NSI Publications

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

This video is a brief overview of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor effort in support of USCENTCOM. Over the past year, the SMA Reach Back Cell has produced a vast corpus of knowledge and insight in support of key USCENTCOM questions regarding Syria and Iraq. On its own, this 1000+ page (and 50+ report) collection of documents is a valuable resource, but due to its sheer size and density, it might prove difficult to fully consume and absorb. Therefore, Project Noor seeks to provide USCENTCOM with a quicker, easier, and more effective way to search through and make effective use of this vast treasure trove of information.

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The Senturion Modeling Project Noor video provides a brief overview of the Senturion modeling and simulation effort in support of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor. For more information on Project Noor itself, please visit: Project Noor Video

Approaches to Space-Based Information Services Among Actors Without Space Capabilities. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

What is ViTTa®?

NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing our global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used to address 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written and verbal input from over 111 experts from National Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academic communities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked; and 2) the full written and/or transcribed interview input received from each expert contributor organized alphabetically. Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in a companion document.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What insight can the US/partners obtain from the space-based information service approaches used by international actors that lack their own space capabilities?

Expert Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Mark Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (USAF Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Auburn University Futures Lab); Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); ViaSat, Inc.

Summary Response

The experts’ responses to this question suggest two main insights the US can draw from how actors without space capabilities approach space-based information services. The first relates to the information these actors are seeking: what it indicates about their interests and the potential security implications access to that information has for the US. The second relates to the strategies these states are using to gain access to space-based information, in particular collaboration and reliance on private sector services.

Interests

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor’s3 response to this question focuses on the observation that what actors choose to buy can provide insight into their interests. Consistent with this, the Faulconer Consulting Group, focusing their response on international actors as customers and/or as potential combatants, highlights the potential benefit to the US that knowledge of the service provider satellite type and capability provides. Specifically, it would enable the US to ascertain what type of information is of interest to other actors and thus draw conclusions “as to the need for that type of data/information and its attendant purpose.” Dr. Namrata Goswami from Auburn University Futures Lab identifies Luxembourg, UAE, Israel, and Iran as states that have all shown interest and capability in using insights drawn from space-based information services.

Security Implications and Threats

Mark Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of USAF Air Command and Staff College both consider that the increased access to data that space-based information services provides raises security issues. The availability of high-resolution imagery from commercial providers combined with customized data-analytics makes it possible for actors to track military activities and capabilities as well as non-military factors, including those that could be used to manipulate economic stability (Garretson), without needing their own space capabilities. Berkowitz suggests that space-based information services can provide the US with insight into threats to intelligence sources and methods, force protection and operations security, as well as countermeasures to mitigate those threats.

Opportunities for Collaboration

Data sharing

Dr. Goswami suggests that India’s sharing of satellite services with countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal could be used to mitigate disasters and detect weather patterns, much as the UN does with its UN-SPIDER space-based information systems. She suggests that countries like the US and India could collaborate in similar data sharing to build disaster mitigation capacity. Consistent with this idea, Caelus Partners suggest “that the US consider providing additional space services and support to all of humanity (as is done with GPS).” They contend that “[c]ertain space-based information services are a basic necessity to operating effectively on Earth.”

Capability enhancement

Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland states that reliance on outside providers enables states to gain capabilities faster than they can through domestic development, thus resulting in more up-to-date technology. Furthermore, states currently developing space-based infrastructure have a variety of potential partners to choose from, and thus a wider range of capabilities to choose from. The ViaSat team notes that a similar logic applies to the US/partners, where private sector satellite services are faster to develop and deploy than are government systems, and result in more flexible architectures that allow for “near-instantaneous response to continually evolving cyber threats and related security concerns.” Leveraging private sector services enables international actors that lack their own space capabilities to rapidly improve their capabilities at a fraction of the time and investment of US/partners. Further, without adherence to installed base solutions, these international actors can adopt so rapidly that they could potentially surpass US/partner capabilities.

Dr. Goswami notes that Iran, UAE, and China all jumpstarted their entry into space activities through partnerships with countries with more advanced space program and capabilities. The effectiveness of this strategy for China is reflected in the fact that it is now offering its own Beideu2 navigation systems to countries along the One Belt One Road (OBOR).4 In its contribution, Harris Corporation suggests that utilizing others’ space services also allows actors to benefit from “lessons learned,” making their own choices more cost effective.

Brigadier General (USAF ret.) Tom Gould of Harris Corporation suggests, however, that security considerations may limit the potential for such collaboration in support of military operations, as it will require sharing sensitive information about each other’s capabilities in a domain that has traditionally stove-piped or highly classified its capabilities.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question (R3 QL7): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da’esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

Da’esh Transition in Syria

The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.

The contributors to this Quick Look indicated that we may observe the following for Da’esh in Syria and abroad:

Ongoing actions in Syria

• continued agitation and exploitation of the uncertainty and dysfunction in Syria
• ongoing efforts to be present and to expand

Change in strategy and associated tactics

• reorientation toward increasing attacks abroad
• shift from acquisition and maintenance of territory to insurgent methods aimed at weakening enemies
• increased emphasis on both terrorist and insurgent tactics (e.g., recent attacks in Paris and Brussels)
• movement away from direct attacks toward scorched earth defensive strategy combined with aggressive insurgency tactics
• return to indiscriminate urban violence, using lone wolves and small militant groups
• increased use of two-tiered attacks (first soft civilian targets, then first responders)
• use of “mobile, dispersed, and flexible units” that operate on behalf of Da’esh Da’esh Alliances

Views among the contributors on the groups with whom Da’esh might align demonstrated some degree of consensus. Both Shaikh and Pagano indicated that a merger or strong alliance between Da’esh and other groups would be highly unlikely. This was due in part to Da’esh’s history of denouncing others as apostates when they failed to conform to its strict rules and interpretations of Islam. Da’esh’s rigid approach has resulted in eventual isolation and the creation of enemies among groups with which it might under different circumstances have allied. Shaikh also emphasized the breadth of the ideological divide between Da’esh and other groups, which would in turn make it difficult for Da’esh to justify any future cooperation with so-called deviant groups. While Pagano cites possible points of Da’esh ideological convergence with either Jabhat Fateh al Sham or the quietest Salafists, the likelihood of collaboration between these groups remains very low. These points of convergence would be dependent on a shift in Da’esh’s goals and subsequent motives as it is faced with the fall of the caliphate, which might make previously unlikely alliances necessary for the sake of survival and future goal pursuit.

Use of “Ungoverned Spaces”

Liebl put forth the view that ‘ungoverned space’ does not truly exist given that formal or informal political institutions will always exist where there are people. Shaikh however focused on likely future contests for “ungoverned” spaces in Syria, suggesting that that the primary competition would be between Da’esh and Al Qaeda given their rivalry and different organizational purpose and approaches. Landis briefly addressed the topic by suggesting that the proportion of ungoverned space in Syria will decrease as Da’esh is weakened, and the Syrian regime retakes the west and parts of eastern Syria. Pagano emphasizes areas of strategic or symbolic importance to Da’esh and the existing or potential loss of these resources. She reviews the status of northern Aleppo province, Raqqa, and Deir el-Zour, as well as the recent retaking of Palmyra, and concludes by briefly listing the conditions under which these spaces would provide the greatest utility or opportunity to Da’esh.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma); Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture, USMC); Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI, Inc.); Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool)

Question (R3 QL6): How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Similar to points made by other contributors to this SMA Reach-back report, Dr. Kathleen Reedy of Rand includes a caveat in her response to the CENTCOM question. Given international pressure to avoid Salafi expansion in Syria, it is doubtful she argues, that Salafist policies or leaders would be allowed to become dominant over sizeable areas of northwest Syria. Nonetheless, contributors’ input on the likely response to future Salafist political institutions in northwest Syria tends to align with one of two viewpoints: 1) Syrians will reject Salafi efforts to establish political institutions (i.e., to govern); or 2) Salafi governance will be accepted under certain circumstances.

In addition, the experts offer a range of key factors to support either the “reject” or “accept with conditions” conclusions. These factors suggest four areas of inquiry: 1) the cultural salience of Salafism in Syria; 2) the degree to which people differentiate among political groups; 3) popular views of, and experience with political groups; and 4) the relative importance of ideology versus provision of public services.

Questions #1 and #2: The Cultural Acceptability of Salafism & Ideological Differentiation

Professor Murhaf Jouejati of the National Defense University contends that Syrian culture is a more apt foundation for moderate than for extremist Islamic practices. Salafism, which represents the culture of the Arabian Peninsula, is foreign to Levantine culture and as a result Syrians are most likely to reject Salafist institutions or reforms. Jouejati recalls that in the past Syrians living in areas controlled by radical extremists engaged in civil disobedience and demonstrations and sees little reason that these types of activities would not occur in areas taken or retaken by ISIL, Al Qaeda or Jabat Fatah al Sham (JFS). Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, adds that even within the opposition there is a preference for the Syrian national movement “initiated by peaceful protesters advocating for moderate ideals, rather than the transnational jihadis like Al-Qaeda.” He warns though that “that dynamic is not necessarily immovable.”

Mubin Shaik of the University of Liverpool provides a variation on this argument. He maintains that in fact Syrians differentiate between Salafists and “Saudi style Wahhabists” so would not necessarily reject all Salafist governors or political institutions. It is the particular Wahhabism of the Islamic State that is countercultural in this area. Finally, Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma) warns that the issue of the cultural salience of Salafism in Syria may be becoming moot. While he concedes that many Syrians are “fed up with fundamentalism” because of the harsh treatment they received at the hands of JFS and then ISIL, he argues that over the past six years of conflict the Syrian population has been radicalized as, consciously or not, Salafi ideas and practices have been accepted into their psyches and aspects of their daily lives where they were not necessarily present before.

Question #3: Popular Experience with Salafi Groups

Charles Lister (MEI) argues that the fall of Aleppo, the moderate opposition’s key safe haven in Syria, had the effect of diminishing popular confidence in moderate civil society. However, because in his view JFS failed to demonstrate its military value to the Syrian revolution it is now seen as “impotent” by local populations and enjoys “only minimal respect” in civil affairs. Mubin Shaik (University of Liverpool) on the other hand, believes that Salafist groups like Al Qaeda and Jabat Fatah al Sham have succeeded in building the foundation for public support of their leadership by encouraging locals to see them as defenders of the interests of the Syria people as opposed to other groups who they peg as the flunkies of the regime or of the West. As a result, Shaik expects that Salafist groups will be accepted by local populations as long as they continue their gradualist approach to instituting socially conservative (Salafist) practices.

Question #4: The Relative Importance of Goods versus Ideology

Finally, in line with the conclusions of other SMA Reach-back write-ups (e.g., see R3 QL5, V7), Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma) argues that local support for one governing structure over another will not be a function of ideology or religious preference as others intimate, but a function of which government can provide goods and services to its constituents. Landis notes that people in northwest Syria are, and will remain, in dire need of employment, security and education and the government that best provides these goods will receive their allegiance. In a specific instance of this argument Lister (MEI) forecasts that continued civil conflict in Syria will eventually bring the people of the Idlib and Hama governates into the regime’s sights and in urgent need of defense. Lister warns that if the Coalition were to discontinue support for moderate forces, local populations may again see no option but to align with Salafi groups for their defense.

The Result

As is clear from the review of their arguments, there is no clear consensus on the prospects for Syrian acquiescence to Salafi authority and/or attempts to govern in the northwest of the country. It is also unclear which factors would be the most important determinants of popular support or rejection of Salafi control. Producing a more definitive answer to the CENTCOM question requires further study and data collection on the ground. In short, in both cases – expectations and critical variables – the jury is still out.

What the experts’ input does suggest however, is arguably more useful than a single, consensus answer to (any) question of popular desire or preference in such a volatile environment. Taken together the experts’ contributions to this report imply a series of important questions that provide a template for assessing or engaging with local preferences for governing structures (e.g., Salafi, Assad regime, or moderate Islamist, etc.) in both Syria and Iraq. Specifically, analysts and planners should tailor and seek to answer the following questions relative to their areas of interest:

1. Is the prospective government or governing system salient to, and consistent with local culture?
2. Do opponents/supporters of the prospective government or system differentiate among proposed leaders, or are all elements or factions of the proposed governing authority seen as unacceptable/acceptable?
3. What history or past experiences do local constituents have with the prospective government?
4. What is the relative importance of religious and/or ideological beliefs and government provision of goods and services (e.g., security, employment, etc.) in determining popular acceptance of a governing authority?

The Accept-Reject figure above shows these generic questions tailored for the question of popular support for Salafi political institutions in NW Syria, and provides a useful roadmap for further study and on-the-ground data collection.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Kathleen Reedy (RAND), Dr. Murhaf Jouejati (National Defense University), Dr. Amjed Rasheed (Durham University, UK), Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool; independent consultant), Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma), Charles Lister (Middle East Institute)

Question (R2 QL6): What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Despite policy shifts Turkey’s key interests remain the same

The SME contributors to this SMA Reach-back write-up argue that the recent changes in Turkish security policy (e.g., pursuit of ISIL along with the PKK; relaxing of demands for Assad’s removal; warming relations with Russia, etc.) do not necessarily indicate that Turkey’s key interests and intentions have changed. Rather, the shifts should be seen as changes in objectives or tactics that are still thoroughly consistent with Turkey’s fundamental and enduring security interests: 1) containing and ultimately eliminating Kurdish or other threats to Turkey’s internal stability; and, 2) foiling Kurdish (or others’) ambitions that threaten the integrity of Turkey’s borders. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence David Gompert (USNA, Rand) explains that recognizing Turkey’s dire concern with territorial integrity goes a long way in clarifying what may at first blush appear to be inconsistent policies regarding Assad, Syria, ISIL and even its “traditional enmity” toward Russia. Gompert expresses the message clearly: “…we can count on the Turks to do whatever it takes to prevent Kurdish states on their southern border.”

Erdogan’s political ambition: a third fundamental interest?

While most SMEs focused on Turkish threat perceptions and the Turkey—Kurd/PKK conflict as a key motivator of Turkey’s actions in Syria and Iraq, Portland State University Turkey scholar Dr. Birol Yesilada argues that Turkey’s security policy and actions cannot be fully understood without including President Erdogan’s personal political ambitions and domestic political considerations as critical motivators of state behavior. According to Yesilada, President Erdogan is using operations in Iraq and Syria to demonstrate his government’s strength and ability to provide security to Turks in order to advance his domestic political agenda. Erdogan’s ultimate goal is to gain the backing to change Turkey’s constitution to support establishment of his “Turkish-style Presidency” – a highly centralized, some say oligarchic or dictatorial, Islamist regime. (It is interesting to note that to date, Erdogan’s movements and plans for his “Turkish- style” leadership mirror those Vladimir Putin followed to centralize political power in Russia into his hands.)

Key objectives underlying Turkey’s actions

The SME contributors to this write-up provided a number of truly expert and comprehensive essays on Turkey’s short and longer- term objectives in northern Syria and Iraq. Although not always mentioned in this context, as shown in the summary graphic, each objective has a clear and direct link to the two security internal territorial integrity) and/or Erdogan’s domestic political interest.

1) Defeating Terrorism.

Defeating terrorism against the Turkish state has generally meant the PKK in Turkey and Iraq and PYD/YPG in Syria, although once ISIL fighters brought the fight into Turkey, Ankara has expanded the focus of its efforts to include the Islamic State. The question of the impact on Turkey’s security policy of Erdogan’s bid ultimately to change Turkey’s Constitution is a compelling and difficult to isolate. However, Professor Yesilada (Portland State) cites polls that show the political benefit Erdogan gains from these efforts: “91% of Turks support Erdogan’s anti-terror campaign inside the country and 78% support his military intervention in Syria and Iraq (esp. re Mosul) and 88% view his security policies favorably.”

2) Impeding Kurdish political and territorial gain.

Containing Kurdish political and territorial gains and obstructing activities that might by design or inadvertently lead to an autonomous Kurdish entity on Turkey’s border, are critical Turkish objectives in northern Syria. Many experts see Turkey’s pursuit of Operation Euphrates Shield as motivated by the desire to carve out a buffer zone in northern Syria and drive a solid wedge between Kurdish-controlled territory to the east and west to thwart emergence of a contiguous Kurdish region in northern Syria, that from its perspective would threaten both Turkey’s internal stability and potentially control over its own territory.

3) Increasing Turkey’s regional role and influence.

A number of experts noted Turkey’s push to distance itself from EU and NATO. With respect to its recently thawed relations with Russia a number of the SMEs expect that Turkey will move cautiously in its relations with Russia as it seeks to as Gompert tags it, engage in “diversified outreach” to expand its list of international partners and carve out a more independent regional role for itself. They argue that Turkey has little to gain from upsetting the US to the degree that it loses US backing.

4) Assuring domestic support.

Finally, as suggested by the opinion poll results cited above, at present President Erdogan enjoys extremely high public approval for his security policy – especially along Turkey’s border. Continuing to demonstrate the government’s ability to provide security for Turks will be a key facet of Erdogan’s overall popularity and ability to push through his preferred changes to Turkey’s democratic system.

Opening al-Bab: Turkey’s Intentions

Operation Euphrates Shield began with the liberation of Jarabulus in August 2016. In November Turkish forces and allied rebel groups launched the assault to remove ISIL from al-Bab and have been bogged down there since.

Most contributors to this report see Turkey’s mid-range intentions in al-Bab as two-fold: to defeat ISIL and push it away from the Turkish border, and to drive a pro-Turkey wedge between Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria containing the PKK and PYD and strengthening Turkey’s buffer zone in north Syria. A number of the SMEs make the case that one of Turkey’s mid-term objectives in conducting Euphrates Shield is to diminish the prestige the YPG has gained as the US/Coalition’s “go-to” fighters in the area. Specifically, Turkey gains both domestically and internationally if its own Syrian rebel proxies can liberate al-Bab – the last ISIL stronghold in northern Syria — and perhaps help in Raqqah rather than cede those opportunities to the YPG. Benedetta Berti (Institute for National Security Studies, Israel) suggests that Turkey’s objective here is to guarantee itself influence regarding the details of any post-conflict resolution arrangements in particular what happens with regards to Syria’s Kurdish population.

What next?

News reporters, commentators and the SMA SMEs continue to speculate on Turkey’s next move after liberation of al-Bab. Some experts believe that once al-Bab is liberated Turkey-backed rebels will attempt to take the city of Manbij 50 km up the M4 from the YPG forces that helped liberate that city and establish a strong buffer from Jarabulus to al-Bab to Manbij. In fact, in a January 4, speech delivered two months into the battle for al-Bab President Erdogan assured Turks that al-Bab would be retaken from ISIL shortly and after that, that Turkey was “committed to clearing other areas where the terror organizations are nesting, especially Manbij.”

However, on 27 January Erdogan appeared to recant, stating that Turkey would “finish the job” in al-Bab, but not necessarily move beyond al-Bab to other areas of Syria. There is a domestic and a regional concern here: Turkey has taken most of its Euphrates Shield casualties in the fight for al-Bab. Erdogan pronouncement also comes at a time when Syrian government forces are moving toward al-Bab from Aleppo and the southwest. The softening of Erdogan’s rhetoric likely reflects Russian influence as the forces of its two allies – themselves long-time adversaries, could come up against each other in al-Bab. One alternative is posed by Woodrow Wilson Center expert Amberin Zaman6 who is cited in news reports as doubtful that Turkish forces or Turkey-backed rebels would move on Manbij in part because of the Coalition Special Forces that he believes remain there following liberation of the city. Instead Zaman suggests that the next move in Turkey’s battle against the YPG will be against Afrin which is also in Kurdish-controlled territory, but which is less populated than Manbij or al-Bab and so should prove less difficult to secure.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Birol Yeşilada (Portland State University), Dr. Benedetta Berti (Institute for National Security Studies, Israel), The Honorable David Gompert (US Naval Academy, RAND)

Question (R4.7): What are the respective national interests of the US and Russia in the Middle East, and what are the options for alleviating US/Russian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The geopolitical foundation of the Middle East is undergoing a fundamental shift in paradigm, with both the US and Russia adapting their national interests to fit the current reality. As part of this shift, Bogdan Belei of the Carnegie Endowment contends that US national interests in the Middle East are diminishing due to a combination of affordable and abundant domestic energy sources as well as the end of the Cold War. Yet a calm and stable Middle East remains a critical US security objective that underpins other key US interests in the region (Lamoreaux). As Blago Tashev of the Marine Corps University notes (personal communication), “the US sees itself as a status-quo power, maintaining a particular rules-based international order that was created by the US and its allies after WWII and is based on values shared by America and those allies.”

Yet many of the SMA experts note that a driving Russian interest is to restore its image as a US-peer “Great Power” in part by expanding its economic, military, and diplomatic ties to the Middle East. Specifically, Belei, Tashev, and Marten argue that Russia’s goal is to end what it sees as two decades of American unilateralism in the Middle East. Tashev argues that Russia’s moves in the Middle East should ultimately not be viewed as aimed at eliminating US presence there rather, the goal is to achieve parity with the US in terms of Russia’s influence in the region. Marten emphasizes that Russian national interests are not necessarily the same as Putin’s own interests, and that Putin has and will put his own interests first. While “the US views the Middle East in terms of global interests and a global strategy, Russia by contrast looks at the region more in terms of the political legitimacy of the Putin government (validated by external successes) and in terms of regional tactics” (Braun, personal communication). Ultimately, according to Tashev (personal communication), Russia not only differs from the US and its allies in terms of values, but also uses different strategies and policies to attain outcomes consistent with its national interests.

US versus Russian Interests in the Middle East

US Interests

The collective input of the contributors identifies four categories of US national objectives in the Middle East: stability, security, economic, and democratization, with a strong emphasis on the former two.1 Lamoreaux argues that while a stable Middle East—including a non-confrontational Israel—is important to the US, a stable Europe is an even more pressing interest, largely due to economic considerations. He suggests that the best way to encourage both Israeli calm and European stability is to ensure stability in the Middle East.2 In service of this latter goal, Lamoreaux indicates that the US should continue present policy and interactions both with Saudi Arabia and with Egypt, given the current (relative) stability in those states. Similarly, Turkey must also be dealt with carefully, given the risk of destabilization to the EU posed by President Erdogan’s treatment of Syrian and Iraqi refugees (Lamoreaux).

US security interests include long-term partnerships with reliable allies within the region (Israel, Turkey, GCC, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt) (Belei). “These relationships center on stability within the confines of effective governance, yet do not require a uniform approach either towards ‘democracy,’ nor a standardized bilateral model for US engagement—variable interests and dynamic relationships remain the hallmark of the region” (Meredith, personal communication). Within that flexible approach, firm “red line” strategies include containing Iran (Belei); counter-terrorism/counter-ISIS activities (Belei, Lamoreaux, Tashev); and preventing the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction (Tashev).

US economic interest centers around the free flow of energy from the Middle East to the world (Tashev), including freedom of navigation, as well as maintaining sufficient capacity to monitor and potentially offset Russian naval activities in the Mediterranean (Meredith, personal communication). As Tashev discusses (personal communication), protection of strategic assets, economic, and other interests give rise to the US need to provide security over the non-littoral sea lines in the Middle East; the region is especially important given the presence of three important naval choke points—the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime traffic through these choke points has and will continue to face multiple threats, even though the US historically has maintained freedom of navigation. This freedom will decline should US capacity and willingness to provide security be reduced—thereby creating an opportunity for actors such as China or Russia to gain increased influence in the region (Tashev, personal communication). A forward naval deployment strategy to protect and control sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa, as well as the greater Indian Ocean, would assist in protecting the US interest in energy security (Belei, personal communication).

Additional economic interests are “the dividend of stability and effective governance, namely the development of competitive, reliable markets for regional and global trade;4 employment growth to absorb and redirect fighting age males who would otherwise not join violent organizations; and broader tax bases for partner nations to establish capable government services and develop more legitimate social contracts” (Meredith, personal communication). Ultimately, the US views stable economic growth in the region as contributing to overall stability in the region, thus serving another core US interest (Tashev, personal communication).

The US interest in democratization (Tashev; cf. Lamoreaux) includes an emphasis on human rights, but also a recognition that democratization destabilizes political and social relationships, which must be managed carefully by partner nations (Meredith, personal communication). However, there was some disagreement among contributors regarding the importance of democratization as a US interest. Lamoreaux argues that the US does not have a current interest in democratization, but instead is focused on stability, even if this stability comes at the expense of the former (personal communication).

Russia Interests

Russia shares with the US one primary interest: security in the Middle East, which at present centers on counter-terrorism/counter-ISIS (Belei, Braun, Lamoreaux), thereby diminishing the threat of its brand of Islamist extremism expanding into Russia and its neighbors (Tashev). To serve this security interest, Russia is motivated to build alliances in the region, especially with friendly states like Iran, Egypt and more recently Turkey; more broadly to also establish good bilateral relations with all states (Belei, Tashev).

Lamoreaux points out that Russia’s interest in counter-terrorism may not be completely straightforward. He posits that Putin may not particularly want radical Islamic terrorism to be completely eliminated because some level of threat assists him in maintaining legitimacy and influence in the old Soviet sphere of influence (the Caucuses region and increasingly in the “Stans” as well), as the threat of terrorism increases across Central Asia. Russia’s interest in controlling terrorism is served by its continued involvement in Syria. Consistent with this claim, Marten notes that Putin’s primary goals in Syria are to support the Assad regime and eliminate Assad’s competitors; a pivot to defeating ISIS will occur after these goals have been achieved.

Russia also has economic interests in the Middle East, including expanding economic ties with the region through arms sales, nuclear technology, and the oil and gas markets (Belei, Marten, Tashev), as well as supporting energy prices by coordination with principal oil and gas producers in the Persian Gulf (Tashev).

Russia’s secondary interests in the Middle East otherwise focus on countering US and Western influence. This includes efforts to weaken the EU and West more generally, as well as a destabilized Syria, which is believed will contribute to a destabilized EU by fracturing it along multiple fronts (Lamoreaux).5 Putin also has an ongoing interest in undermining or complicating US diplomatic leadership in the Middle East and elsewhere in order to enhance domestic and regional perceptions of his strength and US weakness (Marten). Similarly, Putin is likely to use diplomatic overtures to further complicate and harm the US relationship with countries in the Middle East (Marten). Each of these actions serves Russia’s goal to regain global stature and contest US presence in the region (Serwer). Toward this goal, Russia aims to reestablish its influence in Libya, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran by filling the gaps left by the US (Serwer); Russia establishing a military presence in the Middle East will be a likely consequence of this objective (Belei).

Prognosis for Reducing US/Russian tensions and Improving Regional Stability

Several contributors indicated that the prospects for US-Russia cooperation in the Middle East are relatively poor (Belei, Braun, Marten, Serwer, Tashev). Braun (personal communication) notes, “In certain key areas, the differences between Putinite Russia and the US are more than tactical or even strategic; they are fundamental and cannot be bridged.” Meredith asserts that, while global competition has been tempered somewhat by US and Russian desires to control escalation to the point of outright conflict, the mutual restraint in US-Russian relations characteristic of the Cold War has not yet fully re-emerged. “This absence of mutual restraint is in part because the Russian paradigm remains zero-sum at its core—which leads to divergent interests vis-à-vis Iran, Syria, and Turkey as core actors in either the Western or Russian sphere of influence” (Meredith, personal communication). Belei argues that contrasting US and Russian interests also lead to opposing activities in the region that are fundamentally at odds. For example, in Syria and Libya, Russia opposes factions that the US supports; whereas in Afghanistan, Russia bolsters Taliban fighters who target US forces (Belei, Marten). According to Braun and Marten, as long as Putin relies on external events for internal political legitimation, a true resolution of tensions between the US and Russia will be difficult to achieve. This is underscored by Russian investment and military operations in Syria, warming relations with Iran (Braun), and intensification of relations, including with non-state actors, in the region (Tashev). Overall, Marten argues, Putin does not have much incentive to cooperate with the US in regards to defeating ISIS, unless he can portray the West as having capitulated to him and/or the US publicly acknowledges Russia’s leadership in resolving the conflict.

A more optimistic view of the situation suggests that it is possible that the US and Russia can converge on an interest in regional stability6 (Meredith, Tashev) “in the short term—seeking to contain and eventually diminish levels of violence—while recognizing stable governance can become an area for democratic development, itself a stabilizing force over the long term” (Meredith, personal communication). Neither the US nor Russia is interested in a protracted war and thus the tension might also reach a stalemate that would force both countries to engage in a political agreement (Belei). Barring these situations, prolonged conflict—or in the worst-case scenario, direct confrontation—is possible (Belei, personal communication).

Recommendations

The contributors offer a wide range of recommendations for reducing tension between the US and Russia in the Middle East. These are focused primarily on Syria and Russia itself, and include:

Syria

• “Cool off in Syria,” and conclude this conflict as soon as possible. Doing so includes abandoning the policy of regime change in Syria, instead focusing on eroding ISIS-held territory and ensuring that the cities are functional security environments (Belei, Lamoreaux, Meredith)
• Allow Assad to remain in Syria but insist that he work with primary opposition groups and agree to some sort of amnesty for rebel fighters (Lamoreaux)
• Institute more general checks on Assad so that he does not eliminate the competition once talks are done. Ensure that Assad surrenders the majority of his arms with the stipulation that others (Russia, possibly Turkey) enforce the agreement under UN auspices (Lamoreaux)

Russia

• The US and EU should ease sanctions on Russia as these do not seem to be effective, and no one will intervene militarily on behalf of the Ukrainian government (Lamoreaux)
• US policy toward Russia in the Middle East should not be compartmentalized. Take into account that Russia’s activities in the Middle East are tied to its moves elsewhere, as well as its military posture toward the US—all intended to restore Russia’s great power status (Tashev)
• The US should not explicitly include talk of human rights and democracy in its policy discussions with Russia, as the latter views these goals as destabilizing (Tashev)
• Minimize the emphasis on the use of force to achieve US goals in the Middle East as this prompts Russia to engage in asymmetrical response (Tashev)

Contributing Authors

Bogdan Belei (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aurel Braun (University of Toronto & Harvard University), Jeremy W. Lamoreaux (Brigham Young University – Idaho); Kimberly Marten (Barnard College, Columbia University), Spencer B. Meredith III (National Defense University), Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), Blago Tashev (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps University)

US-DiGIA: Overview and Methodology of US Discoverable Government Information Assets Directory.

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The United States Government possesses a vast store of information assets that can be leveraged to inform a variety of problem sets, and can be used by a wide range of governmental actors in the formation and execution of whole-of-government strategies. To enable this goal, however, these assets first must be made accessible in a single source that catalogues the information that is held.

What is US-DiGIA?

The US “Discoverable Government Information Assets” Directory (US-DiGIA for short) resource catalogues the discoverable information assets (practical information, data, analysis, and subject matter expertise) relevant to national security and foreign policy held by the USG in a simple, easy- to-use searchable directory.

The US-DiGIA Directory is focused on “discoverable” information assets—that is, those information assets that are both open source (unclassified) and made available and/or identified as information assets held by the organizations that the NSI team examined. By focusing on which information assets are “discoverable,” this mapping does not claim to represent the true distribution of information assets across the whole-of-government, but instead captures what can be observed and obtained through unclassified channels—and thus potentially accessed via an interagency process.

US-DiGIA compiles and categorizes the information assets of 236 offices across 221 combined US government departments, agencies, and corporations (referred to collectively as “USG organizations”). US-DiGIA catalogues 1,305 unique information topics culled from these combined sources, and accounts for 1,980 total information topics (as some offices work on overlapping issues).

To create the US-DiGIA Directory, the NSI team developed a methodological process (detailed below in the section entitled, “US-DiGIA Mapping Methodology Process”) for taking the unstructured data culled from USG organization websites examined and translating them into information assets. The NSI team created an extended record2 of data sources, including mission statements, links to documents and tools, related web pages, and contact information. On the foundation of this rich source of information, the NSI team in turn developed the US-DiGIA Directory.

US-DiGIA: Mapping the USG Discoverable Information Terrain.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B., Polansky (Pagano), S., & Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The United States currently faces a complex and dynamic security environment. States are no longer the only critical actors in the international arena; rather, a diverse range of non-state entities also has the potential to affect US interests and security—for good or bad. Economic influence, information control and propaganda, political influence, and social discontent can be and are being utilized by state and non-state actors alike to achieve their goals, in many cases bypassing the need for direct military action. In response, the US military is challenged to accomplish more, across a greater variety of domains, while facing a constrained budget environment. There are two central implications of this: first, many of the most intractable security problems the US faces require a whole of government approach. Second, in a complex and evolving international environment characterized by new and often ambiguous threats, information itself is a critical asset.

If USSOCOM and others were able to leverage these existing extant sources of information, data and expertise (i.e. information assets) held by the USG, the cost and time savings from avoiding duplication of effort would be potentially immense. In an effort to enable this, the NSI team “mapped” the USG information terrain, cataloguing all discoverable (unclassified, published, and referenced or held online) information assets relevant to national security and foreign policy held across the non-DoD and non-ODNI USG organizations.

This effort resulted in the Directory of Discoverable US Government Information Assets (US-DiGIA), which provides a tool that enables users to search for and locate open source USG information assets, and possible points of contact for interagency collaboration. The structure of the US-DiGIA is shown in Figure 1 below.

Key Findings

The US-DiGIA Directory can also be analyzed to provide an overview of the USG discoverable information terrain. This report presents some of the key findings of our analysis of the directory. Part 2 focuses on the subset of information assets relevant to gray zone challenges. It also demonstrates how tailored coding for specific issues or security concerns can increase the utility of the US-DiGIA directory for users with specific information needs.

We organized our analysis in each part around the three foundational whole-of-government questions that guided the structure of the directory itself.

1. What national security and foreign policy related information does the USG currently collect and hold?
2. Who (which organizations) collects and holds that information?
3. Where geographically are our information assets focused?

Part 1: US-DiGIA Directory as a whole

What National Security and Foreign Policy Related Information Does the USG Hold?

• Three DIMEFILplus categories—economic, diplomatic and governing each account for approximately 15% of the total discoverable information assets.
• Trade and security are the focuses of the majority of discoverable information assets.
• When it comes to economic aspects of national security and foreign policy, the information assets identified are US-centric and focused on trade.
• When accounting for economically focused diplomatic information assets, economic-focused information assets account for 21% of all US-DiGIA assets, whereas those focused on security account for 14%.
• While more organizations hold cyber related information than economic information, only three have a clear international focus to their cyber efforts.
• Coverage of social information assets accounts for less than 10% of all discoverable information assets. Only a minority of this focuses on topics that can be directly linked to political stability.

Who Collects and Holds that Information?

• The State Department has both the greatest quantity (501 information assets) and diversity (387 topics) of information relevant to national security and foreign policy.
• Many organizations outside the intelligence community (IC), or the group of organizations that frequently coordinate with the DoD1, were found to have information potentially relevant to national security and foreign policy.
• Although the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, Interior, and Energy all hold fewer overall assets than other organizations, they cover a broader range of topics.
• The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has a, perhaps surprising, number of relevant information assets (99), and many of these assets relate to disease detection and tracking or emergency response.

Where Geographically is that Information Focused?

• Internationally focused discoverable information assets were more numerous than were US focused.
• Identifying which information assets cover specific CCMD AORs is in many cases not possible from the published descriptions. This creates inefficiencies when searching for country or region specific information, and it makes it harder to identify countries or regions where gray zone relevant information is lacking.

Implications

Information

Lack of information leaves us functionally blind to potential opportunities to further US interests or mitigate threats to those interests. Without reliable information, it is more likely that we may incorrectly classify an action as gray and increase the risk of either unintended escalation (by assuming an action is gray when it is not) or missing threats to our interests (by assessing an action as not gray when it is in fact gray).

The ability to identify and locate information assets across a broad range of USG organizations could reduce the need for SOCOM and others to undertake their own information collection efforts. This in turn increases the efficiency of information collection and reduces cost in both time and resources.

The current scarcity of information related to potential gray actions places the US at a disadvantage when it comes to developing indicators and warnings. These gaps highlight areas where SOCOM and others could focus their own information collection efforts to maximize efficiency and impact for analysts and planners.

Whole of Government

Appreciation of the complexity of the evolving security environment has prompted calls for a whole of government approach to national security challenges. Information exchange is a logical first step in increasing awareness of common interests and information assets across the USG, and the US- DiGIA Directory can contribute to that process.

The types of discoverable information an office with an organization holds also provide an indication of the interests and expertise within that office and thus a guide to the identification of possible points for interagency cooperation. Interagency collaboration enables the practitioners who best understand specific instruments of power to be involved in their application to specific national security (including gray zone) challenges.

Similarly, bringing diverse areas of expertise and authorities together can reduce institutional bias, and reveal underlying assumptions. This can create the potential for developing a broader and more adaptive set of strategies for responding to gray zone and other national security threats and avoiding unintended consequences.

Question (R4.10): Is the current U.S. approach to supporting Afghanistan beneficial? Or does it promote a cycle of dependency and counter-productive activities in the region? What strategic and local factors would need to be considered, managed and accepted in any significant change in military and/or other support?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Asked about any constructive aspects of the current US approach in Afghanistan the experts who contributed to this Reach-back report, to a one responded with lengthy, well-considered but scathing reviews of the past fifteen years of US/NATO policy and operations in Afghanistan. The majority of the experts — who include practitioners and political scientists, historians and hydrologists with years of on-the- ground experience with Afghanistan — felt there is nothing to commend current US policy toward Afghanistan. The others did not address the question.

In fact, most experts took the tack that the current US approach to Afghanistan (which they date to the “mission creep” that began in 2001) is itself the source of the insecurity, instability and Taliban resurgence happening now in Afghanistan.

The US Approach in Afghanistan

The central themes of the experts’ arguments can be summarized in two main points:

#1: State-building efforts detract from the real US interest in Afghanistan: security

Professor Shalini Venturelli (AU) argues that US activities in Afghanistan have drifted away from what is the true national interest in Afghanistan (security) to focusing on governance and state-building. Along with Spencer Meredith (NDU) she argues that the US must refine the focus of its approach to jettison objectives such as state-building and democratization that have distracted the US from issues that we have the relevant power to impact. Venturelli sees no value to US security from getting involved in the highly culturally- dependent issue of how a nation governs itself.

Instead: Venturelli argues in favor of a major reconceptualization of US policy in Afghanistan that focuses strongly on what is truly the core (and only reasonable) US mission there: US security. She suggests “three concrete components” of a reconceived US mission: 1) preventing and deterring terror group gains in Afghanistan by “expanding counter-terrorism operations in the AF-PAL region;” 2) preventing Afghanistan from becoming a major terror safe haven; and 3) building the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) guided by a more sophisticated and culturally relevant training model that taps into the “indigenous fighting tradition” – (what Dr. Shireen Khan Burki refers to as Afghanistan’s “xenophobic warrior” population.) She cautions that continuing with the current approach of incrementally changing the US approach around the margins as circumstances dictate has already had “devastating consequences” and could be worse than withdrawing US military support altogether.

#2: There is insufficient socio-cultural foundation and local trust to support construction of centralized democracy in Afghanistan: These efforts were doomed to fail from the start

The experts who commented on the political or state-building aspects of the US approach did not mince words, referring to it as: “impractical and expensive,” the result of “overconfidence bordering on insanity” and “hopelessly corrupted and detrimental.” Spencer Meredith (NDU) believes that the US approach is based on the faulty assumption that localized/decentralized governance is at odds with a legitimate and capable national government. Others are highly critical of efforts to construct a Western-style centralized political system in Afghanistan with a very feeble foundation in Afghan political history, social organization or culture. It was doomed from the start. Shalini Venturelli (AU) reckons that “not all the wealth and expertise of the US and its NATO allies” would be sufficient to build a sustainable democratic state in Afghanistan because it would be out of line with the social, cultural and political traditions and expectations of the majority of the Afghan population.

Instead: The contributors who commented on this point agreed that rather than Western expectations of good governance and social and political stability, if the US chooses to remain involved in state-building in Afghanistan, its efforts must refocus on the expectations of the Afghan people. Venturelli points out that Afghan society already contains “highly evolved, complex and variable systems of social order that fall outside the capabilities of Western administrative science.” Specifically, Spencer Meredith (NDU) recommends that the US should patiently pursue a bottom-up, culturally and historically grounded approach to political development. Despite the fact he says that analysts in DC and certainly political elites in the central government in Kabul for obvious reasons do not like this option, it is the only one with a reasonable chance of producing a broadly accepted and legitimate government.

Does the US approach promote a cycle of dependency and counter-productive activities?

The majority opinion among the expert contributors to the Reach-back report is that the current US approach in Afghanistan does promote dependency and is counter-productive. Vern Liebl (CAOCL) among others questions why anyone would be surprised by the negative consequences of pouring billions of dollars of donor money into a devastatingly impoverished country. This aid has fueled elite corruption at the expense of the poorest Afghans which has in turn soured public opinion even more on the US-imposed central government and likely aided the resurgence of the popular acceptance of the Taliban. Benjamin Hopkins (GWU) sees the question of Afghan dependency itself is insulting to Afghans arguing that it is the West’s pursuit of “unrealistic policies” in Afghanistan not some Afghani flaw that has generated deleterious cycles. In addition to fueling government corruption for example, US policy has strapped the Kabul Government with unsustainable government institutions including a security force that “is well beyond the ability of the country to sustain. That said, “anti-corruption” measures are not the solution here. Shalini Venturelli cautions that Westerners/outsiders can easily misunderstand local norms of human networking and in correctly label some social-required activities as corruption. Rather than dismissing social influence networks outright, Venturelli recommends leveraging this existing system of relationships to advance security interests in Afghanistan.

What strategic factors should guide changes in US military or other support?

The authors are clear on this point: we cannot assess our strategic approach without a strategic vision. Reflecting the perspectives of her fellow contributors, Shireen Khan Burki asks the essential question: “What exactly is the strategic mission of the US vis-à-vis Afghanistan?” There is consensus among the experts who feel that the US approach has lacked a clear articulation of US goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Many are skeptical that there is a coherent strategic vision or set of mission objectives that would align with all the foreign activities and aid in Afghanistan. At the very least if they have been articulated, they have not been stated clearly in public. The experts pose a number of other questions that might serve as guides to review US policy in Afghanistan:

• “What are American goals in the country and how do they relate to US national interests?”
• “Who is the enemy?” There is a line of reasoning among the contributors that common responses to this question, for example, counter-terrorism, denying terror groups safe havens, ring hollow. First, there are many other places around the world including Pakistan that violent political networks can easily establish a presence, and secondly our own presence in Afghanistan has in fact exacerbated not minimized the ability of terror networks to recruit and operate in the country.
• “What if any interest [does] the US [have] in a stable vs. democratic Afghanistan?” In other words, what are US priorities regarding an acceptable political outcome if not all aspects can be achieved.
• Is it the mission of the US to fundamentally change Afghanistan?

Contributing Authors

Dr. Shireen Khan Burki (unaffiliated); Dr. Benjamin D. Hopkins (George Washington University); Dr. Shalini Venturelli (American University); Mr. Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, CAOCL); Dr. Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS); Dr. Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies, LLC); Dr. Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs), Dr. Spencer Meredith (National Defense University)