NSI Publications

[Q8] How do key actors in the Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) define their key national interests / regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen by each actor to be the major threats to each interest? Are there any redlines associated with these interests?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, Weston Aviles, Dr. Belinda Bragg, Dr. Larry Kuznar, Nicole Peterson, George Popp, and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This summary explores the national interests and regional objectives of seven key actors (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) in the Asia Pacific region. The interest tables below outline these key national interests and regional objectives for each actor, first identifying the actor’s specific regional interests, then providing a more detailed description of each interest, and finally coding each interest by interest type (national security, economic, international prestige, domestic political, and/or identity). An individual, stand-alone interest table is presented for each actor.

The interest tables were developed using two primary sources of information: 1) insightful written responses from eight Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) subject matter expert contributors, each of which are presented in full in the Subject Matter Expert Response Submission section of this report and are well worth reading in their entirety, and 2) supplemental open source research conducted by the authors. In-text citations are used within the interest tables and expanded reference lists are provided immediately following each interest table.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Kim Jong Un’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space: An Analysis of Public Discourse

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

A collection of Kim Jong Un’s speeches from 2012 to 2017, translated and published online by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Kim Jong Un’s concerns in the space domain and how these concerns are articulated with general political and cultural themes. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as the DPRK’s (i.e., Kim Jong Un’s) perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.

Kim Jong Un’s Perspectives and Worldview Regarding the Space Domain

• The DPRK’s space operations are described in Kim’s speeches in entirely martial and threatening terms and the need to deter aggression.

• Kim Jong Un discusses the DPRK’s space endeavors within the framework of national security rather a commercial perspective.

• Space events, such as missile launches and satellite deployments, and space discourse are associated with negative themes such as danger, threat, instability, adversaries, and nuclear weapons.

• The US and the DPRK are frequently mentioned together when Kim Jong Un discusses space, and in association with actual space events. President Trump is highly associated with space discourse and space events in Kim Jong Un’s discourse. This may indicate that Kim Jong Un values the space domain as a critical venture to counter U.S. ambitions.

• The frequency of space themes and actual space events escalate through time, indicating that both Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric and action track with one another.

• Kim Jong Un’s language regarding space is highly charged and negative, especially in speeches where he mentions President Trump.

• Despite increases in missile testing over the coding period, missiles and military are not often mentioned in Kim’s discourse. However, satellites are mentioned, and are associated with success, authority, legitimacy and economic development. These associations must be understood in the framework of national security, and economic development is only pursued insofar as to serve the interests of bolstering regime survival.

General Worldview and Values

• The most common themes include Juche philosophy, and Kim Jong Un’s predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, emphasizing the importance of the legacy of the Kim family. Other frequently mentioned themes are related to the DPRK’s strength and ability.

• The analysis suggests that Kim Jong Un is most concerned with his adversaries, namely, the US, Japan and South Korea.

• The US and the DPRK share close associations with many themes as a reflection of the adversarial relationship Kim Jong Un sees between the U.S. and the DPRK. These themes are largely negative and similar to themes associated with space, including instability, injustice, danger, threat, extremely negative themes and hyperbole, war, and adversaries.

• The occurrence of only a few themes increase over the 5-year coding period for this study, namely: space, Trump, the US and danger.

• Space themes, President Trump, the U.S. and danger are the only themes that increase through time, and all these themes have accelerated in the past two years.

• Discussion of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un and religious themes decreases through time. Similar decreases in religious themes has been related to increased state leader aggression in previous studies (Kuznar, Yager, Clair, & Stephenson, 2012).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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[Q7] Many analysts indicate that due to the partial marketization of the North Korean economy, the economy has stabilized somewhat. What were the key reasons the regime made the decision to marketize? What factors inhibit a broader marketization of the economy?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 12 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. The expert contributors identify factors that explain the apparent condoning of controlled marketization in North Korea, as well as factors that appear to be inhibiting broader marketization in the country. This summary first discusses the key drivers of North Korean marketization and then considers the primary inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

Key Drivers of North Korean Marketization Efforts

Four key reasons emerge from the expert contributor responses as primary drivers of North Korean marketization efforts.

• The economic downturn and famine that engulfed North Korea and eventually led to the collapse of the country’s Public Distribution System in the 1990s.
• The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans that have started acclimating to marketization.
• The emergence of Kim Jong Un and new economic development policy.
• The reassuring precedent from China integrating itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant economic growth and development while preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime.

Economic Downturn, Famine, and the Collapse of the Public Distribution System

The reason most frequently cited by the contributors to explain marketization in North Korea is the significant economic downturn and famine that engulfed the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, what Dr. James Hoare of Chatham House describes as North Korea’s “economic meltdown.”1 A weak North Korean economy was struggling, as economic infrastructure and equipment decayed and agricultural land wore down. Environmental challenges (e.g., flooding, drought) only made the situation more difficult. All of these obstacles, interacting together, put serious strain on the economy, making an already troubling economic situation even more problematic.2 The situation eventually grew even more dire when, unable to withstand the economic downturn, the regime’s central ration system for providing food and other necessities to its people, the Public Distribution System, collapsed, sparking widespread famine and desperation across the country, with many North Koreans left by their government to survive on their own.

Several contributors point to this collapse of the Public Distribution System as the proximate cause of North Korea’s initial shift toward marketization.4 The collapse meant that the regime was no longer capable of providing basic necessities. No longer able to rely on the regime for basic needs and survival, North Koreans took desperate measures including turning to informal markets for sustenance.5 Despite concerns over the legality of such informal markets, and an overall ideological opposition to marketization and capitalism in general, the regime did not move to quash these activities, seemingly concluding that the seriousness of the situation warranted concession. Soojin Park of the Wilson Center explains that the regime was ultimately left with “no choice but to tacitly condone” and tolerate the spread of commercial activity and marketization across the country, as it offered a means of survival for many North Koreans.6 Thus, an informal market economy emerged to help fill the void left by the failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System.

Importantly, this progression suggests that North Korean marketization initially resulted from what appears to be largely a bottom-up, rather than top-down, process.7 Park states this point directly: “North Korea’s marketization did not come about by design, but rather as a result of the state’s failure to sustain the livelihoods of its population.”

Rising Expectations of North Koreans Acclimating to the Market Economy

The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans who have started to benefit from marketization is also cited by contributors as a key reason for the regime’s decisions to allow limited marketization.8 The failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System unintentionally opened the door to private enterprise in North Korea, and introduced many North Koreans to the idea of a market economy. It also provided many North Koreans with an opportunity to witness first-hand some of the advantageous aspects of marketization. Since the regime’s initial limited opening to the idea of individual citizens profiting from informal market segments outside strict government controls, marketizing activity across the country has increased as North Koreans acclimate to the market economy. These activities, in fact, have created a new class of wealthy elites (“Donju”) who have been able to use their new-found wealth to purchase influence in the country’s economic and political institutions, further adding to their gains.9 Seeing the advancements that have emerged from marketization has driven higher the economic expectations and aspirations of many North Koreans, and has increased curiosity about the kinds of economic advancement opportunities that could arise from further broadening marketization within the country.

Any attempt by the North Korean regime to significantly curb marketization, therefore, is likely to face some degree of pushback from the North Korean population.11 Park reminds us of the regime’s unsuccessful attempts to curb private entrepreneurship and decelerate marketization in 2007 and 2009. She explains that “such attempts, including the currency reform measure in November 2009— redenominating 100 won for 1 won—angered the people and were met with direct resistance, though short of rebellion.” This pushback, Park suggests, helped the regime “realize that it would need to tolerate and allow market activities and marketization as a way to counter the people’s complaints.”

North Koreans with rising economic aspirations are likely to look to the Kim regime to establish and maintain an economic environment that will empower them to achieve their ambitions. The onus, therefore, is on the regime to stimulate and develop the North Korean economy. Not doing so, and diverging from popular expectations, could hurt the regime’s legitimacy even more so than maintaining tight centralized control. In fact, Ken Gause of CNA suggests that the Kim regime is already feeling pressure from North Korean elites on this front:

The idea that Kim Jong Un came to the notion of diplomacy and engagement as a result of the Maximum Pressure Campaign is a fallacy. He has been preparing the country for this moment since 2012. That said, he doesn’t have a lot of time. He is on a clock. By opening up the markets, he has exacerbated the differences in economic classes. The so-called moneyed elite (“Donju”) have rising expectations and have suffered as a result of the sanctions. This class of elite is particularly critical to Kim’s hold on power. Only through opening to the outside world, albeit in a controlled fashion, can he satisfy this demand. If left unsatisfied, his legitimacy will begin to suffer.

The Emergence of Kim Jong Un as the Leader of North Korea

Contributors also consider Kim Jong Un’s emergence as the leader of North Korea to be a key driver of the country’s economic decentralization.12 The contributors generally believe that Kim has exhibited noticeable interest in economic development and marketization since taking over control. For example, he frequently discusses economic development in public, has initiated several highly-visible economic development initiatives (e.g., sparkling new apartment blocks in Pyongyang, the Masikryong Ski Resort in Kangwon Province, and a new international terminal at the Kalma Airport in Wonsan), and has instituted market reforms in the interest of promoting development and growth.13 Moreover, Kim appears willing to both accept some degree of marketization in North Korea and capitalize on markets within the country for economic and political gain. Gause even goes so far as to assert that Kim “gave free reign to the markets” upon taking over control. Kim’s objective in doing so, Gause explains, was to help stabilize the North Korean economy by capitalizing on the markets to supply much needed goods and services, as well as to start acclimating the North Korean population to the market economies.

Ultimately, contributors appear to agree with the assessment from Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies that Kim appears to be “serious about improving the North Korean economy” and is willing to “stake some of his personal legitimacy on economicdevelopment.”

Reassuring Precedent from China’s Approach to Reform

Several contributors suggest that China’s approach to reform might be perceived by the North Korean regime as a reassuring precedent.14 Some of the same factors that drove economic reform in China are likely to be behind North Korea’s efforts to reshape its economic policies. Therefore, North Korea may find reassurance in, and be encouraged by, China’s ability to integrate itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant growth and development of its economy while also preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime. China’s success on this front may entice North Korea into employing a similar approach. Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force emphasizes this point, offering a concise assessment of the dynamics:

Many Asian leaders have witnessed China’s stunning growth and realize you can develop economically yet remain authoritarian because the West will open their societies to you if you act peacefully. It is probable that Kim has finally seen the wisdom of the Chinese approach. This will encourage them to copy China’s economic development model.

Hoare, on the other hand, raises doubt about just how far the North Korean regime would be willing to follow any sort of Chinese model. North Koreans, Hoare argues, “have a very ambivalent relationship with China and resent being told that they should follow a Chinese model. And, of course, they were an industrialized nation well before China.”

Key Factors Inhibiting Broader North Korean Marketization Efforts

There are also three key factors that expert contributors cite as inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

• The Kim regime’s perception of economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.
• The Kim regime’s tight grip on the flow of information in the country and its desire to create ideological purity.
• Structural factors (e.g., productive capacity is severely lacking, the economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment, there is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level, legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak, markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption, and international sanctions have prevented the benefits afforded by globalization).

Fear of Economic Liberalization Threatening the Regime’s Fundamental Interests

The Kim regime appears to view economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.15 Thus, while Kim has demonstrated a willingness to accept some degree of marketization inside North Korea, he is not likely to tolerate any sort of political reform or interference coinciding with economic reform initiatives. Nor is Kim likely interested in fully opening the North Korean economy to broad marketization, as doing so could risk the kind of significant economic and social change that could spark political instability. It would also likely reduce the regime’s ability to maintain absolute control over the population and undermine the regime’s legitimacy.16 As Park explains, “a totalitarian state like North Korea which is maintained under strict control over its people and society becomes increasingly vulnerable when it allows greater liberalization…while willing to accommodate some marketization, the regime is still very vigilant to keep it at a manageable level.”

The Kim regime seems to ultimately be facing an interesting dilemma between balancing its political aspirations, which seemingly best align with a centrally planned and controlled economy, and its economic aspirations, which may be best served by great economic liberalization. Dr. Bruce Bennett of RAND offers further reflection on this dilemma: “the regime knows that if it allows too much market activity, the legitimacy of the regime will be undermined. But if the regime cuts the markets back too much, the North Korean economy will begin to fail.”

Tight Control Over the Flow of Information

The Kim regime’s tight control over the flow of information across the country is cited by contributors as a key factor inhibiting broader North Korean marketization efforts.17 The Kim regime strives to maintain absolute control over the population. In North Korea, this also extends to having absolute control over the flow of information. This information control is a part of Kim’s initiative to create what he calls “ideological purity” across North Korea.18 Platte explains that “to enforce ideological purity and reduce chances for bottom-up political reform, Kim Jong Un likely will retain or strengthen controls meant to limit external influence on North Korean people. News, pop culture, and other media from the outside world, especially from South Korea, will be limited to trusted classes, as will interaction with outsiders.” The current, fully controlled information environment that provides most North Koreans with little to nothing in terms of information freedom, together with the regime’s ideological purity initiative, create conditions that are fundamentally contradictory to the idea of broader marketization.

Structural factors

Finally, the contributors also reference several structural factors that further inhibit broader North Korean marketization. These structural factors are listed below.

• Productive capacity is severely lacking.
• The economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment.
• There is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level.
• Legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak.
• Markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption.
• International sanctions have prevented the foreign direct investment, resources, and markets afforded by globalization.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Soojin Park, Wilson Center; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?

Author(s): George Popp (NSI, Inc.) and Mariah Yager (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of thirty responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions are necessary for achieving final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) without resorting to militarized conflict. This summary details the various conditions that emerge. The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD is a point highlighted by a majority of the contributors, with several contributors expressing significant doubt that a denuclearized DPRK is possible at all. At best, contributors suggest, true progress towards achieving FFVD will require a long-term perspective, modified expectations, and a measured approach; however, even this does not ensure success. Nevertheless, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves.

Setting the Stage and Changing the Outlook

In considering necessary conditions for achieving FFVD, contributorsset the stage by reviewing the DPRK’s motivations for its nuclear weapons program. The prestige of being a nuclear power is certainly important to the Kim regime and the people of the DPRK, but it also helps to ensure the regime’s hold on governing power and control, while also playing to its Juche ideology. Nuclear capability provides the DPRK with security and deterrent capability against potential threats to its sovereignty from outside forces, leverage over other international actors (particularly the ROK), and relevancy and legitimacy on the international stage.

In reflecting on the motivations behind the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, several contributors offer necessary conditions for achieving FFVD that are more akin to perspective or ideological shifts, rather than on-the-ground requisites. These shifts, contributors stress, are compulsory conditions to having any chance of achieving FFVD.

Building Mutual Trust

Contributors who advocate for perspective shifts as being a necessary condition for achieving FFVD emphasize that, in order for any credible steps towards DPRK denuclearization to occur, the key actors involved have to work towards establishing and building mutual trust. Currently, there is a severe lack of trust among the key actors, and this lack of trust, contributors suggest, is a major impediment to the perspective shifts and on-the-ground conditions needed for true progress towards achieving FFVD. Overcoming this impediment, however, may not be easy, as there appears to be little reason (if any at all) currently for the DPRK and the US to trust each other. Thus, as the situation stands currently, the US would have to take substantial risk in trusting any DRPK commitment to FFVD and, at the same time, would have to offer serious reassurances and/or binding agreements to appease the DPRK’s distrust of the US and its true intentions relating to FFVD. Even such reassurances, however, may not be enough given recent US precedent. Dr. Todd Robinson of the Air Command and Staff College, for example, argues that “the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA was a colossal strategic mistake that might ultimately make an agreement with the DPRK impossible, as it suggests that a state might do exactly what it is required to do under the terms of whatever agreement is made and the US might simply renege on its end of the bargain because it feels like it.”

New Perspectives

In addition to the need to overcome an absence of mutual trust, the key actors involved in the DPRK denuclearization process may also have to adjust their existing perspectives and ideologies. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors suggest, will require a shift in the way in which the DPRK thinks about nuclear weapons. More specifically, the Kim regime will have to accept that the security of the regime, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and international prestige of Kim Jong-un and the DPRK would not be harmed—and may actually be increased—without nuclear weapons. Essentially, contributors explain, the DPRK would have to be convinced that there is no threat against the state and, therefore, there is no need for nuclear weapons. If such a shift in the DPRK perspective were to occur, it would likely increase the possibility of FFVD being achieved. This appears to be particularly true, contributors suggest, if the DPRK perspective were to start shifting towards perceiving economic power as being more important than nuclear power, as a more economically-focused mindset may drive the regime towards exchanging nuclear capability for economic opportunity and normalized relations with the international community. Ultimately, however, this type of shift in perspective would require the DPRK to fundamentally change its worldview and raison d’être.

The US may also have to shift the way in which it thinks about the DPRK and denuclearization, including potentially making exceptions to previously held expectations and redlines, in order to achieve FFVD. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors contend, may require the US to take a new approach to the DPRK, specifically one in which the US starts to accept and recognize the DPRK and the Kim regime on the international stage. Such a shift in the US perspective may be a particularly impactful move toward achieving FFVD, Dr. Justin Hastings of the University of Sydney suggests, especially if this US acceptance of the DPRK includes a loosening of restrictions on DPRK economic activity and if the US itself commits to economic investment with the DPRK.

Economic, Political, and Social Conditions Conducive to Achieving FFVD Without Militarized Conflict

Beyond the need for mutual trust and new perspectives discussed above, contributors also highlight several more on-the-ground conditions that may be conducive to achieving FFVD in the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict. The lists below summarize the political, economic, and social conditions most commonly cited by contributors. With thirty contributors offering conditions, however, the list of ideas is extensive, with some conditions directly contradicting others.

Inside the DPRK

Reassure Kim Jong-un’s safety and US credibility:

• Significant reassurances are provided to Kim Jong-un that FFVD will not threaten the security of his regime.
• Credible assurance is provided that the US will not renege on its agreements.
• The DPRK is acknowledged as a member of the international community.
• The US commits to not implementing any new sanctions during FFVD negotiations.

Support economic growth:

• Opportunities are created for the DPRK to access international markets and foreign economic aid.
• Economic development is promoted in the DPRK beyond Pyongyang and the Kim regime.

Improve social conditions:

• Social exchanges are facilitated between the DPRK and other countries(e.g., cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges are initiated in the region, particularly with the ROK; DPRK officials are allowed to travel and study abroad; Americans are allowed to live and work in the DPRK).

Regime change:

• Regime change occurs in the DPRK (e.g., peaceful coup occurs within the DPRK; Kim Jong-un suddenly dies and there is an ascension of figures dependent on China or the ROK; isolation from the outside world becomes so profound that the DPRK collapses, leaving its people and territory to fall under ROK or foreign tutelage).

US-China

The US and China cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US and China fully commit to and cooperate on offering the DPRK economic, political, and security assistance and guarantees.
• The US and China exert costly economic pressure on the DPRK to force it into initial FFVD negotiations and keep it on track towards FFVD.

The US and China do not cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US applies maximum economic pressure against both the DPRK and China (e.g., the US strengthens export/import embargoes against the DPRK and China and toughens sanctions against Chinese financial institutions doing business with the DPRK) to isolate the DPRK from China and force the DPRK to comply with US FFVD demands.

Multilateralism

• The US commits to a multilateral approach that incorporates key regional actors (i.e., DPRK, US, ROK, China, Japan, and Russia) to work towards a broader Asian Pacific regional security architecture.

Reduced Tension on the Korean Peninsula

• US-ROK military exercises are reduced or terminated.
• DPRK-ROK talks on the reunification or demilitarization of the peninsula are established.
• The Korean War is formally ended and a peace treaty is signed.
• Missile and weapon verification and limitation agreements are negotiated with the DPRK.
• DPRK-ROK joint military professional exchanges are established.
• DPRK and ROK observers are increasingly invited to regional military exercises.

What is the Best Approach to Achieving FFVD?

The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict is a point that is echoed in nearly every contributor response. Not surprisingly, therefore, contributors emphasize the importance of carefully considering the approach that is taken towards achieving FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves. Contributors are generally definitive, however, in the view that FFVD should be viewed as a long-term objective that requires a measured approach. Such an approach, contributors explain, must allow the key actors involved ample time to build and establish mutual trust—a fundamental element of any approach to peaceful denuclearization. To help build this trust among key actors, contributors suggest, the US and its regional allies must implement a clearly devised and projected set of executable policies.

As such, contributors reflect on what they envision to be the best approach to achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, presenting several options for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine and Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann of Texas A&M favor a phased approach in which parties work together to implement a defined set of conditions over time (i.e., limits on testing and missile production, increases in DPRK-ROK joint military exchanges, progression towards regional agreements on cooperative threat reduction measures) rather than immediately pushing for denuclearization. Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University offers a “strategic trust” approach, pointing to US-Soviet arms control process as a potential model. Jenny Town of the Stimson Center advances an approach in which the US extends political concessions and commitments early on to consider what the DPRK is willing to do and how far it is willing to progress towards FFVD. Offering these kinds of commitments up front, she believes, could fuel more advanced negotiations later in the process. Finally Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies highlights the importance of sequencing in any approach to achieving FFVD, arguing that granting the DPRK its “ultimate carrot” (i.e., diplomatic recognition)should be the final step in the process, given only once there is confidence that FFVD has indeed been achieved.

Other contributors advocate for an approach that incorporate elements of both punishment and reward. Dr. Rupal Mehta of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln offers an “ad-hoc carrots and sticks” approach that combines a punishments pathway (e.g., targeted sanctions—particularly against the DPRK military—and cyber intervention) with a parallel rewards pathway (e.g., regional economic incentives and financial assistance, particularly from China). Hastings considers a three-phased approach that combines Chinese pressure, US guarantees, and DPRK compensation (i.e., China exerts economic pressure on the DPRK to begin denuclearization efforts and stay on a pathway toward denuclearization, the US provides security and economic guarantees to the DPRK, and the DPRK denuclearizes and shares the economic benefits it receives for doing so with its military and entrepreneurial elite).

Finally, some contributors advocate for an approach that is more focused on internal, domestic DPRK dynamics. For example, Town posits that the best approach may be one that allows Kim Jong-un to present himself as a hero to his people, which, she suggests, may embolden him to choose a new, nonnuclear path. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies suggests that an approach focused on reunifying the peninsula under Seoul’s leadership is likely the approach that is most certain to achieve FFVD. He reminds us, however, that there can be no guarantees that such an approach would not resort to militarized conflict. Therefore, he advocates for an approach that combines implementing robust economic sanctions and launching an information campaign to erode the regime’s domestic governing power and support. A prolonged erosion of the regime’s power and support, he believes, could eventually compel change.

Ultimately, it is unclear that any approach could truly achieve FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. The best outcome for the US, therefore, may include living with a de facto nuclear DPRK, an improved relationship with the hostile state, and acceptance of the DPRK into the international community. What does seem clear, however, is that in order for progress to be made toward achieving FFVD in the DPRK, major shifts in perspectives and expectations are needed on all sides.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Dr. John Delury, Yonsei University; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. Justin Hastings, University of Sydney; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Adam Mount, Federation of American Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Jenny Town, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q13] What are the national security implications of increasingly accessible and affordable commercial launch services? Are these the same for the US and near-peers or states with emergent space capabilities? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The experts solicited in this effort agree that there will be wide-ranging national security challenges and a few benefits arising from decreased launch costs. The challenges are largely derived from two structural changes to the space domain: more actors and a wider diversity of payloads. The subject matter experts indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs affect: military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

Less is More: More Actors and More Junk

The diversity and number of actors accessing space and the types of objects in space is increasing over time, seemingly exponentially. According to Dr. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a suite of commercial entities, “SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and Stratolaunch, amongst others,” are “either launching payloads or soon will be, in new ways that opens up access to space to a broader customer base and at a lower cost and with greater responsiveness.”6 Dr. Deganit Paikowsky of Tel Aviv University observes that commercial entities are one of the “two new types of players [that] joined global space activity” due to decreased costs to launch. Historically, larger incumbent companies, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have used government corporate subsidies to drive their product cycles. Lowered costs to launch have added “(a) small and developing countries [and] (b) private sector players” to the mix of actors in space.

More actors with access to space has led, unsurprisingly, to more material in space of varying quality. Dr. Damon Coletta of the United States Air Force Academy incisively notes that what “looks like a change in launch services” and costs is actually “an advancement and diffusion of technology for building small, lightweight, highly capable payloads.” Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin maintains that further increasing the number of nation-state and sub-national actors able to access space…risks continuing to make the space domain more congested and complex. Such increased congestion and complexity will impose additional resource burdens on space domain awareness capabilities and could create additional debris or other hazardous operating conditions that pose risks of mishaps.

The diversity of payloads, Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit postulates, creates physical danger from an atmosphere of cheap objects threatening the integrity of government-sponsored space systems:

The increasing and unregulated launch of satellites—23,000 satellites have been forecasted for the next ten years, and this estimate grows every three months—may pose several risks. In fact, most of these satellites are designed to be manufactured using COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) components. Hence, they are less reliable than government-type satellites, and their death rate will be higher than the current average.

How the Implications Differ (or Not) Across the International System

The national security implications that the subject matter experts identify are best categorized into four baskets: military procurement deliverables, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

One implication of increasingly affordable launch services that the experts consistently identify is how launch services shift the military procurement deliverables of national space programs. Nations with advanced commercial space sectors would gain more value for their spending and allowing for new timelines of development within both emerging and legacy national space programs, experts postulate. Elliot Carol of Ripple Aerospace observes that any country’s “military budget goes a lot further,” including the United States, if those countries are no longer “paying ULA a couple hundred million dollars for the next launch, but are paying SpaceX $62 million a launch.”

Although saving money in space programs appears to be primarily an economic benefit, these cost savings yield steep national security implications. Shifting the necessary allocation of resources affects the whole of countries’ defense industries and the distribution of capabilities across the international system to those countries whose responses to these changes are strategic and forward-thinking. Berkowitz argues in this vein: “An advantage should accrue to the side that mitigates the risks and takes advantage of the opportunities created by accessible and affordable commercial launch services with the greatest speed, agility, and consistency.

Other exerts concur with Berkowitz that cheaper, changing procurement options shape space program management and initiatives. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College points out that lowered costs allow the United States to “affordably field entirely new military capabilities (Space-Based Radar/MTI, Space-Based Missile Defense, Space-Based Terrestrial Strike).” This innovation, Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas posits, stems from the commercial competitiveness of a larger market to win government contracts, which in turn gives public sector procurement managers increased program design options. He states: “In times past, government actors had very specific kinds of providers and launch opportunities, whereas now, with cheaper access to space and more launch providers, governments can take multiple rides and have many choices.”

Some experts also agree with Berkowitz that only countries that move quickly will gain advantage, but argue that the United States has been slow to capitalize7 on these transformations, reducing the relative competitiveness of the American space program. Dr. Davis warns that “ironically, large, expensive, fully expendable rockets, which take months to prepare for launch and cannot be reused, are still the focus of NASA with its ‘Space Launch System’ (SLS) and United Launch Alliance (ULA) with the Atlas and Delta family of vehicles.” Experts from Harris Corporation, LLC urge American policymakers to “rethink ‘how we do space,’ writ large. The legacy requirements for large, highly sophisticated, redundant systems with lots of fuel, multiple backups, and long service lives may no longer be required to the same extent as today.” The national security implications of these changing options for procurement pushed Dr. Davis to raise a key question: “How will these traditional launch vehicle technologies compete with reusable rockets, airborne launch, and, ultimately, spaceplanes in terms of cost competitiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness in the next two decades, particularly as reusable launch systems mature over time?”

The second implication of these commercial technologies is the environmental destruction from so many actors’ increasing ability to place more materials of varying quality into orbit and potentially affect all states equally. Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua of the University of Florida cautions that actors in the space field are approaching access to space as if it were an infinite resource, and reduced prices are enabling operators to reduce the quality of their satellites and to launch more, relying on redundancy of poor hardware. Low quality hardware’s behavior is more difficult to predict and control. This is obviously a non-sustainable and wild approach but, unfortunately, there are no global regulations and no enforceable actions that can prevent these behaviors.

Third, some of the experts argue that, although many actors can access space and place their objects into space due to the lowered cost to launch, only a select few actors—those with superior information processing capability—will see any benefit from more affordable access to the space domain. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation suggests that when “anyone on the planet with a few dollars will be able to get raw data” from space-based assets, the key “differentiation then is going to be in analysis,” and the benefits of affordable launch services will mostly accrue to those actors who will be able to “look at that data and say, ‘That is a T-72, and that is an M-1 Abrams’ or ‘That is an American AEGIS destroyer, and that is a South Korean or Chinese destroyer.’”

Fourth, and finally, Dr. Davis hypothesizes that a critical national implication of affordable launch capabilities will emerge with the “development of reusable launch capabilities—reusable rockets, airborne launch, and, on the horizon, aerospace planes,” because these technological developments could “improve responsiveness and boost cost efficiencies in accessing and exploiting space” in ways that could “fundamentally transform military space operations.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, the main national security effect of reduced cost to launch is that cheaper launches enable a greater number of actors to send a wider range of payloads—some of which will, quite frankly, be junk—into space. Cheaper costs to launch also shape how countries leverage (and build) their national space programs by shifting available procurement patterns.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Mark Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua3 (University of Florida); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol4 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Dr. Malcolm Ronald Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele5 (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributing Authors | Editors: Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Lt Col Peter Garretson (USAF), Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Bruce W. MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Kazuto Suzuki (Hokkaido University, Japan), Brian C. Weeden (Secure World Foundation), Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University), and Mariah C. Yager (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

Executive Summary

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.

(1) Managing space operations now is not the same as in the Cold War Space Age (1957-1990) or the Unipolar US Space Age (1990-2014) – we recently entered a new space epoch, the “Gray Zone-Entangled Space Age.” It has two distinguishing features:

(a) Gray Zone conflict is more than normal competition and less than war. Space strategic conflict mirrors the Gray Zone conflict on earth, with a rising China and resurgent Russia. Space is ideal for Gray Zone conflict, particularly using diverse reversible technologies (Chs. 1 and 8). As James Lewis puts it (Ch. 3): “If America is waiting for the onset of armed conflict, it will miss the game.”

Recommendations: Gray Zone conflict in space is necessarily limited conflict, and thus the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences. Both influence and control are necessary for US success. US space policy and practice must explicitly place influence and control at the heart of space operations.

US decision-makers must have options to respond proportionally to Gray Zone conflict in space, enabling responses without escalation to war. Allies are critical (e.g. Ch. 7 on Japan), as is long-term competition to shape norms (Ch. 8).

(b) Entanglement: Crucial conventional and nuclear space missions are now deeply entangled, so warfighting with near-peers in space for conventional purposes profoundly threatens the nuclear mission. Commercial and military space systems are also increasingly entangled.

Recommendations: In the short-term, US decision-makers must now prepare for space operations during crises to rapidly escalate to the nuclear level (e.g. involving the space-based infrared system; SBIRs). This should be mitigated by dialogue and US deterrent signals. In the medium-term, the US must reduce dependency on fragile, entangled space assets such as SBIRs – and demonstrate that reduced US dependency.

(2) Managing escalation in space operations is not the same as in other domains. The nature of conflict is the same across domains, but the character differs.

Recommendations: Chs. 1, 2 and 7 outline the particular emphases required for space operations, e.g. dealing with ambiguity and offense-dominance.

(3) Chinese strategic thinking on space, escalation, and space escalation differs from US thinking.

Recommendations: To avoid misperception, planners must take seriously different Chinese thinking on space conflict, e.g. related to deterrence or space blockade (Ch. 4). Beyond conflict, the US Government (USG) more broadly must compete for position over longer-term space industrialization (Chs. 5 and 6).

[Q15] What insight on current space operations can we gain from understanding the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings before the advent of the space age?

Author(s): George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 13 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

Approaches to Military Capabilities Before the Advent of the Space Age

Since long before the space age, capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings have been critical core- competencies of powerful nations. With the emergence of the space age, these capabilities expanded exponentially, both in power and precision, as well as importance to national security and defense objectives. While pre-space age approaches serve as the foundation for current approaches to these capabilities, space-based manifestations have brought clear advancements and new vulnerabilities with them. In response to these new challenges, both scholars and practitioners have started to look back to pre-space age approaches to uncover insights and lessons learned from older methods that might be used to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities in present-day systems.

Navigation, Positioning, and Timing

Before the advent of the space age, approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities consisted largely of “looking to the stars” (Sampigethaya; Samson). This, Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya of United Technologies Research Center explains, entailed “performing geometry-based calculations based on celestial bodies and their alignment with respect to the visible horizon on Earth to compute a current position, in terms of latitude and longitude, on Earth.” Today, navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities are founded in a GPS-based approach. This modern GPS-based approach has distinct advantages over pre-space age celestial navigation, according to Sampigethaya: “it provides altitude and timing data; is more scalable, accurate, and granular; and no human intervention is needed for position computing.” On the other hand, GPS-based navigation, positioning, and timing is prone to security vulnerabilities that pre-space age celestial navigation-based approaches were not. Such security challenges include the ability for potential attackers to directly target GPS satellites; to observe, disrupt, and jam GPS signals and data; and to exploit ground-based GPS systems. Despite these present-day challenges, the assertion from Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation, that “obviously the use of stars for navigation is not as predictable as our current navigation capabilities stemming from space,” illustrates how far the approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities have advanced.

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Indications and Warnings

Like the approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities, approaches to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings capabilities have advanced with the emergence of the space age. Modern satellite-based approaches to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings have emerged as superior to the pre-space age approaches, which largely relied on air- and ground-based sensors.6 Satellites, Sampigethaya explains, make surface-to-air systems more robust, allowing for unmanned operation, greater accuracy and stealth, and instantaneous communication between air and ground systems. Moreover, Samson suggests, satellite-based systems have marginalized some of the capability limitations stemming from overflight and airspace sovereignty constraints that hamper air- and ground-based approaches. The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers an example of what Sampigethaya describes as a “hybrid” approach, combining elements of the pre-space age air-based approach with modern satellites to produce enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings: UAVs are “controlled by human pilots, more cost- effective, adaptive, and accurate, but rel[y] on satellites for navigation, timing, and communications.” The contributors did not specifically mention any vulnerabilities that emerge from the modern satellite- based approach to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings capabilities, but there is no reason to believe that satellites are immune to the same security challenges (e.g., adversarial targeting, observation, disruption, jamming, and exploitation) that can limit the space-based approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities.

Insight on Current Space Operations

The emergence of the space age has propelled advancements in surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities, both in implementation and output. Pre-space age approaches to these capabilities have not been entirely forgotten, however, and in some cases these foundational approaches are still applied, albeit typically to a lesser extent than in the past. Together, the contributors’ reflections on the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities before and after the advent of the space age suggest four general insights.

• Controlling the “high ground” is still important.
• Space domain advancements can and should be capitalized on to maximize military effectiveness.
• There are risks and vulnerabilities associated with being too dependent on space-based approaches and capabilities.
• More efficient and effective space systems and processes are needed.

Controlling the High Ground

The military significance of controlling the high ground has persisted across the spectrum of time, both before and after the advent of the space age. With the emergence of the space age, however, its location has changed: Outer space has become the new high ground.

Surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities are all influenced by the high ground. While simply possessing or using these capabilities does not require control of the high ground, if the goal is to achieve capability dominance and superiority, controlling the high ground can be fundamental. Contributors from Harris Corporation reflect that before the emergence of the space age, superiority in capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings was largely dependent on “controlling the high ground, initially terrestrially and later in the air,” and ensuring “line of sight.” They emphasize the wide-ranging importance of controlling space as the new high ground:

As the new ‘high ground,’ and medium through which an increasing percentage of our communications flows, controlling space will be critical...Controlling the high ground is critical to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings, making space situational awareness and space superiority absolutely critical to these functions. Space also offers another path in support of redundant, robust, and protected lines of communications in support of command and control, navigation, and timing.

Thus, the Harris Corporation contributors conclude that, “whoever can achieve the highest [ground] will always have the best space situational awareness. Whoever has the best space situational awareness has a military advantage in very simplistic terms over the adversary.”

Maximizing Military Effectiveness

The importance of capitalizing on space domain operations, and the enhanced military capabilities space systems offer, in order to maximize overall military effectiveness is an insight that several contributors echo.7 In considering the lessons that can be gleaned from pre-space age approaches to military capabilities, Dr. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute reflects on the approaches to military conflict of the past. He describes a time in which warfare was “a blunt and imprecise affair” that focused on “brute force application” and “the use of attrition in battle.” This is a stark contrast to the “modern information-age” approach to warfare that has emerged since the advent of the space age. Davis’ reflection on the pre-space age approach to military conflict reveals a key insight on current space operations.

The clearest and most important aspects we [can] take from pre-space age operations is an understanding that space opens up a much greater ability to understand the battlespace, control forces, and apply precision effect against an opponent in both time and space in a manner that maximizes military effectiveness.

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK also highlights the importance of capitalizing on space-based capabilities for overall military effectiveness, stressing the importance of increasing resilience and enhancing alternate capabilities. The best approach for achieving success in this sense, he suggests, is to “normalize the use of space in military operations.” Contributors from Harris Corporation express similar thinking, and point to approaches to military capabilities in the air domain as a particularly relevant model. They argue that, “the space domain is no different than the air domain when it comes to the key mission areas. We talk about space superiority, offensive space control, defensive space control. We need to talk about offensive and defensive counter-space, suppression of enemy space defenses, and space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”

Avoiding Over-Dependence on Space

While the emergence of space-enabled capabilities has driven significant advancement in military capabilities, several contributors8 caution against relying entirely on space-based approaches for military capabilities. Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen of Air University most adamantly raises this caution, arguing that military operations and capabilities “should not be wholly dependent upon information or activity from a global commons” such as space.9 His caution stems from concerns relating to ensuring the security and credibility of military capabilities and operations. Military capabilities, he believes, are “most credible and secure when founded in sovereign territory, airspace, or waters, or when the capabilities are encompassed completely within the design of the weapons system itself.”

To illustrate this point, as well as the feasibility of non-space approaches, Cullen points to US inter- continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, which he describes as the “most credible deterrent to date against threats of sovereignty by near-peer adversaries because their navigation systems are completely self-contained” (i.e., US ICBM capabilities are not dependent upon information originating from outside of the US or allied territory). ICBMs, he explains, were initially designed to hit far-ranging targets without the support of space-based timing or navigation capabilities. Moreover, the non-space- based technologies and capabilities that support ICBMs have only improved and become more affordable in the time since the initial development of the ICBM.

Ultimately, Cullen is clear in his assertion that more secure and credible non-space approach alternatives exist and should be considered. Further solidifying his argument that approaches to military operations and capabilities should not, and do not have to, be entirely dependent on space, he posits that “terrestrial and airborne approaches may remain more financially efficient and as adaptable and responsive as less capable legacy weapon systems for generations to come.”

Developing Efficient and Effective Systems and Processes

Several contributors10 suggest that surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities would benefit from more efficient and effective systems and processes. Contributors identify three areas that need improvement: integrating space operations and programs, overcoming innovation-stifling bureaucratic processes, and enhancing of space capability systems.

Integrating Space Operations and Programs

Dr. John Karpiscak III of the United States Army Geospatial Center and contributors from Harris Corporation highlight the need for improved integration of space operations and programs. Harris Corporation contributors describe US space programs as being too stove-piped and devoid of synergy. Notably, this is not the case in other domains, they explain, as the US has “been able to unlock the synergies across all the services and mission areas with a joint force” on the land, on the sea, and in the air. In the space domain, however, US space programs and operations are overly compartmentalized. This lack of synergy has clear consequences, they stress, because “to be truly effective in any domain requires all of our capabilities within that domain to understand each other’s mission areas and leverage them in support of their own mission areas. Until we can do that, we take on more risk and we will not be as effective as we could be going forward.” Karpiscak III similarly highlights the need for improved integration of US space programs and operations, arguing that “what we really need is a change in mindset on being able to integrate all of these things. It’s not just one thing—we need to be able to integrate all of them.”

Overcoming Bureaucracy

Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and Karpiscak III highlight the need for more efficient and effective approaches to bureaucracy. Karpiscak III identifies government bureaucracy, and the glacial pace of progress that deep-rooted bureaucracy causes, as a clear problem. Bureaucracy, he explains, “creates an incremental, slow to change culture due either to an inability, or perhaps even unwillingness, of the decision makers to understand how to properly exploit the technology, and the cost and imposed acquisition limitations by federal acquisition regulations, US policy, etc.”

Berkowitz comments on the bureaucratic sources of the shortcomings of US space indications and warnings systems. He points to a lack of direction and coordination between USG and DoD agencies as the crux of the problem: “There is no clear delineation of authorities and responsibilities among US intelligence agencies to provide operations intelligence support for space indications and warnings. Nor are there adequate human and technical resources allocated for such support.” To begin overcoming these institutional deficiencies, he suggests that “the US national security establishment could gain some understanding by going back to pre-space age basics for the creation of an effective space indications and warnings system.”

Improving Space Capability Systems

Contributors from ViaSat, Inc. reflect on potential improvements to capability systems and approaches, focusing on satellite communication systems in particular. They posit a more robust approach, one in which “a multi-layered satellite architecture is available to deliver capability to users, agnostic of satellite, when needed.” Highlighting the upside of this approach, they explain that “purpose-built satellites are valuable for specific missions but the failure to take advantage of other systems can create gaps and seams. The [US] government can [instead] adopt an approach with satellite communication...in which the best available system is employed to meet mission requirements.”

Conclusion

With the emergence of the space age, capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings have expanded exponentially, both in power and precision, as well as importance to national security and defense objectives. Pre- space age approaches provide the foundation for current approaches to these capabilities. Space-based manifestations have brought both clear advancements and new vulnerabilities with them.

The expert contributors to this report reflect on the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities before and after the advent of the space age. This reflection ultimately uncovers four general insights on current space operations.

• Controlling the “high ground” is still important.
• Space domain advancements can and should be capitalized on to maximize military effectiveness.
• There are risks and vulnerabilities associated with being too dependent on space-based approaches and capabilities.
• More efficient and effective space systems and processes are needed.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant General (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen3 (Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributors: Kuznar, L., Stevenson, J., Polansky (Pagano), S., Jafri, A., & Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This report provides an analysis of the compatibility of reconciliation and reintegration processes, an assessment of the potential for achieving successful reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan, and an examination of which US government capabilities can best be leveraged in support of these processes.

Reconciliation involves creating an overarching framework for peace. Reintegration establishes the underlying framework for the end of conflict and describes the processes by which fighters re-join society and armed groups cease using violence without government authorization.

Adaptation and application of the NSI PathwaysTM Model approach enabled identification of a set of drivers of—and barriers to—reconciliation and reintegration through “top-down” theoretical work and “bottom-up” empirical case studies. This initial set gave rise to a generic model of reconciliation and reintegration, the components of which could then be classified as being affective, cognitive, or behavioral, as well as social, economic, or political in nature. The generic model was then applied to the case of Afghanistan, revealing three major insights about reconciliation and reintegration:

• There is complete overlap between reconciliation and reintegration objectives in Afghanistan, suggesting that reintegration can be pursued in Afghanistan without undermining or prohibiting reconciliation.
• Afghanistan is characterized by a marked lack of drivers of, and an abundance of barriers to, reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.1 This is true both overall and compared with four historical cases. Moreover, virtually all of the required social, political, and economic components (as well as affective, cognitive, and behavioral) required for reconciliation and reintegration are absent.
• Despite a bleak prognosis, the USG is not powerless to influence reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan. Additional consultation of the DIMEFIL framework and doctrinal sources2 suggests actions that can mitigate barriers and support drivers, including: information operations, key leader engagement, and aiding the host nation (e.g., through intel, air, and ground support; military police; etc.). Key partnerships might include those with the host nation, local civil organizations, UN peacekeeping forces, NATO allies, NGOs, and a variety of organizations, departments, and offices within the USG. The latter include the Departments of State and Justice, USAID, the intelligence community, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and Health and Human Services.

Effects of Investment on Pathways to Space Security

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Introduction

Over the past year, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)2 team employed NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) methodology to reach out to a global network of space subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, government, and national security space to elicit expert insight on 23 key questions relating to contested space operations.3 Responses were received from over 111 experts from institutions in the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK. These written and telephone interview responses were compiled into a robust corpus of expert insights that provided the foundation for Space ViTTa summary reports, which were produced for each of the 23 questions. The Space ViTTa summary reports each contain two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked and 2) the full corpus of expert contributor responses received for the question. This report highlights some of the themes and findings that emerge from the Space ViTTa initiative. An abstract of each of the Space ViTTa reports follows the summary overview below. Of course, neither the summary overview nor the report abstracts can fully convey the finer detail of the full Space ViTTa reports and contributor responses, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

Summary Overview

23 Space ViTTa questions can be broadly categorized into four areas of focus: ally, adversary, and partner use of space; commercial use of space; national security and space; and space law and norms. Throughout nearly all of the contributor responses across each of these categories of questions, a central theme emerges clearly: Space is a domain that is evolving rapidly, and US initiatives, planning, and operations for space require particularly close consideration and attention as a result. Contributors emphasize the vital importance of the US government (USG) deciding how it wants to approach and manage US interests in this rapidly changing domain. Failing to establish a clear and coordinated set of national security and commercial space objectives now will put the United States’ decades-old strategic advantage in space at risk in the future. In short, the need for a serious effort to develop a clear and adaptive strategy for achieving US national objectives given a rapidly changing operational environment in space cannot be overstated. The implications of this theme for US space interests and activities across all four of our categories of questions are discussed below.

Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

A key aspect of the rapid evolution of the space domain is the increase in the number and types of actors operating in space. New actors, both state and non-state actors, are entering the space domain in a variety of capacities, from fully-capable space-farers to launch service providers and owners of small satellites. For many of these actors, space domain activities are viewed as sources of national pride and international prestige, as well as economic opportunity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the contributors expect these space actors (whether state or non-state actors, whether well-established or new players in space, etc.) to continue to actively pursue and expand space interests and opportunities into the foreseeable future.

In one sense, more actors operating in the space domain presents new and potentially fruitful opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. Several contributors detail space as a domain in which there is considerable cooperation, both between states and between public and private sectors. This cooperation offers states with fewer resources the potential to quickly and cheaply gain access to space technologies and space-based information and services. Contributors suggest that there is great opportunity for the US to take advantage of its strength in the space domain to expand existing relationships with ally and partner nations. Time is of the essence, however, because other states, notably China and Russia, are already moving ahead with partnerships and developing regulatory environments to attract commercial space actors. China, in particular, appears to be committed to building new partnerships in the space domain. Chinese activity here appears to be particularly robust— China is currently working with developing nations to provide space services to those with little independent space capability, as well as with the European Space Agency and individual European states.

In another sense, more actors operating in the space domain brings with it increased risk and potential threats to US security and economic interests, as well as to US infrastructure in space. Moreover, an increasing number of threats in space increases the opportunity for contestation or conflict, whether the result of unintended activities (i.e., an accident) or intentional attack. Contributors agree that the impact of a warfighting event in space would be historic, and would have no comparable precedent. Planning and preparing for increasing risk and potential threats, therefore, is essential, as the immense consequence of a space conflict cannot be overstated.

US, Russian, and Chinese space domain operations over the past decade demonstrate that space is integral to the national security and defense interests of each country.5 The contributors suggest, however, that other countries, including some that have traditionally conceived of space as a non- military domain, are increasingly starting to demonstrate similar thinking to that of the US, Russia, and China. Contributors cite growing interest in dual-use space technologies and capabilities among space actors across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East as evidence of this shift in thinking. This increasing interest in the national security applications of dual-use aspects of space technologies amongst these states, according to contributors, can be attributed in part to perceptions of instability in their surrounding regions. This is an insight that should not be overlooked. A scenario in which terrestrial instability spreads to a space environment in which a large number of actors consider space as integral to their national security and defense could be prone to rapid and unintended escalation, posing serious threats to US space interests.

Commercial Use of Space

The contributors clearly detail a rapidly expanding and evolving role of commercial actors in the space domain. They caution, though, that it is important to recognize that commercial actors do not have the same interests or objectives in space as those of government and military actors, nor do government and commercial actors always think about security in the same ways. Companies are ultimately focused on the health and success of their business ventures (their key interest), while the US national security community is focused on security and defense and preparing for a conflict or a kinetic attack in space. Contributors from the commercial realm stress that it is imperative that the USG recognizes this difference in thinking, particularly as it continues to expand its reliance on commercial space capabilities for national security purposes. Ensuring that commercial and government actors have a shared understanding of fundamental concepts, such as security, will be critical to avoiding costly misunderstandings and miscommunication. Ultimately, the consensus view among the contributors is that a successful and sustained government-commercial relationship in the space domain is as essential for US national security goals as it is for commercial profits. This, however, will require overcoming the present barriers to cooperation between the commercial space community and US civil and national security space community, namely the barriers posed by undue government red tape, cultural differences between the two communities, and impediments wrought by the bureaucratic organization and structure of the USG.

National Security and Space

The contributors highlight several national security implications stemming from the rapid evolution of the space domain. First, most contributors agree that increasing levels of overall investment in space by both government and commercial actors may enhance space security by providing a disincentive for kinetic military action.6 This is especially true, contributors suggest, if those investments come in the form of public-private partnerships. Almost every contributor who believes that increased spending disincentivizes kinetic military action argues that regardless of whether the source of the spending is commercial or government, the disincentive to kinetic action would be the same. The few contributors who deviate from this view, however, present concerns about the potential for wasteful spending, adversaries that are less invested in the space domain, increasing the number of targets for the US to defend, and political conflict over the rules of the road governing space cooperation.

Contributors also point out that rapid developments in the space domain present new and significant opportunities for USG collaboration7 to enhance resilience, most notably in the form of leveraging information (collection and analysis) and launch (infrastructure, vehicles, and services) capabilities.8 However, as mentioned earlier, more actors operating in space with broadening technological capabilities means more potential threats to USG space interests and infrastructure. The salience of this point is evident when we consider the implications of rapid innovation in space launch. Contributors agree that wide-ranging national security challenges will arise from decreased launch costs that enable a broader array of actors to deliver a wider variety of payloads into space—some of which will inevitably add to the amount of junk in space. They also indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs have significant effects on military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

There is noticeable variation in how the contributors envision non-government space actors operating relative to US security interests in the future (i.e., as disruptors or solid partners for national security). Those who currently work in commercial space tend to foresee commercial entities serving as solid partners of the government, whereas those from think tanks and the US national security space community largely view commercial actors as potential disruptors to US security interests. The majority response in fact is that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners. It appears that “disruption” is considered a necessary part of the development of space capabilities and activities. Commercial actors have organizational advantages with respect to innovation that are likely to better enable them to be the dominant innovators in the space domain in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security operations involving space will be determined largely by how the USG deals with these changes. Most contributors acknowledge that there are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, however, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector and relying on its capabilities and services reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. Moreover, if the USG attempts to limit or control commercial activities to the point that space companies cannot meet their objectives, there is nothing preventing these companies from relocating to another, more favorable business environment. This would diminish USG influence within the commercial space sector, and could position commercial space actors to disrupt US security interests.

Space Law and Norms

The contributors generally do not view the existing legal regime in space (i.e., current international agreements, treaties, and conventions governing the use of space) to be either overly burdensome or restrictive on US space operations. However, despite overwhelming support for foundational agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST),9 most contributors see existing space law and norms as insufficient to manage the rapidly evolving nature of space activities and the range of potential threats these activities may present. As space becomes more crowded, the risk of accidental or intentional harm to an actor’s assets increases. As space capabilities become more critical to actors’ national security, economic, and social well-being, the cost of losing those assets also increases. As a number of contributors note, these conditions create a collective action problem that further refinement of international norms and regulation could help mitigate. With that said, however, most contributors do not think that amending or replacing the OST is either necessary or advisable. Contributors are clear in their warning that opening up the possibility of amending the OST would likely trigger a long and uncontrollable process of negotiation that in itself would create uncertainty and undermine the legitimacy of the OST. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the final treaty would work as well as, let alone any better than, the current one.

The contributors generally agree on the need to develop norms by way of both informal and formal channels in order to maintain a peaceful space domain. At the same time, however, contributors point out that an increase of diverse actors (global powers, countries recently entering the space domain, commercial actors) with diverse interests (domination, deterrence, profit) increases the difficulty of developing shared norms, since norms by definition imply shared values. Given the historic difficulty in achieving effective formal agreements, several contributors share a hope that less formal norms might be an option for regulating a responsible use of space. Overall, however, contributors often fall back upon discussion of the value of formal agreements, exhibiting a bias toward formal rules given their explicitness. In doing so, these contributors largely also stress the need for measurable verification of how space is being used by actors, both to mark norm violations and to support guidelines set forth in formal agreements.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Author(s): Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Elder, R. (George Mason University); Kuznar, L. (NSI); Olsher, D. (Integral Mind); Popp, G. (NSI); Sleevi, N. (TRADOC); Suedfeld, P. (University of British Columbia); Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology)

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Over the course of this project, multiple sets of questions were edited and added to the effort, resulting in a total of 29 questions. In this document, the individual teams have addressed as many of the questions in this list as addressed by their research and analytic efforts for this SMA project.

The list of 29 questions is divided into five sections throughout this report.

Section I: Regional Analyses includes questions examining the ins-and-outs, implications, and potential outcomes from a regional perspective. These questions investigate: key actor interests, the interplay of conceivable actions by these actors, conditions that would support or lead to potential outcomes. Many of the SMA teams were able to apply their individual methodologies or tools to address these questions. The modeling teams included TRADOC’s ATHENA, GMU’s Timed Influence Net (TIN) modeling, and Integral Mind’s cognitive simulation. The analytic approaches included: NSI’s I-R-C Analysis and Pathways Analysis, UBC’s Integrative Complexity, Intelligent Biology’s Cognitive Assessment, NSI’s Quantitative Discourse Analysis, and OSU’s Strategic Media Messaging Analysis. Finally, the SMA teams incorporated subject matter expert via NSI’s ViTTa effort and analysis from an expert from Western Carolina University.

Questions from Section II: DPRK Analyses focus internally on the stability of the DPRK state and economy. DPRK state stability are explored by modeling teams of ATHENA and Integral Mind modeling teams alongside the NSI analytic and ViTTa approaches.

In Section III: Proliferation v. Denuclearization, the I-R-C and ViTTa analyses thoroughly review conditions and options for denuclearization while the OSU team examines the messaging narratives from Russian and Chinese media. Three SMA teams, Intelligent Biology, UBC, and Integral Mind, take a cognitive approach to examining the way towards denuclearization.

Section IV: Regional Objectives, Actions & Implications covers future outcomes and explores the implications of regional actions. In this section, the modeling efforts by GMU and TRADOC submit future scenarios and examine the steps taken to get there. Two ViTTa analyses and work by the cognitive assessment and discourse teams address how the US can work with partners in the region.

In Section V: Cognitive Assessment of KJU Confidence, Cognition, and Discourse, four SMA teams shared a common corpus and conducted seven different analyses: quantitative discourse analysis, cognitive mapping, thematic content analysis, integrative cognitive complexity analysis and motive imagery scoring, application of the empathy checklist, basic emotive analysis, and discourse of deception. From these initial analyses, the teams went on to address questions of KJU’s regime confidence and assurance, and recommended communication strategies that would appeal to KJU’s communication styles and cognitive proclivities. For more in-depth reading, please refer to the full reports submitted by the individual teams. Links to these reports can be found in the appendix. Review the Part I report for a summation of the key findings across all of the individual efforts.

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