NSI Publications

Volume I in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Ms. Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Dr. Ralph Clem (Florida International University), Mr. John Collison (USSOCOM, J59), Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Lt Col Christopher D. Forrest (USAF), LTG(R) Karen H. Gibson, Dr. Erik Herron (West Virginia University), Mr. Daniel R. Lane (USSOCOM, J59), Dr. James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), Dr. Dalton Lin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Lt Col David Lyle (LeMay Center for Doctrine and Education, Air University), Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND), Dr. David W. Montgomery (University of Maryland), LTG(R) Michael K. Nagata (CACI International), Dr. Lawrence Rubin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Dr. Adam B. Seligman (Boston University), Dr. Adam N. Stulberg (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)

Forwards: ADM Charles A. Richard (USSTRATCOM), GEN Richard D. Clarke (USSOCOM)

SMA Perspectives Paper Preview

The future operating environment will present US military leaders and planners with both familiar and unfamiliar problem sets that will test the DoD and partner nations’ ability to maintain strategic stability. These future challenges are anticipated to be significantly different from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are contested norms and persistent disorder. It is expected that adversaries will continue to pursue their national objectives by creatively combining conventional and non-conventional methods to operate below a threshold that they believe would invoke a direct military or other damaging response from the United States or its allies.

This white paper advances the concept of taking action to establish and maintain strategic stability in periods that vary between competition and cooperation. The objective is to create conditions that encourage an adversary to conduct activities that promote cooperation and avoid escalation towards conflict by offering a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both.

Topics addressed include:

• The binary, either-peace-or-war, conception of the operating environment is obsolete, and military power alone is insufficient to achieve sustainable political objectives in the current environment. This necessitates the need for new strategies and a better understanding of what “strategic stability” looks like today, as these differ substantially from past practices.
• This new context includes a decline in popular trust in governments and formal institutions, as well as increased polarization within Western societies that are exasperated by malign influence campaigns and other so-called gray zone actions.
• There are contending elements within respective conceptions of strategic stability applied across various domains for the US, Russia, and China. The concept of strategic stability is increasingly challenged as different countries embrace their own different concepts of strategic stability. Trust and influence are overarching concepts in the context of strategic stability, and trust building is a key challenge.
• If great power competition (GPC) is a contest for “advantage, leverage, and influence,” and influence is a contest for the affinity of relevant actors and populations, great power competition (GPC) is about winning the affinities of people. Power is shifting to populations, and autocratic regimes that have grown increasingly brittle are the threats. China is a “Titanic,” and its population, and those that it negatively impacts around the planet, are icebergs.
• New opportunities and challenges are presented from emerging technologies.
• Predatory economic and business practices, legal actions, public opinion manipulation, and other subversive actions are all means that an adversary might employ to support its competition strategies.

Bottom line: There is a clear need for a “new” security concept that is a blend of legacy deterrence thinking, expanded thoughts on escalation management, and the concept of managing activities along a cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, with the purpose of maintaining strategic stability while promoting US national objectives. To do this requires discussions focused on understanding how the US and its partners should implement recent research about actor behaviors during periods of competition.

SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion – 24 & 25 Aug 2021

Watch presentations by the authors in this companion two-day event, held virtually on 24 & 25 August 2021.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Author: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question of Focus

[Q1] Does deterrence theory change if the US faces two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors? If so, how? What are the impacts to strategy? If not, what impacts to strategy still exist in that scenario? What are the implications for US strategic defense, escalation control options, and the deterrent value of the nuclear triad? In a game theoretic approach, how can the three-body problem be applied to this scenario?

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This NSI Reachback report is part of an effort requested by USSTRATCOM to the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Office, Joint Staff (J39). The essence of the question is how to develop an approach for assessing and developing strategy in the current environment. As in all analytic endeavors, the critical first step is diagnosing the problem. Because theory and research on the strategy and policy implications of facing two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors is very thin, this report offers an initial framework for distinguishing types of deterrence. The intention is not to provide “the” answer but to incite serious discussion and theorizing.

By way of introduction, the first section touches briefly on three variations of deterrence theory to make the case that there is not just one. Section two focuses on problem framing. It discusses the impact on deterrence theory of broadening the (often hidden) bipolar, single adversary assumptions when it comes to deterrence strategy and analysis. It offers a network theory-based framework for differentiating deterrence settings involving two or more peer competitors. This is a particularly crucial exercise for strategists and planners because deterrence objectives and activities change along with the characteristics of the deterrence setting.

Section three lists a number of implications for deterrence strategy highlighted by subject matter expert (SME) interviewees. These are items that teams tasked with upcoming defense reviews should consider carefully. Because theory and empirical scholarship on deterrence of two or more peer competitors is still emerging, the list presents an important set of topics for further study and even the basis for a Three-Peer research agenda. Finally, an appendix contains some comments on value and limitations of game theory for assessing the current international environment and suggestions on other ways to assess three peer deterrence problems.

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Author: Bragg, B. (NSI)

Video Preview

In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries. This report addresses two of those questions:

[Q2] What are US competitors (Russia, China, Iran, DPRK) doing to shape the operational environment for future conflict?

[Q4] What are the biggest perceived threat to, and opportunity for, the interests of these US nuclear competitors? And what are the internal and external factors currently constraining them from acting on these?

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.

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Authors: Dr. Belina Bragg (NSI, Inc.); Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College)

Quick Look Preview

Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This report presents a model for understanding the core communication process, and elaborates on mechanisms to strengthen it. We begin with an overview of the core communication process itself then discuss where and how factors internal and external to the communication process can influence the effectiveness of message transmission and interpretation. As the theoretical foundations of the model are covered in a companion IIJO Quick Look, “The Development of Communication Models,” in this report, we have kept the theoretical section to brief definitions of the key terms.

Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Skylar Stokes (NSI, Inc.); Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Paul Astorino (Senior Vice President, Global Merchandizing, Clarks), Catherine Chapman (Founder and CEO, Parenthetic), Cyndi Coon (CEO and Founder, Labratory5 Inc.), John DeBello (President and Chief Creative Officer, Loma Media), Bill Heater (Creative Executive, Real Life Creative), Dr. William McEwen (Advertising Executive and Consultant, Independent), Dr. Jay Rosen (Author and Associate Professor of Journalism, NYU), Shari Rosenfeld (Senior Vice President of International Social Impact, Sesame Workshop), Dr. Don Stacks (Professor Emeritus, Public Relations, School of Communication, University of Miami; CEO, International Public Relations Research Conference), Al Teller (Music Industry Executive, Independent), Sherrie Westin (President, Sesame Workshop), Two Anonymous Gaming Industry Executives.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What are relevant insights from the private sector with respect to using messaging and communication to influence and inform different audiences?

Summary Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This ViTTa® summary report reflects on the insightful commentary from interviews with thirteen messaging and communications experts from the private sector. The backgrounds of the expert contributors interviewed as part of this ViTTa® elicitation include advertising, branding, marketing, public relations, storytelling, and journalism. For this ViTTa® report, the expert contributors offer insights from their experiences in using messaging and communication in the private sector to influence and inform different audiences. This summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights heard over the course of interviews with the experts.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

US versus China: Promoting “Constructive Competition” to Avoid “Destructive Competition”

NOTE: This event has passed.

Tuesday, November 16^th 2021 1300–1500 (EST)

Please join SMA for its second SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion: a two-hour companion event to our recently released SMA Perspectives volume, US versus China: Promoting “Constructive Competition” to Avoid “Destructive Competition.” The discussion will feature a panel discussion among several of the paper’s contributors, drawing out key insights from, and connections between, the chapters.

Please find our event agenda below.

No registration required. Virtual capacity is capped at 350.

The link to join the event along with other event updates will be sent via email. To get on the mailing list to receive notifications (and all other questions), please email Mariah Yager at mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil or Nicole Omundson at nomundson@nsiteam.com by Friday, November 12^th 2021.

Event Agenda

Welcome and Introductory Remarks | 1300–1310 (EST)

Mr. Todd Veazie, Director, Strategic Multilayer Assessment

Dr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Panel Discussion | 1310–1455 (EST)

Moderator: Lt Gen (Ret) Timothy G. Fay, Director of Staff, Headquarters, US Air Force, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia

Panelists: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, George Mason University; Dr. Scott W. Harold, RAND; Mr. Mark Hoffman, Lockheed Martin; Mr. David Kirkpatrick, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Dr. Michael D. Swaine, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Our speakers’ biographies can be found below.

Authors: Sabrina (Pagano) Polansky (NSI, Inc.); and Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is generally thought to be an important one (Miller, 2020; Sharp, 2019; Wisner & Salem, 2017). However, some experts suggest that the benefits obtained by the United States for its assistance to Egypt may be overstated (Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020). Some members of Congress are similarly critical of this relationship (Barfi, 2020; Salem, 2020). Despite these criticisms, the expert contributors generally believe that the relationship will not undergo any fundamental shifts in the near-term (Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). Several experts note that this question has in part been “stress tested” in the past—with Egypt undergoing several notable events (e.g., protest, a bloody crackdown, Islamist control, military coup) during the 2011-2014 period—with only a temporary suspension of United States assistance to Egypt implemented as a result (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). The continuity and durability of US policy toward Egypt highlights the strategic significance of the relationship and suggests that the tipping point threshold for a severe United States policy response to Egyptian events is high (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Miller, 2020).

The experts nevertheless cite a variety of events that could, in theory, prompt a strong response from the United States, characterized by major policy shifts and mil-mil restrictions. These can be classified into seven broad categories, with the first two being the most likely: a) deepening ties between Egypt and Russia, b) violent crackdowns by the Egyptian state, c) coups of a different kind than those seen in the recent past (e.g., coup by junior military officers), d) Egyptian misuse of American weapons, e) an Egyptian violation of its peace treaty with Israel, f) events that bring into question whether Egypt is a friendly and reliable partner, and g) events that fundamentally violate the nature of the US-Egyptian relationship. In deciphering how the United States is likely to respond to these events, it is also important to consider the role that administration preferences and priorities play (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020).

From an Egyptian strategic perspective, it would be unwise to react punitively to a shift in United States policy by degrading or denying current access, basing, and overflight (ABO) agreements or otherwise endanger its military relationship with the United States. However, several expert contributors (C. Dunne, 2020; M. Dunne, 2020; Miller, 2020) indicate that a drastic reduction or permanent termination by the United States of its provision of aid to Egypt may lead the Egyptians to violate the ABO agreements or pursue an alternative foreign partner, such as Russia, China, or one of the Gulf states, for military assistance. Precipitating factors are likely to include a number of internal pressures including an ongoing financial crisis and competition for resources and influence among the myriad Syrian government and externally- funded security services operating in Syria.

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Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line Up Front

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist. Until a diplomatic resolution is achieved, the dispute raises the risk of militarization, however unlikely such escalation may be. The rift may be resolved if Qatar ceases soft power projection that aggravates the governing legitimacy of the Quartet, or if the Quartet relents on its distrust of Qatar and elevates Doha to a more independent status. The most likely avenues of conflict appear to be unintentional confrontation, overt Qatari support for oppositionists that can credibly threaten the Quartet’s domestic legitimacy, and proxy conflict (in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). Restored diplomatic dialogue between Qatar and the Quartet could enable cooperation to overcome such scenarios. However, it is difficult to predict if such dialogue could be achieved in the present climate if one of the aforementioned avenues occurs. Moreover, precipitous escalation remains a possibility given Qatar’s external supporters (Iran, Turkey, Russia). In the unlikely event of militarization, Russia would likely act opportunistically to increase its regional influence where possible, the US would likely work aggressively to preserve Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unity while working to combat Iran, and China would likely lack significant mechanisms of influence but would nonetheless support immediate mediation to prevent any resulting economic instability.

Author | Editors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Much is made of Black Swans by financiers, pundits, and national security experts (Bellomo, Herrero, & Tosin, 2013; Hunt, 2008). It is easy for such provocative and frightening concepts to become the flavor of the day without thinking through if they matter and, if they do, why. Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla summed up the reason why we should be concerned with Black Swans: they matter because the aim of science in the service of national security is to achieve strategic excellence and not merely react to crises surprised and flatfooted. Further, strategic excellence will not be achieved without applying advanced scientific methods to understand problems like Black Swan surprises. LTC Thomas Pike stressed that warfighters must possess the technical skills to use these methods in order to achieve strategic success. This report integrates various SMA Black Swan research efforts as examples of the kinds of information, data, modeling, and thinking required to achieve strategic success in the USCENTCOM AOR. Examples of surprises that can be avoided and how to monitor them are given, and a range of potential Black Swans that could happen but cannot be predicted are reviewed. Each of the SMA Black Swan efforts also provide USCENTCOM with guidelines for thinking through Black Swan scenarios and recommendations as to what can be monitored and predicted, and these are highlighted at the conclusion of this report.

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Author | Editors: Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Russian and Chinese Interests and Goals Within the USCENTCOM AOR

• Competition for regional influence between the US and Russia and China is inevitable.
• Neither Russia nor China are likely to resort to conflict to achieve regional dominance, even in Central Asia. China’s overwhelming economic advantage means Russia does not pose an existential threat, and Russia knows it is unlikely to “win” in any direct competition with China.
• Reducing US influence is seen by both Russia and China as a more effective strategy for furthering their own interests than competing with each other.
• There are regional (geopolitical) variations within USCENTCOM AOR countries that are reflected in Russia and China’s activities in, and relative leverage over, specific states.
• Globally, MENA is the region where China’s interests place it under the most direct pressure to intervene in security matters.
• MENA tends to be the focus of USG policies and resource expenditure, but Central Asia is critical to the economic and power projection goals of both Russia and China.

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