SMA Publications

Authors | Editors: Logan, M. K. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Zimmerman, L. (University of Nebraska Omaha); Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Executive Summary

This paper addresses two key Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) with close ties to the Iran regime. More specifically, we examine the organizational and leadership characteristics of the Badr Brigades and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) using the Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project. While much of the discussion on Iranian influence focuses on Hezbollah or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we believe both the Badr Brigades and KH warrant attention for at least three reasons. First, both VEOs are highly sophisticated with the operational capabilities to strike US and coalition targets. Second, the leaders of both VEOs function as Partners of Iran and their decision-making reflects the strategic vision of the Iranian regime. Third, in times of increased conflict, both will have increased opportunity to strike our coalition forces currently in the Iraq region.

Iranian Media Narrative Perspectives on the US and Global Competition: A Media Ecology & Strategic Analysis (MESA) Group Report

Authors | Editors: Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Kitsch, S. (Monmouth College); Cooley, A. (Oklahoma State University)

Executive Summary

The following highlights Iranian perspectives on: geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, the US, the global order, and the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region coming from Iranian news media intended for domestic audiences. The study analyzed 134 Iranian news articles across four native Iranian news media publications from 2014 to present.

Key Points from Iranian Media

Iran is a regional power, center of the axis of resistance in the Shia Crescent, and a legitimate center of Islamic authority. Iran, and the regional power bloc it represents, is battle-tested against the US.

• Iranian rhetoric forcefully commits to the protection of its borders and airspace, its regional interests, and the Shia Crescent in general; claims the nation does not seek escalation and is a victim of US-backed hostilities.

• Iran, as a pillar of the axis of resistance against the US, is being isolated due to an attempted systematic destruction of the Shia Crescent across the Middle East.

• The strength and unity of the Shia Crescent, the ability to demonstrate the injustices of the Western-led order, and showcasing Iran as an exemplar in Qur’anic modernity are critical to successful global competition and creating a balanced multi-polar world order.

Presenting the US as anti-Iranian, untrustworthy, and self-interested to the point of recklessness to international community is the principle strategy Iranian media conveys to its population in order to delegitimize US claims against Iran as an aggressive international actor.

• The US is shown as attempting to destroy the Shia Crescent and Iranian regional influence through: wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, disingenuous monetary deals offered to Palestinians in exchange for the suppression of their political will, US-led militarization of Arab states, strategic backing of Arab-Israeli alliances against Iranian interests, suppression of the political will of Bahrainis, and the demonization of Hezbollah.

• The US government is shown as accelerating conflict potentials; hawkish officials are shown as attempting to drive the US toward conflict in order to salvage victory amid failed US policies in the region.

• The US is shown as in violation of international law and flaunting international consensus via a number of positions taken by the US government relating to: actions in Syria, the Paris climate agreement, Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, the US embassy in Jerusalem, the treatment of Canada and Mexico concerning NAFTA, the economic trade war with China, and the Iranian nuclear deal.

• Iran is shown as a source of political convenience for the US and Israel; a supposed enemy to be victimized at any time in order to further their own political agendas and fracture any possibility of regional unity.

Iran media shows the US as determined to coalesce together an international faction against Iran substantial enough to force a negotiation of arms reduction and regional influence capabilities in deterioration of the Shia Crescent.

• This is seen as a non-negotiable position from the Iranian perspective, particularly given the violations of the US government over the past years.

• There is hope that significant numbers of states within the international community will side with Iran in the face of US aggression, and thus render US unilateral actions tolerable.

Iran sees itself as capable of withstanding conflict with the US.

• US pressures will rally Iranian people in support of the regime as it has for the past 40 years.

• US lacks the political will and ability to absorb the financial burden that war with Iran would entail. Syria provides evidence of the resistance’s ability to defeat US coalitions.

• Regional destruction caused to US allies and assets, as well as global escalation potential, make war illogical.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Japan were analyzed: 2008 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and Japanese income by occupation data from 2015.

Results

Both the income data provided by the World Bank and the occupational data provided by Japan’s federal government show a mildly risk acceptant population. Both datasets indicate that the highest earning incomes and wealthiest Japanese citizens are the most risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Japan has a low level of inequality and high level of stability when compared to most countries, buffering any potential grievances from risk acceptant members of the country. However, its slowing economic growth and warming governmental ties to its regional adversary (i.e., China) leave Japan vulnerable to Chinese influence (Kaneko, 2018; Duchatel, 2018). Japan’s homogenous population and small wealth gap make social fissures in Japan minimal and unlikely to threaten overall state stability (World Atlas, 2019; Koike, 2015).

Implications for US Interests

The United States has a long-standing relationship with Japan built on strong economic and security ties, with a recent emphasis on North Korean denuclearization and confronting Chinese military movement past its sovereign borders (Stokes, 2015). New trade deals that exclude the US, as well as some warming of relations with China and Russia pose a slight threat to US interests, this is especially true with interests surrounding foreign direct investment (Cimino-Isaacs & Williams, 2019). However, Japan’s stability and its overall positive relationship with the US keep the risk level to US interests low.

Implications for China’s Interests

While China’s political and economic interests and opportunities in Japan are growing they are still weak following years of anti-Japanese policies, which include threatening access to valuable Rare Earth minerals that are crucial to Japan’s developed economy (Fisher, 2013). However, Japan is still China’s largest destination of goods in the region (OEC, 2017). China and Japan are beginning to re-establish full political communication, which was something that the two countries have not enjoyed over the last seven years (Duchatel, 2018).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Japan’s risk acceptant population gives Russia the potential to increase its involvement in the Asian Pacific and warm ties with one the US’ strongest allies (Kireeva, 2018). While progress has been made by Russia to better Russo-Japanese relations, Russia’s ties to China and Japan’s ties to the US remain a significant barrier for furthered Japan-Russian relations (Streltsov, 2016). While Japan’s relations to the US represents a strategic barrier, Russia’s increased economic relationship with Japan corresponds with its overall strategy to avoid economic dependence on its adversaries—specifically in the European Union—by looking toward East Asian markets and lessening its economic vulnerability.

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Author: Lyle, D. (Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Air University)

Executive Summary

Different perspectives and operational goals across services allows for specialized expertise, but also creates a vulnerability for silo creation. At times, these silos can inhibit cooperation, limit mission effectiveness, and leave critical decision points inadequately addressed.  There is a need for more deliberate planning and operational execution that cuts across multiple services and perspectives in order to better balance requirements, more efficiently plan, and more holistically address national security challenges. This need applies not only to operational decisions but also in evaluating ongoing programs to determine their continued effectiveness.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

No primary data were available for analysis. Instead, a literature review of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea) inequality and stability is summarized.

Results

Primary data on North Korean inequality are not available. However, anecdotal information and innovative means of tracking resource flows indicate that the DPRK may be by far the most unequal society in the world, with a small elite (less than 10%) controlling virtually all wealth, leaving the rest of the population at barely or below subsistence level.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Since the vast majority of the population is probably at near equal levels of impoverishment, they are probably risk averse toward one another, since there is no status to be gained or lost. Because the elite control the existence of the population in this totalitarian society, the population does not have the means to challenge elite control. Therefore, at this time, the risk sensitivity of the population at large is probably not relevant to state stability. Because wealth is concentrated at the top and the state uses material rewards (income, apartments, luxury goods) to incentivize party members, there is likely intense competition and risk acceptance among elites. Rumors of coup plots among these elites indicates that extremely high levels of risk acceptance exist in this segment of DPRK society.

Implications for US Interests

While the risk sensitivity of the population may not be relevant to US interests, the likely risk acceptance of the elite could open the possibility for elites (military officers, high ranking party officials) to challenge central state authority. However, because central party figures punish perceived and real challenges harshly, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which elite risk acceptance could translate to challenges to the central party and the Kim family.

Implications for China’s Interests

China faces the same dilemma regarding risk sensitivity of North Koreans as does the US. It is illustrative that Kim Jong-un is reported to have executed one of China’s key links to the DPRK government, his uncle Jang Song-thaek, who may have been involved in a coup plot (rumored to have involved Kim Jong- un’s half-brother and China). The execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle and half-brother demonstrates the absolute control the Kim family exercises over all in the country.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

North Korean inequality has the same implications as China and the US, but because events concerning the DPRK have less impact on Russia, any consequences have less effect on Russian interests.

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Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in France were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 International Labor Organization (ILO) incomes by occupation.

Results

Income data from the World Bank and occupational data from the ILO present similar evidence of a moderately risk acceptant French population. The World bank data indicates a society where the top and lowest income earners are very risk acceptant and the middle income earners are less risk averse. ILO data demonstrates that the most risk averse occupations are agriculture and service and sales, and the most risk acceptant are craftsmen and machine operators, followed by technicians, professionals, and managers.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

France is the least risk acceptant nation in this study but is still risk acceptant with an Arrow-Pratt score of -2.82 (World Bank dataset). The low levels of inequality compound with a sluggish economy and an entitlement-dependent society to provoke political instability. Such instability is evidenced by the Yellow Jacket protests of late 2018, and the middle class could become increasingly risk acceptant as the refugee crisis in France incurs government spending and the French economy struggles to maintain social welfare.

Implications for US Interests

The US and France share strong relationships despite prominent political disagreements between the Trump and Macron administrations. The low level of risk acceptance in France is positive for the US, as it signifies stability despite protests and a low approval rating for the Macron government. However, if this population were to perceive a loss in status due to a sluggish economy, increased taxation, and the threat of losing jobs to immigrants, it would predictably shift the population to a loss averse frame and lead to dissatisfaction with the government. The Yellow Jacket protests may be evidence of such dissatisfaction. Political change may result in a French leader that is more aligned with the Trump administration’s agenda, but also creates the potential for political instability in a strategic US ally that could also spread insecurity across the EU.

Implications for China’s Interests

As the Macron administration has a relatively warm disposition to Chinese engagement and economic cooperation, political stability in France is also good for Beijing. France has been receptive to Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the significant role France and the Macron government play in the EU makes the potential unseating of Macron highly unfavorable. Beyond risk acceptance in French society increasing to a point where it results in political change, China has little interest in inequality in France.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

While France is an important trading partner for Russia, the Kremlin appears to be heavily invested in inculcating political instability in France. The Macron administration is neoliberal and pro EU, however the leading opposition party (Marine Le Pen’s party) is Eurosceptic and favors restoring relations with Russia. Resultingly, Russia favors risk acceptance in France and will likely influence operations and meddling and inciting instability through election interference.

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SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition

Authors | Editors: DeRosa, J. (Special Operations Command – Europe); Doherty, T. (USASOC); Elwell, J. (Special Forces, USASOC); Fiala, O. (Special Operations Command – Europe); Maloney, M. (USASOC); McBride, R. (USASOC); Meredith, S. (National Defense University); Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Uherka, J. (USASOC); Walton, D. (National Defense University); Worrall, G. (Special Operations Command – Europe)

Executive Summary

The current National Security, Defense, and Military Strategies identify great power rivalries from Russia and China as two of the main challenges facing the United States for the foreseeable future. The transition from non-state threats to existential ones posted by great powers means more than reallocation of resources, as important as those are for the coming fights. It must also include paradigm shifts in the ways the United States organizes it forces, authorizes their uses, and justifies the application of all elements of national power in the pursuit of national security.

The purpose of this Invited Perspective Paper is to explore the implications of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Paradigm in the emerging Great Power Competition (GPC) space. It resulted largely from the “SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition” Speaker Series as part of the Joint Staff Global Competition and Conflict Strategic Multilayer Assessment. Like the Speaker Series, this concept paper evaluates more than existing Special Operations capabilities focused on counter Violent Extremist Organization efforts. More broadly, it considers the ways current approaches can be applied to great power rivalries within the full-spectrum of hybrid warfare. It also expands the potential applications of SOF instruments to historic and emerging areas of the competition space. The project is by no means intended to be exhaustive or the final word on the specific topics, instead presenting promising ideas that represent some of the adaptations currently underway in the Special Operations community.

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SMA Invited Perspectives Series: The American Psyche in a Newly Competitive Era- Some Initial Reflections

Authors | Editors: Wyne, A. (RAND); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In this invited perspectives paper, Mr. Wyne cautions that the construct of “great-power competition” should not substitute for a coherent national strategy oriented toward desired steady states, and that an excessive focus on competition as an imperative unto itself could lead the United States into errors of overcommitment. Mr. Wyne questions how much policy guidance emerges from oft-stated objectives such as remaining the world’s foremost power or maintaining the current postwar order. The lack of strategic clarity along with the anxiety inherent in preeminence make the United States vulnerable to asymmetric tactics of manipulation. Mr. Wyne concludes by exploring specific aspects of “great-power competition,” including Sino-Russian relations and US-China competition in the Asia-Pacific.

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South Africa Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Only one data set on wealth and status distribution in South Africa was available: the 2016 World Bank income quintiles.

Results

South Africa ranks as the third highest risk acceptant population in the world and while the lowest income sector of society is very risk acceptant, the highest income sector is more risk acceptant by roughly 250%. This difference is likely due to the monumental class divisions in South African society, where income inequality in the country has not significantly improved since the end of apartheid.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

South Africa is a key regional actor that assumes important political roles on the African continent, it also has the second largest economy on the continent. Internally, South African politics are slowly shifting away from a one-party democracy to a multi-party one, largely due to the lack of improvement in economic inequality and corruption. Inter-racial divisions still exist in South Africa and intra-racial divisions have steadily increased. With economic growth stagnating in recent years, exacerbated by corruption scandals of the ANC leadership, both the very poor and very rich are highly risk acceptant and skeptical about the government.

Implications for US Interests

The primary interest of the US is to prevent South Africa from politically aligning with Russia or China, and to continue a relatively good existing relationship. However, given the mounting domestic tension and an electorate that expects a great deal of anti-corruption and economic reforms to succeed, the status quo is in a precarious position. If the recently elected Cyril Ramaphosa cannot produce the results he campaigned on, then the political stability the ANC has offered South Africa over the past decades can evaporate, and less friendly governments may align South Africa away from the US.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has been investing heavily for years in South Africa and is Pretoria’s most important trading partner. While Ramaphosa is more inclined to the Western political order, his economic initiatives necessitate $100 billion in investment and Beijing is a prime candidate donor. The extreme wealth inequality and class divisions in a democratic country imply a magnitude of latent instability that can jeopardize Chinese economic interests. The way China operates their investments in South Africa is of paramount concern and Beijing must navigate through a highly divided South African society and avoid the appearance of increasing inequality and exploitation of South Africans.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has little foothold in South Africa either economically or by political influence, and this has lessened even more so after the departure of former South African president Jacob Zuma. Russia can thus view the highly risk acceptant nature of South African society in opportunistic fashion; whereby fomenting anti- Western rhetoric among the risk acceptant poor and enticing the wealthy elite through corruption, could be a feasible strategy for Russia to disrupt US and Chinese influence.

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Leaders of the Chinese Economy: Cognitive and Motivational Analyses

Authors | Editors: Suedfeld, P. (University of British Columbia); Grunert, Lindsy (University of British Columbia); Morrison, B. (University of British Columbia)

Executive Summary

In order to gain a quantified, evidence-based picture of decision-making tendencies of Chinese industrial, technical, economic, and political leaders, the UBC research group assessed the integrative complexity and motivational hierarchy of high-level figures in government and (ostensibly) private enterprise. We selected leaders who have been involved in developing and implementing the global commercial and political strategies of the People’s Republic of China. We used thematic content analysis of open-source texts to assess two categories of psychological processes: (1) patterns of cognition that underlie information search and evaluation, flexibility, contextual monitoring and responding, information inclusivity, and perspective-taking bases of planning and strategizing; and (2) the relative strengths of three basic motives that guide those cognitive processes. The measures are related to planning, decision-making, goal-setting, and relations with other individuals and entities, as well as to strategies for coping with stressful conditions. Excerpts from texts by important figures in the Chinese economy were collected and analyzed. The texts concerned Chinese-American economic relations; the sources were leaders of four major sectors of the national economy: high-level political leaders discussing general economic issues, and top executives in the technology, space, and cyberspace areas.

The results showed high Achievement motivation among all four groups of leaders, indicating the desire to excel, progress, and succeed. Power motivation was relatively low among the political leadership, whose concern with influencing and controlling events may have been focused on areas other than the economy (e.g., international relations, domestic unrest). It was quite high among the executives of the other three areas, most notably in the technological sector. The third basic motivation, which is for Affiliation (warm, friendly relations with others), was very low across all groups. Low Affiliation motivation is not unusual among leaders in several areas of life and in many countries.

These results suggest that Chinese elites will respond flexibly to changing events, modifying policies and strategies to fit new circumstances; will maintain a strong competitive drive and act to exert increasing influence over events and other countries (whether friendly or adversarial); and will show little concern about non-pragmatic (i.e., traditional or emotional) relations with others.

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