SMA Publications

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

To cause intended effects—and avoid unintended effects—in the fiendishly complex regional environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers are required to understand both what motivates key actors and what type of strategic confrontation they face. To these ends, this report applies core insights from the cognition and neuroscience of decision-making, combined with data from historical and contemporary cases of decision-making such as the past 50 years of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) military-diplomatic campaigns. Two broad sets of conclusions emerge. The first arise from analysing core cognitive dimensions of what motivates the DPRK and key regional actors. These include:

(a) Managing unpredictability is a central challenge for U.S. policymakers: The DPRK has skilfully manipulated unexpectedness to maximise the impact of its diplomatic and military actions for over 50 years – U.S. policymakers must manage those effects on themselves, U.S. domestic audiences and allies. For allies such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Japan, the U.S. must also manage the unexpectedness of its own actions, as unpredictability often damages the trust on which rests U.S. credibility and extended deterrence.

(b) Fear drives much regional behavior – and because the DPRK, ROK, U.S., Japan, China have fundamentally different and mismatched fears no single solution can address them. For instance, a key DPRK fear is personal death for the leadership; a key Japanese fear is China’s rise; China’s overriding fear is the U.S.; the U.S. fears DPRK intercontinental nuclear weapons. Only coordinated action on all fronts can address these fears.

(c) Fairness: Rejection of perceived injustice fuels Sino-Japanese and ROK-Japanese antagonism, as well as Japanese concerns over abductions – all destabilizing any regional peace process. Any deal must be perceived as fair or it likely won’t stick.

Second, the U.S. must understand what type of conflict it faces – a “Grey Zone” conflict. North Korea has conducted “Grey Zone” conflict for most of the past half century, literally neither fully at peace nor war. Grey Zone conflict also increasingly characterises regional competition between China, Japan and the ROK. This provides a powerful new lens to understand and manage this devilishly difficult DPRK confrontation and its regional ramifications. Managing Grey Zone conflict requires particular tools. It is necessarily limited conflict. Thus, the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences, rather than removing their capacity to choose using brute force in itself. I apply evidence-based tools for influence in the Grey Zone (Wright 2017, Cognition in the Grey Zone), examined in the historical and current cases noted above. The U.S. retains a portfolio of unused Grey Zone actions it can threaten or apply to the DPRK, e.g. extensive information operations in the DPRK to decrease regime power. Understanding the Korean challenge as a Grey Zone conflict helps the U.S. anticipate and manage regional implications with allies (e.g. ROK and Japan) as well as competitors (e.g. China and Russia).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Iran’s Relationship to Yemeni Zayidis

Authors | Editors: Vern Liebl (Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning).

Executive Summary

Question 10: Do views of the Velayat-i-Faqih (in Yemen) present challenges to Iranian influences among holders of Zayid views?

Question 11: Do divergent religious views/practices present challenges among the Iranian populace in relation to presentation of the Iranian government as protectors of Yemeni Zayidis?

Before delving into the questions, it is important to delineate the differences (and similarities) between Zaydi Shi’a Islam and Imamiyya Shi’a Islam. Both are, today, considered sub-branches of Shi’a Islam, with the Imamiyya (also called the Jafari school of Ithna’Ashari, or 12ers) much more widespread while the Zaydi (sometimes known as Jafurdiyya) are largely located in northwestern Yemen and southwestern Saudi Arabia. Both share the first four Imams in the lineage from Muhammad, those being as follows:

1. Ali ibn Abi Talib, called “The Beloved” and for Sunnis considered the legitimate 4th Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphs (Rightly Guided Successors). His wife was Fatima az-Zahra, youngest daughter of Muhammad (considered by Shia to be the only daughter of Muhammad) and mother of Hasan and Husayn. He is buried at Najaf.

2. Hasan ibn Ali, called “The Chosen,” first son of Ali and oldest surviving grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Medina.

3. Husayn ibn Ali, called “Master of the Martyrs,” second son of Ali, grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Karbala.

4. Ali ibn Husayn, called “One who constantly Prostrates” and/or “Ornament of the Worshippers.” He is buried at Medina.

And here is where the split occurs. For the majority of Shia in the world, the Imamiyya and the Isma’ili (7ers), the next Imam in line is:

5. Muhammad ibn Ali bin Husayn, called “The Revealer of Knowledge.” His mother was Fatimah bint al- Hasan ibn Ali, daughter of the second Imam Hasan and great-granddaughter of Muhammad. The marriage of these two united the Hasan and Husayn branches of the family, which brought great legitimacy with it. He is buried at Medina.

For Zaydi, they consider Zayd ibn Ali, called “Ally of the Quran,” as the true fifth Imam. His mother was Jayda al- Sindhi, thus making a half-brother to Muhammad ibn Ali. He led a revolt against the Umayyids and failed, therefore he is buried in two places; his body in Kufa (Iraq) and his head at Karak (Jordan). He is also called “Zayd al-Shaheed” (Zayd the Martyr).

[Q12] Will major commercial space entities likely serve as disruptors or solid partners in terms of state national security interests? In the short-term (5-10 years), mid-term (15-20 years), and long-term (25+ years)? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

There was considerable variation in how the expert contributors interpreted this question, and in their assessments of the future relationship between commercial and government space enterprises. While the contributors who saw commercial entities as solid partners of the government were, with one exception, representatives of commercial space, respondents from think tank, commercial, and government communities tended to view commercial actors as potential disruptors (39%). However, the majority response among the expert contributors overall (44%) was that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners.

There are two lines of reasoning for this argument. First, based on the perspective that “disruptions” can have positive as well as negative consequences, some contributors saw disruptive actors as potentially valuable allies to government. Second, others argued that technologies or actions that may be disruptive in the short-term can evolve into ordinary or standard practices in the longer-term.3 The contributors also warn, however, that whether commercial space is ultimately a disruptor or a solid partner in space will in large part depend on how the United States government (USG) decides to respond..

Furthermore, commercial actors’ organizational advantages with respect to innovation make it likely that they will become the dominant actors in space in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security interests will be largely determined by how the USG deals with these changes. There are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector, and relying on its capabilities and services, reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. If the USG attempts to limit or control commercial space actors to the point that they cannot meet their own objectives, there is nothing to prevent them from moving their endeavors to another country. This would effectively remove all but the most indirect or extreme forms of influence the USG has, and position commercial space actors to become a significant disruptor of US security interests.

Disruptors, Disruption, and Drivers

Contributors identified disruptors as actors whose behaviors and innovations trigger broad change in a system. In the context of this report’s question of focus, a commercial disruptor is a company that significantly alters (for good or for bad) the ability of the US to achieve its national security space objectives. A disruption changes the nature of the relationship between the USG and commercial space actors. The potential for disruption is determined by the extent to which USG and commercial space are dependent on, or can determine, the activities of the other. Of course, the emergence of a commercial space sector is, in and of itself, a disruption to USG dominance in space activity and technology. The question is: to what effect?.

The Impact of Private Capital

The nature of the relationship between the commercial sector and the US national security community is changing rapidly, and suggests that we may be on the cusp of a major disruption in the way US space has operated for the last 60 years. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, the emergence of “angel investors and venture capitalists wanting to make huge profits” by investing in new commercial space activities has been a major driver of this change. Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit calls out “new space” start-ups, in particular, as potential disruptors as they both increase their capacities for rapid innovation and become less dependent on the USG for operating funds. It is interesting to note that this is happening at the same that the USG is increasingly looking to the commercial sector for services and innovation. As such, Joshua Hampson of the Niskanen Center believes that, 25+ years from now, the USG “may be more reliant on commercial providers for capabilities than those entities will be on the government for funding.”

The availability of private capital to commercial space could spur additional disruptions in the space service provider-user relationship. Namely, if commercial entities rather than the USG are the ones developing and operating cutting-edge space capabilities, USG attempts to regulate the sale and transfer of those capabilities is likely to become both a more complex and more contentious issue than it is today. Simply put, the interests of commercial entities—in other words, their profitability-centric business agendas—cannot be assumed to be in complete accord with the USG’s national security
objectives.

Regulation as Disruption

Several contributors comment on the impact of USG commercial regulations as a type of perennial disruptor,5 which if lifted will increase innovativeness and growth in private space sector. The ViaSat, Inc. contributors note that while the USG has “directed” space innovation until recently, today more innovation is occurring in areas in which the government has had significantly less involvement (e.g., ground segments of space systems like ATMs, etc.). They make this point in reference to USG-controlled GPS, arguing that, “since the start, the USG has gone through GPS-1 and now GPS-3. In a 35 [to] 40-year period, we’ve had three generations of space innovation. On the ground, we’ve had an infinite number of innovations.” The contributors from ViaSat, Inc. do concede that some government direction is not a bad thing, but stress that there must be “a balance of the mix” between commercial requirements for profitability and USG concern with regulating access to high-tech capabilities.

Sources of Disruption in the Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term

In addition to discussing what might make an actor a potential disruptor, contributors emphasize the need to consider what is being disrupted, and how that disruption could affect US national security objectives. Table 1 above provides a summary of space-related capabilities in which disruption and/or private-government partnership is currently happening or expected to occur.

Short- to Medium-Term

Access to and Control of Information

Dr. John Karpiscak III of the United States Army Geospatial Center identifies information as one of the critical commodities that the US will struggle to control in the coming decades. Contributors highlight three particular struggles involving space: information ownership and control, data collection, and space situational awareness (SSA). Karpiscak III discusses the challenges with data ownership and management, in terms of the extent to which commercial space entities will maintain control over who accesses their data or whether they “can be coerced, manipulated, or incentivized [by the USG] to share data with friendlies and deny access to, say, gray or red forces.” Several contributors6 also identify advances in commercial information collection and processing, including remote sensing, as potential disruptors to current practices as they make what today may be considered classified information available in the public domain. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson of the United States Air Force Academy notes that SSA capabilities operated and owned by private companies could transfer tracking of space objects from being done “largely by a government-heavy regime to being done by some regime that’s now entirely private.”

The contributors differ, however, in their assessments of the degree to which these developments will challenge or ease the ability of the US to achieve its national security objectives. Several contributors7 see the improvements in commercial remote sensing as a potential solution to government needs. While Deborah Westphal of Toffler Associates and Karpiscak III acknowledge the potential benefit of this, they also raise concern about the loss of information control it implies. Finally, Dr. Damon Coletta of the United States Air Force Academy suggests that wider access to high-resolution imagery may “disrupt the safety of troops on the ground if suddenly a raft of competing state entities suddenly had access to levels of resolution that only the US government had beforehand.”

Medium- to Long-Term

Infrastructure

In the medium- to long-term, contributors suggest that increases in the amount of infrastructure (both in space and on the ground) could serve as an additional source of disruption. Karpiscak III argues that developments in commercial launch capabilities could make it possible for nearly anyone to launch items into space, without necessarily having to gain “anyone’s permission or consent.” Inevitably, as more actors access space, the amount of infrastructure in space will increase as well (Hitchens; Nield). Increased infrastructure will in turn stimulate the development of space-based power and transportation for on-orbit servicing (Nield; Weeden), as well as increased maneuverability (Jackson). Finally, while expanded infrastructure in space is identified as a potential source of disruption, the implications for US national security are not always clear. This may be because many of the capabilities discussed by the contributors are dual-use technologies, which many of the contributors identify as posing challenges for national security.

Long-Term

Harder to Tell

Perhaps not surprisingly, the contributors were less specific about potential sources of disruption beyond the next 25 years. Resource extraction and debris removal were the only specific capabilities mentioned in this timeframe (Hampson; Hitchens). As Karpiscak III points out: “If you look at rates of technological advance in a lot of the world economies and developments like cellphones and tablets, it’s very difficult to predict a lot of this.”

Despite this uncertainty, many contributors expect time itself to have an effect on the potential for disruption. When considering the system change aspect of disruption,10 most contributors believe that the sources and magnitude of disruptions will diminish over time as markets and commercial entities expand and mature. However, when focusing on the control aspect of disruption, Hampson sees the expansion of the commercial space sector as likely to increase disruption. He suggests that “a contemporary model exists in the computing/software industry today” where, although “companies cannot disregard US policy, [they] are large enough to…lobby against policies they disagree with and independent enough in funding to take their views to the public.”

Building Solid Partnerships

Table 1 above clearly demonstrates considerable variation in the contributors’ evaluations of the potential for government-commercial partnerships across both time and specific capabilities. This variation relates closely to the idea that innovation is intrinsically linked to disruption. The USG benefits from the innovations produced by disruptors (Jah; Rossettini), yet the more successful these actors are, the less controllable they, and their capabilities, become..

Benefits of Collaboration

Strong partnerships and collaboration are built on mutual interest. A good percentage of USG objectives in space involve national security and defense, whereas for commercial actors a business and regulatory environment that allows profitability is critical (Hampson; Stadter). Looking further out into the future, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin suggests that the near-term establishment of routine partnerships could help decrease the extent of disruption in the longer-term. Hampson predicts that, as the orbital environment becomes busier and riskier, commercial actors will be motivated to partner with the USG to reduce the risk of “being placed under burdensome restrictions by causing problems.” Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College posits that, as the value of economic activities such as space mining and the number of US citizens in space increase, “[t]here will be a very strong push for national security services to be extended toward US citizens and their property in space, and a push to make the independent space corps look more like the US Coast and US Navy, with a strong emphasis on safety of navigation for licit commerce.”

Barriers to Collaboration

Several contributors12 indicate that commercial actors want to partner with the USG, but that barriers to solid partnerships do exist. On the government side, contributors point to regulation and security concerns (Faulconer Consulting Group; Hitchens); organizational impediments (Garretson); and lack of outreach to, and communication with, the commercial sector (Weeden). The need for profitability, and the freedom to sell their technology (Armor; Stadter), are mentioned as disincentives for commercial actors to work with the USG. On top of this, the lines of communication between the USG and commercial space sector are weak, as is the understanding of the other’s objectives and constraints (Garreston; Stadter).

Implications of Failure

If national security constraints impede the development of new technologies, as Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland believes has already happened with remote sensing and SAR, innovative commercial actors may abandon the US. Dr. George Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration points out that this is something that “we ignore at our peril because, again, the capability is going to be out there in the rest of the world. If the US chooses not to take advantage of it, we’re likely to be left behind,” a view echoed by Jim Norman of NASA. Even if companies do not relocate out of the US, we should not forget Hampson’s point that, over time, commercial space actors will likely become large enough to wield influence over policy and public opinion. Both of these outcomes would signal a loss of USG influence over some activities in the space domain.

The Verdict

Considering the contributors’ responses as a whole, it appears that “disruption” is considered a necessary part of the development of space capabilities and activities. Commercial actors’ organizational advantages with respect to innovation make it likely that they will become the dominant actors in space in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security interests will be largely determined by how the USG deals with these changes. There are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector, and relying on its capabilities and services, reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. If the USG attempts to limit or control them to the point that they cannot meet their objectives, there is nothing to prevent them from moving their endeavors to another country. This would effectively remove all but the most indirect or extreme forms of influence the USG has, and position commercial space actors to become a significant disruptor of US security interests.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA Headquarters); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy.); Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributors: Aviles, W. & Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This study was conducted to address the question: How can the US increase the resolve and capability of Pakistan to support political reconciliation in Afghanistan and the region?

Two methods of textual analysis were applied to a corpus of 30 Imran Khan speeches that spanned the period of 2007 to 2018, although most speeches postdated 2013 and represent his recent rise to power. The methods were quantitative discourse analysis (QDA) and the Linguistic and Inventory Word Count (LIWC).

The primary political themes Imran Khan expressed in his public discourse are:

• The political machinery of Pakistan and criticism of his political opponents;
• Fighting corruption;
• Appeals to religion (generic Islamic values) and appeals to the common masses;
• Pakistani domestic terrorism and extricating from American counterterrorism efforts;
• The Pakistan economy; his interest in the economy has surged in recent years;
o Imran Khan has a decidedly left-of-center, welfare state model of economic development that he claims is consistent with Islamic principles.
• His interest in education has increased in recent years, emphasizing improving its quality and access to it, including for women and girls.

Imran Khan foreign policy:
Imran Khan claims to seek positive foreign relations with India, the U.S., Afghanistan and China. His views on India are unconventional within the context of traditional power elites in Pakistan. The extent to which the Pakistani military has dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy and their seemingly close relationship with Imran Khan may limit his ability to act independently on these issues.

His language use indicates the following psychological characteristics
• His language exhibits high status and a need for power;
• He has a negative worldview;
• His interest in economic issues is increasing in time;
• His anxiety levels, although initially high, are decreasing through time.

General implications of these findings:
• Imran Khan is very political and particularly open to positions that would enhance his standing and power
in domestic politics.
• Support that would enable him to contend with incidents of domestic terrorism and to improve both the
Pakistani economy and education system should be particularly attractive to him.
• His appeals to religious conservatism manifested among the common masses (as opposed to formal clergy or Islamic extremists) are vital to maintaining his base; positions that would threaten these appeals
would be contrary to his interests and possibly his genuine sentiments.
Implications for Afghanistan reconciliation and reintegration:
• Imran Khan has stated that he would like to be a broker in Afghan reconciliation efforts. If he is truthful in
this intent, aiding him in shoring up his power domestically is likely to help increase his resolve to support Afghan reconciliation and reintegration. Political issues that matter most to him in his public discourse include:
o Domestic terrorism, the economy, education, and maintaining his common, rural and socially conservative base;
o FightingcorruptioninPakistan;
o ForeignaffairswithIndia,theU.S.,AfghanistanandChina.
• An important caveat is that Imran Khan’s ability to advance his foreign affairs agenda, including
reconciliation in Afghanistan, could well be thwarted by Pakistan’s military establishment.

Kim Jong Un’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space: An Analysis of Public Discourse

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

A collection of Kim Jong Un’s speeches from 2012 to 2017, translated and published online by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Kim Jong Un’s concerns in the space domain and how these concerns are articulated with general political and cultural themes. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as the DPRK’s (i.e., Kim Jong Un’s) perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.

Kim Jong Un’s Perspectives and Worldview Regarding the Space Domain

• The DPRK’s space operations are described in Kim’s speeches in entirely martial and threatening terms and the need to deter aggression.

• Kim Jong Un discusses the DPRK’s space endeavors within the framework of national security rather a commercial perspective.

• Space events, such as missile launches and satellite deployments, and space discourse are associated with negative themes such as danger, threat, instability, adversaries, and nuclear weapons.

• The US and the DPRK are frequently mentioned together when Kim Jong Un discusses space, and in association with actual space events. President Trump is highly associated with space discourse and space events in Kim Jong Un’s discourse. This may indicate that Kim Jong Un values the space domain as a critical venture to counter U.S. ambitions.

• The frequency of space themes and actual space events escalate through time, indicating that both Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric and action track with one another.

• Kim Jong Un’s language regarding space is highly charged and negative, especially in speeches where he mentions President Trump.

• Despite increases in missile testing over the coding period, missiles and military are not often mentioned in Kim’s discourse. However, satellites are mentioned, and are associated with success, authority, legitimacy and economic development. These associations must be understood in the framework of national security, and economic development is only pursued insofar as to serve the interests of bolstering regime survival.

General Worldview and Values

• The most common themes include Juche philosophy, and Kim Jong Un’s predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, emphasizing the importance of the legacy of the Kim family. Other frequently mentioned themes are related to the DPRK’s strength and ability.

• The analysis suggests that Kim Jong Un is most concerned with his adversaries, namely, the US, Japan and South Korea.

• The US and the DPRK share close associations with many themes as a reflection of the adversarial relationship Kim Jong Un sees between the U.S. and the DPRK. These themes are largely negative and similar to themes associated with space, including instability, injustice, danger, threat, extremely negative themes and hyperbole, war, and adversaries.

• The occurrence of only a few themes increase over the 5-year coding period for this study, namely: space, Trump, the US and danger.

• Space themes, President Trump, the U.S. and danger are the only themes that increase through time, and all these themes have accelerated in the past two years.

• Discussion of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un and religious themes decreases through time. Similar decreases in religious themes has been related to increased state leader aggression in previous studies (Kuznar, Yager, Clair, & Stephenson, 2012).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Effects of Investment on Pathways to Space Security

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

[Q8] How are the components of the commercial space industry allocated outside of the US? Which countries have which types of market interests on the commercial end (e.g. tourism, imagery, navigation etc.)?

Summary Response

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.

We have compiled and summarized the contributor responses in two graphics that illustrate the extent to which the commercial space industry, which accounts for around three quarters of the global space economy (Bryce Space and Technology), is globalized. The capabilities and components discussed by the contributors have been mapped according to four general “bins”: satellite, launch, new space, and science and exploration.7 The tables, however, preserve the specific components referenced by the contributors, providing more detail of each state’s depth and focus in each area.

Our aggregation of the contributor discussion of commercial space capabilities and areas of interest indicates that, as we might expect, the US, Russia, and the PRC have the most diversified commercial capabilities in launch, satellites, and science and exploration. However, India and the ESA have very similar levels of coverage in launch, satellite, and science and exploration. Other states, such as Israel, Singapore, South Korea, and the UK are choosing to invest in research and development in niche areas (Lynn). Luxembourg is discussed by the contributors as an unexpectedly active and competitive actor in commercial space. The two biggest satellite operators in terms of revenue—SES and IntelSat—are headquartered in Luxembourg, even though a large part of their business is providing services in the US (Bryce Space and Technology). The national legislature has recently passed laws to protect space property rights for Luxembourg-based companies,8 and is providing financing for private companies to develop space mining capabilities (Armor).

As the number of states developing their own commercial space industry grows, so does the potential for partnerships. China in particular has moved to build partnerships in the space sector both with developing nations with little independent space capability (Brown & May; Cheng), as well as the ESA and individual European states (Brown & May). Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin suggests that the small size of most states’ space programs has made partnerships both more necessary and easier to accomplish than is the case for the US. Dr. Martin Lindsey of United States Pacific Command and Agnieszka Lukaszczyk of Planet both suggest that, although space is becoming more crowded and congested, it is a domain in which there is considerable cooperation both between states and between the public and private sectors. This cooperation offers states with fewer resources the potential to quickly and cheaply gain access to space technologies and space-based information and services. The US has the potential to take advantage of its strength in the space domain to broaden and strengthen its existing relationships with ally and partner nations. However it needs to act fast; other nations, including challenging powers like China and Russia, are already moving ahead with partnerships, and developing regulatory environments to attract commercial space actors.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A., Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Wes Brown & Todd May (NASA); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Spire Global Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Contributors: TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch

Executive Summary

This paper provides the TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch initial assessment for Phases I and II of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) CENTCOM Afghanistan project. Phase I specifically assessed the impact of three different hypothetical Afghan government constructs: Centralized, Enhanced Local Governance and Decentralized (regional). Phase II focused on the potential outcomes of a negotiated settlement including: truce, power-sharing Afghan government, and reconciliation.

TRADOC G27 used the Athena Simulation to model the discrete futures listed above in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each future by measuring control, influence, support, security and the relationship between the population and GIRoA.2 This analysis was descriptive rather than prescriptive. Follow on efforts will use the results from the 19 November 2018 United States Institute for Peace workshop in order to further refine these potential futures.

Overall Insights

1. A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas but opens these areas to regional leader and Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA.

2. While much of Afghanistan’s territory is not controlled by GIRoA the QST can only control large amounts of territory under very specific conditions.

3. A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce does not result in any increased GIRoA control.

4. Irrespective of how the study scenario reintegrated QST fighters into the ANSF (both in number and ANSF component), it did not substantially impact GIRoA control or popular support over simply demobilizing them.

5. QST fighter demobilization resulted in by far the greatest improvement of GIRoA control and increase in GIRoA popular support of all the variables we assessed in both Phases I and II.

[Q7] Many analysts indicate that due to the partial marketization of the North Korean economy, the economy has stabilized somewhat. What were the key reasons the regime made the decision to marketize? What factors inhibit a broader marketization of the economy?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 12 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. The expert contributors identify factors that explain the apparent condoning of controlled marketization in North Korea, as well as factors that appear to be inhibiting broader marketization in the country. This summary first discusses the key drivers of North Korean marketization and then considers the primary inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

Key Drivers of North Korean Marketization Efforts

Four key reasons emerge from the expert contributor responses as primary drivers of North Korean marketization efforts.

• The economic downturn and famine that engulfed North Korea and eventually led to the collapse of the country’s Public Distribution System in the 1990s.
• The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans that have started acclimating to marketization.
• The emergence of Kim Jong Un and new economic development policy.
• The reassuring precedent from China integrating itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant economic growth and development while preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime.

Economic Downturn, Famine, and the Collapse of the Public Distribution System

The reason most frequently cited by the contributors to explain marketization in North Korea is the significant economic downturn and famine that engulfed the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, what Dr. James Hoare of Chatham House describes as North Korea’s “economic meltdown.”1 A weak North Korean economy was struggling, as economic infrastructure and equipment decayed and agricultural land wore down. Environmental challenges (e.g., flooding, drought) only made the situation more difficult. All of these obstacles, interacting together, put serious strain on the economy, making an already troubling economic situation even more problematic.2 The situation eventually grew even more dire when, unable to withstand the economic downturn, the regime’s central ration system for providing food and other necessities to its people, the Public Distribution System, collapsed, sparking widespread famine and desperation across the country, with many North Koreans left by their government to survive on their own.

Several contributors point to this collapse of the Public Distribution System as the proximate cause of North Korea’s initial shift toward marketization.4 The collapse meant that the regime was no longer capable of providing basic necessities. No longer able to rely on the regime for basic needs and survival, North Koreans took desperate measures including turning to informal markets for sustenance.5 Despite concerns over the legality of such informal markets, and an overall ideological opposition to marketization and capitalism in general, the regime did not move to quash these activities, seemingly concluding that the seriousness of the situation warranted concession. Soojin Park of the Wilson Center explains that the regime was ultimately left with “no choice but to tacitly condone” and tolerate the spread of commercial activity and marketization across the country, as it offered a means of survival for many North Koreans.6 Thus, an informal market economy emerged to help fill the void left by the failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System.

Importantly, this progression suggests that North Korean marketization initially resulted from what appears to be largely a bottom-up, rather than top-down, process.7 Park states this point directly: “North Korea’s marketization did not come about by design, but rather as a result of the state’s failure to sustain the livelihoods of its population.”

Rising Expectations of North Koreans Acclimating to the Market Economy

The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans who have started to benefit from marketization is also cited by contributors as a key reason for the regime’s decisions to allow limited marketization.8 The failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System unintentionally opened the door to private enterprise in North Korea, and introduced many North Koreans to the idea of a market economy. It also provided many North Koreans with an opportunity to witness first-hand some of the advantageous aspects of marketization. Since the regime’s initial limited opening to the idea of individual citizens profiting from informal market segments outside strict government controls, marketizing activity across the country has increased as North Koreans acclimate to the market economy. These activities, in fact, have created a new class of wealthy elites (“Donju”) who have been able to use their new-found wealth to purchase influence in the country’s economic and political institutions, further adding to their gains.9 Seeing the advancements that have emerged from marketization has driven higher the economic expectations and aspirations of many North Koreans, and has increased curiosity about the kinds of economic advancement opportunities that could arise from further broadening marketization within the country.

Any attempt by the North Korean regime to significantly curb marketization, therefore, is likely to face some degree of pushback from the North Korean population.11 Park reminds us of the regime’s unsuccessful attempts to curb private entrepreneurship and decelerate marketization in 2007 and 2009. She explains that “such attempts, including the currency reform measure in November 2009— redenominating 100 won for 1 won—angered the people and were met with direct resistance, though short of rebellion.” This pushback, Park suggests, helped the regime “realize that it would need to tolerate and allow market activities and marketization as a way to counter the people’s complaints.”

North Koreans with rising economic aspirations are likely to look to the Kim regime to establish and maintain an economic environment that will empower them to achieve their ambitions. The onus, therefore, is on the regime to stimulate and develop the North Korean economy. Not doing so, and diverging from popular expectations, could hurt the regime’s legitimacy even more so than maintaining tight centralized control. In fact, Ken Gause of CNA suggests that the Kim regime is already feeling pressure from North Korean elites on this front:

The idea that Kim Jong Un came to the notion of diplomacy and engagement as a result of the Maximum Pressure Campaign is a fallacy. He has been preparing the country for this moment since 2012. That said, he doesn’t have a lot of time. He is on a clock. By opening up the markets, he has exacerbated the differences in economic classes. The so-called moneyed elite (“Donju”) have rising expectations and have suffered as a result of the sanctions. This class of elite is particularly critical to Kim’s hold on power. Only through opening to the outside world, albeit in a controlled fashion, can he satisfy this demand. If left unsatisfied, his legitimacy will begin to suffer.

The Emergence of Kim Jong Un as the Leader of North Korea

Contributors also consider Kim Jong Un’s emergence as the leader of North Korea to be a key driver of the country’s economic decentralization.12 The contributors generally believe that Kim has exhibited noticeable interest in economic development and marketization since taking over control. For example, he frequently discusses economic development in public, has initiated several highly-visible economic development initiatives (e.g., sparkling new apartment blocks in Pyongyang, the Masikryong Ski Resort in Kangwon Province, and a new international terminal at the Kalma Airport in Wonsan), and has instituted market reforms in the interest of promoting development and growth.13 Moreover, Kim appears willing to both accept some degree of marketization in North Korea and capitalize on markets within the country for economic and political gain. Gause even goes so far as to assert that Kim “gave free reign to the markets” upon taking over control. Kim’s objective in doing so, Gause explains, was to help stabilize the North Korean economy by capitalizing on the markets to supply much needed goods and services, as well as to start acclimating the North Korean population to the market economies.

Ultimately, contributors appear to agree with the assessment from Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies that Kim appears to be “serious about improving the North Korean economy” and is willing to “stake some of his personal legitimacy on economicdevelopment.”

Reassuring Precedent from China’s Approach to Reform

Several contributors suggest that China’s approach to reform might be perceived by the North Korean regime as a reassuring precedent.14 Some of the same factors that drove economic reform in China are likely to be behind North Korea’s efforts to reshape its economic policies. Therefore, North Korea may find reassurance in, and be encouraged by, China’s ability to integrate itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant growth and development of its economy while also preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime. China’s success on this front may entice North Korea into employing a similar approach. Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force emphasizes this point, offering a concise assessment of the dynamics:

Many Asian leaders have witnessed China’s stunning growth and realize you can develop economically yet remain authoritarian because the West will open their societies to you if you act peacefully. It is probable that Kim has finally seen the wisdom of the Chinese approach. This will encourage them to copy China’s economic development model.

Hoare, on the other hand, raises doubt about just how far the North Korean regime would be willing to follow any sort of Chinese model. North Koreans, Hoare argues, “have a very ambivalent relationship with China and resent being told that they should follow a Chinese model. And, of course, they were an industrialized nation well before China.”

Key Factors Inhibiting Broader North Korean Marketization Efforts

There are also three key factors that expert contributors cite as inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

• The Kim regime’s perception of economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.
• The Kim regime’s tight grip on the flow of information in the country and its desire to create ideological purity.
• Structural factors (e.g., productive capacity is severely lacking, the economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment, there is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level, legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak, markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption, and international sanctions have prevented the benefits afforded by globalization).

Fear of Economic Liberalization Threatening the Regime’s Fundamental Interests

The Kim regime appears to view economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.15 Thus, while Kim has demonstrated a willingness to accept some degree of marketization inside North Korea, he is not likely to tolerate any sort of political reform or interference coinciding with economic reform initiatives. Nor is Kim likely interested in fully opening the North Korean economy to broad marketization, as doing so could risk the kind of significant economic and social change that could spark political instability. It would also likely reduce the regime’s ability to maintain absolute control over the population and undermine the regime’s legitimacy.16 As Park explains, “a totalitarian state like North Korea which is maintained under strict control over its people and society becomes increasingly vulnerable when it allows greater liberalization…while willing to accommodate some marketization, the regime is still very vigilant to keep it at a manageable level.”

The Kim regime seems to ultimately be facing an interesting dilemma between balancing its political aspirations, which seemingly best align with a centrally planned and controlled economy, and its economic aspirations, which may be best served by great economic liberalization. Dr. Bruce Bennett of RAND offers further reflection on this dilemma: “the regime knows that if it allows too much market activity, the legitimacy of the regime will be undermined. But if the regime cuts the markets back too much, the North Korean economy will begin to fail.”

Tight Control Over the Flow of Information

The Kim regime’s tight control over the flow of information across the country is cited by contributors as a key factor inhibiting broader North Korean marketization efforts.17 The Kim regime strives to maintain absolute control over the population. In North Korea, this also extends to having absolute control over the flow of information. This information control is a part of Kim’s initiative to create what he calls “ideological purity” across North Korea.18 Platte explains that “to enforce ideological purity and reduce chances for bottom-up political reform, Kim Jong Un likely will retain or strengthen controls meant to limit external influence on North Korean people. News, pop culture, and other media from the outside world, especially from South Korea, will be limited to trusted classes, as will interaction with outsiders.” The current, fully controlled information environment that provides most North Koreans with little to nothing in terms of information freedom, together with the regime’s ideological purity initiative, create conditions that are fundamentally contradictory to the idea of broader marketization.

Structural factors

Finally, the contributors also reference several structural factors that further inhibit broader North Korean marketization. These structural factors are listed below.

• Productive capacity is severely lacking.
• The economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment.
• There is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level.
• Legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak.
• Markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption.
• International sanctions have prevented the foreign direct investment, resources, and markets afforded by globalization.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Soojin Park, Wilson Center; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Randy Kluver (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Ethan Stokes (University of Alabama)

Report Preview

This report details Russian and Chinese media presentations of operations and intentions in the space domain to their respective populations. These presentations provide us insight into how members of these nation states understand their government’s intentions and activities in the space domain, the opportunities and challenges their government’s face in approaching those intentions and activities, the alliances and norms necessary for space usage, and which actors are attempting to destabilizing the space domain. In both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, state influence, oversight, and, in varying degrees, control of media mean that presented narratives are often quite likely to be a reflection of positions of the state itself; or, at least, that lean themselves toward the positions that the state wishes its population to understand. As a result of such oversight, often times even oppositional media sources are constrained to simply respond and react to the narratives reflecting positions of the state.

The narratives generated by these media are extremely important because how a population understands the scope, history, and significance of an issue or event, in many ways dictates how a government can respond to changes, challenges, and opportunities related to those issues or events. Media narratives in a managed state thus become a sort of self-created box of responses and directions that state can take toward a given issue or event. The ability to look inside those narrative boxes provides insights into how to best approach an issue or event, in relation to such managed states, because, in many ways, we can anticipate the responses they themselves have committed to their populations regarding those items.

This report tracks Russian and Chinese media presentations of the space domain from September 2017 to April 2018, and further includes analyses of government issued documents related to space dating back to 2014 in order to provide context to the contemporary data. Researchers conducted a content analysis on media presentations related to the questions posed by the SMA group, as well as qualitative reads of the media presentations of the space domain toward identification of the strategic narratives used. Generally speaking, the results of this report show media in both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China present the militarization of outer space as being led, and instigated by, the United States. Escalations between the U.S. and Russia over events in Syria led Russian media to present the U.S. as much more aggressive and unstable compared to presentations in Chinese media. Media in both nations present the development of offensive and defensive space related armaments as being in response to the actions of the United States in the space domain. Further, media in both nations overwhelmingly project their governments as seeking peaceful space developments, political alliances and treaties to de-weaponize outer space. While media in both nations demonstrate their nation as a leader in outer space, Russian media project far more concern for the economic benefits of commercial space development; while Chinese media are more likely to present economic incentives for commercial developments as part of larger geo-political partnerships.

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Malicious Non-state Actors and Contested Space Operations

Authors: Rachel Gabriel (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)) and Barnett Koven (START)

Executive Summary

This report provides an analysis of potential threats to space-based systems posed by non-state actors. It places particular emphasis on the need to consider the space domain as part of a multi-domain threat environment where domains are interconnected and interdependent. This research devotes significant attention to examining the nexus between space and cybersecurity, and to the strategic vulnerabilities posed by the increasing integration of cyber and space technologies in critical infrastructure.

It proceeds by examining the nature of cross-domain threats, and the space-cyber nexus. It then provides an overview of potential space-based threats and risks. Subsequently, the report develops a typology of malicious actors based on their motives and capabilities. Importantly, this report evaluates the risks that each type of actor might pose individually or in concert with other types of actors. While some non-state actors with malicious intent possess the requisite capabilities to directly threaten space-based systems, many groups possess only malicious intent or the requisite capabilities – not both. Consequently, considering non-state actor collaboration is especially necessary. This report also highlights how space-based capabilities, such as open-source satellite imagery, can be (and indeed, has been) exploited by nonstate actors to further their terrestrial objectives. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations to increase resiliency.

In disaggregating threatening groups by motivation and capabilities, this report finds that of all the types of actors, cyber warriors backed by nation states have the greatest potential and interest to interfere in space. In contrast, more traditional violent non-state actors (VNSAs) have the most limited capability, and probably the smallest interest, in interfering in space. Despite this, it is clear that VNSAs do have much to gain by exploiting space-based technologies (e.g., for intelligence collection, propaganda) in support of their terrestrial activities.

While many of the scenarios contained in this report are largely hypothetical, they are possible. Specifically, at least some non-state groups already possess many of the requisite capabilities and malicious intent. Moreover, there are numerous known security deficiencies in commercial space technologies. As commercialization of the space domain and the number of new commercial entrants increase, existing vulnerabilities will become more pronounced, and additional vulnerabilities will be created. In short, the expansion of multinational commercial space operations is outpacing the ability of governments to anticipate or regulate activities in this domain. Moreover, as space-based capabilities become ever more important to economic activity and terrestrial infrastructure, they also become more attractive targets.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.