SMA Publications

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in France were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 International Labor Organization (ILO) incomes by occupation.

Results

Income data from the World Bank and occupational data from the ILO present similar evidence of a moderately risk acceptant French population. The World bank data indicates a society where the top and lowest income earners are very risk acceptant and the middle income earners are less risk averse. ILO data demonstrates that the most risk averse occupations are agriculture and service and sales, and the most risk acceptant are craftsmen and machine operators, followed by technicians, professionals, and managers.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

France is the least risk acceptant nation in this study but is still risk acceptant with an Arrow-Pratt score of -2.82 (World Bank dataset). The low levels of inequality compound with a sluggish economy and an entitlement-dependent society to provoke political instability. Such instability is evidenced by the Yellow Jacket protests of late 2018, and the middle class could become increasingly risk acceptant as the refugee crisis in France incurs government spending and the French economy struggles to maintain social welfare.

Implications for US Interests

The US and France share strong relationships despite prominent political disagreements between the Trump and Macron administrations. The low level of risk acceptance in France is positive for the US, as it signifies stability despite protests and a low approval rating for the Macron government. However, if this population were to perceive a loss in status due to a sluggish economy, increased taxation, and the threat of losing jobs to immigrants, it would predictably shift the population to a loss averse frame and lead to dissatisfaction with the government. The Yellow Jacket protests may be evidence of such dissatisfaction. Political change may result in a French leader that is more aligned with the Trump administration’s agenda, but also creates the potential for political instability in a strategic US ally that could also spread insecurity across the EU.

Implications for China’s Interests

As the Macron administration has a relatively warm disposition to Chinese engagement and economic cooperation, political stability in France is also good for Beijing. France has been receptive to Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the significant role France and the Macron government play in the EU makes the potential unseating of Macron highly unfavorable. Beyond risk acceptance in French society increasing to a point where it results in political change, China has little interest in inequality in France.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

While France is an important trading partner for Russia, the Kremlin appears to be heavily invested in inculcating political instability in France. The Macron administration is neoliberal and pro EU, however the leading opposition party (Marine Le Pen’s party) is Eurosceptic and favors restoring relations with Russia. Resultingly, Russia favors risk acceptance in France and will likely influence operations and meddling and inciting instability through election interference.

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SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition

Authors | Editors: DeRosa, J. (Special Operations Command – Europe); Doherty, T. (USASOC); Elwell, J. (Special Forces, USASOC); Fiala, O. (Special Operations Command – Europe); Maloney, M. (USASOC); McBride, R. (USASOC); Meredith, S. (National Defense University); Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Uherka, J. (USASOC); Walton, D. (National Defense University); Worrall, G. (Special Operations Command – Europe)

Executive Summary

The current National Security, Defense, and Military Strategies identify great power rivalries from Russia and China as two of the main challenges facing the United States for the foreseeable future. The transition from non-state threats to existential ones posted by great powers means more than reallocation of resources, as important as those are for the coming fights. It must also include paradigm shifts in the ways the United States organizes it forces, authorizes their uses, and justifies the application of all elements of national power in the pursuit of national security.

The purpose of this Invited Perspective Paper is to explore the implications of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Paradigm in the emerging Great Power Competition (GPC) space. It resulted largely from the “SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition” Speaker Series as part of the Joint Staff Global Competition and Conflict Strategic Multilayer Assessment. Like the Speaker Series, this concept paper evaluates more than existing Special Operations capabilities focused on counter Violent Extremist Organization efforts. More broadly, it considers the ways current approaches can be applied to great power rivalries within the full-spectrum of hybrid warfare. It also expands the potential applications of SOF instruments to historic and emerging areas of the competition space. The project is by no means intended to be exhaustive or the final word on the specific topics, instead presenting promising ideas that represent some of the adaptations currently underway in the Special Operations community.

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SMA Invited Perspectives Series: The American Psyche in a Newly Competitive Era- Some Initial Reflections

Authors | Editors: Wyne, A. (RAND); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In this invited perspectives paper, Mr. Wyne cautions that the construct of “great-power competition” should not substitute for a coherent national strategy oriented toward desired steady states, and that an excessive focus on competition as an imperative unto itself could lead the United States into errors of overcommitment. Mr. Wyne questions how much policy guidance emerges from oft-stated objectives such as remaining the world’s foremost power or maintaining the current postwar order. The lack of strategic clarity along with the anxiety inherent in preeminence make the United States vulnerable to asymmetric tactics of manipulation. Mr. Wyne concludes by exploring specific aspects of “great-power competition,” including Sino-Russian relations and US-China competition in the Asia-Pacific.

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South Africa Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Only one data set on wealth and status distribution in South Africa was available: the 2016 World Bank income quintiles.

Results

South Africa ranks as the third highest risk acceptant population in the world and while the lowest income sector of society is very risk acceptant, the highest income sector is more risk acceptant by roughly 250%. This difference is likely due to the monumental class divisions in South African society, where income inequality in the country has not significantly improved since the end of apartheid.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

South Africa is a key regional actor that assumes important political roles on the African continent, it also has the second largest economy on the continent. Internally, South African politics are slowly shifting away from a one-party democracy to a multi-party one, largely due to the lack of improvement in economic inequality and corruption. Inter-racial divisions still exist in South Africa and intra-racial divisions have steadily increased. With economic growth stagnating in recent years, exacerbated by corruption scandals of the ANC leadership, both the very poor and very rich are highly risk acceptant and skeptical about the government.

Implications for US Interests

The primary interest of the US is to prevent South Africa from politically aligning with Russia or China, and to continue a relatively good existing relationship. However, given the mounting domestic tension and an electorate that expects a great deal of anti-corruption and economic reforms to succeed, the status quo is in a precarious position. If the recently elected Cyril Ramaphosa cannot produce the results he campaigned on, then the political stability the ANC has offered South Africa over the past decades can evaporate, and less friendly governments may align South Africa away from the US.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has been investing heavily for years in South Africa and is Pretoria’s most important trading partner. While Ramaphosa is more inclined to the Western political order, his economic initiatives necessitate $100 billion in investment and Beijing is a prime candidate donor. The extreme wealth inequality and class divisions in a democratic country imply a magnitude of latent instability that can jeopardize Chinese economic interests. The way China operates their investments in South Africa is of paramount concern and Beijing must navigate through a highly divided South African society and avoid the appearance of increasing inequality and exploitation of South Africans.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has little foothold in South Africa either economically or by political influence, and this has lessened even more so after the departure of former South African president Jacob Zuma. Russia can thus view the highly risk acceptant nature of South African society in opportunistic fashion; whereby fomenting anti- Western rhetoric among the risk acceptant poor and enticing the wealthy elite through corruption, could be a feasible strategy for Russia to disrupt US and Chinese influence.

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Leaders of the Chinese Economy: Cognitive and Motivational Analyses

Authors | Editors: Suedfeld, P. (University of British Columbia); Grunert, Lindsy (University of British Columbia); Morrison, B. (University of British Columbia)

Executive Summary

In order to gain a quantified, evidence-based picture of decision-making tendencies of Chinese industrial, technical, economic, and political leaders, the UBC research group assessed the integrative complexity and motivational hierarchy of high-level figures in government and (ostensibly) private enterprise. We selected leaders who have been involved in developing and implementing the global commercial and political strategies of the People’s Republic of China. We used thematic content analysis of open-source texts to assess two categories of psychological processes: (1) patterns of cognition that underlie information search and evaluation, flexibility, contextual monitoring and responding, information inclusivity, and perspective-taking bases of planning and strategizing; and (2) the relative strengths of three basic motives that guide those cognitive processes. The measures are related to planning, decision-making, goal-setting, and relations with other individuals and entities, as well as to strategies for coping with stressful conditions. Excerpts from texts by important figures in the Chinese economy were collected and analyzed. The texts concerned Chinese-American economic relations; the sources were leaders of four major sectors of the national economy: high-level political leaders discussing general economic issues, and top executives in the technology, space, and cyberspace areas.

The results showed high Achievement motivation among all four groups of leaders, indicating the desire to excel, progress, and succeed. Power motivation was relatively low among the political leadership, whose concern with influencing and controlling events may have been focused on areas other than the economy (e.g., international relations, domestic unrest). It was quite high among the executives of the other three areas, most notably in the technological sector. The third basic motivation, which is for Affiliation (warm, friendly relations with others), was very low across all groups. Low Affiliation motivation is not unusual among leaders in several areas of life and in many countries.

These results suggest that Chinese elites will respond flexibly to changing events, modifying policies and strategies to fit new circumstances; will maintain a strong competitive drive and act to exert increasing influence over events and other countries (whether friendly or adversarial); and will show little concern about non-pragmatic (i.e., traditional or emotional) relations with others.

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“Discrete, Specified, Assigned, and Bounded Problems: The Appropriate Areas for AI Contributions to National Security“

Author | Editor: Rogers, Z. (Flinders University of South Australia); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

The cluster of technologies associated with artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, and the implications of these technologies across the spectrum of human activity including national security, generates a blur of fast-moving technological, political, strategic, and ethical puzzles. For all their hyper-modern veneer, tracing the trajectories of historical thought associated with these puzzles offers some much-needed clarity. To this end, what follows is an overview of three relevant trajectories. While far from exhaustive, practitioners and theorists alike in national security should have a solid grounding in these thought trajectories to facilitate reasoned decisions about AI research and development.

The overall argument asserts that research and development of AI technologies for national security should be confined to areas where discrete, specified, assigned, and bounded problems and tasks can be scientifically explored and assessed. Battlefield AI for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), target identification, sensing, and weapons tracking is such an area. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center’s current four focus areas are appropriate (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Areas of indiscrete, unspecified, unassigned, and unbounded problems and tasks, such as in the socio-political realm incorporating population-centric cognitive and information warfare, should be approached with a high degree of caution. Risk-taking in this area is attended by high degrees of uncertainty with high exposure to catastrophic costs to domestic populations. Policy-making in AI for national security should follow a bi-modal strategy which allocates the appropriate cost/risk ratios to maximize adaptive innovation and minimize hubris.

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United States Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Four datasets on wealth and status distribution in the United States were analyzed: 2016, 2010, and 2007 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2017 US Bureau of Labor statistics income deciles.

Results

Overall the population of the US is highly risk acceptant, with peaks among the poor and the wealthiest. Furthermore, recent economic volatility has caused middle class Americans to lose wealth, which has not been regained, placing them in a loss averse and therefore risk accepting decision frame. The wealthy have been able to regain wealth lost during the Great Recession. However, their regained wealth has been in the form of more uncertain and volatile income versus traditional rents from capital ownership, possibly sustaining their high level of risk acceptance.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The entire American population is arguably risk acceptant, or in the case of the middle class, loss averse. These conditions imply political risk taking across the social spectrum.

Implications for US Interests

Political partisanship, social unrest, and economic volatility are likely to decrease trust in the political system and lead to protest and major shifts in the priorities of political parties.

Implications for China’s Interests

Given the close economic ties between China and the US, volatility in American markets could jeopardize some Chinese economic interests. However, given the great power competition for global influence between the countries, losses in economic power and increased social division within the US likely play into Chinese interests and objectives.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Given Russia’s desire to see a weakened US and democratic institutions worldwide, economic inequality, volatility, partisanship and social discord in the US presents Russia with opportunities to use cleavages between socio-economic classes to further weaken the nation.

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South Korea Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in South Korea were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2017 and 2012.

Results

South Korea is on average a moderately risk acceptant nation, as measured by World Bank data showing income by individual, and ILO data showing income by occupation. According to the most recent ILO data, South Korea has increasingly become more risk acceptant.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Today, South Korea is a stable, democratic nation. However, it has a checkered past of authoritarian rule and has experienced several military coups d’état. As a risk acceptant nation, generational divides and disparities in wealth are the most likely cleavages that can lead to political instability.

Implications for US Interests

President of Korea Moon Jae-in has promised several economic reforms and diplomatic engagements with North Korea. Given the impeachment of President Moon’s predecessor, President Park Geun-hye, the success of the current administration and stable governance in South Korea is crucial to US-led negotiations with the DPRK. Latent societal inequality that can increase during a financial crisis/natural disaster/conflict etc. could threaten President Moon’s democratic mandate and ability to govern and is subsequently of significant concern to the US.

Implications for China’s Interests

Moderate regional tensions across the Korean Peninsula are favorable for China as it maintains the status quo balance of power and influence. Social cleavages in South Korea that can contribute to a degree of weakness in South Korea is correspondingly also favorable. Any monumental socio-political events in South Korea that can exacerbate inequality will also likely lead to severe instability dyadically with the DPRK however, would not be favorable for Beijing.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia similarly has interest in South Korean instability insofar as it can reverse US influence and military presence. Social cleavages and inequality than can cultivate a dimension of instability that would lead to anti-Western sentiment is advantageous to Russian interests. However, high degrees of South Korean risk-acceptance have the potential to several destabilize the Korean peninsula to a point that would embroil Russian interests Barring the potential for such a scenario, South Korean stability is more advantageous to Russian interests.

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“Investing In Bad Governance: China and Latin America “

Author | Editor: Perera, F. (William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Though there have been many reports of the strengthening of commercial and financial relations between Latin America and China, comparatively few explore the conditions within the countries of Latin America that facilitated this engagement. The study proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes Chinese involvement in the region distinguishing between foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA). The second section attempts to identify institutional determinants of this investment. Specifically, it differentiates between conditions that are seen as favorable to private Chinese investment and those that facilitate official Chinese development assistance. The third section outlines possible implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America.

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The Future of Global Competition & Conflict Comparative Analysis: A Media Ecology & Strategic Analysis (MESA) Group Report

Authors | Editors: Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Kitsch, S. (Monmouth College); Cooley, A. (Oklahoma State University)

Executive Summary

This report provides a comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan media narratives regarding visions of the future of global competition, including their instruments of exerting power (DIME), purported vulnerabilities and necessary capabilities, projected allies and adversaries, views on the future of global order (FGO), the US, and EU, as well as the available means by which global competition should be managed. Statistical modeling on these media narratives revealed concerns for informational and cultural vulnerabilities and demonstrated the importance of maximizing economic and diplomatic capabilities. China was the only nation to view the FGO positively, largely due to its projection of itself as a rising power within the global order with the economic and technological ability to succeed in future global competition. All of the nations shared in having an exceptionally negative perspective on the US and its role within the global order.

Implications on US security

• Potential Challenges to the US
  • US competitors express rising insecurity within the international system threatening greater destabilization of the international order. Future conflict may increase if nations view the order as increasingly unstable, or unable to provide benefits for their participation, resulting in those nations turning more to militarization.
  • While US pressure appears to be weakening Russian and Iranian abilities to compete in a future conflict, the US must ensure it maintains the diplomatic support of its allies.
  • Russia appears committed to developing alternative diplomatic and economic partnerships with Eurasia and China. To maintain US advantage over Russian strength, the US should consider developing policies mitigating Russian-Chinese diplomatic and economic partnerships.
  • Views of the US as in decline threatens to inhibit future US influence. The US should consider developing a strategy highlighting its diplomatic and global leadership potential, especially in areas such as technological innovation, showcasing its ability to drive future global economic growth.

• Potential Openings for the US
  • US competitors appear vulnerable to US leadership regarding multilateral economic and diplomatic partnerships. US ability to maintain multilateral diplomatic and economic partnerships, especially with Western European countries, can be a force multiplier when dealing with Iran, China, and Venezuela.
  • US offering of economic pacts and technology sharing could be powerful inducements for Chinese and Venezuelan cooperation. Invitations to diplomatic and economic cooperation can lessen the chances for conflict and attract partnerships if managed strategically; nations need to be able to see themselves as benefiting from the global order, especially in areas of economic growth.
  • Chinese interests appear amenable to US interests economically and in multilateral institutions. US-China cooperation on economic and diplomatic issues can help support US influence and stabilize international order.
  • The US media and information dominance is a significant advantage and a concern for Russia and Iran specifically. Cultural encroachment as well as the ability for the
• US to set the parameters of, and narratives on, international events among allies using media are weapons of global competition that are acknowledged vulnerabilities by Russia and Iran.

Visions on the Future of Global Competition

• Chinese narratives present the future of global competition as an economic battle centered on free trade and technological development. China views rising nationalism and isolationist policies in Europe and the US as undermining global stability and presents itself as a global leader supporting international institutions such as the UN and WTO. Successful competition requires promotion of diplomatic ties, domestic technological innovation, and continued reforms. China remains optimistic in its ability to lead the world and manage a peaceful global order.
• Russian narratives present the future of global competition as one whereby Russia is in conflict with the Western-led global order. Chief Russian concerns include its perceived domestic economic and technological declines, requiring Russia to develop greater Eurasian economic ties, especially with China; and Western information warfare causing societal disruptions and an unraveling of Russian national identity, requiring Russia to reinvest in the promotion and protection of culture across key industries. Russia is seen as maintaining its great power status and aspiring to be the main guarantor of security in a new global order; challenging US and EU backed institutions and establishing alternative multilateral partnerships to diminish US influence.
• Iranian narratives present the future of global competition through a regional lens whereby diplomatic and informational instruments of power are key for its ability to lead the Shia Crescent and combat the US attempts to isolate it. Iran is shown as under siege from an onslaught of US rhetoric and US leveraging of the international community against it and argues that US actions are in violation of international law and norms. The US is seen as aiming to divide the Shia Crescent, and Iran blames the US for its own internal weaknesses as well as for aiding in the militarization of the Middle East. To succeed in the future global order, Iran calls for greater regional unity within the Shia Crescent and greater diplomatic influence with the EU to balance against the US.
• Venezuelan narratives present the future of global competition in ideological terms where imperialist nations of all sorts, including the US, China, and Russia, compete for their own economic and political influence globally. Latin America, and Venezuela specifically, are seen as suffering the consequences of this competition, as the power brokers of the global order care little about the impacts of competition on the well-being of other nations. Venezuela sees itself as vulnerable to the outside military, diplomatic, and economic influences, especially due to its domestic turmoil and failed economic policies. Authoritarian politics, and corruption, are viewed negatively and seen as undermining humanitarian needs. Venezuela sees itself as lacking capabilities to influence foreign nations and calls for new directions in engagements with the diplomatic community and through regional economic trade relations.

Positive Drivers of the FGO: Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan media present the future of the global order more positively as expressions of their diplomatic and economic capabilities increase, and as mentions of diplomatic vulnerabilities and foreign competitors decrease. Media discussions of integration and alliance with other nations within the global economic system are keys to favorable projections of what the future holds for the international system. Demonstrating diplomatic voice within the global order and competency within the global economy lend themselves toward more optimistic presentations of the future.

• Positive Drivers on Nation’s Role in the Global Order: Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan media project a positive perspective of their nation’s role within the global order as mentions of informational vulnerabilities and articulations of necessary military capabilities increase.
  • Both Russian and Iranian media discuss informational vulnerabilities within broader conversations of shoring up and maintaining cultural homogeneity related to specific regional areas of influence (FSU countries, Shia Crescent); discussions of military capabilities are framed as in defense of sovereign territory and areas of influence. For both Iran and Russia, a critical part of national identity expressed in media narratives relates to regional solidarity; one of the most dangerous aspects of Western influence is seen as its ability to wage information and cultural warfare using media.
  • Chinese media present a more favorable perspective on their role within the global order as discussions on diplomatic capabilities increase, and mentions of foreign competitors decrease. For Chinese media, the role of their nation in the global order is as an emerging superpower committed to global economic fairness and equality, and demonstrating its leadership through the expression of its diplomatic prowess and lack of direct competitors.

• Negative Drivers towards the US: Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan media all present the US negatively. This is largely because the US is presented as an instigator of tension & conflict, a waning imperialist power, and/or a direct competitor in sectors deemed important to the nation. The perceptions of the US become more positive only as media discussions of competitors and conflict management decrease. The ability of the US to project information warfare via media is a significant concern for all of the nations; important to this concern is the underlying discussion of the US as a lawbreaker and often unfair actor in respect to the global order.
  • Critical to Russian and Chinese media perspectives of the US are informational capabilities and vulnerabilities. Russian perspectives of the US become more negative as mentions of their own information capabilities and vulnerabilities are discussed. Chinese perspectives of the US become more positive as discussions of their own informational capabilities increase, and mentions of information vulnerabilities decrease.

• Positive Drivers towards Western Europe: Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan media perspectives on Western Europe became more positive when discussing alliances and when foreign sources were present within news stories. The importance of Western Europe overall within these presentations of the global order is twofold: First, Western Europe as a conceptual block of nations is seen as a traditional ally of the US. Diminishing the purported strength of that alliance, showing Western Europe as seeking new alliances outside of the US, and demonstrating points of common concern between other nations and Western Europe highlights the waywardness of the US in relation to the global order. Second, Western Europe is presented as generally committed to open market principles, diplomacy, and fairness. Thus, presenting the shifting alliances of Western Europe helps to cast legitimacy on the grievances and international leadership of other international actors like Russia, China, and Iran.
  • Chinese media’s presentation of Western Europe was more influenced by mentions of diplomatic, informational, and economic vulnerabilities; as Chinese vulnerabilities were discussed less, presentation of Western Europe became more positive.
  • In Iranian media, as discussions of conflict management increased and mentions of competitors decreased perspectives on Western Europe were more positive.

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