SMA Publications

“Complex Adaptive Systems“

Author | Editor: Lawson, S. (University of Utah); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In his interview with Lt Col David Lyle (US Air Force Academy) on 4 June 2019, Dr. Sean Lawson discusses how complexity might inform SMA’s Future of Global Competition & Conflict study. More specifically, Dr. Lawson argues that although it is important to look back at previous instances of the butterfly effect, butterfly effects are not possible to control because they are merely byproducts of a system’s existence. An inability to control certain butterfly effects, however, does not diminish the importance of expecting and planning for them, as well as developing the ability to react and adapt to changing circumstances. Dr. Lawson also speaks about the OODA Loop (observe, orient, decide, act), highlighting that US decision makers should not abandon it, but they should rethink its application and the way in which they study it. He also warns decision makers that they must maintain their trust in experts in order to avoid a potential negative feedback loop in the midst of an increasingly chaotic world. The interview continues with a discussion about potential factors that could cause a phase change in the current political and economic world order. Dr. Lawson argues that migration and climate change are the two factors that could most likely instigate this change. Dr. Lawson continues by explaining that the stability of the US’s own system is currently in flux, and it is difficult to say whether it can count on its own foundations as the bases of its stability anymore.

‍

“Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities”

Authors | Editors: Allen, G. (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)); Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.); Beckley, M. (Tufts University); Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Bremseth, L.R. (Computer Systems Center Incorporated (CSCI)); Cheng, D. (Heritage Foundation); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Copeland, D. (University of Virginia); DeFranco, J. (George Mason University); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Ehteshami, A. (Durham University); Flynn, D. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)); Forrest, C. (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE)); Giordano, J. (Georgetown University); Gregory, J. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Hinck, R. (Monmouth College); Jiang, M. (Creighton University); Mazarr, M. (RAND); McGlinchey, E. (George Mason University); Nandakumar, G. (Old Dominion University); Roberts, C. (Hunter College, City University of New York (CUNY) / Columbia University); Schurtz, J. (Georgia Tech Research Institute); Sherlock, T. (United States Military Academy, West Point); Spalding, R. (Hudson Institute), Watson, C. (National Defense University); Weitz, R. (Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute); Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology; Georgetown University; University College London; New America); Peterson, N. (NSI, Inc.); Pagano, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Prefaces Provided By: Czerewko, J. (Joint Staff, J39); Babb, J. (US Army Command and General Staff College)

Executive Summary

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-seven experts contributed to this white paper, providing wide-ranging assessments of China’s domestic and international activities in order to assess the future of China and the challenges that these activities may present to US interests. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-four chapters. While this summary presents some of the white paper’s high-level findings, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the experts’ individual contributions, which are worth reading in their entirety.

Understanding Chinese motivations and strategy

There is broad consensus among the white paper contributors that understanding the reasons, motivation, and strategy behind China’s actions is critical. Several of the contributors highlight the motivations behind China’s global activities. For example, one driver of China’s actions is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) belief that it is currently in a state of competition with the US (Cheng). A sense of insecurity about the future (Copeland) and a desire to maintain power also influence CCP behaviors (Copeland; Mazarr; Watson), as does the Party’s belief that information is inseparably linked both to the national interest and to the CCP’s survival (Cheng).

Other contributors focused on Chinese strategy. Internally, the CCP uses humiliation, distrust of the US, and China’s historical grievance to validate its rule and maintain power (Watson). Externally, China has developed a form of “strategic integrated deterrence.” This concept—which goes beyond military capabilities to incorporate political, diplomatic, economic, information, psychological, and scientific/technical capabilities—is designed to “deter and compel the US prior to and after the outbreak of hostilities” (Flynn). Given the criticality of information to regime survival, the CCP deems it necessary not only to control and influence information flow into China, but also to shape and mold the international structures that manage this flow (Cheng). Similarly, the CCP recognizes the importance of data—particularly for social control. The Party seeks to embed its model of social control into the technological matrix built and powered by Western tech companies, according to Dr. Robert Spalding III. It also seeks to expand and guide the development of tech-based businesses and social models in the future, and in order to do so, the CCP may recognize the benefits of adopting a more open system.

China and technological innovation

Several contributors indicate that China is well-positioned to become a world leader in science and technology research and development (S/T R&D), blockchain technology, and artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Dr. James Giordano, CAPT (ret) L. R. Bremseth, and Mr. Joseph DeFranco indicate that China is making significant investments in international scientific, biomedical, and technological markets for strategic purposes. Moreover, China intends to align its S/T R&D with explicit national directives and agendas to exercise its global hegemony and could leverage its S/T to disrupt global balances of order and power (Giordano, Bremseth, & DeFranco). China is also aiming to dominate the finacial technology (fintech) sector. Several Chinese companies possess digital payment systems that have major competitive advantages in the form of scale and proprietary technologies (Nandakumar). These companies could easily become market leaders if blockchain-based financial systems become the norm, and blockchains can also be used by the CCP for strategic purposes. Lastly, according to Mr. Gregory Allen, the CCP believes that AI is a “strategic technology” that will play a critical role in the future of economic and military power. Allen suggests that AI has the potential to start an “intelligentized” military technological revolution, which could give China the opportunity to narrow its military gap with the US. Consequently, China will only continue to seek leadership and make even greater use of its AI strength.

Another contributor, Mr. John Schurtz, argues that China is becoming a world leader in technology and military innovation as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes the importance of leading military innovation, and as a result, it has become poised to challenge the world’s most advanced militaries in the production of next generation high technology weapon systems. China will only continue to pursue ambitious innovation objectives in these areas, as is evidenced by its ‘Military-Civilian Fusion’ (MCF) development efforts.

Digital authoritarianism and Chinese regime durability

In this white paper, Dr. Nicholas D. Wright critically examines the relationship between digital authoritarianism and the durability of the Chinese regime. Although digitization may have negative effects on the durability of the Chinese regime, Dr. Wright argues that it can also strengthen the regime’s durability in the short- to medium-term by providing a plausible route for ongoing regime control while also making Chinese citizens wealthy. In addition, China’s development of a digital authoritarian regime enables its influence over other states in a competition for global influence, both through ideas and the exportation of digital systems (Wright). However, if China’s model is not broadly appealing to swing states, China may not be able to solidify its influence over these countries’ regimes and will ultimately lose this competition for influence. The future evolution of AI technology and the way in which liberal democracies adapt to becoming digital political regimes are also factors that could impact the situation (Wright).

Chinese global influence

China aspires to achieve global power status and challenge the US by extending its influence and strengthening its relationships with regions such as Europe; Eurasia; Central, West, and South Asia; and Latin America. One way in which China is aiming to increase its global influence is by increasing its economic footprint in these regions, as is evidenced by China’s expansion of trade and investments via its Belt and Road Initiative (Ehteshami & Weitz). China wants to secure access to valuable resources and create an “economic web” for its own benefit (Ehteshami, Watson, & Weitz). If these countries become economically dependent on trade with China, Beijing could use these dependencies to its advantage by using economic pressure to gain political compliance and/or undermine alliances with the US, as China did with South Korea and US deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg).

Some regions, such as Central Asia, have reacted to Chinese influence activities with hesitation and skepticism (McGlinchey). Other regions, such as Latin America (Watson), have welcomed China’s increasing engagement and have increasingly turned to China, rather than the US, to fulfill their economic needs. European states benefit significantly from access to Chinese markets for exports and have thus welcomed Chinese economic engagement opportunities as well, despite disapproval of enforced technology-transfer by domestic European companies seeking to operate in China, international property theft, and human rights abuses by Chinese companies (Dorondo).

Another outcome of increasing Chinese influence across these regions is that pre-existing US alliances with regional states are subject to increased pressure from China. Modern US alliances across the globe, and with European nations in particular, have enabled a a high level of US prosperity and security; conversely, weakening of these relationships could lead to potential US vulnerabilities (Dorondo). The diminishment of US relations with states in the referenced regions could result in economic troubles and/or a loss of regional influence, for instance. The US has the ability to counter these Chinese global outreach activities and prevent reliance on trade with China by strengthening its own relationships with these countries and using Chinese regional shortcomings to its advantage.

Despite Chinese global influence activities that present challenges to US interests and the current global order, the US must recognize that Chinese “future elites” (e.g., students from the top universities in China) still generally respect and admire American values and institutions (Gregory & Sherlock). Thus, despite the critical narratives being propagated by the Chinese regime and the competitive nature between the US and China, a significant portion of the Chinese population still views the US in a positive light, and not as an enemy.

The future of US-China competition

The future of global competition between the US and China will be centered around economic development and technological innovation (Hinck & Cooley). Dr. Michael Beckley presents a critical perspective of China’s economic growth, arguing that it is not as impressive as it appears, and that China faces several significant restraints that prevent it from closing the wealth gap with the US. However, China will try to continue to make economic strides in an effort to catch up to the US. Prof. Cynthia Roberts cautions that, despite the importance and usefulness of international financial instruments, the US should refrain from overusing such instruments. US decision makers must consider the consequences of weaponizing finance or imposing economic costs on its opponents. Such actions could result in consequences such as countries looking to diversify to currencies other than the US dollar, like the renminbi (RMB) or digital currencies, which over time could significantly reduce US leverage and give others, including China, greater freedom to maneuver.

Managing the challenges that China presents

The US and China are competing to shape the foundational global paradigm—the ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics (Mazarr). This competition ultimately revolves around norms, narratives, and legitimacy. The CCP has tethered its legitimacy to achieving the goals of the China Dream proposed by Xi Jinping, which include economic success, increasing Chinese influence, and defending national territories (Astorino-Courtois & Bragg). Both internally and externally, it is critical for China to highlight its successes and portray itself in a positive manner in order to make the China Dream a reality. In its attempts to achieve these goals and shape the global paradigm, China is pursuing ambitious economic endeavors, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s power is also growing in the form of its military buildup, as is evident through its increased pressure on Taiwan, its limited war with Vietnam, and its conflict with India over disputed territory (Mazarr). The challenges that China presents threaten US interests and the current world order, and therefore, it is imperative that the US successfully and carefully mitigates these challenges.

Several contributors also provide recommendations for US decision makers, namely that they must acknowledge the extent to which the US is already in competition with China and recognize the range of actions that China is taking; they must also begin to counter these actions by engaging in hard bargaining, drawing clear redlines, and remaining cautious to not provoke unwanted Chinese behaviors (Cheng). One white paper contributor, Dr. Maorong Jiang, suggests that the US might need a new strategy, utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach in order to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Additionally, Lt. Col. Christopher D. Forrest asserts that competing in the gray zone will be an integral part of this competition, where the US must focus its time, energy, and resources. In order to effectively counter ongoing Chinese gray zone actions, the US will likely need to make some cultural and organizational changes and adapt a different lens through which to view US capability development and operations (Forrest).

‍

Venezuela Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Venezuela were analyzed: 2006 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2014 Venezuelan Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) data on income by occupational category.

Results

Income data provided by the World Bank (2006) and occupational data from ENCOVI (2014), shows a Venezuelan population that is extremely risk acceptant with a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -7.15, the second highest in the world.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

Venezuela’s lowest and highest socioeconomic classes are extremely risk acceptant. The Venezuelan political and economic crisis is causing a shortage of living essentials for most of its population (Garcia- Navarro, 2016). How most of its population lives is in stark contrast to those working in the petroleum industries, or political elites who enjoy a high quality of living from low-priced goods and luxury items purchased from the black market.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has strong security interests in Venezuela but has little direct influence over what occurs in the country while President Maduro remains in power (Neghaiwi, 2019). Instead, the United States relies on economic sanctions to place political pressure on President Maduro in the hopes of seeing him removed from office. The US supports the opposition leader Juan Guaido’s claim to the presidency. While President Maduro retains his power, the US must rely on Switzerland, which has been acting as a conduit between the US and President Maduro, to represent US interests. The extremely risk acceptant segments of Venezuelan society indicate that turmoil will continue between aggrieved constituencies supportive of Maduro and Guaido and across socioeconomic classes.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has sunk billions of dollars into Venezuela in the form of financial aid (Rendon, 2018). If President Maduro retains his power, China will retain a tremendous ally in Latin America that it will be able to control through debt (Sigalos, 2019). However, if President Maduro is replaced by Guaido, then China stands to lose much of the money it has loaned Venezuela as well as access to cheap oil. The continued turmoil presents a dynamic situation from which China may either benefit if Maduro retains power or lose of Guaido prevails.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has invested money and military personnel in Venezuela on a smaller scale than China, however its desired end is also to see President Maduro retain his power (Sigalos, 2019). Russia’s interaction with Latin America is partially driven in response to the US and NATO activity in the Balkans and former Soviet republics. Sigalos also states that this is a part of a larger economic strategy that is contingent on Russia growing its markets outside of countries in the European, Union including investments in Venezuela’s petroleum industry (Lowe & Sagdiev, 2019). To both of these ends, if President Maduro secures his presidency, then Russia will gain an important political ally in the region and access to cheap petroleum. As with China, Russia’s interests hang in the balance while a highly divided, discontented and risky accepting population supports their political rivals.

‍

Statistical Modeling of Risk and Political Instability in the Influence Environment – An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Authors | Editors: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.); Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Success in the global competition between the US, China, and Russia may be determined by a country’s ability to influence the world’s populations. A population’s aspirations and grievances can drive national security problems for all three powers when frustrated aspirations and grievances lead to state instability, terrorism, or other challenges such as unwanted or unmanaged migration. In accordance with the questions posed in the J39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Great Power Competition tasking, this study is intended to address the following issues through the use of country-level global statistical modeling, including identifying or anticipating:

• Where aggrieved populations are likely to exist globally and how they may be operationalized against US interests.
• The effects of global climate change on state stability.
• The forms of instability that may challenge US interests (political instability, autocratic regimes, violent extremism, adversarial proxies).
• The causes and effects of mass migration.

Previous academic research was used as the starting point for this study, and it was challenged to approximate the data challenges of intelligence analysis as well as to re-test earlier findings and update models by considering new and potentially relevant variables. Three statistical models (political stability, terrorism, and migration) were developed under these conditions to address the J39 questions. The key findings were:

• Political instability is driven by hunger, risk acceptant elites, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, weak democracy, mountainous terrain, economic isolation, and ethnic division.
• Terrorism is fueled by large populations, ties to MENA oil producers, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, economic isolation, and a risk acceptant middle class.
• Migration from undeveloped countries is driven by hunger, a youth bulge, homicide and political oppression, and
• Migration to developed countries is driven by permissive immigration policies and the attraction of national wealth.

‍

Inequality, Risk Sensitivity, and Grievance in Context – An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Authors | Editors: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.); Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.); Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Success in the global competition between the US, China, and Russia may be determined by a country’s ability to influence the world’s populations. A population’s aspirations and grievances can drive national security problems for all three powers when frustrated aspirations and grievances lead to state instability, terrorism, or other challenges such as unwanted or unmanaged migration. In accordance with the questions posed in the J39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Great Power Competition tasking, this report summarizes context-specific qualitative and quantitative analyses of the conditions impacting population aspirations and grievances for 25 countries, and how these impact US, Chinese, and Russian interests. Issues include:

• Identifying where aggrieved populations are likely to exist globally and how they may be operationalized against US interests
• Anticipating the effects of global climate change on state stability
• Identifying the forms of instability that may challenge US interests (political instability, autocratic regimes, violent extremism, adversarial proxies)
• Identifying the causes and effects of mass migration
• Understanding Chinese interests and strategies in specific countries and their impacts on US interests
• Understanding Russian interests and strategies in specific countries and their impacts on US interests

Six broad patterns in inequality, risk sensitivity, and social disruption emerged from these analyses.

• Baselines. Two countries were used to baseline all other comparisons.
  • Finland—The world’s most stable society is also one of the world’s most egalitarian and therefore least acceptant of risk. The population also is homogenous, lacks a history of feudal inequality, and has a high level of education. The Finnish population’s lack of risk acceptance and high level of education appear to have inoculated its population against Russian attempts at disruption through social media.
  • The United States—The US was chosen as a baseline because of its familiarity to the researchers and intended audience of this report. The US has a highly risk acceptant population increasingly divided along class, race, and rural/urban divides. Furthermore, much of the middle class is experiencing loss aversion due to losses suffered in the Great Recession of 2009, which have not been regained. Adversaries have effectively used this risk acceptance to sow discord through social media.
• Risk Acceptant Populations—Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and Venezuela have populations that are entirely or mostly risk acceptant
  • The primary effect of widespread risk acceptance is extremely high homicide rates, confirming research that demonstrates a connection between inequality and homicide.
  • In Nigeria and Venezuela, inequality between ethnic groups and/or classes has given rise to extremely disruptive protests, rebellions, and terrorism. Social unrest in Nigeria threatens oil production, investments, and the political stability of Africa’s most populous country, which all great powers desire. Social unrest in Venezuela threatens Russian and Chinese investments in propping up an adversarial government to the US.
  • Honduran and Mexican inequality and risk acceptance has fueled illegal migration and created disruption at the US border and further division among the US population.
  • Widespread risk acceptance in China has caused little disruption because of the state’s ability to suppress dissent, and to sustain growth that provides opportunities for a population hungry for advancement. However, protests in Hong Kong and Xinjiang are symptoms that when wealthy Chinese feel threatened (Hong Kong) or minorities (Uighurs in Xinjiang) perceive unfair gains for Han Chinese, the state will be challenged. A key to China’s mitigation of the risk acceptance of its population is to sustain a high rate of growth, which the Chinese economy may not be able to do in the future.
• Loss Averse Populations—A number of the countries in the sample are experiencing real or perceived economic losses, leading to loss aversion, risk taking, and unrest.
  • European countries in this sample (Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Serbia, United Kingdom) largely experienced either real or perceived losses and threats to their livelihoods and cultures from immigration, placing their populations into highly risk acceptant, loss averse, frames. This has manifest in challenges to their political status quo (Brexit) and the rise of right-wing challenges to their governments. Russia has exploited the situation to weaken European governments, the integrity of the European Union, and NATO.
  • Dramatic losses in status by working class Pakistanis fueled the rise of maverick populist Prime Minister Imran Khan.
  • Real and sustained economic losses in the Venezuelan economy have contributed to unrest.
  • Losses from a softening oil market and US sanctions are exacerbating upper-class risk acceptance and rural/urban differences, although the Iranian government’s ability to suppress dissent will probably contain any serious challenge to the government.
• Agrarian Populations—Agrarian societies are characterized by extreme levels of inequality and consequently, risk acceptance. This was especially the case in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Most of these countries are also distinguished by sharp ethnic divides in access to wealth and opportunity, and all of them have a distinct impoverished rural vs. relatively wealthy urban divide. These divisions and inequalities create highly risk acceptant populations with grievances against other ethnic groups and urban elites, fueling social unrest in many forms including ethnic conflict, rebellion against the government, and terrorism.
• Typical Populations—A typical society has an impoverished, risk acceptant class of poor, a distinct and risk averse middle class, and a highly risk acceptant elite. India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Serbia, and South Korea have such a typical profile.
  • In the cases of Japan and South Korea, low inequality in relation to other countries has supported social stability, although there has been a shift toward a more nationalistic government in Japan.
  • India and Indonesia have so far been able to mitigate degrees of risk acceptance in some segments of their populations through continued economic growth. However, their agrarian and rural/urban divides and their ethnic diversity pose a challenge to stability.
  • Russia’s and Serbia’s communist past has left a legacy of relative equality compared to most countries, despite the rapid growth of their economies since the fall of the Soviet Union and a continued concentration of wealth among oligarchs. For now, indications are that Russians and Serbs are not risk acceptant enough to pose a serious challenge to their governments.
• North Korea—There is probably no more unequal country than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Virtually all wealth is concentrated in an extremely small cadre at the very top of society. Furthermore, the Kim regime punishes all dissent extremely harshly and effectively. This provides common North Koreans, who are struggling to survive, with virtually no incentive to rebel or to take any risky course of action such as escape through immigration. They are predicted to be risk averse. In contrast, the fight for the spoils among the elite is expected to generate intense competition and challenges at the top. There is some evidence that challenges have occurred. However, the Kim family has so far punished any challenge, even from close relatives, extremely harshly, effectively quashing any dissent. The DPRK is a truly unique case.

‍

United Kingdom Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in United Kingdom were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2017 and 2011.

Results

Income data form the World Bank and occupational data from ILO indicate that the United Kingdom is highly risk acceptant. Despite this similarity, the relationship between wealth attainment and risk acceptance between the two sources is different. The World Bank data indicates a country in which the individuals who make the highest incomes are the least risk averse. while the data from ILO shows a positive relationship between the average income for an occupation and an increase in risk aversion.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

The United Kingdom’s propensity for risk taking can be currently observed through the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, which is planned to take place later in 2019 (BBC, 2019). However, the impact Brexit will have on stability and the UK and its institutions is still unknown as it has been delayed repeatedly.

Implications for US Interests

The United States has an important relationship with the United Kingdom as it has been a long time ideological and political ally against autocratic states including Russia. The US also holds the UK as a strategically important player due to its current position in the EU (Belin, 2019). The United Kingdom has been a US ally in its activities outside of Europe against Chinese encroachment into the South China Sea. Despite this, economic changes from the UK leaving the EU will occur within the next year, challenging the US-UK relationship. The scope and impact of these changes has yet to be understood. The economic changes that will occur have far reaching implications because of the large trade between the US and UK (United States Trade Representatives, 2019). Much more important than their trade relationship is their political partnership, both strategically with respect to security/coalition issues and with respect to soft power (Belin, 2019). The UK’s risk acceptant population is a risk to the US interests because this population has chosen disruptive political and economic changes that may destabilize the country.

Implications for China’s Interests

China sees a post-EU United Kingdom as a potential economic partner. The UK’s planned exit from the EU has led to Chinese economic overtures, suggesting a potential free-trade deal and the connection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to London (Johnson, 2019). China and the UK have little political differences with one other than the UK’s joint military operations with the US (Kelly, 2019). Despite the UK’s close ties to the US, its risk acceptant population gives China an opportunity to increase its standings politically and economically as it looks to extend its BRI to London (Johnson, 2019).

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Russia has little direct influence within the United Kingdom. Other than their historic ties as two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the two countries are fundamentally at odds with each other on an ideological level (House of Commons, 2017). While the upcoming Brexit may offer the opportunity to soften Russian-UK relations, it is unlikely to cause wide ranging or deep changes. Despite the unlikelihood of changes in Russia and the UK’s relationship the UK’s risk acceptant population provides Russia an opportunity, as Brexit will weaken the UK’s connection to the EU.

‍

[Q15] What insight on current space operations can we gain from understanding the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings before the advent of the space age?

Author(s): George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 13 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

Approaches to Military Capabilities Before the Advent of the Space Age

Since long before the space age, capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings have been critical core- competencies of powerful nations. With the emergence of the space age, these capabilities expanded exponentially, both in power and precision, as well as importance to national security and defense objectives. While pre-space age approaches serve as the foundation for current approaches to these capabilities, space-based manifestations have brought clear advancements and new vulnerabilities with them. In response to these new challenges, both scholars and practitioners have started to look back to pre-space age approaches to uncover insights and lessons learned from older methods that might be used to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities in present-day systems.

Navigation, Positioning, and Timing

Before the advent of the space age, approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities consisted largely of “looking to the stars” (Sampigethaya; Samson). This, Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya of United Technologies Research Center explains, entailed “performing geometry-based calculations based on celestial bodies and their alignment with respect to the visible horizon on Earth to compute a current position, in terms of latitude and longitude, on Earth.” Today, navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities are founded in a GPS-based approach. This modern GPS-based approach has distinct advantages over pre-space age celestial navigation, according to Sampigethaya: “it provides altitude and timing data; is more scalable, accurate, and granular; and no human intervention is needed for position computing.” On the other hand, GPS-based navigation, positioning, and timing is prone to security vulnerabilities that pre-space age celestial navigation-based approaches were not. Such security challenges include the ability for potential attackers to directly target GPS satellites; to observe, disrupt, and jam GPS signals and data; and to exploit ground-based GPS systems. Despite these present-day challenges, the assertion from Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation, that “obviously the use of stars for navigation is not as predictable as our current navigation capabilities stemming from space,” illustrates how far the approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities have advanced.

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Indications and Warnings

Like the approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities, approaches to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings capabilities have advanced with the emergence of the space age. Modern satellite-based approaches to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings have emerged as superior to the pre-space age approaches, which largely relied on air- and ground-based sensors.6 Satellites, Sampigethaya explains, make surface-to-air systems more robust, allowing for unmanned operation, greater accuracy and stealth, and instantaneous communication between air and ground systems. Moreover, Samson suggests, satellite-based systems have marginalized some of the capability limitations stemming from overflight and airspace sovereignty constraints that hamper air- and ground-based approaches. The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers an example of what Sampigethaya describes as a “hybrid” approach, combining elements of the pre-space age air-based approach with modern satellites to produce enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings: UAVs are “controlled by human pilots, more cost- effective, adaptive, and accurate, but rel[y] on satellites for navigation, timing, and communications.” The contributors did not specifically mention any vulnerabilities that emerge from the modern satellite- based approach to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings capabilities, but there is no reason to believe that satellites are immune to the same security challenges (e.g., adversarial targeting, observation, disruption, jamming, and exploitation) that can limit the space-based approaches to navigation, positioning, and timing capabilities.

Insight on Current Space Operations

The emergence of the space age has propelled advancements in surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities, both in implementation and output. Pre-space age approaches to these capabilities have not been entirely forgotten, however, and in some cases these foundational approaches are still applied, albeit typically to a lesser extent than in the past. Together, the contributors’ reflections on the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities before and after the advent of the space age suggest four general insights.

• Controlling the “high ground” is still important.
• Space domain advancements can and should be capitalized on to maximize military effectiveness.
• There are risks and vulnerabilities associated with being too dependent on space-based approaches and capabilities.
• More efficient and effective space systems and processes are needed.

Controlling the High Ground

The military significance of controlling the high ground has persisted across the spectrum of time, both before and after the advent of the space age. With the emergence of the space age, however, its location has changed: Outer space has become the new high ground.

Surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities are all influenced by the high ground. While simply possessing or using these capabilities does not require control of the high ground, if the goal is to achieve capability dominance and superiority, controlling the high ground can be fundamental. Contributors from Harris Corporation reflect that before the emergence of the space age, superiority in capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings was largely dependent on “controlling the high ground, initially terrestrially and later in the air,” and ensuring “line of sight.” They emphasize the wide-ranging importance of controlling space as the new high ground:

As the new ‘high ground,’ and medium through which an increasing percentage of our communications flows, controlling space will be critical...Controlling the high ground is critical to surveillance, reconnaissance, and indications and warnings, making space situational awareness and space superiority absolutely critical to these functions. Space also offers another path in support of redundant, robust, and protected lines of communications in support of command and control, navigation, and timing.

Thus, the Harris Corporation contributors conclude that, “whoever can achieve the highest [ground] will always have the best space situational awareness. Whoever has the best space situational awareness has a military advantage in very simplistic terms over the adversary.”

Maximizing Military Effectiveness

The importance of capitalizing on space domain operations, and the enhanced military capabilities space systems offer, in order to maximize overall military effectiveness is an insight that several contributors echo.7 In considering the lessons that can be gleaned from pre-space age approaches to military capabilities, Dr. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute reflects on the approaches to military conflict of the past. He describes a time in which warfare was “a blunt and imprecise affair” that focused on “brute force application” and “the use of attrition in battle.” This is a stark contrast to the “modern information-age” approach to warfare that has emerged since the advent of the space age. Davis’ reflection on the pre-space age approach to military conflict reveals a key insight on current space operations.

The clearest and most important aspects we [can] take from pre-space age operations is an understanding that space opens up a much greater ability to understand the battlespace, control forces, and apply precision effect against an opponent in both time and space in a manner that maximizes military effectiveness.

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK also highlights the importance of capitalizing on space-based capabilities for overall military effectiveness, stressing the importance of increasing resilience and enhancing alternate capabilities. The best approach for achieving success in this sense, he suggests, is to “normalize the use of space in military operations.” Contributors from Harris Corporation express similar thinking, and point to approaches to military capabilities in the air domain as a particularly relevant model. They argue that, “the space domain is no different than the air domain when it comes to the key mission areas. We talk about space superiority, offensive space control, defensive space control. We need to talk about offensive and defensive counter-space, suppression of enemy space defenses, and space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”

Avoiding Over-Dependence on Space

While the emergence of space-enabled capabilities has driven significant advancement in military capabilities, several contributors8 caution against relying entirely on space-based approaches for military capabilities. Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen of Air University most adamantly raises this caution, arguing that military operations and capabilities “should not be wholly dependent upon information or activity from a global commons” such as space.9 His caution stems from concerns relating to ensuring the security and credibility of military capabilities and operations. Military capabilities, he believes, are “most credible and secure when founded in sovereign territory, airspace, or waters, or when the capabilities are encompassed completely within the design of the weapons system itself.”

To illustrate this point, as well as the feasibility of non-space approaches, Cullen points to US inter- continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, which he describes as the “most credible deterrent to date against threats of sovereignty by near-peer adversaries because their navigation systems are completely self-contained” (i.e., US ICBM capabilities are not dependent upon information originating from outside of the US or allied territory). ICBMs, he explains, were initially designed to hit far-ranging targets without the support of space-based timing or navigation capabilities. Moreover, the non-space- based technologies and capabilities that support ICBMs have only improved and become more affordable in the time since the initial development of the ICBM.

Ultimately, Cullen is clear in his assertion that more secure and credible non-space approach alternatives exist and should be considered. Further solidifying his argument that approaches to military operations and capabilities should not, and do not have to, be entirely dependent on space, he posits that “terrestrial and airborne approaches may remain more financially efficient and as adaptable and responsive as less capable legacy weapon systems for generations to come.”

Developing Efficient and Effective Systems and Processes

Several contributors10 suggest that surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities would benefit from more efficient and effective systems and processes. Contributors identify three areas that need improvement: integrating space operations and programs, overcoming innovation-stifling bureaucratic processes, and enhancing of space capability systems.

Integrating Space Operations and Programs

Dr. John Karpiscak III of the United States Army Geospatial Center and contributors from Harris Corporation highlight the need for improved integration of space operations and programs. Harris Corporation contributors describe US space programs as being too stove-piped and devoid of synergy. Notably, this is not the case in other domains, they explain, as the US has “been able to unlock the synergies across all the services and mission areas with a joint force” on the land, on the sea, and in the air. In the space domain, however, US space programs and operations are overly compartmentalized. This lack of synergy has clear consequences, they stress, because “to be truly effective in any domain requires all of our capabilities within that domain to understand each other’s mission areas and leverage them in support of their own mission areas. Until we can do that, we take on more risk and we will not be as effective as we could be going forward.” Karpiscak III similarly highlights the need for improved integration of US space programs and operations, arguing that “what we really need is a change in mindset on being able to integrate all of these things. It’s not just one thing—we need to be able to integrate all of them.”

Overcoming Bureaucracy

Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and Karpiscak III highlight the need for more efficient and effective approaches to bureaucracy. Karpiscak III identifies government bureaucracy, and the glacial pace of progress that deep-rooted bureaucracy causes, as a clear problem. Bureaucracy, he explains, “creates an incremental, slow to change culture due either to an inability, or perhaps even unwillingness, of the decision makers to understand how to properly exploit the technology, and the cost and imposed acquisition limitations by federal acquisition regulations, US policy, etc.”

Berkowitz comments on the bureaucratic sources of the shortcomings of US space indications and warnings systems. He points to a lack of direction and coordination between USG and DoD agencies as the crux of the problem: “There is no clear delineation of authorities and responsibilities among US intelligence agencies to provide operations intelligence support for space indications and warnings. Nor are there adequate human and technical resources allocated for such support.” To begin overcoming these institutional deficiencies, he suggests that “the US national security establishment could gain some understanding by going back to pre-space age basics for the creation of an effective space indications and warnings system.”

Improving Space Capability Systems

Contributors from ViaSat, Inc. reflect on potential improvements to capability systems and approaches, focusing on satellite communication systems in particular. They posit a more robust approach, one in which “a multi-layered satellite architecture is available to deliver capability to users, agnostic of satellite, when needed.” Highlighting the upside of this approach, they explain that “purpose-built satellites are valuable for specific missions but the failure to take advantage of other systems can create gaps and seams. The [US] government can [instead] adopt an approach with satellite communication...in which the best available system is employed to meet mission requirements.”

Conclusion

With the emergence of the space age, capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings have expanded exponentially, both in power and precision, as well as importance to national security and defense objectives. Pre- space age approaches provide the foundation for current approaches to these capabilities. Space-based manifestations have brought both clear advancements and new vulnerabilities with them.

The expert contributors to this report reflect on the approaches used for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications and warnings capabilities before and after the advent of the space age. This reflection ultimately uncovers four general insights on current space operations.

• Controlling the “high ground” is still important.
• Space domain advancements can and should be capitalized on to maximize military effectiveness.
• There are risks and vulnerabilities associated with being too dependent on space-based approaches and capabilities.
• More efficient and effective space systems and processes are needed.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant General (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen3 (Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q17] As we move into multi-domain conflicts will our success hinge on being successful in every domain or can we lose in one and still be successful in the overall campaign? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Contributors were varied in their responses, with approximately half of the subject matter experts replying to this question with a variation of “it depends.” In other words, campaign success in a multi- domain conflict (MDC) is not solely a question of US need to dominate in all domains (or not), but instead is contingent on contextual factors that are likely to vary from one conflict to the next. Broadly, these can be grouped into the following categories, which can be examined individually or in concert: a) aspects of the conflict, b) aspects of the adversary, and c) aspects of the domain (Berkowitz; Cheng; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Karpiscak; Steer). Figure 1 presents a set of guiding questions derived from contributor inputs, which address these categories and demonstrate the range of considerations when engaging in a multi-domain conflict.

Contributor responses as a whole focused on only one of these contextual factors—aspects of the domain. Specifically, expert discussions often emphasized the degree of domain interdependence. Multiple experts implied that space in particular is a crucial domain without which the US currently cannot “win” in any serious conflict (Cheng; Garretson; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Steer; Weeks).5 A loss or extreme degradation in the space domain is likely to significantly affect capability in other domains (though the opposite does not necessarily hold true, with the exception of cyber). At the same time, absolute dominance in space is not required6 in order to maintain some degree of capability in other domains.

Within the context of this broader discussion of domain interdependence emerged a more concrete articulation of whether US campaign success in a multi-domain conflict necessarily hinges on success in every domain. The picture that emerged was that the US can lose in one domain—even if that domain is space—and yet succeed overall. However, this statement comes with important caveats. While the US can lose space dominance and prevail, given the degree of domain interdependence, the US cannot lose its entire capability in space and still prevail. The US must retain the ability to maneuver throughout space and other domains. However, continuing to operate (or “succeed”) in the face of partial degradation of space capabilities will come at a high cost (e.g., in national treasure or human capital) (Harris Corporation).

In order to continue fighting and ultimately suceed, the US will need to become more agile overall. (See Figure 2 for a graphic summary of the factors affecting MDC campaign success and the need for increased US agility.) This agility includes ensuring that there are appropriately robust plans and infrastructure in place to enable continued operation, whether conditions are ideal or suboptimal (e.g., domain degradation). As such, the “answer” to this question can be reformulated as follows: Success is not required in every domain, as long as the US becomes and remains agile.

Several options were in turn derived from the expert inputs for how the US might increase its agility.

Space is Different Than Other Domains and Critical to Campaign Success

The experts indicated that campaign success will depend in part on aspects of the domain(s) being invoked. These include whether any one domain is essential for the proper functioning of the others, as well as the more general interplay between and among the domains in a given multi-domain conflict. The ViaSat team underscored this interdependence, noting that:

Space systems that deliver communications, Earth observation, position/navigation/timing, missile warning, weather, etc. do not exist exclusively in space. Their delivery platforms, or infrastructure, exist in all domains including land, sea, air, space, and cyber. Thus, a network infrastructure loss in any of these domains equates to a loss in providing service or delivery to their customers that operate in the land, sea, air, space, [and cyber] domains. The inability to defend and protect systems in all domains leads to loss of service or operational capability in the operational domains of land, sea, air, space, [and cyber] (Follow-Up Communication, January 25, 2018).

However, the specific effects of dominance or loss of dominance within different domains may vary. As Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation postulates:

“dominance in different domains will have different effects. For example, losing dominance in Domain A may or may not be as bad as losing dominance in Domain B. Where you start having more problematic issues is the synergies: If I have a 30% reduction in Domain A, does that mean I’m more likely to lose all ability in Domain B?”

A theme that emerged consistently from contributor inputs is that the cross-cutting nature of space makes it fundamentally different from other domains such as maritime or land. As Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada indicated, “space is…utilized in a unique way compared to all other domains” because it (as well as cyber) is an enabler to other domains, without which those domains could not function optimally (see Garretson; Harris Corporation; Steer). In the same vein, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the USAF Air Command and Staff College argued that, given the US dependency on space for terrestrial command-and-control and targeting, losing space (or cyber) services would result in degradation spanning the entire joint force.8 The Harris Corporation also emphasized this point, and added that, not only would the loss of space make successful military campaigns difficult or impossible, but that if a US victory were to occur, it would come at a much higher cost than it would have if space assets had been available. Taking a global perspective, Gilmour Space Technologies added that there would also be significant weakness in other defense forces if the allied countries were to lose space communication capability in a future conflict. Cheng most powerfully illustrates the danger of current US dependence on space, by noting that:

“it will have more far-reaching effects in both the military and civilian realms if we lose space because we are not as aware of how permeating space is…. We are de facto beyond dependent on space…we are 5-year heroin addicts mainlining every couple of hours on space without realizing it.”

The Importance of Increasing US Agility

A conventional understanding of campaign success might emphasize overall US dominance. While the goal of campaign success in a multi-domain conflict might best be served by achieving dominance across all domains, as multiple experts (Armor; Berkowitz; Harris Corporation; Sampigethaya; Steer) implied, it may not be strictly necessary for the US to dominate in all domains in order to remain successful in the campaign. Instead, as Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK emphasized, the US might aim to “preserv[e] options across all domains.” Moreover, several contributors suggested that achieving, and especially maintaining, multi-domain dominance in every campaign is improbable, and thus an inadvisable goal. These contributors made the point that the US needs to be prepared for the fact that it may not be possible to succeed in every domain all of the time. The US may not always have the “home field advantage,” and thus needs to be prepared to think about trade-offs9 among domains (Hitchens; Karpiscak; ViaSat, Inc.). At the same time, the domains are highly interdependent, and each domain is highly dependent on space, which implies a potential US vulnerability that must be resolved.

Together, these points converge around the need for the US to increase its overall agility, whether aiming to “preserve options” or “think about trade-offs,” in order to achieve campaign success. It may be sufficient for the US to retain the ability to maneuver throughout the various domains, in order to “deliver the desired effects at a time and place of our choosing” (Harris Corporation). Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin10 added precision to this line of reasoning by acknowledging that dominance in all domains should not be a prerequisite for victory if the US can offset disadvantages in one domain with advantages in another. However, he offered an important caveat that, “it is difficult to conceive how the US could achieve victory or terminate conflict on favorable terms if it cannot seize and maintain at least ‘working control’ (as opposed to absolute command) of the space, air, and maritime domains.”

Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya of the United Technologies Research Center similarly emphasized the ability of the US to continue fighting in the face of attacks, rather than the necessity of defeating attacks in all domains. He offered as an example a UAV conducting reconnaissance. If a UAV relies solely on satellites for navigation, timing, and communications, it may contribute to mission failure if space is attacked. In contrast, a UAV that can fall back on other domains in the case of a space attack can continue to operate and complete the mission. Dr. Steer made a different but compatible point, noting that success in the space domain may entail preventing escalation, even if this means loss in another domain. Moreover, she argued that the waging or winning of an armed conflict in space may not be necessary to ensure the successful use of that domain to enhance other domains.

However, even partial loss of space capability could mean losing total effective capability in a second domain, and/or degradation in the space domain can have follow-on effects in other domains if those systems are not sufficiently resilient. As one example, Steer noted that, “the US [currently] lacks sufficient redundancy in many of its terrestrial systems to deal with a loss of satellite services.” Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland made a similar point, indicating that the US generally has not secured Plan(s) B to reduce space system reliance, as “protection and resiliency aren’t sexy; they aren’t ‘pointy edges’ that get funding.” She elaborated that, “We have to be prepared to have various domains suppressed or even rendered unusable for a specific conflict…including space.” Doing so would enable the US to continue fighting in the face of adversary attacks.

The current gap in preparation leaves the US with a core vulnerability. The challenge of 21st century US defense thus points to the importance of enhancing US agility, including an emphasis on building resilience into new and legacy systems and developing and exercising contingency plans—“Plans B”—to enable the US to withstand suppression or loss of capabilities in space or any other domain.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Group Captain (Indian Air Force, ret.) Ajey Lele3 (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security- Canada); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

Given the current distribution of actor interests, capabilities and resolve (I-R-C), North Korean denuclearization is highly unlikely without significant change in regional interests and conditions. Under current conditions:

• Neither economic incentives nor threats change the DPRK view of denuclearization –an outcome it can veto.
  • I-R-C analysis demonstrates that achieving final and fully-verified denuclearization (FFVD) would require the Kim regime to agree to a path that is detrimental to multiple of its political, security and economic interests. Neither offers of economic and diplomatic rewards (carrots), nor threats of increased regional tension or US military action (sticks) is sufficient to change the North Korean decision calculus enough to make denuclearization appear acceptable from the perspective of the Kim regime. Moreover, North Korea is the single actor with the power to veto denuclearization, i.e., stalling or half-steps result in de facto international acceptance of its nuclear status.
• China is both incentivized and has the ability to undermine FFVD.
  • The I-R-C analysis shows both China’s and North Korea’s interests to be better served by
    moderate regional tension (as in the pre-summit status quo) than by a US, or South Korean-brokered FFVD. Both also gain more by a drawn-out process of US-DPRK talks that reduce regional tensions but do not make progress on denuclearization. The I-R-C indicates that China’s incentive to undermine FFVD is driven by its interests in gaining regional influence.
• A US-brokered FFVD of North Korea would require change in core US, Chinese, Russian and DPRK threat perceptions and worldviews.
  • US, Russia and China all to prioritize engagement and economic assistance to North Korea (DPRK) over increasing their own regional influence; a broader strategic goal of each.
  • Kim regime to radically alter one of its basis for legitimacy away from protecting North Korea from existential threats (through nuclear capability and economic self- sufficiency), toward provision of economic growth and development.

The current US approach to regional leadership may be out-of-touch with regional interests.

• For regional actors, denuclearization is not primarily about security, but about regional stability and influence.
  • While no regional actor (other than the DPRK) particularly wants to see a nuclear DPRK, most do not consider DPRK nuclear weapons to be a pressing national security issue or threat. The main DPRK-related threats to regional stability are indirect and have more to do with how others like Japan and the US would respond to North Korean provocations. In fact, concern for their future influence in regional affairs is what drives most regional actors’ preferences with regard to the DPRK nuclear issue. For China and Russia this means containing US regional influence and expanding their own. For South Korea, Australia, and Japan preferences over the issue are driven by their common interests in taking on larger roles in regional security achieved by rules-based multilateral diplomacy.

• Multilateral solutions to regional issues are preferred region-wide.
  • he increasingly unilateral US approach to regional issues (such as DPRK
    denuclearization) conflicts with the preference of most regional states to work multilaterally and through international law to resolve disputes and increase stability.

The success of US efforts to balance China in security matters facilitates growth of Chinese regional influence at the expense of the US.

• China’s strategy of regional economic expansion is a major source of its regional influence which in turn, ensures its own domestic stability and regime legitimacy. Historic US security relationships guarantees, together with regional suspicion of China and Japan have been major source of US regional influence relative to that of China.
• China’s economic growth and influence depends on regional stability, which is reinforced by US security guarantees and assurance of allies suspicious of Chinese intentions. As the region becomes more secure, it becomes more stable. Stability allows states to prioritize economic growth and prosperity. Over time, US security and extended deterrence relationships become less important for insuring a safe and stable region.

How the US approaches this issue may be equally important for its long-term regional interests and influence than whether an agreement on denuclearization is actually achieved.

• For most regional actors, heightened tension and competition for influence between the US and China is a greater threat to their interests than the failure to reach an agreement on DPRK denuclearization.
• US allies and smaller states interests will inevitably be compromised if they are forced to chose between China (critical to their economic interests), and the US (preferred security partner).
• Engaging regional actors through multilateral negotiations would reduce concern over US regional commitment and signal US recognition of the preferences and constraints facing smaller regional states. It would also make it more difficult for China and Russia to act as spoilers than does a bilateral approach.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q13] What are the national security implications of increasingly accessible and affordable commercial launch services? Are these the same for the US and near-peers or states with emergent space capabilities? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The experts solicited in this effort agree that there will be wide-ranging national security challenges and a few benefits arising from decreased launch costs. The challenges are largely derived from two structural changes to the space domain: more actors and a wider diversity of payloads. The subject matter experts indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs affect: military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

Less is More: More Actors and More Junk

The diversity and number of actors accessing space and the types of objects in space is increasing over time, seemingly exponentially. According to Dr. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a suite of commercial entities, “SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and Stratolaunch, amongst others,” are “either launching payloads or soon will be, in new ways that opens up access to space to a broader customer base and at a lower cost and with greater responsiveness.”6 Dr. Deganit Paikowsky of Tel Aviv University observes that commercial entities are one of the “two new types of players [that] joined global space activity” due to decreased costs to launch. Historically, larger incumbent companies, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have used government corporate subsidies to drive their product cycles. Lowered costs to launch have added “(a) small and developing countries [and] (b) private sector players” to the mix of actors in space.

More actors with access to space has led, unsurprisingly, to more material in space of varying quality. Dr. Damon Coletta of the United States Air Force Academy incisively notes that what “looks like a change in launch services” and costs is actually “an advancement and diffusion of technology for building small, lightweight, highly capable payloads.” Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin maintains that further increasing the number of nation-state and sub-national actors able to access space…risks continuing to make the space domain more congested and complex. Such increased congestion and complexity will impose additional resource burdens on space domain awareness capabilities and could create additional debris or other hazardous operating conditions that pose risks of mishaps.

The diversity of payloads, Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit postulates, creates physical danger from an atmosphere of cheap objects threatening the integrity of government-sponsored space systems:

The increasing and unregulated launch of satellites—23,000 satellites have been forecasted for the next ten years, and this estimate grows every three months—may pose several risks. In fact, most of these satellites are designed to be manufactured using COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) components. Hence, they are less reliable than government-type satellites, and their death rate will be higher than the current average.

How the Implications Differ (or Not) Across the International System

The national security implications that the subject matter experts identify are best categorized into four baskets: military procurement deliverables, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

One implication of increasingly affordable launch services that the experts consistently identify is how launch services shift the military procurement deliverables of national space programs. Nations with advanced commercial space sectors would gain more value for their spending and allowing for new timelines of development within both emerging and legacy national space programs, experts postulate. Elliot Carol of Ripple Aerospace observes that any country’s “military budget goes a lot further,” including the United States, if those countries are no longer “paying ULA a couple hundred million dollars for the next launch, but are paying SpaceX $62 million a launch.”

Although saving money in space programs appears to be primarily an economic benefit, these cost savings yield steep national security implications. Shifting the necessary allocation of resources affects the whole of countries’ defense industries and the distribution of capabilities across the international system to those countries whose responses to these changes are strategic and forward-thinking. Berkowitz argues in this vein: “An advantage should accrue to the side that mitigates the risks and takes advantage of the opportunities created by accessible and affordable commercial launch services with the greatest speed, agility, and consistency.

Other exerts concur with Berkowitz that cheaper, changing procurement options shape space program management and initiatives. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College points out that lowered costs allow the United States to “affordably field entirely new military capabilities (Space-Based Radar/MTI, Space-Based Missile Defense, Space-Based Terrestrial Strike).” This innovation, Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas posits, stems from the commercial competitiveness of a larger market to win government contracts, which in turn gives public sector procurement managers increased program design options. He states: “In times past, government actors had very specific kinds of providers and launch opportunities, whereas now, with cheaper access to space and more launch providers, governments can take multiple rides and have many choices.”

Some experts also agree with Berkowitz that only countries that move quickly will gain advantage, but argue that the United States has been slow to capitalize7 on these transformations, reducing the relative competitiveness of the American space program. Dr. Davis warns that “ironically, large, expensive, fully expendable rockets, which take months to prepare for launch and cannot be reused, are still the focus of NASA with its ‘Space Launch System’ (SLS) and United Launch Alliance (ULA) with the Atlas and Delta family of vehicles.” Experts from Harris Corporation, LLC urge American policymakers to “rethink ‘how we do space,’ writ large. The legacy requirements for large, highly sophisticated, redundant systems with lots of fuel, multiple backups, and long service lives may no longer be required to the same extent as today.” The national security implications of these changing options for procurement pushed Dr. Davis to raise a key question: “How will these traditional launch vehicle technologies compete with reusable rockets, airborne launch, and, ultimately, spaceplanes in terms of cost competitiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness in the next two decades, particularly as reusable launch systems mature over time?”

The second implication of these commercial technologies is the environmental destruction from so many actors’ increasing ability to place more materials of varying quality into orbit and potentially affect all states equally. Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua of the University of Florida cautions that actors in the space field are approaching access to space as if it were an infinite resource, and reduced prices are enabling operators to reduce the quality of their satellites and to launch more, relying on redundancy of poor hardware. Low quality hardware’s behavior is more difficult to predict and control. This is obviously a non-sustainable and wild approach but, unfortunately, there are no global regulations and no enforceable actions that can prevent these behaviors.

Third, some of the experts argue that, although many actors can access space and place their objects into space due to the lowered cost to launch, only a select few actors—those with superior information processing capability—will see any benefit from more affordable access to the space domain. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation suggests that when “anyone on the planet with a few dollars will be able to get raw data” from space-based assets, the key “differentiation then is going to be in analysis,” and the benefits of affordable launch services will mostly accrue to those actors who will be able to “look at that data and say, ‘That is a T-72, and that is an M-1 Abrams’ or ‘That is an American AEGIS destroyer, and that is a South Korean or Chinese destroyer.’”

Fourth, and finally, Dr. Davis hypothesizes that a critical national implication of affordable launch capabilities will emerge with the “development of reusable launch capabilities—reusable rockets, airborne launch, and, on the horizon, aerospace planes,” because these technological developments could “improve responsiveness and boost cost efficiencies in accessing and exploiting space” in ways that could “fundamentally transform military space operations.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, the main national security effect of reduced cost to launch is that cheaper launches enable a greater number of actors to send a wider range of payloads—some of which will, quite frankly, be junk—into space. Cheaper costs to launch also shape how countries leverage (and build) their national space programs by shifting available procurement patterns.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Mark Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua3 (University of Florida); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol4 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Dr. Malcolm Ronald Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele5 (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.