a set of assets in space, vulnerabilities in the entire system from ground station to space and back can be underappreciated. Counter-space activities executed against the ground and communication link segments are perceived and treated differently than activities directed against the satellite segment.
• Space operations are not homogenous: To improve cross-domain understanding of space operations, it is useful to describe the actions using unambiguous terminology commonly used in other domains.
• There is a pressing need to clarify and clearly articulate deterrence and operational concepts involving space.
• Space superiority or dominance in space are not always critical to US and ally defense.
• Conflict domains are interdependent, but absolute space dominance is not a necessary prerequisite for success in other domains.

Bolstering Security Partnerships via Space

• The US must act rapidly to use its advantages in space to strengthen ties to regional partners.

DOTMLPF Insights

Doctrine

• Impacts of the rapidly increasing priority of space as a critical economic domain, which arguably is greater than its importance as a military operations domain.
• Difficult to contain the effects of combat operations in space to prevent unacceptable collateral damage or even fratricide.
• Importance of commercial space in reducing risk of unacceptable behaviors affecting the domain.
• Importance of differentiating (and understanding the relevance of) strategic, operational, and tactical military space operations.
• Use of space for military operations is of significantly less importance to actors operating with easy access to alternative means for communication, navigation, and surveillance operations.
• Space community would benefit from developing terminology for use when communicating with members of other communities to reduce potential for confusion or errors.

Organization

• Use of commercial and partner space capabilities requires Unified Action processes and organizations, as well as joint military and tactical coordination processes—and to be effective, these should be established well ahead of when they might be needed.
• Organizations are needed to develop and vet strategic courses of action and associated comprehensive risk assessments of non-defensive military space operations for national-level decisionmakers.
• Joint C2 organizations would benefit from greater space integration than just embedded liaison cells.

Training

• Non-space military personnel lack sufficient understanding of tactical-level space operations to integrate them properly into multi-domain operations.
• Military operators need training on how to leverage the capabilities available through commercial space.

Materiel

• Military platforms cannot leverage commercial space capabilities without compatible terminal equipment (e.g., waveforms, spectrum, encryption).
• Military capabilities should be adapted for use with commercial rapid launch capabilities.

Leadership

• Military commanders from outside the space community must understand space operations at the operational level to properly integrate them into multi-domain operations.
• Senior officers need leadership development to understand use of military force in concert with other instruments to influence competitor and partner decisions, particularly when military operations would have detrimental economic and/or civilian safety effects.
• Senior space leaders need better understanding of how other domains exploit space to achieve joint effects, as well as cross-domain opportunities to minimize risk of critical space capabilities.

Personnel

• Benefits demonstrated from civilian government participation in space C2 cells suggests opportunities to leverage additional non-military government civilian participation in military space C2 organizations.

Facilities

• Value of resiliency and redundancy in the space ground segment, perhaps leveraging multi-domain military, government agency, and allied partners.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q21] What can the US do to best facilitate development of verifiable norms that maintain a peaceful space domain?

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report describes expert views on the existence and non-existence of space norms and the challenges and opportunities norms represent for peaceful space use. At the broadest level, norms are informal but generally accepted rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community, 3 in this case a community of nations. Norms can emerge from either formal or informal channels, as Jonty Kasku-Jackson of the National Security Space Institute argues. Informal means of norm development include persuasion emerging from being a good exemplar of norm-based behavior, such as: the “creation of domestic legislation and regulations that serve as a model for others to adopt, publication and acceptance of academic papers, and shaping the discussion during ‘Track 2’ (non- governmental, informal, and unofficial) conferences and meetings” (Kasku-Jackson). Formal rule development examples consist of: “negotiation and implementation of binding international treaties, non-binding codes of conduct, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and state declaratory policy” (Kasku-Jackson).

The expert contributors generally agree on the need for norms from both informal and formal channels to maintain a peaceful space domain. The most verifiable norms, the contributors emphasize, would generally stem from more formal channels in so far as the US could facilitate norm development by leading in the responsible and transparently measurable use of space, and through the use of treaties.

Are Norms Necessary for a Peaceful Space Domain?

An increasingly large and diverse array of actors, both state and commercial, are actively seeking to exploit and explore the space domain, dramatically shifting the political context of space. The contributors indicate that states newly entering the space domain (India, North Korea, Germany, Australia), competing major powers (US, Russia, China), and commercial actors (SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, many new satellite companies) have different interests and perspectives on space. The diversity of the actors is likely to represent a range of potentially incompatible interests. According to the contributors, it appears that competing major powers are attempting to maintain their advantages within the space domain, new states are seeking affordable and perpetual access to the space domain, and commercial actors are seeking partners and initiatives that will expand the size and profitability of space markets and ventures.

Maintaining a peaceful space domain amidst the growing heterogeneity of interests in space, Dr. P.J. Blount of the University of Luxembourg notes, will require the United States to develop “norms for responsible space activities that help to ensure coordination among all space actors.”4 Norms can function to coordinate a range of interests because norms, as detailed by Kasku-Jackson, “outline good behavior and bad behavior for the [space] community.” By identifying problematic areas of space use through active engagement with diverse space actors, the United States can shape a consensus with wide-spread buy-in.

Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation concurs that norms are based on shared expectations and that a diverse array of actors in the space domain often lack these critical commonalities. Cheng questions, however, whether United States leadership and engagement with those interests will lead to stable norms that, whether verifiable or not, will help maintain a peaceful domain: Americans “talk about creating norms because we live in a rule of law society governing through mediation, and we believe that the law itself has value, separate from whoever comes before it,” but “what is the purpose of these norms and when are these norms supposed to operate?” For Cheng, norms advocates have not fully appreciated that developed and verifiable norms can also be used to entrench competing interests in ways that limit the United States’ options. In his words, the United States can “go ahead and create as many [restrictive] norms as possible,” our adversaries will sign on to these norms and hold us to them. They will make the United States “live by [its] rules,” although our adversaries may not abide by them, making these norms “self-straightjacketing.”,

Achieving Verifiable Norms: Codification, Enforcement, and Measurement

There was disagreement among the contributors on whether norms require formalization (in treaties) to be effectively verifiable. Blount concedes that “norms need not come in the form of a binding treaty,” but rather could “come in a variety of mechanisms that solidify what constitutes responsible space activities.” Blount’s optimism that non-codified norms could still be verifiable and enforceable notwithstanding, most of the contributors feel that formal agreements are the best pathway to verifiable, enforceable norms.5 The mantra that verification is enforcement typifies the views the contributors.6 Some contributors focus on the potential usefulness of formal agreements versus norms. For instance, David Koplow of Georgetown University emphasizes the usefulness of formal agreements and proposes that they would provide a vehicle for regulating space use. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, these norms should be “things that promote transparency and are things that are measurable, and not measurable just by one entity but measurable by the community at large.”

In fact, many of the contributors stress the need for metrics to verify space use, which, as Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin indicates, would be difficult as it entails the measurement of behavior that may not be obvious, or have clear intent as in dual-use technologies. The contributors also lament that the US does not currently have adequate capabilities to verify actions in space and must invest resources to strengthen verification capabilities, particularly in space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. As Kaksu-Jackson notes, SSA is a foundationalcapability thatfacilitatesattribution of activities in space and therefore supports norm enforcement.”

Conclusion

After considering whether norms are necessary for a peaceful space domain, the expert contributors address how enforcement applications of norms could provide an avenue for verification. They generally agree that an increase of diverse actors (global powers, states recently entering the space domain, commercial actors) with diverse interests (domination, deterrence, profit) increases the difficulty in developing shared norms, since norms by definition imply shared values. Given the historic difficulty in achieving effective formal agreements, the contributors share a hope that less formal norms might be an option for regulating a responsible use of space. However, they often fell back upon discussion of the value of formal agreements, exhibiting a bias toward formal rules given their explicitness. Another issue the contributors stress is the need for measurable verification of how space is being used by actors, both to mark norm violations and to support guidelines set forth in formal agreements.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Harris Corporation; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Jonty Kasku-Jackson (National Security Space Institute); David Koplow (Georgetown Law); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Paris, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Michael Spies (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Mark Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation),

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q19] What international legal codes or norms are needed to govern the increasingly crowded space domain?

[Q23] Fifty years of space has seen much change. Which aspects of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are still valid and which need updating? Is it better to add to/amend the 1967 Treaty or to establish a new framework for the 21st century?

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the lynchpin of the current international legal regime for space. 105 countries have ratified the treaty, while another 25 are signatories.6 The OST extends the UN Charter and its underlying principles to outer space (Berkowitz), and provides additional principles to guide activities in space. These principles have been elaborated and further codified in three subsequent UN treaties related to space activity: the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, and 1975 Registration Convention.

OST: Retain, Amend, Replace?

The OST and the other “core” treaties were drafted in a relatively short time in the late 1960’s to mid-1970s. The principles upon which they rest—peaceful use of space, free access, and non-territoriality—clearly reflect a shared contemporary concern that Cold War competition could spill over into space. Today, these principles can often be found at the center of arguments that the OST is obsolete, or at least in need of amendment.

However, when asked whether they thought the OST should be amended or replaced, a large majority of the contributors (see Figure 1) respond that the treaty should not be changed at all. Furthermore, contributors who favor amendment specified changes that are limited in scope, rather than a more comprehensive revision of the treaty.8 As Figure 2 shows, opinion does vary between different groups of expert contributors. Academics overwhelmingly favor keeping the OST without change, while the majority of contributors representing commercial enterprises favor amendment or replacement.,

OST: Comprehensive Law or Guiding Principles?

The division in opinion over whether to keep the OST unchanged, or amend or replace it, appears to derive primarily from how the contributors conceptualize the role of the OST in space governance. Those favoring amendment or replacement appear to be considering the OST as a stand-alone and independently comprehensive legal document. In light of the enormous changes in the actors involved in the space domain, this perspective leads them to conclude that the OST cannot provide the legal structure necessary for ensuring the development of either commercial space, or the national security interests of the US in space.

In contrast, those who oppose changing the OST consider it as a set of guiding principles for governing space, rather than a comprehensive set of regulations. David Koplow of the Georgetown University Law Center, Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada, and Dr. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation compare its role to that of the US constitution. In a similar vein, Dr. Mark J. Sundahl of the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Koplow evoke the Magna Carta. However, as Koplow notes,9 just as statements of foundational principles are insufficient to govern a state, they are also insufficient to govern space.

It’s as if, in the case of the United States, we had adopted the Constitution, but then Congress did not get around to passing any laws after. The Constitution sets out the general principles, but you have to flesh those out.

Understood in this light, the continued relevance of the OST is not a function of whether it can address all contingencies and legal requirements for current and future activities in space. Rather, what matters is whether it provides an operative framework for creating subsidiary treaties, agreements, and norms to regulate activities in space. Those who support the continuation of the OST unchanged, judge it to be capable of doing this (Armor; Blount; Gabrynowicz; Gallagher; Hitchens; Johnson; Meyer; Steer; Sundahl). Furthermore, they state, it has been successful; enabling safe and secure access to space (Gabrynowicz; Meyer; Sundahl), blocking the placement of nuclear weapons in space (Gabrynowicz; Sundahl), and preventing national appropriation of the Moon or other celestial bodies (Sundahl). This success has, in turn, given the OST a level of legitimacy and influence that would be difficult to recreate in a new treaty. Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation concludes:

This demonstrates that, rather than the treaty showing its age after fifty years, this long- standing treaty has facilitated five decades of the peaceful and profitable uses of the access, exploration, and use of outer space, and that states respect and observe the treaty.

Arguments for Leaving the OST Alone

Supporters of the OST in its current form tend to see amendment (and even more so replacement) not only as unnecessary but as potentially perilous as well. They do not take this position out of a belief that there is no need to further develop international space law and norms. In fact, all identify very similar areas of activity that need further codification to those presented by the contributors who argue that the OST should be amended or replaced. Rather, their concerns arise from the potential threat to the legitimacy and support for existing space law, more generally, that changes to the OST could trigger.

Several argue that if the OST were opened to amendment, the process may be difficult to control,10 as amending one section of the treaty would put other sections “on the table” as well (Hertzfeld). This, as Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital OTK puts it, may “encourage mischief” and be counter to US interests. Similarly, Joanne Gabrynowicz of the University of Mississippi School of Law and an Anonymous Contributor11 see opening the OST as inviting the potential loss of the prohibition on nuclear weapons and WMD in space. Although not in favor of altering the OST, Paul Meyer of Simon Fraser University notes12 that some see a potential for supplementing the OST without running the risks of opening up the treaty text itself. In multilateral diplomacy this is often accomplished through developing an "Optional Protocol" that can supplement the original treaty in some way (e.g., extend the ban on WMD to all space-based weapons, or provide for the type of institutional support such as annual meetings of states parties that is common now but which the OST lacks).

The OST has Provided a Durable Set of Principles

As Steer argues, recent negotiations over new legal codes for space, which have stalemated over key national security concerns,13 should serve as a warning that the fundamental principles of the OST are not necessarily undisputed. Is this not an argument for amendment or replacement? Not according to a number of the contributors who provided input for this report.

When the OST and three core treaties were negotiated, there were only two nations active in space, and less than 20 members of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS). There are now 85 members, as well as many countries with assets in space and a quickly expanding set of commercial space actors (Hertzfeld; Simpson; Steer). Given the current international and space environments, contributors are doubtful that a new or significantly amended treaty could reach greater consensus than the OST (Anonymous Contributor; von der Dunk), and any new treaty is expected to take years, even decades, to complete, if it is at all (Anonymous Contributor; Armor; Hertzfeld). During this time, as an Anonymous Contributor notes, “new customary international rules” for space may emerge14 that may not work or serve US interests as well as the current treaty (Blount; Gallagher). That is to say, simply engaging in the process of renegotiation could undermine the authority the OST by creating competing principles for actions in space. Meyer makes an important point regarding the influence of the OST over the past 50 years:

We are repeatedly told that space is ‘congested, competitive, and contested’ but not reminded that it has been a realm of remarkable international ‘cooperation’ as well. The Outer Space Treaty embodied this cooperative approach.

Spillover Effect

Steer notes that the key “principles and clauses are today considered to be customary international law, thus binding on all states, regardless of whether they are party to the OST or not.” When considered in conjunction with the observation of Dr. P.J. Blount of the University of Luxembourg, that “there is a regime of treaties and UNGA resolutions that elaborate on particular aspects of the Outer Space Treaty, and there is a growing body of domestic law and policy that reveals how states are interpreting ambiguities in the treaty,” the broader implications of amending or replacing the OST become clearer. If the legal regime in space is indeed rooted in the OST, then any changes to the substance or standing of the treaty would spillover to affect other legal codes for space.

Governance in Space

As noted above, regardless of their position on the OST (amend, replace, retain), when asked what changes to international legal codes or norms are needed to govern the increasingly crowded space domain, contributors raise a fairly consistent list of issues. Nevertheless, differences of opinion and interpretation do emerge.

State-Centrism of Current Codes

Dr. Henry Hertzfeld of George Washington University sees the state-centric focus of existing legal codes as problematic given the rapid increase in the number of non-state actors involved in space activities. He suggests that while “[t]echnically, nations are responsible for their activities in outer space and even liable for them,” there is “a whole set of commercial law that is not that precisely defined for space.” Relatedly, Steer notes that the rise to prominence of commercial space actors was “either not foreseen by the drafters of the OST, or, given the political pressures at the time, simply not a priority.”15 As a result, many contributors identify commercial space activities as an area in which clearer legal codes and regulations are needed. Differences of opinion involve whether commercial activities can be accommodated within the OST in its present form. Dr. Frans von der Dunk of the University of Nebraska College of Law and Armor believe that they can. Among those who think not, Jonathan Fox of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and contributors from Faulconer Consulting Group point to Article VI16 of the OST in particular as needing “to be substantially modified to provide protection of space- related commercial rights arising in the coming years” (Fox).

Barriers to Commercial Development

As space actors are diversifying, so are the activities in which they engage. Article II and the non- appropriation principle17 have been the focus of arguments that the OST stands in the way of commercial development in outer space (Blount). Article II is seen to present significant barriers to commercial actors and investors operating beyond Earth (space tourism, space hotels) (Cheng), as well as those interested in developing space mining (Faulconer Consulting Group; Fox). Fox contends that, as it stands, the OST prevents “legitimate exercise of market-based commercial activities (including natural resource mining, refining, exploration, extraction, transportation, and other related functions) as may safely and practicably be undertaken under the license and authority of space-faring nations, in accordance with their applicable laws.”

Countering this, Armor notes: “the recent [US] Commercial Launch Competitiveness Act allowed ‘ownership’ of resources removed from planetary bodies. It does not violate the OST at all but clarifies commercial exploitation consistent with original intent of the Treaty.”18 Weeden agrees that there is a lack of clarity in the existing principle but notes that lawyers and economists have used fishing laws as a potential model which would enable resource extraction and use without requiring territorial ownership. This view is shared by Blount, who sees the implications of such changes as far-reaching and potentially detrimental to the United States’ national security interests:

It would be foolish to discard a foundational security treaty that helps to maintain international peace over the question of property rights...While the Outer Space Treaty may increase the cost of doing business for commercial operators, their investments would not be safe without such a treaty.

Governance of Space Debris and Traffic

As the space domain becomes more crowded the need for regulation to protect assets and valuable orbits has become apparent if space is to remain sustainable (Sundahl). Space debris is in many ways a classic collective action problem—it creates potential risk to every space actor, if not addressed it could ultimately render space unsafe for all, and it cannot be “solved” without cooperation between most or all space actors.

Orbital debris guidelines, such as those developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), have been effective but need to be updated to account for new capabilities, such as large constellations of satellites (Spire Global Inc.). While Steer notes that these guidelines have generated “a very high level of compliance,” Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit and contributors from Spire Global Inc. argue that binding rules and some enforcement mechanism are required. Matthew Schaefer of the University of Nebraska College of Law notes, however, that ownership issues may create a problem here. Specifically, whether objects owned by another actor can legally be removed without the owner’s consent.

Space traffic is also seen by the contributors to be an area in which the need for better regulation is becoming more pressing, as it threatens the collective interest of all space actors in the long-term (Steer; Sundahl; Weeden). Commercial plans for satellite servicing, refueling, and outer-orbit inspections will involve getting close to and docking with satellites (Weeden), and Rossettini argues that regulation and clear norms need to be created “to ensure the use of space becomes a controllable or at least verifiable.”

Surveillance and Irresponsible Behavior

Traffic and proximity issues also raise national security concerns. Sundahl and Weeden both give the example of a state actor flying satellites close to those of an adversary. As Weeden ponders:

What is the space equivalent of an Incidents at Sea Agreement that is going to kind of give a bright line of ‘you should do this, this is how you behave responsibly, and this is how we do it normally,’ and if there is deviation from that, it suddenly becomes an indication or warning that something is not right.

Without agreed upon norms of behavior, the potential exists for either unintended escalation or loss of security. To this point, Steer suggests further development of data sharing and transparency norms. This approach is consistent with discussions by Tanja Masson-Zwaan of Leiden University, Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, and Johnson, and reflects the assessment of Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin that there is a need to strengthen mechanisms for consultation, crisis management, and dispute resolution.

Bottom Line

Regardless of their stance on the OST, all of the contributors see existing space law and norms as insufficient to manage the rapidly evolving nature of space activities, and the current and potential threats these activities present. As space becomes more crowded, the risk of accidental or intentional harm to an actor’s assets increases. And, as space capabilities become more critical to actors, the cost of losing those assets also increases. Both of these conditions create a collective action problem that the further articulation of international norms and regulation could potentially mitigate for all. However, most contributors do not think that amending or replacing the OST is either necessary or advisable. These contributors warn that opening up the OST would likely trigger a long and uncontrollable process of negotiation that in itself would create uncertainty and undermine the legitimacy of the OST. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the final treaty would work as well, let alone any better.

Contributors

Anonymous Contributor;2 Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor3 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele4 (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India); David Koplow (Georgetown University Law Center); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Paul Meyer (Simon Fraser University, Canada); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Michiru Nishida5 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D- Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); Anne Sweet (NASA); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain

Authors: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Abstract

Because limitations space situational awareness functionally limit direct observation of adverse events in space, actors in space instead rely on other methods of making inferences about the causes behind adverse events, including communicating with each other. As a result, miscommunications that lead to incorrect inferences about the causes of adverse events can pose great risks to stable governance and crisis management in the space domain. One solution to reduce the risks of miscommunications is creating transparency by sharing SSA-relevant information, particularly in times of crisis. An under-appreciated (and under-theorized) aspect of this process is the key space terms used to describe events and causality in the space domain. Key space terms shape and reflect how actors ascribe intentionality and describe threats within the space domain. In this Concept Paper, we argue that disagreement over key terms related to events in space form barriers to creating communication transparency. While the consequences of these discrepancies in the use of key space terms are in some cases benign, in other cases, disagreement over key space terms can negatively impact US national security when terminological disagreement stifle effective, transparent communication among space actors.

Citation

Pagano, S. & Stevenson, J. (2018). NSI Concept Paper, How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain,. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q5] How does the US, working with its partners, best contest DPRK operations?

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the US can work with its partners to contest DPRK operations. This summary details the various approaches that emerge.

How the US Can Work With Its Partners to Contest DPRK Operations

The expert contributor response reveals several ways in which the US and its partners can best contest DPRK operations. Ultimately, three prevailing approaches and four additional approaches emerge. The three prevailing approaches are:

• Multilateral engagement.
• Strengthening US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation and commitment.
• Cooperating with the DPRK rather than contesting it.

The four additional approaches are:

• Conducting an information campaign to empower the people of the DPRK and possibly bring about change in the decision making calculus of DPRK leadership.
• Putting pressure on China elsewhere in Asia.
• Maintaining maximum sanction pressure on the DPRK until it takes meaningful steps toward
  denuclearization.
• Addressing the wider problem of nuclear weapons proliferation in Asia.

Multilateral Engagement

The most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is with multilateral engagement.2 Contributors that advocate this approach highlight the advantages of strong multilateral alliances and partnerships for advancing US interests vis-à-vis the DPRK. Ariel F.W. Petrovics of the University of California, Davis offers a broad reflection of this approach, assessing that a multilateral regional engagement strategy, particularly one that “integrates persistent cooperative efforts with direct negotiations,” best positions the US to contest and overcome DPRK operations that run counter to US interests, and may “offer tangible benefits that simultaneously provide pathways for developing future leverage over Pyongyang.” Petrovics notes that the DPRK has historically been more receptive to sustained engagements that necessitate repeated cooperative interaction, while attempts at coercion have primarily generated hostility.3 There is also a clear lack of trust between the key regional actors with interests on the Korean Peninsula. Taken together, these factors suggest that a multilateral approach to engagement is likely to be more successful than a bilateral engagement approach when dealing with the DPRK. Petrovics explains that, “when trust between the necessary players is very low—as is the case with North Korean negotiations—engagement has the best chances of success when executed through a multilateral framework.” The prevailing absence of trust may also mean that multilateral engagement is most likely to be successful if participants can agree to delegate negotiating oversight and enforcement powers to an agreeable third party.

Several contributors echo this assessment, but advance it a step further, highlighting the value of a cohesive US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance for effectively contesting DPRK operations. Dr. Patrick McEachern of the Wilson Center highlights the benefit of the three countries working together, explaining that “the most effective and seamless responses to DPRK operations benefit from the national capabilities of all three states.” While long-standing and deep-rooted South Korean distrust of Japan has served as a barrier to advancing the cohesion of the ROK-Japan bilateral and US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliances,5 the current situation on the Korean Peninsula may present an opportunity for the ROK and Japan to overcome some of their differences to expand cooperation in light of a common threat.6 Prioritizing a cohesive US-ROK-Japan trilateral approach may position the US to effectively contest DRPK operations; the same, however, cannot be said about prioritizing a US-China bilateral approach. Though the latter may be tempting, McEachern contends that it would be “an example of a tactical approach that loses sight of the strategic importance of prioritizing the allies.”7 While China certainly plays an important role on the peninsula, the US should not overlook the misalignment of US and Chinese values and interests.8 Attempting to contest DPRK operations by way of a US-China bilateral approach alone, therefore, may not be the best approach for the US to achieve an outcome that is in line with its interests. Rather, contributors agree that the US will be better enabled to effectively contest DPRK operations if it operates according to a fundamental guiding principle of “allies first.”

Strengthening US-ROK-Japan Military and Defense Cooperation and Commitment

The second most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is by strengthening US-ROK-Japan trilateral military and defense cooperation and commitment.10 Yun Sun of the Stimson Center and Dr. William Tow of Australian National University both highlight the importance of enduring US military and defense commitment, stressing that the US “needs to remain steadfast in its efforts to coordinate its regional defense and security policies with its South Korean and Japanese allies”11 and “provide unswerving, consistent commitment to the defense of [both countries].”12 Not doing so, Tow contends, could increase the likelihood of regional instability.

Contributors specifically underscore the critical role that the US plays with respect to deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region more broadly. The US maintains significant levels of troops in both the ROK and Japan,13 and its commitment to the defense of both countries is central to ensuring stability in the region. US deterrence capability is also central to contesting DPRK operations.14 However, while US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation and commitment has continued to deepen,15 McEachern contends that “much work remains to be done.” Dr. Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations echoes McEachern’s sentiment, highlighting several vulnerabilities that currently challenge the US-ROK-Japan alliance. These vulnerabilities include the missile threat to Japan,16 the lack of trust between the ROK and Japan,17 the need for the US and Japanese militaries to address how they will fight together, and the need for a broader understanding between the US and Japan on how to operationalize Article Five protections in the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.

Ultimately, contributors that advocate strengthening US-ROK-Japan security relations as the preferred approach for contesting DPRK operations generally echo Tow’s assertion that “there should be no visible let-up in the scale or tempo of [US-ROK-Japan] defense cooperation.” Moreover, these contributors also identify several potential opportunities for advancing US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation efforts in the interest of contesting DPRK operations, including:

• Integrating missile defense strategies and capabilities.
• Improving intelligence collaboration.
• Pursuing new forms of anti-submarine warfare.
• Working with allies to form constant maritime patrols to eliminate illicit trade with the DPRK.
• Enhancing surveillance and monitoring mechanisms along the China-DPRK border to prevent trade.
• Developing and implementing tools, procedures, and weapons to find, fix, and finish the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs, including its mobile missile systems and command and control infrastructure.
• Planning for and practicing rapid surgical strikes against DPRK nuclear systems and long-range missile systems.

“Cooperate” Rather Than “Contest”

The third most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is, in fact, by not contesting the DPRK but instead cooperating with it to build mutual trust.25 Contributors that advocate this approach challenge the premise of the original question, arguing instead that the US would be better off if it started focusing on cooperating with the DPRK. Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists emphasizes this point, asserting that “this is not a constructive question. If you view the US and allied role as contesting, rather than cooperating with the DPRK, it will undermine efforts to build the mutual trust necessary to resolve the root causes of the DPRK’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons and maintain a robust and threatening military posture.”

Contributors that endorse cooperation over contestation as the preferred approach generally assess that by altering the adversarial nature of the US-DPRK relationship (i.e., stop contesting), relations between the two countries could begin to normalize and the motivations that have driven the DPRK’s antagonistic and threatening operations could start to dissipate as a result.26 In this scenario, developing mutual trust between the US and DPRK is important. Focusing on getting to know the DPRK better and creating opportunities for the DPRK to become less limited in what it can do (e.g., assist the DPRK in developing alternatives to weapons sales) will go a long way toward building mutual trust and advancing cooperative relations.27 Ultimately, as Ken Gause of CNA proposes, “we can continue the endless game of whack-a-mole or we can begin to think differently about North Korea. Not as an adversary, but as an opportunity.”

Additional Approaches

Finally, contributors offer several additional ways in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations. These additional approaches are generally cited by just one contributor and, therefore, are not classified as prevailing approaches28 in this summary. Each, however, merit
consideration. These additional approaches include:

• Conducting an information campaign to empower the people of the DPRK and possibly bring about change in the decision making calculus of DPRK leadership.
• Putting pressure on China elsewhere in Asia.
• Maintaining maximum sanction pressure on the DPRK until it takes meaningful steps toward denuclearization.
• Addressing the wider problem of nuclear weapons spread in Asia.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q20] What are the current international agreements, treaties, conventions, etc., governing the use of space, and what specific limitations and constraints are placed on space operations?

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors identified 26 separate international agreements, treaties, and resolutions (legal codes) that have implications for space operations (Figure 1). The core of the legal space regime is composed of five UN-sponsored space treaties3 centering around the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST). Subsequent non-binding resolutions, and the ITU Treaty, reflect the evolving nature of space operations, and the perceived need for legal codes to develop in response.

Not all the legal codes that have implications for space operations are specific to space, however. UN general treaties, in particular regimes governing the use of force by states and the right to self-defense, inform space-specific legal codes. Furthermore, Article III of the OST states that all activities in space must be carried out “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security” (Steer).

Multilateral and bilateral security agreements (NTBT, START I, New START) place restrictions on the placement, testing, and use of weapons in space by signatory states, and efforts are underway through the UN to prevent all states placing weapons in space. Some experts also argue that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) are applicable to space operations (Hitchens; Kasku-Jackson; Steer).

Figure 2 provides a timeline of all legal codes identified by the expert contributors, and any identified constraints they discussed. Full details of all legal codes and links to the documents are provided in Table 1. The majority of the constraints identified (21 of 40) deal with the placement, testing, or use of weapons in space, which are present in eight of the legal codes. The remaining constraints and limitations identified are, for the most part, not focused on placing prohibiting or limiting specific activities. Rather, they are designed to regulate and reduce interference in the activities of others, create accountability and transparency in space activities, and encourage compliance with international law. One exception to this is the 1978 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada suggests could provide a legal basis for prohibiting the use of kinetic ASATs.

Bottom Line

Overall, the expert contributors do not view the existing legal regime in space to be overly burdensome or restrictive. Starting from the basic tenets of international law—sovereign equality, non-interference, prohibition on the use of force, right of self-defense, peaceful dispute resolution—it explicitly applies these to activities in space (Steer). The emphasis on accountability, transparency (Blount), and coordination of activities reflect the underlying principles of the OST.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Faulconer Consulting Group; Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Jonty Kasku-Jackson (National Security Space Institute); David Koplow (Georgetown University Law Center); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q1] Is there a win-win scenario for all of the key actors (DPRK, ROK, US, China, Russia)? If so, what might this look like?

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of thirty-three insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider the possibility of a win-win scenario for the key actors involved with the DPRK. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Bottom Line Up Front

• Several contributors note that while Japan is not listed as a “key actor” in the question, it is certainly a key actor in relation to the Korean Peninsula and Asia Pacific region and should be considered as such in this assessment.
• Twenty-one of the thirty-four contributors (about 62%) do not believe that a win-win scenario exists for all of the key actors. These contributors generally assess that the current interests of the key actors involved, particularly the US vs. DPRK vs. China and Russia, are irreconcilable (i.e., the DPRK considers its nuclear capability as indispensable, while the US insists on final, fully verified denuclearization [FFVD]. China and Russia want to see US influence in the region diminished, while the US, obviously, does not).
• Eight of the thirty-four contributors (about 23%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors may be possible, at least in the short-term, but doubt that such a scenario could actually be achieved over the long-term. These contributors generally highlight a misalignment of long-term interests among the key actors and an overall lack of trust in the DPRK to fulfill any agreements it makes as the key barriers to a win-win scenario for all of the key actors.
• Five of the thirty-four contributors (about 15%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors is possible without much qualification. These contributors acknowledge the differences in interests amongst the key actors, but generally assess that there is room for negotiation in pursuit of a win-win outcome.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Maorong Jiang, Creighton University; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Matt Korda, NATO; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Dr. Steve Tsang, University of London; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q17] As we move into multi-domain conflicts will our success hinge on being successful in every domain or can we lose in one and still be successful in the overall campaign? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Contributors were varied in their responses, with approximately half of the subject matter experts replying to this question with a variation of “it depends.” In other words, campaign success in a multi- domain conflict (MDC) is not solely a question of US need to dominate in all domains (or not), but instead is contingent on contextual factors that are likely to vary from one conflict to the next. Broadly, these can be grouped into the following categories, which can be examined individually or in concert: a) aspects of the conflict, b) aspects of the adversary, and c) aspects of the domain (Berkowitz; Cheng; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Karpiscak; Steer). Figure 1 presents a set of guiding questions derived from contributor inputs, which address these categories and demonstrate the range of considerations when engaging in a multi-domain conflict.

Contributor responses as a whole focused on only one of these contextual factors—aspects of the domain. Specifically, expert discussions often emphasized the degree of domain interdependence. Multiple experts implied that space in particular is a crucial domain without which the US currently cannot “win” in any serious conflict (Cheng; Garretson; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Steer; Weeks).5 A loss or extreme degradation in the space domain is likely to significantly affect capability in other domains (though the opposite does not necessarily hold true, with the exception of cyber). At the same time, absolute dominance in space is not required6 in order to maintain some degree of capability in other domains.

Within the context of this broader discussion of domain interdependence emerged a more concrete articulation of whether US campaign success in a multi-domain conflict necessarily hinges on success in every domain. The picture that emerged was that the US can lose in one domain—even if that domain is space—and yet succeed overall. However, this statement comes with important caveats. While the US can lose space dominance and prevail, given the degree of domain interdependence, the US cannot lose its entire capability in space and still prevail. The US must retain the ability to maneuver throughout space and other domains. However, continuing to operate (or “succeed”) in the face of partial degradation of space capabilities will come at a high cost (e.g., in national treasure or human capital) (Harris Corporation).

In order to continue fighting and ultimately suceed, the US will need to become more agile overall. (See Figure 2 for a graphic summary of the factors affecting MDC campaign success and the need for increased US agility.) This agility includes ensuring that there are appropriately robust plans and infrastructure in place to enable continued operation, whether conditions are ideal or suboptimal (e.g., domain degradation). As such, the “answer” to this question can be reformulated as follows: Success is not required in every domain, as long as the US becomes and remains agile.

Several options were in turn derived from the expert inputs for how the US might increase its agility.

Space is Different Than Other Domains and Critical to Campaign Success

The experts indicated that campaign success will depend in part on aspects of the domain(s) being invoked. These include whether any one domain is essential for the proper functioning of the others, as well as the more general interplay between and among the domains in a given multi-domain conflict. The ViaSat team underscored this interdependence, noting that:

Space systems that deliver communications, Earth observation, position/navigation/timing, missile warning, weather, etc. do not exist exclusively in space. Their delivery platforms, or infrastructure, exist in all domains including land, sea, air, space, and cyber. Thus, a network infrastructure loss in any of these domains equates to a loss in providing service or delivery to their customers that operate in the land, sea, air, space, [and cyber] domains. The inability to defend and protect systems in all domains leads to loss of service or operational capability in the operational domains of land, sea, air, space, [and cyber] (Follow-Up Communication, January 25, 2018).

However, the specific effects of dominance or loss of dominance within different domains may vary. As Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation postulates:

“dominance in different domains will have different effects. For example, losing dominance in Domain A may or may not be as bad as losing dominance in Domain B. Where you start having more problematic issues is the synergies: If I have a 30% reduction in Domain A, does that mean I’m more likely to lose all ability in Domain B?”

A theme that emerged consistently from contributor inputs is that the cross-cutting nature of space makes it fundamentally different from other domains such as maritime or land. As Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada indicated, “space is…utilized in a unique way compared to all other domains” because it (as well as cyber) is an enabler to other domains, without which those domains could not function optimally (see Garretson; Harris Corporation; Steer). In the same vein, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the USAF Air Command and Staff College argued that, given the US dependency on space for terrestrial command-and-control and targeting, losing space (or cyber) services would result in degradation spanning the entire joint force.8 The Harris Corporation also emphasized this point, and added that, not only would the loss of space make successful military campaigns difficult or impossible, but that if a US victory were to occur, it would come at a much higher cost than it would have if space assets had been available. Taking a global perspective, Gilmour Space Technologies added that there would also be significant weakness in other defense forces if the allied countries were to lose space communication capability in a future conflict. Cheng most powerfully illustrates the danger of current US dependence on space, by noting that:

“it will have more far-reaching effects in both the military and civilian realms if we lose space because we are not as aware of how permeating space is…. We are de facto beyond dependent on space…we are 5-year heroin addicts mainlining every couple of hours on space without realizing it.”

The Importance of Increasing US Agility

A conventional understanding of campaign success might emphasize overall US dominance. While the goal of campaign success in a multi-domain conflict might best be served by achieving dominance across all domains, as multiple experts (Armor; Berkowitz; Harris Corporation; Sampigethaya; Steer) implied, it may not be strictly necessary for the US to dominate in all domains in order to remain successful in the campaign. Instead, as Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK emphasized, the US might aim to “preserv[e] options across all domains.” Moreover, several contributors suggested that achieving, and especially maintaining, multi-domain dominance in every campaign is improbable, and thus an inadvisable goal. These contributors made the point that the US needs to be prepared for the fact that it may not be possible to succeed in every domain all of the time. The US may not always have the “home field advantage,” and thus needs to be prepared to think about trade-offs9 among domains (Hitchens; Karpiscak; ViaSat, Inc.). At the same time, the domains are highly interdependent, and each domain is highly dependent on space, which implies a potential US vulnerability that must be resolved.

Together, these points converge around the need for the US to increase its overall agility, whether aiming to “preserve options” or “think about trade-offs,” in order to achieve campaign success. It may be sufficient for the US to retain the ability to maneuver throughout the various domains, in order to “deliver the desired effects at a time and place of our choosing” (Harris Corporation). Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin10 added precision to this line of reasoning by acknowledging that dominance in all domains should not be a prerequisite for victory if the US can offset disadvantages in one domain with advantages in another. However, he offered an important caveat that, “it is difficult to conceive how the US could achieve victory or terminate conflict on favorable terms if it cannot seize and maintain at least ‘working control’ (as opposed to absolute command) of the space, air, and maritime domains.”

Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya of the United Technologies Research Center similarly emphasized the ability of the US to continue fighting in the face of attacks, rather than the necessity of defeating attacks in all domains. He offered as an example a UAV conducting reconnaissance. If a UAV relies solely on satellites for navigation, timing, and communications, it may contribute to mission failure if space is attacked. In contrast, a UAV that can fall back on other domains in the case of a space attack can continue to operate and complete the mission. Dr. Steer made a different but compatible point, noting that success in the space domain may entail preventing escalation, even if this means loss in another domain. Moreover, she argued that the waging or winning of an armed conflict in space may not be necessary to ensure the successful use of that domain to enhance other domains.

However, even partial loss of space capability could mean losing total effective capability in a second domain, and/or degradation in the space domain can have follow-on effects in other domains if those systems are not sufficiently resilient. As one example, Steer noted that, “the US [currently] lacks sufficient redundancy in many of its terrestrial systems to deal with a loss of satellite services.” Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland made a similar point, indicating that the US generally has not secured Plan(s) B to reduce space system reliance, as “protection and resiliency aren’t sexy; they aren’t ‘pointy edges’ that get funding.” She elaborated that, “We have to be prepared to have various domains suppressed or even rendered unusable for a specific conflict…including space.” Doing so would enable the US to continue fighting in the face of adversary attacks.

The current gap in preparation leaves the US with a core vulnerability. The challenge of 21st century US defense thus points to the importance of enhancing US agility, including an emphasis on building resilience into new and legacy systems and developing and exercising contingency plans—“Plans B”—to enable the US to withstand suppression or loss of capabilities in space or any other domain.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Group Captain (Indian Air Force, ret.) Ajey Lele3 (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security- Canada); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.