SMA Publications

Author: Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

[B4] How do you reintegrate radicalized people back into society? Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have centers focussed on this problem. What should the international community do with people who cannot be reintegrated into society? Are there lessons from other regions on reintegration and reconciliation that could be applied to the central region?

Reintegrating radicalised or violent people back into society requires focussing on two elements: the person themselves; and the society into which they might go. Here I apply cognitive and neuroscientific insights to help CENTCOM better address both.

Part I considers the radicalised or violent person themselves. What cognitive factors affect their process of disengagement and reintegration – and how can we influence their decision-making?

Recommendation One: CENTCOM should reframe their question away from just radicalisation (i.e. beliefs), because both beliefs and behaviours matter. Behavioural disengagement should be the main aim. Behaviour can beget belief.

Recommendation Two: Individuals often disengage from violent extremist activity (or civil war) and CENTCOM should use evidence-based methods to influence that process. This includes:

1. Audience: Put the target audience’s decision-making at the heart of the influence process. Practical tools help put one in the audiences’ shoes. For terrorism or those caught in civil war, identify the costs/benefits of continuing (e.g. dissatisfaction with day-to-day tasks) versus leaving (e.g. money).
2. Messengers: Audiences to be disengaged will often not perceive CENTCOM as the appropriate voice, so CENTCOM should act with trusted local, civil society and other actors. Local tailoring is key for Pakistani and Saudi centres.
   

Furthermore, societies must consider what should be done with those who cannot be reintegrated. Cognitive insights, e.g. for risk-assessment, can help marginally but offer no panacea. More research is needed for these specific cases.

Part II considers the societal scale. In a society as dislocated as Syria’s, what cognitive factors affect reconciliation between its factions, and what opportunities does Syrian society afford people who might—we hope—reintegrate?

Recommendation Three:Help society afford individuals options to disengage.A useful concept is that of “affordances”, which are the possibilities for action that an actor perceives that their tools or environment gives them.

1. Afford people plausible pathways to futures outside violence, e.g. CENTCOM can work with partners to prioritise economic development, safety, family and social networks.
2. Order or predictability provided by formal laws or informal rules is a key psychological need for populations – and CENTCOM should work with partners (local, allies, civil society) to generate societal order.
   

Recommendation Four: Syrian “society” fractured in civil war and CENTCOM should use long-term, evidence-based interventions for predictable psychological forces (e.g. fear, self-interest, fairness) that obstruct societal reconciliation.

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Author | Editors: Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Russian and Chinese Interests and Goals Within the USCENTCOM AOR

• Competition for regional influence between the US and Russia and China is inevitable.
• Neither Russia nor China are likely to resort to conflict to achieve regional dominance, even in Central Asia. China’s overwhelming economic advantage means Russia does not pose an existential threat, and Russia knows it is unlikely to “win” in any direct competition with China.
• Reducing US influence is seen by both Russia and China as a more effective strategy for furthering their own interests than competing with each other.
• There are regional (geopolitical) variations within USCENTCOM AOR countries that are reflected in Russia and China’s activities in, and relative leverage over, specific states.
• Globally, MENA is the region where China’s interests place it under the most direct pressure to intervene in security matters.
• MENA tends to be the focus of USG policies and resource expenditure, but Central Asia is critical to the economic and power projection goals of both Russia and China.

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Authors: Gary Ackerman (University of Albany); Anna Wetzel (University of Albany); Douglas Clifford (University of Albany); Haley Peterson (University of Albany); and Jenna Latourette (University of Albany)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

As a pilot study, the Center for Advanced Red Teaming conducted a series of four simulation sessions in January 2020 to explore the question of how Great Power Competition (GPC) and regional dynamics might change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. These employed Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming, a technique that varies RED players across multiple simulations, while keeping BLUE and GREEN teams constant. Simulated actors included the PRC, Iran, and Russia as RED, the United States as BLUE and KSA, Israel and the EU as GREEN. Four simulation sessions were conducted, three of which involved experts and one students as participants. The process collects a variety of information relevant to gaining a picture of strategic developments over the simulated timeframe (2020-2022), including data on: longer-term strategic objectives, strategic assumptions, risk proclivities, shorter-term “operational” objectives, overt and covert actions and a post exercise strategic assessment.

Analysis of the collected data yielded a variety of expected developments, like Chinese economic expansion into the AOR and continued Iranian support for proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. However, the simulations also revealed several developments that were less expected or displayed one or more novel characteristics. Among the more notable of these were:

• The PRC seeking to forward base Chinese naval and maritime patrol assets in the AOR (e.g., in Djibouti and Gwadar) and in several cases securing the right to build bases in the AOR.
• Russia acting to forcibly dissolve Iran’s militias in Syria, in coordination with the Assad regime.
• Iran conducting a false flag attempted attack against its own pipelines carrying oil to China and accusing the U.S. of trying to cut it off, in order to secure international sympathy and encourage the PRC to buy more Iranian oil and equip Iran with a modern fighter force.
• KSA working to develop its own version of the IRGC Quds Force, which would support the training of both sympathetic government and non-government actors in the region to curb Iranian influence.
• KSA establishing an alliance with the PRC and allowing China to purchase a lease for naval facilities on Saudi soil (ostensibly to aid in its deradicalization efforts).
• The EU creating and maintaining its own Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead).
• The United States stationing advanced tactical fighters and associated military personnel at bases in the north and south of Israel as part of a new strategic aerial effort in the region.
• The United States, using a cyberattack, causing an Iranian military plane to crash into the Fordow enrichment facility and planting doctored footage to make it seem that the Iranians shot it down via an anti-aircraft missile after mistaking it for an enemy plane.

Comparatively, all of the adversaries across most sessions had as an explicit strategic goal to diminish U.S. power and influence in the AOR and all three adversaries sought to expand their geopolitical influence in the AOR in at least one session. Both China and Iran in several sessions sought to create military and/or economic dependencies with state and non-state actors in the region. Russia and China both sought to expand their economic growth through engagement in the region, and both desired to increase their status as a regional diplomatic partner and convener. China also notably sought to secure vital energy resources, while (together with the EU) it was the only actor that had a deep desire to avoid the eruption of conflict in the region (especially between the United States and Iran). Somewhat surprisingly in the case of Iran, only one of four participants had acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as an explicit strategic goal. With respect to overall strategic risk tolerance, Russia’s was the highest of the three RED adversaries, but it is noteworthy that the expert participants who played KSA, Israel and the United States in Sessions 1-3 all rated their countries’ risk tolerance higher than any of the adversaries in any of the sessions.

Across actors, simulation sessions and rounds, the most common shorter-term “operational” objectives were to increase economic ties and investments in the AOR and to coordinate diplomatically in order to stabilize the region and prevent war between Iran and the United States. Both the PRC and Russia intended to force U.S. military personnel out from the AOR in most sessions. Perhaps as expected, both China and Russia in at least one session sought to increase their military presence in the region, but perhaps more surprisingly, both the expert and student participants representing the EU decided to increase the EU’s naval activity in the Gulf. Turning to individual states, China generally attempted to reduce U.S. influence in the region and protect or expand their economic influence (through the Belt and Road Initiative). The PRC supported Iran politically but was also willing to work with all regional parties to avoid an open conflict. In addition to the goals noted above, Russia worked to marginalize Iran in Syria, as well as to undermine U.S. influence in the region, including through covert disinformation campaigns. It also sought to solidify and deepen its influence in Central Asia to counter an encroaching China and – unlike many of the other actors – actually looked to increase the price of oil, which would benefit it economically; therefore, regional instability could actually help Russia in this regard. Aside from those goals already mentioned, Iran in a single session worked to acquire and then later to relinquish a nuclear weapons program. It also sought to hinder traffic in the Straits of Hormuz and to lessen the effects of sanctions.

The most common overt actions across the four sessions were engaging in trade negotiations (or concluding trade deals), diplomatic offers to act as a peace broker between competing sides, and offers of (or activities demonstrating) peaceful cooperation between two or more states. Military aid and propaganda were also fairly common. There was only one case of major overt kinetic action (a missile strike by Iran against an American base in Oman). Unsurprisingly, the EU took the greatest number of overt actions, mainly acting diplomatically and economically. Somewhat more interestingly, Russia also took a large number of overt actions, primarily diplomatically, but also militarily. The bulk of United States actions were military in nature.

All of the actors in the simulations engaged in several different types of covert action. By far the most common type of covert action was backchannel discussions, threats and negotiations, but this was mainly due to their prolific use by the European Union. Prominent across multiple actors were espionage, cyberattacks, covert arms transfers, disinformation campaigns and funding sub-state proxies. With respect to differences across actors, the RED actors tended to utilize military covert actions, while GREEN and BLUE tended to engage in more intelligence-focused actions. The Great Power Competitors (United States, PRC and Russia) all engaged in disinformation campaigns in at least one session.

Although this effort represented only a pilot study, it demonstrated that Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming is capable of rapidly and at low cost exploring complex strategic dynamics in an AOR. Beyond merely narrative output, the multiple simulations involved allow for sophisticated analysis. For example, the study applied natural language processing techniques to the outputs of the exercises. While the results were only illustrative, they indicated that future SDRT studies could benefit from this approach.

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Author: Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

[B1] How do we break the cycle of radicalization, particularly with children who know no other social system/model of governance? Are there possible graduated steps to deradicalization, i.e., judicial efforts, penal efforts, religious efforts, familial efforts, treatment efforts, that can be applied?

Cycles of radicalization and violent behaviour have a fundamentally cognitive dimension. What happens inside the minds of vulnerable young people aged 0 to 17 years – and how can we help such young people amongst the millions of Syrian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in order to break these cycles?

Here I apply insights from cognition and neuroscience. The report has two parts.

Part I examines the “brain terrain” created by the developing human brain, in which planners must operate, and that brings both challenges and opportunities.

Human brains develop from 0-25 years, during which distinct growth phases occur – and these require different policies. Policymakers can break this process down using three factors: human biology, culture, and political/legal distinctions.

Recommendation One: CENTCOM should focus policies on each of three distinct periods: 0-4 earliest years, 5-12 younger children, and 13-17 adolescents.

Young people can be very resilient – and they benefit from help. Psychiatric evidence and historical cases (e.g., Germany or South Korea after devastating prolonged wars) illustrate this resilience. Afford young people opportunities.

Recommendation Two: CENTCOM should see the opportunity new generations present – and afford them opportunities for plausible non-radical or violent futures, by helping build environments with basic education and social support.

Part II examines specific interventions. Limited direct evidence evaluates interventions for young refugees or IDPs in the developing world (e.g., much conflates work in rich/developing world settings, or with child soldiers/terrorists/radical groups). Thus, I provide convergent evidence from related fields like mental health and criminology – and I stress dual use aspects, e.g. providing routine is foundational in mental health everywhere, and also in deradicalization programmes in Pakistan.

For many of these interventions CENTCOM can provide security, funding and leadership, but success requires internal (e.g. USAID) and external (e.g. allies, charities, local) partners.

Recommendation Three: A hierarchy of interventions should be used – first build the foundations! E.g. giving young people in camps places to go and routine likely matters more than giving them wafer-thin versions of rich world deradicalization programmes, but still leaving them with few routines or safe places. Dual-use education or mental health programmes likely help break cycles of radicalization.

Recommendation Four: Cost effective interventions – use, develop and evaluate affordable and scalable interventions.Global mental health provides practical developing world templates, e.g. not using expensive doctors but training alternative practitioners, and there may be roles for digital aides.

Recommendation Five: Enhance the information environment. E.g. research young target audiences’ viewing and develop Arabic resources for each age.

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Authors: Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Aleksandra Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

Host countries, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have the primary responsibility for the management and ongoing care of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, ongoing budget shortfalls and the recent surge in the number of displaced civilians create ongoing challenges in many countries, leading to the need to prioritize resources. Once basic needs are met by the host country and UNHCR, priority should be given to the host country providing economic opportunities, psychological counseling, and a secure environment, as well as countering any potential extremist narratives. Counter-narrative work should go beyond simple religious re-education and should take into account local grievances that could be exploited by militant organizations. The most effective voices for ideology-based counter-narratives are respected clerics and experts that share a similar background to the displaced population. Ownership within a country and the specific “voice” for each of these priority areas may differ, depending on resources, but are best delivered by in-country institutions and resources to maintain trust and a perception of neutrality. The most appropriate US military involvement is protection of displaced civilians from combat operations and assisting with security concerns surrounding relocation. While the US military can assist with other needs, such as water supply, camp infrastructure, and security, doing so requires the proper authorization and funding, and should be viewed only as a temporary solution.

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Authors | Editor: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Jeffrey Day (NSI, Inc.); and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

Strategic surprise, the realization that one’s knowledge and assumptions are wrong and the adversary has an upper hand, is a national security nightmare (Amidon, 2005; Defense Science Board, 2015; Handel, 1984). Classic examples include Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. This report addresses two types of surprises, Black Swans and Gray Rhinos. Black Swans are surprising, high-impact events produced by complex systems of non-linear interactions that are inherently unpredictable. In contrast, Gray Rhinos are surprising events whose indicators exist and should have been obvious but were missed because we were not looking or properly assessing them. This report presents statistical models that identify the drivers of Gray Rhino events and provide insight into Black Swan events in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Political instability and terrorism are the two types of events modeled.

Political Stability

• Corruption is the primary factor that undermines the political stability of USCENTCOM AOR countries. US government (USG) efforts to monitor corruption are, therefore, critical for providing indicators and warnings (I&W) of instability; US influence has the potential to decrease corruption.
• Insecurity in basic needs are an important source of instability in the USCENTCOM AOR. Water resources are finite and dwindling in the region and both water availability and hunger are associated with political instability. Food and water availability and food prices provide indicators of approaching instabilities that could threaten US interests in the region. Severe droughts or rapid fluctuations in the world food market have the potential to create Black Swan-like spikes in political instability. Such a spike, for example, contributed to the onset of the Syrian civil war.
• The models reveal that competition among elites in USCENTCOM AOR countries is a risk factor for instability. Elites who feel that the established political system is not serving their aspirations are the most likely source of disruption. Despite popular protests, rank-and-file populations do not have the means to mount an effective challenge to their governments. However, elites can use grievances, such as lack of basic needs, to mobilize the masses when convenient. USG efforts to influence elites, therefore, may be particularly effective in preventing social instability.
• Rugged terrain is associated with political instability, and many of the countries in the USCENTCOM AOR have such terrain.

Terrorism

• By far the leading factor in associated with terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR is physically abusive state terror. Highly autocratic regimes are able to suppress terrorism in their own countries; however, if they use physically abusive means, they may be spawning terrorism abroad because such means are associated with terrorism.
• Corruption is strongly associated with terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR. USG efforts to counteract corruption should, therefore, help to limit terrorism in the region.
• As USCENTCOM AOR countries democratize, terrorists are better able to operate. Democracy is associated with increased political stability in the region but may paradoxically increase terrorism.
• In the USCENTCOM AOR, the combination of a young population and high unemployment is associated with terrorism. Efforts to boost employment should help alleviate terrorism.
• The presence of war resulting in high battle deaths in the population is strongly associated with terrorism. US efforts to prevent war in the region should help to counter terrorism.

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“Analysis and Artificial Intelligence in Integrated Campaigning”

Authors | Editor: Pike, T. (US Army); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Integrated Campaigning requires the development and execution of US foreign policy across the whole of the US Government (USG). Such coherent policy development and implementation necessitates a common perspective to analyze the situation that provides (1) an accurate description of operating environment and (2) supports synergistic action across the USG with minimal coordination. The current analytic approach for the Department of Defense and the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) has a strong foundation but can be improved to both better accomplish these requirements and more effectively support Integrated Campaigning. Advancing from the JIPOE’s systems foundation, the USG must adopt a perspective that views the behavior of a foreign entity as the result of the adaption and competition of layers of interdependent groups. Although this description may defy intuition, an updated JIPOE framework (and some examples) will help develop intuition for the dynamics of complex adaptive systems. Due to the complexity of these systems, computational tools are inextricably intertwined with their analyses and have the added benefit of being able to encode knowledge for more effective coordination. An improved analytic framework combined with an understanding of existing and emerging artificial intelligence (AI), and a subset of computational tools, allows for an assessment of how computation fits into both the Joint Intelligence Process and Joint Planning Process to support Integrated Campaigns. This shift in understanding has far reaching consequences for all of the Joint Staff directorates but particularly the J2, J3, and J5, and has the potential to revolutionize the conduct of foreign policy.

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Authors: Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.), and Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

Defining Reintegration and Distinguishing Related Terms

We begin by defining reintegration and distinguishing it from other concepts with which it is sometimes conflated. Reintegration is often discussed in the context of disengagement, demobilization, deradicalization, the related literature, which leads to ambiguity regarding their conceptual boundaries (Crowell, 2017; Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012; Marsden, 2015). For the purposes of this discussion, we define reintegration as a process by which ex-combatants or associates assume functional roles in society. This conceptualization can be contrasted with disengagement, which involves a literal movement away from violence; demobilization, which is the process of discharging individuals from their roles as active combatants in armed forces or groups; and deradicalization, which refers to a cognitive shift away from supporting violence as a means for achieving desired goals. Like deradicalization, reconciliation refers to a primarily psychological process that involves healing relationships and creating acceptance for ex-combatants in society. While the “fully realized product” of reintegration is social rehabilitation of former combatants (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis, 2010), “the fully realized product of reconciliation is the achievement of a sustainable peace, including the cessation of violence” (Kuznar, Stevenson, & Pagano, 2018).

In order to successfully execute reintegration and reconciliation (R&R), it is important to understand how R&R fit within an overarching framework for peace. While R&R are the terminal phases of the conflict resolution process and are crucial for an enduring peace, the process may also include disengagement, deradicalization, and counter-radicalization. R&R can occur without deradicalization or where deradicalization is executed at the same time as R&R. Of course, successful R&R is more likely to be achieved if combatants have foregone violence and undergone a psychological shift away from their militant motivations. We provide an overview of these terms and their relationships to one another in Figure 1 [in the report].

Deriving Lessons for Conducting Successful Reintegration and Reconciliation

At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the considerable challenges associated with deriving general lessons for conducting successful R&R. First, there is no single approach to R&R; instead, there are many variations in how programs are structured, the fundamental assumptions driving different approaches, program components, and how the program components are implemented. Second, the empirical evidence base is both narrow and based largely on Western populations, limiting the degree to which findings can be confidently generalized (Marsden, 2019). Third, reintegration and reconciliation processes are extremely context dependent (Marsden, 2019; Moghaddam, 2019). Political, cultural, socio-economic, historical, psychological, and ethnic variables relevant to each conflict can all mold the success or failure of R&R programs. Physical, social, criminal justice, and conflict contexts also influence individual and group motivations to engage in R&R processes as well as which opportunities even exist for reintegration (Marsden, 2019). Despite these limitations, however, there are some emergent themes and insights from R&R in other areas of the world that may be applicable to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). We begin with a discussion of the conditions and components required for successful reintegration, continue with a discussion on reconciliation, and conclude by considering the barriers to reintegration and how the United States and international community might respond in order to overcome those barriers.

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Rethinking Communication Influence from a Strategic Communication Approach

Authors | Editors: Lieber, P. (US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

For over a decade, many within US defense and interagency circles maintain a belief they are ‘losing’ the communication influence battle, one its adversaries are excelling at due to seemingly better strategy and reach. Peer competitor infiltration into American elections, radical groups facilitating foreign fighter flow over chat applications, and/or failed attempts to counter narratives should reason for a glaring need for the US to change strategy. But surprisingly little or none of this strategic shift is occurring. While it acknowledges the importance of peer competitors, there is literally no direct reference to ‘strategic communication’ or equivalent process shortcomings anywhere in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy. Instead—and by political design—US institutions with strategic communication and/or influence authorities remain separated in legislated powers and activities. The result? Disconnected, disjointed and even conflicting approaches to the same problem. In contrast, peer competitors almost brazenly implement a communication influence strategy sabotaging internal and external US interests.

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Authors: Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron) and Arie Kruglanski (University of Maryland)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Key Questions Motivating Study

• How do you protect an at-risk population from extremism in an IDP camp?
• How do you build community resilience to help prevent radicalization?
• How do you triage and segregate persons in IDP/refugee camps that have varying degrees of radicalization?

Abstract

There are tremendous numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria and Iraq as a consequence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The IDPs are a mix of people; men, women, children and those who are radicalized into ISIS ideology and those who are not.  The potential for spreading radicalization into ISIS ideology is high given the conditions most IDPs in Syria and Iraq live under.  This study argues that the most important ingredients for radicalization are the presence of human needs, networks of trusted others who are radicalized, and a narrative that seems to resonate with the potentially radicalizing individual.  The most important need in radicalizing an individual is the need for significance.  This is the need to feel that one matters, that one has purpose in life, and others care about them.  While physical conditions in the camps are very poor as well, with shortages or food, water, security, etc., these conditions reinforce the sense among camp residents that they are not cared for and they do not matter to those who run the camps.  This study employs interview data collected at Al Hawl camp in Syria on behalf of SOJTF/OIR to determine what needs are must salient among the IDPs.  Conditions in Al Hawl camp are rife with significance-diminishing factors for the inhabitants.  There are also many individuals who are already radicalized in the camp who can appeal to those suffering from significance loss.  The primary recommendation offered here is that the most effective immediate strategy to reduce the likelihood of spreading radicalization in the IDP camps is to give the residents a sense of voice and empowerment in their lives.  This means establishing representative bodies for camp residents, creating outreach to the community outside of the camps, and giving camp residents educational and other types of opportunities that give them a sense of agency in their lives.

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