NSI Publications

Authors | Editors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Four panelists with deep knowledge and experience in the USCENTCOM AOR and with complex systems modeling were asked to reflect on how to think about and anticipate surprises in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), especially Black Swan surprises that are the product of non-linear relationships between interacting variables. The panelists shared a wealth of knowledge on the region and complexity. Key takeaways included:

• The aim of complex modeling is to provide strategic success—the US needs to be able to anticipate surprises and their likelihoods to plan against them instead of reacting to events as they unfold.
• Black Swan surprises emerge as a result of non-linear relationships between system variables, but also high dimensionality and the interdependence of key variables.
• Examples of the variables that interact in complex ways in the USCENTCOM AOR include unstable governments and economies, ineffective conflict management, uncoordinated development, ethnic and religious diversity, and climate change.
• Actual modeling must be done, and not simply using metaphors of complexity. The warfighter users of complex modeling need the skills to build models and understand them and, at a minimum, they must understand assumptions and actionable results.
• Data are a problem. Data exist at the country level, but the complex dynamics that really need to be understood operationally are sub-national if not local. Efforts must be undertaken to fill this gap, which also includes data on past known Black Swans in the AOR.

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Authors: Nathan Heath, N. (NSI, Inc.) and Veronica Murdoch (Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA))

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Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The current SMA project, Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO), builds on a strong foundation of prior SMA work on influence and information operations. The themes underlying the research reflect shifting priorities as SMA has responded to requests ranging counterterrorism to deterrence to great power competition. However, the requirement to inform and influence actors and populations through effective, strategic communication remains consistent. This annotated bibliography comprises nearly 50 SMA studies and speaker series events in five areas related to the information environment: 1) bio-psycho-social drivers of instability, 2) messaging & counter-messaging, 3) competition and conflict, 4) influence, and 5) cyber considerations. The following section highlights the type of content that you can expect to discover in each of the five key areas related to information operations.

Highlights from Five Key Areas of SMA Research Related to Information and Influence Activities

Messaging & Counter-messaging

SMA has produced a significant body of work on the ways in which state and non-state actors use messaging to convey narratives and/or to influence populations. Several works in this section focus on effective counter-messaging techniques. These include 1) management of unintended negative consequences from counter-VEO influence operations, 2) maneuver and engagement against ISIS in the narrative space, 3) means of undermining ISIS’s virtual caliphate, and 4) identification of capability gaps in counter-ISIS messaging. Regarding state actors, studies explore the use of narratives to shape Russian and Chinese behavior, as well as narrative analyses of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian media.

Bio-Psycho-Social Drivers of Instability

Much of SMA research over the past ten years has focused on the drivers of instability, particularly in the context of countering violent extremism and destabilizing population dynamics. In trying to understand why individuals and groups choose or reject violence, SMA turned to the neuroscience and cognitive psychology communities for insights. Reports submitted in this area particularly explore the neuro-cognitive basis of deterrence and extremism.

Competition & Conflict

SMA research also considered the theoretical, strategic, and operational aspects of the competition continuum, with particular focus on gray zone activities. In addition to developing a widely-held, theoretically-based definition of “Gray Zone” activities (or, operations below the level of armed conflict), SMA’s work in this area has examined the motivations for actors to engage in “gray activities,” how the US should respond to such activities, and the capabilities needed to respond effectively.

Cyber

Alongside other studies related to information and influence, SMA has explored topics in the “fifth domain” pertaining to cyber and information warfare, emerging technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic ambiguity. While cyber considerations have not been a driving factor in SMA studies, its importance for information and influence activities is acknowledged through papers and speaker events at the intersection of the cyber realm and communications theory.

Influence Operations

All other reports relating to effective communication and persuasion are included in this last category: influence operations. Reports in this section range from managing unintended consequences of messages to understanding target populations to identifying communication techniques and patterns used by adversaries. Reports in this section often grapple with how to best conduct influence operations in an increasingly complex and connected world.

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Authors: Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.) and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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China and Russia support each other’s political and economic objectives both globally and in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) because, in part, of a strong mutual interest in weakening the United States’ geopolitical influence and power (Solomentseva, 2014; Lons, 2019). However, despite this cooperation, China and Russia do compete, especially in Central Asia where both have long-standing historical connections, manage competing economic initiatives, and seek to exert influence over regional governments (Laruelle, 2019; Ehteshami, 2019; McGlinchey, 2019; Weitz, 2020). In the future, competition between Beijing and Moscow in the Middle East over natural resources and economic opportunities may increase, as both become more economically involved in the region (Wormuth, 2019). However, both do benefit considerably from cooperation, and have diverse enough strengths to make direct competition costly. Furthermore, particularly in Russia’s case, there are no comparable strategic partnerships available to help balance United States and Western regional influence (Weitz, 2020). While there is a wealth of literature discussing how China’s and Russia’s activities affect the United States’ interests in the USCENTCOM AOR, the discussion on what the United States can do to create Sino-Russian competition is sparse and instead mostly focuses on actions to slow either China’s or Russia’s individual geopolitical growth.

Authors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Mariah Yager (NSI, Inc.)

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Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

In July 2019, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) endorsed a list of specific actions for the Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR). A requested action under item 1b asks for a “process to develop a baseline understanding of the IE (Information Environment) and subsequently modify the model of relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive behaviors.” To that end, Lt. Gen Mark Kelly, Operations (AF/A3), requested Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiate an effort to better understand and integrate information and influence into operational-level planning, execution, and assessment activities across the competition continuum.

Information influences behavior through the process of communication, and so this report provides a review of formative communication models that underly the baseline SMA Effective Communication Framework (Modeling Effective Communication), developed in support of the A3 request. That generic model of communication establishes a baseline understanding of the information environment (IE), as well as the role of relevant actor perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior. The models reviewed in this report are considered key developments in the theory of communication that undergird that model, and each provides a critical insight into operating in the IE.

Models are essential in the sciences for focusing attention on relevant variables and exposing predictive, or when possible, causal relationships (Bankes, Lempert, & Popper, 2002; Cioffi-Revilla, 2014). The models reviewed here are essential for decomposing the communication process into its constituent elements, and the lines, arrows, and shapes in the models described below represent different communication interactions. These interactions provide hypotheses to be tested when thinking about and conducting IO, and the elements define what aspects of the communication process need to be measured in order to provide measures of effectiveness (MOEs), not just measures of performance (MOPs).

The history of models of communication reveals that as new models were created, the concept of the information environment was expanded; that is, more variables contributing to communication and their interactions were considered. The report begins with a review of linear models that describe communication as a process of transmitting a message from a sender to a receiver. A review of transactional models that describe how the exchange and interpretation of messages between communicators creates meaning follows. Subsequent Quicklook reports describe how strategic communication models build upon this basis to model how communication can be done effectively.

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Authors: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.); and Weston Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Abstract

Despite significant challenges to its stability, Lebanon has long survived politically and economically. Nonetheless, poor governance and a severe economic crisis, coupled with ongoing public outrage, signal that the Lebanese government may no longer be able to withstand its enduring pressures. In this report, we consider two recommendations for how the United States should react to the current situation in Lebanon: continuing aid and political support while exerting diplomatic pressure, and limiting aid and political support to the government while supporting those who would disrupt it. Expert observers are largely oriented toward maintaining aid (primarily through assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF]) and political support. Underlying this recommendation is the belief that the LAF can be distinguished from the political elites, most notably, Hezbollah. Though less commonly proffered and more controversial, it is important to similarly consider the logic underpinning the latter recommendation, as it reflects certain political realities within the United States. This recommendation is predicated on the view that all Lebanese political actors—whether individual politicians, Hezbollah, the security forces (viz., Internal Security Forces, LAF), or otherwise—remain tied to the sectarian system and are therefore all inextricably linked through this system as an organizing principle. According to this viewpoint, the LAF may consequently be unlikely to provide a significant counterweight to Hezbollah.

While there is some disagreement over Russia’s motivation to engage with Lebanon, several experts indicate that Russia not only would stand to gain from involvement in Lebanon but has been purposefully positioning itself for such involvement, which is arguably motivated by competition with the US. While there is no inherent Lebanese motivation to ally with Russia, the Lebanese are likely to be practical and act in their own self-interest during this period of crisis. A frequent refrain among observers considering US actions that could cause Lebanon to fall into Russia’s orbit is that cutting funding to Lebanon and to the LAF in particular at this juncture could leave Lebanon susceptible to exploitation by US adversaries, including Russia. More generally, US disengagement from the region may present an ideal environment for great power competition.

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Authors | Editors: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.); Laster, N. (US Army TRADOC G2)

This article was featured in Volume 10, Issue 1 of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC G2) journal, entitled Red Diamond.

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Following the collapse of the North Korean economy and disastrous famine of the mid- 1990s, the regime adapted its centrally-planned economy, allowing limited and small-scale private entrepreneurship among a starving population that the government’s Public Distribution System could no longer support. As a result, the North Koreans turned to informal markets for sustenance in order to survive. Although Kim Jong-un’s own statements have highlighted the need for economic development in North Korea, he remains suspicious of further economic liberalization and broad marketization viewing this as a strong threat to the security and survival of his regime. Nonetheless, the informal economy remains and represents a substantial sector of the total economy, fostering a new stratum of wealthy North Koreans, unattached to the military or the traditional elite. Observers and scholars have questioned whether there is in fact an insurmountable tension between economic reform and marketization on the one hand, and stability of the Kim family political control on the other. A research team at NSI tackles this question in a recent study by examining the impact of marketization on the potential for DPRK regime collapse.

Using the NSI Pathways™ methodology and model, the NSI team addresses the following question: Has marketization put the North Korean regime on a path to near-term collapse? They define regime collapse as the dysfunction of a government to the point that it loses both efficacy and legitimacy and thus can no longer maintain its functions, or even falls out of power completely. The NSI Pathways assessment explores three theoretical subpaths to collapse via marketization relevant to the DPRK. These subpaths align with three different stakeholder groups within North Korea that could conceivably exert pressure on the regime, at present or in the future. Their subpaths include: a) regime collapse as the result of pressure for reform and the frustration of the new class of entrepreneurs not directly tied to the Communist Party or the military (i.e., the “nouveau riche” path); b) pressure arising from the broader, mainly rural population, for example, who are frustrated with the regime’s inability to distribute goods (i.e., the “grass- roots” path), or c) a coup led by members of the military, or military support to one of the other two groups (i.e., “military or military assisted” path). By applying the most critical components of regime collapse to each of the three subpaths, NSI deter- mined there to be little evidence that the DPRK is currently on a pathway to regime collapse as a result of marketization.

NOTE: Please see pp. 28-31 for Dr. Pagano and Dr. Laster’s article.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.)

Questions of Focus

[Q3] What is the source of Russian and Chinese influence in Iran, and how have recent events (incl. COVID-19) changed this?

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Among all the experts interviewed for this report, there was a general consensus that relations between Iran and both Russia and China are driven by pragmatic considerations. Many described the Iran-Russia and Iran- China relationships as primarily transactional, with each having something concrete the other needs to meet their domestic economic growth and development needs. The experts did identify one interest that all three share: decreasing US global and regional influence (Goldenberg, Edelstein, Katz, Nephew). This interest, rather than any specific affinity for Iran, is what motivates Russian and Chinese actions to shield Iran from the US (Brewer, Ehteshami, Goldenberg, Katz, Markey, Spalding, Tabatabai), despite neither wanting to see Iran gain nuclear weapons (Goldenberg, Katz, Markey). Their willingness to continue to trade and engage with Iran, regardless of international and US censure underlies their influence with the Iranian regime (Nephew). This influence does not equate to trust or liking on Iran’s part, however, and while “Iran obviously detests and mistrusts the United States, I think we should also keep in mind that it’s quite skeptical of Russian and Chinese motives as well,” according to Mr. Eric Brewer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Questions of Focus

[Q1] What is the extent of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) involvement in black (criminal) economic activity in Iran and internationally?

1. How significant is the drug abuse problem in Iran currently?
2. What is the population’s knowledge of IRGC involvement in trafficking drugs, including through Iran?
3. How much has IRGC trafficking contributed to Iran’s drug abuse issues?
4. What are the incentives and disincentives that would drive the Iranian government to renounce the transnational crime it currently sponsors (e.g., drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking into Syria, etc.)?
5. How much does the Iranian populace know about its government’s role in international crime?

*Caveat: The answer to the question of the extent of the IRGC’s participation in the black economy in unknowable in the open source. This is particularly true when it comes to the illicit black economy. Experts cautioned that since the nature of the activities in question are covert, criminal, and clandestine, all responses are based on personal expertise, inference, and anecdotal observations.

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While official data do not exist, the informal (black) economy is estimated to be 35-44 percent of Iran’s stated gross domestic product (GDP), or some 160-200 billion USD. With even less certainty, experts and other sources estimate that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls roughly a third of Iran’s total economy (both formal and informal). The extent of the IRGC’s involvement in the illicit black economy—comprised of drug, arms, alcohol, and other forms of smuggling—is unknown in the open source. Given that the questions driving this study were particularly focused on the IRGC’s role in drug trafficking, experts reach three conclusions: 1) it cannot be assumed that the IRGC as an institution is involved in narcotrafficking, 2) the Iranian public does not blame the IRGC for Iran’s opioid crisis, and 3) an information operations campaign could more effectively link the IRGC to Iran’s devastating opioid epidemic.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.)

Questions of Focus

[Q4] What, if any, effect will COVID-19 have on regime stability in Iran, both over the short and medium term?

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Iran appears to have been hit hard by the COVID-19 virus, and there has been criticism both within and outside the country over the Iranian regime’s response. The subject matter experts (SMEs) who responded to this question, however, do not think it likely that the pandemic will have novel direct effects on the stability of the Iranian regime, either in the short term or further out. At the same time, all were quick to point out that this is a difficult question. Not only is this the first global pandemic in the post-WWII era, and its global scope and duration remain to be seen (Brewer, Goldenberg, Nephew), but, as Dr. Ariane Tabatabai of the German Marshall Fund of the United States reminds us, “it is the Middle East, and in general you should never try to predict what will happen.”

Instead, in assessing this question, the SMEs focus on drivers of social and political instability already present in Iran prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and how these may be intensified by the pandemic. The SMEs largely agree that the direct impact of COVID-19 on the stability of the Iranian regime will likely be negligible. However, the pandemic, and the regime’s response to it, will exacerbate existing drivers of instability within Iran, as well as provide a justification for the regime to expand activities that buffer instability. Figure 1 shows the key drivers of instability and buffers of stability identified by the SMEs for the Iranian regime, and the associated actions or events that have and/or will intensify each (pre-COVID-19) driver and buffer. These are discussed in more detail below.

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Question of Focus

[Q1] In the next five years, how likely is it that Iran will be willing to negotiate a new nuclear treaty with the United States?

Bottom Line Up Front

Most of the expert contributors agree that, though not a certainty, it appears likely that Iran will be willing to reengage in some form of nuclear negotiations with the United States at some point over the next five years. The likelihood of a new nuclear agreement being reached between the two sides, however, is less certain. It is unclear as to whether Iran will be willing to negotiate an entirely new nuclear agreement with the United States, especially absent some form of United States recommitment to elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement as an initial starting point. Moreover, for such an agreement to be reached, the United States will also need to be willing to reengage in negotiations. It is similarly unclear as to whether that will be the case. The United States’ self-described maximum pressure campaign against Iran has created notable burdens and constraints that are likely to drive Iran’s willingness to reengage in negotiations, but maximum pressure in itself is not a means to an end. If the end goal is a new nuclear agreement with Iran, then the United States will need to demonstrate a willingness to sincerely reengage in negotiations as well.