SMA Publications

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Five datasets on wealth and status distribution in Ethiopia were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation estimates for 2013, and USAID Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 2016 on wealth factor scores and agricultural land ownership and 2005 data on wealth factor scores.

Results

Ethiopia is paradoxical; compared to other countries it is an extremely poor nation with an extremely high economic growth rate and low inequality across the entire population. However, Ethiopia’s strides in economic growth and reducing inequality are uneven across socio-economic, rural/urban, educational, and ethnic lines. Economic growth has been differentially enjoyed by well-educated, urban elites from minority ethnic groups such as the Tigray.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The differential distribution of Ethiopia’s limited wealth has led to grievances from poorer uneducated members of ethnic groups such as the Oromo and Amhara as well as risk acceptant elites from these ethnic groups. These grievances have erupted into protests that have destabilized the Ethiopian government and led to the resignation of the Tigray Prime Minister and the recent (June 2019) assassination of the Army Chief of Staff and the president of Amhara State in a coup attempt. The groups that the authors would predict to be acceptant of taking political risks appear to be acting upon their grievances.

Implications for US Interests

Ethiopia is the United States’ primary ally in East Africa and one of the US’ most important allies on the continent. To that end, the US continues to invest heavily in the country through foreign direct investment and governmental aid. The current shape of inequality and its attendant social unrest threaten these interests. Ironically, China’s aggressive involvement in Ethiopian development may enable it to eclipse US influence. The US is in danger of losing its influence in Ethiopia no matter what direction the country goes economically and politically.

Implications for China’s Interests

China is currently the primary investor in Ethiopia, through foreign direct aid (especially in infrastructure) and loans. Inequality fueled instability threatens these investments. However, China’s larger investment (2.5 times that of the US) provides it the opportunity to eclipse US influence if Ethiopia stabilizes.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has not invested nearly as much in Ethiopia but has recently signed an agreement to support the development of Ethiopian nuclear capability. Ethiopian political instability may threaten this Russian investment. However, if Ethiopia stabilizes and continues to grow economically, then Russia would gain a strategic and economic advantage and consequent leverage in Ethiopia.

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Authors | Editors: Ahmadzai, S. (University of Nebraska, Omaha); Bolger, D. (North Carolina State University); Kaltenthaler, K. (Case Western Reserve University & University of Akron); Liebl, V. (US Marine Corps University, Center for Advanced Operational and Culture Learning); Pantucci, R. (Royal United Services Institute); Rubin, B. (New York University); US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G27 Modeling & Simulation Branch; Whiteside, C. (Naval Postgraduate School)

Executive Summary

It is not yet clear whether reconciliation in Afghanistan is possible. But what has become increasingly clear is that certain critical elements must be addressed and overcome before any semblance of longterm stability in Afghanistan can emerge. This report is structured into three main sections: 1) contextualizing the current pressure toward reconciliation in terms of what Afghans want, 2) breaking down a potential negotiated settlement into its essential component parts, and 3) looking at some of the spoilers that make this process particularly difficult in Afghanistan.

This report does not seek to establish the ground truth from an objective perspective—such an effort is not possible in the context of competing interests of stakeholders both inside and out of Afghanistan. Instead, it seeks insights from leading experts from a variety of viewpoints that hopefully lead to a more nuanced understanding of the critical paths and roadblocks to a grand bargain in Afghanistan.

Part One: Contextualizing the Potential for Grand Bargain in Afghanistan

In Chapter 1, Dr. Barnett Rubin, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, outlines the historical dimensions of great power competition in Afghanistan starting with the Great Game and ending with a pessimistic view of a potential grand bargain. He argues that the perceived US intent to establish permanent hegemony over Afghanistan since 2005 has revolutionized the strategic balance in Eurasia, putting regional stakeholders further at odds with the United States. As an “offshore power in [relative] decline” and without a single cooperative relationship with regional powers (China, Iran, Russia, or Pakistan), stabilization is unlikely. The result is a balancing act in which the states of the region, in accord with their differing interests and capacities, try to assure that the US neither consolidates its position nor leaves abruptly.

In Chapter 2, Dr. Thomas Barfield, Professor of Anthropology at Boston University and President of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies, notes that the biggest obstacle to a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is the highly centralized, monopolistic government that has characterized all national Afghan governments since the late 19th century. Now at a hurting stalemate, Taliban fighters, the Kabul government, and the population are increasingly tired of war. A “grand bargain” in Afghanistan would entail changing the constitution so that power between the center and periphery is shared as was the case when kings ruled from Kabul over regions that held a considerable degree of autonomy—not unlike the United States. Regardless, any effort that does not account for the will of the Afghan people will not succeed.

In Chapter 3, Dr. Homayun Sidky, Professor of Anthropology at Miami University, questions whether a resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan is even possible given US missteps in the region. These include no coherent US strategy, support for what many see as an illegitimate central government, pushing democratic governance, and not doing enough to support multi-ethnic representation in governance. Complicating these issues are Afghanistan’s dependence on foreign aid, a failing economy, and unrestricted opium cultivation. In a society that is tired of war—and of both the central government and the Taliban—perhaps the only way forward is through a federated system of governance.

Part II Elements Critical to a Negotiated Settlement

In Chapter 4, Mr. Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute, discusses China’s potential role in a negotiated settlement. With the view that Afghanistan is the graveyard of Empires, China’s main priority is to establish workable relationships with as many regional stakeholders as possible to ensure that their own economic and security interests are covered. China lacks the power many ascribe to it to bring Pakistan and the Taliban to the negotiating table. While China is not adverse to a negotiated settlement, it will only invest in the effort once it is clear it is going to work and that all the other actors are on board.

In Chapter 5, Mr. Sher Jan Ahmadzai, the Director of the Center for Afghan Studies at the University Nebraska at Omaha, addresses demands to rewrite the Afghan constitution. He notes two groups that are calling for reform: those that want a more decentralized form of government and the Taliban, which claims that the constitution lacks Islamic values and norms. Mr. Ahmadzai fears that rewriting the constitution will exacerbate political instability and instead advocates for revising the constitution gradually through existing mechanisms. With regard to elections, Mr. Ahmadzai emphasizes the importance of holding elections, even if they are imperfect. However, he suggests that electoral reforms should better take into account traditional Afghan ways of choosing their representatives and leaders.

In Chapter 6, the US Training and Doctrine Command G27 Models and Simulations team describes how its Athena course of action analysis tool assesses the political and social effects of a potential power sharing agreements in Afghanistan. The team found that both of the power sharing structures studied—power shared at the ministerial level versus a decentralized regional government structure—resulted in increased Afghan governmental control geographically as well as increased popular support for the government. While the latter structure was a superior outcome in both control and population support, it comes with a potential downside. Recent Afghan history has shown that regional leaders often chafe under centralized control and will not hesitate to ignore the national government at best or plunge the country into civil war at worst.

In Chapter 7, Mr. Vern Liebl, analyst at the US Marine Corps University Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), paints a somber prospect for settlements that involve sharing power with the Taliban. The primary obstacle is that the Taliban is not willing to compromise on its prime objectives of expelling all foreigners and the reversion of governance completely into its own hands. Furthermore, he warns that ceasefires should not be read as a symbol of hope but as a tactic used by the Taliban to further alienate the National Unity Government. Finally, while Afghans largely want an ethnically representative and pluralistic state, they lack a unifying and charismatic leader that could lead such a movement. The preponderance of the evidence in Afghanistan suggests that a grand bargain is an unrealistic expectation at this time.

In Chapter 8, Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University, describes Afghanistan and Pakistan as locked in a complex security dilemma, which leaves Pakistan with little interest or motivation to support a negotiated settlement. Amongst Pakistan’s concerns is rising Pashtun nationalism, encirclement by India, and persistent US presence in the region. In fact, Pakistan has many reasons for intransigence in regard to any effort that moves Afghanistan in the direction of reconciliation. In particular, Pakistan fears that even a reconciled Afghan government would not be strong enough to control anti-Pakistan groups in the country. Pakistan’s best strategy remains strategic patience as it waits for the US to eventually withdraw.

Part III Spoilers

In Chapter 9, Dr. Gina Ligon and Mr. Michael Logan, University of Nebraska at Omaha, conducted a study of fragmentation and consolidation within violent extremist organizations (VEOs) within Afghanistan. By looking at periods of instability—defined by high of violence—in Afghanistan, Dr. Ligon and Mr. Logan found that three factors likely drive this behavior: organizational uncertainty, fractionalization, and consolidation. This has implications for successful counterterrorism strategies. With regard to organizational uncertainty, counterterrorism efforts like decapitation increases friction between group members as organizational influence and control is delegated from senior leaders to foot soldiers. Fractionalization occurs when new VEOs emerge from inter-group rivalry after the death of a senior leader. Consolidation occurs when new VEOs emerge (e.g., ISKP) and threaten the preexisting extremist organizations. A follow on study will evaluate how changes in leadership impact regional stability.

In Chapter 10, Dr. Craig Whiteside, professor at the Naval War College at the Naval Postgraduate School, discusses whether Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) could act as a spoiler in any potential reconciliation effort. While ISKP could make gains that destabilize the region—by making gains in northern provinces, which could motivate Tajikistan or even Russia to intervene by aiding the Taliban OR by becoming popular among the youth in Kabul, driving urban terror—the greatest threat ISKP poses is in its potential to draw in disaffected Taliban. This could be particularly relevant if the Taliban enters into talks with GIRoA. While ISKP remains a low risk threat in the region, a worstcase scenario would be a large swing from the Taliban to ISKP.

In Chapter 11, LTG (ret.) Daniel Bolger, professor at North Carolina State University, concludes the white paper with an essay opining that while the US may prefer a grand bargain, the ugly reality is a choice between open-ended stalemate and outright withdrawal. He notes that Afghanistan has a warfighting culture that will never accept foreign interventions. This encourages strategic patience on the Taliban’s part to continue the insurgency and reject any form of negotiated settlement. Prospects for stability may be outside the capacity of the USG to facilitate.

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Afghanistan were analyzed: the 2015 wealth factor scores and distribution of agricultural land from the USAID Demography Health Survey (DHS).

Results

Despite Afghanistan’s poverty, it does not have severe overall inequality. However, there is severe inequality in agricultural land ownership, making this segment of the population extremely risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The distribution of agricultural land touches on a defining issue of Afghan inequality, namely the urban- rural divide that heavily impedes Afghanistan’s progress in modernization. A poor, highly risk acceptant rural population is ripe for Taliban recruitment, where it has the most allegiance, and directly contributes to the rampant illicit opium economy.

Implications for US Interests

Urban-rural inequality dynamics are of significant concern to US interests in Kabul’s stability, because they serve to undermine the legitimacy of President Ashraf Ghani’s administration and the abdication of hostilities with the Taliban. Minimizing inequality in rural areas can increase the popularity of the Ghani government, reduce the Taliban’s recruitment ability, and diminish the informal and black economies of Afghanistan.

Implications for China’s Interests

China shares similar interests to the US, insofar as advancing general political stability and counter- terrorism. Urban-rural inequality will be of concern to Beijing in the context of safeguarding China’s agenda of integrating Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and destitute, risk-acceptant rural populations do not help in this regard. Furthermore, China is also concerned with Taliban recruitment among such rural populations.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Afghanistan’s inequality is of less concern to Russia than either the US or China, and risk acceptant populations are favorable to Moscow in the context of undermining US presence, and unfavorable with regard to increased terrorist activity within their geopolitical periphery.

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Five datasets on wealth and status distribution in Iran were analyzed: 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and Iranian government income data for years 2015 and 2006 for both urban and rural populations.

Results

Iran has moderate levels of inequality compared to most countries, although inequality is gradually increasing and there is growing concentration of wealth in cities and a corresponding impoverishment in the countryside. Inequality is exacerbated by sanctions.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

In general, Iran exhibits moderate levels of risk acceptance, although losses in the business sector are beginning to result in riots and demonstrations which culminated in 2018. While inequality appears to be fueling unrest, the Iranian government has a strong capacity for suppression of dissent.

Implications for US Interests

Social unrest weakens the Iranian government, potentially distracting it from its regional objectives and US sanctions are exacerbating this unrest. However, the Iranian population is overall not very risk acceptant and the Iranian state’s capacity for repression probably means that dissent will not really weaken the Iranian state. There is no evidence that Iran has been distracted in its regional activities, including operations in Syria, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf.

Implications for China’s Interests

Iran is an important node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China has been investing heavily in Iranian infrastructure. Inequality and social unrest threaten these investments.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Iran is Russia’s key ally in the Middle East for countering US influence. Inequality and social unrest that can weaken the Iranian government would be problematic for Russian interests in the region.

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The Character of Global Competition and Conflict, 2019-2029 – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University), Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (US Naval War College), Dr. Patricia J. Blocksome (US Naval War College), Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. Michael W. Fowler (US Air Force Academy), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Barry B. Hughes (University of Denver), Dr. Dr. Molly M. Jahn (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Dr. Buddhika Jayamaha (US Air Force Academy), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Martin Libicki (US Naval Academy), Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Robert Morgus (New America), Linda Robinson (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution), Dr. Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Dr. William C. Wohlforth (Dartmouth College), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)

Question of Focus

[Q1] How will the character of global competition and conflict change over the next decade, and which emerging global trends and conditions will drive this change? What are the implications of expected future global conditions for developing integrated US strategy and plans to defend US interests over both short- and long- term timeframes?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of twenty-eight Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the character of global competition and conflict will change over the next decade, and the implications of those changes on United States policy and planning.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

SMA Quick Concepts Series: Extended Deterrence

Authors | Editors: Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University) & Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc)

Summary

Extended deterrence encompasses pledges of military protection by a deterrent power to its allies and/or partners against a common potential aggressor. In the US case, these pledges constitute formal military commitments. These commitments can be, and have been, both nuclear and non-nuclear in nature. They imply, and typically reflect, not only common security concerns but also political and operational coordination between the deterrent power and its allies and/or partners.

Quick Concept: Competition

Authors | Editors: LTC D. Doran & J. Stevenson (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

The conceptual keystone within competition is relative advantage. Due to the fluid, persistent, and continual nature of competition, relative advantage refers to the position between two competitors, (1) either at a given point in time, or (2) in a particular area of competition, or (3) as a generalization of the aggregation of contests within the rivalry.
Countries conduct activity across the competition continuum, from cooperation to conflict. However, competition is that space in the center of the continuum that pits countries in a ubiquitous contest for relative advantage in every conceivable domain and with varying degrees of competitiveness. Traditional concepts of “victory” or “end state” are antithetical to 21st century competition. Gaining and maintaining relative advantage in strategically important areas of competition can be considered as success, but it is a transient state and must be continually reinforced.
Countries can gain relative advantage in a myriad of competitive areas and activities. However, there are key areas within competition that are of more vital, strategic interest. Prioritization is therefore essential, particularly since countries face unique limitations and challenges on an uneven playing field and cannot be competitive at everything. Understanding when and where to apply resources is indispensable. Likewise, knowing when to shift priority away from a competitive area is prudent.
In the global context, there are two ideal types of competition: friendly and adversarial. (In practice, competition types [e.g., gray zone activity] are not always so clear cut as competitors may compete in a semi-restrained way by bending and subverting rules.)
Friendly Competition. Countries compete in a rules-based, structured environment that results in benefit to those who compete most effectively. Countries follow the rules, which are reinforced by the assurance of fair play as a condition for participation. This state has clear winners and losers, but the stakes are generally not high and the objectives are limited.
Adversarial Competition. Countries compete in an unconstrained environment, in which they make and break rules in an attempt to shape the dynamics of the competition to their advantage. They may challenge the status quo and resort to ways that fall completely outside the norms of the rules-based international order. It is in this state that strong competitors will try to achieve maximum benefit and advantage without moving into conflict. This state is characterized by continually maneuvering elements of national power to achieve the broadest possible effects. In this state, gains are exceedingly transient and must be constantly reinforced and maintained.

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Italy were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2014 and 2010.

Results

Income data provided by the World Bank and occupational data provided by ILO tell similar narratives of a risk acceptant Italian population. The two datasets show that the Italian population is overall very risk acceptant and individuals or occupations attaining more wealth than others are on average more acceptant of risk.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Italy’s risk acceptant population combined with weak economic performance may be fueling a wave of conservative sentiment that has allowed Russia and China to sign economic deals with Rome that worry other EU nations (Poggetti, 2018; Isachenkov, 2018). This coincides with a recent political surge in Italy’s Eurosceptic population, which has occurred due to the country’s weak economic performance and lack of job opportunities for future generations (Pew Research Center, 2017; Lovene, 2018).

Implications for US Interests

Italy’s risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US’ interest of keeping Russia and China out of EU and NATO politics. Italy and the US have maintained a friendly and cooperative relationship in combatting global terrorism, natural disasters including Ebola, and joint humanitarian aid including in Libya (US Department of State, 2019). However, if Russia and China can use a friendly relationship with Italy to insert their own interests into EU politics and decision making, it will greatly threaten a wide range of joint US- EU security interests (Poggetti, 2018; Isachenkov, 2018).

Implications for China’s Interests

China recently signed an economic deal that lays the groundwork for eventually bringing the BRI to Italy (Poggetti, 2018). This opens a vast new array of opportunities for China as Italy is the largest economy to date to sign a BRI deal and is an EU and NATO member state. The downward projecting Italian economy and its slim economic opportunities (especially for the younger population), combined with Italy’s risk acceptant population, grants China the potential for furthering its influence not just into Italy, but also into the EU (Grant, 2019).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Italy’s risk acceptant population presents a large potential opportunity for Russia as it has ridden a wave of Euroscepticism and weak Italian economic performance to sign multiple economic deals (Isachenkov, 2018). Isachenkov points out that Russia sees the potential for continuing this trend, as former Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte acknowledged Russia as a member of Europe and said that an open dialogue with Russia on European issues is something that should be positive for the economic and political evolution of Europe.

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Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in India were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2015-2016 USAID DHS (Demographic Health Survey) data on wealth factor score and agricultural land ownership.

Results

India is moderately risk acceptant across all datasets.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Despite the risk-acceptant nature of India’s population, it is a stable democratic country that seeks to forge an independent path to become an emerging global power. However, given this latent risk- acceptant propensity and the soaring levels of economic inequality, some sort of catalyst has the potential to deteriorate national unity along a multitude of societal divisions.

Implications for US Interests

India is a vital strategic partner not only in South Asia but globally, and increasingly more so in the age of great power competition. Encouraging and maintaining India’s political stability and democratic institutions is important in buffering against Chinese influence, and the decay of national socio-political unity has to potential to deteriorate US-Indian relations.

Implications for China’s Interests

China is poised to take advantage of any political instability and unrest inspired by India’s social cleavages and inequality. However, this is only true to the extent that it will distract New Delhi from competing with China.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia is far more ambivalent to India than the US or China and seeks to maintain their security/energy cooperation with New Delhi while simultaneously diminishing US hegemony in the region.

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China’s and Russia’s Approach to Regional and Global Competition – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Valentin Weber (University of Oxford), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q8] How do China and Russia approach global, not just regional, arenas for competition?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of eleven Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how China and Russia approach regional and global competition.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.