SMA Publications
NSI maintains an extensive Publications archive of government-sponsored research and analysis products, various research efforts from our professional and technical staff, and a variety of corporate news items. The government-sponsored products are maintained on behalf of the US Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program and address challenging national security problems and operational imperatives.
The Character of Global Competition and Conflict, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Barry B. Hughes (University of Denver), Dr. Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Dr. William C. Wohlforth (Dartmouth College), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)
Question of Focus
[Q1] How will the character of global competition and conflict change over the next decade, and which emerging global trends and conditions will drive this change? What are the implications of expected future global conditions for developing integrated US strategy and plans to defend US interests over both short- and long- term timeframes?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-eight Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the character of global competition and conflict will change over the next decade, and the implications of those changes on United States policy and planning.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Tactics of Competing Powers Over the Coming Decade – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Bogdan Belei (Harvard University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Steve S. Sin (University of Maryland START), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)
Question of Focus
[Q2] What kinetic (e.g., weapon systems) and non-kinetic (e.g., disinformation campaigns, financial market manipulation, political tampering) tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-six Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what kinetic and non-kinetic tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to challenge the United States and its interests over the coming decade.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
China’s and Russia’s Approach to Regional and Global Competition – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q8] How do China and Russia approach global, not just regional, arenas for competition?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how China and Russia approach regional and global competition.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Potential for a China-Russia and/or US-China-Russia Alliance – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Paul J. Bolt (US Air Force Academy), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Dr. Steve Tsang (University of London), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q9] Are there any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against US interests, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there are any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against the US, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Regional Competitors in the Great Power Context – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Ken Gause (CNA), Dr. Mark N. Katz (George Mason University), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation)
Question of Focus
[Q7] How can the US defend its interests against regional competitors (e.g., Iran, North Korea) in ways complementary to US strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia, while not undercutting other US interests?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of nine Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can defend its interests against regional competitors in ways complementary to United States strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Chinese and Russian Economic Statecraft: Strategic Threat or Benign Business Activity? – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); & Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dr. Kerry Brown (King’s College, London), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q11] How do we determine whether economic influence is a strategic threat or a benign business activity? When should the US push back against Chinese or Russian economic statecraft (such as Belt and Road projects or strategic investments)?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fourteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how to determine whether Chinese and Russian economic activity is a strategic threat or benign business activity, and when the US should push back against such economic statecraft.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Power Under Parity – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Author | Editors: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Paul I. Bernstein (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics)
Question of Focus
[Q10] What are the long-term implications for the US of adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia rather than military dominance?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fourteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors contemplate strategic parity and the implications of the United States adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
Author(s): Klipstein, M. (Army Cyber Institute, West Point); Minter, A. (Army Cyber Institute, West Point); Pittman, J. (Amy Cyber Institute, West Point)
Report Preview
In our increasingly digital society, military operations and civilian-alike rely heavily on the technological tools that connect us. Social media has become a powerful influence tool to sow discord, sway sentiment, and purport cause for actions that otherwise would be condemned by the international community. Cellular services have become the default mode of communication. And the amount of data collected continues to grow. The convergence of information operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations have brought a new paradigm to nations in friction or conflict. Distortion and delivery of information allow the perception of ‘truth’ in populations that in turn can move a nation’s course of action. These realities alone are challenging; when US adversaries use cyber capabilities, the result could have a drastic effect on the ability to wage war and retain the status we enjoy in the international community. We examine the holistic information space ten years into the future to better understand how the information environment will interact with governments and society. This paper draws four predictions that will affect nations if the current trend continues. These trends include the diminishment of the United States on the global stage, the rise of China in computing supremacy, cultural division and schism continuing fueled by online news and information sources, and finally, nation-states fighting conflicts further “upstream” in the information space to prevent conflict or eliminate its necessity. In conclusion, the authors recommend questions that governments must seek answers to in order to stay
competitive in this environment.
Using Narratives to Shape Chinese and Russian Behavior – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report
Authors | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)
Subject Matter Expert Contributors
Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Nicholas Michelsen (King’s College, London), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Dr. Laura Roselle (Elon University), Dr. Scott Ruston (Arizona State University), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)
Question of Focus
[Q12] What are the elements of a narrative that lends coherence to United States military activities and can help shape Chinese and Russian behaviors?
Summary Overview
This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the United States can use narratives to lend coherence to its military activities and shape Chinese and Russian behavior.
Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.
TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate China Futures Study
Author | Editor: TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate
Executive Summary
The Competitive Zone (or Gray Zone) is “an operational environment ‘churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.’” Given Russia’s military actions in eastern Ukraine and China’s expansion in the South China Sea, “military and academic communities have attempted to describe conflict in the Gray Zone to create shared understanding and spur discussion on conflict and competition in this space.”
The Competitive Zone is further described as “a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use single or multiple elements of power to achieve political- security objectives with activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.”
In 2018, the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiated the Global Competition and Conflict (GCC) Project which sought to answer the following overarching question: “How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?” This requirement also included a request that the Joint Staff SMA coordinate with the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Directorate (MSD) to explore options for employing the Athena Simulation in support of this SMA Project.
The Athena Simulation is a sociocultural modeling capability employed by the TRADOC G-2 which is designed to improve a commander’s understanding of the intended and unintended effects of introducing various DIME-FIL engagement strategies across an operational environment (OE) that is described by the operational variables (PMESII-PT).
The SMA GCC Project focused primarily on Russia and China. The Athena modeling effort focused solely on China (with the exception of one study excursion that explored current events in Hong Kong and the long-term implications on regional stability).
This Final Report compiles the insights derived by the Athena team from research, Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements, Athena Simulation runs, and the collaborative analysis conducted with other members of the SMA community of interest. Insights were also derived as a result of Athena team participation in various related experiments and exercises conducted between January and September 2019.
This Athena-based analysis primarily conducted a deep dive into China’s global outlook, activities, and strategy. The study approach considered three outcome-oriented use cases to assess, compare and contrast potential futures for China over a simulated multi-year period. These use cases are framed as:
- Use Case 1: Status Quo Continuation
- Use Case 2: State Capitalist Acceleration
- Use Case 3: The Lost Decade
The use cases are more fully defined in the introduction section, following this EXSUM. In addition, Athena modeling was used to evaluate two “excursions”:
- Excursion 1: A vignette assessing the volatility in Hong Kong.
- Excursion 2: A vignette examining an influx of members from a violent extremist organization (VEO) into Xinjiang
The analytic focus of the Athena modeling effort was oriented on determining how key factors (i.e., government decisions and economic engagements) affect political, economic, and social stability dynamics across China.
A combination of research, SME engagements, and Athena Simulation modeling and analysis produced the following insights:
Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable
Regardless of the economic growth rate across three use cases, nationwide support for and popular satisfaction with governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declined mildly over a decade. There was no collapse of CCP influence in any region within China (neighborhood). The Lost Decade use case produced a greater decline in popular support for the central government, but not nearly enough to produce any significant change. The Hong Kong Crisis excursion had virtually no effect on the level of popular satisfaction with CCP governance, while the Xinjiang Uprising excursion produced a sharp decline in this metric until the simulated VEO was decisively defeated.
Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable
Nationwide “mood” initially increased and then decreased mildly, roughly mirroring the greatest period of economic growth in the Status Quo and Acceleration cases. In the Lost Decade use case, mood rose negligibly, flattened out, and then declined. When mood was increasing, it was buoyed primarily by the population’s improving sense of safety. When the Hong Kong Crisis and Xinjiang Uprising excursions were applied to all use cases, national mood was virtually unaffected by the Hong Kong Crisis. However, national mood sharply declined during the Xinjiang Uprising and recovered somewhat after it ended. Without excursions, national mood terminates with virtually the same measured effect across all three use cases.
Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard
The Lost Decade impacts the mood of the Chinese population much more negatively than the Acceleration case’s effects are positive. Additionally, the positive changes are very small. When included, the Hong Kong Crisis again had minimal impact on national mood, but the Xinjiang Uprising produced a significant negative impact. The economically vital middle class civilian group, “Working Poor,” is especially harmed by the conditions of The Lost Decade. Both their mood and satisfaction with governance decline steeply over ten years. The Working Poor were specifically assessed in the megacities of Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. The heartland city of Chongqing showed the greatest degree of loss. Along with the Working Poor, the “Power Elite” of Chongqing City saw sharp declines in mood and satisfaction with governance, suggesting a looming threat to CCP legitimacy in the interior if there were significant economic stress.
Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure
The Han “Downtrodden” peasant civilian groups in the countryside show durable tolerance for CCP governance. The mood of the Downtrodden in Han Central declines mildly in the Lost Decade case, mostly due to weakening satisfaction with governance, the net change in mood is virtually zero. The mood rises, then returns to its starting point by the end of the decade. In the Status Quo and State Capitalist Acceleration cases, mood sees a significant net increase, indicating the benefits of economic growth on even one of the most marginal groups.
Insight 5: The Elites are Stable
Chinese political and wealthy elites (“Power Elite” and “Well-Off” civilian groups) generally show durable confidence in CCP governance. There are only slight declines in satisfaction with governance over all three use cases—except in Chongqing City, where elite satisfaction declines precipitously.
Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang
While mood in Xinjiang decayed sharply in all use cases, the mood of Uyghurs was slightly better under Status Quo and State Acceleration (which includes milder treatment of Uyghurs by the CCP). This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area.
Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary
In Hong Kong, during the Hong Kong Crisis excursion and after, support for the Municipal Government fluctuates turbulently during the protests, but post-crisis, it is virtually identical under all use cases. Support trends slightly higher under State Capitalist Acceleration than the Status Quo. Support for the Municipal Government is slightly lower under the Lost Decade than Status Quo.
Conclusion
TRADOC G-2 employed the Athena Simulation to computationally model three potential Chinese futures in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each by assessing control, support, mood, and satisfaction with governance of the Chinese population. Future analytical efforts will leverage the pathway analysis work that other participants in the SMA enterprise are currently developing.
The modeling and analysis produced four primary conclusions resulting from the seven insights:
- The possibility of regime change in China is virtually nonexistent. (Conclusion from Insight #1)
- China will likely remain stable overall despite any localized disturbances and grievances. (Conclusion from Insight #2)
- Chinese elites are generally satisfied with the status quo of Chinese Communist Party governance. (Conclusion from Insight #5)
- The Hong Kong disturbances are ephemeral and their impact on the rest of China is minimal. (Conclusion from Insight #7)
