NSI Publications

Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Report Card.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands. SMA projects focus on complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi- disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. SMA solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO. SMA efforts are Coalition based and address mission areas spanning Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Countering Proliferation of WMD (State and non-State); Individual, State, and National-level Deterrence Assessment; and Strategic Global and Regional Assessments.

This report provides a scorecard of SMA project assessment results by geographical region: Middle East, Eurasia, Central and South Asia, Pacific, and Africa; as well as by global issue: Cyber, Deterrence, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-WMD.

The SMA projects assessed include:

• FY 07: Sudan Strategic Assessment (CENTCOM)
• FY 07: DAPSE (STRATCOM)
• FY 08: WMD-T (SOCOM), Global Assessment of WMD-T (SOCOM/DTRA Cell established)
• FY 09: Interagency LOE (STRATCOM)
• FY 09: Deterrence (STRATCOM)
• FY 09-10: Support to ISAF (Gens McChrystal/Flynn)
• FY 11: IVEO (CENTCOM/SOCOM)
• FY 11: Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability – CANS (STRATCOM)
• FY 12: Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism (Joint Staff)
• FY 12-13: Strategic Short- and Long-term Stability in South Asia (CENTCOM/PACOM/STRATCOM)
• FY 14: A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad (JS)
• FY 14: Megacities RSI (PACOM)
• FY 14: Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the
  Next 5-25 Years (PACOM)
• FY 14: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRICOM)
• FY 14: The Dynamics of ISIL Success in Multi-method Assessment of ISIL
• FY 15: Coordinator’s Mission Review (USSC)
• FY 15: Looking Beyond ISIL: What Would the Region Look Like Beyond the Current Phase? (SOCCENT)
• FY 15: Russia and NATO Post Putin: The Space Between Peace and War (EUCOM)
• FY 16: Gray Zone Conflicts – Challenges and Opportunities (SOCOM)
• FY 16: Counter Da’esh Messaging (USASOC)

10th Annual SMA Conference – From Control to Influence?
A View of—and Vision for—the Future.

Author | Editor: George Popp, Sarah Canna, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

Conference Background

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office hosted the 10th Annual SMA Conference on 25-26 April 2017 at Joint Base Andrews. This year’s conference, formally titled “From Control to Influence? A View of—and Vision for—the Future,” brought together a multidisciplinary group of participants to consider how the US and its allies can more effectively counter the influence that recently re-emerging, capable states (such as China and Russia) and non-state actors (such as ISIS) exert on their neighbors and/or third parties through multiple elements of power.

The rise of Anti-Access Area Denial capabilities and the economic ascendance of China lead some to argue that we are moving toward becoming a more pluralized, multipolar world in which military and economic sources of power are widely distributed. Technologies (e.g., the Internet and rapid means of mass migration) are making nation states increasingly more porous, and a resurgence of nationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics has solidified some states and weakened others. The continuance of these factors may change the way that the US, its allies, and its adversaries consider and prioritize influence, both within the state and across interstate borders. This conference examined these trends, and explored possible implications for how such factors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control” and how influence could exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next 30 years.

Conference Overview

Many of the conference’s panels touched on the human dimension of the challenges and opportunities the United States Government (USG) faces in the 21st century. The human element is a new aspect of competition and conflict that is not in the physical realm where the military typically feels most comfortable, but it is an environment that the military (and, more appropriately, the whole of government and whole of nation) must become more comfortable with.

Operating in this new world requires forms of mental agility that cannot be ordered on Amazon or developed in a military lab; it must be developed and nurtured. Societies must become more resilient— to attacks, to fake news, to unreasonable fears, and to reasonable fears as well. Creativity and surprise will become more important elements of US strategy than simply overwhelming military force. We must also do a better job of crafting and explaining our vision for the future international system, as this is another essential element of successful US strategy.

People will matter more in this new world, which means a successful US strategy must integrate not only whole of government, but whole of society to include industry, community groups, etc. Conflict is no longer solely in the military domain. Partly because of this, unclassified information will increasingly dominate intelligence analysis.

Warfare has always reflected new developments in society. Given the empowerment of individuals fueled by the information revolution, this has several implications for how the USG understands and interacts with populations (not just leaders). First, physical might is not going to always achieve strategic aims. We must use a soft power/influence/information strategy. Second, perceptions matter. We have a hard time accepting or acknowledging the validity of others’ perceptions, especially if we disagree with them. This hampers our effectiveness in communicating our strategy, influencing others’ behaviors, and responding to threats. Third, Target Audience Analysis (TAA) should not just be a Military Information Support Operations (MISO) process. Actions influence just as much, or even more, than messages do. Fourth, people are not persuaded by facts and logic. Neuroscience research show us that humans make decisions based on emotions first, and logic later.

As the conference shifted from defining new challenges brought by the changing environment, its focus turned to trying to understand how the Commands are dealing with these developments. The changing environment theme is not new—it has been a focus of SMA conferences for the last 10 years. But when we ask ourselves what exactly is so alarming about change, it is not only that the world is changing, but that parts of the US paradigm or strategy no longer work. The USG can no longer prevail by sheer application of overwhelming force. However, the US defense paradigm has not properly evolved or adapted to the changing environment. Conference participants suggested that the USG needs a new set of rules that are more adaptive to new and evolving environments. It is difficult for a bureaucracy to change, so this challenge should not be underestimated.

Ultimately, paradigms matter. The way we perceive and frame a challenge conditions and/or limits our responses. We clearly have blind spots. For example, the USG tends to apply the kinetic metaphor to influence operations. However, we cannot “win” in the information space by applying the equivalent of overwhelming force. Instead, we must understand the motivation and intentions of others, understand the environment in which they live, and—most importantly—understand ourselves.

Question (R4.6): What are the competing national interests of the United States and Iran in the Middle East and what are the options for alleviating United States / Iranian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

The US and Iran have the same types of interests — national security, international influence, economic, and domestic political—at stake in the conflicts surrounding Iraq and Syria. However, the different ways that each country currently defines these interests places them on a continuum that ranges from full accord over select regional issues to complete, zero-sum discord. This is an important point and one very pertinent to the question of alleviating US-Iran tensions: Iran and the US do not disagree on everything and national security is not always the primary issue at stake. The most promising avenue to alleviate tensions therefore may be to focus on issues on which US and Iranian interests tend to converge. However, there may be more leverage over what seem to be fully divergent interests than at first appears.

Convergent Interests: Stability in Syria, Stability in Iraq

Regardless of current US policy, the defeat of ISIS, followed by relative stability in Iraq and Syria are in the interests of both Iran and the US. For Iran, there are potentially huge post-conflict reconstruction contracts in the offing in Syria, provided the Syrian regime is friendly or weak enough for Iran to control a large part of that business. The earnings could be a boon for Rouhani and the moderate leadership in Iran who had promised yet-to-be-see Iranian gains following the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). US security interests in the region also are not served by instability in Syria, even if this means abiding by a weakened Assad regime for the immediate term.

Diverging Interests: Strong Iraqi Army

The strengthening of the Iraqi Army is a contentious subject between the US and Iran. The US would like to have influence in Iraqi military institutions, as would Iran. The ideal outcome for the US appears to be a professionalized Iraqi military strong and capable enough to secure its borders, maintain internal stability, and clamp down on radical extremist organizations in Iraq and elsewhere. While it is in Iran’s interests to see a security force in Iraq strong enough to maintain internal order and put down any resurgence of Sunni extremism, an Iraqi force strong enough to pose a threat outside Iraq’s borders is something no Iranian leader likely could or would support. The horrors and trauma of the Iran-Iraq War are still in the vivid memories of a good portion of the Iranian population.

Complete Divergence: Regional Security and Israel

Probably the most rigid points of conflict in US and Iranian interests involve how each defines regional security and, as a result, which actions and actors it perceived as threatening. Iran scholar, Dr. Payam Mohseni of Harvard University, identifies two security issues that serve as “the cornerstone” of US-Iran antagonism: “revisionism for the security architecture of the Middle East” including eliminating US military influence in the Middle East following ISIS defeat, and support of or opposition to Israel.

Iranian Revision to Regional Order.

Iran has long had a goal of changing the power dynamics in the Middle East region. This serves multiple Iranian interests simultaneously and shapes the policies it pursues. First, from the Iranian perspective, expanding its reach via Shi’a groups in Iraq, the Gulf, and Lebanon is an important means of defending Iranian security in a region in which it is a minority. Considering what Iran perceives as its main security threats (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Israel—both backed by US force), together with a desire for regional recognition and prestige, explains Iran’s attachment to a nuclear program. Revisions to the current system that enable Iran to exert additional regional influence and establish additional economic ties also serve the domestic objectives of the more moderate political and commercial elite.

Israel.

Ironically, relations with Israel serve the US and Iran in similar ways. Support for Israel is a consistent element of US foreign policy and is very much tied to US electoral politics. Since the Iranian Revolution, the Government has used its strong opposition to the security threat posed by Israel and the West to garner domestic approval and underscore its break from the Iran of the past (i.e., its revolutionary bona fides) to enhance its (self-proclaimed) legitimacy as the regional protector of the Muslim people.

Both Iranian and US security concerns are indelibly intertwined with the desire of each to increase regional influence and prestige, and to some degree, domestic support. An argument can be made that this coupling of interests is what generates the zero-sum quality of the US and Iranian positions and makes mutual animosities so easy to ignite. A situation perceived as zero-sum, “I win-you lose” by definition is one in which mutual gain is not possible; antagonism is assumed. As a result, all action by the opponent is perceived as competitive and, in the strategic sense, the only options available to each side are opposition or capitulation.

At present, both US and Iranian policy-makers imagine the regional expansion, influence, and attempts to change the regional order by and of the other as important threats to their own security and prestige. In this context, a perceived security gain for the US or its allies, for example by increasing the presence of US forces in the region or inking a $110 billion weapons deal with Saudi Arabia, inevitably is a loss for Iran. Similarly, an Iranian gain, for example increased influence within the Shi’a-led government in Iraq; professionalization and institutionalization of “mini Hezbollahs,” or IRGC clones in the Iraqi armed forces, is seen in the US primarily as Iranian aggression.

Can tensions be reduced? No. Not without reconceiving the US approach

Fortunately, the zero-sum nature of US and Iranian perspectives on these critical issues is not a mathematical absolute (as suggested by the term). Rather, US decision makers interested in alleviating tensions with Iran must recognize that the intractability in how the US and Iran have conceived of regional security is a psychological construct, in large part based in mutual uncertainty about what the other will choose to do. While it may require considerable cognitive and perhaps emotional effort to accomplish, reconceptualizing how the US approaches Middle East regional security and Iran’s role in it is very possible.

Mohseni emphasizes not just the possibility but the urgency of making these changes in US thinking. He argues that changed and changing conditions in the Middle East now demand rethinking of US interests in the region and the threats that it perceives from Iran: in “today’s increasingly fractious and unstable Middle East, it is all the more important to understand where and how the United States and Iran can see eye-to-eye.” He strengthens this argument with the discerning observation that even if the US were to succeed in containing Iran and eliminating the security threat that Iran poses to US allies in the region, some of the most pressing threats in the region, like the spread of violent jihadism and insurgency and political instability in traditional US allies, will remain. Critical threats to US interests and allies will not be mitigated by weakening Iran. This new context requires new thinking.

How? Small steps

If not seeing completely eye-to-eye, alleviating tensions essentially means that diverging Iranian and US interests are moved closer together; toward convergence. Each of the contributors suggests that this can only happen via direct engagement with Iran, which is essential not only for alleviating US-Iran tensions, but indeed for defending the US’s own security interests in the region. First, Dr. Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins SAIS) argues that US-Iran tensions cannot be overcome in a bilateral setting, but instead that a regional security architecture that could help reduce tensions among other regional actors and on other issues (e.g., Sunni-Shi’a competition) is needed. In a similar vein, SFC Mark Luce (USASOC) suggests using diplomacy to reduce Iran’s isolation by, for example, opening dialogues with Iran and Russia on Afghanistan and counter-VEO activities, encouraging others to expand diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, and providing US security guarantees to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in the event of Iranian aggression. While negotiating these arrangements certainly would require time and significant US domestic and regional resolve, other experts suggest more tactical and short- to mid-term steps for initiating US-Iran cooperation. Specifically, Dr. Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies) and Dr. Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs) cite the value that Iran has historically put on science, and suggest scientific exchange particularly on water, food, and energy issues. They note that Iranian scientists already “co-author more scientific papers with US scientists than with scientists of any other country,” and that US-trained STEM scientists serve in key positions in the Iranian government.

Contributors

Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs); Mark Luce (USASOC); Payam Mohseni (Harvard University); Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies, LLC); Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS)

[Q11] What opportunities are there to leverage ally and commercial capabilities to enhance the resilience of space services for commercial and national security critical space services? What are the major hurdles to doing so? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The importance of strengthening the resilience of US space capabilities is directly addressed in the 2010 National Space Policy, and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. While these documents identify resilience as central to mission assurance, they do not provide any detail on what comprises resilience in the context of US space capabilities. The 2012 DoD Directive 3100.10 is consistent with these documents and offers the following definition of resilience:

• The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.

The experts who responded to this question represent both the government and commercial space sectors, and academia and think tanks (see above Q11: Contributors figure). Overall, there was consensus among contributors that there are significant opportunities for collaboration between the USG and allies, and the USG and commercial actors. The contributors to this question identified over 70 distinct allied and/or commercial capabilities that could be leveraged to enhance resilience (see Table 1 below). To provide an overview of how these specific capabilities may contribute to US space activities, we grouped them according to the more general service (activity or purpose) that the expert discussions specified. From this analysis, eight categories of service emerged. As shown in Figure 1, information (collection and analysis) was the most frequently referenced category, followed by launch (infrastructure, vehicles, and services).

Approaches to enhancing resilience

From the contributors’ discussions of these capabilities, two general approaches to enhancing resilience, consistent with the DoD definition above, were identified: enhancing capabilities and providing redundancy.

Enhance capabilities

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College identifies commercial advances in space-based solar power as contributing to resilience, by enabling the powering of systems capable of earth observation from higher orbit. Solar electric propulsion, Dennis Ray Wingo of Skycorp, Inc. suggests, enables the development of spacecraft that would “simply be able to move out of the way of most ballistic threats, thus passively defeating attacks.”5 Furthermore, distance provides protection to space-based assets, as it requires greater capabilities on the part of our adversaries to disrupt them, and is harder to achieve “without revealing intent” (Wingo). It also makes such assets less vulnerable to unintentional damage or destruction from space debris.

Coming from a slightly different perspective, Wes Brown and Todd May of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center note that cooperative efforts with allies or commercial actors could help bridge capability gaps created by politically driven changes in USG budget priorities that potentially impact national security needs. They offer the recent drop in support for Earth science and remote sensing as examples of this.

Increase speed of innovation and adoption of new technology

Discussion of the faster pace of innovation in the commercial sector was also common.6 The underlying message being that leveraging commercial capabilities would bring the added advantage of providing the USG with more advanced technologies more quickly. Use of allied and commercial capabilities would also reduce reliance on the federal acquisitions cycle, which is notoriously slow and cumbersome, resulting in outdated systems and a reduction in the United States’ relative capability advantage over its adversaries (Hampson).

Improve space servicing capabilities

Contributors discussed two ways in which cooperation with commercial actors and/or allies in the provision of space servicing may enhance US capabilities. The first of these was space traffic management—knowing where things are with a greater degree of precision (Dr. Moriba Jah, University of Texas at Austin) and removing objects that are endangering that traffic (Rossettini). The second was the maintenance and upgrading of capabilities in space. In particular, a number of experts7 discussed the potential of commercial developments to increase the feasibility of on-orbit servicing of satellites. Such a capability could increase the lifespan of expensive GEO-satellites, and enable modifications and repairs.

Increase coverage

Dr. Patrick Stadter of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory sees potential for commercial actors to supplement SIGINT capabilities by providing observations and data analysis in areas that are either not covered by existing USG capabilities or in instances where specific data requirements were not predicted in time. Berkowitz suggests that interoperability with commercial and allied communication, PNT, and remote sensing systems would increase distribution (orbit, spectrum, geographically) of US capabilities. Brown and May also see allies and commercial actors as offering the potential for the USG to broaden the geographic location of its ground services to increase coverage and redundancy.

Provide redundancy/back-up

As Steve Nixon of Stratolaunch Systems Corporation points out, “we don’t stockpile anything when it comes to space. . . .War fighting always involves the possibility of living with attrition. We buy extras and we keep them in reserve to put them into conflict as needed. . . .Space is not like that.” His view that this situation needs to change if the US wants to improve its ability to deal with contested space is implicitly reflected in the responses of the other subject matter experts that responded to this question. Several contributors8 suggested that leveraging allied and/or commercial services in addition to existing USG capabilities would add resilience through proliferation (adding to the number of assets serving national security needs) or diversification (different types of assets). Doing so would introduce a level of redundancy in US space capabilities that is currently lacking (Hampson), and thus increase the speed with which the US could resume services interrupted by accidents or attack (Brown and May).

More specifically, Berkowitz suggests that “[a]llied launch infrastructure, vehicles, and services could serve as a backup to US capabilities in extremis” (see also Hampson). Wingo proposes that developing commercial capabilities may, in the future, enable the placement of communications and data storage systems on the Moon, providing back-ups that are “impervious to electromagnetic pulse damage.” The Spire Global Inc. team notes that employing commercial satellite constellations would make systems “nearly impossible to destroy,” and Hampson suggests that commercial satellites could also provide back-up information services to ensure that the US is never “blind.”

Major hurdles to leveraging allied and commercial capabilities for resilience

All of the contributors identified at least one substantial way in which allied and commercial capabilities could be leveraged to enhance the resilience of US space services.9 Almost all, however, also identified barriers (either within the USG or between the USG and allies or commercial actors) to such cooperation.

Security/reliability concerns

Once systems are connected, each is only as secure as the most vulnerable, and as Brown and May discuss, “[t]his is of particular importance when considering US allies have partnerships with our adversaries for use of similar if not the same capabilities.” Faulconer Consulting Group raises a related concern, noting that leveraging external capabilities will mean that the workforce will include a broader set of contractors and civil servants. Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson of the United States Air Force Academy questions whether concerns on the government side over classification will allow for the data sharing that collaboration with allies and commercial actors may require. Finally, a number of contributors indicated that mission assurance and control could prove a barrier (Robert D. Cabana, NASA–Kennedy Space Center; Nield), due to concerns over command and control switch over in times of need (Faulconer Consulting Group) or reliability (Hampson). Berkowitz notes that the “track record is decidedly mixed regarding the reliability of political commitments and commercial contracts in crisis and conflict.”

Attitude

Security concerns also underpin some of the contributors’ observations that the attitude of the US defense community may also prove a hurdle (Berkowitz; ViaSat, Inc.) Still more contributors suggest that the problem is cultural, including a lack of understanding of the breadth and depth of commercial and allied capabilities (Bryce Space and Technology; Wingo), or a vision of how such a partnership would look (Major General [USAF ret.] James Armor, Orbital ATK). Wingo suggests that, for the USG, “anything that is not quantifiable through the lens of past experience is considered risky, and thus downgraded in evaluation and thus unlikely to be funded”—an approach that is diametrically opposed to that of many of the new commercial space ventures. Such divergent perspectives create a significant hurdle to collaboration.

Organizational barriers

Organizational barriers both within the USG and between the USG and allied and commercial actors were also identified as a hurdle to collaboration. Deborah Westphal of Toffler Associates and Hampson both note that it is unclear which USG agency would orchestrate collaboration of this sort, and Dr. T.S. Kelso of Analytical Graphics, Inc. suggests that the procurement cycle presents another internal barrier even when there is need for and interest in an outside capability. Organizational barriers also exist between the USG and allies. Leveraging the assets of another state requires both political and legal arrangements (Berkowitz) and from the US side, there are also export control rules and classification concerns (Hampson). For commercial actors, the lack of clarity and transparency regarding USG timelines, and infrastructure and communication needs in times of conflict, present a hurdle (Stratolaunch Systems Corporation), as does the lack of clarity in policy across government agencies to support commercial activities (Cabana). Finally, just as the USG has concerns over classification, commercial actors may be unwilling to share their information due to concerns over intellectual property and competitive advantage (Jackson; Harris Corporation, LLC).

Interoperability

Even if organizational barriers are overcome, technical barriers remain, in particular the complexity involved in ensuring interoperability across a wider variety and number of service providers (Berkowitz; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; ViaSat, Inc.). As Hampson states, “Compatibility across systems can be difficult if they are originally constructed with differing end goals in mind,” which will be the case if the USG moves to integrate commercially developed capabilities with its existing custom capabilities.

Divergent goals

Collaboration requires at some level shared goals and priorities, which is not necessarily the case when it comes to the defense and commercial space communities. Commercial actors need to be profitable, and without a good probability that there will be revenue at the end, they will be unwilling or unable to put money toward developing a capability specifically to meet a national security need, if there is no market demand (Harris Corporation, LLC; Hampson; Roesler; Wingo).

Overcoming hurdles to leveraging allied and commercial capabilities

In addition to identifying hurdles to cooperation, the contributors also discussed changes that could reduce some of these barriers.

• The US defense community needs a better understanding of and relationship with the commercial space sector (Roberto Aceti, OHB Italia S.p.A.; Armor).
• Regulatory and policy frameworks and lines of authority need to be developed (Garretson; Hampson; Kelso; ViaSat, Inc.; C. Weeden; Westphal).
  • Areas specified: access and control assurance (ViaSat, Inc.), quality control (Hampson), IP and data protection (Jackson), and space traffic controls (Chwastek).
• Technical and funding support to build a strong, stable commercial sector (Brown and May; Cabana; Carol; Wingo).

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A., Italy); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Daniel N. Baker (University of Colorado—Boulder Campus); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Wes Brown and Todd May (NASA—Marshall Space Flight Center); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA—Kennedy Space Center); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Gordon Roesler (DARPA Tactical Technology Office); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Patrick Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; ViaSat, Inc.; Charity A. Weeden (Satellite Industry Association); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates); Dennis Ray Wingo (Skycorp, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q2] How does each entity in the following categories conceive of space operations for military and commercial purposes? How do they approach space operations and services? Is there any difference in how their commercial ventures (if any) consider security during peace, crisis, and conflict? a. PRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea; b. European Space Agency, Japan, India, South Korea, Israel; c. Canada, Brazil, Australia, Singapore, Ukraine, others. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), Nicole Peterson (NSI, Inc.), and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Kevin Pollpeter of CNA considers China’s approach to space to be motivated by the desire to “increase what [the PRC] calls its comprehensive national power … the basket of everything that makes a country powerful: its military might, its economic power, its diplomatic power, its cultural power.” This assessment is consistent among the contributors who discussed China,7 although there was some deviation regarding the scope of China’s ambitions relative to their military, commercial, and civil/scientific pursuits in the space domain. Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings of the Royal United Services Institute refer to Beijing’s “strategic vision as a global power,” whereas Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation frames such strategic vision as being more regional orientated and not expeditionary in nature. These ambitions are grounded in the long-term “future-orientated,” multi- generational planning (Dr. Namrata Goswami, Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab) characteristic of Beijing’s centralized approach to policy development.

Multiple experts8 consider the PRC’s geopolitical priorities to be driving all aspects of its space operations and services. Every component of China’s space operations effectively serves its objective of increasing national power. The civil, commercial, and military components of the PRC’s space operations have varying operational goals and programs, but all are ambitious and holistic in nature. For example, the PRC’s civil and commercial efforts in space predominantly fall under the yoke of Beijing’s national defense strategy in some form or another, but can still claim objectives independent of military ambitions. Civil space ventures, in particular, are often consistent with the strategy of dual-use technology9 that Nouwens and Stickings argue presents the potential for “degrading US assets in space and on Earth.” Finally, as Cheng notes, Chinese leaders regard US dependence on space infrastructure as a weakness, and will seek to avoid such reliance as it advances its own space capability.

There is broad consensus among contributors that the PRC’s military approach to space operations are, as Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin writes, “central to denying the US its ability to sense, decide, and act effectively and thereby deter intervention.”10 The experts’ discussions of the PRC’s strategic vision for space suggest that there is a concerted effort underway to decrease the United States’ advantage in space. Nouwens and Stickings note that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking “information dominance capabilities in space, while developing capabilities to deny or degrade the capabilities [of the US].” Several of the experts11 discuss the recent successful test of the “unhackable” quantum entanglement as evidence of China’s aspiration for information dominance. Beijing’s development of military space capabilities goes beyond the information domain—the PRC is also developing direct ascent missile hit-to-kill technology which could be used to target satellites or to help it improve the survivability of its nuclear-capable missiles (Grego).

Despite the military focus of the PRC’s space programs, there is significant commercial space activity in China. This activity reflects China’s desire “to position itself as a great power that is at the forefront of humanity’s exploration of space,” and science and technology more generally (Nouwens and Stickings). Nouwens and Stickings note that the PRC “has sought to promote greater innovation in the commercial domain,” with entities such as ExPace demonstrating Beijing’s response to the success of the American SpaceX (Pollpeter). Tempering the growth of innovation and cooperation in the space domain is what the ViaSat, Inc. team characterizes as China’s “lack [of] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation.”

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Berkowitz remark that, despite the advances made by the PRC in cultivating a commercial space industry, such ventures are simply “extensions of the regime” and will completely yield to functions of the state in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command) and Cheng warn that the dual-use nature of many space technologies enables China to mask military ventures in space as civil-science operations. Consequently, commercial interests “will not deviate from PRC goals during conflicts” (Goswami). Commercial space assets may even be aggressively defended by the PRC during a crisis, and their continued operation viewed as a strategic necessity.

Russia

Russia’s approach to space is primarily influenced by its resurgent rivalry with the US. Cheng characterizes Moscow’s space operations and services as “one of the various instrumentalities available to achieve deterrent objectives.” Yet, as several contributors13 note, Russia is falling behind the US in terms of its space capabilities. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation writes of the vagueness of the role space has in current Russian policy, while noting that Moscow is, “just fearful of being left behind and being perceived as being weak.” Nevertheless, Moscow is actively resisting US hegemony, although its efforts are hampered by substantial resource constraints (Theresa Hitchens, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland).

Despite its emphasis on space for defense and national security, Russia has made significant contributions to international civil space by supporting the International Space Station (ISS) and other civil space ventures. Additionally, the development of GLONASS14 and other commercial space services indicates that Russia is interested in exploiting its space capabilities for commercial purposes (Hitchens). Indian Air Force Group Captain (ret.) Ajey Lele of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses notes that Moscow has “succeeded in keeping their space agenda [i.e., ‘orbital cooperation’ and other civil pursuits] shielded from geopolitical tensions [with the US].” Supported by China, the Russian Federation has proposed a treaty15 banning space weaponry. Grego suggests Moscow recognizes that securing space operations as orderly, safe, and secure in peacetime benefits both their national security and commercial interests, and contends that if “a crisis unfolds and the possibility of armed conflict in space is entertained, [we should] expect that they [will] also prefer constraint and predictability and to be able to manage the conflict.” These points of international collaboration speak to Moscow’s interest in limiting US dominance in the space domain as well as ensuring future Russian space operations.

Russia is clearly capable of fielding different types of reversible, nondestructive means of interfering with satellites, and has some capability to field anti-satellite weapons and missile defense technologies that are destructive (Grego). The escalatory potential of such space technology embodies the “Russia[n] concept of ‘escalate to deescalate’ … with its apparent emphasis on a quick resort to irreversible weapons effects” (Berkowitz), and illustrates Moscow’s interest in offensive capabilities (Hitchens). A necessary adjunct to Russia’s military capabilities in space is space-based information capability. Russia’s GLONASS PNT program embodies Moscow’s pursuit of an independent, state-controlled space infrastructure that can support informationalized warfare.

Russia designates over 100 small-to-medium companies as commercial space ventures. However, in contrast to the US, each is administered by, and to a large extent under the control of, Russia’s space agency, ROSCOSMOS (Lele). Although primarily intended for commercial purposes, these companies are subject to Moscow’s agenda and needs. While this degree of control supports defense, the result is that Russia “lack[s] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation,” according to the ViaSat, Inc. team. Goswami notes that Russia’s commercial space efforts have included “build[ing] space infrastructure in countries lacking such expertise and sharing its space technology;” a practice which has become a means of revenue for the Russian military industrial complex (Lele; Samson). In addition to generating revenue, Moscow’s civil and commercial space capabilities bolster national pride, and highlight Russia’s international influence and prestige.

Iran

There is overall agreement among the contributors that Iran’s space ambitions are centered on national security and reflect its desire for both regional hegemony and national prestige. Iran’s antagonistic relationships with neighboring Arab nations and Israel provides the motivation for Tehran to pursue sophisticated information dominance and missile defense and offense, while also growing its civil space operations. Goswami identifies Iran as “the most advanced ‘space-assets nation’ in the Middle-East, especially in relation to the Arab states in the region.” She suggests that, as tensions in the Persian/Arab Gulf continue to grow, a space race may occur between Tehran and the Gulf nations.

Iran has a “large and sophisticated missile program” (Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, National Defense University) that Grego observes has launched a small number of low-mass satellites that have little demonstrated capability. In fact, discussion of Iranian space operations is often dominated by analysis of Tehran’s missile technology and ambitions, although several experts16 point out that Iran has other civil space and technological aspirations as well. Grego explains that Iran has long sought to jumpstart its space scientific efforts through cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) and Italy, and the funding of academic initiatives for space exploration. These efforts, along with their missile program, are seen by Tehran as a means of bolstering nationalistic sentiments and pride associated with such pursuits (Bahgat). The prospect of international prestige and the “dual-use nature of technology” (Lele) also make a sophisticated space program irresistible, perhaps even a necessity for achieving Tehran’s aspiration of becoming the dominant regional actor in the Middle East (Grego). Assistance from Russia is vital to Iran’s missile program. China also has shown interest in cooperating with Iran on civil space projects.

Grego writes that, given Iran’s security and domestic concerns, “good intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications would seem essential for its national security as well as for its economic and social development.” Goswami considers these capabilities to be particularly relevant to Iran’s involvement in Yemen, and its fight against extremist groups such as ISIL. Grego believes that Iran is interested in and capable of anti-satellite techniques such as jamming, dazzling, and cyber attacks that could help repel an adversary’s attacks or intrusive uses of intelligence gathering, but that more sophisticated weapons, such as direct-ascent weapons, are not in their foreseeable future. Hitchens views offensive capabilities in space as a priority for Tehran and, looking forward, identifies counter space capabilities as a long-term ambition.

Again, the contributors are not aware of any Iranian commercial space industry,18 and indicate that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard controls all of its space operations.

North Korea

North Korea’s space activities are motivated by the need to counter what its leaders perceive as the existential threat posed by the US and South Korea. Moreover, to date, North Korea has demonstrated little to no interest in science and technology that does not serve its defense objectives (Samson). Hitchens refers to North Korea as an aspiring actor in the space domain, and despite its lack of significant space capability, Pyongyang places tremendous value on the advancement of space operations. It is likely that North Korea will seek to develop space technologies and capabilities as far as necessary to support its growing nuclear arsenal and oppose regional adversaries.

Perhaps more than any other nation, North Korea’s economy is focused on its primary national security goal of regime survival, and its space program is not an exception to this. Contributors characterize North Korean space operations as either a means of perpetuating the regime or of countering US military superiority, or both. North Korea does not have a commercial space sector; any space operation declared as civil is simply a facade for a military program (Cheng).

Several contributors discuss military space programs that the Pyongyang regime is actively pursuing in addition to its focus on achieving platforms for nuclear ICBM capability. In particular, North Korea seeks counterintelligence technology capable of “jamming GPS signaling to defuse data on its internal developments as well as jam early missile warning signals” (Goswami). However, strategic capabilities such as communication, counter space technology, and other force enhancement pursuits in space are manifested only by a nascent and unsophisticated satellite program. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s missile program transcends all other activity in space. Samson notes that North Korea’s military space operations are tempered by Pyongyang’s awareness that the development of capabilities such as anti- satellite weapons or EMP bursts are probably unattainable and would lead to a regime ending response if they are ever developed.

Grego argues that North Korea “does not have a developed civil society that it must be accountable to at some level. North Korea’s battle is for survival. So, … all its space activities will be tailored very carefully to that aim.” Lele suggests that illegal trade in missile parts or satellite components is the only likely avenue for North Korea to engage in commercial space activity.

European Space Agency (ESA)

The European Space Agency (ESA) is an international space agency, not a state space actor, so it is unique in comparison to the other actors presented in this summary. However, like some of the other space actors presented, ESA appears to be increasingly thinking about dual-use aspects of space capabilities and activities (Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, Planet).

Hitchens and Lukaszczyk explain that ESA was initially established to focus purely on civilian and peaceful uses of space, not on military uses. However, Lukaszczyk notes that Europe’s current geopolitical climate is increasingly driving European interests toward a closer focus on security concerns. She suggests that this is starting to be reflected in ESA’s space interests and operations, particularly with respect to its increasing acceptance of the use of space for security activities, capabilities, and technologies. This is a recent development, according to Lukaszczyk, who notes that just 3-5 years ago there was a clear, distinct separation between civil space and military space in Europe.

ESA is the world’s only regional space agency and its members are, in many cases, involved in other space programs and agencies. Hitchens and Lukaszczyk detail three overlapping types of government space actors in Europe:

• The national space programs, space agencies, and space offices of individual European states.
• ESA, which is comprised of 22 European member states.
• The EU, itself, which has its own space policies, space programs, and space operations that cover its member states.

As Lukaszczyk explains, ESA and the EU are independent from one another and have different member states, different procurement processes, and different ways of spending money. She contends that the key difference between ESA and EU space initiatives is that ESA focuses on activities such as space exploration, research, and the technical aspects of space operations (i.e., similar to NASA in the US), whereas the EU is more policy-oriented and focuses on the strategic aspects of space operations (i.e., similar to the US State Department and Department of Defense). Moreover, the EU has supranational power that requires member states to abide by its directives, an authority ESA simply does not have.

While Lukaszczyk notes that there have been some instances of friction between ESA and the EU, particularly over issues relating to authority and jurisdiction, she suggests that a significant step toward improved coordination and cooperation was made with the development of the European Space Strategy in 2016, which she describes as a space strategy for Europe as a whole. Perhaps most critically, she asserts, the European Space Strategy was developed through a unified, collaborative effort that included all three of the overlapping types of government space actors and programs within the EU (member states, ESA, and the EU itself).

Historically there has been little cooperation or collaboration between civil and military space actors in Europe, and even the idea of dual-use was a sensitive topic of discussion, according to Lukaszczyk. She contends, however, that a perception of increasing regional security threats has opened the door to the idea of strengthening European defense capability by capitalizing on existing civil and commercial space capabilities and technologies for military purposes and dual-use applications.

This change seems to be consistent with wider European perspectives on the role of space. As Lele points out, NATO has historically viewed space as a force enabler and multiplier. He explains that the space domain has been of strategic importance to many EU states for decades, particularly as EU states have served with the US in recent military operations that depended heavily on satellites. Supporting Lele’s point, the experts highlight two particularly relevant European space initiatives, both of which ESA is now involved with: Galileo (the global navigation satellite system [GNSS] of the EU) and Copernicus (an Earth observation program). Lukaszczyk explains that both Galileo and Copernicus were initially established as purely civil and commercial space programs but the EU has adjusted each program’s mandate to incorporate military and security objectives and operations. Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force) highlight the strategic and operational value of Galileo to the EU as the provision of an independent GNSS capability that increases European control over access to its own communications. This reflects what Miller sees as the core reason why actors get involved in space in the first place: the fundamental need to see and communicate over the horizon, for the benefit of national security objectives, civilian objectives, and commercial objectives.

According to Lele, European commercial space activity more commonly occurs at the EU member state level, rather than at the ESA level. However, in general, Lukaszczyk suggests that Europeans tend not to trust the private sector as much as Americans do, despite recognizing the obvious achievements and successes of commercial space actors in the United States. Consequently, she explains, European government and military space actors are typically reluctant to turn over control of aspects of their programs to private sector actors. To illustrate this point, she points to a collaborative (ESA, EU, and EU member state) Europeans space communications initiative, Government Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM). As she explains, Europe has excellent telecom operators (e.g., SES, Eutelsat, etc.) that could, theoretically, meet the necessary security requirements and easily and effectively support GOVSATCOM. Instead, she contends, the EU is planning to build its own, entirely separate satellite constellation in support of GOVSATCOM because, in large part, it does not want to turn over any control to private hands—thus eliminating an opportunity for cooperation with commercial space actors. Ongoing ESA, EU, and EU member state efforts to attract commercial space startups into the European commercial space marketplace does suggest that this reluctance is receding, however Lukaszczyk characterizes the overall progress as quite slow.

Japan

While Japan is an older player in the space domain, it is also a space actor transitioning the way it conceives of its space interests and operations for both national security and defense purposes, as well as for commercial purposes (Dr. Brian Weeden, Secure World Foundation). Japan has historically viewed space as a non-military domain, according to Goswami. However, several of the experts19 assert that this appears to be changing as a result of mounting regional security challenges, particularly the growing threat of from North Korea.

Lele explains that Japan has both an established national space agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), which is the main force behind the country’s space program, as well as commercial space entities that have significant international footprints (e.g., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHI Corporation). Moreover, Hitchens believes that Japan’s efforts to review and revamp its national space policies, plus its continued commitment to encouraging and enticing commercial actors to get involved in the Japanese commercial space sector, have helped the country become a growing force in the space domain.

Japan also appears to be taking steps to expand its own footprint in the domain of military space. There appear to be two primary factors driving Japan’s expanding space interests and operations: security concerns and regional competition. Increasing regional security challenges have pushed Japan to take a more national security and defense focused approach to its space interests and operations (Goswami; Lele; B. Weeden). As Lele notes, Japan launched its first military communications satellite in 2017 and is planning to launch a military space force by 2019. These space operations will increase both Japan’s defense capacity (i.e., boosting the broadband capacity of Japanese Self-Defense Forces) and the security of essential capabilities (i.e., protecting Japanese satellites from dangerous debris orbiting the Earth) (Lele).

Lindsey indicates that nationalism and national pride are also a significant factor in how Asian countries, including Japan, approach space interests, ambitions, and operations. Japan and other Asian countries want to be seen as the “first Asian country to do X thing in space.” This idea of an “Asian Space Race,” (Lindsey) likely provides some additional context and insight into Japan’s space interests and operations. Illustrating this point, Goswami notes that JAXA is conducting futuristic space exploration research relating to asteroid exploration and the wireless transmission of electricity, which she suggests could eventually be used for the transmission of electricity from space solar satellites. These kinds of space operations, Goswami contends, could have a major impact on the future of space resource exploration. They would also certainly represent an interesting, noticeable achievement in the context of the “Asian Space Race.”

As discussed, the experts suggest Japan is transitioning how it approaches space operations, increasingly focusing on national security and defense-related interests and objectives. The experts highlight several key events and decisions that illustrate this evolution in Japanese thinking.

• The reinterpretation of “peaceful use of space” away from meaning “non-military” (B. Weeden).
• The amendment of its national space policy to permit Japanese military activities in space (B. Weeden).
• The decision to utilize satellites for military purposes, including reconnaissance and information gathering efforts pertaining to the seas (Goswami).
• The introduction of ballistic missile defense into its national space policy (Goswami).
• The release of its fourth Space Basic Plan in 2016, putting forward a national space policy as part of an overall national security strategy (Lele).

These actions, together, seem to illustrate an evolving Japanese mindset regarding space operations for military purposes; one that appears to be shifting more toward using space to protect and advance Japan’s national security interests in a time of escalating regional security challenges.

According to Goswami, Japan has shown a clear commitment to encouraging the involvement of commercial entities in the space domain. She supports this argument by pointing to business-friendly initiatives such as the sharing of state-funded research and development funds with private commercial space entities, and also the creation of national legislation to encourage commercial space activity and construct a more attractive marketplace. Building on Goswami’s analysis, Lele points to two particularly relevant legislative accomplishments from 2016: 1) the passing of law that makes it easier for private companies to invest in Japan’s commercial space sector and 2) the establishment of a space activity law that allows commercial companies to launch artificial satellites. Lele asserts that these actions have paved the way for several new, notable commercial entities to enter Japan’s commercial space sector (e.g., Interstellar Technologies, Astroscale, PD Aerospace, and Canon Electronics).

India

Although India does not have a comprehensive national space policy, the experts generally agree that it is working to expand its footprint in the space domain.20 This is evident through both concerted efforts to develop its commercial space sector and an increasing interest in and willingness to capitalize on space capabilities to support national security and defense-related interests.

The experts note that India has historically conceived of space operations primarily as a mechanism to support its civil and national development interests and capabilities, with the goal of developing space technologies for the purpose of societal benefit.21 However, they suggest that how India conceives of space operations appears to be shifting. In particular, Goswami and Samson point to an increasing Indian consideration of security and defense-related factors in relation to space domain interests and operations. As Lele explains, this shift in thinking seems logical given the unique assortment of security challenges India faces in today’s geopolitical environment (e.g., cross-border terrorism, large distances of maritime borders to monitor, and having two nuclear weapon state adversaries). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indian military appears to be increasingly recognizing that it is in its interest to utilize space for security purposes.

India’s approach to space operations is driven by both military and commercial interests. On the military side, Lele notes that India’s increasing interest in exploiting space capabilities for national security and defense has resulted in increased coordination between India’s national space agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and components of the Indian military. Commercially, Lele and Samson explain that India has demonstrated clear and expanding interest in its commercial space sector and has started to take steps to grow and develop its commercial space environment. However, as is the case in most of the other states discussed in this summary, India’s commercial space sector is still largely dependent on state support.

As mentioned in the discussion of Japan, nationalism and national pride are also a significant factor in how Asian countries approach space interests, ambitions, and operations (Lindsey). As Lindsey explains, India and other Asian countries want to be seen as the “first Asian country to do X thing in space,” and this idea of an “Asian Space Race” likely provides some additional context and insight into India’s space interests and operations. Interestingly, despite the inherent level of competition that naturally emerges from this “Asian Space Race,” Goswami and Lele note that India has demonstrated a willingness to share space services with other regional space actors. For instance, India is offering its satellite services to its neighbors through the launch of the “South Asia Satellite” (Goswami), and has also developed its own regional navigation system (i.e., like that of GPS in the US), the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which it is likely interested in expanding into and/or sharing with surrounding countries (Lele).

Though India’s national space agency (ISRO) is mostly focused on space operations for civilian purposes, Lele and Goswami note that ISRO has been expanding its coordination with, and support to, the Indian military. As several of the experts highlight,23 expanded ISRO coordination with Indian military services has included activities like launching national security-dedicated satellites, using dual-use satellites for national defense activities, and providing augmented data on areas of concern (i.e., India’s disputed borders with China and in the Indian Ocean region), and is expected to expand into activities relating to counter space anti-satellite capabilities. Goswami also suggests that the establishment of an Indian military space agency may be forthcoming, as there have been discussions within India to establish an Aerospace Command separate from the Air Force.

While the experts generally agree that India has a growing commercial space sector, Lele stresses that commercial space operations in India are in their infancy and India’s commercial space actors largely depend on government assistance. There are several examples of startup commercial space actors that have been making investments in the Indian commercial space market, but, as Lele notes, at this point the country’s commercial space actors are mostly dependent on ISRO for jobs and/or funding and are generally expected to simply be service providers.

The expert contributors from ViaSat, Inc. suggest that there is significant interest from Indian commercial entities in developing a robust commercial space sector modeled on those achieving success in Western nations. It appears that both ISRO and the Indian government are taking steps in support of this. Goswami and Lele present three particularly relevant examples to illustrate this initiative:

• ISRO plans to engage the commercial space sector in launch activities by offering technology transfer agreements.
• The Indian government has shown a keen interest in developing ground infrastructure for prospective commercial space clients.
• The Indian government is working to establish national space legislation that will regulate private space actors in accordance with the international obligations laid out in the Outer Space Treaty.

However, despite these steps toward commercial sector development, several of the experts24 highlight concerns about government ownership of commercial space activity, and the true level of independence and openness in India’s commercial space sector. They note that India is not known to have a culture of openness and trust, and underscore concern that this may limit India’s ability to attract private, commercial sector innovation in space operations.25 Goswami and Lele point out that government ownership of India’s commercial space actors and activities likely means that if a crisis were to arise, the commercial actors would have just limited, if any, autonomous influence on security matters and decisions would be made by the government.

South Korea

South Korea’s regional security environment is challenging, particularly given the uncertainty and instability stemming from North Korea. It is not surprising, therefore, that South Korea increasingly conceives of, and approaches, space interests and operations with national security and defense-related objectives in mind (Lele).

South Korea’s approach to space operations appears to be driven largely by national security interests and elements of national pride. As mentioned in the discussions of Japan and India, nationalism and national pride are a significant factor in how Asian countries approach space interests, ambitions, and operations, and this is certainly true for South Korea (Lindsey). Moreover, in what seems to illustrate a fusion of national security and national pride factors, Lele points out that South Korea’s evolution toward a more heavily national security and defense-related approach to space has notably coincided with a growing aspiration for space-related cooperation with the United States, particularly cooperation concerning mutually beneficial security objectives. Expanding space domain cooperation with the US helps to increase South Korea’s operational capability and international standing.

To illustrate this increasing national security and defense-related focus of South Korean space interests and operations, Lele points to South Korea’s development and implementation of a new defense doctrine for outer space. Notably, this new outer space defense doctrine highlights a particular South Korean interest in incorporating advanced technologies with military relevance in space, an interest in which he indicates the burgeoning US-South Korea space partnership has also taken steps to advance. As he explains, space technologies form an important element of any missile defense system, something that will almost certainly remain a key focus for both the US and South Korea for the coming years given escalating tensions with North Korea.

Lele expects South Korea’s commercial space sector to progress significantly in the coming years. This expectation driven by:

• The country’s standing as a technologically advanced state, and the belief that South Korean commercial space operations will be well-positioned to capitalize on these technological capabilities.
• The increasing availability of financial resources as the number of venture capital firms involved in South Korea’s commercial space sector is rapidly growing and the overall investment in commercial space operations is expected to continue to increase.

However, while South Korea seems poised to further develop its commercial space sector, Lele believes that the regional security situation will likely dictate its future. Accordingly, Lele suggests that the nature of the threat from North Korea and the regional security environment overall may be what decides the future of South Korea’s commercial space operations, particularly in a time of crisis.

Israel

Israel is a sophisticated producer and user of space technologies and applications (Dr. Deganit Paikowsky, Tel Aviv University), with space interests and operations that appear to be largely driven by national security and defense-related interests and objectives. Given high levels of government control and ownership within Israel’s commercial space sector (Hitchens), Israeli commercial space interests and operations are certainly influenced by national security and defense-related interests and objectives.

Paikowsky suggests that the significance of space in Israel’s strategic concept shapes its perspective on space security today. Her characterization of Israel’s approach to space suggests a fundamental tension between pragmatic goals and broader ideals. Israel, she contends, views space as a global commons and aspires to contribute to a secure and sustainable space environment. Toward this end, Israel is interested in greater international collaboration and cooperation in the space domain with the goal of maintaining space as a peaceful environment for the benefit of all. However, Paikowsky notes that Israel also acknowledges and accepts the worldwide use of space as a mechanism for supporting terrestrial military activity, as well as for defense and deterrence efforts against harmful activities in space— particularly with respect to the protection of satellites and space systems in its own case.

Israel’s approach to space operations and services appears to be largely driven by national security interests. Paikowsky explains that as a small country, Israel is able to enhance its overall national power through space in ways that might otherwise not be possible. According to Paikowsky, Israel both enjoys and suffers from a growing reliance on space systems for its critical national infrastructure. For this reason, she explains, Israel has concerns about the growing global trend of space militarization because the resulting threats, if realized, could lead to Israel losing any relative advantages it might currently have in the space domain. Therefore, she maintains that Israel is interested in achieving a sustainable space environment, particularly one in which Israeli satellites are not endangered.

Longstanding regional security concerns and threats have driven Israel to commit significant effort and resources toward securing and assuring its overall national security. Israel’s narrow borders, Paikowsky contends, constitute a lack of strategic depth and pose an existential threat that necessitates a search for solutions to avoid strategic surprise and sudden attack. For these reasons, she explains, Israel’s security doctrine demands advanced intelligence capabilities for early warning. An orientation toward space assists Israel in coping with the challenges presented by this aforementioned lack of strategic depth, and Israel’s space program, therefore, is recognized as a critical component of its national security strategy, according to Paikowsky. More specifically, she asserts that Israel is particularly focused on space capabilities for identifying and addressing threats from an intelligence and operational point of view (i.e., early warning; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; deterrence; and self-reliance in advanced technologies). She contends that Israel views these types of interests and operations as force multipliers that boost national space capability and infrastructure in both the military and civilian realms, thus strengthening Israel’s overall national security and regional status.

Despite its space domain ambitions, Paikowsky notes that Israel’s space interests and operations are limited by resource constraints imposed by its relatively small size. She argues that this forces Israel to be more selective in its space operations, necessitating a concentration on those most critical to national objectives (e.g., developing, operating, and launching satellites into space), as well as several specifically targeted niche areas that present potentially high return on investment opportunities (e.g., Earth observation, low-Earth orbit launch capability, and communications). Another notable way in which Israel attempts to neutralize domestic resource constraints is by building partnerships with other space actors. Paikowsky notes that Israel does not build all of its systems entirely on its own (e.g., Israel does not have its own navigation system, weather system, or manned missions), but rather seeks to cooperate with international partners—particularly the United States—on mutually beneficial space- related projects. Therefore, it is important to recognize that while Israel’s size might present some limitations with respect to available resources, the strong US-Israel cooperative partnership does in part help to buffer Israel against domestic resource constraints. As Bahgat notes, the US provides a significant amount of political and economic assistance in support of Israeli space interests and operations.

Since the establishment of its commercial space sector, Paikowsky contends that Israel has developed a robust commercial space industry and a strong scientific sector. Hitchens, however, notes that while Israel does technically have a commercial space sector and commercial space actors, there is a high level of government control and ownership involved. Therefore, these Israeli “commercial operations” might not be as truly independently “commercial” as one might imagine (Hitchens).

Canada

Canada has had a few decades of experience with both military and commercial space (B. Weeden). It is among the group of space-faring nations that utilizes space and have both a strong space policy and a government space agency (Samson). Canada, like most countries discussed by the contributors, implements a different model for commercial space operations than does the US (Hitchens). Canada’s space sector lacks a clear distinction between civil, military, and commercial operations. There is also significant government investment in the commercial sector, which reflects the government’s commitment to building up the nation’s commercial space sector.

Many of Canada’s commercial satellite companies still have broad government investment and therefore cannot be deemed as entirely independent entities, unlike the United States’ commercial satellite companies (Hitchens). For instance, Canada makes frequent use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)28 satellites for both military and commercial use, and is even ahead of the US in its widespread use of such satellites (Hitchens). This is one of Canada’s key areas of investment, and the dual-use (commercial and military) nature of these capabilities is indicative of the lack of segmentation within the Canadian space sector (civil, military, and commercial) as a whole.

Charity Weeden of the Satellite Industry Association states that Canada’s recent defense policy documents indicate a determination to incorporate space capabilities into critical national security infrastructure. This emphasizes Canada’s recognition of the importance of space for national security and defense. In particular, space is vital to the scope of Canada’s Arctic operations and NORAD missions since it requires Automatic Identification System (AIS) and radar satellites to protect its coastlines (C. Weeden).

Canada has its own military space assets, including satellites intended for military use. However, Hitchens emphasizes that many of these assets are connected to US operations, and Canada often requires the United States’ support for its military space ventures. Thus, while Canada appears to have an interest in utilizing space capabilities for military operations, it currently requires outside assistance to achieve its goals.

Canada also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US), whose member nations are currently working to build space relationships with each other (B. Weeden). B. Weeden notes that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC) to organize Five Eyes nations’ operations within a national space integration cell. The CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden).

Canada’s commercial space operations and services are tightly linked with its national security and defense efforts (C. Weeden). Furthermore, based on Canada’s extensive experience with and ownership of satellites, the experts suggest that the nation’s commercial sector is focused on building up this facet of its space industry.

Brazil

Juan Hurtado of United States Southern Command stresses that Brazil has more space capabilities than many other countries in the region. However, it is still not on par with many other more advanced space-faring nations due to its dependence on international support for launches, satellite manufacturing, and orbital mechanics. Despite Brazil’s classification as an emerging space power, Hitchens stresses that the US should keep an eye on Brazil because it may become a larger player in the space domain in the future.

Brazil has its own government Space Agency, the Agencia Espacial Brasileira (AEB), which facilitates the nation’s civilian and commercial space operations. In addition, there are various government organizations that assist with space operations. The Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), which sits under the Brazilian government’s Ministry of Science and Technology, oversees most governmental space research and development efforts (Hurtado). The Center for Space Operations, under the oversight of the Fuerza Aerea Brasileira (FAB), conducts most of Brazil’s space operations (Hurtado). Combined, these government organizations are responsible for administering the nation’s space program, research, education, and operations (Hurtado). While the INPE in particular works closely with Brazil’s military, military benefits are secondary to civilian interests and applications (Hurtado).

As stated above, INPE works closely with Brazil’s military; however, its primary focus is on civilian space operations (Hurtado). This, combined with the placement of Brazil’s government space programs within the civilian sector, suggests that Brazil is primarily focused on commercial and civil space ventures.

Brazil is specifically interested in making advancements in the field of small satellites, with a secondary focus on the development of launch facilities and launch vehicles (Hurtado). In terms of research, the nation’s primary focus is on space physics and heliophysics30 rather than any planetary research (Brent Sherwood, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory). Both Brazil’s commercial sector and its universities augment the activities of its government programs and operations (Hurtado). Brazil’s commercial ventures are not overly active in the security and stability domains (Hurtado), and thus do not view security differently during times of peace, crisis, and conflict.

Australia

Since the 1940s, space has influenced Australia’s national strategy (Brett Biddington, Biddington Research Pty Ltd), and the country recognizes the importance of developing space capabilities. Samson states that Australia “use[s] space, recognize[s] space as being important, and [has its] own space interests and capabilities;” however, the country still lacks some of the capabilities that more advanced space powers possess.

Despite Australia’s long history of involvement in space, several of the experts31 note that it still lacks a national space agency and a central coordination office. However, the government is developing a new space policy (B. Weeden) and has recently announced intentions to establish a central space agency. Although small in terms of population and GDP, Australia is responsible for approximately 15% of the Earth’s surface (Biddington). Earth observation satellites and communication satellites therefore have the potential to significantly enhance efforts to regulate, govern, and monitor Australian territories, and they are a major component of Australia’s space investments (Biddington).

Despite its desire to have a successful space program, the nation’s limited monetary resources restrict its ability to spend on space ventures.32 Nevertheless, Australia has allocated funds to revitalize its space industry (B. Weeden), further highlighting the nation’s interest in investing in satellite launch capabilities. Australia presently has the capability to purchase foreign satellites and operate launches in other nations (Gilmour Space Technologies) but lacks the capability to launch on its own soil. A $3-4 billion project for space-based remote sensing was outlined in a recent Australian defense white paper and investment plan and, according to Biddington, the development of Australia’s own government- owned Earth observation satellites is on the horizon as well.

Australia recognizes and values the benefits that space services from other countries provide Australian military forces and is determined to preserve those benefits (Duncan Blake, International Aerospace Law and Policy Group). Australia has long been a popular location for the US, ESA, and other space-faring nations to place ground stations, and it is starting to build some of its own ground-based space surveillance capabilities (Biddington). The Gilmour Space Technology team contends that they could also see the Australian government looking to domestic commercial space industries to launch military satellites within the next 5-10 years.

The US has helped advance Australian space operations significantly (Dr. Jason Held, Saber Astronautics), and the two countries have worked together quite closely on space ventures for decades (Biddington). The US possesses the money and resources that Australia lacks to conduct these military operations (Biddington), and Australia has the geographic position that provides the US with extended satellite coverage. Much of Australia’s military assets are linked to United States operations, and Australia does not conduct many military activities in space on its own (Hitchens).

Australia also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US) on space technology development and national security-related space matters (Lindsey). B. Weeden explains that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC) in an effort to have all of the Five Eyes nations to operate a national space integration cell. This CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden).

In terms of commercial space, Held suggests that Australian commercial activities drive the nation’s space industry. The nation has a variety of private companies that use space, and these companies have differing relations with government, both in terms of control and funding (Hitchens). The diminishing price of satellites is encouraging small, startup companies in Australia, as elsewhere, to start buying and launching satellites without any government funding or assistance (Biddington; Held; Lindsey). This lowers the barriers for entry for less-experienced companies (Biddington; Lindsey) and removes the need to rely on large-scale government investments.

Despite these developments, Australia’s commercial space sector currently lacks a cohesive identity (Biddington). As Biddington explains, some Australian companies utilize satellites as part of their telecommunications business, but they view themselves as telecommunication suppliers who happen to use satellites to conduct their business rather than as commercial space companies. He also stresses the need for these companies to recognize their role as commercial space companies as well as the extent of their dependence on space.

Singapore

Singapore’s involvement in the space domain is relatively recent (Jonathan Hung, Singapore Space and Technology Association). In fact, Singapore’s commercial space activities began about 5 years ago, and the nation still lacks both a government space agency and a national space policy (Hung). Despite the absence of these institutions, Singapore has identified space as an area of interest for economic development (Samson). The nation recognizes the importance of space, invests capital and resources into space, and has its own space interests and capabilities; however, these capabilities still remain limited (Samson).

The key ambitions and interests of Singapore’s commercial space entities are improving and developing satellite communication, strengthening its telecommunication and imaging services, improving Earth observation on the ground, and providing accurate data (Hung). Singapore also aspires to develop its space capabilities so that it can further extend its commercial services to the rest of the world (Hung). Overall, Singapore’s main area of interest is small satellites, and the nation has chosen to focus on providing commercial space services via small satellites rather than investing in large telecommunication satellites (Hung).

According to Hung, Singapore does not conduct space operations for military purposes, nor is it looking to do so.

Singapore views space as a commercial business opportunity as well as an opportunity to create jobs and conduct groundbreaking research (Hung). Consequently, the nation’s interest in space is driven by its commercial and economic interests, and it is predominantly focused on how it can improve and advance in the realm of commercial space (Hung). Most of the commercial space research being conducted in Singapore focuses on satellite imaging and observation activities and, as the price of small satellites continues to decline, Singapore is investing more in research and development of such capabilities (Hung).

Ukraine

p>According to Samson, in a ranking of national space capabilities, Ukraine belongs in the lower tier of space-faring nations. Ukraine falls into this category it is interested in making advancements in space, recognizes the importance of space, and has its own space interests and capabilities, but does not have the advanced space capabilities and resources that other higher-tiered nations possess (Samson). Nevertheless, due its clear interest in space, further investment in Ukraine’s space operations is anticipated.

Luxembourg

Goswami predicts that along with the United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg will “emerge as a major space player in the future of setting space norms and utilizing insights drawn from space-based information services.” She supports this argument by pointing out that Luxembourg has invested extensively in asteroid mining and has established legislation that allows private companies to settle in Luxembourg by promising ownership of outer space resources. Thus, Luxembourg is primarily focused on its commercial space ventures, recognizes the economic opportunities available in space, and supports ownership of outer space resources.

The Middle East

For most Middle Eastern countries, there are two major barriers to becoming a space-faring nation: money and scientific infrastructure (Bahgat). The Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Kuwait, have the economic resources to conduct space activities, but lack the necessary technical infrastructure and scientific expertise (Bahgat). Despite these shortcomings, Goswami predicts that the UAE will “emerge as a major space player in the future of setting space norms and utilizing insights drawn from space-based information services.” This prediction stems from the UAE’s efforts to partner with more advanced space-faring nations to build expertise, stimulate the process of obtaining space-based capabilities, and gain access to the wealth of space knowledge that these nations possess (Goswami). Other Middle Eastern nations, including Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, do not have the required financial resources to build a space program (Bahgat). According to Bahgat, this helps explain why the only Middle Eastern countries with space programs are Israel and Iran, both of which have resources and infrastructure.

New Zealand

New Zealand does not have a national space agency (Biddington) and, according to B. Weeden, it is not engaging in many space activities at the moment.34 However, it is a member of the Five Eyes, whose member nations are currently working to build space relationships with each other (B. Weeden). B. Weeden elaborates that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC), and the goal of these efforts would be for all of the Five Eyes nations to operate a national space integration cell. The CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden). Therefore, we can anticipate an increase in New Zealand’s interest in space in the near future.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (
Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab); Dr. Laura Grego (Union of Concerned Scientists); Harris Corporation, LLC.; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Juan Hurtado (United States Southern Command); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele3 (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force); Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings (Royal United Services Institute, UK); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Kevin Pollpeter (CNA); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q7] Are other nations outside the West poised to tap into their own commercial space industry for military purposes in the next 5-10 years?. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Background

All the experts who contributed to this question noted that it begins from the incorrect assumption that space industries in other countries are organized in a similar manner to the US—with clear delineations among civil, military, and commercial space industries. Furthermore, most indicate that, taking advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology, many states both non-Western and Western, are already tapping commercial and civil space capabilities for military use. Their responses suggest that a better way to frame this question might be: “Which nations outside the West are tapping into their civil (commercial and/or government run) space industry for military purposes?”

Lack of separation between public and private space sectors

Several contributors comment specifically on the organization of space sectors in countries outside the West. Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin notes that while both our European and Asian allies have separate public and private space sectors, “there is a very permeable membrane between their governments and commercial industry” (see also ViaSat, Inc. and Roberto Aceti of OHB Italia SpA). Faulconer Consulting Group suggests there is no separation at all in China. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation similarly observes that, although the Indian space agency ISRO has a commercial wing (Antrix) that develops a lot of their commercial capabilities, it is funded by the Indian government and not, she argues, truly commercial. Berkowitz mentions that Russia, Iran, and North Korea are comparably organized, with “commercial” space enterprises wholly owned by the government.

In effect, there are fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities and, in many non-Western states Aceti contends, there are in fact institutional incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. Additionally, the “[c]utting edge of technology and performance is being defined by truly private sector capital investments” (ViaSat, Inc.), incentivizing militaries to tap commercial capabilities. Such arrangements also benefit commercial entities, as joint ventures provide protection by national governments (Caelus Partners, LLC). Major General (USAF ret.) Armor4 regards this as part of the development of the industry: “It’s blending in all directions, not unlike the IT industry.”

Military utilization of civil capabilities

An anonymous commercial executive contributor stated that it is a “safe assumption that other countries see the benefits of space from a military perspective and have the vision to know it will only grow in the coming decade.” This view is reflective of almost all of the other experts’ responses, although Matthew Chwastek of Orbital Insight, focusing on capability rather than intent, does offer a qualification to this. He notes that none of these states currently has the “depth of capital formation, governance, and regulatory flexibility” needed to develop civilian (government or commercial) space capabilities that could benefit the military, although this situation could change in the next decade.

How is this being done? Dual use

As Table 1 shows, there was considerable agreement amongst the experts that the crossover from civil (government and/or commercial) to military use most commonly takes advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology. As Brigadier General (USAF ret.) Thomas Gould of the Harris Corporation points out, “the same rocket engines used to boost satellites into orbit can deliver conventional or nuclear warheads” (see also: Adranos, Cheng, and Samson). Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) contends that, with the possible exception of Russia, most space activities outside the US are concentrated on dual use technologies and applications.5 Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin agrees with her assessment, and adds that the US has been behind in this regard, something he sees as a detriment to the US.

Conclusion

The contributors’ responses to this question all either directly or indirectly challenge the assumption made in the question that other states organize and conceive of their space industry in the same three- part structure—civil, military, and commercial—that we have in the US. In some cases (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India), this is a reflection of the separation, or lack of separation, between public and private sectors in general. In other cases, it reflects the fledgling nature of many state’s space industry, where government funding and private research and investment have been combined for greater efficiency. Furthermore, this type of collaboration is already underway. While, as the summary table shows, there is some difference of opinion among experts regarding which commercial capabilities are currently being tapped by specific countries, their responses collectively reflect Dr. Jason Held’s (SaberAstronautics) comment: “Bottom line answer is: absolutely. Defining the nature and scope of that commercial industry is the big question.”

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia SpA, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Faulconer Consulting Group; Adam and James Gilmour (Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia); Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics Inc.); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association); John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Crimean Annexation Analysis Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders prior to and during the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s leading indicators, those of Crimean leaders and the Russian-supported President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, are presented separately.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

The primary findings regarding Russian government leading indicators are focused on Putin and include:

1. As a general pattern, Putin is more restrained in his language than most Western leaders, making indicators of his intent rare.
2. The rarity of these indicators increases the ability to detect them as statistical “blips” in his language use; a thing that rarely appears is noticeable when it occurs.
3. When Putin mentions key emotive issues, they occur suddenly as a “blip” in his general discourse in advance of operations. However, he is disciplined in subsequently silencing himself during apparent planning and execution phases.
4. However, once his goal is achieved, he relaxes his restraint and releases a rhetorical flourish of concerns and emotional language (a “brag”).
5. After a rhetorical flourish, Putin again restrains his discourse when planning and executing operations to achieve his next strategic goal.
6. The blip patterns that may be detected are manifest in emotional themes such as Pride, Protection, Unity, Strength, and Russian Superiority, and political themes such as Russian Security, mentioning Adversaries, Russian Energy, and the Ceasefire.
7. Putin exhibits a sustained and increasing apparent concern with Russian Energy Resources and the Threat of Nazism, consistent with earlier studies.
8. Putin is demonstrating an increasing concern with Turkey, which may have direct implications for his intentions in Syria.

The primary findings regarding Crimean leaders and government include detectable blips approximately a month and a half before the annexation in emotive themes that include:

1. Fear of Extremism, Failure of the Ukrainian government (an enemy), desire for Stability, Independence, Legitimacy of Crimean cause, Unity of Crimeans, Separatism, Sovereignty for Crimea, a sarcastic claim to be open to Cooperation, and use of the rhetorical device of Accusation.
2. There is a curious “blip and brag” pattern in the mention of the ingroup (Crimea), their friend (Russia) and primary enemy (Ukraine).

Russian-supported President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych

1. There were no detectable leading indicators for the Russian-supported Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovch, but this may be due to the fact that his speeches ended four months before the annexation of Crimea, and perhaps more relevantly, Yanukovych may have had more pressing concerns as his hold on power was failing at this time.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

1. The pervasive concerns of the Putin government were Economics and Trade, not expansion, Russian imperialism, or national pride.
2. The pro-Russian President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, expressed views identical to those of the Putin government, indicating his ideological alignment, if not direct control, by the Kremlin.

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Russian-Estonian Relations Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders and has the potential to provide leading indicators and reveal key issues and concerns.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

• Putin exhibits a sustained concern over Europe and the threat of Nazism, consistent with earlier studies (Kuznar, 2016b).
• The overall sentiment between the Putin and Estonian governments demonstrates increasingly negative relations between the two countries.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

• The Putin government predictably stresses the plight of Russian Minorities in Estonia, and the need for Cooperation in its discourses on Estonia.
• Ethnic Russian-Estonians emphasizes their ethnic Identity.
• The Estonian government stresses the need for Cooperation.

Use of Emotional Language

• The Estonian government used nearly five times the amount of emotional language (emotional themes and rhetorical devices) used by the Putin government.
  • This pattern reflects other studies that have demonstrated that the Putin government generally uses much more restrained language than other leaders (Kuznar, Popp, & Peterson, 2017; Kuznar & Yager, 2016).
  • This restrained language may be an indicator that the Putin government is more vulnerable to traditional deterrence operations (USSTRATCOM, 2006), provided that their values are accurately identified.

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: South China Sea Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese government officials during peak times of conflict in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2016. The leading indicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presented separately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant national concerns.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

The 16-year period examined was divided into six-month periods, and measures of theme use were correlated with the frequency of gray zone activity initiated by each actor in the subsequent period. This enabled identification of indicators and warnings approximately six months in advance of gray zone actions.

• The specific themes that indicated Chinese gray zone activity included Conspiracy, Self-defense, Equality and Rights, Gray Zone Activities, and Domestic Development.
• Criminal/Illegal, Borders/Territory, Crime, Oil/Gas, Materiel, Protests, Friendship, and China were the primary indicators for the Philippine gray zone activity.
• Aggressor/Aggression, Legitimacy, Economy and Trade, UN, and Lexicalization indicated Vietnamese gray activity.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

The themes that occur statistically more often for each actor provide an indicator of what issues are most important for that actor.

• Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments share a mutual concern for their borders, their territories, and their own nation’s prosperity.
• China also outwardly reveals their preoccupations with peace, stability, sovereignty, cooperation, and the South China Sea.
• The Philippines, like the Chinese, also display a strong concern about the South China Sea, cooperation, China, and sovereignty and also have a strong interest in conflict, equality and rights, their economy and trade, and formal agreements.
• Vietnam, like the Philippines, is predominately concerned with conflict as well as peace, like the Chinese, and security.

Use of Emotional Language

The use of emotional language (themes that evoke emotion such as Pride, or rhetorical devices such as Sarcasm) indicates the importance of an issue for an actor.

• The Vietnamese used over twice as much moderate to extremely negative language as the Chinese did when discussing South China Sea matters and the countries involved. This may indicate that they feel most threatened by Chinese actions in the South China Sea. There were no statistically discernable differences between the Chinese and Philippine leaders.

SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School – May 2017.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc).

On 11 May 2017, NPS convened a panel session and discuss areas related to the 4th round of CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Questions. The speakers are listed below, and their biographies are available in Appendix A.

Speakers:

1. Dr. Craig Whiteside (ISIS)
2. Dr. Hy Rothstein (Afghanistan)
3. Dr. Afshon Ostovar (Iran)
4. Dr. Ryan Gingeras (Turkey)
5. Dr. John Arquilla (General Strategy)
6. Dr. Glenn Robinson (Middle East)