SMA Publications

Venezuela Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Venezuela were analyzed: 2006 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 Venezuelan Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) data on income by occupational category.

Results

Income data provided by the World Bank (2006) and occupational data from ENCOVI (2014), shows a Venezuelan population that is extremely risk acceptant with a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -7.15, the second highest in the world.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Venezuela’s lowest and highest socioeconomic classes are extremely risk acceptant. The Venezuelan political and economic crisis is causing a shortage of living essentials for most of its population (Garcia- Navarro, 2016). How most of its population lives is in stark contrast to those working in the petroleum industries, or political elites who enjoy a high quality of living from low-priced goods and luxury items purchased from the black market.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has strong security interests in Venezuela but has little direct influence over what occurs in the country while President Maduro remains in power (Neghaiwi, 2019). Instead, the United States relies on economic sanctions to place political pressure on President Maduro in the hopes of seeing him removed from office. The US supports the opposition leader Juan Guaido’s claim to the presidency. While President Maduro retains his power, the US must rely on Switzerland, which has been acting as a conduit between the US and President Maduro, to represent US interests. The extremely risk acceptant segments of Venezuelan society indicate that turmoil will continue between aggrieved constituencies supportive of Maduro and Guaido and across socioeconomic classes.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has sunk billions of dollars into Venezuela in the form of financial aid (Rendon, 2018). If President Maduro retains his power, China will retain a tremendous ally in Latin America that it will be able to control through debt (Sigalos, 2019). However, if President Maduro is replaced by Guaido, then China stands to lose much of the money it has loaned Venezuela as well as access to cheap oil. The continued turmoil presents a dynamic situation from which China may either benefit if Maduro retains power or lose of Guaido prevails.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has invested money and military personnel in Venezuela on a smaller scale than China, however its desired end is also to see President Maduro retain his power (Sigalos, 2019). Russia’s interaction with Latin America is partially driven in response to the US and NATO activity in the Balkans and former Soviet republics. Sigalos also states that this is a part of a larger economic strategy that is contingent on Russia growing its markets outside of countries in the European, Union including investments in Venezuela’s petroleum industry (Lowe & Sagdiev, 2019). To both of these ends, if President Maduro secures his presidency, then Russia will gain an important political ally in the region and access to cheap petroleum. As with China, Russia’s interests hang in the balance while a highly divided, discontented and risky accepting population supports their political rivals.

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Statistical Modeling of Risk and Political Instability in the Influence Environment – An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Authors | Editors: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.); Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Success in the global competition between the US, China, and Russia may be determined by a country’s ability to influence the world’s populations. A population’s aspirations and grievances can drive national security problems for all three powers when frustrated aspirations and grievances lead to state instability, terrorism, or other challenges such as unwanted or unmanaged migration. In accordance with the questions posed in the J39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Great Power Competition tasking, this study is intended to address the following issues through the use of country-level global statistical modeling, including identifying or anticipating:

• Where aggrieved populations are likely to exist globally and how they may be operationalized against US interests.
• The effects of global climate change on state stability.
• The forms of instability that may challenge US interests (political instability, autocratic regimes, violent extremism, adversarial proxies).
• The causes and effects of mass migration.

Previous academic research was used as the starting point for this study, and it was challenged to approximate the data challenges of intelligence analysis as well as to re-test earlier findings and update models by considering new and potentially relevant variables. Three statistical models (political stability, terrorism, and migration) were developed under these conditions to address the J39 questions. The key findings were:

• Political instability is driven by hunger, risk acceptant elites, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, weak democracy, mountainous terrain, economic isolation, and ethnic division.
• Terrorism is fueled by large populations, ties to MENA oil producers, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, economic isolation, and a risk acceptant middle class.
• Migration from undeveloped countries is driven by hunger, a youth bulge, homicide and political oppression, and
• Migration to developed countries is driven by permissive immigration policies and the attraction of national wealth.

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Inequality, Risk Sensitivity, and Grievance in Context – An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Authors | Editors: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.); Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Success in the global competition between the US, China, and Russia may be determined by a country’s ability to influence the world’s populations. A population’s aspirations and grievances can drive national security problems for all three powers when frustrated aspirations and grievances lead to state instability, terrorism, or other challenges such as unwanted or unmanaged migration. In accordance with the questions posed in the J39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Great Power Competition tasking, this report summarizes context-specific qualitative and quantitative analyses of the conditions impacting population aspirations and grievances for 25 countries, and how these impact US, Chinese, and Russian interests. Issues include:

• Identifying where aggrieved populations are likely to exist globally and how they may be operationalized against US interests
• Anticipating the effects of global climate change on state stability
• Identifying the forms of instability that may challenge US interests (political instability, autocratic regimes, violent extremism, adversarial proxies)
• Identifying the causes and effects of mass migration
• Understanding Chinese interests and strategies in specific countries and their impacts on US interests
• Understanding Russian interests and strategies in specific countries and their impacts on US interests

Six broad patterns in inequality, risk sensitivity, and social disruption emerged from these analyses.

• Baselines. Two countries were used to baseline all other comparisons.
  • Finland—The world’s most stable society is also one of the world’s most egalitarian and therefore least acceptant of risk. The population also is homogenous, lacks a history of feudal inequality, and has a high level of education. The Finnish population’s lack of risk acceptance and high level of education appear to have inoculated its population against Russian attempts at disruption through social media.
  • The United States—The US was chosen as a baseline because of its familiarity to the researchers and intended audience of this report. The US has a highly risk acceptant population increasingly divided along class, race, and rural/urban divides. Furthermore, much of the middle class is experiencing loss aversion due to losses suffered in the Great Recession of 2009, which have not been regained. Adversaries have effectively used this risk acceptance to sow discord through social media.
• Risk Acceptant Populations—Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and Venezuela have populations that are entirely or mostly risk acceptant
  • The primary effect of widespread risk acceptance is extremely high homicide rates, confirming research that demonstrates a connection between inequality and homicide.
  • In Nigeria and Venezuela, inequality between ethnic groups and/or classes has given rise to extremely disruptive protests, rebellions, and terrorism. Social unrest in Nigeria threatens oil production, investments, and the political stability of Africa’s most populous country, which all great powers desire. Social unrest in Venezuela threatens Russian and Chinese investments in propping up an adversarial government to the US.
  • Honduran and Mexican inequality and risk acceptance has fueled illegal migration and created disruption at the US border and further division among the US population.
  • Widespread risk acceptance in China has caused little disruption because of the state’s ability to suppress dissent, and to sustain growth that provides opportunities for a population hungry for advancement. However, protests in Hong Kong and Xinjiang are symptoms that when wealthy Chinese feel threatened (Hong Kong) or minorities (Uighurs in Xinjiang) perceive unfair gains for Han Chinese, the state will be challenged. A key to China’s mitigation of the risk acceptance of its population is to sustain a high rate of growth, which the Chinese economy may not be able to do in the future.
• Loss Averse Populations—A number of the countries in the sample are experiencing real or perceived economic losses, leading to loss aversion, risk taking, and unrest.
  • European countries in this sample (Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Serbia, United Kingdom) largely experienced either real or perceived losses and threats to their livelihoods and cultures from immigration, placing their populations into highly risk acceptant, loss averse, frames. This has manifest in challenges to their political status quo (Brexit) and the rise of right-wing challenges to their governments. Russia has exploited the situation to weaken European governments, the integrity of the European Union, and NATO.
  • Dramatic losses in status by working class Pakistanis fueled the rise of maverick populist Prime Minister Imran Khan.
  • Real and sustained economic losses in the Venezuelan economy have contributed to unrest.
  • Losses from a softening oil market and US sanctions are exacerbating upper-class risk acceptance and rural/urban differences, although the Iranian government’s ability to suppress dissent will probably contain any serious challenge to the government.
• Agrarian Populations—Agrarian societies are characterized by extreme levels of inequality and consequently, risk acceptance. This was especially the case in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Most of these countries are also distinguished by sharp ethnic divides in access to wealth and opportunity, and all of them have a distinct impoverished rural vs. relatively wealthy urban divide. These divisions and inequalities create highly risk acceptant populations with grievances against other ethnic groups and urban elites, fueling social unrest in many forms including ethnic conflict, rebellion against the government, and terrorism.
• Typical Populations—A typical society has an impoverished, risk acceptant class of poor, a distinct and risk averse middle class, and a highly risk acceptant elite. India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Serbia, and South Korea have such a typical profile.
  • In the cases of Japan and South Korea, low inequality in relation to other countries has supported social stability, although there has been a shift toward a more nationalistic government in Japan.
  • India and Indonesia have so far been able to mitigate degrees of risk acceptance in some segments of their populations through continued economic growth. However, their agrarian and rural/urban divides and their ethnic diversity pose a challenge to stability.
  • Russia’s and Serbia’s communist past has left a legacy of relative equality compared to most countries, despite the rapid growth of their economies since the fall of the Soviet Union and a continued concentration of wealth among oligarchs. For now, indications are that Russians and Serbs are not risk acceptant enough to pose a serious challenge to their governments.
• North Korea—There is probably no more unequal country than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Virtually all wealth is concentrated in an extremely small cadre at the very top of society. Furthermore, the Kim regime punishes all dissent extremely harshly and effectively. This provides common North Koreans, who are struggling to survive, with virtually no incentive to rebel or to take any risky course of action such as escape through immigration. They are predicted to be risk averse. In contrast, the fight for the spoils among the elite is expected to generate intense competition and challenges at the top. There is some evidence that challenges have occurred. However, the Kim family has so far punished any challenge, even from close relatives, extremely harshly, effectively quashing any dissent. The DPRK is a truly unique case.

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United Kingdom Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in United Kingdom were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2017 and 2011.

Results

Income data form the World Bank and occupational data from ILO indicate that the United Kingdom is highly risk acceptant. Despite this similarity, the relationship between wealth attainment and risk acceptance between the two sources is different. The World Bank data indicates a country in which the individuals who make the highest incomes are the least risk averse. while the data from ILO shows a positive relationship between the average income for an occupation and an increase in risk aversion.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The United Kingdom’s propensity for risk taking can be currently observed through the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, which is planned to take place later in 2019 (BBC, 2019). However, the impact Brexit will have on stability and the UK and its institutions is still unknown as it has been delayed repeatedly.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an important relationship with the United Kingdom as it has been a long time ideological and political ally against autocratic states including Russia. The US also holds the UK as a strategically important player due to its current position in the EU (Belin, 2019). The United Kingdom has been a US ally in its activities outside of Europe against Chinese encroachment into the South China Sea. Despite this, economic changes from the UK leaving the EU will occur within the next year, challenging the US-UK relationship. The scope and impact of these changes has yet to be understood. The economic changes that will occur have far reaching implications because of the large trade between the US and UK (United States Trade Representatives, 2019). Much more important than their trade relationship is their political partnership, both strategically with respect to security/coalition issues and with respect to soft power (Belin, 2019). The UK’s risk acceptant population is a risk to the US interests because this population has chosen disruptive political and economic changes that may destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China sees a post-EU United Kingdom as a potential economic partner. The UK’s planned exit from the EU has led to Chinese economic overtures, suggesting a potential free-trade deal and the connection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to London (Johnson, 2019). China and the UK have little political differences with one other than the UK’s joint military operations with the US (Kelly, 2019). Despite the UK’s close ties to the US, its risk acceptant population gives China an opportunity to increase its standings politically and economically as it looks to extend its BRI to London (Johnson, 2019).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has little direct influence within the United Kingdom. Other than their historic ties as two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the two countries are fundamentally at odds with each other on an ideological level (House of Commons, 2017). While the upcoming Brexit may offer the opportunity to soften Russian-UK relations, it is unlikely to cause wide ranging or deep changes. Despite the unlikelihood of changes in Russia and the UK’s relationship the UK’s risk acceptant population provides Russia an opportunity, as Brexit will weaken the UK’s connection to the EU.

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Author(s): Klipstein, M. (Army Cyber Institute, West Point); Minter, A. (Army Cyber Institute, West Point); Pittman, J. (Amy Cyber Institute, West Point)

Report Preview

In our increasingly digital society, military operations and civilian-alike rely heavily on the technological tools that connect us. Social media has become a powerful influence tool to sow discord, sway sentiment, and purport cause for actions that otherwise would be condemned by the international community. Cellular services have become the default mode of communication. And the amount of data collected continues to grow. The convergence of information operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations have brought a new paradigm to nations in friction or conflict. Distortion and delivery of information allow the perception of ‘truth’ in populations that in turn can move a nation’s course of action. These realities alone are challenging; when US adversaries use cyber capabilities, the result could have a drastic effect on the ability to wage war and retain the status we enjoy in the international community. We examine the holistic information space ten years into the future to better understand how the information environment will interact with governments and society. This paper draws four predictions that will affect nations if the current trend continues. These trends include the diminishment of the United States on the global stage, the rise of China in computing supremacy, cultural division and schism continuing fueled by online news and information sources, and finally, nation-states fighting conflicts further “upstream” in the information space to prevent conflict or eliminate its necessity. In conclusion, the authors recommend questions that governments must seek answers to in order to stay
competitive in this environment.

Author | Editor: Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

This white paper deals with broad topic of assessing options to gain better understanding of the subjective world of populations we need to interface and relate to. How can we reliably anticipate behavior patterns? Our challenge is gaining the most accurate and useful information for commanders and other agencies for planning purposes. Who are the right people to try to influence to achieve strategic goals (individuals and/or groups). Which behaviors are we targeting? Why do people display those particular behaviors? Finally, how do we coordinate operations to drive the desired behaviors? We cannot rely entirely on social media (we must blend it with other intelligence), even though it can be an important contributor. This White Paper is intended to provide recommendations for planning methodologies, technological approaches, and required expertise.

Contributors

Brig Gen Alexus G. Grynkewich (Joint Staff), Dr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan (Joint Staff), Mr. Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Col. Scott K. Thomson (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)), Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III (NDU), LTC (Dr.) Gregory S. Seese (JHU-APL), LTC (Dr.) Rafael E. Linera (USASOC), Mr. Erinn McQuagge (Northop Grumman), Ms. Patricia DeGennaro (TRADOC G2), Mr. Randy Munch (TRADOC G2), Dr. Diane DiEuliis (NDU), Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown), Dr. Ian McCulloh (John Hopkins), Ms. Laurie McCulloh (Fielding), Dr. Jason Spitaletta (JHU-APL), Dr. Nicholas D. Wright (Univ. Birmingham, UK), Dr. Margeret Hall (UNO), Dr. Gina Ligon (UNO), Ms. Clara Braun (UNO), Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE), Mr. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr), Ms. Sophia Moskalenko (Bryn Mawr), Mr. Tom McCauley (Univ. Rochester), Mr. Dan Foy (Gallup), Mr. Chris Stewart (Gallup), Dr. Linda Durnell (Fielding), Dr. Garry Hare (Fielding), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services), Mr. Mark Polyak (Ipsos Public Affairs), Dr. David C. Ellis (Joint Special Operations Univ.), Dr. Katie Ziemer (Ipsos Public Affairs), Mr. Howard Simkin (USASOC G9), and Dr. William D. Casebeer (Lockheed Martin ATL)

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

Top-Level Findings

This paper reports a number of the top-level findings from the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project requested by the Joint Staff and USINDOPACOM. They are based on an integration of the results of the eleven different analytic efforts included in the project.

Finding: There are impediments to North Korean denuclearization on multiple layers making it highly unlikely and extremely difficult to achieve under foreseeable conditions.

Finding: Increased US-PRC tensions (the “new Cold War”) may work to Chinese advantage if regional actors are forced to choose between US guns and Chinese butter; US seen as disruptive or unengaged.

Bottom Line: The US role and approach to satisfying its objectives in the Pacific may be at a crossroads. Long-term US influence in the Pacific may require a change in the way the US perceives “regional leadership” and the activities that go with it.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Effects of Investment on Pathways to Space Security

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

[Q8] How are the components of the commercial space industry allocated outside of the US? Which countries have which types of market interests on the commercial end (e.g. tourism, imagery, navigation etc.)?

Summary Response

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.

We have compiled and summarized the contributor responses in two graphics that illustrate the extent to which the commercial space industry, which accounts for around three quarters of the global space economy (Bryce Space and Technology), is globalized. The capabilities and components discussed by the contributors have been mapped according to four general “bins”: satellite, launch, new space, and science and exploration.7 The tables, however, preserve the specific components referenced by the contributors, providing more detail of each state’s depth and focus in each area.

Our aggregation of the contributor discussion of commercial space capabilities and areas of interest indicates that, as we might expect, the US, Russia, and the PRC have the most diversified commercial capabilities in launch, satellites, and science and exploration. However, India and the ESA have very similar levels of coverage in launch, satellite, and science and exploration. Other states, such as Israel, Singapore, South Korea, and the UK are choosing to invest in research and development in niche areas (Lynn). Luxembourg is discussed by the contributors as an unexpectedly active and competitive actor in commercial space. The two biggest satellite operators in terms of revenue—SES and IntelSat—are headquartered in Luxembourg, even though a large part of their business is providing services in the US (Bryce Space and Technology). The national legislature has recently passed laws to protect space property rights for Luxembourg-based companies,8 and is providing financing for private companies to develop space mining capabilities (Armor).

As the number of states developing their own commercial space industry grows, so does the potential for partnerships. China in particular has moved to build partnerships in the space sector both with developing nations with little independent space capability (Brown & May; Cheng), as well as the ESA and individual European states (Brown & May). Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin suggests that the small size of most states’ space programs has made partnerships both more necessary and easier to accomplish than is the case for the US. Dr. Martin Lindsey of United States Pacific Command and Agnieszka Lukaszczyk of Planet both suggest that, although space is becoming more crowded and congested, it is a domain in which there is considerable cooperation both between states and between the public and private sectors. This cooperation offers states with fewer resources the potential to quickly and cheaply gain access to space technologies and space-based information and services. The US has the potential to take advantage of its strength in the space domain to broaden and strengthen its existing relationships with ally and partner nations. However it needs to act fast; other nations, including challenging powers like China and Russia, are already moving ahead with partnerships, and developing regulatory environments to attract commercial space actors.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A., Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Wes Brown & Todd May (NASA); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Spire Global Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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[Q6] How do commercial ventures think about the security of their space assets during peacetime, crisis and conflict? Do industry leaders think about warfare in or through space differently than military leaders? What are their main concerns? How reliant are they on governments for warning or protection of space? What are their threat priorities?

Author(s): Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors suggest that commercial companies’ understanding of security is fundamentally different than that of military leaders. For both, security concerns reflect their primary interests; however, as their primary interests and goals are divergent, so are their perceptions of security and threat. When synthesizing the contributors’ responses, it becomes apparent that there is a relationship between commercial actors’ key interests, their security concerns and vulnerabilities, and their expectations regarding US government warnings and protection. This relationship is captured in Figure 1 below.

According to the expert contributors, commercial space companies’ key interests are maintaining business operations, continuity of revenue, continuity of growth, and continuity of profitability. Their main concerns, therefore, are any and all actions or conditions that may threaten business operations and revenue and profitability—natural, accidental, or intentional. Furthermore, intentional actions can be the result of commercial sabotage or conflict.

Interests and Threat Perceptions

The contributors indicate that we cannot think of commercial entities in the same way that we think about the national security space (NSS) community. Commercial space companies are primarily motivated by financial success,4 whereas NSS is focused on security matters. Consequently, commercial perceptions of “security” are rooted in the potential of any situation or action (intentional or accidental) to threaten profitability.

Commercial companies are also involved in different activities than governments. They often have international customer bases and, consequently, multiple roles and ties to uphold, many of which differ from those of the government (Bryce Space and Technology). Contributors from Bryce Space and Technology explain how companies often adopt an international perspective because of their global clientele:

Typically, if you’re operating a satellite business, you have an international perspective. So, with respect to the consequences of conflict or pre-conflict activities, those industry leaders are going to interpret them differently and bring different and useful perspectives to the table because they will see how those actions or situations will affect their broad business base, which is a global business base.

As several contributors note,5 commercial space companies are not all the same; they vary in size, in the types of services they provide (i.e., satellite manufacturers, satellite launch companies, etc.), and in the clients to which they provide those services. These three factors, along with commercial companies’ specific activities, shape their vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, in turn, contribute to their individual threat perceptions and security concerns.

Commercial companies’ levels of vulnerability to specific security threats and, consequently, their primary security concerns, vary according to where their assets are located. For example, satellite manufacturers and operators are likely to be most concerned about threats to their assets in space, whereas satellite launch companies are likely to be most concerned about ground-based threats. Vulnerability can also be a function of size. Often, larger commercial companies can more easily afford to provide their own security, whereas smaller companies cannot (Adranos Energetics).

Clientele also affects perceived vulnerability. Many believe that the assets of companies with clients in the national security arena are at relatively greater risk of being targeted than those involved in other types of space ventures.6 Conversely, contributors note that if a company is not involved with national security affairs, the expectation is that adversaries would have no reason to attack or tamper with that company’s assets.7 As a result, as the Harris Corporation contributors note, “commercial owners, operators, and manufacturers supporting purely commercial capabilities are unlikely to really think about potential threats or prioritize investments for self-protection.”

Commercial Companies’ Concept of Security

Some of the experts argue that, while commercial companies are concerned about security in space, they do not think about it primarily in terms of intentional kinetic attack.8 Furthermore, industry leaders generally do not think about space warfare at all,9 because they consider it to be outside of their domain. In contrast, contributors from ViaSat, Inc. state that kinetic attacks are a concern; and one that it takes “considerable moves to deter or eliminate.”10 The ViaSat, Inc. contributors note that their approach to this is to reduce the vulnerability of their network to attack and loss of continuity by “selling to all sides, [which] keeps us neutral or ‘gray,’” and tailoring design techniques to eliminate the possibility of deliberate jamming.

There is consensus among the contributors, however, that the primary concerns of commercial space entities involve the assurance of safe day-to-day business operations,11 including avoidance of natural and accidental threats, spectrum interference, intellectual property (IP) violations, and vulnerabilities in cyber security. They are also focused on their ability to generate revenue, battle competition, and manage space traffic to prevent any sort of interference.12 To reiterate, tracking potential international conflicts is not typically one of a commercial entity’s day-to-day priorities, nor is thinking about protection from an active strike.13 Furthermore, the contributors indicate that if there was a reason to be concerned about security in the military sense, commercial companies assume that the US government would offer protection.

Commercial Companies’ Perception of Risk

As discussed earlier, commercial companies think about risk in terms of loss of profit and commercial advantage rather than national security and defense capabilities.14 Most companies, particularly those that do not have military clientele, do not perceive their assets as being likely targets of military attacks or threats (Kelso). However, they do recognize that all of their assets are vulnerable to some degree at all times, and that in many cases there is not much that they can do to protect themselves.15 Commercial space companies recognize that natural hazards, (especially space debris and space weather), cyberattacks, and physical attacks (including sabotage, RF spectrum interference, and spectrum jamming) could all damage their assets at any moment despite conscious efforts to drastically reduce these risks. However, their solutions to these vulnerabilities generally do not include efforts to harden their assets or build in redundancy (a cost-prohibitive approach for most). Instead, they rely on insurance to offset these risks.

Role of Government: What Do Commercial Companies Expect?

Almost all of the contributors agree that commercial companies maintain an almost complete reliance on the US government for protection and space situational awareness (SSA) data from the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC). Several contributors17 argue that this is because commercial leaders believe that the government is best positioned and equipped to provide security against kinetic or other militarized attack against their space assets. In addition, contributors from Adranos Energetics suggest that governments also have better political and legal standing to offer these protections:

The groups that are in the best position to [regulate and protect assets in space] are governments because they have a greater power to enforce. They have greater incentives among each other, meaning governments have greater incentive to work with other governments than they do with some kind of group located in the US. They also have the resources in this and the desire to enforce it as kind of a public policy manner.

Interestingly, some contributors18 suggest that the government is unaware of the fact that commercial entities expect the US military to protect them in situations of crisis and conflict. If widespread, this lack of communication and common understanding could result in serious government-commercial tensions and vulnerabilities, not only during an intentional attack, but also in response to a natural or accidental space event.

Many of the contributors also mention how inconsistently the government shares data with commercial space entities and how this leads to uncertainty and ambiguity on the commercial side (Jah). Furthermore, some commercial leaders believe that government information is often over-classified, making it difficult for companies to know what is going on in space (Westphal). If governments would provide more information, commercial companies would be able to operate more effectively and be more aware of what is occurring in space.

Despite their dependence on government provision of warnings and protection, some contributors suggest that there is a prevalent mistrust and uncertainty as to whether the government would actually protect companies in a time of crisis or conflict. Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin even suggests that many companies think that the US government would be “ill-equipped” to adequately protect them from harm during a conflict scenario. This has prompted the establishment of a few private organizations that offer alternative sources of protection and security to commercial space companies.19 These organizations are currently few in number, but more are emerging due to the growing recognition of the shortcomings in government support. The contributors stress the need for more transparency20 and communication between the sectors to eliminate some of these misunderstandings, to explain their points of view, and to clarify what commercial companies’ expectations are.

The Bottom Line

The experts are unanimous in their assessment that industry leaders do not think about security in the same way that the military does.21 Commercial contributors argue that this is because they are focused on the health and success of their business ventures (their key interest), while the national security community is more focused on security the case of a conflict or a kinetic attack in space.

Contributors believe that the US government needs to be aware of discrepancy in thinking because the number of commercial space companies and activities are rapidly increasing, as is the probability of natural or manmade threats. Furthermore, as the US government continues to expand its reliance on commercial space capabilities for national security purposes, ensuring that commercial and government actors have a shared understanding of fundamental concepts, such as security, will be critical to avoiding costly misunderstandings and miscommunication.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia, S.p.A. a Subsidiary of OHB, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Anonymous Launch Executive; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Bryce Space and Technology; Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliott Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Michael Gold (Space Systems Loral); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Spire Global, Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University) Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q8] How do key actors in the Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) define their key national interests / regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen by each actor to be the major threats to each interest? Are there any redlines associated with these interests?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, Weston Aviles, Dr. Belinda Bragg, Dr. Larry Kuznar, Nicole Peterson, George Popp, and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This summary explores the national interests and regional objectives of seven key actors (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) in the Asia Pacific region. The interest tables below outline these key national interests and regional objectives for each actor, first identifying the actor’s specific regional interests, then providing a more detailed description of each interest, and finally coding each interest by interest type (national security, economic, international prestige, domestic political, and/or identity). An individual, stand-alone interest table is presented for each actor.

The interest tables were developed using two primary sources of information: 1) insightful written responses from eight Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) subject matter expert contributors, each of which are presented in full in the Subject Matter Expert Response Submission section of this report and are well worth reading in their entirety, and 2) supplemental open source research conducted by the authors. In-text citations are used within the interest tables and expanded reference lists are provided immediately following each interest table.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.