SMA Publications

AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives

Contributors: Ahmed, S. (UC Berkeley); Bajema, N. (NDU); Bendett, S. (CNA); Chang, B. (MIT); Creemers, R. (Leiden University); Demchak, C. (Naval War College); Denton, S. (George Mason University); Ding, J. (Oxford); Hoffman, S. (MERICS); Joseph, R. (Pytho LLC); Kania, E. (Harvard); Kerr, J. (LLNL); Kostopoulos, L. (LKCYBER); Lewis, J. (CSIS); Libicki, M. (USNA); Lin, H. (Stanford); Miura, K. (MIT); Morgus, R. (New America); Esplin Odell, R. (MIT); Pauwels, E. (United Nations University); Saalman, L. (EastWest Institute); Snow, J. (USSOCOM); Steckman, L. (MITRE); Weber, V. (Oxford)

Opening Remarks provided by: Grynkewich, A. (JS J39); Freedman, L. (King’s College, London)

Editor: Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology)

Integration Editor: Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

ISBN: 9781585662951

Executive Summary

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data promise to help reshape the global order. For decades, most political observers believed that liberal democracy offered the only plausible future pathways for big, industrially sophisticated countries to make their citizens rich. Now, by allowing governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more effectively than ever before, AI offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them—the first since the end of the Cold War. That may help fuel and shape renewed international competition between types of political regimes that are all becoming more “digital.” Just as competition between liberal democratic, fascist, and communist social systems defined much of the twentieth century, how may the struggle between digital liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism define and shape the twenty-first?

The technical nature of AI’s new advances particularly well suits all-encompassing surveillance; and as a consequence authoritarianism. New forms of authoritarianism arose with previous waves of global authoritarian expansion: fascism in the 1920s or bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1960s. China has begun constructing core components of a digital authoritarian state. America’s liberal democratic political regime is turning digital, and so too is Russia’s hybrid political regime that lies between democracy and authoritarianism.

Swing states from Asia to Africa, Europe and Latin America must manage their own political regimes within the context of this global competition. Several like-minded countries have begun to buy or emulate Chinese systems. Russian techniques are diffusing. To be sure, competing models for
domestic regimes must be seen within the broader strategic context—relative military or economic power also matter deeply—but as in the twentieth century it will likely prove a crucial dimension.

This report focuses on the emerging Chinese and Russian models and how they will interact with the global order. We bring together deep expertise on China, Russia, strategy and technology—as well as artists to provide illuminating sidelights.

The key recommendation is that US policymakers must understand the potential for the new AIrelated to technologies to affect domestic political regimes (authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic) that will compete for influence in the global order. We recommend policymakers use the following three-pronged strategy to understand the challenge and develop global policy:

• US democracy must be kept robust as it adapts to these new technologies. It must respond to both domestic threats (e.g. capture by a tech oligopoly or drift to a surveillance state) and external threats, without becoming governed by a military-industrial complex. US digital democracy, if successful at home, will exert gravitational influence globally.
• The US must exert influence effectively, and manage potential escalation, in the swing states (e.g. in Asia or Europe) and global systems (e.g. norms and institutions) that form the key terrain for competition between the digital regime types. Diplomatic, economic, informational and commercial dimensions will be crucial, with both allies and other states.
• The US should push back on the digital authoritarian and digital hybrid heartlands, but do so in ways that manage the significant risks of spiraling fear and animosity.

Download the Book from Air University Press

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Chinese and Russian Economic Statecraft: Strategic Threat or Benign Business Activity? – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); & Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Kerry Brown (King’s College, London), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q11] How do we determine whether economic influence is a strategic threat or a benign business activity? When should the US push back against Chinese or Russian economic statecraft (such as Belt and Road projects or strategic investments)?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fourteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how to determine whether Chinese and Russian economic activity is a strategic threat or benign business activity, and when the US should push back against such economic statecraft.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Nigeria were analyzed: 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2013 USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores.

Results

Nigeria has a largely risk acceptant population based on inequality and cross-cutting rural/urban, ethno- religious, and elite/common cleavages. The result is a population vulnerable to ambition, distrust, and grievance at all levels. These grievances are well-manipulated by elites in the country’s main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. These cleavages threaten economic growth and political stability in Africa’s most populous nation that has the continent’s largest economy. Nigeria is also a major oil producer, making it an attractive target for influence by world powers.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The levels of inequality indicate a highly risk acceptant population; Nigerians are a population primed for taking risks. Synergies between ethno-religious, rural/urban, and educated elite/commoner cleavages and risk acceptance present a political volatility situation that threatens trade and economic growth.

Implications for US Interests

The US is heavily vested in Nigeria, especially in its oil industry but also in Nigeria’s political influence on the African continent. Inequality-fueled instability threatens this interest.

Implications for China’s Interests

China shares much the same economic and political interests in Nigeria as the US, and therefore is equally threatened by instability.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia is much less vested in Nigeria but has sought influence at least through support of a potential nuclear industry in the country. This interest is also threatened by Nigeria’s instability.

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Authors | Editors: Ackerman, G. (University at Albany); Burnett, R. (National Defense University); Clifford, B. (George Washington University); Earnhardt, R. (University at Maryland); Harrigan, G. (Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate); Holt, T. (Michigan State University); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Logan, M. (University of Nebraska Omaha); McCreight, R. (George Mason University); Rassler, D. (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point); Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

Executive Summary

Innovation and new technologies have many positive attributes and provide significant improvement to humanity, much that is likely unforeseen at the time of initial discovery. The unpredictability of the technology trajectories can lead to significant negative consequences. This white paper aims to discuss the massive leaps in innovation and understand what this means for national security.

The articles are briefly summarized below.

In Chapter 1, entitled “Third Offset Implications for Homeland Security: Tranquility or Turbulence,” Robert McCreight states that the overall future trajectory of modern technologies hinges on a fairly imperfect and periodically naïve grasp of dual-use science and technology and what it portends for our planet and its inhabitants. He goes on to say that one immediate concern is to determine not only how it is affecting our current way of life, geopolitics, the economy, social stability, governance, security, and the ordinary functions and determinants of the natural world around us, but also weigh the downstream consequences of technology growth, diversity, and convergence on all of those things ten to twenty years on. If advanced dual-use technologies hold the potential for a vast array of unanticipated threats in the next few years, we will need effective doctrine, strategy, and deterrence measures. He asks a key question: How to begin to establish criteria which guarantees that humans retain ultimate control, management, and direction of advanced dual-use technologies and thereby thwart untoward and dangerous outcomes arising from their mix of expected and unexpected outcomes. He advances five possible criteria for wrestling with the emergence of ADUCT (advanced dual-use convergent technologies) in a manner that sketches out an approach for the short term and allows flexibility for modifications and improvements along the way over the next decade.

Gina Ligon and Michael Logan in Chapter 2, “Malevolent Innovation: Novelty and Effectiveness in Terror Attacks,” state that terrorism provides a model context for examining creativity, as the need for survival and innovation pervades these destructive and malevolent groups. Despite this, creativity and innovation remain underdeveloped concepts in terrorism research. One reason for this is the limited empirical data about this phenomenon, making it unclear which tenets of creativity research hold versus which do not translate in the domain of terrorism. The present effort overcomes this by examining the dimensions of malevolent innovation in a large sample of terrorist attacks. To anticipate adversary threats, it is critical that we examine all of the possible combinations of VEO innovation developed in the past. This particular effort can provide planners with exemplars of the highest levels of VEO innovation across a large dataset of violent extremist organizations, providing a comprehensive look at what is possible and what should be prevented.

Don Rassler in Chapter 3 “Back to the Future: The Islamic State, Drones, and Future Threats” states that the Islamic State is an irony of sorts, as while the organization looks to, is inspired by, and seeks to recreate the past certain aspects of the group’s behavior also provide a window into conflicts of the future. A key case study in this regard is the Islamic State’s drone program, and specifically how the group “overcame technical and cost asymmetries,” and creatively developed a novel and scalable drone-based weapons system “constructed from commercial components that challenged—at least for a period of time—states’ ability to respond.” He goes on to state that the Islamic State’s drone accomplishments speak to, and have a number of important implications regarding, the character and style of future threats that are either constructed around or that significantly leverage dual-use commercial technologies. He concludes by stating to stay ahead of the issue, and to better prepare for a future that will almost certainly be typified by the proliferation of other hybrid threats that leverage and/or repurpose commercial systems in dangerous ways, the United States should identify the pathways and methods that allowed the Islamic State to acquire and scale its fleet of quadcopter drones in the first place, and trace the evolution of functional threat streams.

Bennett Clifford in Chapter 4, “Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram,” makes several key observations:

• English-speaking supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) use the messaging application Telegram to distribute a range of information, including instructional material—manuals and guides designed to aid operatives with step-by-step procedures for providing assistance to the group.

• Channel administrators distribute whichever manuals they believe can be of aid to aspiring operatives, regardless of its ideological background.

• Telegram’s internal file-sharing features and lax approach to content moderation allow channel administrators to create repositories of instructional information within Telegram channels.

• While attack-planning manuals available on Telegram channels understandably pose a large concern for counterterrorism authorities, operational security and cybersecurity manuals are also frequently distributed, relatively easy to implement, and help operatives successfully conduct activities in support of terrorist groups while minimizing the risk of detection or apprehension.

In Chapter 5 entitled “Examining the Present and Future Role of Cybercrime-as-a-Service in Terror and Extremism,” Thomas Holt makes the case that the rise of online illicit markets that enable the sale of cybercrime tools and stolen personal information have made it possible for individuals to engage in technically sophisticated forms of crime regardless of level of computer skill. Ideological and terror groups over the last decade have expressed an interest in cyberattacks as a means to cause harm, though it is not clear how much ability they have to perform such attacks. As a result, cybercrime markets may engender their attacks, though it is not clear how often this may occur, or what conditions would lead to their use. He provides recommendations for policy and research to disrupt cybercrime markets and improve our knowledge of ideologically-motivated cyberattackers generally.

• Cybercrime markets generate millions of dollars in revenue and enable non-technical actors to perform sophisticated attacks.

• They may provide a point of entry for ideologically-motivated extremists and terrorists to engage in cyberattacks.

• These markets can be disrupted through traditional law enforcement investigations, and may also be affected through other extra-legal efforts such as Sybil attacks.

• Research is needed on the radicalization process of ideologically-motivated actors who engage in cyberattacks, and how this differs from those who have engaged in physical attacks.

Rebecca Earnhardt and Gary Ackerman in Chapter 6 entitled “Modelling Terrorist Technology Transfer,” make the point that while technology transfer occurs as a part of routine life, the topic remains relatively understudied in the terrorism literature. As terrorists engage in increasingly lethal and technologically sophisticated attacks, the concern surrounding terrorists acquiring cutting-edge weaponry and related technologies is accumulating. They go on to describe the Terrorist Technology Transfer (T3) project which provides a first cut at addressing this critical operational gap in knowledge through the exploration of extant technology transfer literature, construction of the first iteration of the T3 Model, and illustrative application of the model to an emerging technological threat. They conclude by stating the T3 project indicates the promise of having not only research, but also operational and policy impacts. It raises the possibility of providing government stakeholders, including intelligence, law enforcement, military, and policy agencies with a variety of insights and operational tools

In Chapter 7, “Hacking the Human Body: The Cyber-Bio Convergence,” Rebecca Earnhardt makes the point that the increasing convergence between the fields of biosecurity and cybersecurity may result in consequences that analysts have yet considered. Biotechnology use and expertise expansion beyond practitioners have stoked concerns about a wide range of traditional biosecurity issues including shielding the outputs from advanced gene editing systems or protecting university lab data storage systems. As biotechnology advances, including digitization and automation of systems that were once localized and only accessible to those directly involved on related research, biosecurity and cybersecurity fields continue to intersect. She concludes by stating a fully-fledged research project would explore the cyber security risk factors that are cited commonly as key vulnerabilities, and filter these cyber security risk factors through an adversary technology adoption decision making and motivational analysis.

In Chapter 8 entitled “Evolving Human and Machine Interdependence in Conflict: Advantages, Risks, and Conundrums,” R. E. Burnett makes several key points:

• Emerging science and technology will continue to disrupt customary characteristics of political and kinetic conflicts among states and non-state actors.

• The increasing complex interdependence between humans and machines is one area for particular examination.

• We cannot reliably predict whether or not human roles will rapidly give way to a more dominant robotic style of war, so we must prepare for a variety of futures, per the Scharre/Horowitz autonomy typologies.

• Humans involved with machines that operate at vastly greater speeds and volumes of data will further create problems of cognitive demand for the human soldier that need to be examined.

• We must investigate this not only in terms of technical performance, but also from a more holistic perspective, to include the social, political, and psychological dimensions of the soldier and of the citizen.

Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley, (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Robert Hinck, (Monmouth College); Dr. Robert Utterback, (Monmouth College)

This report was part of a small, rapid effort by SMA. Please email mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil for additional information. A second report from this effort can be found here.

Executive Summary

The following study explored how extremist organizations may take advantage of the Kashmir crisis; it identifies prominent extremist organizations and stakeholder interests reported in Indian and Pakistani news media. Data was collected from 54 Indian and Pakistani news sources from May 16th to August 16th, 2019; a total of 437 articles were analyzed.

Extremist Organizations, Stakeholders, and Interests

Extremist organizations most prominently identified:

• Indian media reports: Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Taliban, Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence, ISIL- Khorasan, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
• Pakistan media reports: Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh as a Hindu terrorist organization committing acts of genocide against Muslims.
• Taliban: US peace talks seen as empowering Taliban; bolstering their interests and increasing their influence in Jammu and Kashmir. LeT and Harkat-ulAnsar are shown as benefiting from Taliban protection. The expectation that the US will leave Afghanistan is seen as increasing the influence of the Taliban.

Local dissatisfaction:

• Mass protests against local officials in Jammu and Kashmir. Local officials are perceived as failing to represent constituent interests, corrupt, and unable to deliver social goods.
• Pakistani media argue India’s regional clamp down and draconian policies exacerbate local tensions and hurt business leaders. Indian troops shown as routinely profiling mosques and conducting unfair cordon and search procedures.

Indian government:

• Abrogation of Article 370 and 35A intended to end patronage system corrupting local officials in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian media describe the reforms as benefitting the local populace through economic development and educational opportunities.
• Retaliatory tit-for-tat against Pakistani backed terrorists with the goal of killing and preventing terrorist infiltration. Indian media reports considerable success in these endeavors.
• Pakistani media perceives India’s goal as using “terrorism” as a shield to hide injustices against Kashmiris; India’s strategy is described as following a policy of a “thousand cuts” similar to Israel’s policy towards Palestinians.

Pakistan government:

• Goal is to destabilize the region and support Kashmiri right to self-determination.
• Attempts to internationalize the issue by highlighting human rights violations committed by Indian state; appeals are made to the international community to pressure India to oppressive policies in Jammu and Kashmir.

Extremist Organizations: Key Tactics and Targets

• Coordination between Pakistan’s ISI, and special forces, with terrorist organizations is described as focused on infiltrating the LoC and establishing launch pads for attacks in both border areas and Indian heartland. Pakistani government shown by Indian media as sanctioning attacks regardless of collateral damage to civilian population.
• Shifting tactics reported by Indian media, include emphasis on the use of IEDs, including vehicle based IEDs, among terrorists in order to reduce the casualties within their organizations.
• Terrorist groups are reported in Indian media as targeting corrupt officials in Jammu and Kashmir, Indian security personnel, as well as, rail transport, civil aviation centers, and economic infrastructure. Concerns are specifically expressed in Indian media over extremists targeting Armanath Yatra pilgrimage and disrupting rail construction/transport.
• Focus on recruitment of dissatisfied youth by terrorist groups is shown in Indian media. Pakistani media emphasize Indian state-sponsored humanitarian atrocities and provide the assumption that the Indian government’s goal is to erase Muslim culture and influence.
• Areas most frequently discussed include: Pulwama, Srinagar, Anantnag, and Shopian.

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Author | Editor: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

“Influence” and “power” are foundational to how geopolitics are discussed and understood. Many American planners and policymakers are strong believers in global influence: fearing both its relative and absolute loss; seeking to “grow” and “spread” the United States’ influence; and trying to counter the influence of critical competitors such as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jafri & Stevenson, 2019).

Yet, there has been little consensus-making in either policy or scholarly discourse about how to consistently measure, operationalize, or conceptualize global influence. Often left undefined, global influence is a concept presumed obvious: everyone always “knows (it) when they see it (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 1964).” Therefore, global influence is an observable phenomenon which lacks clearly defined parameters. Treating global influence in this manner is not ultimately in the best interest of planners, as concepts that could mean everything often mean nothing.

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Author | Editor: Roshelli, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Mexico were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and income by occupation data from the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) for 2017.

Results

Overall, with the exception of a small proportion of middle-low income members of society the data shows a Mexican population that is risk accepting, with the poorest and wealthiest Mexicans having the greatest proclivity towards risk.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Data demonstrate an extremely high degree of risk taking for the wealthiest sector of the population. Mexico experiences high amounts of corruption and strong influence from the numerous drug cartels in the country, and excessive amounts of violence as a result of the drug trafficking which has a serious impact on national stability. Risk taking among the poorest segments of the population is represented in the numerous migrants seeking asylum in the US due to gang violence and lack of economic growth opportunities.

Implications for US Interests

The Mexican population demonstrates a high propensity for risk and is notably fragile according to the 2018 Fragile States Index. A continued increase in the number of migrants coming from the Northern Triangle has put a strain on the already difficult situation at the US-Mexico border leading to higher tension on US-Mexico relations. With evidence of China increasing trade ties with Mexican markets it is possible that unresolved tensions between the US and Mexico and changes in US trade policy may help facilitate an increase in Sino-Mexican trade relations. Moreover, legalization of marijuana in some areas of the US has increased the number of drug trafficking organizations focused on producing and selling more dangerous drugs like opioids (Lee, Renwick, & Labrador, 2019). Despite state fragility and possibly cleavages, the US’ position as Mexico’s largest trade partner and greatest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) creates some security for US interests (Congressional Research Service, 2019).

Implications for China’s Interests

Recent changes in US trade policy and a desire, by Mexico, to reduce its dependence on the US may provide an opportunity for China to increase market share in Mexico (Ellis, 2019). Some talks in 2018 indicated that Mexico has considered partaking in the Belt and Road Initiative which would have significant implications for Sino-Mexican relations (Nathanson, 2018). China is still likely to have trouble building out a mutually beneficial relationship though as the two countries compete in similar production markets.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia’s interests in Mexico comes as part of a continued national interest in Latin America as a whole powered by the desire to destabilize the pro-US leanings of the region (Koven & Kamp, 2019; Ellis, 2019). Russian involvement in Mexico’s 2018 election was a noted event pointing towards deeper interest by the Kremlin in Mexico than previously demonstrated (Koven & Kamp, 2019). Koven and Kamp (2019) explain that Russian influence in Mexico is rational as a technique for countering US influence in the region. Due to Mexico’s high-risk propensity and already unsatisfied citizens, Russian hacking likely had very little influence on the election outcome of its leftist president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (often referred to as AMLO) in 2018 (Koven & Kamp, 2019).

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Power Under Parity – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Paul I. Bernstein (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Question of Focus

[Q10] What are the long-term implications for the US of adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia rather than military dominance?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fourteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors contemplate strategic parity and the implications of the United States adopting an objective of strategic parity with China and Russia.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Russia’s Sentimental Revisionist Approach to Competition and Conflict – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Robert Morgus (New America), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q4] How does Russia perceive the continuum of conflict? How does Russia plan for, operate within, and manage risk within the competitive space? From the Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management? What are the implications of those differences for senior political and military decision makers in the US?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of seven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict and how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the competitive space.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Five datasets on wealth and status distribution in Ethiopia were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation estimates for 2013, and USAID Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 2016 on wealth factor scores and agricultural land ownership and 2005 data on wealth factor scores.

Results

Ethiopia is paradoxical; compared to other countries it is an extremely poor nation with an extremely high economic growth rate and low inequality across the entire population. However, Ethiopia’s strides in economic growth and reducing inequality are uneven across socio-economic, rural/urban, educational, and ethnic lines. Economic growth has been differentially enjoyed by well-educated, urban elites from minority ethnic groups such as the Tigray.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The differential distribution of Ethiopia’s limited wealth has led to grievances from poorer uneducated members of ethnic groups such as the Oromo and Amhara as well as risk acceptant elites from these ethnic groups. These grievances have erupted into protests that have destabilized the Ethiopian government and led to the resignation of the Tigray Prime Minister and the recent (June 2019) assassination of the Army Chief of Staff and the president of Amhara State in a coup attempt. The groups that the authors would predict to be acceptant of taking political risks appear to be acting upon their grievances.

Implications for US Interests

Ethiopia is the United States’ primary ally in East Africa and one of the US’ most important allies on the continent. To that end, the US continues to invest heavily in the country through foreign direct investment and governmental aid. The current shape of inequality and its attendant social unrest threaten these interests. Ironically, China’s aggressive involvement in Ethiopian development may enable it to eclipse US influence. The US is in danger of losing its influence in Ethiopia no matter what direction the country goes economically and politically.

Implications for China’s Interests

China is currently the primary investor in Ethiopia, through foreign direct aid (especially in infrastructure) and loans. Inequality fueled instability threatens these investments. However, China’s larger investment (2.5 times that of the US) provides it the opportunity to eclipse US influence if Ethiopia stabilizes.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has not invested nearly as much in Ethiopia but has recently signed an agreement to support the development of Ethiopian nuclear capability. Ethiopian political instability may threaten this Russian investment. However, if Ethiopia stabilizes and continues to grow economically, then Russia would gain a strategic and economic advantage and consequent leverage in Ethiopia.

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