SMA Publications

Authors | Editors: Aviles, W. (NSI); Blocksome, P. (Naval War College– Monterey); Bolduc, D. (Truth to Power LLC); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); DeGennaro, P. (USARMY TRADOC G2 OEC); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Kamp, A. (University of Maryland START); Koven, B. (University of Maryland START); Kuznar, L. (NSI); Levi-Sanchez, S. (Naval War College- Newport); Liebl, V. (CAOCL); Logan, M. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Maloney, M. (USSOCOM); McKee, M. (McKee  Innovation Consulting); Meredith III, S. (National Defense University); Munch, R. (USARMY TRADOC G2 OEC); Oliver, R. (USSOCOM); Pike, T. (USASD / NIU); Sample, E. (Oklahoma State University); Snow, J. (USSOCOM & Donovan Group); Zaborowski, M. (POL AF / USCENTCOM, CCJ-5, CSAG); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Jones, R. (USSOCOM J52 Donovan Group); Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI); Miller, W. (USSOCOM Director of Plans, Strategy and Policy)

Disclaimers

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of War or the U.S. Government.

Mention of any commercial product in this paper does not imply Department of War (DOW) endorsement or recommendation for or against the use of any such product. No infringement on the rights of the holders of the registered trademarks is intended.

The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States DOW of the linked websites, or the information, products or services contained therein. The DOW does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

Executive Summary

Global Power Competition creates more conflict, particularly when those in the arena believe “Power” to be finite, or a zero-sum game, against a defined set of actors. Both the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy portend of a change in our focus: inter-state strategic competition is now the primary concern in U.S. national security. While the temptation exists for us to focus on the looming giants and the conventional arsenals they build, it is too recent in our history that focusing on one class of adversary—even those who may pose an existential threat compared to a lesser peril from others—leaves us vulnerable for at least three reasons. First, as argued throughout this white paper, because Global Power Competition will result in increased violence and disruption associated with that competition, our success depends on how well we deploy our military to deter unwanted violence in competition and in war. Historically, competition for power inferred power “over.” However, a central thesis of this white paper is that competition should be for power “of.” As Chapter One deftly summarizes, influence on—or power of the people— should be central to the securing of our interests and the modern goal of global power competition.

Second, while a focus on outbidding the activities of our near-peer adversaries is an alluring and measurable objective, to do so may result in a deficit in our lessons learned over the past decades of nonstate conflict. As argued in Chapter Two, great power and asymmetric threats are not orthogonal; instead modern threats are part of an integrated network of complimentary, pragmatic, and sometimes ideological interests that interact in ways that may at times augment our adversaries or weaken our allies. In essence, behind every violent extremist organization (VEO) is a potential great power who stands to gain or lose. As a consequence, decisions we make about what appear to be today’s proximal hazards can diminish our attention on those over the horizon—the Black Swan Scenarios (i.e., Swanarios) that foment in the fissures created by Global Power Competition.

Finally, a focus on inter-state competition mischaracterizes our reality. Moreover, every potential battle increasingly appears related, as near-peer adversaries use sub-conflict strategies to accomplish their goals iteratively—pushing against each other in unexpectedly consequential domains. To create a sustained competitive advantage, the U.S. must lean into the complexity that is associated with this multi-domain competition for influence. The push to understand these globally integrated fires is paramount. To do so, new analytic frameworks must be considered in the age of disruption, as well as a deference to the historical patterns that repeat and provide a roadmap of what to do more of, less of, or differently.

In an initial effort to engage the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Community on these topics, the following White Paper is organized in five sections: 1) an introduction: anatomy of the age of disruption, 2) historical, cross-cultural, and gender perspectives, 3) analytical frameworks for globally integrated fires, 4) regional deep dives and application of the concepts, and 5) operational perspectives.

Author: Lyle, D. (Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Air University)

Executive Summary

Different perspectives and operational goals across services allows for specialized expertise, but also creates a vulnerability for silo creation. At times, these silos can inhibit cooperation, limit mission effectiveness, and leave critical decision points inadequately addressed.  There is a need for more deliberate planning and operational execution that cuts across multiple services and perspectives in order to better balance requirements, more efficiently plan, and more holistically address national security challenges. This need applies not only to operational decisions but also in evaluating ongoing programs to determine their continued effectiveness.

Russian Strategic Intentions

Authors | Editors: Arquilla, J. (Naval Postgraduate School); Borshchevskaya, A. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Devyatkin, P. (The Arctic Institute); Dyet, A. (U.S. Army, J5-Policy USCENTCOM); Ellis, R.E. (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Goure, D. (Lexington Institute); Kamp, A. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Kangas, R. (National Defense University); Katz, M. (George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government); Koven, B. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)); Lamoreaux, J. (Brigham Young University- Idaho); Laruelle, M. (George Washington University); Marsh, C. (Special Operations Research Association); Person, R. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Pyatkov, R. (HAF/A3K CHECKMATE); Schindler, J. (The Locarno Group); Severin, M. (UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Siegle, J. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University); Spalding, R. (U.S. Air Force); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute); Werchan, J. (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict, in direct response to a series of questions posed by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Twenty-three experts contributed to this white paper and provided wide-ranging assessments of Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-five chapters, as described below. This summary reports some of the white paper’s high-level findings, but it is no substitute for a careful read of the individual contributions.

There is broad consensus among the contributors that Russian President Vladimir Putin is indeed adhering to a global grand strategy, which aims to achieve the following goals:

• Reclaim and secure Russia’s influence over former Soviet nations
• Regain worldwide recognition as a “great power”
• Portray itself as a reliable actor, a key regional powerbroker, and a successful mediator (Katz; Borshchevskaya) in order to gain economic, military, and political influence over nations worldwide and to refine the liberalist rules and norms that currently govern the world order (Lamoreaux)

According to Dr. Robert Person, these goals are motivated by Russia’s deep-seated geopolitical insecurity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to find its place in the global community, which has left the leadership with a lingering desire to regain the influence and power that it once had. In particular, Russia seeks to regain its influence over former Soviet states, which it claims are in its rightful “sphere of influence” (Lamoreaux; Person; Marsh). As a result, one of the United States’ core goals, namely promoting and protecting the international liberal order, comes into contention with the goals of Russia’s grand strategy. This underpins the Kremlin’s belief that it must contain and constrain US influence and activities in Europe and elsewhere across the globe. As Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya’s contribution suggests, the Russian leadership’s worldview is zero-sum; it believes that in order for Russia to win, the US must lose. However, Dr. Christopher Marsh’s contribution suggests that this world view is not necessarily shared by the Russian population or its elite. As evidenced by the range of “gray zone” activities it engages in, a number of the expert contributors argue that the Russian leadership sees itself as at war with the US and the West as a whole. From a Russian perspective, this war is not total, but rather, it is fundamental (Goure)—a type of “war” that is at odds with the general US understanding of warfare. Russia believes that there is no unacceptable or illegitimate form of deterrence, compellence, or escalation management (Goure). It also does not believe in the continuum of conflict that the US has constructed. Like Russia’s perception of its competition with the US, its perception of conflict is dichotomous: one is either at war or not at war. To fight and win this war, Russia believes that the successful integration of all instruments of state power (Goure), as well as the orchestrated employment of non-military and military means to deter and compel (Flynn), are paramount. Furthermore, Russian military concepts include options for employing preemptive force to induce shock and dissuade an adversary from conducting military operations and to compel a de-escalation of hostilities (Flynn). The authors observe that Russia’s strategies are continuously evolving and expect that the discrepancy between the Russian and the US understanding of “conflict” and “war” will continue to grow, leading to a higher risk of escalation in future situations involving both nations.

Overall, Russia’s influence abroad is growing, and the Kremlin has mastered the use of “hybrid warfare” in driving Russia’s foreign policy (Lamoreaux). Russia utilizes a variety of gray zone tactics around the globe. These include the use of paramilitary forces and other proxies, interference in political processes, economic and energy exploitation (particularly in Africa), espionage, and media and propaganda manipulation. Putin is also adept at blending military and civilian elements for maximum impact (Weitz).

The specific tactics of hybrid warfare that Russia uses vary by region. In Europe, for example, Russia has utilized propaganda, an increasing dependence on external energy resources, and political manipulation to achieve its primary goals (Schindler; Lamoreaux). In contrast, in the Middle East and Africa— important sources of minerals and other natural resources from a Russian perspective1— Russia has primarily utilized economic exploitation tools (Katz; Borshchevskaya; Severin). In Central Asia, Russia maintains a much more limited presence, due to China’s geographic proximity and the current levels of economic and security engagement by other regional actors (Kangas). Nevertheless, Russia does retain influence in the Central Asia, as a result of its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to the region (Laruelle; Dyet). Likewise, in Latin America, Russia lacks a sufficient amount of deployable resources to fully implement its strategy or to extend its influence very far (Ellis). However, as Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp observe, Russia makes up for its shortcomings by engaging in episodic and reactive endeavors to disrupt US influence in the region.

Although Russian tactics vary significantly, in all regions of the world energy has been a key source of Russian power and influence (Weitz; Lamoreaux; Borshchevskaya; Devyatkin; Pyatkov; Werchan). Globally, many countries have developed a strong relationship with Russia when it comes to energy. Russia’s energy priorities extend worldwide, and European nations in particular have become dependent on Russia for access to these resources. Africa and the Arctic have also become significant as Russia looks to exploit opportunities for energy-related commerce.

Despite the strength of Russia’s growing influence abroad and the diverse array of gray zone tactics it uses to achieve its strategic goals, the US can still limit the results of this grand strategy. There is broad consensus among the contributors that countering Russian provocations will require the use of all instruments of national power. In particular, US success will be reliant both on its ability to influence populations, states, and non-state actors, and on its ability to minimize Russia’s influence on these actors (Bragg). Creating effective narratives in each of the regions covered in this white paper will be critical for achieving this goal (Kangas; Bragg). Furthermore, the US can counter specific Russian gray zone activities, such as diversifying energy sources to reduce European nations’ dependence on Russia (Pyatkov; Werchan) and counteracting propaganda by creating both resilient democratic institutions and populations abroad, particularly in Europe (Pyatkov). Finally, it is imperative that the US establishes a consensus definition of “gray zone” (Bragg) and reevaluates old paradigms defining war and peace, as we enter a “new era of international politics which is defined by shades of gray” (Weitz). Once defined, a federal agency dedicated to gray zone activities may be required in order to implement a true whole of government approach to combatting Russian influence activities abroad (Werchan).

Report Overview

This white paper has been separated into five parts:

Part I analyzes the key sources of motivation or interests that drive Russian global competitive activities and strategy. This part also addresses the fundamental issues being contested and how these issues impact enduring US national interests.

Part II examines, from a Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and/or escalation management. Part II also evaluates how Russia perceives the continuum of conflict, as well as how it plans for, operates within, and manages risk within the gray zone. Lastly, Part II assesses the implications of the differences between US and Russian thinking for senior political and military decision makers.

Part III identifies actions the Russians are undertaking in the Gray Zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.

Part IV identifies potential actions that the US could employ either proactively or in response to provocative Russian activities in the gray zone across the following regions: a) Europe, b) Central Asia and China, c) the Middle East, d) Africa, e) Latin America, and f) the Arctic.

Part V highlights capabilities that the US requires to effectively respond to actions the Russians are undertaking in the gray zone.

Part I. What Drives Russia’s Global Interests and Strategy?

Chapter 1: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux identifies three motivations underpinning Russian grand strategy: (1) for the country to be recognized as a great power with its own distinct sphere of influence; (2) the Russian elite perception that Russia has a moral right to predominance within “its” sphere of influence; and (3) the desire to see US global influence curbed and, if possible, scaled back.

Chapter 2: Using the military’s traditional understanding of “strategy” as the coordinated integration of ends, ways, and means, Dr. Robert Person explicates Russian grand strategy. The main “end” of Russian grand strategy in the 21st century is establishing is a “Yalta 2.0,” in which Russia enjoys an uncontested sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, broadcasts Russian voice and influence globally, and establishes reliable constraints on American globe-trotting and regime-change activities. Russia’s ways can be described as one of “asymmetric balancing” through gray zone challenges to prevent uncontested US influence from setting the global agenda. Russia’s means, Person argues, expanded with the oil boom, allowing critical investments and increases in defense spending to be made.

Chapter 3: Using survey data, Dr. Thomas Sherlock shows that neither the Russian mass public, nor Russia elites, believe that the West, particularly the United States, poses a critical military or political danger to the Russian state or regime. While both elites and members of the mass public are supportive of restoring Russia’s great power status, they often define a great power and its priorities more in terms of domestic socio-economic development than in the production and demonstration of hard power. These perspectives increasingly come into conflict with those of Kremlin.

Chapter 4: Dr. Richard Weitz explores key motivations and interests driving Russian global competitive activities and strategies. He discusses how Russian strategists adeptly select gray zone tools optimized to their objectives. These tools often include paramilitary forces, economic and energy exploitation, and media and propaganda manipulation. He suggests that Washington must reevaluate old paradigms between war and peace to maintain strategic primacy in this new era of international politics that is defined by shades of gray.

Chapter 5: Dr. Christopher Marsh takes on one of the most significant questions surrounding Russian foreign policy: whether president Vladimir Putin has an overarching strategy. In his paper, he describes Putin’s grand strategy for Russia and the world. He also analyzes each of Russia’s interests and to what degree they pose a threat to vital US national interests.

Part II. How Does Russia Perceive Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, and the Continuum of Conflict?

Chapter 6: Dr. Daniel Goure argues that according to Russian strategic thought, Russia is already at war with the West. There is no separate concept of gray zone: war is not total, but it is fundamental to the Russian perspective. It follows that Russia’s ability to manage risk in the so-called gray zone is a function of its successful integration of all the instruments of state power.

Chapter 7: Mr. Daniel J. Flynn describes Russian coercive strategies involving the orchestrated employment of nonmilitary and military means to deter and compel the United States prior to and after any outbreak of hostilities. The risk to the US is that these strategies increase the risk of miscalculation and escalation during a future crisis involving the United States.

Part III. What Gray Zone Actions Are Russia Undertaking Across the Globe?

Chapter 8: Dr. John Schindler identifies Russian activities in Europe within a historical and ideological framework. In doing so, he identifies key similarities and differences between the Putin regime and Tsarist Russia, as well as the regime and the Soviet Union. Present day Russian institutions and religious discourse are examined, and Dr. Schindler predicts that the Kremlin will act aggressively in a number of domains, including the few in which it holds an advantage against the United States and its allies. He suggests that a near-term future of “Special War” (i.e. low-level operations that fall below the threshold of declared war) will be the Russian modus operandi and cautions US and allied policymakers to guard against such actions.

Chapter 9: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux explains that the list of Russian activities in Europe remains long and complex, and the means that the Kremlin uses to sow instability span geopolitics, economics, diplomacy, and military domains. In this chapter, Dr. Lamoreaux pays special attention to Russia’s ability to propagate societal discord, particularly through Russian-linked populations in the Baltic States. These populations, whether active or passive participants in a campaign, are vulnerable to Russian actions aimed at weakening social cohesion in these states. Short of each side grudgingly accepting the other’s claims on the continent (which is improbable), Russia and the West are likely to be locked in at some level of competition for the near future.

Chapter 10: Dr. Marlene Laruelle states that, despite a more crowded field of large states vying for influence in Central Asia, Russia still retains a prime position as “first among equals,” due to its historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to states in the region. To wit, Russia can exercise remunerative, punitive, and ideological power over the states within the bloc. It has tried to develop its diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with states in the region, with varying degrees of success. Even though the space for great powers to exert influence has become more crowded, because of relatively recent overtures by China and the United States, this region is not necessarily a site of zero-sum statist competition, due to shared objectives by these great powers.

Chapter 11: Dr. Mark N. Katz explains that, although the United States and Russia share a number of objectives in the Middle East, the means by which Russia seeks to achieve these objectives will likely continue to bring it into conflict with the United States. The Kremlin has purported itself as a reliable interlocutor and partner to Middle Eastern nations, some of whom fear wavering commitment by the United States recently. Animated largely by fears of a restive Muslim population that could end up within his borders, in addition to economic and prestige concerns, Vladimir Putin has been conducting deft diplomacy within the region. However, his strategy is vulnerable to shocks to the system and may not be able to withstand Arab Spring/Color Revolution-style uprisings within the region.

Chapter 12: Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya highlights Russia’s series of multi-faceted outreach initiatives in Africa. Through economic, military, and other means, Russia is creating an intentional dependence among North Africa’s military, political leaders and businessmen on continuous Russian support. For more autocratic regimes, Russia’s support is intended to provide a shield against Western influence in the area through forming alliances with the country’s strongmen, while serving as an intermediary for local conflict resolution. Russia’s key interests include gaining and protecting access to the Mediterranean coast, while exploiting opportunities for energy and trade. The intent of these efforts is increased political leverage, rather than a genuine resolution for the people of North Africa.

Chapter 13: Ms. Malin Severin argues that Russia believes that it is currently engaged in a multi- faceted conflict with the West, and is constrained by Western policies and actions. As such, Russia has established several footholds in Africa. The Russian presence goes beyond seeking natural resources; Russia has placed private military contractors and advisors into several African regimes, including the Central African Republic, among others. These actions reflect a strategy similar to that revealed through Russian activities in the Ukraine and Syria, and involvement is likely to increase as the US potentially takes steps to limit Western presence in Africa.

Chapter 14: Dr. R. Evan Ellis explains that Russian activity in Latin America, while constrained by resources and geopolitical events, has been historically focused on the Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes, although it is not limited solely to those regimes. By attempting to create both economic and military footholds, Russia seeks opportunities to expand its influence in the region. Despite setbacks due to regional events, Russia is likely to continue to explore ways to leverage and exploit opportunities for increasing both its military and economic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Chapter 15: Mr. Pavel Devyatkin writes that Russia’s activities in the Arctic have included more multilateral cooperation, and have been focused on securing access for northern shipping routes and energy extraction. The formation of the Arctic Council between Russia and other Arctic countries has enabled cooperation on resolution of territorial claims, as well as oil spill and search-and-rescue operations. Strategically, the Arctic region plays a significant role in Russia’s energy, economic, and defense priorities, as evidenced by the size and activities of the Northern Fleet, as well as frequent mention in Russian published doctrine.

Part IV. How Should the US Counteract Russian Gray Zone Activities Across the Globe?

Chapter 16: Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov discusses potential global actions to counter provocative Russian activities. The US National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls out Russian actions to undermine NATO and modify European and Middle Eastern security and economic organizations in its favor (National Defense Strategy summary, p. 2). Countering Russian provocations requires all instruments of national power, and US responses can be both proactive and reactive. Proactively, the United States can strengthen its allies’ and partners’ democratic systems of governance, while reducing their dependence on Russian energy through diversification of energy sources. To counter Russian military proxies, the United States can increase the capabilities of allies and partners. Meanwhile, Russian threats to use force can be mitigated by demonstrating US resolve and capability to deter and defeat Russian aggression.

Chapter 17: Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux focuses on countering Russian influence in the Baltic States. He writes that Russian influence in Europe happens primarily through “hybrid warfare” techniques. To counter this, the United States ought to take steps to strengthen economic, political, and societal liberalism across Europe. Economic and political liberalism both create strong states, capable of providing the institutions necessary for societal liberalism. Societal liberalism, when it is upheld by the rule of law, helps create a more diverse, yet united, populace that is more committed to the state and its basic institutions, and less likely to be influenced by outside sources (in this case, Russia).

Chapter 18: Dr. Roger Kangas recommends a US approach to Russian activities across Central Asia. He begins by discussing the particular difficulties of Central Asia, geopoltically. Among the sub- regions of the world, the area of Central Asia is one of the more difficult regions to outline clear actions for the US, simply because of the advantages that other large powers have, due to geographic proximity and current rates of economic and security engagement. Given this geopolitical reality in Central Asia, the US has a limited role to play. If the “tools of engagement” are exercised consistently and clearly, the US can have a positive influence in the region. The countries collectively chafe at that notion they are part of a “Russian Near Abroad.” Officials and analysts from the region repeatedly discuss the need to choose their future paths of engagement, whether in terms of multi-vectored security relations or diversifying trade and export/import routes. These signals can be addressed by US policies and actions. The refrain from needing the US to act as a “balancer” is heard from such actors, as well as many in the Washington, DC think tank community that focus on Central Asia. To do this, the US must be able to shape its own narrative in the region, combatting a rather vitriolic Russian message that paints the US in a negative light.

Chapter 19: Dr. Robert Spalding III discusses how the US role with regard to Russia should be to continue to engage European allies to take the lead for balancing in Europe. The allies’ goal should be deterrence. At the same time, the US should bilaterally engage Russia to peel them away from China’s orbit. The US can work with Russia in ways that improve the US-Russia relationship without detracting from European efforts to balance and deter. This can be applied by engaging with Russia in other regional or functional domains that do not detract from European efforts to deter.

Chapter 20: MAJ Adam Dyet argues that, while the breakup of the Soviet Union presented the US with new engagement opportunities in Central Asia, options to expand US influence in the area remain limited. He argues that despite Central Asian ire at Russian activities in Ukraine, Russian influence in the area remains high, and US policy makers should take a carefully moderated approach to engagement in Central Asia. Suggestions of diplomatic, security, and economic activities that the US could undertake are offered, as are cautions about treading over long-standing Russian red lines.

Chapter 21: MAJ Adam Dyet discusses a variety of ways in which the United States can respond to Russian gray zone activities in the Middle East—the balance of which, he argues, are directly tied to Russian strategic culture and a worldview based in a history of invasion and military encirclement.

Chapter 22: Dr. Joseph Siegle discusses Russian interests in Africa, namely access to natural resources and new markets for Russian goods, including weapons. He argues that, as a result, Russia has tended to support autocratic or uninclusive regimes, giving the US an opportunity to distinguish itself in Africa by pursuing an assertive policy against individual corrupt leaders and positive engagement, while also supporting democratic reforms.

Chapter 23: Dr. Barnett S. Koven and Ms. Abigail C. Kamp explain that Russia’s activities in Latin America have largely been an extension of its efforts to operate within the gray zone between overt military conflict and normal peacetime operations. In Latin America, the Kremlin has engaged in electoral meddling and targeted disinformation campaigns in order to impose costs on adversaries. In Mexico, Russian media had vocally supported a chosen candidate, and observers noted activity by bots and trolls in support of that candidate’s agenda. In Colombia, Russia had long supplied arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist insurgency, but since the group’s recent peace deal with the Colombian government, the Kremlin may need to change tactics in order to maintain influence therein. Colombia’s complex political dynamics, nevertheless, provides a fertile ground for Russian activities, spanning electoral meddling, mass media disinformation, and hardliners within the FARC.

Part V. What Capabilities Does the US Need to Effectively Respond to Russian Gray Zone Activities?

Chapter 24: Dr. Belinda Bragg provides a summary of findings from an SMA project on gray zone conflict, noting the importance of honing a clear definition of the “competitive zone” within which gray activities occur. She also notes that an effective US response to these activities requires added capabilities to both influence foreign populations and block the efforts of others to manipulate popular sentiment.

Chapter 25: Mr. Jason Werchan argues that Russia’s form of governance gives it “significant flexibility” and an advantage over the US when it comes to gray zone activities. The US needs a true whole-of-government approach to counter Russia in this area. Werchan suggests that the US government should identify a lead federal agency for US activities in the gray zone. He also encourages the development of the US’s “capability to effectively foster distrust and unease between the Russia Federation and China,” as well as US efforts to reduce European dependence on Russian energy resources.

“Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities”

Authors | Editors: Allen, G. (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)); Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Beckley, M. (Tufts University); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Bremseth, L.R. (Computer Systems Center Incorporated (CSCI)); Cheng, D. (Heritage Foundation); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Copeland, D. (University of Virginia); DeFranco, J. (George Mason University); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Ehteshami, A. (Durham University); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Forrest, C. (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE)); Giordano, J. (Georgetown University); Gregory, J. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Jiang, M. (Creighton University); Mazarr, M. (RAND); McGlinchey, E. (George Mason University); Nandakumar, G. (Old Dominion University); Roberts, C. (Hunter College, City University of New York (CUNY) / Columbia University); Schurtz, J. (Georgia Tech Research Institute); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Spalding, R. (Hudson Institute), Watson, C. (National Defense University); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute); Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology; Georgetown University; University College London; New America); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.); Pagano, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Prefaces Provided By: Czerewko, J. (Joint Staff, J39); Babb, J. (US Army Command and General Staff College)

Executive Summary

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-seven experts contributed to this white paper, providing wide-ranging assessments of China’s domestic and international activities in order to assess the future of China and the challenges that these activities may present to US interests. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-four chapters. While this summary presents some of the white paper’s high-level findings, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the experts’ individual contributions, which are worth reading in their entirety.

Understanding Chinese motivations and strategy

There is broad consensus among the white paper contributors that understanding the reasons, motivation, and strategy behind China’s actions is critical. Several of the contributors highlight the motivations behind China’s global activities. For example, one driver of China’s actions is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) belief that it is currently in a state of competition with the US (Cheng). A sense of insecurity about the future (Copeland) and a desire to maintain power also influence CCP behaviors (Copeland; Mazarr; Watson), as does the Party’s belief that information is inseparably linked both to the national interest and to the CCP’s survival (Cheng).

Other contributors focused on Chinese strategy. Internally, the CCP uses humiliation, distrust of the US, and China’s historical grievance to validate its rule and maintain power (Watson). Externally, China has developed a form of “strategic integrated deterrence.” This concept—which goes beyond military capabilities to incorporate political, diplomatic, economic, information, psychological, and scientific/technical capabilities—is designed to “deter and compel the US prior to and after the outbreak of hostilities” (Flynn). Given the criticality of information to regime survival, the CCP deems it necessary not only to control and influence information flow into China, but also to shape and mold the international structures that manage this flow (Cheng). Similarly, the CCP recognizes the importance of data—particularly for social control. The Party seeks to embed its model of social control into the technological matrix built and powered by Western tech companies, according to Dr. Robert Spalding III. It also seeks to expand and guide the development of tech-based businesses and social models in the future, and in order to do so, the CCP may recognize the benefits of adopting a more open system.

China and technological innovation

Several contributors indicate that China is well-positioned to become a world leader in science and technology research and development (S/T R&D), blockchain technology, and artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Dr. James Giordano, CAPT (ret) L. R. Bremseth, and Mr. Joseph DeFranco indicate that China is making significant investments in international scientific, biomedical, and technological markets for strategic purposes. Moreover, China intends to align its S/T R&D with explicit national directives and agendas to exercise its global hegemony and could leverage its S/T to disrupt global balances of order and power (Giordano, Bremseth, & DeFranco). China is also aiming to dominate the finacial technology (fintech) sector. Several Chinese companies possess digital payment systems that have major competitive advantages in the form of scale and proprietary technologies (Nandakumar). These companies could easily become market leaders if blockchain-based financial systems become the norm, and blockchains can also be used by the CCP for strategic purposes. Lastly, according to Mr. Gregory Allen, the CCP believes that AI is a “strategic technology” that will play a critical role in the future of economic and military power. Allen suggests that AI has the potential to start an “intelligentized” military technological revolution, which could give China the opportunity to narrow its military gap with the US. Consequently, China will only continue to seek leadership and make even greater use of its AI strength.

Another contributor, Mr. John Schurtz, argues that China is becoming a world leader in technology and military innovation as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes the importance of leading military innovation, and as a result, it has become poised to challenge the world’s most advanced militaries in the production of next generation high technology weapon systems. China will only continue to pursue ambitious innovation objectives in these areas, as is evidenced by its ‘Military-Civilian Fusion’ (MCF) development efforts.

Digital authoritarianism and Chinese regime durability

In this white paper, Dr. Nicholas D. Wright critically examines the relationship between digital authoritarianism and the durability of the Chinese regime. Although digitization may have negative effects on the durability of the Chinese regime, Dr. Wright argues that it can also strengthen the regime’s durability in the short- to medium-term by providing a plausible route for ongoing regime control while also making Chinese citizens wealthy. In addition, China’s development of a digital authoritarian regime enables its influence over other states in a competition for global influence, both through ideas and the exportation of digital systems (Wright). However, if China’s model is not broadly appealing to swing states, China may not be able to solidify its influence over these countries’ regimes and will ultimately lose this competition for influence. The future evolution of AI technology and the way in which liberal democracies adapt to becoming digital political regimes are also factors that could impact the situation (Wright).

Chinese global influence

China aspires to achieve global power status and challenge the US by extending its influence and strengthening its relationships with regions such as Europe; Eurasia; Central, West, and South Asia; and Latin America. One way in which China is aiming to increase its global influence is by increasing its economic footprint in these regions, as is evidenced by China’s expansion of trade and investments via its Belt and Road Initiative (Ehteshami & Weitz). China wants to secure access to valuable resources and create an “economic web” for its own benefit (Ehteshami, Watson, & Weitz). If these countries become economically dependent on trade with China, Beijing could use these dependencies to its advantage by using economic pressure to gain political compliance and/or undermine alliances with the US, as China did with South Korea and US deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg).

Some regions, such as Central Asia, have reacted to Chinese influence activities with hesitation and skepticism (McGlinchey). Other regions, such as Latin America (Watson), have welcomed China’s increasing engagement and have increasingly turned to China, rather than the US, to fulfill their economic needs. European states benefit significantly from access to Chinese markets for exports and have thus welcomed Chinese economic engagement opportunities as well, despite disapproval of enforced technology-transfer by domestic European companies seeking to operate in China, international property theft, and human rights abuses by Chinese companies (Dorondo).

Another outcome of increasing Chinese influence across these regions is that pre-existing US alliances with regional states are subject to increased pressure from China. Modern US alliances across the globe, and with European nations in particular, have enabled a a high level of US prosperity and security; conversely, weakening of these relationships could lead to potential US vulnerabilities (Dorondo). The diminishment of US relations with states in the referenced regions could result in economic troubles and/or a loss of regional influence, for instance. The US has the ability to counter these Chinese global outreach activities and prevent reliance on trade with China by strengthening its own relationships with these countries and using Chinese regional shortcomings to its advantage.

Despite Chinese global influence activities that present challenges to US interests and the current global order, the US must recognize that Chinese “future elites” (e.g., students from the top universities in China) still generally respect and admire American values and institutions (Gregory & Sherlock). Thus, despite the critical narratives being propagated by the Chinese regime and the competitive nature between the US and China, a significant portion of the Chinese population still views the US in a positive light, and not as an enemy.

The future of US-China competition

The future of global competition between the US and China will be centered around economic development and technological innovation (Hinck & Cooley). Dr. Michael Beckley presents a critical perspective of China’s economic growth, arguing that it is not as impressive as it appears, and that China faces several significant restraints that prevent it from closing the wealth gap with the US. However, China will try to continue to make economic strides in an effort to catch up to the US. Prof. Cynthia Roberts cautions that, despite the importance and usefulness of international financial instruments, the US should refrain from overusing such instruments. US decision makers must consider the consequences of weaponizing finance or imposing economic costs on its opponents. Such actions could result in consequences such as countries looking to diversify to currencies other than the US dollar, like the renminbi (RMB) or digital currencies, which over time could significantly reduce US leverage and give others, including China, greater freedom to maneuver.

Managing the challenges that China presents

The US and China are competing to shape the foundational global paradigm—the ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics (Mazarr). This competition ultimately revolves around norms, narratives, and legitimacy. The CCP has tethered its legitimacy to achieving the goals of the China Dream proposed by Xi Jinping, which include economic success, increasing Chinese influence, and defending national territories (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg). Both internally and externally, it is critical for China to highlight its successes and portray itself in a positive manner in order to make the China Dream a reality. In its attempts to achieve these goals and shape the global paradigm, China is pursuing ambitious economic endeavors, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s power is also growing in the form of its military buildup, as is evident through its increased pressure on Taiwan, its limited war with Vietnam, and its conflict with India over disputed territory (Mazarr). The challenges that China presents threaten US interests and the current world order, and therefore, it is imperative that the US successfully and carefully mitigates these challenges.

Several contributors also provide recommendations for US decision makers, namely that they must acknowledge the extent to which the US is already in competition with China and recognize the range of actions that China is taking; they must also begin to counter these actions by engaging in hard bargaining, drawing clear redlines, and remaining cautious to not provoke unwanted Chinese behaviors (Cheng). One white paper contributor, Dr. Maorong Jiang, suggests that the US might need a new strategy, utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach in order to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Additionally, Lt. Col. Christopher D. Forrest asserts that competing in the gray zone will be an integral part of this competition, where the US must focus its time, energy, and resources. In order to effectively counter ongoing Chinese gray zone actions, the US will likely need to make some cultural and organizational changes and adapt a different lens through which to view US capability development and operations (Forrest).

Authors: Dr. Bradford Morrison (University of British Columbia) and Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia)

Executive Summary

The UBC research group assessed psychological processes of six DPRK leaders, including Kim Jong-un, using thematic content analysis for integrative complexity and motive imagery, and Profiler Plus® computer-scored measures of Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE), Distrust, and Self-Confidence. Despite some individual differences, in general the leaders were low in complexity, higher in power motivation than other motives, and high in BACE and distrust. This pattern indicates closed-mindedness, rigid thinking and planning, lack of perceptiveness in considering or trusting outsiders’ viewpoints and goals, a need for rapid and definite closure, and low probability of negotiating mutual concessions or flexibility in interaction. When under increased tension, the DPRK leaders’ profiles showed even higher distrust and need for power, somewhat increased affiliation need, and reduced motivation for achievement. These patterns indicate a low likelihood of significant changes of basic beliefs, motives, and strategies, despite possible overt assertions of such changes.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

12th Annual SMA Conference – The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Conference Theme

The 12th Annual SMA Conference, entitled “The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World,” was held 21-22 May 2019 at the General Jacob E. Smart Conference Center at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The conference theme was defined as:

“The actors, actions, and arenas of the emerging global security environment are changing. To navigate these murky waters, the United States requires effective statecraft that relies in equal measure on: (1) resurgent diplomatic application of national will, (2) information and technological overmatch including through artificial intelligence, (3) multi-use conventional and irregular warfighting capabilities, and (4) economic growth fostering national interests across domestic and international private-public partnerships. Such a comprehensive and nuanced approach is needed to achieve strategic success in diverse contested spaces, and address the complex political, economic, social, and ecological challenges that will face the nation.”

Jointly with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), SMA welcomed panelists and speakers from across the United States Government (USG), academia, foreign partner nations, and industry to explore this theme. This year, the Conference welcomed keynote speakers General Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and Lieutenant General John N. T. Shanahan, Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and invited speaker Mr. Brian Murphy, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in DHS.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Honduras were analyzed: the 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, the 2011-12 distribution of agricultural land, and the 2011-12 distribution of the USAID DHS wealth factor score.

Results

The Honduran population exhibits an overall propensity for taking risks, and at a much higher rate than is typical for most countries. This analysis indicates that both the very poor and the wealthiest Hondurans have the greatest potential for risk taking.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The high degree of risk taking among elites may be reflected in political instability such as the 2009 coup d’état. Risk taking among the poorest half of the population could be manifest in their attraction toward illegal activity, migration as a reaction to the lack of economic opportunity in a poor nation with wage stagnation, and to the threat of violence from gangs.

Implications for US Interests

Honduras’ high levels of inequality are a source of its extremely high levels of violence, which has emerged as the main driver for migration. Honduran migration has had a destabilizing effect on the region, including on US domestic political unity. Increasing distance between the US government and Honduras, coupled with the potential for unexpected changes in leadership and policy of the Honduran government, could jeopardize US interests and create opportunities for Chinese and Russian encroachment.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has been actively increasing its influence in the region through development, aid, and education programs. The Honduran government could potentially shift its allegiance toward China depending on changes among the political elite, and common Honduran people might seek Chinese aid in order to overcome the lack of opportunity within Honduran society. However, Honduran recognition of Taiwan remains an obstacle to Chinese/Honduran political relations.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has been actively increasing its influence in Latin America through diplomatic initiatives. The Honduran government has historically been a staunch US ally, although recent decreases in aid to Honduras may weaken that relationship. The Honduran government at this time appears to fear growing influence of Russia in the region, although increasing distance between the US and Honduras creates an opportunity for Russia to undermine US influence.

Author: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

As part of the Quick Concept Series, Dr. John A. Stevenson of NSI, Inc, defines “fragile states” in the context of this effort. In situating fragile states as internationally recognized political units experiencing disorder, Dr. Stevenson briefly reviews the various conceptions of state strength, and then operationalizes the correlates of state fragility. In doing so, Dr. Stevenson highlights which factors of state fragility foreign powers can assist with without increasing disorder in fragile states.

Pakistan Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Six datasets on wealth and status distribution in Pakistan were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data from years 2018 and 2014, USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores and agricultural land ownership from 2012-13, and wealth factor scores from 2006-07.

Results

All six datasets paint a picture of a risk acceptant Pakistani population that has slightly decreased over the past decade, and the average Arrow-Pratt score is higher than most countries in this study, indicating a less risk acceptant population than most countries. Interesting variations and shifts between occupational datasets in risk acceptance may explain the success of Imran Khan’s populist campaign; furthermore, the highly risk acceptant scores in the agricultural land ownership datasets highlight the extreme economic inequality that exists in the distribution of agricultural land ownership.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The propensity for risk taking in Pakistan is best understood in the context of Pakistan’s widespread corruption and the lack of competent economic governance. Public discontent possibly fuels frustration with these issues and maybe linked to the populist rise of Imran Khan who ran anti-corruption, economic reform, and a strong anti-Western sentiment that places the blame of VEO activity and instability on the US.

Implications for US Interests

Due to the complex socio-political dynamics in Pakistan and the complex regional interests in Islamabad and across South Asia, the US has paradoxical interests in Pakistan’s stability. The pronounced decrease in social status registered in this report’s analysis of craftsmen coincided with the ascendancy of Imran Khan, and this dynamic is important understanding the populist support that Khan enjoys. The continued success of Imran Khan is supported by his strong anti-Western rhetoric (which resonates with working class Pakistanis), and such sentiment further encourages the growing Sino-Pak relationship. Conversely, a decrease in Imran Khan’s popularity could lead to widespread instability and a larger role for Pakistan’s security forces in political affairs. Such a dynamic would likely lead to more tacit support for VEOs operating in Pakistan, which is antithetical to Washington’s strategic interests.

Implications for China’s Interests

Pakistan’s social cleavages and wealth inequality do not present immediate concerns to China’s economic interests and investments in Pakistan. Given the integral role that Pakistan plays in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and in the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China is more interested in safeguarding their investment and of Chinese citizens working to construct CPEC infrastructure. Such social cleavages and inequality may come to a boiling point that threatens the ability of the Khan regime to deliver on the economic agreements, and in this regard China may pursue activities that seek to stabilize Pakistan’s economy and political security.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia stands to gain the most from instability brought on by economic inequality in Pakistan, provided that Moscow can capitalize on such uncertainty by increasing anti-Western sentiment and further contract US presence.

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Serbia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Serbia were analyzed: Serbian state data on monthly income by occupation for 2018, and International Labor Organization (ILO) data on income by occupation for the years 2016 and 2014.

Results

Serbia’s population is highly risk acceptant. Occupations that earn higher incomes are more to take risks due to the high reward of maintaining or increasing their socioeconomic status within Serbian society (Imas, 2016). The risk acceptance of the wealthier and poorer classes is exacerbated by political pressure from major international powers, internal economic issues, and social cleavages that refuse to allow old prejudices and conflicts to die. These long-lasting cleavages have the potential to incur violent outbursts and see a devolution back into a state of civil war (UNPD, 2018; CRS report, 2018).

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Serbia has the potential to control the flow of displaced refugees into Europe. Furthermore, it has strong cultural and geopolitical connections to Russia. For these reasons, the United States, Western Europe, China, and Russia all take special interest in Serbian stability. The great powers attempt to influence Serbia using humanitarian aid, infrastructure investments, and more covert means through media and propaganda (CRS report, 2018; Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019; Nalaeva, 2016). Low economic achievement and a precarious relationship with the self-proclaimed independent state of Kosovo has only aggravated ethnic and societal tensions in recent years, causing a rising fear that Serbian society may devolve back into the violence it experienced in the 1990s (CRS, 2018). This scenario would place Serbian civilians in a position where they must take extreme risks amid sinking Serbian stability, and the data analyzed in this study indicate that they may very well be in a risk acceptant decision frame.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an increased interest in Serbia, which has grown from a socialist state and perpetrator of genocide to a democratic government and potential EU member state (CRS, 2018). However, ethnic tensions still lie under the surface of Serbian society and contribute to social discrimination and an ongoing socioeconomic crisis (UNPD, 2018). The United States’ main interests are in supporting its allies in the EU and NATO as they seek to counter Russian influence by creating a stable and politically democratic Balkan region (CRS, 2018). To meet this goal, the United States has given millions of dollars in financial and humanitarian aid to Serbia. Serbia’s risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US’ interests should economically frustrated ethnic Serbs turn their frustrations toward minorities and destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has fewer immediate interests in Serbia than Russia and Western European countries. Instead its interests lie in potential future economic and political aspirations for China, both in the Balkans and beyond into central Europe (Le Corre & Vuksanovic, 2019). Several Chinese infrastructure projects, which include the high-speed railway from Belgrade to Budapest and two separate construction projects on Serbia’s corridor 11 highway, rely upon future Serbian social stability (Dimitrijević, 2017). Serbia has been incredibly receptive of China’s infrastructure projects going as far as to suggest China open a joint infrastructure office with Budapest. Since its business sector has been receptive of economic overtures from Beijing, Serbia’s risk acceptant population gives the leadership in China an opportunity if it is able to break ground on its Belt and Road initiative, providing more economic opportunities for the Serbian population.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russian interests in Serbia are based upon its ethnic and cultural ties to Slavic nations that follow Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Russia considers itself a protector of Serbia and other Balkan States due to these cultural connections (CRS, 2018). Russia views the EU and NATO’s interaction within Serbia as a direct affront to its sovereign rights, and its ability to interact economically and politically within Eastern Europe. While Russia’s interests in Serbia remain mostly political, it has used economic and media tools (such as Serbia’s reliance on Russian energy, and Russia’s posturing as a pan-Slavic Orthodox Christian defender), to counteract the United States’ and Western Europe’s interaction in the country (Bugajski, 2018). Serbia’s risk acceptant population is both a risk and an opportunity for Russia. This is due to its population’s ability to sway the direction of Serbia’s government that could either align itself with the EU and NATO or Russia in the future based off of perceived potential gains.

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