SMA Publications

Authors: Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron) and Arie Kruglanski (University of Maryland)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Key Questions Motivating Study

• How do you protect an at-risk population from extremism in an IDP camp?
• How do you build community resilience to help prevent radicalization?
• How do you triage and segregate persons in IDP/refugee camps that have varying degrees of radicalization?

Abstract

There are tremendous numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria and Iraq as a consequence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The IDPs are a mix of people; men, women, children and those who are radicalized into ISIS ideology and those who are not.  The potential for spreading radicalization into ISIS ideology is high given the conditions most IDPs in Syria and Iraq live under.  This study argues that the most important ingredients for radicalization are the presence of human needs, networks of trusted others who are radicalized, and a narrative that seems to resonate with the potentially radicalizing individual.  The most important need in radicalizing an individual is the need for significance.  This is the need to feel that one matters, that one has purpose in life, and others care about them.  While physical conditions in the camps are very poor as well, with shortages or food, water, security, etc., these conditions reinforce the sense among camp residents that they are not cared for and they do not matter to those who run the camps.  This study employs interview data collected at Al Hawl camp in Syria on behalf of SOJTF/OIR to determine what needs are must salient among the IDPs.  Conditions in Al Hawl camp are rife with significance-diminishing factors for the inhabitants.  There are also many individuals who are already radicalized in the camp who can appeal to those suffering from significance loss.  The primary recommendation offered here is that the most effective immediate strategy to reduce the likelihood of spreading radicalization in the IDP camps is to give the residents a sense of voice and empowerment in their lives.  This means establishing representative bodies for camp residents, creating outreach to the community outside of the camps, and giving camp residents educational and other types of opportunities that give them a sense of agency in their lives.

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Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line Up Front

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist. Until a diplomatic resolution is achieved, the dispute raises the risk of militarization, however unlikely such escalation may be. The rift may be resolved if Qatar ceases soft power projection that aggravates the governing legitimacy of the Quartet, or if the Quartet relents on its distrust of Qatar and elevates Doha to a more independent status. The most likely avenues of conflict appear to be unintentional confrontation, overt Qatari support for oppositionists that can credibly threaten the Quartet’s domestic legitimacy, and proxy conflict (in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia). Restored diplomatic dialogue between Qatar and the Quartet could enable cooperation to overcome such scenarios. However, it is difficult to predict if such dialogue could be achieved in the present climate if one of the aforementioned avenues occurs. Moreover, precipitous escalation remains a possibility given Qatar’s external supporters (Iran, Turkey, Russia). In the unlikely event of militarization, Russia would likely act opportunistically to increase its regional influence where possible, the US would likely work aggressively to preserve Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unity while working to combat Iran, and China would likely lack significant mechanisms of influence but would nonetheless support immediate mediation to prevent any resulting economic instability.

Author | Editors: Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Preview

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Much is made of Black Swans by financiers, pundits, and national security experts (Bellomo, Herrero, & Tosin, 2013; Hunt, 2008). It is easy for such provocative and frightening concepts to become the flavor of the day without thinking through if they matter and, if they do, why. Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla summed up the reason why we should be concerned with Black Swans: they matter because the aim of science in the service of national security is to achieve strategic excellence and not merely react to crises surprised and flatfooted. Further, strategic excellence will not be achieved without applying advanced scientific methods to understand problems like Black Swan surprises. LTC Thomas Pike stressed that warfighters must possess the technical skills to use these methods in order to achieve strategic success. This report integrates various SMA Black Swan research efforts as examples of the kinds of information, data, modeling, and thinking required to achieve strategic success in the USCENTCOM AOR. Examples of surprises that can be avoided and how to monitor them are given, and a range of potential Black Swans that could happen but cannot be predicted are reviewed. Each of the SMA Black Swan efforts also provide USCENTCOM with guidelines for thinking through Black Swan scenarios and recommendations as to what can be monitored and predicted, and these are highlighted at the conclusion of this report.

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Author(s): Jiang, M. (Creighton University)

Publication Preview

The United States must adopt a new overarching strategy to guide US-China relations moving forward. Neither the traditional approach of engagement intended to promote democratic ideals, nor more recent confrontational practices, have worked. There is an urgent need for a new strategic framework that embraces Chinese political and economic realities and uses those realities to US advantage to advance US national and international agendas. What is proposed here is an innovative strategic framework utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Successfully implementing this strategy demands a flexible rather than reactive US-China policy encompassing short-term (reengagement), medium-term (challenging), and long-term (integrating) approaches that will advance US interests across the spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict throughout the coming decade.

Great Power Activities in the Indo-Pacific and Africa – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Justin V. Hastings (University of Sydney), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Dr. Philip Fei- Ling Wang (Georgia Institute of Technology), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q6] How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by increasing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa? How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by Russian efforts to assert its influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fifteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors assess Chinese and Russian activities and influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa, and how an increasing Chinese and Russian presence in these regions are likely to impact the United States and its allies.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

“Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): The Strategic Importance of Defining the Enemy”

Author | Editor: Liebl, V. (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In this paper, as part of SMA’s Invited Perspectives series, Mr. Vern Liebl indicates that ‘violent extremist organization’ (VEO) may not be an accurate term for describing modern terrorist entities. To illustrate this point, Mr. Liebl first provides a brief history of how the term ‘VEO’ entered US defense, intelligence, and law enforcement officials’ lexicon and became commonly used. He then defines what the term ‘VEO’ means and questions whether it still appropriately applies to the organizations that have been labelled as such (namely Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State). To conclude, Mr. Liebl questions whose viewpoints are taken into consideration when declaring an entity a ‘VEO’ and whether this practice is valid or “mere propaganda by those who may sympathize with it.” He also argues that the definitions of terms such as ‘VEO’ and ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) should have a statutory basis and cautions US government officials that assigning labels based on fear and political expediency is unacceptable and could potentially be dangerous.

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Types and Locations of Challenges to US Interests, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Colonel Kris Bauman (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Raphael S. Cohen (RAND Corporation), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Stuart J. Kaufman (University of Delaware), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Dr. Laura Silver (Pew Research Center), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)

Question of Focus

[Q5] In which regions should the US expect significant challenges to its interests over the coming decade? What form will these challenges take (e.g., poor/instable governance, rising hegemons, aggrieved populations, violent non-state actors, external influence operations, etc.) and which US interests will these challenges most likely impact?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eighteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors assess the types and locations of significant challenges to US interests that will emerge over the coming decade.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Global Strategy Amidst the Globe’s Cultures: Cultures in Individual Cognition, States and the Global System

Author | Editor: Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology)

Executive Summary

How can the US make global strategy in a world both vast and rich with cultural diversity? This matters: the US shaped the global system more than any other power since 1945, and that system hugely benefited the US and much of the globe. Whoever leads the global examine two aspects of this challenge.

First, how can US policymakers make global strategy? The globe is vast, with some 193 countries, 4 billion internet users, 7000 languages, and 100 million Amazon Alexas. ‘Global strategy’ involves important activities and interests in all the continents that contain a significant fraction of the world’s population. It isn’t just grand strategy, which any state can have. It isn’t just international strategy: the global system differs from the sum of its nations, because of transnational societal networks and domains like global finance or cyber. Three defining US conflicts were global: both World Wars and the Cold War.

Recommendations:

(1) Adopt a global mindset. Policymaking should include a global vantage point.

(2) Use global system effects, not just actor-specific effects. The US may most decisively influence China, for instance, via actions with Russia, global finance or Japan.

Second, how should strategy consider global cultural diversity? Culture is the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a human group and reflects ‘how things are done around here.’ Many disciplines study culture (e.g. cross-cultural cognition and business, strategic, or political cultures) – and all of them find it slippery to define and measure. I integrate these largely disconnected fields into a mutually reinforcing framework.

I also conduct two deep dives on culture:

Culture in the individual’s mind and brain: I systematically reviewed thousands of cognitive science papers comparing decision-making in East Asia and the West. I found: (1) for most aspects of choice no robust evidence shows cultural differences (e.g. risk or fairness); (2) some differences are often discussed but lack any clear testing (e.g. East Asians care more about “face”); and (3) some aspects of choice do consistently differ, e.g. East Asians tend to engage in more context-dependent processing than Westerners, by attending more to a salient object’s relationship with its context.

Next I asked if these cognitive differences relate to strategic thinking. I compared China and the US using empirical data from doctrine, elite opinion (including interviews in China) and extant scholarship. Context-dependence, for instance, helps explain different representations of deterrence, offense and defense.

Recommendations:

(1) Apply a framework integrating cultural insights from multiple disciplines in order to anticipate both (a) competitors’ decision-making, and (b) how to influence the global swing states crucial to success in global grey zone competition.

(2) Cultural commonalties between the world’s humans greatly outweigh differences, but specific differences—e.g. context dependence—can provide operationalizable tools to cause intended, and avoid unintended, effects.

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Global Competition: Planning Globally Integrated Operations

Authors | Editors: Elder, R. (George Mason University); Levis, A. (George Mason University)

Abstract

With support from GTRI, GMU worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to identify preferred, acceptable, and sustainable strategic outcomes for the U.S. and its partners. Decomposing these outcomes into causal effects and influencers served as a starting point to identify opportunities for Joint Force leaders and their inter-organizational partners to integrate military efforts and align military and non-military activities to avoid unacceptable strategic outcomes while pursuing U.S. national interests. A specific focus was to identify opportunities to counter competitor- shaping activities (particularly China and Russia) that limit U.S. freedom of action. The approach was based on challenges outlined in the Joint Staff Globally Integrated Operations Concept document. Using TIN models, GMU found that comparing U.S. and competitor regional objectives and identifying those that are in conflict with one another were a good way to highlight likely areas of competition that could develop into crises. This approach was also found useful as a means to develop potential indications and warnings. Computational experiments highlighted that U.S. and partner activities in response (counter-shaping) to one competitor’s actions can be easily misinterpreted by other competitors due to lack of context, as well as purposefully misinterpreted to use as leverage for their own counter-U.S. or counter-West campaigns. Finally, the experiments suggest that U.S. or partners taking actions to shape the environment as a prophylactic against competitor counter-west shaping activities has the potential to be misinterpreted which could create disturbances affecting regional stability and potentially lead to inadvertent escalation during periods of crisis.

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Russia’s Sentimental Revisionist Approach to Competition and Conflict – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q4] How does Russia perceive the continuum of conflict? How does Russia plan for, operate within, and manage risk within the competitive space? From the Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management? What are the implications of those differences for senior political and military decision makers in the US?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of seven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict and how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the competitive space.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.