SMA Publications

Authors | Editors: R. Spalding & S. Canna (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

This paper seeks to describe the cultural and cognitive dissimilarities in how the United States and China pursue strategic competition. The first difference detailed involves how the two societies look at goals and time, as well as how those two factors lead to very different conceptions of strategy. The paper posits that the United States focuses more on a militaristic national security policy while China focuses more on economics and information. Other factors are described that attempt to explain how societal or cultural differences serve to enhance China’s strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Overall, the paper describes a future where China’s model may be more successful in a globalized world, which creates a magnetism for developing countries as well as the corporate sectors of developed countries. The paper concludes by briefly outlining American strengths and how it might use them to create a more effective strategy.

Author: Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc.)

Summary

As part of the Quick Concept Series, Dr. John A. Stevenson of NSI, Inc. defines “great powers” in the context of this effort. Great powers are state actors with both of two types of capability: global force projection capability and agenda-setting capability. After describing the component elements of these capability, Dr. Stevenson identifies which states are in, and which states are out, the great powers club. There are three in: the United States, China, and Russia, with all the other major state actors lacking at least one of the types of capability.

Authors: Gina Ligon (University of Nebraska Omaha); Michael Logan (University of Nebraska Omaha); Lauren Zimmerman (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Abstract

In this study, we examine five active Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) and their capacity for violence in a potential conflict in the Kashmir region. The four VNSA include Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Al Qaeda. Drawing from both the Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results project, we focus on each VNSA’s organizational and leadership capabilities. Our findings suggest that two VNSA, LeT and Al Qaeda, have high levels of destructive capacity based on their organizational features. The other two VNSA, HM, and JeM, have moderate levels of destructive capacity. In our conclusions, we also speculate as to the potential role of the Islamic State in the Kashmir region.

This report was part of a small, rapid effort by SMA. Please email mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil for additional information. A second report from this effort can be found here.

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Brazil were analyzed: 2015 World Bank centile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for the years 2017 and 2012.

Results

According to all three datasets, Brazil’s population is highly risk acceptant. The data provided by the World Bank examines risk sensitivity based on income, while the datasets taken from ILO examine risk sensitivity by occupation. Both methodologies show that the highest earners and the highest earning occupations are the most risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Brazil is fairly average when compared to other countries that were measured for political stability by the Fragile States Index. However, its population is highly acceptant of risk with a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -5.68, placing it in the 94th percentile of the study. Despite a drastic decrease in Brazil’s income inequality during the last decade, coupled with numerous affirmative action plans put in place for racial and ethnic minorities, its black and female populations still suffer from a disproportionate amount of discrimination (Loveman, 2012; Ystanes, 2018). As one measure of social unrest, Brazil’s homicide rate is in the top 10% of countries; homicide and risk acceptance are strongly correlated (Daly, 2016; Kuznar, 2019b).

Implications for US Interests

The US sees Brazil as a crucial centerpiece of Latin America’s geopolitical structure and stability. Despite this, the US has weak economic interests in Brazil when compared to other larger countries with which the US has bilateral trade (OEC, 2017). The potentially anti-Chinese administration lead by President Jair Bolsonaro could prove to be a valuable regional ally for the US (Santibanes, 2018). Brazil’s risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to grow its political clout and economic engagement given that it can provide Brazil’s citizens with a clear path for economic improvement by enhancing opportunities for its ambitious population. If growth does not meet the population’s ambitions, then their frustrations may manifest in social unrest and increased illicit activity as people seek other avenues for improvement.

Implications for China’s Interests

China possesses strong economic and political interests in Brazil, and it has funneled large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Chinese companies. Both China and Brazil are members of the BRICS association that is designed to foster increased political connectiveness between leadership of its five member states. This joint membership, as well as China’s involvement with other regional organizations, affords Brazil multiple platforms to interact with China in a political capacity (Ellis, 2017). Despite these available avenues the recent election of President Jair Bolsonaro poses several concerns for Beijing over the security of its investments, given Bolsonaro’s anti-Chinese rhetoric. Brazil’s risk acceptant population gives China an opportunity much in the same way it gives the US, making it available for influence as long as its population sees it can benefit from outside Chinese influence.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia sees the recent elections in Brazil and other Latin American countries as opportunities to expand its influence and leverage within Latin America (Gurganus, 2018). The risk acceptant nature of Brazil’s population leaves it open to influence if Russia can provide support to the government and its population. In order to present itself as a viable political and trade partner, Russia has used arms deals, energy initiatives, and propaganda disseminated through media to gain favor with state actors and harm the United States’ influence at the same time. Russia is also a member of the BRICS association (Ellis, 2017).

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Russia Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in Russia were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and income by occupation statistics gathered by the Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service for years 2005 and 2016.

Results

Russia’s population was found to be risk acceptant across all three datasets that were analyzed. Even though Russia suffers from both internal and external threats as well as a large income gap, its Arrow- Pratt score is higher than the median for all countries.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Russia suffers from internal instability, high amounts of corruption, a large wage gap, and right-wing violence from nationalistic or white-supremacy organizations (Walker, 2017; Due Enstad, 2017). The threat of terrorism emanating from returning Islamic State fighters adds to Russian national security concerns as well (Berman, 2017). These factors combined with the risk acceptance of Russia’s population, create the potential for future, increased instability.

Implications for US Interests

The US and Russia have some overlapping interests, such as maintaining a stable world economy and counter terrorism (Smith & Twardowski, 2017). However, Russia’s aggressive, expansionist and revisionist policies toward the US and the Western worldview, is a major source of conflict (Graham & Blackwill, 2011). The relative lack of an economic relationship and the confrontational political past between Russia and the US weakens US economic interests. Russia’s risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to advance its interest of seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s central government undermined from within.

Implications for China’s Interests

China’s relationship with Russia is that of a cooperative partner (Dobbins, Shatz, & Wyne, 2019). Over the last decade China and Russia have accelerated their relationship to include increased economic cooperation, joint military exercises, and the backing of anti-US allies in regional conflicts. The risk acceptant nature of Russia’s populace poses an indirect threat to China and its interests, as a large civil upheaval would likely weaken its largest global political ally. However, it is unlikely that any new regime in Russia would be pro-US as 74% of the Russian population has an unfavorable view of the US (Poushter, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia’s interests revolve around revising the global geopolitical landscape, earning Russia the international respect of a great power, and fostering unity among its population (Gurganus, 2018). Its population suffers from high wealth inequality, which exacerbates racial and ethnic fissures that often turn violent (Novokmet, Piketty; Zucman, 2017). The violence that Russia suffers from right-wing nationalistic groups is a constant threat to national security. Russian President Vladimir Putin follows his predecessors’ views of aggressive Russian advancement and nationalistic policies as the best way to protect both Russia’s sovereign borders and its national interests1 (Gurganus, 2018).

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Five datasets on wealth and status distribution in Indonesia were analyzed: 2013 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data from 2017 and 2009, and USAID Demographic Health Survey (DHS) wealth factor scores from 2012 and 2007.

Results

The study examines data from three different sources: World Bank, ILO, and USAID DHS. The data provided by all three sources shows a similar pattern of a risk acceptant population. The World Bank provides information on income, the ILO provides occupational data, and USAID DHS provides data on assets per household. The datasets show the highest earning individuals, occupations, and households owning the most assets as the most accepting of risk.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Indonesia has a strongly risk acceptant population with several cultural, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic fissures that threaten to cause widespread civil strife. Many of these intergovernmental and societal issues are rising to the forefront of Indonesian political dialogue as it begins its 2019 national election cycle (Pepinsky, 2019). The upcoming elections and varied degrees of civil unrest throughout the country make its risk acceptant population a potential threat to Indonesian stability.

Implications for US Interests

The US has many potential strategic interests in Indonesia; however, many of these interests have yet to be realized. Indonesia’s democratic government and regional importance potentially give the US a capable ally to control the valuable waterways that flow through South Eastern Asia and confront China’s encroachment into the South China Sea (Kurlantzick, 2018). However, recent policy changes for the US saw a decrease in the US’ advocacy for democratic expansion, and the ending of its involvement in the Paris Accord has slightly alienated the US from Indonesia. The risk acceptant nature of Indonesia’s population threatens potential US interests by potentially destabilizing an ally and increasing the possibility of terrorism.

Implications for China’s Interests

China views Indonesia’s hostile stance toward Chinese claims in the South China Sea as an abridgement of China’s sovereign rights (Zhen, 2016). To increase its control over Indonesia, it has tried to increase economic leverage through foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country (Tan, 2019). However, Indonesia’s skepticism of Chinese involvement in its economic and political institutions has been making it harder for China to aggressively pursue this end. The risk acceptance of Indonesia’s population gives the Chinese the opportunity to continue to gain political influence by offering aid to a country eager for economic opportunity (Legarda & Hoffman, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia views Indonesia as a potential country with which it can build its international prestige (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019). Through utilizing arms sales and energy deals, Russia is gaining influence in the South East Asian country (Tsvetov, 2018). Indonesia’s risk acceptant population gives Russia the potential to increase its involvement through instability much in the same way as China by using political instability to sway political leaders in favor of aid (Metz, 2018), while at the same time posing little threat to Russia’s current, overall-weak interests in the country.

Authors | Editors: Logan, M. K. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Zimmerman, L. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Executive Summary

This paper addresses two key Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) with close ties to the Iran regime. More specifically, we examine the organizational and leadership characteristics of the Badr Brigades and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) using the Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project. While much of the discussion on Iranian influence focuses on Hezbollah or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we believe both the Badr Brigades and KH warrant attention for at least three reasons. First, both VEOs are highly sophisticated with the operational capabilities to strike US and coalition targets. Second, the leaders of both VEOs function as Partners of Iran and their decision-making reflects the strategic vision of the Iranian regime. Third, in times of increased conflict, both will have increased opportunity to strike our coalition forces currently in the Iraq region.

Iranian Media Narrative Perspectives on the US and Global Competition: A Media Ecology & Strategic Analysis (MESA) Group Report

Authors | Editors: Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Kitsch, S. (Monmouth College); Cooley, A. (Oklahoma State University)

Executive Summary

The following highlights Iranian perspectives on: geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, the US, the global order, and the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region coming from Iranian news media intended for domestic audiences. The study analyzed 134 Iranian news articles across four native Iranian news media publications from 2014 to present.

Key Points from Iranian Media

Iran is a regional power, center of the axis of resistance in the Shia Crescent, and a legitimate center of Islamic authority. Iran, and the regional power bloc it represents, is battle-tested against the US.

• Iranian rhetoric forcefully commits to the protection of its borders and airspace, its regional interests, and the Shia Crescent in general; claims the nation does not seek escalation and is a victim of US-backed hostilities.

• Iran, as a pillar of the axis of resistance against the US, is being isolated due to an attempted systematic destruction of the Shia Crescent across the Middle East.

• The strength and unity of the Shia Crescent, the ability to demonstrate the injustices of the Western-led order, and showcasing Iran as an exemplar in Qur’anic modernity are critical to successful global competition and creating a balanced multi-polar world order.

Presenting the US as anti-Iranian, untrustworthy, and self-interested to the point of recklessness to international community is the principle strategy Iranian media conveys to its population in order to delegitimize US claims against Iran as an aggressive international actor.

• The US is shown as attempting to destroy the Shia Crescent and Iranian regional influence through: wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, disingenuous monetary deals offered to Palestinians in exchange for the suppression of their political will, US-led militarization of Arab states, strategic backing of Arab-Israeli alliances against Iranian interests, suppression of the political will of Bahrainis, and the demonization of Hezbollah.

• The US government is shown as accelerating conflict potentials; hawkish officials are shown as attempting to drive the US toward conflict in order to salvage victory amid failed US policies in the region.

• The US is shown as in violation of international law and flaunting international consensus via a number of positions taken by the US government relating to: actions in Syria, the Paris climate agreement, Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, the US embassy in Jerusalem, the treatment of Canada and Mexico concerning NAFTA, the economic trade war with China, and the Iranian nuclear deal.

• Iran is shown as a source of political convenience for the US and Israel; a supposed enemy to be victimized at any time in order to further their own political agendas and fracture any possibility of regional unity.

Iran media shows the US as determined to coalesce together an international faction against Iran substantial enough to force a negotiation of arms reduction and regional influence capabilities in deterioration of the Shia Crescent.

• This is seen as a non-negotiable position from the Iranian perspective, particularly given the violations of the US government over the past years.

• There is hope that significant numbers of states within the international community will side with Iran in the face of US aggression, and thus render US unilateral actions tolerable.

Iran sees itself as capable of withstanding conflict with the US.

• US pressures will rally Iranian people in support of the regime as it has for the past 40 years.

• US lacks the political will and ability to absorb the financial burden that war with Iran would entail. Syria provides evidence of the resistance’s ability to defeat US coalitions.

• Regional destruction caused to US allies and assets, as well as global escalation potential, make war illogical.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Japan were analyzed: 2008 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and Japanese income by occupation data from 2015.

Results

Both the income data provided by the World Bank and the occupational data provided by Japan’s federal government show a mildly risk acceptant population. Both datasets indicate that the highest earning incomes and wealthiest Japanese citizens are the most risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Japan has a low level of inequality and high level of stability when compared to most countries, buffering any potential grievances from risk acceptant members of the country. However, its slowing economic growth and warming governmental ties to its regional adversary (i.e., China) leave Japan vulnerable to Chinese influence (Kaneko, 2018; Duchatel, 2018). Japan’s homogenous population and small wealth gap make social fissures in Japan minimal and unlikely to threaten overall state stability (World Atlas, 2019; Koike, 2015).

Implications for US Interests

The United States has a long-standing relationship with Japan built on strong economic and security ties, with a recent emphasis on North Korean denuclearization and confronting Chinese military movement past its sovereign borders (Stokes, 2015). New trade deals that exclude the US, as well as some warming of relations with China and Russia pose a slight threat to US interests, this is especially true with interests surrounding foreign direct investment (Cimino-Isaacs & Williams, 2019). However, Japan’s stability and its overall positive relationship with the US keep the risk level to US interests low.

Implications for China’s Interests

While China’s political and economic interests and opportunities in Japan are growing they are still weak following years of anti-Japanese policies, which include threatening access to valuable Rare Earth minerals that are crucial to Japan’s developed economy (Fisher, 2013). However, Japan is still China’s largest destination of goods in the region (OEC, 2017). China and Japan are beginning to re-establish full political communication, which was something that the two countries have not enjoyed over the last seven years (Duchatel, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Japan’s risk acceptant population gives Russia the potential to increase its involvement in the Asian Pacific and warm ties with one the US’ strongest allies (Kireeva, 2018). While progress has been made by Russia to better Russo-Japanese relations, Russia’s ties to China and Japan’s ties to the US remain a significant barrier for furthered Japan-Russian relations (Streltsov, 2016). While Japan’s relations to the US represents a strategic barrier, Russia’s increased economic relationship with Japan corresponds with its overall strategy to avoid economic dependence on its adversaries—specifically in the European Union—by looking toward East Asian markets and lessening its economic vulnerability.

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Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

No primary data were available for analysis. Instead, a literature review of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea) inequality and stability is summarized.

Results

Primary data on North Korean inequality are not available. However, anecdotal information and innovative means of tracking resource flows indicate that the DPRK may be by far the most unequal society in the world, with a small elite (less than 10%) controlling virtually all wealth, leaving the rest of the population at barely or below subsistence level.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Since the vast majority of the population is probably at near equal levels of impoverishment, they are probably risk averse toward one another, since there is no status to be gained or lost. Because the elite control the existence of the population in this totalitarian society, the population does not have the means to challenge elite control. Therefore, at this time, the risk sensitivity of the population at large is probably not relevant to state stability. Because wealth is concentrated at the top and the state uses material rewards (income, apartments, luxury goods) to incentivize party members, there is likely intense competition and risk acceptance among elites. Rumors of coup plots among these elites indicates that extremely high levels of risk acceptance exist in this segment of DPRK society.

Implications for US Interests

While the risk sensitivity of the population may not be relevant to US interests, the likely risk acceptance of the elite could open the possibility for elites (military officers, high ranking party officials) to challenge central state authority. However, because central party figures punish perceived and real challenges harshly, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which elite risk acceptance could translate to challenges to the central party and the Kim family.

Implications for China’s Interests

China faces the same dilemma regarding risk sensitivity of North Koreans as does the US. It is illustrative that Kim Jong-un is reported to have executed one of China’s key links to the DPRK government, his uncle Jang Song-thaek, who may have been involved in a coup plot (rumored to have involved Kim Jong- un’s half-brother and China). The execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle and half-brother demonstrates the absolute control the Kim family exercises over all in the country.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

North Korean inequality has the same implications as China and the US, but because events concerning the DPRK have less impact on Russia, any consequences have less effect on Russian interests.

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