SMA Publications

Authors: Dr. Bradford Morrison (University of British Columbia) and Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia)

Executive Summary

The UBC research group assessed psychological processes of six DPRK leaders, including Kim Jong-un, using thematic content analysis for integrative complexity and motive imagery, and Profiler Plus® computer-scored measures of Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE), Distrust, and Self-Confidence. Despite some individual differences, in general the leaders were low in complexity, higher in power motivation than other motives, and high in BACE and distrust. This pattern indicates closed-mindedness, rigid thinking and planning, lack of perceptiveness in considering or trusting outsiders’ viewpoints and goals, a need for rapid and definite closure, and low probability of negotiating mutual concessions or flexibility in interaction. When under increased tension, the DPRK leaders’ profiles showed even higher distrust and need for power, somewhat increased affiliation need, and reduced motivation for achievement. These patterns indicate a low likelihood of significant changes of basic beliefs, motives, and strategies, despite possible overt assertions of such changes.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

12th Annual SMA Conference – The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Conference Theme

The 12th Annual SMA Conference, entitled “The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World,” was held 21-22 May 2019 at the General Jacob E. Smart Conference Center at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The conference theme was defined as:

“The actors, actions, and arenas of the emerging global security environment are changing. To navigate these murky waters, the United States requires effective statecraft that relies in equal measure on: (1) resurgent diplomatic application of national will, (2) information and technological overmatch including through artificial intelligence, (3) multi-use conventional and irregular warfighting capabilities, and (4) economic growth fostering national interests across domestic and international private-public partnerships. Such a comprehensive and nuanced approach is needed to achieve strategic success in diverse contested spaces, and address the complex political, economic, social, and ecological challenges that will face the nation.”

Jointly with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), SMA welcomed panelists and speakers from across the United States Government (USG), academia, foreign partner nations, and industry to explore this theme. This year, the Conference welcomed keynote speakers General Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and Lieutenant General John N. T. Shanahan, Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and invited speaker Mr. Brian Murphy, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in DHS.

Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Tactics of Competing Powers Over the Coming Decade – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Bogdan Belei (Harvard University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Steve S. Sin (University of Maryland START), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)

Question of Focus

[Q2] What kinetic (e.g., weapon systems) and non-kinetic (e.g., disinformation campaigns, financial market manipulation, political tampering) tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-six Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what kinetic and non-kinetic tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to challenge the United States and its interests over the coming decade.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Honduras were analyzed: the 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, the 2011-12 distribution of agricultural land, and the 2011-12 distribution of the USAID DHS wealth factor score.

Results

The Honduran population exhibits an overall propensity for taking risks, and at a much higher rate than is typical for most countries. This analysis indicates that both the very poor and the wealthiest Hondurans have the greatest potential for risk taking.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The high degree of risk taking among elites may be reflected in political instability such as the 2009 coup d’état. Risk taking among the poorest half of the population could be manifest in their attraction toward illegal activity, migration as a reaction to the lack of economic opportunity in a poor nation with wage stagnation, and to the threat of violence from gangs.

Implications for US Interests

Honduras’ high levels of inequality are a source of its extremely high levels of violence, which has emerged as the main driver for migration. Honduran migration has had a destabilizing effect on the region, including on US domestic political unity. Increasing distance between the US government and Honduras, coupled with the potential for unexpected changes in leadership and policy of the Honduran government, could jeopardize US interests and create opportunities for Chinese and Russian encroachment.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has been actively increasing its influence in the region through development, aid, and education programs. The Honduran government could potentially shift its allegiance toward China depending on changes among the political elite, and common Honduran people might seek Chinese aid in order to overcome the lack of opportunity within Honduran society. However, Honduran recognition of Taiwan remains an obstacle to Chinese/Honduran political relations.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has been actively increasing its influence in Latin America through diplomatic initiatives. The Honduran government has historically been a staunch US ally, although recent decreases in aid to Honduras may weaken that relationship. The Honduran government at this time appears to fear growing influence of Russia in the region, although increasing distance between the US and Honduras creates an opportunity for Russia to undermine US influence.

Author: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

As part of the Quick Concept Series, Dr. John A. Stevenson of NSI, Inc, defines “fragile states” in the context of this effort. In situating fragile states as internationally recognized political units experiencing disorder, Dr. Stevenson briefly reviews the various conceptions of state strength, and then operationalizes the correlates of state fragility. In doing so, Dr. Stevenson highlights which factors of state fragility foreign powers can assist with without increasing disorder in fragile states.

Pakistan Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Six datasets on wealth and status distribution in Pakistan were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data from years 2018 and 2014, USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores and agricultural land ownership from 2012-13, and wealth factor scores from 2006-07.

Results

All six datasets paint a picture of a risk acceptant Pakistani population that has slightly decreased over the past decade, and the average Arrow-Pratt score is higher than most countries in this study, indicating a less risk acceptant population than most countries. Interesting variations and shifts between occupational datasets in risk acceptance may explain the success of Imran Khan’s populist campaign; furthermore, the highly risk acceptant scores in the agricultural land ownership datasets highlight the extreme economic inequality that exists in the distribution of agricultural land ownership.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The propensity for risk taking in Pakistan is best understood in the context of Pakistan’s widespread corruption and the lack of competent economic governance. Public discontent possibly fuels frustration with these issues and maybe linked to the populist rise of Imran Khan who ran anti-corruption, economic reform, and a strong anti-Western sentiment that places the blame of VEO activity and instability on the US.

Implications for US Interests

Due to the complex socio-political dynamics in Pakistan and the complex regional interests in Islamabad and across South Asia, the US has paradoxical interests in Pakistan’s stability. The pronounced decrease in social status registered in this report’s analysis of craftsmen coincided with the ascendancy of Imran Khan, and this dynamic is important understanding the populist support that Khan enjoys. The continued success of Imran Khan is supported by his strong anti-Western rhetoric (which resonates with working class Pakistanis), and such sentiment further encourages the growing Sino-Pak relationship. Conversely, a decrease in Imran Khan’s popularity could lead to widespread instability and a larger role for Pakistan’s security forces in political affairs. Such a dynamic would likely lead to more tacit support for VEOs operating in Pakistan, which is antithetical to Washington’s strategic interests.

Implications for China’s Interests

Pakistan’s social cleavages and wealth inequality do not present immediate concerns to China’s economic interests and investments in Pakistan. Given the integral role that Pakistan plays in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and in the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China is more interested in safeguarding their investment and of Chinese citizens working to construct CPEC infrastructure. Such social cleavages and inequality may come to a boiling point that threatens the ability of the Khan regime to deliver on the economic agreements, and in this regard China may pursue activities that seek to stabilize Pakistan’s economy and political security.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia stands to gain the most from instability brought on by economic inequality in Pakistan, provided that Moscow can capitalize on such uncertainty by increasing anti-Western sentiment and further contract US presence.

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Serbia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Serbia were analyzed: Serbian state data on monthly income by occupation for 2018, and International Labor Organization (ILO) data on income by occupation for the years 2016 and 2014.

Results

Serbia’s population is highly risk acceptant. Occupations that earn higher incomes are more to take risks due to the high reward of maintaining or increasing their socioeconomic status within Serbian society (Imas, 2016). The risk acceptance of the wealthier and poorer classes is exacerbated by political pressure from major international powers, internal economic issues, and social cleavages that refuse to allow old prejudices and conflicts to die. These long-lasting cleavages have the potential to incur violent outbursts and see a devolution back into a state of civil war (UNPD, 2018; CRS report, 2018).

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Serbia has the potential to control the flow of displaced refugees into Europe. Furthermore, it has strong cultural and geopolitical connections to Russia. For these reasons, the United States, Western Europe, China, and Russia all take special interest in Serbian stability. The great powers attempt to influence Serbia using humanitarian aid, infrastructure investments, and more covert means through media and propaganda (CRS report, 2018; Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019; Nalaeva, 2016). Low economic achievement and a precarious relationship with the self-proclaimed independent state of Kosovo has only aggravated ethnic and societal tensions in recent years, causing a rising fear that Serbian society may devolve back into the violence it experienced in the 1990s (CRS, 2018). This scenario would place Serbian civilians in a position where they must take extreme risks amid sinking Serbian stability, and the data analyzed in this study indicate that they may very well be in a risk acceptant decision frame.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an increased interest in Serbia, which has grown from a socialist state and perpetrator of genocide to a democratic government and potential EU member state (CRS, 2018). However, ethnic tensions still lie under the surface of Serbian society and contribute to social discrimination and an ongoing socioeconomic crisis (UNPD, 2018). The United States’ main interests are in supporting its allies in the EU and NATO as they seek to counter Russian influence by creating a stable and politically democratic Balkan region (CRS, 2018). To meet this goal, the United States has given millions of dollars in financial and humanitarian aid to Serbia. Serbia’s risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US’ interests should economically frustrated ethnic Serbs turn their frustrations toward minorities and destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has fewer immediate interests in Serbia than Russia and Western European countries. Instead its interests lie in potential future economic and political aspirations for China, both in the Balkans and beyond into central Europe (Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019). Several Chinese infrastructure projects, which include the high-speed railway from Belgrade to Budapest and two separate construction projects on Serbia’s corridor 11 highway, rely upon future Serbian social stability (Dimitrijević, 2017). Serbia has been incredibly receptive of China’s infrastructure projects going as far as to suggest China open a joint infrastructure office with Budapest. Since its business sector has been receptive of economic overtures from Beijing, Serbia’s risk acceptant population gives the leadership in China an opportunity if it is able to break ground on its Belt and Road initiative, providing more economic opportunities for the Serbian population.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russian interests in Serbia are based upon its ethnic and cultural ties to Slavic nations that follow Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Russia considers itself a protector of Serbia and other Balkan States due to these cultural connections (CRS, 2018). Russia views the EU and NATO’s interaction within Serbia as a direct affront to its sovereign rights, and its ability to interact economically and politically within Eastern Europe. While Russia’s interests in Serbia remain mostly political, it has used economic and media tools (such as Serbia’s reliance on Russian energy, and Russia’s posturing as a pan-Slavic Orthodox Christian defender), to counteract the United States’ and Western Europe’s interaction in the country (Bugajski, 2018). Serbia’s risk acceptant population is both a risk and an opportunity for Russia. This is due to its population’s ability to sway the direction of Serbia’s government that could either align itself with the EU and NATO or Russia in the future based off of perceived potential gains.

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in China were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2011 net wealth centiles compiled by the Chinese government’s Household Finance Survey.

Results

Both datasets show that China’s population is risk acceptant. The data provided by the World Bank not only show a population that is on average risk acceptant, but also demonstrate that the entire population is risk acceptant with the wealthy exhibiting the greatest risk acceptance.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

While China’s ethnic makeup is 91% Han, the remaining 8% number more than 100 million Chinese citizens that belong to 55 ethnic minorities, many of whom reside in China’s outer provinces and consider their particular ethnic groups autonomous from China (Clarke, 2017). The highly restrictive and autocratic practices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) experienced by these minority groups creates the potential for further civil strife throughout the country. Examples of ethnic repression as domestic policy are the CCP’s preemptive limiting of the Uighur population’s freedom and imposing military control over Tibet (Clark, 2017; Maizland, 2019). Beijing’s growing repressive civil policies for Chinese citizens and targeted persecution toward its minorities, combined with China’s highly risk acceptant population has the potential to spark widespread civil unrest and instability.

Implications for US Interests

The US has a competitive relationship with China that occasionally turns into necessary collaboration, as both economies are interdependent and are heavily reliant on each other for success (Egan, 2019). Politically, the US has concerns with China’s intrusion into US international interests and influence (Hass & Rapp-Hooper, 2019). This makes the risk acceptant nature of China’s population and the present ethnic fissures an opportunity for the US to influence its competitor from the inside. Current unrest in Hong Kong1—where per capita GDP is approximately five times higher than the rest of China—may be an example of this potential, as China’s most risk acceptant societal elements, who are therefore more likely to protest government policies, are at the high end of the income scale.

Implications for China’s Interests

The risk acceptance of China’s population threatens its national and international interests from within. The CCP views the ethnic fissures and perceived separatist mentality of its minority groups as a direct threat to its regime stability and China’s outward BRI projects, which must go through some of these provinces (Clarke, 2017). Furthermore, inequality could fuel protest even at the higher end of the economic scale. However, risk taking can be done in pro-social ways, such as business investment and start-up businesses. If the CCP can re-start the Chinese economy and provide growth and opportunity, this potential liability could be turned into an asset.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia relies deeply on its cooperative activities with China, including interacting with countries in foreign regions with the expressed purpose of weakening Western democratic values and US political influence (Oliker, 2016; Gurganus, 2018). Given its strong political and economic ties to China, Russia may stand to lose economic and geopolitical power in certain regions including South Asia and the Asia Pacific if the CCP’s legitimacy is weakened by inner turmoil from its repressed and risk acceptant population.

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Authors | Editors: P. Layton & S. Canna (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

The SMA Future of Great Power Competition & Conflict project is researching how the United States might strategize to defend its global interests. This paper supports the project in deriving some grand strategy alternatives specifically related to China (twelve) and Russia (ten). The development of the alternatives draws on a broader spectrum of international relation’s theories than the restricted neorealist set generally employ. The study’s aims are to encourage the consideration of tangential approaches, suggest different framing mechanisms that could restructure our thinking about managing great power competition, and briefly outline a range of alternative ways to meet the challenges China and Russia pose.

Regional Competitors in the Great Power Context – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Ken Gause (CNA), Dr. Mark N. Katz (George Mason University), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)

Question of Focus

[Q7] How can the US defend its interests against regional competitors (e.g., Iran, North Korea) in ways complementary to US strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia, while not undercutting other US interests?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of nine Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can defend its interests against regional competitors in ways complementary to United States strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.