SMA Publications

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in China were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2011 net wealth centiles compiled by the Chinese government’s Household Finance Survey.

Results

Both datasets show that China’s population is risk acceptant. The data provided by the World Bank not only show a population that is on average risk acceptant, but also demonstrate that the entire population is risk acceptant with the wealthy exhibiting the greatest risk acceptance.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

While China’s ethnic makeup is 91% Han, the remaining 8% number more than 100 million Chinese citizens that belong to 55 ethnic minorities, many of whom reside in China’s outer provinces and consider their particular ethnic groups autonomous from China (Clarke, 2017). The highly restrictive and autocratic practices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) experienced by these minority groups creates the potential for further civil strife throughout the country. Examples of ethnic repression as domestic policy are the CCP’s preemptive limiting of the Uighur population’s freedom and imposing military control over Tibet (Clark, 2017; Maizland, 2019). Beijing’s growing repressive civil policies for Chinese citizens and targeted persecution toward its minorities, combined with China’s highly risk acceptant population has the potential to spark widespread civil unrest and instability.

Implications for US Interests

The US has a competitive relationship with China that occasionally turns into necessary collaboration, as both economies are interdependent and are heavily reliant on each other for success (Egan, 2019). Politically, the US has concerns with China’s intrusion into US international interests and influence (Hass & Rapp-Hooper, 2019). This makes the risk acceptant nature of China’s population and the present ethnic fissures an opportunity for the US to influence its competitor from the inside. Current unrest in Hong Kong1—where per capita GDP is approximately five times higher than the rest of China—may be an example of this potential, as China’s most risk acceptant societal elements, who are therefore more likely to protest government policies, are at the high end of the income scale.

Implications for China’s Interests

The risk acceptance of China’s population threatens its national and international interests from within. The CCP views the ethnic fissures and perceived separatist mentality of its minority groups as a direct threat to its regime stability and China’s outward BRI projects, which must go through some of these provinces (Clarke, 2017). Furthermore, inequality could fuel protest even at the higher end of the economic scale. However, risk taking can be done in pro-social ways, such as business investment and start-up businesses. If the CCP can re-start the Chinese economy and provide growth and opportunity, this potential liability could be turned into an asset.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia relies deeply on its cooperative activities with China, including interacting with countries in foreign regions with the expressed purpose of weakening Western democratic values and US political influence (Oliker, 2016; Gurganus, 2018). Given its strong political and economic ties to China, Russia may stand to lose economic and geopolitical power in certain regions including South Asia and the Asia Pacific if the CCP’s legitimacy is weakened by inner turmoil from its repressed and risk acceptant population.

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Authors | Editors: P. Layton & S. Canna (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

The SMA Future of Great Power Competition & Conflict project is researching how the United States might strategize to defend its global interests. This paper supports the project in deriving some grand strategy alternatives specifically related to China (twelve) and Russia (ten). The development of the alternatives draws on a broader spectrum of international relation’s theories than the restricted neorealist set generally employ. The study’s aims are to encourage the consideration of tangential approaches, suggest different framing mechanisms that could restructure our thinking about managing great power competition, and briefly outline a range of alternative ways to meet the challenges China and Russia pose.

AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives

Contributors: Ahmed, S. (UC Berkeley); Bajema, N. (NDU); Bendett, S. (CNA); Chang, B. (MIT); Creemers, R. (Leiden University); Demchak, C. (Naval War College); Denton, S. (George Mason University); Ding, J. (Oxford); Hoffman, S. (MERICS); Joseph, R. (Pytho LLC); Kania, E. (Harvard); Kerr, J. (LLNL); Kostopoulos, L. (LKCYBER); Lewis, J. (CSIS); Libicki, M. (USNA); Lin, H. (Stanford); Miura, K. (MIT); Morgus, R. (New America); Esplin Odell, R. (MIT); Pauwels, E. (United Nations University); Saalman, L. (EastWest Institute); Snow, J. (USSOCOM); Steckman, L. (MITRE); Weber, V. (Oxford)

Opening Remarks provided by: Grynkewich, A. (JS J39); Freedman, L. (King’s College, London)

Editor: Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology)

Integration Editor: Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

ISBN: 9781585662951

Executive Summary

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data promise to help reshape the global order. For decades, most political observers believed that liberal democracy offered the only plausible future pathways for big, industrially sophisticated countries to make their citizens rich. Now, by allowing governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more effectively than ever before, AI offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them—the first since the end of the Cold War. That may help fuel and shape renewed international competition between types of political regimes that are all becoming more “digital.” Just as competition between liberal democratic, fascist, and communist social systems defined much of the twentieth century, how may the struggle between digital liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism define and shape the twenty-first?

The technical nature of AI’s new advances particularly well suits all-encompassing surveillance; and as a consequence authoritarianism. New forms of authoritarianism arose with previous waves of global authoritarian expansion: fascism in the 1920s or bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1960s. China has begun constructing core components of a digital authoritarian state. America’s liberal democratic political regime is turning digital, and so too is Russia’s hybrid political regime that lies between democracy and authoritarianism.

Swing states from Asia to Africa, Europe and Latin America must manage their own political regimes within the context of this global competition. Several like-minded countries have begun to buy or emulate Chinese systems. Russian techniques are diffusing. To be sure, competing models for
domestic regimes must be seen within the broader strategic context—relative military or economic power also matter deeply—but as in the twentieth century it will likely prove a crucial dimension.

This report focuses on the emerging Chinese and Russian models and how they will interact with the global order. We bring together deep expertise on China, Russia, strategy and technology—as well as artists to provide illuminating sidelights.

The key recommendation is that US policymakers must understand the potential for the new AIrelated to technologies to affect domestic political regimes (authoritarian, hybrid, and democratic) that will compete for influence in the global order. We recommend policymakers use the following three-pronged strategy to understand the challenge and develop global policy:

• US democracy must be kept robust as it adapts to these new technologies. It must respond to both domestic threats (e.g. capture by a tech oligopoly or drift to a surveillance state) and external threats, without becoming governed by a military-industrial complex. US digital democracy, if successful at home, will exert gravitational influence globally.
• The US must exert influence effectively, and manage potential escalation, in the swing states (e.g. in Asia or Europe) and global systems (e.g. norms and institutions) that form the key terrain for competition between the digital regime types. Diplomatic, economic, informational and commercial dimensions will be crucial, with both allies and other states.
• The US should push back on the digital authoritarian and digital hybrid heartlands, but do so in ways that manage the significant risks of spiraling fear and animosity.

Download the Book from Air University Press

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Nigeria were analyzed: 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2013 USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores.

Results

Nigeria has a largely risk acceptant population based on inequality and cross-cutting rural/urban, ethno- religious, and elite/common cleavages. The result is a population vulnerable to ambition, distrust, and grievance at all levels. These grievances are well-manipulated by elites in the country’s main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. These cleavages threaten economic growth and political stability in Africa’s most populous nation that has the continent’s largest economy. Nigeria is also a major oil producer, making it an attractive target for influence by world powers.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The levels of inequality indicate a highly risk acceptant population; Nigerians are a population primed for taking risks. Synergies between ethno-religious, rural/urban, and educated elite/commoner cleavages and risk acceptance present a political volatility situation that threatens trade and economic growth.

Implications for US Interests

The US is heavily vested in Nigeria, especially in its oil industry but also in Nigeria’s political influence on the African continent. Inequality-fueled instability threatens this interest.

Implications for China’s Interests

China shares much the same economic and political interests in Nigeria as the US, and therefore is equally threatened by instability.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia is much less vested in Nigeria but has sought influence at least through support of a potential nuclear industry in the country. This interest is also threatened by Nigeria’s instability.

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Authors | Editors: Ackerman, G. (University at Albany); Burnett, R. (National Defense University); Clifford, B. (George Washington University); Earnhardt, R. (University at Maryland); Harrigan, G. (Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate); Holt, T. (Michigan State University); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Logan, M. (University of Nebraska Omaha); McCreight, R. (George Mason University); Rassler, D. (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point); Yager, M. (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

Executive Summary

Innovation and new technologies have many positive attributes and provide significant improvement to humanity, much that is likely unforeseen at the time of initial discovery. The unpredictability of the technology trajectories can lead to significant negative consequences. This white paper aims to discuss the massive leaps in innovation and understand what this means for national security.

The articles are briefly summarized below.

In Chapter 1, entitled “Third Offset Implications for Homeland Security: Tranquility or Turbulence,” Robert McCreight states that the overall future trajectory of modern technologies hinges on a fairly imperfect and periodically naïve grasp of dual-use science and technology and what it portends for our planet and its inhabitants. He goes on to say that one immediate concern is to determine not only how it is affecting our current way of life, geopolitics, the economy, social stability, governance, security, and the ordinary functions and determinants of the natural world around us, but also weigh the downstream consequences of technology growth, diversity, and convergence on all of those things ten to twenty years on. If advanced dual-use technologies hold the potential for a vast array of unanticipated threats in the next few years, we will need effective doctrine, strategy, and deterrence measures. He asks a key question: How to begin to establish criteria which guarantees that humans retain ultimate control, management, and direction of advanced dual-use technologies and thereby thwart untoward and dangerous outcomes arising from their mix of expected and unexpected outcomes. He advances five possible criteria for wrestling with the emergence of ADUCT (advanced dual-use convergent technologies) in a manner that sketches out an approach for the short term and allows flexibility for modifications and improvements along the way over the next decade.

Gina Ligon and Michael Logan in Chapter 2, “Malevolent Innovation: Novelty and Effectiveness in Terror Attacks,” state that terrorism provides a model context for examining creativity, as the need for survival and innovation pervades these destructive and malevolent groups. Despite this, creativity and innovation remain underdeveloped concepts in terrorism research. One reason for this is the limited empirical data about this phenomenon, making it unclear which tenets of creativity research hold versus which do not translate in the domain of terrorism. The present effort overcomes this by examining the dimensions of malevolent innovation in a large sample of terrorist attacks. To anticipate adversary threats, it is critical that we examine all of the possible combinations of VEO innovation developed in the past. This particular effort can provide planners with exemplars of the highest levels of VEO innovation across a large dataset of violent extremist organizations, providing a comprehensive look at what is possible and what should be prevented.

Don Rassler in Chapter 3 “Back to the Future: The Islamic State, Drones, and Future Threats” states that the Islamic State is an irony of sorts, as while the organization looks to, is inspired by, and seeks to recreate the past certain aspects of the group’s behavior also provide a window into conflicts of the future. A key case study in this regard is the Islamic State’s drone program, and specifically how the group “overcame technical and cost asymmetries,” and creatively developed a novel and scalable drone-based weapons system “constructed from commercial components that challenged—at least for a period of time—states’ ability to respond.” He goes on to state that the Islamic State’s drone accomplishments speak to, and have a number of important implications regarding, the character and style of future threats that are either constructed around or that significantly leverage dual-use commercial technologies. He concludes by stating to stay ahead of the issue, and to better prepare for a future that will almost certainly be typified by the proliferation of other hybrid threats that leverage and/or repurpose commercial systems in dangerous ways, the United States should identify the pathways and methods that allowed the Islamic State to acquire and scale its fleet of quadcopter drones in the first place, and trace the evolution of functional threat streams.

Bennett Clifford in Chapter 4, “Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram,” makes several key observations:

• English-speaking supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) use the messaging application Telegram to distribute a range of information, including instructional material—manuals and guides designed to aid operatives with step-by-step procedures for providing assistance to the group.

• Channel administrators distribute whichever manuals they believe can be of aid to aspiring operatives, regardless of its ideological background.

• Telegram’s internal file-sharing features and lax approach to content moderation allow channel administrators to create repositories of instructional information within Telegram channels.

• While attack-planning manuals available on Telegram channels understandably pose a large concern for counterterrorism authorities, operational security and cybersecurity manuals are also frequently distributed, relatively easy to implement, and help operatives successfully conduct activities in support of terrorist groups while minimizing the risk of detection or apprehension.

In Chapter 5 entitled “Examining the Present and Future Role of Cybercrime-as-a-Service in Terror and Extremism,” Thomas Holt makes the case that the rise of online illicit markets that enable the sale of cybercrime tools and stolen personal information have made it possible for individuals to engage in technically sophisticated forms of crime regardless of level of computer skill. Ideological and terror groups over the last decade have expressed an interest in cyberattacks as a means to cause harm, though it is not clear how much ability they have to perform such attacks. As a result, cybercrime markets may engender their attacks, though it is not clear how often this may occur, or what conditions would lead to their use. He provides recommendations for policy and research to disrupt cybercrime markets and improve our knowledge of ideologically-motivated cyberattackers generally.

• Cybercrime markets generate millions of dollars in revenue and enable non-technical actors to perform sophisticated attacks.

• They may provide a point of entry for ideologically-motivated extremists and terrorists to engage in cyberattacks.

• These markets can be disrupted through traditional law enforcement investigations, and may also be affected through other extra-legal efforts such as Sybil attacks.

• Research is needed on the radicalization process of ideologically-motivated actors who engage in cyberattacks, and how this differs from those who have engaged in physical attacks.

Rebecca Earnhardt and Gary Ackerman in Chapter 6 entitled “Modelling Terrorist Technology Transfer,” make the point that while technology transfer occurs as a part of routine life, the topic remains relatively understudied in the terrorism literature. As terrorists engage in increasingly lethal and technologically sophisticated attacks, the concern surrounding terrorists acquiring cutting-edge weaponry and related technologies is accumulating. They go on to describe the Terrorist Technology Transfer (T3) project which provides a first cut at addressing this critical operational gap in knowledge through the exploration of extant technology transfer literature, construction of the first iteration of the T3 Model, and illustrative application of the model to an emerging technological threat. They conclude by stating the T3 project indicates the promise of having not only research, but also operational and policy impacts. It raises the possibility of providing government stakeholders, including intelligence, law enforcement, military, and policy agencies with a variety of insights and operational tools

In Chapter 7, “Hacking the Human Body: The Cyber-Bio Convergence,” Rebecca Earnhardt makes the point that the increasing convergence between the fields of biosecurity and cybersecurity may result in consequences that analysts have yet considered. Biotechnology use and expertise expansion beyond practitioners have stoked concerns about a wide range of traditional biosecurity issues including shielding the outputs from advanced gene editing systems or protecting university lab data storage systems. As biotechnology advances, including digitization and automation of systems that were once localized and only accessible to those directly involved on related research, biosecurity and cybersecurity fields continue to intersect. She concludes by stating a fully-fledged research project would explore the cyber security risk factors that are cited commonly as key vulnerabilities, and filter these cyber security risk factors through an adversary technology adoption decision making and motivational analysis.

In Chapter 8 entitled “Evolving Human and Machine Interdependence in Conflict: Advantages, Risks, and Conundrums,” R. E. Burnett makes several key points:

• Emerging science and technology will continue to disrupt customary characteristics of political and kinetic conflicts among states and non-state actors.

• The increasing complex interdependence between humans and machines is one area for particular examination.

• We cannot reliably predict whether or not human roles will rapidly give way to a more dominant robotic style of war, so we must prepare for a variety of futures, per the Scharre/Horowitz autonomy typologies.

• Humans involved with machines that operate at vastly greater speeds and volumes of data will further create problems of cognitive demand for the human soldier that need to be examined.

• We must investigate this not only in terms of technical performance, but also from a more holistic perspective, to include the social, political, and psychological dimensions of the soldier and of the citizen.

Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley, (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Robert Hinck, (Monmouth College); Dr. Robert Utterback, (Monmouth College)

This report was part of a small, rapid effort by SMA. Please email mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil for additional information. A second report from this effort can be found here.

Executive Summary

The following study explored how extremist organizations may take advantage of the Kashmir crisis; it identifies prominent extremist organizations and stakeholder interests reported in Indian and Pakistani news media. Data was collected from 54 Indian and Pakistani news sources from May 16th to August 16th, 2019; a total of 437 articles were analyzed.

Extremist Organizations, Stakeholders, and Interests

Extremist organizations most prominently identified:

• Indian media reports: Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Taliban, Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence, ISIL- Khorasan, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
• Pakistan media reports: Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh as a Hindu terrorist organization committing acts of genocide against Muslims.
• Taliban: US peace talks seen as empowering Taliban; bolstering their interests and increasing their influence in Jammu and Kashmir. LeT and Harkat-ulAnsar are shown as benefiting from Taliban protection. The expectation that the US will leave Afghanistan is seen as increasing the influence of the Taliban.

Local dissatisfaction:

• Mass protests against local officials in Jammu and Kashmir. Local officials are perceived as failing to represent constituent interests, corrupt, and unable to deliver social goods.
• Pakistani media argue India’s regional clamp down and draconian policies exacerbate local tensions and hurt business leaders. Indian troops shown as routinely profiling mosques and conducting unfair cordon and search procedures.

Indian government:

• Abrogation of Article 370 and 35A intended to end patronage system corrupting local officials in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian media describe the reforms as benefitting the local populace through economic development and educational opportunities.
• Retaliatory tit-for-tat against Pakistani backed terrorists with the goal of killing and preventing terrorist infiltration. Indian media reports considerable success in these endeavors.
• Pakistani media perceives India’s goal as using “terrorism” as a shield to hide injustices against Kashmiris; India’s strategy is described as following a policy of a “thousand cuts” similar to Israel’s policy towards Palestinians.

Pakistan government:

• Goal is to destabilize the region and support Kashmiri right to self-determination.
• Attempts to internationalize the issue by highlighting human rights violations committed by Indian state; appeals are made to the international community to pressure India to oppressive policies in Jammu and Kashmir.

Extremist Organizations: Key Tactics and Targets

• Coordination between Pakistan’s ISI, and special forces, with terrorist organizations is described as focused on infiltrating the LoC and establishing launch pads for attacks in both border areas and Indian heartland. Pakistani government shown by Indian media as sanctioning attacks regardless of collateral damage to civilian population.
• Shifting tactics reported by Indian media, include emphasis on the use of IEDs, including vehicle based IEDs, among terrorists in order to reduce the casualties within their organizations.
• Terrorist groups are reported in Indian media as targeting corrupt officials in Jammu and Kashmir, Indian security personnel, as well as, rail transport, civil aviation centers, and economic infrastructure. Concerns are specifically expressed in Indian media over extremists targeting Armanath Yatra pilgrimage and disrupting rail construction/transport.
• Focus on recruitment of dissatisfied youth by terrorist groups is shown in Indian media. Pakistani media emphasize Indian state-sponsored humanitarian atrocities and provide the assumption that the Indian government’s goal is to erase Muslim culture and influence.
• Areas most frequently discussed include: Pulwama, Srinagar, Anantnag, and Shopian.

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Author | Editor: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

“Influence” and “power” are foundational to how geopolitics are discussed and understood. Many American planners and policymakers are strong believers in global influence: fearing both its relative and absolute loss; seeking to “grow” and “spread” the United States’ influence; and trying to counter the influence of critical competitors such as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jafri & Stevenson, 2019).

Yet, there has been little consensus-making in either policy or scholarly discourse about how to consistently measure, operationalize, or conceptualize global influence. Often left undefined, global influence is a concept presumed obvious: everyone always “knows (it) when they see it (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 1964).” Therefore, global influence is an observable phenomenon which lacks clearly defined parameters. Treating global influence in this manner is not ultimately in the best interest of planners, as concepts that could mean everything often mean nothing.

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Author | Editor: Roshelli, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Mexico were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and income by occupation data from the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) for 2017.

Results

Overall, with the exception of a small proportion of middle-low income members of society the data shows a Mexican population that is risk accepting, with the poorest and wealthiest Mexicans having the greatest proclivity towards risk.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Data demonstrate an extremely high degree of risk taking for the wealthiest sector of the population. Mexico experiences high amounts of corruption and strong influence from the numerous drug cartels in the country, and excessive amounts of violence as a result of the drug trafficking which has a serious impact on national stability. Risk taking among the poorest segments of the population is represented in the numerous migrants seeking asylum in the US due to gang violence and lack of economic growth opportunities.

Implications for US Interests

The Mexican population demonstrates a high propensity for risk and is notably fragile according to the 2018 Fragile States Index. A continued increase in the number of migrants coming from the Northern Triangle has put a strain on the already difficult situation at the US-Mexico border leading to higher tension on US-Mexico relations. With evidence of China increasing trade ties with Mexican markets it is possible that unresolved tensions between the US and Mexico and changes in US trade policy may help facilitate an increase in Sino-Mexican trade relations. Moreover, legalization of marijuana in some areas of the US has increased the number of drug trafficking organizations focused on producing and selling more dangerous drugs like opioids (Lee, Renwick, & Labrador, 2019). Despite state fragility and possibly cleavages, the US’ position as Mexico’s largest trade partner and greatest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) creates some security for US interests (Congressional Research Service, 2019).

Implications for China’s Interests

Recent changes in US trade policy and a desire, by Mexico, to reduce its dependence on the US may provide an opportunity for China to increase market share in Mexico (Ellis, 2019). Some talks in 2018 indicated that Mexico has considered partaking in the Belt and Road Initiative which would have significant implications for Sino-Mexican relations (Nathanson, 2018). China is still likely to have trouble building out a mutually beneficial relationship though as the two countries compete in similar production markets.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia’s interests in Mexico comes as part of a continued national interest in Latin America as a whole powered by the desire to destabilize the pro-US leanings of the region (Koven & Kamp, 2019; Ellis, 2019). Russian involvement in Mexico’s 2018 election was a noted event pointing towards deeper interest by the Kremlin in Mexico than previously demonstrated (Koven & Kamp, 2019). Koven and Kamp (2019) explain that Russian influence in Mexico is rational as a technique for countering US influence in the region. Due to Mexico’s high-risk propensity and already unsatisfied citizens, Russian hacking likely had very little influence on the election outcome of its leftist president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (often referred to as AMLO) in 2018 (Koven & Kamp, 2019).

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Five datasets on wealth and status distribution in Ethiopia were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation estimates for 2013, and USAID Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 2016 on wealth factor scores and agricultural land ownership and 2005 data on wealth factor scores.

Results

Ethiopia is paradoxical; compared to other countries it is an extremely poor nation with an extremely high economic growth rate and low inequality across the entire population. However, Ethiopia’s strides in economic growth and reducing inequality are uneven across socio-economic, rural/urban, educational, and ethnic lines. Economic growth has been differentially enjoyed by well-educated, urban elites from minority ethnic groups such as the Tigray.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The differential distribution of Ethiopia’s limited wealth has led to grievances from poorer uneducated members of ethnic groups such as the Oromo and Amhara as well as risk acceptant elites from these ethnic groups. These grievances have erupted into protests that have destabilized the Ethiopian government and led to the resignation of the Tigray Prime Minister and the recent (June 2019) assassination of the Army Chief of Staff and the president of Amhara State in a coup attempt. The groups that the authors would predict to be acceptant of taking political risks appear to be acting upon their grievances.

Implications for US Interests

Ethiopia is the United States’ primary ally in East Africa and one of the US’ most important allies on the continent. To that end, the US continues to invest heavily in the country through foreign direct investment and governmental aid. The current shape of inequality and its attendant social unrest threaten these interests. Ironically, China’s aggressive involvement in Ethiopian development may enable it to eclipse US influence. The US is in danger of losing its influence in Ethiopia no matter what direction the country goes economically and politically.

Implications for China’s Interests

China is currently the primary investor in Ethiopia, through foreign direct aid (especially in infrastructure) and loans. Inequality fueled instability threatens these investments. However, China’s larger investment (2.5 times that of the US) provides it the opportunity to eclipse US influence if Ethiopia stabilizes.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has not invested nearly as much in Ethiopia but has recently signed an agreement to support the development of Ethiopian nuclear capability. Ethiopian political instability may threaten this Russian investment. However, if Ethiopia stabilizes and continues to grow economically, then Russia would gain a strategic and economic advantage and consequent leverage in Ethiopia.

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Authors | Editors: Ahmadzai, S. (University of Nebraska, Omaha); Bolger, D. (North Carolina State University); Kaltenthaler, K. (Case Western Reserve University & University of Akron); Liebl, V. (US Marine Corps University, Center for Advanced Operational and Culture Learning); Pantucci, R. (Royal United Services Institute); Rubin, B. (New York University); US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G27 Modeling & Simulation Branch; Whiteside, C. (Naval Postgraduate School)

Executive Summary

It is not yet clear whether reconciliation in Afghanistan is possible. But what has become increasingly clear is that certain critical elements must be addressed and overcome before any semblance of longterm stability in Afghanistan can emerge. This report is structured into three main sections: 1) contextualizing the current pressure toward reconciliation in terms of what Afghans want, 2) breaking down a potential negotiated settlement into its essential component parts, and 3) looking at some of the spoilers that make this process particularly difficult in Afghanistan.

This report does not seek to establish the ground truth from an objective perspective—such an effort is not possible in the context of competing interests of stakeholders both inside and out of Afghanistan. Instead, it seeks insights from leading experts from a variety of viewpoints that hopefully lead to a more nuanced understanding of the critical paths and roadblocks to a grand bargain in Afghanistan.

Part One: Contextualizing the Potential for Grand Bargain in Afghanistan

In Chapter 1, Dr. Barnett Rubin, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, outlines the historical dimensions of great power competition in Afghanistan starting with the Great Game and ending with a pessimistic view of a potential grand bargain. He argues that the perceived US intent to establish permanent hegemony over Afghanistan since 2005 has revolutionized the strategic balance in Eurasia, putting regional stakeholders further at odds with the United States. As an “offshore power in [relative] decline” and without a single cooperative relationship with regional powers (China, Iran, Russia, or Pakistan), stabilization is unlikely. The result is a balancing act in which the states of the region, in accord with their differing interests and capacities, try to assure that the US neither consolidates its position nor leaves abruptly.

In Chapter 2, Dr. Thomas Barfield, Professor of Anthropology at Boston University and President of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies, notes that the biggest obstacle to a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is the highly centralized, monopolistic government that has characterized all national Afghan governments since the late 19th century. Now at a hurting stalemate, Taliban fighters, the Kabul government, and the population are increasingly tired of war. A “grand bargain” in Afghanistan would entail changing the constitution so that power between the center and periphery is shared as was the case when kings ruled from Kabul over regions that held a considerable degree of autonomy—not unlike the United States. Regardless, any effort that does not account for the will of the Afghan people will not succeed.

In Chapter 3, Dr. Homayun Sidky, Professor of Anthropology at Miami University, questions whether a resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan is even possible given US missteps in the region. These include no coherent US strategy, support for what many see as an illegitimate central government, pushing democratic governance, and not doing enough to support multi-ethnic representation in governance. Complicating these issues are Afghanistan’s dependence on foreign aid, a failing economy, and unrestricted opium cultivation. In a society that is tired of war—and of both the central government and the Taliban—perhaps the only way forward is through a federated system of governance.

Part II Elements Critical to a Negotiated Settlement

In Chapter 4, Mr. Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute, discusses China’s potential role in a negotiated settlement. With the view that Afghanistan is the graveyard of Empires, China’s main priority is to establish workable relationships with as many regional stakeholders as possible to ensure that their own economic and security interests are covered. China lacks the power many ascribe to it to bring Pakistan and the Taliban to the negotiating table. While China is not adverse to a negotiated settlement, it will only invest in the effort once it is clear it is going to work and that all the other actors are on board.

In Chapter 5, Mr. Sher Jan Ahmadzai, the Director of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University Nebraska at Omaha, addresses demands to rewrite the Afghan constitution. He notes two groups that are calling for reform: those that want a more decentralized form of government and the Taliban, which claims that the constitution lacks Islamic values and norms. Mr. Ahmadzai fears that rewriting the constitution will exacerbate political instability and instead advocates for revising the constitution gradually through existing mechanisms. With regard to elections, Mr. Ahmadzai emphasizes the importance of holding elections, even if they are imperfect. However, he suggests that electoral reforms should better take into account traditional Afghan ways of choosing their representatives and leaders.

In Chapter 6, the US Training and Doctrine Command G27 Models and Simulations team describes how its Athena course of action analysis tool assesses the political and social effects of a potential power sharing agreements in Afghanistan. The team found that both of the power sharing structures studied—power shared at the ministerial level versus a decentralized regional government structure—resulted in increased Afghan governmental control geographically as well as increased popular support for the government. While the latter structure was a superior outcome in both control and population support, it comes with a potential downside. Recent Afghan history has shown that regional leaders often chafe under centralized control and will not hesitate to ignore the national government at best or plunge the country into civil war at worst.

In Chapter 7, Mr. Vern Liebl, analyst at the US Marine Corps University Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), paints a somber prospect for settlements that involve sharing power with the Taliban. The primary obstacle is that the Taliban is not willing to compromise on its prime objectives of expelling all foreigners and the reversion of governance completely into its own hands. Furthermore, he warns that ceasefires should not be read as a symbol of hope but as a tactic used by the Taliban to further alienate the National Unity Government. Finally, while Afghans largely want an ethnically representative and pluralistic state, they lack a unifying and charismatic leader that could lead such a movement. The preponderance of the evidence in Afghanistan suggests that a grand bargain is an unrealistic expectation at this time.

In Chapter 8, Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University, describes Afghanistan and Pakistan as locked in a complex security dilemma, which leaves Pakistan with little interest or motivation to support a negotiated settlement. Amongst Pakistan’s concerns is rising Pashtun nationalism, encirclement by India, and persistent US presence in the region. In fact, Pakistan has many reasons for intransigence in regard to any effort that moves Afghanistan in the direction of reconciliation. In particular, Pakistan fears that even a reconciled Afghan government would not be strong enough to control anti-Pakistan groups in the country. Pakistan’s best strategy remains strategic patience as it waits for the US to eventually withdraw.

Part III Spoilers

In Chapter 9, Dr. Gina Ligon and Mr. Michael Logan, University of Nebraska at Omaha, conducted a study of fragmentation and consolidation within violent extremist organizations (VEOs) within Afghanistan. By looking at periods of instability—defined by high of violence—in Afghanistan, Dr. Ligon and Mr. Logan found that three factors likely drive this behavior: organizational uncertainty, fractionalization, and consolidation. This has implications for successful counterterrorism strategies. With regard to organizational uncertainty, counterterrorism efforts like decapitation increases friction between group members as organizational influence and control is delegated from senior leaders to foot soldiers. Fractionalization occurs when new VEOs emerge from inter-group rivalry after the death of a senior leader. Consolidation occurs when new VEOs emerge (e.g., ISKP) and threaten the preexisting extremist organizations. A follow on study will evaluate how changes in leadership impact regional stability.

In Chapter 10, Dr. Craig Whiteside, professor at the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School, discusses whether Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) could act as a spoiler in any potential reconciliation effort. While ISKP could make gains that destabilize the region—by making gains in northern provinces, which could motivate Tajikistan or even Russia to intervene by aiding the Taliban OR by becoming popular among the youth in Kabul, driving urban terror—the greatest threat ISKP poses is in its potential to draw in disaffected Taliban. This could be particularly relevant if the Taliban enters into talks with GIRoA. While ISKP remains a low risk threat in the region, a worstcase scenario would be a large swing from the Taliban to ISKP.

In Chapter 11, LTG (ret.) Daniel Bolger, professor at North Carolina State University, concludes the white paper with an essay opining that while the US may prefer a grand bargain, the ugly reality is a choice between open-ended stalemate and outright withdrawal. He notes that Afghanistan has a warfighting culture that will never accept foreign interventions. This encourages strategic patience on the Taliban’s part to continue the insurgency and reject any form of negotiated settlement. Prospects for stability may be outside the capacity of the USG to facilitate.