SMA Publications

Iran’s Relationship to Yemeni Zayidis

Authors | Editors: Vern Liebl (Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning).

Executive Summary

Question 10: Do views of the Velayat-i-Faqih (in Yemen) present challenges to Iranian influences among holders of Zayid views?

Question 11: Do divergent religious views/practices present challenges among the Iranian populace in relation to presentation of the Iranian government as protectors of Yemeni Zayidis?

Before delving into the questions, it is important to delineate the differences (and similarities) between Zaydi Shi’a Islam and Imamiyya Shi’a Islam. Both are, today, considered sub-branches of Shi’a Islam, with the Imamiyya (also called the Jafari school of Ithna’Ashari, or 12ers) much more widespread while the Zaydi (sometimes known as Jafurdiyya) are largely located in northwestern Yemen and southwestern Saudi Arabia. Both share the first four Imams in the lineage from Muhammad, those being as follows:

1. Ali ibn Abi Talib, called “The Beloved” and for Sunnis considered the legitimate 4th Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphs (Rightly Guided Successors). His wife was Fatima az-Zahra, youngest daughter of Muhammad (considered by Shia to be the only daughter of Muhammad) and mother of Hasan and Husayn. He is buried at Najaf.

2. Hasan ibn Ali, called “The Chosen,” first son of Ali and oldest surviving grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Medina.

3. Husayn ibn Ali, called “Master of the Martyrs,” second son of Ali, grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Karbala.

4. Ali ibn Husayn, called “One who constantly Prostrates” and/or “Ornament of the Worshippers.” He is buried at Medina.

And here is where the split occurs. For the majority of Shia in the world, the Imamiyya and the Isma’ili (7ers), the next Imam in line is:

5. Muhammad ibn Ali bin Husayn, called “The Revealer of Knowledge.” His mother was Fatimah bint al- Hasan ibn Ali, daughter of the second Imam Hasan and great-granddaughter of Muhammad. The marriage of these two united the Hasan and Husayn branches of the family, which brought great legitimacy with it. He is buried at Medina.

For Zaydi, they consider Zayd ibn Ali, called “Ally of the Quran,” as the true fifth Imam. His mother was Jayda al- Sindhi, thus making a half-brother to Muhammad ibn Ali. He led a revolt against the Umayyids and failed, therefore he is buried in two places; his body in Kufa (Iraq) and his head at Karak (Jordan). He is also called “Zayd al-Shaheed” (Zayd the Martyr).

Contributors: TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch

Executive Summary

This paper provides the TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch initial assessment for Phases I and II of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) CENTCOM Afghanistan project. Phase I specifically assessed the impact of three different hypothetical Afghan government constructs: Centralized, Enhanced Local Governance and Decentralized (regional). Phase II focused on the potential outcomes of a negotiated settlement including: truce, power-sharing Afghan government, and reconciliation.

TRADOC G27 used the Athena Simulation to model the discrete futures listed above in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each future by measuring control, influence, support, security and the relationship between the population and GIRoA.2 This analysis was descriptive rather than prescriptive. Follow on efforts will use the results from the 19 November 2018 United States Institute for Peace workshop in order to further refine these potential futures.

Overall Insights

1. A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas but opens these areas to regional leader and Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA.

2. While much of Afghanistan’s territory is not controlled by GIRoA the QST can only control large amounts of territory under very specific conditions.

3. A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce does not result in any increased GIRoA control.

4. Irrespective of how the study scenario reintegrated QST fighters into the ANSF (both in number and ANSF component), it did not substantially impact GIRoA control or popular support over simply demobilizing them.

5. QST fighter demobilization resulted in by far the greatest improvement of GIRoA control and increase in GIRoA popular support of all the variables we assessed in both Phases I and II.

Contributors: Jafri, A., Stevenson, J., Kuznar, E. & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In August of 2018, United States Central Command asked the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Reachback team, How can the United States best increase the resolve and capability of regional actors to get to political reconciliation in Afghanistan? This report highlights the results of NSI’s Interest-Resolve-Capability (I-R-C)™ analysis of Afghanistan stakeholder dynamics.

The I-R-C analysis reveals a stakeholder preference for some kind of stable political settlement (the exception is the ISKP). However, under current conditions, the analysis also suggests that critical stakeholders are divided between two stability outcomes—Enhanced Governance and Brokered Settlement. Sensitivity analyses of stakeholders’ interests ranking reveal that this divide is maintained by the United States as the most resolved and most capable actor in favor of Enhanced Governance over Brokered Settlement. The United States’ preferences were found to be extremely robust; the key factor limiting the United States support of Brokered Settlement is its ongoing, global competition for relative geopolitical influence vis-à-vis China and Russia. For almost all the other actors, a Brokered Settlement is the potential outcome most likely to find broad stakeholder support—or at least avoid direct opposition; besides the United States, those resolved against Brokered Settlement, such as the ISKP and KSA, lack capability to undermine the outcome.

The report concluded that the United States can increase key stakeholder’s resolve in favor of political reconciliation in Afghanistan by prioritizing a Brokered Settlement more than geopolitical influence competition. Our analysis suggests that the United States will still possess high absolute levels of influence capability, though its levels of influence capability relative to Russia and China may be less asymmetrically in its favor. In other words, a cooperative approach which nourishes the rise of other stakeholders’ levels of influence may counter-intuitively better preserve sustainable (and more affordable) options for long-term United States’ influence in the region beyond a two to five-year window.kuz

[Q1] Is there a win-win scenario for all of the key actors (DPRK, ROK, US, China, Russia)? If so, what might this look like?

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of thirty-three insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider the possibility of a win-win scenario for the key actors involved with the DPRK. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Bottom Line Up Front

• Several contributors note that while Japan is not listed as a “key actor” in the question, it is certainly a key actor in relation to the Korean Peninsula and Asia Pacific region and should be considered as such in this assessment.
• Twenty-one of the thirty-four contributors (about 62%) do not believe that a win-win scenario exists for all of the key actors. These contributors generally assess that the current interests of the key actors involved, particularly the US vs. DPRK vs. China and Russia, are irreconcilable (i.e., the DPRK considers its nuclear capability as indispensable, while the US insists on final, fully verified denuclearization [FFVD]. China and Russia want to see US influence in the region diminished, while the US, obviously, does not).
• Eight of the thirty-four contributors (about 23%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors may be possible, at least in the short-term, but doubt that such a scenario could actually be achieved over the long-term. These contributors generally highlight a misalignment of long-term interests among the key actors and an overall lack of trust in the DPRK to fulfill any agreements it makes as the key barriers to a win-win scenario for all of the key actors.
• Five of the thirty-four contributors (about 15%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors is possible without much qualification. These contributors acknowledge the differences in interests amongst the key actors, but generally assess that there is room for negotiation in pursuit of a win-win outcome.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Maorong Jiang, Creighton University; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Matt Korda, NATO; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Dr. Steve Tsang, University of London; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

To cause intended effects—and avoid unintended effects—in the fiendishly complex regional environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers are required to understand both what motivates key actors and what type of strategic confrontation they face. To these ends, this report applies core insights from the cognition and neuroscience of decision-making, combined with data from historical and contemporary cases of decision-making such as the past 50 years of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) military-diplomatic campaigns. Two broad sets of conclusions emerge. The first arise from analysing core cognitive dimensions of what motivates the DPRK and key regional actors. These include:

(a) Managing unpredictability is a central challenge for U.S. policymakers: The DPRK has skilfully manipulated unexpectedness to maximise the impact of its diplomatic and military actions for over 50 years – U.S. policymakers must manage those effects on themselves, U.S. domestic audiences and allies. For allies such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Japan, the U.S. must also manage the unexpectedness of its own actions, as unpredictability often damages the trust on which rests U.S. credibility and extended deterrence.

(b) Fear drives much regional behavior – and because the DPRK, ROK, U.S., Japan, China have fundamentally different and mismatched fears no single solution can address them. For instance, a key DPRK fear is personal death for the leadership; a key Japanese fear is China’s rise; China’s overriding fear is the U.S.; the U.S. fears DPRK intercontinental nuclear weapons. Only coordinated action on all fronts can address these fears.

(c) Fairness: Rejection of perceived injustice fuels Sino-Japanese and ROK-Japanese antagonism, as well as Japanese concerns over abductions – all destabilizing any regional peace process. Any deal must be perceived as fair or it likely won’t stick.

Second, the U.S. must understand what type of conflict it faces – a “Grey Zone” conflict. North Korea has conducted “Grey Zone” conflict for most of the past half century, literally neither fully at peace nor war. Grey Zone conflict also increasingly characterises regional competition between China, Japan and the ROK. This provides a powerful new lens to understand and manage this devilishly difficult DPRK confrontation and its regional ramifications. Managing Grey Zone conflict requires particular tools. It is necessarily limited conflict. Thus, the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences, rather than removing their capacity to choose using brute force in itself. I apply evidence-based tools for influence in the Grey Zone (Wright 2017, Cognition in the Grey Zone), examined in the historical and current cases noted above. The U.S. retains a portfolio of unused Grey Zone actions it can threaten or apply to the DPRK, e.g. extensive information operations in the DPRK to decrease regime power. Understanding the Korean challenge as a Grey Zone conflict helps the U.S. anticipate and manage regional implications with allies (e.g. ROK and Japan) as well as competitors (e.g. China and Russia).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?

Author(s): George Popp (NSI, Inc.) and Mariah Yager (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of thirty responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions are necessary for achieving final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) without resorting to militarized conflict. This summary details the various conditions that emerge. The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD is a point highlighted by a majority of the contributors, with several contributors expressing significant doubt that a denuclearized DPRK is possible at all. At best, contributors suggest, true progress towards achieving FFVD will require a long-term perspective, modified expectations, and a measured approach; however, even this does not ensure success. Nevertheless, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves.

Setting the Stage and Changing the Outlook

In considering necessary conditions for achieving FFVD, contributorsset the stage by reviewing the DPRK’s motivations for its nuclear weapons program. The prestige of being a nuclear power is certainly important to the Kim regime and the people of the DPRK, but it also helps to ensure the regime’s hold on governing power and control, while also playing to its Juche ideology. Nuclear capability provides the DPRK with security and deterrent capability against potential threats to its sovereignty from outside forces, leverage over other international actors (particularly the ROK), and relevancy and legitimacy on the international stage.

In reflecting on the motivations behind the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, several contributors offer necessary conditions for achieving FFVD that are more akin to perspective or ideological shifts, rather than on-the-ground requisites. These shifts, contributors stress, are compulsory conditions to having any chance of achieving FFVD.

Building Mutual Trust

Contributors who advocate for perspective shifts as being a necessary condition for achieving FFVD emphasize that, in order for any credible steps towards DPRK denuclearization to occur, the key actors involved have to work towards establishing and building mutual trust. Currently, there is a severe lack of trust among the key actors, and this lack of trust, contributors suggest, is a major impediment to the perspective shifts and on-the-ground conditions needed for true progress towards achieving FFVD. Overcoming this impediment, however, may not be easy, as there appears to be little reason (if any at all) currently for the DPRK and the US to trust each other. Thus, as the situation stands currently, the US would have to take substantial risk in trusting any DRPK commitment to FFVD and, at the same time, would have to offer serious reassurances and/or binding agreements to appease the DPRK’s distrust of the US and its true intentions relating to FFVD. Even such reassurances, however, may not be enough given recent US precedent. Dr. Todd Robinson of the Air Command and Staff College, for example, argues that “the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA was a colossal strategic mistake that might ultimately make an agreement with the DPRK impossible, as it suggests that a state might do exactly what it is required to do under the terms of whatever agreement is made and the US might simply renege on its end of the bargain because it feels like it.”

New Perspectives

In addition to the need to overcome an absence of mutual trust, the key actors involved in the DPRK denuclearization process may also have to adjust their existing perspectives and ideologies. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors suggest, will require a shift in the way in which the DPRK thinks about nuclear weapons. More specifically, the Kim regime will have to accept that the security of the regime, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and international prestige of Kim Jong-un and the DPRK would not be harmed—and may actually be increased—without nuclear weapons. Essentially, contributors explain, the DPRK would have to be convinced that there is no threat against the state and, therefore, there is no need for nuclear weapons. If such a shift in the DPRK perspective were to occur, it would likely increase the possibility of FFVD being achieved. This appears to be particularly true, contributors suggest, if the DPRK perspective were to start shifting towards perceiving economic power as being more important than nuclear power, as a more economically-focused mindset may drive the regime towards exchanging nuclear capability for economic opportunity and normalized relations with the international community. Ultimately, however, this type of shift in perspective would require the DPRK to fundamentally change its worldview and raison d’être.

The US may also have to shift the way in which it thinks about the DPRK and denuclearization, including potentially making exceptions to previously held expectations and redlines, in order to achieve FFVD. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors contend, may require the US to take a new approach to the DPRK, specifically one in which the US starts to accept and recognize the DPRK and the Kim regime on the international stage. Such a shift in the US perspective may be a particularly impactful move toward achieving FFVD, Dr. Justin Hastings of the University of Sydney suggests, especially if this US acceptance of the DPRK includes a loosening of restrictions on DPRK economic activity and if the US itself commits to economic investment with the DPRK.

Economic, Political, and Social Conditions Conducive to Achieving FFVD Without Militarized Conflict

Beyond the need for mutual trust and new perspectives discussed above, contributors also highlight several more on-the-ground conditions that may be conducive to achieving FFVD in the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict. The lists below summarize the political, economic, and social conditions most commonly cited by contributors. With thirty contributors offering conditions, however, the list of ideas is extensive, with some conditions directly contradicting others.

Inside the DPRK

Reassure Kim Jong-un’s safety and US credibility:

• Significant reassurances are provided to Kim Jong-un that FFVD will not threaten the security of his regime.
• Credible assurance is provided that the US will not renege on its agreements.
• The DPRK is acknowledged as a member of the international community.
• The US commits to not implementing any new sanctions during FFVD negotiations.

Support economic growth:

• Opportunities are created for the DPRK to access international markets and foreign economic aid.
• Economic development is promoted in the DPRK beyond Pyongyang and the Kim regime.

Improve social conditions:

• Social exchanges are facilitated between the DPRK and other countries(e.g., cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges are initiated in the region, particularly with the ROK; DPRK officials are allowed to travel and study abroad; Americans are allowed to live and work in the DPRK).

Regime change:

• Regime change occurs in the DPRK (e.g., peaceful coup occurs within the DPRK; Kim Jong-un suddenly dies and there is an ascension of figures dependent on China or the ROK; isolation from the outside world becomes so profound that the DPRK collapses, leaving its people and territory to fall under ROK or foreign tutelage).

US-China

The US and China cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US and China fully commit to and cooperate on offering the DPRK economic, political, and security assistance and guarantees.
• The US and China exert costly economic pressure on the DPRK to force it into initial FFVD negotiations and keep it on track towards FFVD.

The US and China do not cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US applies maximum economic pressure against both the DPRK and China (e.g., the US strengthens export/import embargoes against the DPRK and China and toughens sanctions against Chinese financial institutions doing business with the DPRK) to isolate the DPRK from China and force the DPRK to comply with US FFVD demands.

Multilateralism

• The US commits to a multilateral approach that incorporates key regional actors (i.e., DPRK, US, ROK, China, Japan, and Russia) to work towards a broader Asian Pacific regional security architecture.

Reduced Tension on the Korean Peninsula

• US-ROK military exercises are reduced or terminated.
• DPRK-ROK talks on the reunification or demilitarization of the peninsula are established.
• The Korean War is formally ended and a peace treaty is signed.
• Missile and weapon verification and limitation agreements are negotiated with the DPRK.
• DPRK-ROK joint military professional exchanges are established.
• DPRK and ROK observers are increasingly invited to regional military exercises.

What is the Best Approach to Achieving FFVD?

The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict is a point that is echoed in nearly every contributor response. Not surprisingly, therefore, contributors emphasize the importance of carefully considering the approach that is taken towards achieving FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves. Contributors are generally definitive, however, in the view that FFVD should be viewed as a long-term objective that requires a measured approach. Such an approach, contributors explain, must allow the key actors involved ample time to build and establish mutual trust—a fundamental element of any approach to peaceful denuclearization. To help build this trust among key actors, contributors suggest, the US and its regional allies must implement a clearly devised and projected set of executable policies.

As such, contributors reflect on what they envision to be the best approach to achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, presenting several options for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine and Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann of Texas A&M favor a phased approach in which parties work together to implement a defined set of conditions over time (i.e., limits on testing and missile production, increases in DPRK-ROK joint military exchanges, progression towards regional agreements on cooperative threat reduction measures) rather than immediately pushing for denuclearization. Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University offers a “strategic trust” approach, pointing to US-Soviet arms control process as a potential model. Jenny Town of the Stimson Center advances an approach in which the US extends political concessions and commitments early on to consider what the DPRK is willing to do and how far it is willing to progress towards FFVD. Offering these kinds of commitments up front, she believes, could fuel more advanced negotiations later in the process. Finally Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies highlights the importance of sequencing in any approach to achieving FFVD, arguing that granting the DPRK its “ultimate carrot” (i.e., diplomatic recognition)should be the final step in the process, given only once there is confidence that FFVD has indeed been achieved.

Other contributors advocate for an approach that incorporate elements of both punishment and reward. Dr. Rupal Mehta of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln offers an “ad-hoc carrots and sticks” approach that combines a punishments pathway (e.g., targeted sanctions—particularly against the DPRK military—and cyber intervention) with a parallel rewards pathway (e.g., regional economic incentives and financial assistance, particularly from China). Hastings considers a three-phased approach that combines Chinese pressure, US guarantees, and DPRK compensation (i.e., China exerts economic pressure on the DPRK to begin denuclearization efforts and stay on a pathway toward denuclearization, the US provides security and economic guarantees to the DPRK, and the DPRK denuclearizes and shares the economic benefits it receives for doing so with its military and entrepreneurial elite).

Finally, some contributors advocate for an approach that is more focused on internal, domestic DPRK dynamics. For example, Town posits that the best approach may be one that allows Kim Jong-un to present himself as a hero to his people, which, she suggests, may embolden him to choose a new, nonnuclear path. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies suggests that an approach focused on reunifying the peninsula under Seoul’s leadership is likely the approach that is most certain to achieve FFVD. He reminds us, however, that there can be no guarantees that such an approach would not resort to militarized conflict. Therefore, he advocates for an approach that combines implementing robust economic sanctions and launching an information campaign to erode the regime’s domestic governing power and support. A prolonged erosion of the regime’s power and support, he believes, could eventually compel change.

Ultimately, it is unclear that any approach could truly achieve FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. The best outcome for the US, therefore, may include living with a de facto nuclear DPRK, an improved relationship with the hostile state, and acceptance of the DPRK into the international community. What does seem clear, however, is that in order for progress to be made toward achieving FFVD in the DPRK, major shifts in perspectives and expectations are needed on all sides.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Dr. John Delury, Yonsei University; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. Justin Hastings, University of Sydney; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Adam Mount, Federation of American Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Jenny Town, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributing Authors | Editors: Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Lt Col Peter Garretson (USAF), Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Bruce W. MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Kazuto Suzuki (Hokkaido University, Japan), Brian C. Weeden (Secure World Foundation), Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University), and Mariah C. Yager (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

Executive Summary

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.

(1) Managing space operations now is not the same as in the Cold War Space Age (1957-1990) or the Unipolar US Space Age (1990-2014) – we recently entered a new space epoch, the “Gray Zone-Entangled Space Age.” It has two distinguishing features:

(a) Gray Zone conflict is more than normal competition and less than war. Space strategic conflict mirrors the Gray Zone conflict on earth, with a rising China and resurgent Russia. Space is ideal for Gray Zone conflict, particularly using diverse reversible technologies (Chs. 1 and 8). As James Lewis puts it (Ch. 3): “If America is waiting for the onset of armed conflict, it will miss the game.”

Recommendations: Gray Zone conflict in space is necessarily limited conflict, and thus the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences. Both influence and control are necessary for US success. US space policy and practice must explicitly place influence and control at the heart of space operations.

US decision-makers must have options to respond proportionally to Gray Zone conflict in space, enabling responses without escalation to war. Allies are critical (e.g. Ch. 7 on Japan), as is long-term competition to shape norms (Ch. 8).

(b) Entanglement: Crucial conventional and nuclear space missions are now deeply entangled, so warfighting with near-peers in space for conventional purposes profoundly threatens the nuclear mission. Commercial and military space systems are also increasingly entangled.

Recommendations: In the short-term, US decision-makers must now prepare for space operations during crises to rapidly escalate to the nuclear level (e.g. involving the space-based infrared system; SBIRs). This should be mitigated by dialogue and US deterrent signals. In the medium-term, the US must reduce dependency on fragile, entangled space assets such as SBIRs – and demonstrate that reduced US dependency.

(2) Managing escalation in space operations is not the same as in other domains. The nature of conflict is the same across domains, but the character differs.

Recommendations: Chs. 1, 2 and 7 outline the particular emphases required for space operations, e.g. dealing with ambiguity and offense-dominance.

(3) Chinese strategic thinking on space, escalation, and space escalation differs from US thinking.

Recommendations: To avoid misperception, planners must take seriously different Chinese thinking on space conflict, e.g. related to deterrence or space blockade (Ch. 4). Beyond conflict, the US Government (USG) more broadly must compete for position over longer-term space industrialization (Chs. 5 and 6).

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Introduction and Purpose of Study

The collapse of the North Korean economy and disastrous famine of the mid-1990s forced the regime to adapt its centrally-planned economy—most notably by allowing limited and small-scale private entrepreneurship among a starving population that the government’s Public Distribution System could no longer support. In this context, the North Koreans had turned to informal markets for sustenance in order to survive (Gause, 2018; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Rinna, 2018). This “bottom up” marketization resulted in policy reforms that followed rather than led the transition (Haggard & Noland, 2005; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Rinna, 2018). While the regime acknowledged the need for these informal markets to meet needs that it could not fulfill, and even instructed state institutions to find profit-making opportunities, the regime nonetheless remained ideologically opposed to marketization and capitalism. The leadership even enacted policy reversals in late 2005 intended to roll back some of this change—including “banning private trade in grain, resuscitating the quantity rationing system, and…rever[ting back] to confiscatory seizures from rural cultivators” (Haggard & Noland, 2005). The regime’s 2007 and 2009 efforts to inhibit private entrepreneurship and decelerate marketization (e.g., through currency reform) were ultimately unsuccessful (Park, 2018).

The informal economy is still in place, represents a substantial sector of the total economy, and has fostered a new stratum of wealthy North Koreans, unattached to the military or traditional elite (Hastings, 2017). The result today is the emergence and continued growth of private entrepreneurs. One estimate is that 20% of the North Korean population is directly or indirectly reliant on “general markets” for survival (DailyNK, 2018). Simultaneously, there are party and military organizations with their own trading companies. This leaves the DPRK with public institutions funded by the state and private corporations liable for paying a percentage of proceeds to the state.

Nonetheless, marketization in the DPRK has remained limited overall. Though Kim Jong Un’s own statements (Kuznar, 2017; Platte, 2018) have highlighted the need for economic development in North Korea, he remains suspicious of further economic liberalization and broad marketization, which he views as a strong threat to the security and survival of his regime (Bennett, 2018; Cheng, 2018; Cronin, 2018; Gause, 2018; Goto, 2018; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Sun, 2018). Indeed, observers and scholars continue to question the longer-term implications of these economic developments, and whether there is an insurmountable tension between economic reform and marketization on the one hand, and stability of Kim family political control on the other. This analysis thus addresses the following question: Has marketization put the North Korean regime on a path to near-term collapse?

NSI applied its NSI Pathways™ methodology and model to search for and identify indicators that marketization in North Korea could lead to collapse of the Kim regime.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of seventeen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what political, economic, and social conditions are conducive to achieving a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific that is in alignment with US and US ally interests. This summary details the various conditions that emerge.

Achieving a Stable Regional Order

Nearly all of the contributors indicate, either directly or indirectly, that, if the United States’ desired regional order in the Asia Pacific is interpreted as continued US military presence and dominant US influence in the region, then it is unlikely to be stable. Such a regional order fundamentally conflicts with China’s strategic interest in becoming the dominant regional power and influencer. For China, weakening US alliances, and pushing the US out of the region—politically, economically, and militarily—is essential to achieving its own regional objectives. Contributors, therefore, generally align with the
conclusion put forward by Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that US “efforts to double down on [its] predominance [in the region], with or without allied support, are likely to prove futile and excessively destabilizing.” Accordingly, a stable regional order, contributors
suggest, may require achieving a unique balance between the United States’ force posture and China’s expansionist tendencies. 3 It is clear, however, that the fundamental incompatibility between US and Chinese interests will make any effort to achieve a stable regional order in alignment with US and US ally
interests quite challenging.

When considering specific conditions that are conducive to regional stability in the Asia Pacific, therefore, it is important to recognize that what either the US or China sees as a driver of stability, is likely to be seen by the other as a barrier to stability. The table below summarizes what contributors identify as key conditions of the regional order preferred by the US and its allies, as well as the often conflicting (red cells) nature of these US preferences to those of China and Russia.

Of all the conditions highlighted as conducive to a stable regional order as currently envisioned by the US, only final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) in the DPRK is identified by contributors as an essential condition that should not to be negotiated away. While contributors contend that FFVD will make the region safer and more stable, they also suggest that it has implications for achieving other US objectives in the region. For example, Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University argues that settling for anything less than FFVD in the DPRK could be interpreted by US allies as a signal of declining US regional commitment and, as a consequence, undermine US deterrence credibility. This could lead US allies such as Japan or the ROK to reevaluate their own military capabilities, potentially including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and, consequently, undermine US non-proliferation goals.

The contributors, therefore, emphasize the importance of taking a gradual, multilateral approach to denuclearization that recognizes and accommodates the intermediate objectives of key regional actors. Achieving an agreement that has regional buy-in, particularly from the United States’ regional allies, contributors explain, may counter concerns regarding US disengagement. Moreover, while including China and Russia in the negotiations may increase the complexity of the negotiation process, and the potential for a breakdown in negotiations as a result, it also decreases the likelihood that the US and China, in particular, will come into direct confrontation over any negotiated outcomes.

Conclusion

The contributor response overall highlights the significant impact that competing interests and regional competition between the US and China has on stability in the Asia Pacific region. The ways in which the US and China currently perceive their regional interests seem destined to lead to a clash between the two powers if not amended. A regional order based on continued US military presence and dominant US influence fundamentally conflicts with China’s current interests in increased, if not dominant, regional political, military, and economic power. If the US fails to account for China’s interests, therefore, the actions that the US is likely to take to reinforce its vision of a stable regional order may end up decreasing stability in the Asia Pacific region over the longer-term. Additionally, if the US fails to redress the loss of confidence amongst its regional allies and partners in its economic and security commitments to the region, it is hard to see how the US would continue to exercise regional influence at all. Therefore, the most effective way for the US to balance these two considerations, the contributors suggest, appears to be by working multilaterally with regional allies as well as with China and Russia toward a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Yuki Tatsumi, Stimson Center; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University & STRATCOM Academic Alliance)

Executive Summary

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

Certain States of GS-ECE/EU have direct security concerns regarding how U.S.-DPRK relations might develop. These concerns arise in the context of three international frameworks:

1) These States’ membership in NATO and their resultant commitments to the United States and Canada under a possible invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty in the event of war between the U.S. and the DPRK.

2) These States’ concurrent (though separate) strategic and security concerns in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CFSP’s subsidiary Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a party to elements of both the CFSP and the CSDP.

3) These States’ current (as of 31 August 2018) negotiations with Japan for a Strategic Partnership Agreement to address, inter alia, matters of common security interests.

The States of GS-ECE and, by extension, the EU (whether members of NATO or not) have immediate and very substantial economic interests in all possible outcomes of currently developing (as of 31 August 2018) U.S.-DPRK relations. These interests arise primarily via:

1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the United States (as of 31 August 2018). The EU is the PRC’s largest trading partner (ditto).

2) Bi-lateral trade between Beijing and Berlin. In Europe, Germany is the PRC’s principal bi-lateral trading partner in both imports and exports. As of May 2018, Chancellor Angela Merkel has visited Beijing 11 times during her tenure in office which began in 2005.

3) The EU-ROK Free Trade Agreement (EU-ROK FTA). The EU-ROK FTA was provisionally applied as of 2011 and was formally ratified in 2015.

4) The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-Japan EPA). The EU-Japan EPA was finalized in December 2017 and ratified on 17 July 2018.

Reactions in GS-ECE/EU to possible deterioration in U.S.-DPRK relations must be viewed first and foremost through the lens of the withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The U.S.’ withdrawal has proved deeply unpopular in GS-ECE/EU, as well as for non-EU European States. Washington’s action affects vital European security and economic interests in the Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula, and the Mediterranean Basin. Washington’s action also places GS-ECE/EU on the same side of a critical strategic issue as the U.S.’s avowed or potential adversaries, namely Russia and China. It remains to be seen whether GS-ECE/EU commonality of interest with Russia and China in opposition to the United States on the JCPOA will sustain itself over time in the face of threatened U.S. secondary sanctions and separate U.S.-EU arguments over tariffs on steel and aluminum which were imposed by the U.S. government on 31 May 2018. So long as this commonality of interest persists, however, it could adversely affect GS-ECE/EU attitudes and governmental policies towards U.S. decision-making regarding the DPRK, particularly if U.S.-DPRK relations deteriorate as a result of lack of progress toward Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD).

Given serious, existing strains in transatlantic relations dating to 2016, any deterioration in U.S.-DPRK relations would likely generate significantly increased doubts in GS-ECE/EU and elsewhere in Europe about both the quality and the continued value of the United States’ international leadership. This consideration would apply most particularly in the event of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Already-extant animosity towards the United States among European populist parties (of both the Left and the Right) and/or in certain European governments, as well as concomitant sympathy for Russia, would thereby equally likely grow. To the same degree, any such developments would work to the near-term geo-strategic and economic advantage of Russia in Europe and possibly the long-term advantage of China. Exceptions to such a prognosis might be found in Poland and the Baltic States, however, where historically-conditioned suspicions of Moscow’s geo-strategic intentions remains pronounced.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.