NSI Publications

Gray Zone Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities – Executive Summaries of Team Reports

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.).

Table of Contents

• SPECIFYING & SYSTEMATIZING HOW WE THINK ABOUT THE GRAY ZON
• RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN THE GRAY ZONE
• GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS IN CHINESE MEDIA
• EXAMINATIONS OF SAUDI-IRANIAN GRAY ZONE COMPETITION IN MENA, AND OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO THE UNITED STATES
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN COLOMBIA, 2002-PRESENT
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN LIBYA, 2014-PRESENT
• THE CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS BETWEEN GRAY AND BLACK: THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE STUDY
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS CASE STUDY
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: CRIMEAN ANNEXATION CASE STUDY
• VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE GRAY ZONE A VIRTUAL THINK TANK ANALYSIS (VITTA)
• THE CHARACTERIZATION AND CONDITIONS OF THE GRAY ZONE: A VIRTUAL THINK TANK ANALYSIS (VITTA)
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN COLOMBIA, LIBYA AND UKRAINE
• US DISCOVERABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ASSETS DIRECTORY
• US-DIGIA: OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY OF US DISCOVERABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ASSETS DIRECTORY
• US-DIGIA: MAPPING THE USG DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION TERRAIN: SOURCES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION WITH A FOCUS ON GRAY ZONE IDENTIFICATION AND RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
• US-DIGIA: MAPPING THE USG DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION TERRAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• FROM CONTROL TO INFLUENCE: COGNITION IN THE GREY ZONE
• VIOLATING NORMAL: HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS TRANSGRESSIONS MAGNIFY GRAY ZONE CHALLENGES
• GRAY ZONE DETERRENCE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW (NOT) TO DO IT
• QUANTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: (DE-)ESCALATORY TRENDS IN GRAY ZONE CONFLICTS IN COLOMBIA, LIBYA AND UKRAINE
• MEDIA VISIONS OF THE GRAY ZONE: CONTRASTING GEOPOLITICAL NARRATIVES IN RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MEDIA
• INTEGRATION REPORT: GRAY ZONE CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The EUCOM video highlights work NSI did in collaboration with the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office and the US Department of Defense to apply NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to examine potential drivers of conflict and convergence in Eurasia over the next 5-25 years. For access to the full ViTTa analysis, please visit: ViTTa Analysis of Eurasia in the Next 5-25 Years.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

At its zenith in 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory. ISIS seized control over major cities, notably Mosul and Raqqa, which contributed to increasing disorder in the Middle East. As late as 2015, the geographic reach of ISIS appeared to pose serious threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria as well as the physical safety of citizens in the region. Nonetheless, as of June 2017, estimates show that about 90% of Mosul had been liberated as Iraqi forces, in coordination with the Coalition, while they continued to regain large portions of the western part of the city. Similarly, a battle to retake Raqqa is in progress. US officials estimate that only around 2,000 ISIS fighters remain in the city, while US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces total around 55,000 fighters. Given these developments, ISIS is likely facing the end of its territorial rule.

Subject matter experts’ hypotheses about the future of ISIS have similarly evolved with changes in ISIS’s geographic holdings. Two years ago, experts converged on the significance of ISIS as an enduring threat. In contrast, in the present study, the experts consulted now indicate near certainty that the current geographic expression of ISIS will meet its demise. A question remains, however: What do these experts believe will happen next?

This paper will review subject matter experts’ opinions about a post-territorial ISIS to showcase what experts believe the organizational future of ISIS will be and what enduring or emergent threats this creates for the US and its allies. At the broadest level, some experts believe that after ISIS’s demise, displaced foreign fighters without allegiance could serve as human resource “kick starters” for other terrorist and insurgency groups, such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Other experts instead believe that former ISIS members are more likely to create splinter groups, an altered version of ISIS (an “ISIS 2.0”), or an entirely new organization in unstable areas where citizens’ grievances have been left unaddressed. Experts also differ in whether they believe ISIS can effectively evolve into a virtual organization. Some experts speculate that ISIS will manifest into an organization where members gather online, are recruited online, and are encouraged via this medium to carry out terror attacks in their home countries. Others assert that a core component of ISIS as an organization is the ownership of physical territory—and thus an entirely virtual ISIS is unlikely. To best present these various schools of thought about the future of ISIS and what that means with relation to the present-day ISIS, this paper is organized around three central questions:

1. Can ISIS exist without territory?
2. What happens to the fighters after ISIS is dismantled?
3. What can the United States do now to prevent the rise of an “ISIS 2.0” after ISIS 1.0’s demise?

SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School – Jan 2017.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Speakers were John Arquilla, Ryan Gingeras, Glenn Robinson, and Hy Rothstein of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Glenn Robinson:

Let me go over the agenda very briefly. As I mentioned yesterday Doc, unfortunately Craig Whiteside has come down with a very nasty stomach virus so unfortunately will not be joining us today.

We’ll start with Ryan Gingeras, who is a Turkey expert at the Naval Postgraduate School, and then I will follow Ryan. Then let’s have a discussion at that point, some Q&A.

At which point John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein will be able to join us, and they will each speak, John on strategic narrative, development, and information operations more generally and Hy Rothstein on some of the lessons learned in Iraq when it comes to influence operations.

After those two sets of comments, we can again open up discussion and Q&A. Does that sound reasonable to everyone?

Doc Cabayan:

Sounds good. Adam, okay with you?

Adam Gable

No. Hey Doc, sorry, pressed the wrong button. That sounds good, Doc.

SMA Reachback: Highlights From CENTCOM Round 1, 2 and 3 Questions.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Overview

ISIS will be defeated militarily. However, whether it is ultimately overcome by containment or by deploying ground forces to apply overwhelming force, the path to mitigating violent extremism in the region is a generations-long one. Military options alone are insufficient to protect US interests and stabilize the region. It will require significant strengthening of State Department and non-DoD capacity to help build inclusive political institutions and processes in Syria and Iraq. Only if these flourish will ISIS — the organization and the idea it represents — have failed and the region been put on a sustainable path to stability

Contents

• Charter
• The Meaning of ISIS Defeat & Shaping Stability: Highlights from CENTCOM Round 1, 2 and 3 Reach-back Reports.
• Individual theme Executive Summaries 17 Messaging Executive Summaries.
• What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda? Executive Summary.
• What are USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from countermessaging efforts in the information domain? Executive Summary.
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Executive Summary Part 1.
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Executive Summary Part 2.
• The response to QL5 noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures What effect could this have on Intel efforts? Executive Summary.
• The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda Is there more data available about the types of apps (eg, WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished? Executive Summary.
• The Fight Against ISIS Executive Summaries.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)? Executive Summary.
• What is the strategic framework for undermining ISIL’s “Virtual Caliphate?” Executive Summary.
• What long-term actions and processes should US government (USG) institutions, the Coalition and the international community examine to position ourselves against a long term ISIL threat? How can the private sector be effectively engaged by government institutions to optimize the effects needed for success? Executive Summary.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability? Executive Summary.
• Have sentiments changed since the December 2014 polling? Have recent IO efforts in Mosul influenced these sentiments? What other means can we use to influence? Executive Summary.
• What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah? Executive Summary.
• How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support? Executive Summary.
• Mosul Coalition Fragmentation: Causes and Effects.
• Encouraging Regional Stability Executive Summaries.
• What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors? Executive Summary.
• What are the most likely post-lSIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end state favorable to US and coalition interests? Executive Summary.
• What opportunities are there for USCENTCOM to shape a post-ISIL Iraq and regional security environment promoting greater stability? Executive Summary.
• What are the factors that will influence the future of Syria and how can we best affect them? Executive Summary.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability? Executive Summary.
• What will be Iran’s strategic calculus regarding Iraq and the region post-ISIL? How will JCPOA impact the calculus? What opportunities exist for the US/Coalition to shape the environment favorable to our interests? Executive Summary.
• What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post- ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups? Executive Summary.
• How does the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict influence, affect, and relate to current conflicts in the region? Executive Summary.
• What are the key factors or elements within the Government of Iraq that influence overall stability in Syria and Iraq? What are the tipping points for each? Executive Summary.
• Regional Actor Interests and Motivations Executive Summaries.
• What are the strategic objectives and motivations of indigenous state and non-state partners in the counter-ISIL fight? Executive Summary.
• In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the US-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the US coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals? Executive Summary.
• What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab? Executive Summary.
• What internal factors would influence Iran’s decision to interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb? Executive Summary.
• What major economic, political and security (military) activities does KSA and Iran currently conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to gain influence? What are KSA and Iran’s ultimate goals behind these activities? What motivates KSA and Iran towards these goals? What future activities might KSA and Iran conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? Executive Summary.
• What are the indicators of changes in Russian strategic interests in Syria? Executive Summary.
• What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh? Executive Summary.
• What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence, following the effective military defeat of Da’esh [in Iraq] that Iran may view as beneficial? Executive Summary.
• Sources of Extremism Executive Summaries.
• What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community? Executive Summary.
• What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (ie, external events) For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model? Executive Summary.
• ISIL Support and Recruitment Executive Summaries.
• What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL- held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)? Executive Summary.
• To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL’s ideology, particularly in European, N African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? Executive Summary.
• What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters? Executive Summary.
• USG Bureaucratic Requirements Executive Summaries.
• Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050? Executive Summary.
• Post ISIL Governance Executive Summaries.
• Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population? Executive Summary.
• Following the clearance of Da’esh from both Mosul and Raqqah, and beyond that any remaining substantive elements in the Euphrates River Valley, what governing structure is most likely to be effective, and acceptable to the predominant tribes? Executive Summary.
• How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions? Executive Summary.
• Coalition Views Executive Summary.
• How does the US/Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the US/Coalition position on combatting extremists? Executive Summary.

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Question (AR1.Q1): How will the future of ISIS in Syria and Iraq impact the presence of ISIS in Africa?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

While the consideration of ISIS’s fate in Syria and Iraq of course adds significant value to the question of ISIS in Africa, ISIS’s next steps there appear to call upon a far broader set of considerations. Ultimately, the question of ISIS in Africa is complicated by the intricacies of local, state, and regional variation; competing factions and shifting loyalties, as well as the evolving situation in the Levant. Each of these issues could provide its own opportunity for a deep dive. As a first step, this report aims to provide an overview of the various considerations at play.

Three broad framing questions can be used to guide an assessment of what ISIS’s presence in Africa might look like moving forward. These are: 1) whether ISIS’s ideology and approach can sustain supporters in Africa, 2) whether African states are strong enough to withstand ISIS’s influence, and 3) whether ISIS or Al Qaeda will prevail in Africa.

Framing Questions

Can ISIS’s Ideology and Approach Sustain Supporters in Africa?

A key question is whether ISIS’s ideology and approach hold appeal for the varying groups and communities in multiple regions across Africa. Na’eem Jeenah, director of the Afro-Middle East Centre, indicates that the vast majority of Muslim organizations oppose ISIS and even publicly reject its ideology1 As Barfi (New America Foundation) indicates, the core tenets of ISIS’s approach, including its focus on sectarianism, which finds favor in Iraq and less so in Syria, is “non-existent on the [African] continent.” Similarly, he notes that ISIS’s rigid and unyielding interpretation of Islam may hold little appeal to, and may even turn away, the populations of potential ISIS sanctuaries. As two examples, he notes the Bedouin in the Sinai Peninsula who traditionally have adhered weakly to Islamic teachings, and Sahelian nationals who are Muslim in name only—and thus presumably would not be attracted to such an extreme version of the faith. In contrast, Siegle (National Defense University) indicates that when ISIS has had success in attracting African counterparts, its appeal has relied on its “reputational and ideological potency.” He notes, however, that the principal influence for militant Islamic ideology is not ISIS’s brand, but instead the highly conservative Wahhabi model of Islam, which continues to exert a strong influence supported by ample funding and social media and other forms of communication. In addition to its inability to fully root its ideology in Africa, specific groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) also appear to reject ISIS’s extreme tactics (Barfi).

Beyond a rejection of ISIS’s ideology and tactics, it may simply be that the focus in Africa is on more local concerns—such as local resource competition, grievances, or funding (Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations; Hansen, Harvard University / NMBU – Norway; Henneberg, Johns Hopkins University). Barring logistical support (Dele-Adedeji, University of London), ISIS has generally not provided or promised much in the way of resources to its affiliates and others (Campbell; Hansen; Siegle). As such, it cannot reasonably compete or make appeals on those grounds.

In contrast to the view that ISIS’s ideology holds little appeal, multiple contributors discussed counterpoints to this potential weakness. For example, ISIS won some respect due to its early victories, along with its innovative and successful use of social media tools and propaganda—the latter of which also has the potential to influence ISIS’s path forward (Barfi, Henneberg). Grievances against the central government (e.g., in the Sinai Peninsula) also may leave people open to ISIS influence (Barfi). For disaffected youth looking to demonstrate their agency, ISIS’s ideology and action also hold a specific appeal, particularly in Tunisia (Siegle). Finally, when ISIS was on an upward trajectory in the Levant, it enjoyed a reputation in Africa characterized by operational capacity, ability to gain and control large amounts of territory, and a singular vision and purpose—which greatly heightened its appeal among those enticed by jihad (Siegle).

ISIS appears to have had the most success with recruitment in Tunisia, with approximately 6,500 Tunisians having traveled to Syria and Iraq (Siegle). In other areas, despite an initial appearance of success, ISIS’s grasp is in fact tenuous. For example, though Libya has been considered a stronghold for ISIS, it does not particularly enjoy “homegrown support” there, and in fact was aggressively pushed out of Sirte by the Libyan militia and others who viewed ISIS as a hostile foreign presence (Barfi, Siegle). Though this lack of domestic support does not necessarily prevent ISIS from its destructive activities, at a minimum, it removes a source of support, and at worst for ISIS, may provide a source of active resistance. Siegle argues that ISIS’s ability to recruit and build alliances in Africa in fact will diminish as a function of losing influence and control of land in the Levant and the subsequent hits to credibility and reputation.2 Its loss of two strongholds in Libya may also contribute to a perception that it is a failing enterprise (Barfi). ISIS’s symbolic defeat in the face of its increasing loss of territory in the Levant and losses elsewhere, along with its transition to insurgency, renders it less capable of differentiating itself from other groups, and thus undermines its very basis for calling itself a Caliphate.

Ultimately, ISIS’s broader lack of success in persuading broad segments of the African population to adopt its ideology and tactics serves to limit its reach and hold in Africa. According to Siegle, “ISIS is, by and large, not well-rooted in the communities where Africa’s most active violent Islamist groups operate. This is particularly so in Sub-Saharan Africa. ISIS’s closest ties appear to be in Tunisia and the Sinai, plus a cadre of fighters displaced from Sirte in southern Libya and the Sahel.”

Are African States Strong Enough to Withstand ISIS’s Influence?

A second major question is whether African states are strong enough to resist ISIS’s influence, irrespective of how local populations view the organization or its ideology. In Africa, as elsewhere, vulnerability to insurgent activity will depend in part on the strength, stability, and legitimacy of the state. All else equal, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to enable ISIS to carve out safe havens for operation. As such, the specific vulnerabilities within Africa will vary greatly based on location and current status—relative stability or chaos. ISIS’s success may for example center around their focus on targeting rural communities, where little or no government presence is felt (Adeboye, University of Ibadan; Boukhars, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). A related factor is the degree to which formal entities (e.g., the state) or informal entities (e.g., communities) push back against these ongoing or emerging threats.

As several contributors (Barfi, Boukhars, Campbell) note, factors such as (local) ethnic tensions, social and economic dislocation, geography, political instability, weak public institutions, demographic challenges, poverty and unemployment, underdevelopment, and ungoverned spaces all contribute to making the African continent an appealing one to ISIS in terms of developing and strengthening affiliates—particularly in Egypt, Libya, and the Sahel (Barfi). ISIS’s cause is also furthered by a growth in the Sahel and Sahara of radical interpretations of Islam and violent extremism (Boukhars).

ISIS’s strongest presence and base of operations is in Libya,4 where it has been able to exploit political conflict and the security vacuum (Henneberg), though it also faces significant opposition there, and was ultimately displaced from Sirte (as noted above). Siegle suggests that the future success of any ISIS-linked groups in Libya (e.g., a regrouping of ISIS elements combined with fighters displaced from the Levant) would be less a function of local support required for a sustained presence and more a function of the lack of capable and centralized governance. As Barfi notes, “Libya has proved to be both ISIS’ most successful venture into Africa and its worst setback.” Similarly, though extremism has taken hold in Somalia in the face of state weakness, a countervailing factor is clan dynamics, which may stifle ISIS’s pursuit of additional territory there (Henneberg).

The Sahel region may be most deeply at risk, given its expanse of ungoverned space, which ISIS is likely to target (Adeboye). As Campbell notes, the Sahel also may be the poorest majority-Muslim territory in the world, with generally weak governments in the region, and an absence of national identity within the specific states. The Western Sahel may prove particularly vulnerable to ISIS, given its combination of several factors indicated just above (Barfi).5 In West Africa, we would expect politically fragile countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria also to be at risk (Adeboye). While the mix of vulnerability and resilience vary in these and other countries of West Africa, they share a large mixture of factors, all of which contribute to structural fragility (Boukhars).

Campbell argues that the littoral states (with the exception of Tunisia and Libya) generally are in a better position to resist ISIS’s influence (similar to Egypt) than are countries further to the south. Barfi nonetheless suggests that Egypt6—while buffered by a strong sense of nationalism, relative state stability, and a strong military—may become vulnerable in the Sinai Peninsula as its attacks on ISIS’s affiliate cause civilian casualties, resulting in the population’s subsequent sense of alienation.

Will ISIS or Al Qaeda Prevail in Africa?

The third key theme invoked by multiple contributors is the rivalry between ISIS and Al Qaeda (and their affiliates), referred to elsewhere as a “war within a war.”7 Campbell notes that, while ISIS and Al Qaeda share the goal of a pure Islamic state administrated according to their interpretation of Islamic Law, the groups vary in the tactics they use and are hostile to one another. The relative and absolute influence of these groups also varies as a function of geography and socio-politics.

Al Qaeda—which has a much longer history in Africa—may be better positioned to maintain and increase its power. Al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM have also been extremely agile in adapting strategy and tactics both in response to counterterrorism operations as well as to jihadi competition, and have been working to expand their footprint in Africa (Boukhars). While ISIS has, and will likely continue to have, minor footholds across Africa, their influence may be comparatively limited8 and perhaps dwindling. Several of the factors that are indicated as facilitating ISIS’s success are not unique to ISIS, but instead could be leveraged by competing groups such as Al Qaeda. These factors include leveraging social cleavages and communal distrust, migrant populations that provide a ready recruiting pool, people’s disillusionment and distrust of state institutions, ineffective counterterrorism operations, and several others (Barfi, Boukhars).

ISIS has some tangible advantages, such as significant funding enabling it to draw in potential adversaries and attract new recruits, a social media arm that is superior to that of its competitors, and a large supply of human resources that can be leveraged to send operatives to global locations while preserving its base (Barfi). ISIS also may enjoy an advantage to the extent that it is seen as having succeeded where Al Qaeda failed (e.g., fighting where Al Qaeda was less willing to fight) (Hansen). Similarly, ISIS has had other symbolic victories, such as Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance, loyalty from at least one faction of al Mourabitoun in Mali, and support from leaders such as Abdiqadir Mumin, who defected from al-Shabab—though ISIS has ultimately been unable to unseat Al Qaeda from its position of dominance.9 At the same time, Hansen notes that ISIS affiliates are geographically on the periphery of the more powerful Al Qaeda affiliates (AQIM and Al-Shabab), with the potential exception of the Abu Musab al-Barnawi group of Boko Haram.

There are also tensions growing out of competing loyalties that exist within the leadership of other extremist groups. For example, the senior leadership of Al-Shabab is split between those who align with ISIS and those who align with Al Qaeda (Henneberg). However, these loyalties can be transient and oft-changing, as well as subject to convenience (Boukhars). As Siegle discusses, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while affiliated formally with Al Qaeda, also has splinter groups who have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Within this context, Siegle notes, another possibility is that ISIS may gain traction over time as fighters relocate from Iraq and Syria, strengthening these splinter groups.

Further complicating this rivalry, both ISIS and Al Qaeda are also fighting a variety of armies and counter-terrorist organizations as well as fighting one another—the outcome of which will have an effect on Islamic militancy in Africa in the long-run.

Contributing Authors

Wale Adeboye (Institute for Peace & Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan), Barak Barfi (New America Foundation), Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Ambassador John Campbell (Council on Foreign Relations), Ini Dele-Adedeji (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), Stig Hansen (Harvard University / NMBU – Norway), Sabina Henneberg (School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), Joseph Siegle (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University)

Violating Normal: How International Norms Transgressions Magnify Gray Zone Challenges.

Author | Editor: Stevenson, J., Bragg, B., & Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.)

Overview

The current international system presents multiple potential challenges to US interests. In recent years, state actors, especially but not limited to Russia and China, have taken actions that disrupt regional stability and potentially threaten US interests (Bragg, 2016). Many of these challenges are neither “traditional” military actions nor “normal” competition, but rather fall into a class of actions we have come to call “gray” (Votel, 2015). Here we define the concept as: “the purposeful use of single or multiple instruments of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of [proportional response and] large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten the interests of other actors by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.” (Popp and Canna, 2016).

Many analyses have focused on the material effects of gray zone actions and gray strategies, such as changes to international borders, or threats to domestic political stability, however few have emphasized the role that international norms play in gray actions and gray strategies, and potential response to them. This paper beings to fill that gap by exploring the normative dimensions of gray zone challenges.

The role of norms in international relations

At the broadest level, norms are rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community of nations. In many cases norms go unnoticed until they are violated (Goffman, 1963). International norms represent collective expectations about how other states will act and thus can have significant influence on the behavior of individual actors in the international system. In particular, they can help actors overcome some of the barriers to interstate cooperation. Norms provide solutions to coordination problems (Martin, 1992; Stein, 2004), reduce transaction costs (Ikenberry, 1998; Keohane, 2005), and provide a “language and grammar” for international politics (Kratochwil, 1999; Onuf, 2013). In some cases, such as norms regarding use of chemical weapons or the use of force to change territorial boundaries, norms have been institutionalized and become part of international law. In other cases, such as human rights, international norms reflect widely shared, but not necessarily universal, beliefs.

Among actors in the international system norms provide guidance regarding which behaviors, although not strictly forbidden or illegal are considered unacceptable and liable to censure. Regular compliance with international norms signals that we are dealing with an actor who shares our perspective on how states “should” behave (Shannon, 2000). An actor abiding by relevant norms signals the value it places on those shared standards of behavior, and its intention to play by the established “rules of the game.” Doing so many also increase the willingness of others to engage in political, economic, or security cooperation.

In essence, a pattern of adherence to norms can build trust between actors in an otherwise uncertain system. Trust is “a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it” (Kydd, 2005). Trust is important component of understanding the effects of norms violations because that another actor will comply with international norms significantly reduces the kinds of uncertainty that gray zone challenges nurture. As trust deepens, reliance on norms, rather than explicitly stated and formalized rules to regulate behavior, particularly competitive behavior can increase (Bearce & Bondanella, 2007; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Glanville, 2016; Katzenstein, 1996; Klotz, 1995). While international norms are generally understood by states in the global system, we cannot assume that those rules and supporting norms necessarily reflect the domestic values and interests of all states.

[Q14] How should space feature in US deterrence strategy? How do space operations, policies, and investments impact multi-domain deterrence? What changes to US deterrence thinking are required to incorporate the space domain? To what extent should space adopt deterrence strategies from other domains? Which is the most critical US national security objective: deterring aggression from space, through space, or in space? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.

How Space Features in US Deterrence Strategy (It Is Integral, but…)

Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and the team from ViaSat, Inc. articulate an underlying presumption that appears in most of the expert contributions to this report. Namely, that strikes against space and cyber assets (whether on orbit or on the ground) will almost certainly feature in the earliest stages of future conflicts. Consequently, there is broad consensus among contributors that space systems should be a “prominent feature” of US deterrence thinking and policy; that they are now integral to the strength of the economy, to US and allied defense in all conflict domains, and are essential facilitators of cross-domain operations. Differences of opinion emerge, however, over what that critical importance implies for US defense postures and policy involving space. Here, two schools of thought emerge regarding whether the exceptionality of the space domain requires a deterrence strategy specifically for space (what we will call ‘space deterrence’) or whether talking about deterrence of space assets independent of deterrence in all other domains is meaningless (i.e., ‘deterrence involving space’).

Space Is Unique

The arguments of contributors5 favoring a space deterrence policy tend to rest on the contention that space is so integral to US national security that it demands a distinct space deterrence policy, albeit one that is ultimately integrated with other defense doctrine and policy. The focus for this group is deterring aggression against specific military space capabilities.

Space Is Just Another Domain

However, for the majority of contributors—proponents of the ‘deterrence involving space’ school of thought— the appropriate question is how to deter aggression in any domain and using any source of national power. This line of reasoning holds that space is so indelibly intertwined in all national security activities that the idea of a separate “space deterrence” is nonsensical. Rather, these contributors— including scholar, government, and commercial views—echo the sentiment of Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK that space is “just another medium of national power” and agree with General Hyten’s belief that “there’s no such thing as war in space; there’s just war.”

How Is This Accomplished? (Hegemony Versus Collective Management)

There were also two schools of thought on what contributors considered reasonable and achievable goals regarding defense of space assets. The first group believes that space superiortity or dominance in space is critical to US and ally defense and thus demands a space policy and posture directed toward retaining US military hegemony there. Jonathan Fox of DTRA points out that potential US adversaries are already working to exploit US dependence on space and calls for a space policy based on “anticipatory self-defense,” while Sergeant First Class Jerritt Lynn of United States Army Civil Affairs argues that US interests are best served by retaining “hegemonic dominance” in space. Lynn caveats his support for a policy of maintaining US space superiority by reminding the reader that “the image of the US amongst the international community affects US power and legitimacy” and asserts that “the United States must use international space relations to create a narrative that showcases how the US is a steward of an open, secure, and reasonably regulated domain.” Lastly, Jack M. Beard from the University of Nebraska College of Law states his argument in terms of the current reality: “The US Air Force has a mission to defend our assets in space and to disable or restrict the other country from operating in space if such actions become necessary in an armed conflict. So, the US Air Force has to have the ability to establish supremacy when it needs to, and it has to be able to control space if that is what is required in order to achieve its mission in an armed conflict.”

The alternative view is that achieving space hegemony, dominance, or superiority is not only infeasible, but the act of pursuing such a goal itself is likely to reduce rather than enhance US security. Many of the experts that take this position mirror the argument of French researcher Dr. Xavier Pasco of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique that also represents current reality: “Space remains an environment that cannot be fully controlled.” As a result, many of the experts suggest that the US must move toward collective international management, in large part by taking the lead in establishing international security norms for space.7 Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen of Air University offers an economic argument regarding the importance of approaching space as a global commons and establishing international norms to manage conflict when it arises. He notes that to date commercial and other activities in space “are financially viable because there remains little need for expensive security measures. It is in US interests for conditions to remain that way.”

The Issue of Credibility

Space effects and services go directly to US capabilities to attribute attack and retaliate, and thus to the credibility of deterrent threats. For example, capabilities like space situational awareness support the credibility of threatened retaliatory strikes on Earth. Berkowitz reminds us that “space systems have been integral to nuclear deterrence for years” and more recently are critical components of conventional deterrence as well. Many of the experts argue that space capabilities significantly enhance the credibility of US deterrence in all domains.8 Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) point out that given the possibility of causing military and potentially economic devestation without necessarily causing loss of life, the response principles and means of escalation control have not yet been well-understood or articulated. As a result, what is required for the credibility of deterrent threats may be different in space than in other domains. Similarly, Fox recommends that the credibility of US deterrence strategy must be shored up with well- articulated response options to a clearly defined series of threats, for example to “national and allied space-based systems, personnel, property, and interests critical to the functioning of core military or civilian societal functions.”

However, the expense of space assets and the US dependence on them may suggest that the credibility of a US threat to take kinetic action in space is difficult to maintain. Cullen argues that “US postures to deter aggression in space with force will be counter-productive and hardly credible … kinetic operations in space risk environmental catastrophe.” Other experts argue that deterrent credibility comes from the ability to threaten retaliation in other terrestrial domains. This, in fact, is the US advantage when it comes to deterrence involving space.

How Do Space Operations, Policies, and Investments Impact Multi-Domain Deterrence?

The majority of the experts appear to reject the basic premise of this question. To make this case, a number of experts highlight the historic interdependence between space assets and capabilities to produce military effects in other conflict domains. With respect to multi-domain deterrence, the contributors see space not only as a critical enabler but in many cases, the critical enabler. While most emphasize additional positives that space capabilities provide to decision makers, like more expansive warning and a wider range of deterrence options, others highlight the added vulnerabilities that relying on space presents (e.g., an additional domain to manage/defend or the greater cost to the US than adversaries of conflict in space).

What Changes to US Deterrence Thinking Are Required?

Although they clearly have different views on other issues, the SME contributors universally point to the prominent place of space within US deterrence and strategic options. Rather than changing how we think about deterrence, Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation begins by reminding us that simply changing the way we think will not be enough to forge an effective deterrent including space. Rather, key conditions must change—namely the obvious dependence of the US security establishment on space assets. In this context, there are a number of suggested changes to thinking as well. Berkowitz, Coletta, and Jackson assert that the first hurdle is for the national security space community to move beyond the post-Cold War notion that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would ameliorate the space threat. Experts also remark on the urgent need for policy makers to shore up deterrence effectiveness by clarifying for ourselves, our allies, and potential adversaries what the US considers a provocation with regard to space systems. These new bounds of behavior should be followed quickly with demonstrations of US resolve to respond.

Primarily experts classified as academics and policy researchers admonished the defense establishment to rethink what they consider to be the critical components of deterrence as it relates to space or otherwise. Namely, these contributors advise that policy makers pay serious attention to the role and formation of international norms as critical features of US deterrence.10 Similarly, quite a few experts question the applicability to the space domain of notions of deterrence as punishment, especially where kinetic actions are involved. Rather, as Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland argues, when thinking about deterrence involving space, one should consider the “cooperative dimension” of deterrence, not just deterrence as punishment. Finally, the contributing experts from ViaSat, Inc. make the point that the national security establishment in the US might take a page from the commercial and private sector playbooks with regard to updating thinking about space- related deterrence or strategic thinking. They point out that these space communities should not think of space systems such as space situational awareness (SSA); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); or communications assets as existing “exclusively in space or the space domain,” but consider them to be “complex ecosystems that exist in multiple domains.” The ViaSat, Inc. experts add that the least attributable, lowest cost, and most effective attack to a space ecosystem could likely not occur in space, and this needs to be considered in regard to the defense of space ecosystems and their space based assets.

Borrowing From Other Domains

There is no single conflict domain that shares the characteristics of space completely. While a number of the experts reference deterrence concepts from other domains that might be used to inform deterrence strategies involving space, most also echo Fox’s caution to avoid “unerring straight-line extrapolation” from other domains to space. Still, as shown in the table below, insight may be gleaned from experience and thinking in different domains for specific conditions. For example, deterrence questions about the impact of difficult attribution on the credibility of deterrent threats might be illuminated by submarine or cyber deterrence operations. Space deterrence problems that involve single or limited attacks that can cause large numbers of fatalities may find applicable instruction in nuclear deterrence thinking, while circumstances in which mass effects can be produced without direct loss of life might be informed by literature on cyber deterrence.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen3 (School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author | Editor: Popp, G., Canna, C., Bragg, B., Stevenson, J. & Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.).

Overview

At the request of the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team initiated an effort, titled Gray Zone Conflicts-Challenges and Opportunities-A Multi-Agency Deep Dive Assessment, focused on assessing gray zone conflict. The overall objective of this SMA gray zone effort is to determine how the United States Government (USG) can identify, diagnose, and assess indirect strategies, as well as develop response options against, associated types of gray zone conflicts.

On 27 April, SMA held a Gray Zone panel discussion in Crystal City, VA. This panel discussion brought together multiple elements of the SMA coalition to present some of the work and key insights that have been produced in support of USSOCOM.

The Key Role of Human Geography, Culture and Language in Effective Communication.

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services, Inc.).

Overview

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures’ shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

Creating a clear picture for cognitive maneuver should not feel like charting a new frontier simply because the terrain is made up of unfamiliar cultural and linguistic objects. This white paper brings together several approaches from the academic and operational perspectives that describe cultural variation in communication patterns as well as the content of the communications– the complex concepts such as morality, loyalty and motivations– for the purpose of more effective cross-cultural communications analysis and engagement in the IE.

Human Geography, the study of relationships between locations, groups and individuals, provides a foundation for engaging in the cognitive domain, and in fact, in illustrating key aspects of the IE. Humans, after all, possess the cognitive aspects we want to understand. They produce the narratives, hold the beliefs and values, and are the audience targeted within the IE. Human Geography begins with location. Our origin is a significant part of who we are. Our home team that defines our allegiance. Our beliefs and behaviors which can be traced back to the history and events of that location. Perhaps it is the place we strive to protect, the site of an attack that prompts retaliation, the origin of our family name that gives us standing in the community, or the locus of our closest network with whom we share a dialect and a collective memory—our cultural narrative. If we understand culture as learned practices that set one group apart from another, part of that learning is connected to sharing a place. This is how British culture can be separate from American culture and yet still share the English language. Human Geography’s emphasis on location provides a foundation to understand culture, communication and cognitive maneuver.

The white paper is divided into three (3) sections that walk through a definition of the impact of cultural variation for operations in the IE; support for planning from theory, research and the field; and going forward for all USG engagements, several authors discuss approaches that hold promise from strategy to methodology. Authors share key insights on the state of the art in cultural narrative analysis and cognitive maneuver in the IE as well as theory, research and field observation that can support continued development of applied research, policy and training in this area.

Part One unfolds from the premise that most populations that the US Government engages with are bilingual or multilingual. Dr. Loyet writes that this is a contrast with the monolingual experience of many Americans. Multilingualism is one of many cultural differences we need to take into account for effective communications and analysis across the IE. Many populations are adept at shifting between languages for different purposes. From a cognitive perspective, the bi-lingual brain works differently with perception, memory and cognition. Shifting between linguistic identities is part of their daily lives. Dr. Spitaletta, bringing insights from a series of SMA papers on bio-psycho-social communication, writes that, “Cognitive processes such as perception, judgment, and decision- making are the most vital aspect of the IE.” Finally, Ms. Kompaniiets illustrates cultural narrative in action through a Ukrainian language use case.

Part Two steps back to explore theories on culture and communication that can support a sound approach to developing successful narratives and planning cognitive maneuver. Prof. Ess and Ms. MacNulty map out dimensions of culture and values that serve as building blocks for most working in this field. These are fundamental to grounding further practical research, operational methods or analytic products. Dr. Ehlschlaeger is already developing operational means to put theory into practice using human geography to help navigate communications challenges. As a field case in action, Ms. Mushtaq describes on-going efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan to identify and foster local forms of cultural narratives and communication that are seen to be effective for peacebuilding.

Part Three looks forward by focusing on current conflicts where communication, narrative and culture play a vital role in how we engage and how successful we are. This section brings together the operators’ view from Col (Ret.) Robert Jones, applied research on narratives of elite individuals, and a field interview with Mr. Maktary on peacebuilding in Yemen that describes successful and unsuccessful initiatives to influence the situation.

Finally, most authors have read across each other’s works and referenced one another in their papers. This experience has provided these expert contributors the chance to dialog on best practices, shared and conflicting viewpoints, gaps, strengths and ways forward. In this way, we are taking the chance to learn more on this topic ourselves while we contribute to the SMA white paper series.

Contributing Authors

Mr. John DeRosa (GMU), Dr. Charles Ess (University of Oslo), Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger (USACE), Col (Ret.) Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Olesia Kompaniiets (Polizor Centre) Dr. Dianne Loyet (University
of Illinois Springfield), Ms. Christine MacNulty (Applied Futures), Ms. Angie Mallory (Iowa State University), Mr. Shoqi Maktary (Search for Common Ground, Yemen), Ms. Yusra Mushtaq (Visiting Scholar, Pakistan), Dr. Amjed Rasheed (Durham University, Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies), Dr. Jason Spitaletta (JHU-APL, Maj, USMCR), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.)