SMA Publications

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.)

Discussion Details

On 27 February 2019, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA, Joint Staff, J39) office—with the support of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and National Defense University (NDU) – convened a panel discussion on China in support of the SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict effort. The scope of the day’s event was to assess how the United States Government (USG) should consider China’s power in relation to other states for the purpose of understanding the implications for future geopolitical competition.

Panel 1: How does China view strategic competition?

The first panel “How does China View Strategic Competition?” examined the nature of strategic competition, and China’s role therein. Dr. Cynthia Watson, Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs at the National War College, introduced the panel. She underscored the necessity of understanding Chinese intent within a context broader than bilateral relationships. Indeed, Dr. Watson highlighted the relevancy of this examination within the larger arena of great power competition. Additionally, Dr. Watson encouraged both panelists and attendees to broaden the scope of the conversation of strategic competition to include alternative topics, viewpoints, and ideas within the national security community.

Brigadier General (ret) Dr. Rob Spalding, GTRI, began his remarks by challenging the notion that the United States has not been operating with a cohesive top-down strategy. He noted that one of the central themes of the most recent National Security Strategy was that military power alone is insufficient to achieving United States interests; not only is the current force structure insufficient to counter China in the Pacific, but the economic path for strengthening the military has not yet been actualized. Whereas the military has an outsized role in executing national interests because of the resources it is afforded, it is not sufficiently oriented towards an appropriate understanding of the inherent conflict between the United States and China. He cited the example of the primacy of the information domain and suggested that policymakers are not investing the requisite time and energy into competing in this domain. Relatedly, Dr. Spalding suggested that providing for the common defense of the citizenry within the information domain is incumbent on the military. He underscored the necessity of a more expansive toolkit with which to execute national policy by bringing up the nature of alliances and suggested cooperation in economic, diplomatic, and information relationships would undergird security cooperation.

The concept of operating within a set of principles was also highlighted by Dr. Spalding, who noted the shift in such an idea around the Cold War. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the United States’ trade relationships were more ideologically based; however, since that time, the free market has become a more useful determinant of trade patterns. Dr. Spalding conceptualizes this shift as the marriage between democratic and free market principles. Furthermore, he suggested using the strengths of liberal democracies as avenues of attacks on alternative systems and encouraged the panel to no longer rely on 20th century solutions to the problems of today, particularly those that reside within the information domain.

On China, Dr. Spalding suggested reframing thought around the Communist Party, rather than the 1.4 billion citizens of China; the former, according to him, acts as the sovereign of the latter. He noted the particular social contract in China, using President Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms as a framework. Specifically, Dr. Spalding noted that the Chinese Communist Party satisfies the polity’s “freedom from want” and, in exchange, the population sublimates their remaining freedoms (i.e., freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom from fear).

Following Dr. Spalding’s comments, Mr. Roy Kamphausen of the National Bureau of Asian Research stressed several points. First, Mr. Kamphausen asserted that China has been engaged with strategic competition with the U.S., but in ways that will not resemble what the United States national security community might expect. Not least, Beijing desperately wants to avoid competition that features built-in military conflict, but China’s own actions might be pushing the United States in that direction.

Mr. Kamphausen argued that China’s desire to avoid military conflict as a part of the strategic competition is in great measure reflective of a risk aversion that is part of Chinese strategic DNA. This risk aversion derives from several factors: Chinese view of its own history, particularly the “Century of Humiliation;” real and deep concerns about the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, as expressed by Chinese leadership; concern that military conflict could put at risk China’s economic development goals; and finally, a reluctance to precipitate a military crisis prematurely, out of a conviction that time is fundamentally on Beijing’s side.

This principle of competition in areas where the adversary has a perceived weakness is a long-held tenet in Chinese strategic thinking. Mr. Kamphausen noted that eschewing traditional security competition in favor of “gray zone competition” in areas where the United States is unlikely to respond with force is a good example of this approach. Mr. Kamphausen warned of the misalignment between US and Chinese military conceptions on escalation management. Finally, he noted that China will only have occasional partners of convenience, rather than substantive allies. He stated this is the greatest opportunity to create leverage on China: the U.S. both has productive alliance relationships and China most fears the isolation that American-led allies can produce.

Panel 2: What are the capabilities or elements of power China uses to compete and how should we measure them?

Following the first panel was a discussion on the capabilities and elements of power that China uses to compete. Mr. Dan Flynn, Director of the IC Net Assessments Division, introduced the speakers, and offered comments on how to best identify and consider Chinese power. Speaking via videoconference was Dr. Michael Beckley of Tufts University, who suggested that the United States, despite many estimates, remains far ahead of China economically and militarily the competition with China. This assertion was based on analysts using gross indicators (such as gross domestic product (GDP)) that account for resources but do not deduct the costs. This is an analytical trap that befalls those who fail to account for social welfare and security burdens. It also does not account for the asymmetric nature of the Chinese threat. A traditional balance sheet that measures assets and liabilities on opposite sides of a ledger would be a more appropriate way to measure national wealth, according to Dr. Beckley.

Further, he noted that China has the world’s largest number of useless infrastructure projects. Additionally, China also leads the world in capital flight. Similarly, even though China’s input production is high, enormous amounts of money are wasted in research and development, and many Chinese innovators end up relocating to places where they can monetize patents and royalties. Dr. Beckley also characterized China’s role in Asian trade in context (i.e. that many Chinese companies were merely nodes on a continental assembly line). Militarily, while Chinese spending has increased, and it has acquired powerful missiles, China’s military expansion is constrained by China’s relative lack of power-projection platforms and by the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) forces of its neighbors. Also, the costs of securing the borders of such a large country are very significant and ought to be measured.

Determinants of future national economic growth include favorable geography, institutions, and demographics. On each of these indicators, Chinese future prospects have been scaled back from prior estimates. With respect to geography, China has hostile, or unstable, neighbors and has decimated its own natural endowment in pursuit of the economic growth it is enjoying. Institutionally, China’s track as an oligarchy ruled by a dictator-for-life projects limited long-term growth potential. Additionally, the Chinese system of propping up state firms at the expense of private institutions is problematic for China’s long-term prospects. Demographically, China’s workforce will shrink by 200 million workers, around the same time it will add 300 million senior citizens, for whom the state will have to extend social services, representing a reversal of the demographic trends that have propelled China thus far.

In concluding his remarks, Dr. Beckley explored the implications of a faltering Chinese growth trajectories for United States policy. He noted that as China becomes more vulnerable to the aforementioned indicators, it will likely act more aggressively, as the windows of opportunity to realize its national ambitions will be slowly closing. While recognizing the priority on keeping China in check, he noted that there is no need to gear up for another Cold War. He argued that the United States can maintain checks on China while simultaneously working with them. Indeed, he suggested that the bigger threat to the United States is not China’s rise in and of itself, but a gross American overreaction to that rise.

Interrogating the macroeconomic indicators of Chinese growth was Dr. Derek Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). He followed Dr. Beckley’s presentation largely in agreement with his predecessor but provided a more specifically economic look at China’s rise. He derided conventional indicators, specifically purchasing power parity (PPP) and underscored the methodological problems with using GDP. Specifically, since GDP measures transactions, it does not correct when goods get oversupplied. Dr. Scissors presented an example of this, when he noted the number of large, dubious infrastructure projectswhich are often quickly replaced and thus essentially count double towards GDP. In household wealth, the United States enjoys a comfortable lead.

Further, China is vulnerable when examining capital, labor, land, and innovation indicators. Dr. Scissors noted Chinese debt is over 250% of its total GDP, and both corporate and consumer debt levels have been rising. He supplemented earlier points about an aging Chinese population and added that national land use policy can be an impediment to innovation. For instance, the economic model that has powered the shale-gas revolution in the United States is virtually impossible in a state-run economy such as China’s. In general on innovation, the top-down involvement of the state in economic affairs has made it nearly impossible for private entities to innovate, create, and compete with state-owned enterprises.

Looking forward, Dr. Scissors saw three distinct futures for China. The first is a reform path, which, given Xi Jinping’s tendencies towards centralization, seems highly unlikely. The second is crisis, punctuated by China’s debt burden and demographic strain. A full-blown crisis is also highly unlikely, Dr. Scissors postulated; rather, a third scenario of a large but stagnated economy looms. The United States faces its own challenges, principally getting its fiscal house in order. If the United States does so, it will remain tens of trillions of dollars ahead of China in aggregate wealth. Dr. Scissors also noted that China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative is technically being built with American money, because the hard currency China uses to fund the Belt and Road now comes exclusively from merchandise exports to the United States.

What followed was analysis by Mr. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation on China’s self-image, how it sees the future, and how it considers information. The Chinese measures their place in the world through the concept of “comprehensive national power,” which is a collection of capabilities and influence in economics, military, political cohesion, diplomacy, science and technology, and cultural security. In pursuit of a greater level of comprehensive national power, China is seeking out natural resources, as well as market access; this is rooted in the failure of Chinese national strategy from the late 19th century, which is remembered as China’s “Century of Humiliation.” Perhaps as a means of preventing yet another sustained period of national malaise, China has been seeking to balkanize global common spaces, such as the South and East China Seas as well as the internet in order to challenge today’s rules-based order.

Discussions about the Chinese future are incomplete if they do not mention the power given to the information domain. The Chinese Communist Party has internalized a shift in the measure of global power from the industrial age, during which time physical assets could be counted and cataloged, to the information age; the latter era is less quantitatively oriented, for measures are made on metrics such as the ability to gather, analyze, exploit, and transmit information more rapidly and more accurately than one’s adversaries. This information is critical in traditional computer technology, but also in outer space. As an example of the shift from prioritizing physical assets, China understands its presence in space as not merely a collection of objects in orbit; rather, it understands the space domain as powerful because of the information that is transmitted between data links in outer space and terrestrially.

Information dominance has proven important on a strategic level and can be understood to be a component of political warfare wherein supremacy in public opinion, legal, and cyber issues can help buttress national power. Particularly in societies such as China, information is seen as a whole-of- society commodity that can be levied and exploited. China has been seeking to use information on an operational level, for example, by linking electronic hardware and data together. On a tactical level, the Chinese have been engaging in a variety of influence activities to create a deterrent climate. In pursuit of this strategy, China has placed a priority on gathering information; the re-direction of a meaningful amount of the world’s internet traffic into China has been a means of achieving this outcome. In many of its national struggles, China is facing a familiar set of adversaries and is on a familiar terrain, whereas the United States is acting as an expeditionary entity. Complicating this dynamic are misalignments in each state’s concept of escalation. Mr. Cheng cited numerous Chinese incursions into India, a large, nuclear-armed neighbor, as an example of a difference in risk perception and escalation control.

Dr. Jacqueline Deal, President and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group, concluded the panel with comments on Chinese power projection, focused on drivers, observable behavior, and implications for the United States. She noted that China’s journey from a state that thought deeply about how to target US power projection via counter-intervention or anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to one that engages in its own power projection merited further discussion. Material drivers of Chinese power projection can be traced to the early 1990s, when, as a result of its rise as a global manufacturing hub, China became a net energy importer and an importer of other key commodities; its reliance on sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for both imports of raw materials and exports of finished goods exposed China to potential delivery disruptions, and Chinese political-military strategists perceived a requirement to protect seaborne commerce to and from the mainland. The choice to not rely on the US Navy as the security guarantor for China’s SLOCs was a reflection of the choice Deng Xiaoping made to reform Chinese trading relationships. That decision to reform and open China to trade was a pragmatic one animated by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) desire to stay in power. The party does not trust the United States, which it calls a “hegemon” or “the strong enemy.” Nor does the CCP believe in the free market. Rather, it has a mercantilist understanding of the world.

Accordingly, intellectual drivers of Chinese power projection include CCP strategists’ view of the world as home to a zero-sum competition for wealth and power. By the early 2000s, Chinese foreign policy discourse developed a concept of the “big periphery,” a zone well beyond China’s near-abroad where China would and should be influential, thanks to economic relationships, trade ties, consular links, and terrestrial and/or high-tech infrastructure connections. In concrete terms, then-CCP leader Hu Jintao assigned the PLA the mission of protecting China’s overseas interests in 2004. This mission was further institutionalized at the 18th Party Congress, during which Xi asserted that China should strive to be a “maritime great power.” Not long after that declaration, Xi kicked off the Belt and Road Initiative. PLA textbooks began describing the need for “forward defense” and studying the history of other powers’ overseas basing. By 2015, the Chinese navy announced its first overseas base in Djibouti. Scholars have also identified a range of potential dual-use or paramilitary Chinese facilities, e.g., at Gwadar (Pakistan) and in Tajikistan, respectively.

Dr. Deal identified two main implications of this Chinese strategic expansion, the first being a new set of Chinese vulnerabilities (i.e., the requirement to protect its access to overseas bases and investments, in addition to the bases and investments themselves), and a direct challenge to how the United States operates globally. To minimize its signature, China has been operating through dual- use technology and trying to use light footprint tactics in challenging terrain, but as the Djibouti case shows, in some places the PLA will eventually want to establish a formal presence. Additionally, US policymakers will increasingly have to take into account potential Chinese interference in American efforts to project power in locations far from China; moreover, the United States can no longer see potential conflicts in East Asia (e.g., over Taiwan) as being geographically bound. China’s global footprint means that even “local” issues could have global reverberations.

Panel 3: Summary & Implications for the United States

The final panel of the day was a discussion between Dr. Cynthia Watson and Mr. Dan Flynn, who placed the conversations in a larger context, and considered the implications for US policymakers. Mr. Flynn spoke about how China is attempting to compete in a number of domains, beyond just military and trade. China’s preference appears to be to compete below the level of armed conflict. This partly reflects the People’s Liberation Army’s assessment that it must continue to modernize before it reaches US capabilities. In competing in the “gray zone” short of armed conflict, managing escalation dynamics becomes critically important, particularly given differences in Chinese and US conceptions of deterrence. Looking ahead to China’s future challenges, Mr. Flynn suggested that in assessing China’s foreign policies, analysts must also keep in mind China’s domestic situation. In the past, when the Chinese Communist Party has felt insecure at home, it has been more willing to compromise on foreign policy issues. However, in such situations, it is also possible for the CCP to be overly sensitive and reactive to perceived threats to its security interests.

The primacy of domestic issues within the Chinese mainland was also mentioned by Dr. Cynthia Watson. The Chinese Communist Party does face domestic vulnerabilities, and President Xi is presented with a very complex set of challenges. Since the PLA is a party army, it cannot chart its own trajectory, and is subservient to the party. Therefore, the party may be more inclined to use the PLA as an instrument of state power if it feels threatened. Dr. Watson also challenged the notion that isolated clashes in Asia would encourage China to retreat from its power projection in the continent; she underscored the geographic centrality of China to Asia, and vice-versa, and underscored that competition therein will not be confined to Chinese borders.

Future of Global Competition & Conflict (GCC) Russia Panel Discussion

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

On 8 May 2019, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA, Joint Staff, J39) office, with the support of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and National Defense University (NDU), convened a panel discussion on Russia in support of the SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict effort. The scope of the day’s event was Russian activities in the Gray Zone, its perception of global competition and conflict worldwide, and its long-term growth trends, economic activities, and diplomatic affairs. The event convened speakers from government, think tanks, and the academic community; each speaker offered prepared remarks, and then assembled to debrief and take questions.

Beginning the proceedings was Mr. Dan Flynn, Director of the IC Net Assessments Division within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He introduced the key themes of the day’s event, among them, Russian strategy, economic statecraft, Gray Zone activities, and the future. Mr. Gary E. Phillips of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Assistant DCS G2, offered Opening Remarks. His comments reflected on Russian malign activities, including its behavior in the 2016 election. He noted Russian insecurity, and encouraged a critical analysis of the Kremlin’s behavior.

Offering up a comprehensive accounting of Russia’s complex demography, the distribution of its people, its military structure, and geographical contiguity was the first speaker, Brigadier General (ret) Peter Zwack of National Defense University. Each of these factors contributed to an overarching insecurity that the Kremlin manipulates to shore up domestic support. Since the government functions as a high-end autocracy, it often resorts to headline-grabbing adventures to fulfill the social contract with its people that it has long ignored, as evidenced by its governance failures. He stressed that the Russian state finds itself at war with ideas rather than traditional military threats. Internationally, Moscow enjoys escalation dominance in its near-abroad, but is constrained in its economic, demographic, and conventional military capabilities when looking at Russia’s 11-time zone vastness, particularly in the currently peaceable Far East opposite China. Broadly, Brig Gen (ret) Zwack expects the Kremlin to continue to irritate and frustrate US global ambitions.

Continuing on the theme of Russian insecurity and the resultant impact on state policy was Dr. Celeste Wallander of the US-Russia Foundation. She further explored the social compact, and applied to different types of governance, comparing pluralistic democracies and autocracies. She extended her analysis to the particular brand of Russian President Vladimir Putin. She defined Putinism as a non-ideological brand of political power based on personal relationships. Many of these personal relations, she clarified, are those forged in 1990s St. Petersburg, as Putin was beginning his political career. The pursuit of stronger economic ties informs why Russia was so aggressive in forming the Eurasian Economic Union. Militarily, Dr. Wallander asserted, Russia is a revisionist power who seeks to change the rules of the international order. She also explained Russian escalation dominance in detail, and encouraged the attendees to avoid imprecise verbeage to describe this.

Concluding the first group of speakers was Dr. Elena Kovalova of the National War College. She said that Russia’s strategic behavior is based on four major assumptions: that Russia is a great power, that it is a “besieged fortress,” that it is an “indispensable” European power, and the the end of the Cold War brought the humiliation of Russia. Further, she suggested that Russia’s Gray Zone activities signal its own insecurity. The opacity of Gray Zone activities overstates the impression of Russia’s global reach, its ability to alter the liberal international order and influence world politics, as well as its capabilities and its technological advances; additionally, the ability to camouflage within the Gray Zone allows Russia to disguise its areas of concentration. Additionally, she asserted that Russia seeks to destroy political, economic, and military institutions in Europe, such as NATO and the European Union (EU). This reflects a Russian belief that it is an essential European power, and therefore is owed a seat at the table. To further this narrative, Dr. Kovalova cited narratives emerging from Russia about the true intent of its involvement in Syria and Libya, namely that Russia is securing consistent energy access to Europe. Additionally, Russia has continued its European charm offensive on issues related to the Arctic; here, Russia is said to have a captive audience. She concluded her remarks by noting that Putin’s constitutional term ends in 2024, and urged attendees to examine the development of the Russian relationship with Belarus at that time; there might be, according to her, an opportunity for Putin to establish a new unified state, thus creating preconditions for a new term as the president of a newly created state

The idea of Russian expansionism as destiny was introduced by Dr. Angela Stent of Georgetown Univeristy. She introduced several Russian strategic objectives of Russia, namely ensuring that Russia has a seat at the table, a conferring of respect by the international community onto Russia, its right to a sphere of privilege, and the legitimization of its own national interests. Further, she suggested, Russia seeks to replace the existing world order with one in which Russia enjoys more agency. Dr. Stent also highlighted specific activities that the Kremlin has organized to further these objectives. Among them were playing on existing societal divisions in the United States, delegitimizing democratic governance, providing a lifeline for embattled authoritarians abroad, and pursuing a strategic partnership with China.

Mr. Michael Kofman of CNA discussed conventional deterrence and the extension of those principles to Gray Zone activities. He also examined Russian attitudes towards Europe, and assessed that Russia feels that not only does it not have a stake in the current continental security structure, NATO is a projection of US military power, which Moscow resents. With respect to its near abroad, Mr. Kofman noted that the current generation of Russian strategic thinkers do not see these states as truly independent from Russia. Those individuals, he suggested, also understand Russia as flanked by a steadily creeping Europe from the West, and an aggressive China on the East. Strategically, Russia seeks a normalization of its gains, reflecting the USSR’s status during the Détente period of 1972- 1979. Mr. Kofman also explained Russian views on conflict and escalation.

Concluding the prepared remarks was Dr. Spencer Meredith III of National Defense University who presented slides on Russia’s strategic dimensions. He echoed points on Russian instability, and suggested that its government operates as a mafia, but with imperial DNA. Operationally, Russia’s ability to cloud the information domain underpins its hybrid warfare conduct; additionally, he highlighted the belief that hybrid warfare is full-spectrum. Because of this assertion, Dr. Meredith outlined the importance of the special operations community on both sides. Russia will likely be forced to think creatively about its hybrid warfare activities, because it faces some long-term challenges, such as its demographic time bomb, the shift in its relative power in energy markets due to the fracking revolution, and increasing resilience to its activities by its adversaries.

Mr. Jason Werchan of United States European Command (USEUCOM) convened the speakers for a moderated question-and-answer session. A question on possible actions by the US, with a specific focus on the military element of national power, to expand the competitive space, and win in the Gray Zone highlighted the necessity of US allies to help further these objectives, and a keen understanding of escalation management. Additionally, speakers spoke on the importance of perception to Russian narratives. Regardless of the intent, nearly any US action will be understood by Russia to be destabilizing, and advocating regime change. Broadcasting Russian successes will not necessarily undermine the US position, speakers agreed, because power is best assessed as a balance sheet, and exposing shortcomings will only encourage future best practices. Additionally, the group tended to agree on the necessity of using precise language with specific definitions when discussing the issues highlighted in the day’s sessions. Finally, speakers examined Central Asia as a potential arena for the United States to confront Russia (and China). Though they all admitted that the United States was the junior partner of the three, several of them highlighted potential areas of cooperation with partner states that could help achieve US objectives.

Great Power Activities in the Indo-Pacific and Africa – A Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank Report

Author | Editors: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc.); Popp, G. (NSI, Inc.); Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. David T. Burbach (US Naval War College), Dr. Ryan Burke (US Air Force Academy), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), David C. Gompert (US Naval Academy), Dr. Justin V. Hastings (University of Sydney), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Dr. Philip Fei- Ling Wang (Georgia Institute of Technology), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Question of Focus

[Q6] How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by increasing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa? How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by Russian efforts to assert its influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa?

Summary Overview

This summary overview reflects on the insightful responses of fifteen Future of Global Competition and Conflict Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert contributor responses provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors assess Chinese and Russian activities and influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa, and how an increasing Chinese and Russian presence in these regions are likely to impact the United States and its allies.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Germany were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 International Labor Organization (ILO) data on income by occupation.

Results

Income data provided by the World Bank and occupational data provided by the ILO show similar patterns of a risk acceptant population with both the individuals or occupations earning the highest incomes being the most risk acceptant. Germany’s mean Arrow-Pratt measure is a modest -3.97.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The risk acceptant nature of the German population shows some potential for generating instability in both its civil society and political institutions. However, Germany’s risk averse population may be its greatest liability for state stability. Risk aversion changes to risk acceptance by Germans in occupations where people fear loss in income and status. Russian propaganda and the surge of refugees have combined to create a perception of threat and loss in many working-class Germans, which appears to be fueling the rise of more authoritarian right-wing groups (Shuller, 2018 & Koehler, 2018); this extremism is represented by the white nationalist Alternative for Germany (AFD) which has gained seats in the German Bundestag and now possesses political power (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019). Germany also has an ongoing economic issue with its bottom 20% of society owning little to no assets (WSI, 2019). This gives people in this category very little chance to improve their quality of life.

Implications for US Interests

The US and Germany continue to maintain a strong alliance. Germany is often the most economically capable to aid the US in its Eastern European interests (Janning & Möller, 2016). Despite their close alliance, the two countries have some policy differences in the manner in which they deal with China and Russia (Sharma, 2018). The risk acceptance of Germany’s population has allowed Russia to encourage far right-wing organizations that challenge the German political status quo. This risk acceptance has culminated in the insertion of Russian influence into German political institutions, which threatens US interests in Germany (Shuller, 2018; Applebaum, 2018).

Implications for China’s Interests

China’s interests in Germany are coming under suspicion by the German economic and political organizations it relies upon to continue its advancements (Düben, 2019). This is due to slowing economic reformation that is supposed to ease access to Chinese markets and is potentially a growing hurdle for China to overcome, as it has in the past had a warmer relationship with Germany than many of the other European Union member states (Kakissis, 2019). Even with the current shift toward Chinese skepticism, Germany’s risk acceptant population is partially fueling grassroots movements by far right-wing organizations that favor autocratic governance presents China with an opportunity (Shuller, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has both strong opportunities in Germany and major obstacles to overcome. It shares strong trade with Germany (OEC, 2017), however it has at the same time both inserted political influence and alienated itself from the German government (Applebaum, 2018; Stelzenmuller, 2017). It has ridden a wave of right- wing populism, giving media aid to members of the AFD in order to gain political influence in Germany (Applebaum, 2018). However, its success has put the rest of Germany’s government, which make up the vast majority of its political offices, on high alert and helped highlight the saliency of keeping Russian influence out of Western democracies (Stelzenmuller, 2017).

‍

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Finland were analyzed: 2016 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for the years 2017 and 2011.

Results

Finland is known as one of the world’s most equal societies, and the analyses conducted for this report reinforce this perception. The low levels of inequality, combined with cultural factors such as a tradition of cooperation and trust in government, most likely contribute to Finland’s social stability.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The analyses in this report indicate that Finland is one of the least risk acceptant populations in the world. Consequently, people do not have reasons to challenge the Finnish status quo.

Implications for US Interests

Even though Finland maintains friendly relations with Russia and tries to moderate between Russia and the US and its European allies, Finland is an important check on Russian ambitions in the Scandinavian north. Therefore, Finland’s stability is an asset to US interests.

Implications for China’s Interests

China is beginning to develop trade ties with Finland and hopes to project its power into the Arctic. Therefore, Finnish stability serves China’s aspirations by providing a stable partner.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia’s near-term primary interest in Finland is as a source for Russian energy exports. Despite Finland’s near total reliance on Russian energy (70%), Finland’s shift toward sustainable energy and the availability of energy on the open market makes Finland potentially independent of Russian influence. Therefore, Russia’s influence in Finland is likely to diminish. Finland’s positive relations with the EU, NATO, and the US are liabilities for Russia. Recently, Russia is suspected of cyberattacks and social media campaigns designed to sow discord in Finland.

‍

Authors | Editors: R. Spalding & S. Canna (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

This paper seeks to describe the cultural and cognitive dissimilarities in how the United States and China pursue strategic competition. The first difference detailed involves how the two societies look at goals and time, as well as how those two factors lead to very different conceptions of strategy. The paper posits that the United States focuses more on a militaristic national security policy while China focuses more on economics and information. Other factors are described that attempt to explain how societal or cultural differences serve to enhance China’s strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Overall, the paper describes a future where China’s model may be more successful in a globalized world, which creates a magnetism for developing countries as well as the corporate sectors of developed countries. The paper concludes by briefly outlining American strengths and how it might use them to create a more effective strategy.

Author: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

As part of the Quick Concept Series, Dr. John A. Stevenson of NSI, Inc. defines “great powers” in the context of this effort. Great powers are state actors with both of two types of capability: global force projection capability and agenda-setting capability. After describing the component elements of these capability, Dr. Stevenson identifies which states are in, and which states are out, the great powers club. There are three in: the United States, China, and Russia, with all the other major state actors lacking at least one of the types of capability.

Authors: Gina Ligon (University of Nebraska Omaha); Michael Logan (University of Nebraska Omaha); Lauren Zimmerman (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Abstract

In this study, we examine five active Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) and their capacity for violence in a potential conflict in the Kashmir region. The four VNSA include Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Al Qaeda. Drawing from both the Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results project, we focus on each VNSA’s organizational and leadership capabilities. Our findings suggest that two VNSA, LeT and Al Qaeda, have high levels of destructive capacity based on their organizational features. The other two VNSA, HM, and JeM, have moderate levels of destructive capacity. In our conclusions, we also speculate as to the potential role of the Islamic State in the Kashmir region.

This report was part of a small, rapid effort by SMA. Please email mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil for additional information. A second report from this effort can be found here.

‍

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Brazil were analyzed: 2015 World Bank centile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for the years 2017 and 2012.

Results

According to all three datasets, Brazil’s population is highly risk acceptant. The data provided by the World Bank examines risk sensitivity based on income, while the datasets taken from ILO examine risk sensitivity by occupation. Both methodologies show that the highest earners and the highest earning occupations are the most risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Brazil is fairly average when compared to other countries that were measured for political stability by the Fragile States Index. However, its population is highly acceptant of risk with a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -5.68, placing it in the 94th percentile of the study. Despite a drastic decrease in Brazil’s income inequality during the last decade, coupled with numerous affirmative action plans put in place for racial and ethnic minorities, its black and female populations still suffer from a disproportionate amount of discrimination (Loveman, 2012; Ystanes, 2018). As one measure of social unrest, Brazil’s homicide rate is in the top 10% of countries; homicide and risk acceptance are strongly correlated (Daly, 2016; Kuznar, 2019b).

Implications for US Interests

The US sees Brazil as a crucial centerpiece of Latin America’s geopolitical structure and stability. Despite this, the US has weak economic interests in Brazil when compared to other larger countries with which the US has bilateral trade (OEC, 2017). The potentially anti-Chinese administration lead by President Jair Bolsonaro could prove to be a valuable regional ally for the US (Santibanes, 2018). Brazil’s risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to grow its political clout and economic engagement given that it can provide Brazil’s citizens with a clear path for economic improvement by enhancing opportunities for its ambitious population. If growth does not meet the population’s ambitions, then their frustrations may manifest in social unrest and increased illicit activity as people seek other avenues for improvement.

Implications for China’s Interests

China possesses strong economic and political interests in Brazil, and it has funneled large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Chinese companies. Both China and Brazil are members of the BRICS association that is designed to foster increased political connectiveness between leadership of its five member states. This joint membership, as well as China’s involvement with other regional organizations, affords Brazil multiple platforms to interact with China in a political capacity (Ellis, 2017). Despite these available avenues the recent election of President Jair Bolsonaro poses several concerns for Beijing over the security of its investments, given Bolsonaro’s anti-Chinese rhetoric. Brazil’s risk acceptant population gives China an opportunity much in the same way it gives the US, making it available for influence as long as its population sees it can benefit from outside Chinese influence.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia sees the recent elections in Brazil and other Latin American countries as opportunities to expand its influence and leverage within Latin America (Gurganus, 2018). The risk acceptant nature of Brazil’s population leaves it open to influence if Russia can provide support to the government and its population. In order to present itself as a viable political and trade partner, Russia has used arms deals, energy initiatives, and propaganda disseminated through media to gain favor with state actors and harm the United States’ influence at the same time. Russia is also a member of the BRICS association (Ellis, 2017).

‍

Russia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Russia were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and income by occupation statistics gathered by the Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service for years 2005 and 2016.

Results

Russia’s population was found to be risk acceptant across all three datasets that were analyzed. Even though Russia suffers from both internal and external threats as well as a large income gap, its Arrow- Pratt score is higher than the median for all countries.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Russia suffers from internal instability, high amounts of corruption, a large wage gap, and right-wing violence from nationalistic or white-supremacy organizations (Walker, 2017; Due Enstad, 2017). The threat of terrorism emanating from returning Islamic State fighters adds to Russian national security concerns as well (Berman, 2017). These factors combined with the risk acceptance of Russia’s population, create the potential for future, increased instability.

Implications for US Interests

The US and Russia have some overlapping interests, such as maintaining a stable world economy and counter terrorism (Smith & Twardowski, 2017). However, Russia’s aggressive, expansionist and revisionist policies toward the US and the Western worldview, is a major source of conflict (Graham & Blackwill, 2011). The relative lack of an economic relationship and the confrontational political past between Russia and the US weakens US economic interests. Russia’s risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to advance its interest of seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s central government undermined from within.

Implications for China’s Interests

China’s relationship with Russia is that of a cooperative partner (Dobbins, Shatz, & Wyne, 2019). Over the last decade China and Russia have accelerated their relationship to include increased economic cooperation, joint military exercises, and the backing of anti-US allies in regional conflicts. The risk acceptant nature of Russia’s populace poses an indirect threat to China and its interests, as a large civil upheaval would likely weaken its largest global political ally. However, it is unlikely that any new regime in Russia would be pro-US as 74% of the Russian population has an unfavorable view of the US (Poushter, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia’s interests revolve around revising the global geopolitical landscape, earning Russia the international respect of a great power, and fostering unity among its population (Gurganus, 2018). Its population suffers from high wealth inequality, which exacerbates racial and ethnic fissures that often turn violent (Novokmet, Piketty; Zucman, 2017). The violence that Russia suffers from right-wing nationalistic groups is a constant threat to national security. Russian President Vladimir Putin follows his predecessors’ views of aggressive Russian advancement and nationalistic policies as the best way to protect both Russia’s sovereign borders and its national interests1 (Gurganus, 2018).

‍