NSI Publications

Author | Editor: Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

pop

• This series of USCENTCOM questions is largely oriented around processes of radicalization and deradicalization, which focus on deeply held beliefs. However, several studies suggested that a similar or greater emphasis on behavior (e.g., disengagement) may be a more practical goal in the short term.
• The questions also assume a reliable base of generalizable findings exists for deradicalization and reintegration programs, from which lessons learned can be derived and applied across a variety of contexts. This in turn presupposes effective assessments are in place using reliable metrics to determine each program’s degree of success. Yet the research base is both narrow and largely based on Western populations, which limits generalizability.
• Moreover, while there are some common components to programs generally thought to be successful, there is no one size fits all solution for deradicalization, reintegration, and reconciliation program design. Instead, programs should be tailored to the specifics of the context and target populations in question.
• Additionally, approaches should be both multi-level (e.g., addressing the needs of both individuals and communities) and harness the inputs of multiple organizations (e.g., taking a whole of government approach, working with US partners and local entities).
• Solutions also require both short and long time horizons. As an example of the latter, overcoming years of trauma and shifting people’s outlook on life in order to effect behavioral and especially attitudinal change are long-term processes and require sustained follow-up, including after-care.
• The research conducted for this effort suggests that addressing the root causes of trauma and recruitment to violent extremism, rather than taking a reactive approach, is the best long-term solution for breaking the cycle of radicalization. Nonetheless, several effective and impactful measures can be taken in the short term by, for example, drawing on insights from other fields to inform development of relatively low cost interventions that can be scaled to the resource environment (e.g., low or medium).

‍

Authors | Editors: Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.); Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Top-Level Findings

Implicit in USCENTCOM’s Gulf and Levant questions is a sense of inevitable cataclysm. This is typified by assumptions of worsening conflict, diplomatic ruptures, and regime change or collapse. The reports prepared in response to these questions suggest that such an outcome is not preordained. Coupled with drivers that threaten to further mire the region in chaos, there exist buffers against cataclysm. Instability itself does not mean regime collapse is inevitable or even likely across the region. While instability remains a constant in the region, the natural endpoint to that instability is not anarchic failure. Moreover, that Russia and China are seeking different outcomes than the United States does not imply that they are seeking anarchic collapse. In fact, no great powers’ interests are served by regional conflagration.

Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and Jeff Day (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

There is no “one size fits all” approach to disengagement and deradicalization—disengagement and deradicalization programs should be tailored to the specific environments and individuals/groups of interest. However, analysis of historical cases of disengagement and deradicalization programs reveals what appear to be several common characteristics of programs that have demonstrated some levels of success: creating a sense of hope and purpose, building a sense of community, providing individual attention and regimented daily schedules, and ensuring sustainable, long-term commitment following completion of the program (i.e., after- care). While designing disengagement and deradicalization programs to include these characteristics could serve as a useful starting point, they should not be considered universal, or guarantees of successful deradicalization. Rigorous research and analysis is still needed in order to solidify our understanding of, and ability to measure, “success” with respect to deradicalization programs.

‍

Authors: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), and Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

In advance of the Turkish incursion into Syria last October, warnings about the security risks of “the children of ISIS” and radicalized youths in internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugee camps in Syria and Iraq increased. Media outlets reported that women in Al Hol camp in northeast Syria were setting up their own “mini Islamic State” within the camp and terrorizing other residents in the already under-resourced camp (Sancha, 2019). The shredding of ISIS’s physical caliphate and the horrifying realization of the depths of derangement of ISIS’s treatment of Cubs and Pearls of the Caliphate—young children who serve as perpetrators, witnesses, and victims of the horrors—have raised inevitable questions about the appropriate security, moral, and legal “next steps” for these children.

Tragically, a focus on just these “children of ISIS” or “children with extremist families” is too narrow to properly address a self-perpetuating cycle of Islamist extremism and violence in the region and beyond. Here is the critical point: If we consider the “radicalization cycle” only among “children of ISIS,” we run the considerable risk of missing factors that will have severe behavioral and cognitive impact on “non-ISIS” young peoples in Syria and Iraq who have lived similarly violent and traumatic lives in prolonged conflict (Moreland, 2019).

Protracted civil conflict in which terror-inducing tactics are used (e.g., deliberately targeting civilians at home or in school, enslavement and rape of women and children, forced recruitment, and abductions) are particularly devastating for young people as they inevitably bring them to the frontlines of traumatic violence. Responding to the needs only of children who are known to have been directly in the control or care of radicalized adults is not enough. Any child who has been exposed to prolonged conflict and violence is at risk of turning to violence as a means of conflict resolution. Therefore, the focus of USCENTCOM and the USG as a whole should be on preventing violence first and foremost, rather than radicalization. It is critical that we recognize that all children—former child soldiers, IDPs, refugees, and victims—who have been touched by warfare in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere—even indirectly—are candidates for experiencing the neurological, psychological, and physical impacts of war. They have all been habituated to violent means of conflict resolution and, in the future, are more likely to turn to these destabilizing tactics, regardless of ideology or religious belief.

‍

Authors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.); and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

The Middle Eastern region of the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) currently has approximately 20 million displaced persons, many of whom live in camps (see NSI Reachback question B3 response). These people have been uprooted, lost their livelihoods, and in many cases experienced severe trauma. These stresses place them at risk of radicalization as their frustrations and grievances increase with time. Research was conducted on counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs appropriate for use in refugee camps, returning a broad range of counter-radicalization measures, and screening and segregation protocols. Their validity, respective pros and cons, and implementation considerations are reported here. Determining the appropriate measures for protecting refugees, building community resilience, and triaging individuals who would most benefit from deradicalization programs can inform how USCENTCOM can take action, or support organizations that are engaged with deradicalization in refugee camps.

We used the following definitions of key terms throughout the report.

• Radicalization refers to a process whereby individuals (and even groups) develop a mindset that can, under the right circumstances and opportunities, increase the risk that he or she will engage in violent extremism or terrorism (Clutterbuck, 2015).

• Deradicalization implies that an individual change his or her thought and values toward more mainstream views. Actually changing one’s views and assessing one’s values is extremely difficult and presents ethical issues in light of US principles of freedom of conscience. A more achievable and less problematic goal is disengagement, which is a shift away from supporting violence as a means for achieving political or ideological goals; a person may retain radical views, but violent behavior, which is observable, can be mitigated. As a further consideration, much of what is addressed in this report is more properly defined as counter-radicalization, efforts to counter and prevent radicalization efforts by militants. Unfortunately, the term deradicalization is often used in research and policy variously to mean deradicalization, disengagement, and counter-radicalization. These distinctions will be made when possible in this report (Horgan, 2009; Clutterbuck, 2015).

The summarized, overall findings of this report are as follows:

1. An integrated system of interventions addressing individual through community needs is necessary for effective counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts, bearing in mind that the primary goal is disengagement from violence (see Figure 1). Such an integrated system addresses deradicalization and disengagement at multiple social scales, enabling protection of individual refugees from radicalization up through building community resilience against radicalization.
2. Limiting the time spent in a camp setting is key to preventing the long-term radicalization of refugees. The average time refugees spend in camp is seventeen years, enough time for a generation to grow up with deep resentment and grievance that militants can use for radicalizing a population.
3. Screening instruments exist for triaging an individual’s degree of radicalization and propensity for violence. However, they are useful only in the hands of trained professionals.
4. One consideration concerning triage is the extent to which radicalized individuals and groups should be segregated from, versus dispersed into, the general population. There are pros and cons to each approach, and each has its associated ethical dilemmas. The competing benefits and risks need to be weighed when deciding what degree of separation or dispersal is appropriate for a particular camp; this report provides guidelines for weighing the pros and cons.

Drivers of radicalization occur in layers from the individual level up to the wider community that are mutually influencing. As a result, deradicalization and disengagement interventions designed to protect refugees from and build community resilience to radicalization must address these levels in mutually supportive ways. Consequently, this report will be structured as follows: The first two parts of the question of focus are answered in Section I, which addresses deradicalization and disengagement efforts. The third part of the question is answered in Section II, which describes practical matters of screening refugees and managing camps through segregation and dispersal mechanisms.

‍

Authors | Editor: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Jeffrey Day (NSI, Inc.); and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

Strategic surprise, the realization that one’s knowledge and assumptions are wrong and the adversary has an upper hand, is a national security nightmare (Amidon, 2005; Defense Science Board, 2015; Handel, 1984). Classic examples include Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. This report addresses two types of surprises, Black Swans and Gray Rhinos. Black Swans are surprising, high-impact events produced by complex systems of non-linear interactions that are inherently unpredictable. In contrast, Gray Rhinos are surprising events whose indicators exist and should have been obvious but were missed because we were not looking or properly assessing them. This report presents statistical models that identify the drivers of Gray Rhino events and provide insight into Black Swan events in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Political instability and terrorism are the two types of events modeled.

Political Stability

• Corruption is the primary factor that undermines the political stability of USCENTCOM AOR countries. US government (USG) efforts to monitor corruption are, therefore, critical for providing indicators and warnings (I&W) of instability; US influence has the potential to decrease corruption.
• Insecurity in basic needs are an important source of instability in the USCENTCOM AOR. Water resources are finite and dwindling in the region and both water availability and hunger are associated with political instability. Food and water availability and food prices provide indicators of approaching instabilities that could threaten US interests in the region. Severe droughts or rapid fluctuations in the world food market have the potential to create Black Swan-like spikes in political instability. Such a spike, for example, contributed to the onset of the Syrian civil war.
• The models reveal that competition among elites in USCENTCOM AOR countries is a risk factor for instability. Elites who feel that the established political system is not serving their aspirations are the most likely source of disruption. Despite popular protests, rank-and-file populations do not have the means to mount an effective challenge to their governments. However, elites can use grievances, such as lack of basic needs, to mobilize the masses when convenient. USG efforts to influence elites, therefore, may be particularly effective in preventing social instability.
• Rugged terrain is associated with political instability, and many of the countries in the USCENTCOM AOR have such terrain.

Terrorism

• By far the leading factor in associated with terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR is physically abusive state terror. Highly autocratic regimes are able to suppress terrorism in their own countries; however, if they use physically abusive means, they may be spawning terrorism abroad because such means are associated with terrorism.
• Corruption is strongly associated with terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR. USG efforts to counteract corruption should, therefore, help to limit terrorism in the region.
• As USCENTCOM AOR countries democratize, terrorists are better able to operate. Democracy is associated with increased political stability in the region but may paradoxically increase terrorism.
• In the USCENTCOM AOR, the combination of a young population and high unemployment is associated with terrorism. Efforts to boost employment should help alleviate terrorism.
• The presence of war resulting in high battle deaths in the population is strongly associated with terrorism. US efforts to prevent war in the region should help to counter terrorism.

‍

Authors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

NSI, Inc. interviewed seven subject matter experts and conducted additional background research in support of its analyses on Black Swans, Gray Rhinos, and current thinking about key factors and variables not typically included in political stability models (e.g., climate variables, the influence of illicit networks). The main topics of focus included water and food availability, sectarianism (ethnic and religious), refugee flows, illicit drug networks, illicit antiquities trade, and human trafficking. Summarized findings relating to each of these topics are presented in detail below.

Water and Food Availability

• The USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) is largely dependent on groundwater resources, which are finite and dwindling. This is a looming threat because, as the region, especially the Middle East, runs out of water, the population will come under stress and may be forced to emigrate.
• Surface water is also in jeopardy due to decreasing rainfall. Furthermore, it is controlled by relatively few states in the Middle East and Central Asia, creating the potential for interstate conflict over this life-essential resource.
• The Middle East is dependent on foods and goods produced in other regions (particularly Eurasia and China). Many of these resources require continued access to water for sustained production. Therefore, droughts in these regions that impact food production levels will also have a profound impact on food insecurity and instability in the Middle East.
• A Black Swan-like danger is that when food and water availability cross critical thresholds, weak governance in the region may not be able to compensate, which could lead to rapid regime collapse and instability.
• The greatest potential for sudden, Black Swan-like effects is in the interactions between water availability, climate change, economic growth, urbanization, and population growth. Unit changes in these variables are multiplied, producing amplified effects on instability.

Sectarianism

• Religious and ethnic sectarianism is important in the region. However, these identities are not immutable and written in stone.
• Sectarianism rose after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, which alarmed Sunni Arab states in the region and intensified the Sunni/Shia Muslim division. Within Iraq, the US invasion in 2003, increased Sunni/Shia sectarianism within the country as those factions vied for power. However, the ethnic orders established in Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries may be weakening as their governments have failed to serve their own ethnic constituencies.
• A new generational division appears to be emerging between a disaffected younger population and the ethnically-based establishment.
• Sectarian divides exist but are not necessarily always salient and should not be assumed as such. They become active when elites use them to mobilize support in bids for power. Extremists will also try to mobilize support along sectarian lines.
• However, power typically flows upward from local strongmen and elites who serve as patrons for local followings. Those local leaders similarly gain benefits and serve provincial leaders, and so forth to national leaders. These power relations do not necessarily follow sectarian lines.
• The dynamics of these power relations can be different from country to country.
• Outside powers exert powerful influences as well; however, they do not always do so to their own benefit. Russian and Chinese ethnocentrism is manifest in different ways. Central Asians are dependent on remittances from labor in Russia but resent the discrimination they experience when working there. The Russian government appears to regard Central Asia as a region it could take back if it wanted to, which is probably a delusion. China tends to look down on non-Han, and while its investments are welcome in cash-strapped Central Asian states, China’s condescension, predatory loaning practices, and unfair labor practices may eventually create a serious backlash.
• The dependency of Central Asians on remittances from Russia means that political or economic instability in Russia is likely to have a ripple effect on Central Asia.

Refugee Flows

• Refugees are a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. Iran also houses millions of Afghan refugees.
• Countries that house large refugee populations are burdened and potentially destabilized, but they can also use them as political pawns by threatening to send them home or unleash them on other regions of the world.
• The water availability crisis in the region may ultimately cause mass migrations from the region if food availability and quality of life become no longer tenable. This is especially the case if regional governments are unable to cope with the effects of water and food vulnerability.

Drugs

• Illicit drug manufacturers and traffickers benefit from insecurity, and places like Syria and Afghanistan have attracted drug trafficking as a result. However, there is a reciprocal effect in that drug trafficking increases corruption and instability in these very states, creating a spiraling positive feedback loop of increasing drug trafficking and instability.
• Terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah (with Captagon), the Taliban (with opium), and ISIS (with Tramadol and nicotine) have benefitted from the instability they have sown and have been able to partially fund their operations through the illicit trade.
• The proliferation of the drug trade in the Middle East and Central Asia has led to extremely high drug abuse rates, taxing health care systems and damaging societies throughout the region.

Illicit Antiquities

• Political insecurity increases the looting of antiquities. Locals may opportunistically loot as law enforcement and antiquity site protection becomes diminished or insufficient, and terrorist groups may strategically loot to fund their operations and denigrate their enemies by destroying sacred sites.
• Because re-establishing security in unstable regions is difficult, the most effective way of preventing illegal antiquities trade and denying terrorists this income may be to target wealthy buyers in the West who make online purchases with near impunity.

Human Trafficking

• Human trafficking in the Middle East is often used to coerce labor and force women into prostitution and sexual slavery. This adds to the burden of grievances that fuel unrest in the region.
• Trafficking networks also fuel illegal migration outside of the region and destabilize regions like Europe.

‍

Authors: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), & Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line

What would be the strongest catalyst leading to a civil war/revolt in Jordan?

It is highly unlikely that a single catalyst could lead to a civil war or revolt in Jordan. Significant regime crisis in Jordan would more likely require a ‘perfect storm’ of severe popular grievance aimed at the government (including the monarchy), multiple catalysts, and the failure of the regime’s considerable sources of resilience (i.e., buffers).

Will His Majesty King Abdullah (HMKA) and his tribal affiliates be able to contain the level of violence?

Yes. In all likelihood, HMKA and his tribal affiliates would be able to quell a civil uprising, unless significant numbers of the tribal affiliates themselves took part in the violent opposition.

Who/what would succeed HMKA?

The answer to this question depends wholly on whether the pathway to regime change involved primarily institutional change or violence. Thus, those who assume control could range from members of Parliament and government ministers (more likely) to violent extremists ruling over a fractured state (less likely).

How would a civil war/revolt impact the broader region?

Violent non-state actors are likely to be the only “winners,” as a violent uprising in Jordan would present opportunities for resurgence in ungoverned spaces. This in itself would present significant security threats to Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other actors currently battling these groups. The most stricken would be the Jordanian people and well over one million refugees in Jordan who would quickly become the victims of a massive humanitarian crisis.

‍

Authors: Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Aleksandra Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

Host countries, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have the primary responsibility for the management and ongoing care of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, ongoing budget shortfalls and the recent surge in the number of displaced civilians create ongoing challenges in many countries, leading to the need to prioritize resources. Once basic needs are met by the host country and UNHCR, priority should be given to the host country providing economic opportunities, psychological counseling, and a secure environment, as well as countering any potential extremist narratives. Counter-narrative work should go beyond simple religious re-education and should take into account local grievances that could be exploited by militant organizations. The most effective voices for ideology-based counter-narratives are respected clerics and experts that share a similar background to the displaced population. Ownership within a country and the specific “voice” for each of these priority areas may differ, depending on resources, but are best delivered by in-country institutions and resources to maintain trust and a perception of neutrality. The most appropriate US military involvement is protection of displaced civilians from combat operations and assisting with security concerns surrounding relocation. While the US military can assist with other needs, such as water supply, camp infrastructure, and security, doing so requires the proper authorization and funding, and should be viewed only as a temporary solution.

‍

Authors: Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.), and Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

Defining Reintegration and Distinguishing Related Terms

We begin by defining reintegration and distinguishing it from other concepts with which it is sometimes conflated. Reintegration is often discussed in the context of disengagement, demobilization, deradicalization, the related literature, which leads to ambiguity regarding their conceptual boundaries (Crowell, 2017; Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012; Marsden, 2015). For the purposes of this discussion, we define reintegration as a process by which ex-combatants or associates assume functional roles in society. This conceptualization can be contrasted with disengagement, which involves a literal movement away from violence; demobilization, which is the process of discharging individuals from their roles as active combatants in armed forces or groups; and deradicalization, which refers to a cognitive shift away from supporting violence as a means for achieving desired goals. Like deradicalization, reconciliation refers to a primarily psychological process that involves healing relationships and creating acceptance for ex-combatants in society. While the “fully realized product” of reintegration is social rehabilitation of former combatants (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis, 2010), “the fully realized product of reconciliation is the achievement of a sustainable peace, including the cessation of violence” (Kuznar, Stevenson, & Pagano, 2018).

In order to successfully execute reintegration and reconciliation (R&R), it is important to understand how R&R fit within an overarching framework for peace. While R&R are the terminal phases of the conflict resolution process and are crucial for an enduring peace, the process may also include disengagement, deradicalization, and counter-radicalization. R&R can occur without deradicalization or where deradicalization is executed at the same time as R&R. Of course, successful R&R is more likely to be achieved if combatants have foregone violence and undergone a psychological shift away from their militant motivations. We provide an overview of these terms and their relationships to one another in Figure 1 [in the report].

Deriving Lessons for Conducting Successful Reintegration and Reconciliation

At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the considerable challenges associated with deriving general lessons for conducting successful R&R. First, there is no single approach to R&R; instead, there are many variations in how programs are structured, the fundamental assumptions driving different approaches, program components, and how the program components are implemented. Second, the empirical evidence base is both narrow and based largely on Western populations, limiting the degree to which findings can be confidently generalized (Marsden, 2019). Third, reintegration and reconciliation processes are extremely context dependent (Marsden, 2019; Moghaddam, 2019). Political, cultural, socio-economic, historical, psychological, and ethnic variables relevant to each conflict can all mold the success or failure of R&R programs. Physical, social, criminal justice, and conflict contexts also influence individual and group motivations to engage in R&R processes as well as which opportunities even exist for reintegration (Marsden, 2019). Despite these limitations, however, there are some emergent themes and insights from R&R in other areas of the world that may be applicable to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). We begin with a discussion of the conditions and components required for successful reintegration, continue with a discussion on reconciliation, and conclude by considering the barriers to reintegration and how the United States and international community might respond in order to overcome those barriers.

‍