NSI Publications

Author: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question of Focus

[Q1] Does deterrence theory change if the US faces two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors? If so, how? What are the impacts to strategy? If not, what impacts to strategy still exist in that scenario? What are the implications for US strategic defense, escalation control options, and the deterrent value of the nuclear triad? In a game theoretic approach, how can the three-body problem be applied to this scenario?

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This NSI Reachback report is part of an effort requested by USSTRATCOM to the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Office, Joint Staff (J39). The essence of the question is how to develop an approach for assessing and developing strategy in the current environment. As in all analytic endeavors, the critical first step is diagnosing the problem. Because theory and research on the strategy and policy implications of facing two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors is very thin, this report offers an initial framework for distinguishing types of deterrence. The intention is not to provide “the” answer but to incite serious discussion and theorizing.

By way of introduction, the first section touches briefly on three variations of deterrence theory to make the case that there is not just one. Section two focuses on problem framing. It discusses the impact on deterrence theory of broadening the (often hidden) bipolar, single adversary assumptions when it comes to deterrence strategy and analysis. It offers a network theory-based framework for differentiating deterrence settings involving two or more peer competitors. This is a particularly crucial exercise for strategists and planners because deterrence objectives and activities change along with the characteristics of the deterrence setting.

Section three lists a number of implications for deterrence strategy highlighted by subject matter expert (SME) interviewees. These are items that teams tasked with upcoming defense reviews should consider carefully. Because theory and empirical scholarship on deterrence of two or more peer competitors is still emerging, the list presents an important set of topics for further study and even the basis for a Three-Peer research agenda. Finally, an appendix contains some comments on value and limitations of game theory for assessing the current international environment and suggestions on other ways to assess three peer deterrence problems.

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Author: Bragg, B. (NSI)

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In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries. This report addresses two of those questions:

[Q2] What are US competitors (Russia, China, Iran, DPRK) doing to shape the operational environment for future conflict?

[Q4] What are the biggest perceived threat to, and opportunity for, the interests of these US nuclear competitors? And what are the internal and external factors currently constraining them from acting on these?

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.

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Authors: Dr. Belina Bragg (NSI, Inc.); Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College)

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Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This report presents a model for understanding the core communication process, and elaborates on mechanisms to strengthen it. We begin with an overview of the core communication process itself then discuss where and how factors internal and external to the communication process can influence the effectiveness of message transmission and interpretation. As the theoretical foundations of the model are covered in a companion IIJO Quick Look, “The Development of Communication Models,” in this report, we have kept the theoretical section to brief definitions of the key terms.

Volume II in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.),
Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI, Inc.)

Contributing Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Mr. Alex Campbell (LLNL), Dr. Zachary S. Davis (LLNL), Mr. Abraham M. Denmark (The Wilson Center), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Dr. Scott W. Harold (RAND Corporation), Mr. Mark Hoffman (Lockheed Martin), Mr. David Kirkpatrick (LLNL), Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Maj, USAFR) (USINDOPACOM; Stanford University; AEI), Mr. Marshall Monroe (Marshall Monroe Magic; National Center for Soft Power Strategies), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jack Shanahan (USAF, Retired), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), Dr. Yi E. Yang (James Madison University)

SMA Perspectives Publication Preview

It is not an exaggeration to state that China is and will remain a significant challenge to the US on all aspects of national power for the foreseeable future. This situation has been in the making for quite some time. This SMA Perspectives paper will not delve into the historical roots of why the US got to where it is, however. Nor will it dwell on the purely military aspects of the conflict. These are important considerations that are amply discussed elsewhere in numerous scholarly publications. This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.” It is also a follow-on to a previously published paper, entitled “Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition.” The focus of the previous paper was on the conditions that encourage actors to act in ways that promote cooperation and avoid escalation to conflict. It offered a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both. In the current SMA Perspectives paper, we apply this paradigm and the general insights from the previous paper to the US-China relationship specifically.

In the context of this SMA perspectives paper, “constructive competition” is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issue to be in some degree of non-threatening, non-damaging opposition.” It is “tolerable and productive,” and it is “the ideal mode in a dynamic global system, as it stimulates innovation and movement” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). It assumes that the main actors can cooperate on common interests. It requires agreed upon norms or boundaries of accepted behavior and assumes that there is some degree of agreement between them. In this context, mutualism implies that both sides see the potential for gains.

“Destructive competition,” on the other hand,is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issueto be in opposition and potentially damaging to their respective interests. Tactics consistent with destructive competition can range in severity from international rules violations (e.g., stealing intellectual property) to actions seen as sufficiently harmful to necessitate shows of armed force to signal or demonstrate willingness to escalate. Thus, it is possible for two actors to be in a state of constructive competition on some issues and in a state of destructive competition on others” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). In this context, the animosity between the actors is such that they are willing to undermine themselves to take the other down. It is also possible for destructive competition to interfere with constructive competition. This occurs when two actors’ interests do not align. In this context, it is assumed that the US and China will use all forms of competition to include selective use of direct confrontation and/or conflict when a state’s vital interests are at risk or perceived to be at risk.

Maintaining balance among competing interests in international security affairs is both a leadership and a management issue. Major leadership and management objectives include satisfying specific security objectives, while simultaneously 1) avoiding escalation (to the right) on the cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, 2) looking for opportunities to cooperate and compete constructively with long-time partners and competitors alike, and 3) retaining escalation control in the case of destructive competition and conflict. The ideal states are cooperation and constructive competition, given that US security objectives are met. Thus, the US objective would not necessarily be to “gain advantage,” particularly where cooperation better serves overall US interests. “Gaining advantage” implies asymmetry, which in and of itself is the foundation of destabilizing escalatory security spirals. Rather, the US objective would be to defend against disadvantage and seek to “create dilemmas for the adversary,” if these dilemmas would lead to cooperation or de-escalation, but not if the dilemmas would lead to destabilizing choice options. Key to all this is a viable risk management strategy.

There are wide differences in perception between the US and China (and other authoritarian governments) in terms of what is “acceptable” behavior in competition below armed conflict. Examples from China include forced technology transfer, economic and military espionage to fuel China’s military advantage (i.e., military-civilian fusion), influence operations, offensive cyber operations, biological attacks, and the use of non-traditional intelligence collectors. Some of these aspects are examined in this SMA Perspectives paper.

The US perspective of this competition with China is discussed by Lt Gen (Ret) Jack Shanahan, who proposes exchanging a single-note (specifically, containment) strategy for a five “C-note” scale—cooperate, compete, contest, confront, and conflict—to enable the US to tune its policy response to specific issues, approaching each on its merits and allowing progress to be made (or not be made) independently.

China’s perspective of US-China competition is discussed by four respective contributors:

• Dr. Michael D. Swaine argues that China is well aware that the US possesses huge advantages, both internal and through its allies and partners, that make conflict a risky strategy of dubious benefit.
• Dr. Scott W. Harold notes that the Chinese Communist Party has consistently framed the US as a threat to China’s interests and security, and this has enabled them at various times to promote a narrative that places the responsibility for regional tension and instability with “anti-China forces” within the US.
• Mr. Abraham M. Denmark notes that for China’s leadership, competition with the US is not an end in itself, but rather a necessary part of their effort to build an international system in which the CCP can achieve its own interests and objectives.
• Dr. Yi Edward Yang argues that China’s policies are both issue- and domain-dependent and, drawing on a broad literature, presents three models to explain various aspects of China’s behavior: the Social Identity Model, the Opportunistic Multilateralism Model, and the Centrality-Heterogeneity Model.

Other aspects of the US-China rivalry are addressed by several authors throughout the course of the paper:

• Dr. Zachary S. Davis and Mr. Marshall Monroe highlight the scope and purpose of the movie and media aspects of the CCP’s soft power crusade and propose several options for countering it.
• Mr. Alex Campbell and Mr. David Kirkpatrick advocate a regional cyber pact in the Indo-Pacific that suits the nature of cyber competition and builds on a unique American asset.
• Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro states that the US must avoid relying on Cold War tools and strategies of competition. Instead, the US needs to demonstrate to its allies and partners that it can protect them not only from military attacks but against other costly behaviors that Beijing may enact against them, such as economic coercion or diplomatic isolation.
• Mr. Mark Hoffman argues that the nature of peer competition is in essence that of a complex adaptive system, and as such, insights and approaches from complexity management might be leveraged to help compensate for some of the asymmetric disadvantages endemic to the current adversarial peer competition.

Finally, in the closing chapter, Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois attempts to bring all of the contributors’ insights together to provide a deeper understanding of the complexities of competition between the US and China.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Watch the virtual discussion with the authors here.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Skylar Stokes (NSI, Inc.); Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Paul Astorino (Senior Vice President, Global Merchandizing, Clarks), Catherine Chapman (Founder and CEO, Parenthetic), Cyndi Coon (CEO and Founder, Labratory5 Inc.), John DeBello (President and Chief Creative Officer, Loma Media), Bill Heater (Creative Executive, Real Life Creative), Dr. William McEwen (Advertising Executive and Consultant, Independent), Dr. Jay Rosen (Author and Associate Professor of Journalism, NYU), Shari Rosenfeld (Senior Vice President of International Social Impact, Sesame Workshop), Dr. Don Stacks (Professor Emeritus, Public Relations, School of Communication, University of Miami; CEO, International Public Relations Research Conference), Al Teller (Music Industry Executive, Independent), Sherrie Westin (President, Sesame Workshop), Two Anonymous Gaming Industry Executives.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What are relevant insights from the private sector with respect to using messaging and communication to influence and inform different audiences?

Summary Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This ViTTa® summary report reflects on the insightful commentary from interviews with thirteen messaging and communications experts from the private sector. The backgrounds of the expert contributors interviewed as part of this ViTTa® elicitation include advertising, branding, marketing, public relations, storytelling, and journalism. For this ViTTa® report, the expert contributors offer insights from their experiences in using messaging and communication in the private sector to influence and inform different audiences. This summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights heard over the course of interviews with the experts.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

US versus China: Promoting “Constructive Competition” to Avoid “Destructive Competition”

NOTE: This event has passed.

Tuesday, November 16^th 2021 1300–1500 (EST)

Please join SMA for its second SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion: a two-hour companion event to our recently released SMA Perspectives volume, US versus China: Promoting “Constructive Competition” to Avoid “Destructive Competition.” The discussion will feature a panel discussion among several of the paper’s contributors, drawing out key insights from, and connections between, the chapters.

Please find our event agenda below.

No registration required. Virtual capacity is capped at 350.

The link to join the event along with other event updates will be sent via email. To get on the mailing list to receive notifications (and all other questions), please email Mariah Yager at mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil or Nicole Omundson at nomundson@nsiteam.com by Friday, November 12^th 2021.

Event Agenda

Welcome and Introductory Remarks | 1300–1310 (EST)

Mr. Todd Veazie, Director, Strategic Multilayer Assessment

Dr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Panel Discussion | 1310–1455 (EST)

Moderator: Lt Gen (Ret) Timothy G. Fay, Director of Staff, Headquarters, US Air Force, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia

Panelists: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, George Mason University; Dr. Scott W. Harold, RAND; Mr. Mark Hoffman, Lockheed Martin; Mr. David Kirkpatrick, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Dr. Michael D. Swaine, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Our speakers’ biographies can be found below.

Authors: Sabrina (Pagano) Polansky (NSI, Inc.); and Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is generally thought to be an important one (Miller, 2020; Sharp, 2019; Wisner & Salem, 2017). However, some experts suggest that the benefits obtained by the United States for its assistance to Egypt may be overstated (Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020). Some members of Congress are similarly critical of this relationship (Barfi, 2020; Salem, 2020). Despite these criticisms, the expert contributors generally believe that the relationship will not undergo any fundamental shifts in the near-term (Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). Several experts note that this question has in part been “stress tested” in the past—with Egypt undergoing several notable events (e.g., protest, a bloody crackdown, Islamist control, military coup) during the 2011-2014 period—with only a temporary suspension of United States assistance to Egypt implemented as a result (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). The continuity and durability of US policy toward Egypt highlights the strategic significance of the relationship and suggests that the tipping point threshold for a severe United States policy response to Egyptian events is high (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Miller, 2020).

The experts nevertheless cite a variety of events that could, in theory, prompt a strong response from the United States, characterized by major policy shifts and mil-mil restrictions. These can be classified into seven broad categories, with the first two being the most likely: a) deepening ties between Egypt and Russia, b) violent crackdowns by the Egyptian state, c) coups of a different kind than those seen in the recent past (e.g., coup by junior military officers), d) Egyptian misuse of American weapons, e) an Egyptian violation of its peace treaty with Israel, f) events that bring into question whether Egypt is a friendly and reliable partner, and g) events that fundamentally violate the nature of the US-Egyptian relationship. In deciphering how the United States is likely to respond to these events, it is also important to consider the role that administration preferences and priorities play (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020).

From an Egyptian strategic perspective, it would be unwise to react punitively to a shift in United States policy by degrading or denying current access, basing, and overflight (ABO) agreements or otherwise endanger its military relationship with the United States. However, several expert contributors (C. Dunne, 2020; M. Dunne, 2020; Miller, 2020) indicate that a drastic reduction or permanent termination by the United States of its provision of aid to Egypt may lead the Egyptians to violate the ABO agreements or pursue an alternative foreign partner, such as Russia, China, or one of the Gulf states, for military assistance. Precipitating factors are likely to include a number of internal pressures including an ongoing financial crisis and competition for resources and influence among the myriad Syrian government and externally- funded security services operating in Syria.

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Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line Up Front

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist. Until a diplomatic resolution is achieved, the dispute raises the risk of militarization, however unlikely such escalation may be. The rift may be resolved if Qatar ceases soft power projection that aggravates the governing legitimacy of the Quartet, or if the Quartet relents on its distrust of Qatar and elevates Doha to a more independent status. The most likely avenues of conflict appear to be unintentional confrontation, overt Qatari support for oppositionists that can credibly threaten the Quartet’s domestic legitimacy, and proxy conflict (in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). Restored diplomatic dialogue between Qatar and the Quartet could enable cooperation to overcome such scenarios. However, it is difficult to predict if such dialogue could be achieved in the present climate if one of the aforementioned avenues occurs. Moreover, precipitous escalation remains a possibility given Qatar’s external supporters (Iran, Turkey, Russia). In the unlikely event of militarization, Russia would likely act opportunistically to increase its regional influence where possible, the US would likely work aggressively to preserve Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unity while working to combat Iran, and China would likely lack significant mechanisms of influence but would nonetheless support immediate mediation to prevent any resulting economic instability.

Author | Editors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Much is made of Black Swans by financiers, pundits, and national security experts (Bellomo, Herrero, & Tosin, 2013; Hunt, 2008). It is easy for such provocative and frightening concepts to become the flavor of the day without thinking through if they matter and, if they do, why. Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla summed up the reason why we should be concerned with Black Swans: they matter because the aim of science in the service of national security is to achieve strategic excellence and not merely react to crises surprised and flatfooted. Further, strategic excellence will not be achieved without applying advanced scientific methods to understand problems like Black Swan surprises. LTC Thomas Pike stressed that warfighters must possess the technical skills to use these methods in order to achieve strategic success. This report integrates various SMA Black Swan research efforts as examples of the kinds of information, data, modeling, and thinking required to achieve strategic success in the USCENTCOM AOR. Examples of surprises that can be avoided and how to monitor them are given, and a range of potential Black Swans that could happen but cannot be predicted are reviewed. Each of the SMA Black Swan efforts also provide USCENTCOM with guidelines for thinking through Black Swan scenarios and recommendations as to what can be monitored and predicted, and these are highlighted at the conclusion of this report.

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Author | Editors: Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Russian and Chinese Interests and Goals Within the USCENTCOM AOR

• Competition for regional influence between the US and Russia and China is inevitable.
• Neither Russia nor China are likely to resort to conflict to achieve regional dominance, even in Central Asia. China’s overwhelming economic advantage means Russia does not pose an existential threat, and Russia knows it is unlikely to “win” in any direct competition with China.
• Reducing US influence is seen by both Russia and China as a more effective strategy for furthering their own interests than competing with each other.
• There are regional (geopolitical) variations within USCENTCOM AOR countries that are reflected in Russia and China’s activities in, and relative leverage over, specific states.
• Globally, MENA is the region where China’s interests place it under the most direct pressure to intervene in security matters.
• MENA tends to be the focus of USG policies and resource expenditure, but Central Asia is critical to the economic and power projection goals of both Russia and China.

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