SMA Publications

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line Up Front

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist. Until a diplomatic resolution is achieved, the dispute raises the risk of militarization, however unlikely such escalation may be. The rift may be resolved if Qatar ceases soft power projection that aggravates the governing legitimacy of the Quartet, or if the Quartet relents on its distrust of Qatar and elevates Doha to a more independent status. The most likely avenues of conflict appear to be unintentional confrontation, overt Qatari support for oppositionists that can credibly threaten the Quartet’s domestic legitimacy, and proxy conflict (in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). Restored diplomatic dialogue between Qatar and the Quartet could enable cooperation to overcome such scenarios. However, it is difficult to predict if such dialogue could be achieved in the present climate if one of the aforementioned avenues occurs. Moreover, precipitous escalation remains a possibility given Qatar’s external supporters (Iran, Turkey, Russia). In the unlikely event of militarization, Russia would likely act opportunistically to increase its regional influence where possible, the US would likely work aggressively to preserve Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unity while working to combat Iran, and China would likely lack significant mechanisms of influence but would nonetheless support immediate mediation to prevent any resulting economic instability.

Author | Editors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Much is made of Black Swans by financiers, pundits, and national security experts (Bellomo, Herrero, & Tosin, 2013; Hunt, 2008). It is easy for such provocative and frightening concepts to become the flavor of the day without thinking through if they matter and, if they do, why. Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla summed up the reason why we should be concerned with Black Swans: they matter because the aim of science in the service of national security is to achieve strategic excellence and not merely react to crises surprised and flatfooted. Further, strategic excellence will not be achieved without applying advanced scientific methods to understand problems like Black Swan surprises. LTC Thomas Pike stressed that warfighters must possess the technical skills to use these methods in order to achieve strategic success. This report integrates various SMA Black Swan research efforts as examples of the kinds of information, data, modeling, and thinking required to achieve strategic success in the USCENTCOM AOR. Examples of surprises that can be avoided and how to monitor them are given, and a range of potential Black Swans that could happen but cannot be predicted are reviewed. Each of the SMA Black Swan efforts also provide USCENTCOM with guidelines for thinking through Black Swan scenarios and recommendations as to what can be monitored and predicted, and these are highlighted at the conclusion of this report.

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Author(s): Jiang, M. (Creighton University)

Publication Preview

The United States must adopt a new overarching strategy to guide US-China relations moving forward. Neither the traditional approach of engagement intended to promote democratic ideals, nor more recent confrontational practices, have worked. There is an urgent need for a new strategic framework that embraces Chinese political and economic realities and uses those realities to US advantage to advance US national and international agendas. What is proposed here is an innovative strategic framework utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Successfully implementing this strategy demands a flexible rather than reactive US-China policy encompassing short-term (reengagement), medium-term (challenging), and long-term (integrating) approaches that will advance US interests across the spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict throughout the coming decade.

Authors | Editors: Aviles, W. (NSI); Blocksome, P. (Naval War College– Monterey); Bolduc, D. (Truth to Power LLC); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); DeGennaro, P. (USARMY TRADOC G2 OEC); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Kamp, A. (University of Maryland START); Koven, B. (University of Maryland START); Kuznar, L. (NSI); Levi-Sanchez, S. (Naval War College- Newport); Liebl, V. (CAOCL); Logan, M. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Maloney, M. (USSOCOM); McKee, M. (McKee  Innovation Consulting); Meredith III, S. (National Defense University); Munch, R. (USARMY TRADOC G2 OEC); Oliver, R. (USSOCOM); Pike, T. (USASD / NIU); Sample, E. (Oklahoma State University); Snow, J. (USSOCOM & Donovan Group); Zaborowski, M. (POL AF / USCENTCOM, CCJ-5, CSAG); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Jones, R. (USSOCOM J52 Donovan Group); Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI); Miller, W. (USSOCOM Director of Plans, Strategy and Policy)

Disclaimers

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Mention of any commercial product in this paper does not imply Department of Defense (DOD) endorsement or recommendation for or against the use of any such product. No infringement on the rights of the holders of the registered trademarks is intended.

The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States DOD of the linked websites, or the information, products or services contained therein. The DOD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

Executive Summary

Global Power Competition creates more conflict, particularly when those in the arena believe “Power” to be finite, or a zero-sum game, against a defined set of actors. Both the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy portend of a change in our focus: inter-state strategic competition is now the primary concern in U.S. national security. While the temptation exists for us to focus on the looming giants and the conventional arsenals they build, it is too recent in our history that focusing on one class of adversary—even those who may pose an existential threat compared to a lesser peril from others—leaves us vulnerable for at least three reasons. First, as argued throughout this white paper, because Global Power Competition will result in increased violence and disruption associated with that competition, our success depends on how well we deploy our military to deter unwanted violence in competition and in war. Historically, competition for power inferred power “over.” However, a central thesis of this white paper is that competition should be for power “of.” As Chapter One deftly summarizes, influence on—or power of the people— should be central to the securing of our interests and the modern goal of global power competition.

Second, while a focus on outbidding the activities of our near-peer adversaries is an alluring and measurable objective, to do so may result in a deficit in our lessons learned over the past decades of nonstate conflict. As argued in Chapter Two, great power and asymmetric threats are not orthogonal; instead modern threats are part of an integrated network of complimentary, pragmatic, and sometimes ideological interests that interact in ways that may at times augment our adversaries or weaken our allies. In essence, behind every violent extremist organization (VEO) is a potential great power who stands to gain or lose. As a consequence, decisions we make about what appear to be today’s proximal hazards can diminish our attention on those over the horizon—the Black Swan Scenarios (i.e., Swanarios) that foment in the fissures created by Global Power Competition.

Finally, a focus on inter-state competition mischaracterizes our reality. Moreover, every potential battle increasingly appears related, as near-peer adversaries use sub-conflict strategies to accomplish their goals iteratively—pushing against each other in unexpectedly consequential domains. To create a sustained competitive advantage, the U.S. must lean into the complexity that is associated with this multi-domain competition for influence. The push to understand these globally integrated fires is paramount. To do so, new analytic frameworks must be considered in the age of disruption, as well as a deference to the historical patterns that repeat and provide a roadmap of what to do more of, less of, or differently.

In an initial effort to engage the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Community on these topics, the following White Paper is organized in five sections: 1) an introduction: anatomy of the age of disruption, 2) historical, cross-cultural, and gender perspectives, 3) analytical frameworks for globally integrated fires, 4) regional deep dives and application of the concepts, and 5) operational perspectives.

TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate China Futures Study

Author | Editor: TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate

Executive Summary

The Competitive Zone (or Gray Zone) is “an operational environment ‘churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.’” Given Russia’s military actions in eastern Ukraine and China’s expansion in the South China Sea, “military and academic communities have attempted to describe conflict in the Gray Zone to create shared understanding and spur discussion on conflict and competition in this space.”

The Competitive Zone is further described as “a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use single or multiple elements of power to achieve political- security objectives with activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.”

In 2018, the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiated the Global Competition and Conflict (GCC) Project which sought to answer the following overarching question: “How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?” This requirement also included a request that the Joint Staff SMA coordinate with the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Directorate (MSD) to explore options for employing the Athena Simulation in support of this SMA Project.

The Athena Simulation is a sociocultural modeling capability employed by the TRADOC G-2 which is designed to improve a commander’s understanding of the intended and unintended effects of introducing various DIME-FIL engagement strategies across an operational environment (OE) that is described by the operational variables (PMESII-PT).

The SMA GCC Project focused primarily on Russia and China. The Athena modeling effort focused solely on China (with the exception of one study excursion that explored current events in Hong Kong and the long-term implications on regional stability).

This Final Report compiles the insights derived by the Athena team from research, Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements, Athena Simulation runs, and the collaborative analysis conducted with other members of the SMA community of interest. Insights were also derived as a result of Athena team participation in various related experiments and exercises conducted between January and September 2019.

This Athena-based analysis primarily conducted a deep dive into China’s global outlook, activities, and strategy. The study approach considered three outcome-oriented use cases to assess, compare and contrast potential futures for China over a simulated multi-year period. These use cases are framed as:

• Use Case 1: Status Quo Continuation
• Use Case 2: State Capitalist Acceleration
• Use Case 3: The Lost Decade

The use cases are more fully defined in the introduction section, following this EXSUM. In addition, Athena modeling was used to evaluate two “excursions”:

• Excursion 1: A vignette assessing the volatility in Hong Kong.
• Excursion 2: A vignette examining an influx of members from a violent extremist organization (VEO) into Xinjiang

The analytic focus of the Athena modeling effort was oriented on determining how key factors (i.e., government decisions and economic engagements) affect political, economic, and social stability dynamics across China.

A combination of research, SME engagements, and Athena Simulation modeling and analysis produced the following insights:

Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable
Regardless of the economic growth rate across three use cases, nationwide support for and popular satisfaction with governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declined mildly over a decade. There was no collapse of CCP influence in any region within China (neighborhood). The Lost Decade use case produced a greater decline in popular support for the central government, but not nearly enough to produce any significant change. The Hong Kong Crisis excursion had virtually no effect on the level of popular satisfaction with CCP governance, while the Xinjiang Uprising excursion produced a sharp decline in this metric until the simulated VEO was decisively defeated.

Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable
Nationwide “mood” initially increased and then decreased mildly, roughly mirroring the greatest period of economic growth in the Status Quo and Acceleration cases. In the Lost Decade use case, mood rose negligibly, flattened out, and then declined. When mood was increasing, it was buoyed primarily by the population’s improving sense of safety. When the Hong Kong Crisis and Xinjiang Uprising excursions were applied to all use cases, national mood was virtually unaffected by the Hong Kong Crisis. However, national mood sharply declined during the Xinjiang Uprising and recovered somewhat after it ended. Without excursions, national mood terminates with virtually the same measured effect across all three use cases.

Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard
The Lost Decade impacts the mood of the Chinese population much more negatively than the Acceleration case’s effects are positive. Additionally, the positive changes are very small. When included, the Hong Kong Crisis again had minimal impact on national mood, but the Xinjiang Uprising produced a significant negative impact. The economically vital middle class civilian group, “Working Poor,” is especially harmed by the conditions of The Lost Decade. Both their mood and satisfaction with governance decline steeply over ten years. The Working Poor were specifically assessed in the megacities of Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. The heartland city of Chongqing showed the greatest degree of loss. Along with the Working Poor, the “Power Elite” of Chongqing City saw sharp declines in mood and satisfaction with governance, suggesting a looming threat to CCP legitimacy in the interior if there were significant economic stress.

Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure
The Han “Downtrodden” peasant civilian groups in the countryside show durable tolerance for CCP governance. The mood of the Downtrodden in Han Central declines mildly in the Lost Decade case, mostly due to weakening satisfaction with governance, the net change in mood is virtually zero. The mood rises, then returns to its starting point by the end of the decade. In the Status Quo and State Capitalist Acceleration cases, mood sees a significant net increase, indicating the benefits of economic growth on even one of the most marginal groups.

Insight 5: The Elites are Stable
Chinese political and wealthy elites (“Power Elite” and “Well-Off” civilian groups) generally show durable confidence in CCP governance. There are only slight declines in satisfaction with governance over all three use cases—except in Chongqing City, where elite satisfaction declines precipitously.

Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang
While mood in Xinjiang decayed sharply in all use cases, the mood of Uyghurs was slightly better under Status Quo and State Acceleration (which includes milder treatment of Uyghurs by the CCP). This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area.

Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary
In Hong Kong, during the Hong Kong Crisis excursion and after, support for the Municipal Government fluctuates turbulently during the protests, but post-crisis, it is virtually identical under all use cases. Support trends slightly higher under State Capitalist Acceleration than the Status Quo. Support for the Municipal Government is slightly lower under the Lost Decade than Status Quo.

Conclusion

TRADOC G-2 employed the Athena Simulation to computationally model three potential Chinese futures in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each by assessing control, support, mood, and satisfaction with governance of the Chinese population. Future analytical efforts will leverage the pathway analysis work that other participants in the SMA enterprise are currently developing.

The modeling and analysis produced four primary conclusions resulting from the seven insights:

1. The possibility of regime change in China is virtually nonexistent. (Conclusion from Insight #1)
2. China will likely remain stable overall despite any localized disturbances and grievances. (Conclusion from Insight #2)
3. Chinese elites are generally satisfied with the status quo of Chinese Communist Party governance. (Conclusion from Insight #5)
4. The Hong Kong disturbances are ephemeral and their impact on the rest of China is minimal. (Conclusion from Insight #7)

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Russian Strategic Intentions

Authors | Editors: Arquilla, J. (Naval Postgraduate School); Borshchevskaya, A. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Devyatkin, P. (The Arctic Institute); Dyet, A. (U.S. Army, J5-Policy USCENTCOM); Ellis, R.E. (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Goure, D. (Lexington Institute); Kamp, A. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Kangas, R. (National Defense University); Katz, M. (George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government); Koven, B. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Lamoreaux, J. (Brigham Young University- Idaho); Laruelle, M. (George Washington University); Marsh, C. (Special Operations Research Association); Person, R. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Pyatkov, R. (HAF/A3K CHECKMATE); Schindler, J. (The Locarno Group); Severin, M. (UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Siegle, J. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University); Spalding, R. (U.S. Air Force); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute); Werchan, J. (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict, in direct response to a series of questions posed by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Twenty-three experts contributed to this white paper and provided wide-ranging assessments of Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-five chapters, as described below. This summary reports some of the white paper’s high-level findings, but it is no substitute for a careful read of the individual contributions.

There is broad consensus among the contributors that Russian President Vladimir Putin is indeed adhering to a global grand strategy, which aims to achieve the following goals:

• Reclaim and secure Russia’s influence over former Soviet nations
• Regain worldwide recognition as a “great power”
• Portray itself as a reliable actor, a key regional powerbroker, and a successful mediator (Katz; Borshchevskaya) in order to gain economic, military, and political influence over nations worldwide and to refine the liberalist rules and norms that currently govern the world order (Lamoreaux)

According to Dr. Robert Person, these goals are motivated by Russia’s deep-seated geopolitical insecurity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to find its place in the global community, which has left the leadership with a lingering desire to regain the influence and power that it once had. In particular, Russia seeks to regain its influence over former Soviet states, which it claims are in its rightful “sphere of influence” (Lamoreaux; Person; Marsh). As a result, one of the United States’ core goals, namely promoting and protecting the international liberal order, comes into contention with the goals of Russia’s grand strategy. This underpins the Kremlin’s belief that it must contain and constrain US influence and activities in Europe and elsewhere across the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s contribution suggests, the Russian leadership’s worldview is zero-sum; it believes that in order for Russia to win, the US must lose. However, Dr. Christopher Marsh’s contribution suggests that this world view is not necessarily shared by the Russian population or its elite. As evidenced by the range of “gray zone” activities it engages in, a number of the expert contributors argue that the Russian leadership sees itself as at war with the US and the West as a whole. From a Russian perspective, this war is not total, but rather, it is fundamental (Goure)—a type of “war” that is at odds with the general US understanding of warfare. Russia believes that there is no unacceptable or illegitimate form of deterrence, compellence, or escalation management (Goure). It also does not believe in the continuum of conflict that the US has constructed. Like Russia’s perception of its competition with the US, its perception of conflict is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To fight and win this war, Russia believes that the successful integration of all instruments of state power (Goure), as well as the orchestrated employment of non-military and military means to deter and compel (Flynn), are paramount. Furthermore, Russian military concepts include options for employing preemptive force to induce shock and dissuade an adversary from conducting military operations and to compel a de-escalation of hostilities (Flynn). The authors observe that Russia’s strategies are continuously evolving and expect that the discrepancy between the Russian and the US understanding of “conflict” and “war” will continue to grow, leading to a higher risk of escalation in future situations involving both nations.

Overall, Russia’s influence abroad is growing, and the Kremlin has mastered the use of “hybrid warfare” in driving Russia’s foreign policy (Lamoreaux). Russia utilizes a variety of gray zone tactics around the globe. These include the use of paramilitary forces and other proxies, interference in political processes, economic and energy exploitation (particularly in Africa), espionage, and media and propaganda manipulation. Putin is also adept at blending military and civilian elements for maximum impact (Weitz).

The specific tactics of hybrid warfare that Russia uses vary by region. In Europe, for example, Russia has utilized propaganda, an increasing dependence on external energy resources, and political manipulation to achieve its primary goals (Schindler; Lamoreaux). In contrast, in the Middle East and Africa— important sources of minerals and other natural resources from a Russian perspective1— Russia has primarily utilized economic exploitation tools (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Central Asia, Russia maintains a much more limited presence, due to China’s geographic proximity and the current levels of economic and security engagement by other regional actors (Kangas). Nevertheless, Russia does retain influence in the Central Asia, as a result of its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to the region (Laruelle; Dyet). Likewise, in Latin America, Russia lacks a sufficient amount of deployable resources to fully implement its strategy or to extend its influence very far (Ellis). However, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp observe, Russia makes up for its shortcomings by engaging in episodic and reactive endeavors to disrupt US influence in the region.

Although Russian tactics vary significantly, in all regions of the world energy has been a key source of Russian power and influence (Weitz; Lamoreaux; Borshchevskaya; Devyatkin; Pyatkov; Werchan). Globally, many countries have developed a strong relationship with Russia when it comes to energy. Russia’s energy priorities extend worldwide, and European nations in particular have become dependent on Russia for access to these resources. Africa and the Arctic have also become significant as Russia looks to exploit opportunities for energy-related commerce.

Despite the strength of Russia’s growing influence abroad and the diverse array of gray zone tactics it uses to achieve its strategic goals, the US can still limit the results of this grand strategy. There is broad consensus among the contributors that countering Russian provocations will require the use of all instruments of national power. In particular, US success will be reliant both on its ability to influence populations, states, and non-state actors, and on its ability to minimize Russia’s influence on these actors (Bragg). Creating effective narratives in each of the regions covered in this white paper will be critical for achieving this goal (Kangas; Bragg). Furthermore, the US can counter specific Russian gray zone activities, such as diversifying energy sources to reduce European nations’ dependence on Russia (Pyatkov; Werchan) and counteracting propaganda by creating both resilient democratic institutions and populations abroad, particularly in Europe (Pyatkov). Finally, it is imperative that the US establishes a consensus definition of “gray zone” (Bragg) and reevaluates old paradigms defining war and peace, as we enter a “new era of international politics which is defined by shades of gray” (Weitz). Once defined, a federal agency dedicated to gray zone activities may be required in order to implement a true whole of government approach to combatting Russian influence activities abroad (Werchan).

Report Overview

This white paper has been separated into five parts:

Part I analyzes the key sources of motivation or interests that drive Russian global competitive activities and strategy. This part also addresses the fundamental issues being contested and how these issues impact enduring US national interests.

Part II examines, from a Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and/or escalation management. Part II also evaluates how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict, as well as how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the gray zone. Lastly, Part II assesses the implications of the differences between US and Russian thinking for senior political and military decision makers.

Part III identifies actions the Russians are undertaking in the Gray Zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.

Part IV identifies potential actions that the US could employ either proactively or in response to provocative Russian activities in the gray zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.

Part V highlights capabilities that the US requires to effectively respond to actions the Russians are undertaking in the gray zone.

Part I. What Drives Russia’s Global Interests and Strategy?

Chapter 1: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux identifies three motivations underpinning Russian grand strategy: (1) for the country to be recognized as a great power with its own distinct sphere of influence; (2) the Russian elite perception that Russia has a moral right to predominance within “its” sphere of influence; and (3) the desire to see US global influence curbed and, if possible, scaled back.

Chapter 2: Using the military’s traditional understanding of “strategy” as the coordinated integration of ends, ways, and means, Dr. Robert Person explicates Russian grand strategy. The main “end” of Russian grand strategy in the 21st century is establishing is a “Yalta 2.0,” in which Russia enjoys an uncontested sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, broadcasts Russian voice and influence globally, and establishes reliable constraints on American globe-trotting and regime-change activities. Russia’s ways can be described as one of “asymmetric balancing” through gray zone challenges to prevent uncontested US influence from setting the global agenda. Russia’s means, Person argues, expanded with the oil boom, allowing critical investments and increases in defense spending to be made.

Chapter 3: Using survey data, Dr. Thomas Sherlock shows that neither the Russian mass public, nor Russia elites, believe that the West, particularly the United States, poses a critical military or political danger to the Russian state or regime. While both elites and members of the mass public are supportive of restoring Russia’s great power status, they often define a great power and its priorities more in terms of domestic socio-economic development than in the production and demonstration of hard power. These perspectives increasingly come into conflict with those of Kremlin.

Chapter 4: Dr. Richard Weitz explores key motivations and interests driving Russian global competitive activities and strategies. He discusses how Russian strategists adeptly select gray zone tools optimized to their objectives. These tools often include paramilitary forces, economic and energy exploitation, and media and propaganda manipulation. He suggests that Washington must reevaluate old paradigms between war and peace to maintain strategic primacy in this new era of international politics that is defined by shades of gray.

Chapter 5: Dr. Christopher Marsh takes on one of the most significant questions surrounding Russian foreign policy: whether president Vladimir Putin has an overarching strategy. In his paper, he describes Putin’s grand strategy for Russia and the world. He also analyzes each of Russia’s interests and to what degree they pose a threat to vital US national interests.

Part II. How Does Russia Perceive Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, and the Continuum of Conflict?

Chapter 6: Dr. Daniel Goure argues that according to Russian strategic thought, Russia is already at war with the West. There is no separate concept of gray zone: war is not total, but it is fundamental to the Russian perspective. It follows that Russia’s ability to manage risk in the so-called gray zone is a function of its successful integration of all the instruments of state power.

Chapter 7: Mr. Daniel J. Flynn describes Russian coercive strategies involving the orchestrated employment of nonmilitary and military means to deter and compel the United States prior to and after any outbreak of hostilities. The risk to the US is that these strategies increase the risk of miscalculation and escalation during a future crisis involving the United States.

Part III. What Gray Zone Actions Are Russia Undertaking Across the Globe?

Chapter 8: Dr. John Schindler identifies Russian activities in Europe within a historical and ideological framework. In doing so, he identifies key similarities and differences between the Putin regime and Tsarist Russia, as well as the regime and the Soviet Union. Present day Russian institutions and religious discourse are examined, and Dr. Schindler predicts that the Kremlin will act aggressively in a number of domains, including the few in which it holds an advantage against the United States and its allies. He suggests that a near-term future of “Special War” (i.e. low-level operations that fall below the threshold of declared war) will be the Russian modus operandi and cautions US and allied policymakers to guard against such actions.

Chapter 9: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux explains that the list of Russian activities in Europe remains long and complex, and the means that the Kremlin uses to sow instability span geopolitics, economics, diplomacy, and military domains. In this chapter, Dr. Lamoreaux pays special attention to Russia’s ability to propagate societal discord, particularly through Russian-linked populations in the Baltic States. These populations, whether active or passive participants in a campaign, are vulnerable to Russian actions aimed at weakening social cohesion in these states. Short of each side grudgingly accepting the other’s claims on the continent (which is improbable), Russia and the West are likely to be locked in at some level of competition for the near future.

Chapter 10: Dr. Marlene Laruelle states that, despite a more crowded field of large states vying for influence in Central Asia, Russia still retains a prime position as “first among equals,” due to its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to states in the region. To wit, Russia can exercise remunerative, punitive, and ideological power over the states within the bloc. It has tried to develop its diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with states in the region, with varying degrees of success. Even though the space for great powers to exert influence has become more crowded, because of relatively recent overtures by China and the United States, this region is not necessarily a site of zero-sum statist competition, due to shared objectives by these great powers.

Chapter 11: Dr. Mark N. Katz explains that, although the United States and Russia share a number of objectives in the Middle East, the means by which Russia seeks to achieve these objectives will likely continue to bring it into conflict with the United States. The Kremlin has purported itself as a reliable interlocutor and partner to Middle Eastern nations, some of whom fear wavering commitment by the United States recently. Animated largely by fears of a restive Muslim population that could end up within his borders, in addition to economic and prestige concerns, Vladimir Putin has been conducting deft diplomacy within the region. However, his strategy is vulnerable to shocks to the system and may not be able to withstand Arab Spring/Color Revolution-style uprisings within the region.

Chapter 12: Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya highlights Russia’s series of multi-faceted outreach initiatives in Africa. Through economic, military, and other means, Russia is creating an intentional dependence among North Africa’s military, political leaders and businessmen on continuous Russian support. For more autocratic regimes, Russia’s support is intended to provide a shield against Western influence in the area through forming alliances with the country’s strongmen, while serving as an intermediary for local conflict resolution. Russia’s key interests include gaining and protecting access to the Mediterranean coast, while exploiting opportunities for energy and trade. The intent of these efforts is increased political leverage, rather than a genuine resolution for the people of North Africa.

Chapter 13: Ms. Malin Severin argues that Russia believes that it is currently engaged in a multi- faceted conflict with the West, and is constrained by Western policies and actions. As such, Russia has established several footholds in Africa. The Russian presence goes beyond seeking natural resources; Russia has placed private military contractors and advisors into several African regimes, including the Central African Republic, among others. These actions reflect a strategy similar to that revealed through Russian activities in the Ukraine and Syria, and involvement is likely to increase as the US potentially takes steps to limit Western presence in Africa.

Chapter 14: Dr. R. Evan Ellis explains that Russian activity in Latin America, while constrained by resources and geopolitical events, has been historically focused on the Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes, although it is not limited solely to those regimes. By attempting to create both economic and military footholds, Russia seeks opportunities to expand its influence in the region. Despite setbacks due to regional events, Russia is likely to continue to explore ways to leverage and exploit opportunities for increasing both its military and economic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Chapter 15: Mr. Pavel Devyatkin writes that Russia’s activities in the Arctic have included more multilateral cooperation, and have been focused on securing access for northern shipping routes and energy extraction. The formation of the Arctic Council between Russia and other Arctic countries has enabled cooperation on resolution of territorial claims, as well as oil spill and search-and-rescue operations. Strategically, the Arctic region plays a significant role in Russia’s energy, economic, and defense priorities, as evidenced by the size and activities of the Northern Fleet, as well as frequent mention in Russian published doctrine.

Part IV. How Should the US Counteract Russian Gray Zone Activities Across the Globe?

Chapter 16: Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov discusses potential global actions to counter provocative Russian activities. The US National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls out Russian actions to undermine NATO and modify European and Middle Eastern security and economic organizations in its favor (National Defense Strategy summary, p. 2). Countering Russian provocations requires all instruments of national power, and US responses can be both proactive and reactive. Proactively, the United States can strengthen its allies’ and partners’ democratic systems of governance, while reducing their dependence on Russian energy through diversification of energy sources. To counter Russian military proxies, the United States can increase the capabilities of allies and partners. Meanwhile, Russian threats to use force can be mitigated by demonstrating US resolve and capability to deter and defeat Russian aggression.

Chapter 17: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux focuses on countering Russian influence in the Baltic States. He writes that Russian influence in Europe happens primarily through “hybrid warfare” techniques. To counter this, the United States ought to take steps to strengthen economic, political, and societal liberalism across Europe. Economic and political liberalism both create strong states, capable of providing the institutions necessary for societal liberalism. Societal liberalism, when it is upheld by the rule of law, helps create a more diverse, yet united, populace that is more committed to the state and its basic institutions, and less likely to be influenced by outside sources (in this case, Russia).

Chapter 18: Dr. Roger Kangas recommends a US approach to Russian activities across Central Asia. He begins by discussing the particular difficulties of Central Asia, geopoltically. Among the sub- regions of the world, the area of Central Asia is one of the more difficult regions to outline clear actions for the US, simply because of the advantages that other large powers have, due to geographic proximity and current rates of economic and security engagement. Given this geopolitical reality in Central Asia, the US has a limited role to play. If the “tools of engagement” are exercised consistently and clearly, the US can have a positive influence in the region. The countries collectively chafe at that notion they are part of a “Russian Near Abroad.” Officials and analysts from the region repeatedly discuss the need to choose their future paths of engagement, whether in terms of multi-vectored security relations or diversifying trade and export/import routes. These signals can be addressed by US policies and actions. The refrain from needing the US to act as a “balancer” is heard from such actors, as well as many in the Washington, DC think tank community that focus on Central Asia. To do this, the US must be able to shape its own narrative in the region, combatting a rather vitriolic Russian message that paints the US in a negative light.

Chapter 19: Dr. Robert Spalding III discusses how the US role with regard to Russia should be to continue to engage European allies to take the lead for balancing in Europe. The allies’ goal should be deterrence. At the same time, the US should bilaterally engage Russia to peel them away from China’s orbit. The US can work with Russia in ways that improve the US-Russia relationship without detracting from European efforts to balance and deter. This can be applied by engaging with Russia in other regional or functional domains that do not detract from European efforts to deter.

Chapter 20: MAJ Adam Dyet argues that, while the breakup of the Soviet Union presented the US with new engagement opportunities in Central Asia, options to expand US influence in the area remain limited. He argues that despite Central Asian ire at Russian activities in Ukraine, Russian influence in the area remains high, and US policy makers should take a carefully moderated approach to engagement in Central Asia. Suggestions of diplomatic, security, and economic activities that the US could undertake are offered, as are cautions about treading over long-standing Russian red lines.

Chapter 21: MAJ Adam Dyet discusses a variety of ways in which the United States can respond to Russian gray zone activities in the Middle East—the balance of which, he argues, are directly tied to Russian strategic culture and a worldview based in a history of invasion and military encirclement.

Chapter 22: Dr. Joseph Siegle discusses Russian interests in Africa, namely access to natural resources and new markets for Russian goods, including weapons. He argues that, as a result, Russia has tended to support autocratic or uninclusive regimes, giving the US an opportunity to distinguish itself in Africa by pursuing an assertive policy against individual corrupt leaders and positive engagement, while also supporting democratic reforms.

Chapter 23: Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp explain that Russia’s activities in Latin America have largely been an extension of its efforts to operate within the gray zone between overt military conflict and normal peacetime operations. In Latin America, the Kremlin has engaged in electoral meddling and targeted disinformation campaigns in order to impose costs on adversaries. In Mexico, Russian media had vocally supported a chosen candidate, and observers noted activity by bots and trolls in support of that candidate’s agenda. In Colombia, Russia had long supplied arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist insurgency, but since the group’s recent peace deal with the Colombian government, the Kremlin may need to change tactics in order to maintain influence therein. Colombia’s complex political dynamics, nevertheless, provides a fertile ground for Russian activities, spanning electoral meddling, mass media disinformation, and hardliners within the FARC.

Part V. What Capabilities Does the US Need to Effectively Respond to Russian Gray Zone Activities?

Chapter 24: Dr. Belinda Bragg provides a summary of findings from an SMA project on gray zone conflict, noting the importance of honing a clear definition of the “competitive zone” within which gray activities occur. She also notes that an effective US response to these activities requires added capabilities to both influence foreign populations and block the efforts of others to manipulate popular sentiment.

Chapter 25: Mr. Jason Werchan argues that Russia’s form of governance gives it “significant flexibility” and an advantage over the US when it comes to gray zone activities. The US needs a true whole-of-government approach to counter Russia in this area. Werchan suggests that the US government should identify a lead federal agency for US activities in the gray zone. He also encourages the development of the US’s “capability to effectively foster distrust and unease between the Russia Federation and China,” as well as US efforts to reduce European dependence on Russian energy resources.

“Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities”

Authors | Editors: Allen, G. (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)); Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Beckley, M. (Tufts University); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Bremseth, L.R. (Computer Systems Center Incorporated (CSCI)); Cheng, D. (Heritage Foundation); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Copeland, D. (University of Virginia); DeFranco, J. (George Mason University); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Ehteshami, A. (Durham University); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Forrest, C. (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE)); Giordano, J. (Georgetown University); Gregory, J. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Jiang, M. (Creighton University); Mazarr, M. (RAND); McGlinchey, E. (George Mason University); Nandakumar, G. (Old Dominion University); Roberts, C. (Hunter College, City University of New York (CUNY) / Columbia University); Schurtz, J. (Georgia Tech Research Institute); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Spalding, R. (Hudson Institute), Watson, C. (National Defense University); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute); Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology; Georgetown University; University College London; New America); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.); Pagano, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Prefaces Provided By: Czerewko, J. (Joint Staff, J39); Babb, J. (US Army Command and General Staff College)

Executive Summary

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-seven experts contributed to this white paper, providing wide-ranging assessments of China’s domestic and international activities in order to assess the future of China and the challenges that these activities may present to US interests. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-four chapters. While this summary presents some of the white paper’s high-level findings, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the experts’ individual contributions, which are worth reading in their entirety.

Understanding Chinese motivations and strategy

There is broad consensus among the white paper contributors that understanding the reasons, motivation, and strategy behind China’s actions is critical. Several of the contributors highlight the motivations behind China’s global activities. For example, one driver of China’s actions is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) belief that it is currently in a state of competition with the US (Cheng). A sense of insecurity about the future (Copeland) and a desire to maintain power also influence CCP behaviors (Copeland; Mazarr; Watson), as does the Party’s belief that information is inseparably linked both to the national interest and to the CCP’s survival (Cheng).

Other contributors focused on Chinese strategy. Internally, the CCP uses humiliation, distrust of the US, and China’s historical grievance to validate its rule and maintain power (Watson). Externally, China has developed a form of “strategic integrated deterrence.” This concept—which goes beyond military capabilities to incorporate political, diplomatic, economic, information, psychological, and scientific/technical capabilities—is designed to “deter and compel the US prior to and after the outbreak of hostilities” (Flynn). Given the criticality of information to regime survival, the CCP deems it necessary not only to control and influence information flow into China, but also to shape and mold the international structures that manage this flow (Cheng). Similarly, the CCP recognizes the importance of data—particularly for social control. The Party seeks to embed its model of social control into the technological matrix built and powered by Western tech companies, according to Dr. Robert Spalding III. It also seeks to expand and guide the development of tech-based businesses and social models in the future, and in order to do so, the CCP may recognize the benefits of adopting a more open system.

China and technological innovation

Several contributors indicate that China is well-positioned to become a world leader in science and technology research and development (S/T R&D), blockchain technology, and artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Dr. James Giordano, CAPT (ret) L. R. Bremseth, and Mr. Joseph DeFranco indicate that China is making significant investments in international scientific, biomedical, and technological markets for strategic purposes. Moreover, China intends to align its S/T R&D with explicit national directives and agendas to exercise its global hegemony and could leverage its S/T to disrupt global balances of order and power (Giordano, Bremseth, & DeFranco). China is also aiming to dominate the finacial technology (fintech) sector. Several Chinese companies possess digital payment systems that have major competitive advantages in the form of scale and proprietary technologies (Nandakumar). These companies could easily become market leaders if blockchain-based financial systems become the norm, and blockchains can also be used by the CCP for strategic purposes. Lastly, according to Mr. Gregory Allen, the CCP believes that AI is a “strategic technology” that will play a critical role in the future of economic and military power. Allen suggests that AI has the potential to start an “intelligentized” military technological revolution, which could give China the opportunity to narrow its military gap with the US. Consequently, China will only continue to seek leadership and make even greater use of its AI strength.

Another contributor, Mr. John Schurtz, argues that China is becoming a world leader in technology and military innovation as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes the importance of leading military innovation, and as a result, it has become poised to challenge the world’s most advanced militaries in the production of next generation high technology weapon systems. China will only continue to pursue ambitious innovation objectives in these areas, as is evidenced by its ‘Military-Civilian Fusion’ (MCF) development efforts.

Digital authoritarianism and Chinese regime durability

In this white paper, Dr. Nicholas D. Wright critically examines the relationship between digital authoritarianism and the durability of the Chinese regime. Although digitization may have negative effects on the durability of the Chinese regime, Dr. Wright argues that it can also strengthen the regime’s durability in the short- to medium-term by providing a plausible route for ongoing regime control while also making Chinese citizens wealthy. In addition, China’s development of a digital authoritarian regime enables its influence over other states in a competition for global influence, both through ideas and the exportation of digital systems (Wright). However, if China’s model is not broadly appealing to swing states, China may not be able to solidify its influence over these countries’ regimes and will ultimately lose this competition for influence. The future evolution of AI technology and the way in which liberal democracies adapt to becoming digital political regimes are also factors that could impact the situation (Wright).

Chinese global influence

China aspires to achieve global power status and challenge the US by extending its influence and strengthening its relationships with regions such as Europe; Eurasia; Central, West, and South Asia; and Latin America. One way in which China is aiming to increase its global influence is by increasing its economic footprint in these regions, as is evidenced by China’s expansion of trade and investments via its Belt and Road Initiative (Ehteshami & Weitz). China wants to secure access to valuable resources and create an “economic web” for its own benefit (Ehteshami, Watson, & Weitz). If these countries become economically dependent on trade with China, Beijing could use these dependencies to its advantage by using economic pressure to gain political compliance and/or undermine alliances with the US, as China did with South Korea and US deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg).

Some regions, such as Central Asia, have reacted to Chinese influence activities with hesitation and skepticism (McGlinchey). Other regions, such as Latin America (Watson), have welcomed China’s increasing engagement and have increasingly turned to China, rather than the US, to fulfill their economic needs. European states benefit significantly from access to Chinese markets for exports and have thus welcomed Chinese economic engagement opportunities as well, despite disapproval of enforced technology-transfer by domestic European companies seeking to operate in China, international property theft, and human rights abuses by Chinese companies (Dorondo).

Another outcome of increasing Chinese influence across these regions is that pre-existing US alliances with regional states are subject to increased pressure from China. Modern US alliances across the globe, and with European nations in particular, have enabled a a high level of US prosperity and security; conversely, weakening of these relationships could lead to potential US vulnerabilities (Dorondo). The diminishment of US relations with states in the referenced regions could result in economic troubles and/or a loss of regional influence, for instance. The US has the ability to counter these Chinese global outreach activities and prevent reliance on trade with China by strengthening its own relationships with these countries and using Chinese regional shortcomings to its advantage.

Despite Chinese global influence activities that present challenges to US interests and the current global order, the US must recognize that Chinese “future elites” (e.g., students from the top universities in China) still generally respect and admire American values and institutions (Gregory & Sherlock). Thus, despite the critical narratives being propagated by the Chinese regime and the competitive nature between the US and China, a significant portion of the Chinese population still views the US in a positive light, and not as an enemy.

The future of US-China competition

The future of global competition between the US and China will be centered around economic development and technological innovation (Hinck & Cooley). Dr. Michael Beckley presents a critical perspective of China’s economic growth, arguing that it is not as impressive as it appears, and that China faces several significant restraints that prevent it from closing the wealth gap with the US. However, China will try to continue to make economic strides in an effort to catch up to the US. Prof. Cynthia Roberts cautions that, despite the importance and usefulness of international financial instruments, the US should refrain from overusing such instruments. US decision makers must consider the consequences of weaponizing finance or imposing economic costs on its opponents. Such actions could result in consequences such as countries looking to diversify to currencies other than the US dollar, like the renminbi (RMB) or digital currencies, which over time could significantly reduce US leverage and give others, including China, greater freedom to maneuver.

Managing the challenges that China presents

The US and China are competing to shape the foundational global paradigm—the ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics (Mazarr). This competition ultimately revolves around norms, narratives, and legitimacy. The CCP has tethered its legitimacy to achieving the goals of the China Dream proposed by Xi Jinping, which include economic success, increasing Chinese influence, and defending national territories (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg). Both internally and externally, it is critical for China to highlight its successes and portray itself in a positive manner in order to make the China Dream a reality. In its attempts to achieve these goals and shape the global paradigm, China is pursuing ambitious economic endeavors, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s power is also growing in the form of its military buildup, as is evident through its increased pressure on Taiwan, its limited war with Vietnam, and its conflict with India over disputed territory (Mazarr). The challenges that China presents threaten US interests and the current world order, and therefore, it is imperative that the US successfully and carefully mitigates these challenges.

Several contributors also provide recommendations for US decision makers, namely that they must acknowledge the extent to which the US is already in competition with China and recognize the range of actions that China is taking; they must also begin to counter these actions by engaging in hard bargaining, drawing clear redlines, and remaining cautious to not provoke unwanted Chinese behaviors (Cheng). One white paper contributor, Dr. Maorong Jiang, suggests that the US might need a new strategy, utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach in order to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Additionally, Lt. Col. Christopher D. Forrest asserts that competing in the gray zone will be an integral part of this competition, where the US must focus its time, energy, and resources. In order to effectively counter ongoing Chinese gray zone actions, the US will likely need to make some cultural and organizational changes and adapt a different lens through which to view US capability development and operations (Forrest).

Types and Locations of Challenges to US Interests, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Colonel Kris Bauman (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Raphael S. Cohen (RAND Corporation), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Stuart J. Kaufman (University of Delaware), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Dr. Laura Silver (Pew Research Center), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)

Question of Focus

[Q5] In which regions should the US expect significant challenges to its interests over the coming decade? What form will these challenges take (e.g., poor/instable governance, rising hegemons, aggrieved populations, violent non-state actors, external influence operations, etc.) and which US interests will these challenges most likely impact?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eighteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors assess the types and locations of significant challenges to US interests that will emerge over the coming decade.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Potential for a China-Russia and/or US-China-Russia Alliance – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Paul J. Bolt (US Air Force Academy), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Dr. Steve Tsang (University of London), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q9] Are there any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against US interests, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there are any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against the US, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Using Narratives to Shape Chinese and Russian Behavior – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Authors | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Nicholas Michelsen (King’s College, London), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Dr. Laura Roselle (Elon University), Dr. Scott Ruston (Arizona State University), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q12] What are the elements of a narrative that lends coherence to United States military activities and can help shape Chinese and Russian behaviors?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can use narratives to lend coherence to its military activities and shape Chinese and Russian behavior.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.