SMA Publications

Effects of Investment on Pathways to Space Security

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

[Q8] How are the components of the commercial space industry allocated outside of the US? Which countries have which types of market interests on the commercial end (e.g. tourism, imagery, navigation etc.)?

Summary Response

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.

We have compiled and summarized the contributor responses in two graphics that illustrate the extent to which the commercial space industry, which accounts for around three quarters of the global space economy (Bryce Space and Technology), is globalized. The capabilities and components discussed by the contributors have been mapped according to four general “bins”: satellite, launch, new space, and science and exploration.7 The tables, however, preserve the specific components referenced by the contributors, providing more detail of each state’s depth and focus in each area.

Our aggregation of the contributor discussion of commercial space capabilities and areas of interest indicates that, as we might expect, the US, Russia, and the PRC have the most diversified commercial capabilities in launch, satellites, and science and exploration. However, India and the ESA have very similar levels of coverage in launch, satellite, and science and exploration. Other states, such as Israel, Singapore, South Korea, and the UK are choosing to invest in research and development in niche areas (Lynn). Luxembourg is discussed by the contributors as an unexpectedly active and competitive actor in commercial space. The two biggest satellite operators in terms of revenue—SES and IntelSat—are headquartered in Luxembourg, even though a large part of their business is providing services in the US (Bryce Space and Technology). The national legislature has recently passed laws to protect space property rights for Luxembourg-based companies,8 and is providing financing for private companies to develop space mining capabilities (Armor).

As the number of states developing their own commercial space industry grows, so does the potential for partnerships. China in particular has moved to build partnerships in the space sector both with developing nations with little independent space capability (Brown & May; Cheng), as well as the ESA and individual European states (Brown & May). Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin suggests that the small size of most states’ space programs has made partnerships both more necessary and easier to accomplish than is the case for the US. Dr. Martin Lindsey of United States Pacific Command and Agnieszka Lukaszczyk of Planet both suggest that, although space is becoming more crowded and congested, it is a domain in which there is considerable cooperation both between states and between the public and private sectors. This cooperation offers states with fewer resources the potential to quickly and cheaply gain access to space technologies and space-based information and services. The US has the potential to take advantage of its strength in the space domain to broaden and strengthen its existing relationships with ally and partner nations. However it needs to act fast; other nations, including challenging powers like China and Russia, are already moving ahead with partnerships, and developing regulatory environments to attract commercial space actors.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A., Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Wes Brown & Todd May (NASA); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Spire Global Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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[Q6] How do commercial ventures think about the security of their space assets during peacetime, crisis and conflict? Do industry leaders think about warfare in or through space differently than military leaders? What are their main concerns? How reliant are they on governments for warning or protection of space? What are their threat priorities?

Author(s): Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors suggest that commercial companies’ understanding of security is fundamentally different than that of military leaders. For both, security concerns reflect their primary interests; however, as their primary interests and goals are divergent, so are their perceptions of security and threat. When synthesizing the contributors’ responses, it becomes apparent that there is a relationship between commercial actors’ key interests, their security concerns and vulnerabilities, and their expectations regarding US government warnings and protection. This relationship is captured in Figure 1 below.

According to the expert contributors, commercial space companies’ key interests are maintaining business operations, continuity of revenue, continuity of growth, and continuity of profitability. Their main concerns, therefore, are any and all actions or conditions that may threaten business operations and revenue and profitability—natural, accidental, or intentional. Furthermore, intentional actions can be the result of commercial sabotage or conflict.

Interests and Threat Perceptions

The contributors indicate that we cannot think of commercial entities in the same way that we think about the national security space (NSS) community. Commercial space companies are primarily motivated by financial success,4 whereas NSS is focused on security matters. Consequently, commercial perceptions of “security” are rooted in the potential of any situation or action (intentional or accidental) to threaten profitability.

Commercial companies are also involved in different activities than governments. They often have international customer bases and, consequently, multiple roles and ties to uphold, many of which differ from those of the government (Bryce Space and Technology). Contributors from Bryce Space and Technology explain how companies often adopt an international perspective because of their global clientele:

Typically, if you’re operating a satellite business, you have an international perspective. So, with respect to the consequences of conflict or pre-conflict activities, those industry leaders are going to interpret them differently and bring different and useful perspectives to the table because they will see how those actions or situations will affect their broad business base, which is a global business base.

As several contributors note,5 commercial space companies are not all the same; they vary in size, in the types of services they provide (i.e., satellite manufacturers, satellite launch companies, etc.), and in the clients to which they provide those services. These three factors, along with commercial companies’ specific activities, shape their vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, in turn, contribute to their individual threat perceptions and security concerns.

Commercial companies’ levels of vulnerability to specific security threats and, consequently, their primary security concerns, vary according to where their assets are located. For example, satellite manufacturers and operators are likely to be most concerned about threats to their assets in space, whereas satellite launch companies are likely to be most concerned about ground-based threats. Vulnerability can also be a function of size. Often, larger commercial companies can more easily afford to provide their own security, whereas smaller companies cannot (Adranos Energetics).

Clientele also affects perceived vulnerability. Many believe that the assets of companies with clients in the national security arena are at relatively greater risk of being targeted than those involved in other types of space ventures.6 Conversely, contributors note that if a company is not involved with national security affairs, the expectation is that adversaries would have no reason to attack or tamper with that company’s assets.7 As a result, as the Harris Corporation contributors note, “commercial owners, operators, and manufacturers supporting purely commercial capabilities are unlikely to really think about potential threats or prioritize investments for self-protection.”

Commercial Companies’ Concept of Security

Some of the experts argue that, while commercial companies are concerned about security in space, they do not think about it primarily in terms of intentional kinetic attack.8 Furthermore, industry leaders generally do not think about space warfare at all,9 because they consider it to be outside of their domain. In contrast, contributors from ViaSat, Inc. state that kinetic attacks are a concern; and one that it takes “considerable moves to deter or eliminate.”10 The ViaSat, Inc. contributors note that their approach to this is to reduce the vulnerability of their network to attack and loss of continuity by “selling to all sides, [which] keeps us neutral or ‘gray,’” and tailoring design techniques to eliminate the possibility of deliberate jamming.

There is consensus among the contributors, however, that the primary concerns of commercial space entities involve the assurance of safe day-to-day business operations,11 including avoidance of natural and accidental threats, spectrum interference, intellectual property (IP) violations, and vulnerabilities in cyber security. They are also focused on their ability to generate revenue, battle competition, and manage space traffic to prevent any sort of interference.12 To reiterate, tracking potential international conflicts is not typically one of a commercial entity’s day-to-day priorities, nor is thinking about protection from an active strike.13 Furthermore, the contributors indicate that if there was a reason to be concerned about security in the military sense, commercial companies assume that the US government would offer protection.

Commercial Companies’ Perception of Risk

As discussed earlier, commercial companies think about risk in terms of loss of profit and commercial advantage rather than national security and defense capabilities.14 Most companies, particularly those that do not have military clientele, do not perceive their assets as being likely targets of military attacks or threats (Kelso). However, they do recognize that all of their assets are vulnerable to some degree at all times, and that in many cases there is not much that they can do to protect themselves.15 Commercial space companies recognize that natural hazards, (especially space debris and space weather), cyberattacks, and physical attacks (including sabotage, RF spectrum interference, and spectrum jamming) could all damage their assets at any moment despite conscious efforts to drastically reduce these risks. However, their solutions to these vulnerabilities generally do not include efforts to harden their assets or build in redundancy (a cost-prohibitive approach for most). Instead, they rely on insurance to offset these risks.

Role of Government: What Do Commercial Companies Expect?

Almost all of the contributors agree that commercial companies maintain an almost complete reliance on the US government for protection and space situational awareness (SSA) data from the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC). Several contributors17 argue that this is because commercial leaders believe that the government is best positioned and equipped to provide security against kinetic or other militarized attack against their space assets. In addition, contributors from Adranos Energetics suggest that governments also have better political and legal standing to offer these protections:

The groups that are in the best position to [regulate and protect assets in space] are governments because they have a greater power to enforce. They have greater incentives among each other, meaning governments have greater incentive to work with other governments than they do with some kind of group located in the US. They also have the resources in this and the desire to enforce it as kind of a public policy manner.

Interestingly, some contributors18 suggest that the government is unaware of the fact that commercial entities expect the US military to protect them in situations of crisis and conflict. If widespread, this lack of communication and common understanding could result in serious government-commercial tensions and vulnerabilities, not only during an intentional attack, but also in response to a natural or accidental space event.

Many of the contributors also mention how inconsistently the government shares data with commercial space entities and how this leads to uncertainty and ambiguity on the commercial side (Jah). Furthermore, some commercial leaders believe that government information is often over-classified, making it difficult for companies to know what is going on in space (Westphal). If governments would provide more information, commercial companies would be able to operate more effectively and be more aware of what is occurring in space.

Despite their dependence on government provision of warnings and protection, some contributors suggest that there is a prevalent mistrust and uncertainty as to whether the government would actually protect companies in a time of crisis or conflict. Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin even suggests that many companies think that the US government would be “ill-equipped” to adequately protect them from harm during a conflict scenario. This has prompted the establishment of a few private organizations that offer alternative sources of protection and security to commercial space companies.19 These organizations are currently few in number, but more are emerging due to the growing recognition of the shortcomings in government support. The contributors stress the need for more transparency20 and communication between the sectors to eliminate some of these misunderstandings, to explain their points of view, and to clarify what commercial companies’ expectations are.

The Bottom Line

The experts are unanimous in their assessment that industry leaders do not think about security in the same way that the military does.21 Commercial contributors argue that this is because they are focused on the health and success of their business ventures (their key interest), while the national security community is more focused on security the case of a conflict or a kinetic attack in space.

Contributors believe that the US government needs to be aware of discrepancy in thinking because the number of commercial space companies and activities are rapidly increasing, as is the probability of natural or manmade threats. Furthermore, as the US government continues to expand its reliance on commercial space capabilities for national security purposes, ensuring that commercial and government actors have a shared understanding of fundamental concepts, such as security, will be critical to avoiding costly misunderstandings and miscommunication.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia, S.p.A. a Subsidiary of OHB, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Anonymous Launch Executive; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Bryce Space and Technology; Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliott Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Michael Gold (Space Systems Loral); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Spire Global, Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University) Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q8] How do key actors in the Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) define their key national interests / regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen by each actor to be the major threats to each interest? Are there any redlines associated with these interests?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, Weston Aviles, Dr. Belinda Bragg, Dr. Larry Kuznar, Nicole Peterson, George Popp, and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This summary explores the national interests and regional objectives of seven key actors (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) in the Asia Pacific region. The interest tables below outline these key national interests and regional objectives for each actor, first identifying the actor’s specific regional interests, then providing a more detailed description of each interest, and finally coding each interest by interest type (national security, economic, international prestige, domestic political, and/or identity). An individual, stand-alone interest table is presented for each actor.

The interest tables were developed using two primary sources of information: 1) insightful written responses from eight Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) subject matter expert contributors, each of which are presented in full in the Subject Matter Expert Response Submission section of this report and are well worth reading in their entirety, and 2) supplemental open source research conducted by the authors. In-text citations are used within the interest tables and expanded reference lists are provided immediately following each interest table.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Iran’s Relationship to Yemeni Zayidis

Authors | Editors: Vern Liebl (Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning).

Executive Summary

Question 10: Do views of the Velayat-i-Faqih (in Yemen) present challenges to Iranian influences among holders of Zayid views?

Question 11: Do divergent religious views/practices present challenges among the Iranian populace in relation to presentation of the Iranian government as protectors of Yemeni Zayidis?

Before delving into the questions, it is important to delineate the differences (and similarities) between Zaydi Shi’a Islam and Imamiyya Shi’a Islam. Both are, today, considered sub-branches of Shi’a Islam, with the Imamiyya (also called the Jafari school of Ithna’Ashari, or 12ers) much more widespread while the Zaydi (sometimes known as Jafurdiyya) are largely located in northwestern Yemen and southwestern Saudi Arabia. Both share the first four Imams in the lineage from Muhammad, those being as follows:

1. Ali ibn Abi Talib, called “The Beloved” and for Sunnis considered the legitimate 4th Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphs (Rightly Guided Successors). His wife was Fatima az-Zahra, youngest daughter of Muhammad (considered by Shia to be the only daughter of Muhammad) and mother of Hasan and Husayn. He is buried at Najaf.

2. Hasan ibn Ali, called “The Chosen,” first son of Ali and oldest surviving grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Medina.

3. Husayn ibn Ali, called “Master of the Martyrs,” second son of Ali, grandson of Muhammad. He is buried at Karbala.

4. Ali ibn Husayn, called “One who constantly Prostrates” and/or “Ornament of the Worshippers.” He is buried at Medina.

And here is where the split occurs. For the majority of Shia in the world, the Imamiyya and the Isma’ili (7ers), the next Imam in line is:

5. Muhammad ibn Ali bin Husayn, called “The Revealer of Knowledge.” His mother was Fatimah bint al- Hasan ibn Ali, daughter of the second Imam Hasan and great-granddaughter of Muhammad. The marriage of these two united the Hasan and Husayn branches of the family, which brought great legitimacy with it. He is buried at Medina.

For Zaydi, they consider Zayd ibn Ali, called “Ally of the Quran,” as the true fifth Imam. His mother was Jayda al- Sindhi, thus making a half-brother to Muhammad ibn Ali. He led a revolt against the Umayyids and failed, therefore he is buried in two places; his body in Kufa (Iraq) and his head at Karak (Jordan). He is also called “Zayd al-Shaheed” (Zayd the Martyr).

Contributors: TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch

Executive Summary

This paper provides the TRADOC G27 Models and Simulations Branch initial assessment for Phases I and II of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) CENTCOM Afghanistan project. Phase I specifically assessed the impact of three different hypothetical Afghan government constructs: Centralized, Enhanced Local Governance and Decentralized (regional). Phase II focused on the potential outcomes of a negotiated settlement including: truce, power-sharing Afghan government, and reconciliation.

TRADOC G27 used the Athena Simulation to model the discrete futures listed above in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each future by measuring control, influence, support, security and the relationship between the population and GIRoA.2 This analysis was descriptive rather than prescriptive. Follow on efforts will use the results from the 19 November 2018 United States Institute for Peace workshop in order to further refine these potential futures.

Overall Insights

1. A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas but opens these areas to regional leader and Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA.

2. While much of Afghanistan’s territory is not controlled by GIRoA the QST can only control large amounts of territory under very specific conditions.

3. A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce does not result in any increased GIRoA control.

4. Irrespective of how the study scenario reintegrated QST fighters into the ANSF (both in number and ANSF component), it did not substantially impact GIRoA control or popular support over simply demobilizing them.

5. QST fighter demobilization resulted in by far the greatest improvement of GIRoA control and increase in GIRoA popular support of all the variables we assessed in both Phases I and II.

Contributors: Jafri, A., Stevenson, J., Kuznar, E. & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

In August of 2018, United States Central Command asked the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Reachback team, How can the United States best increase the resolve and capability of regional actors to get to political reconciliation in Afghanistan? This report highlights the results of NSI’s Interest-Resolve-Capability (I-R-C)™ analysis of Afghanistan stakeholder dynamics.

The I-R-C analysis reveals a stakeholder preference for some kind of stable political settlement (the exception is the ISKP). However, under current conditions, the analysis also suggests that critical stakeholders are divided between two stability outcomes—Enhanced Governance and Brokered Settlement. Sensitivity analyses of stakeholders’ interests ranking reveal that this divide is maintained by the United States as the most resolved and most capable actor in favor of Enhanced Governance over Brokered Settlement. The United States’ preferences were found to be extremely robust; the key factor limiting the United States support of Brokered Settlement is its ongoing, global competition for relative geopolitical influence vis-à-vis China and Russia. For almost all the other actors, a Brokered Settlement is the potential outcome most likely to find broad stakeholder support—or at least avoid direct opposition; besides the United States, those resolved against Brokered Settlement, such as the ISKP and KSA, lack capability to undermine the outcome.

The report concluded that the United States can increase key stakeholder’s resolve in favor of political reconciliation in Afghanistan by prioritizing a Brokered Settlement more than geopolitical influence competition. Our analysis suggests that the United States will still possess high absolute levels of influence capability, though its levels of influence capability relative to Russia and China may be less asymmetrically in its favor. In other words, a cooperative approach which nourishes the rise of other stakeholders’ levels of influence may counter-intuitively better preserve sustainable (and more affordable) options for long-term United States’ influence in the region beyond a two to five-year window.kuz

[Q1] Is there a win-win scenario for all of the key actors (DPRK, ROK, US, China, Russia)? If so, what might this look like?

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of thirty-three insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider the possibility of a win-win scenario for the key actors involved with the DPRK. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Bottom Line Up Front

• Several contributors note that while Japan is not listed as a “key actor” in the question, it is certainly a key actor in relation to the Korean Peninsula and Asia Pacific region and should be considered as such in this assessment.
• Twenty-one of the thirty-four contributors (about 62%) do not believe that a win-win scenario exists for all of the key actors. These contributors generally assess that the current interests of the key actors involved, particularly the US vs. DPRK vs. China and Russia, are irreconcilable (i.e., the DPRK considers its nuclear capability as indispensable, while the US insists on final, fully verified denuclearization [FFVD]. China and Russia want to see US influence in the region diminished, while the US, obviously, does not).
• Eight of the thirty-four contributors (about 23%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors may be possible, at least in the short-term, but doubt that such a scenario could actually be achieved over the long-term. These contributors generally highlight a misalignment of long-term interests among the key actors and an overall lack of trust in the DPRK to fulfill any agreements it makes as the key barriers to a win-win scenario for all of the key actors.
• Five of the thirty-four contributors (about 15%) believe that a win-win scenario for all of the key actors is possible without much qualification. These contributors acknowledge the differences in interests amongst the key actors, but generally assess that there is room for negotiation in pursuit of a win-win outcome.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Maorong Jiang, Creighton University; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Matt Korda, NATO; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Dr. Steve Tsang, University of London; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

To cause intended effects—and avoid unintended effects—in the fiendishly complex regional environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers are required to understand both what motivates key actors and what type of strategic confrontation they face. To these ends, this report applies core insights from the cognition and neuroscience of decision-making, combined with data from historical and contemporary cases of decision-making such as the past 50 years of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) military-diplomatic campaigns. Two broad sets of conclusions emerge. The first arise from analysing core cognitive dimensions of what motivates the DPRK and key regional actors. These include:

(a) Managing unpredictability is a central challenge for U.S. policymakers: The DPRK has skilfully manipulated unexpectedness to maximise the impact of its diplomatic and military actions for over 50 years – U.S. policymakers must manage those effects on themselves, U.S. domestic audiences and allies. For allies such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Japan, the U.S. must also manage the unexpectedness of its own actions, as unpredictability often damages the trust on which rests U.S. credibility and extended deterrence.

(b) Fear drives much regional behavior – and because the DPRK, ROK, U.S., Japan, China have fundamentally different and mismatched fears no single solution can address them. For instance, a key DPRK fear is personal death for the leadership; a key Japanese fear is China’s rise; China’s overriding fear is the U.S.; the U.S. fears DPRK intercontinental nuclear weapons. Only coordinated action on all fronts can address these fears.

(c) Fairness: Rejection of perceived injustice fuels Sino-Japanese and ROK-Japanese antagonism, as well as Japanese concerns over abductions – all destabilizing any regional peace process. Any deal must be perceived as fair or it likely won’t stick.

Second, the U.S. must understand what type of conflict it faces – a “Grey Zone” conflict. North Korea has conducted “Grey Zone” conflict for most of the past half century, literally neither fully at peace nor war. Grey Zone conflict also increasingly characterises regional competition between China, Japan and the ROK. This provides a powerful new lens to understand and manage this devilishly difficult DPRK confrontation and its regional ramifications. Managing Grey Zone conflict requires particular tools. It is necessarily limited conflict. Thus, the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences, rather than removing their capacity to choose using brute force in itself. I apply evidence-based tools for influence in the Grey Zone (Wright 2017, Cognition in the Grey Zone), examined in the historical and current cases noted above. The U.S. retains a portfolio of unused Grey Zone actions it can threaten or apply to the DPRK, e.g. extensive information operations in the DPRK to decrease regime power. Understanding the Korean challenge as a Grey Zone conflict helps the U.S. anticipate and manage regional implications with allies (e.g. ROK and Japan) as well as competitors (e.g. China and Russia).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?

Author(s): George Popp (NSI, Inc.) and Mariah Yager (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of thirty responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions are necessary for achieving final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) without resorting to militarized conflict. This summary details the various conditions that emerge. The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD is a point highlighted by a majority of the contributors, with several contributors expressing significant doubt that a denuclearized DPRK is possible at all. At best, contributors suggest, true progress towards achieving FFVD will require a long-term perspective, modified expectations, and a measured approach; however, even this does not ensure success. Nevertheless, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves.

Setting the Stage and Changing the Outlook

In considering necessary conditions for achieving FFVD, contributorsset the stage by reviewing the DPRK’s motivations for its nuclear weapons program. The prestige of being a nuclear power is certainly important to the Kim regime and the people of the DPRK, but it also helps to ensure the regime’s hold on governing power and control, while also playing to its Juche ideology. Nuclear capability provides the DPRK with security and deterrent capability against potential threats to its sovereignty from outside forces, leverage over other international actors (particularly the ROK), and relevancy and legitimacy on the international stage.

In reflecting on the motivations behind the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, several contributors offer necessary conditions for achieving FFVD that are more akin to perspective or ideological shifts, rather than on-the-ground requisites. These shifts, contributors stress, are compulsory conditions to having any chance of achieving FFVD.

Building Mutual Trust

Contributors who advocate for perspective shifts as being a necessary condition for achieving FFVD emphasize that, in order for any credible steps towards DPRK denuclearization to occur, the key actors involved have to work towards establishing and building mutual trust. Currently, there is a severe lack of trust among the key actors, and this lack of trust, contributors suggest, is a major impediment to the perspective shifts and on-the-ground conditions needed for true progress towards achieving FFVD. Overcoming this impediment, however, may not be easy, as there appears to be little reason (if any at all) currently for the DPRK and the US to trust each other. Thus, as the situation stands currently, the US would have to take substantial risk in trusting any DRPK commitment to FFVD and, at the same time, would have to offer serious reassurances and/or binding agreements to appease the DPRK’s distrust of the US and its true intentions relating to FFVD. Even such reassurances, however, may not be enough given recent US precedent. Dr. Todd Robinson of the Air Command and Staff College, for example, argues that “the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA was a colossal strategic mistake that might ultimately make an agreement with the DPRK impossible, as it suggests that a state might do exactly what it is required to do under the terms of whatever agreement is made and the US might simply renege on its end of the bargain because it feels like it.”

New Perspectives

In addition to the need to overcome an absence of mutual trust, the key actors involved in the DPRK denuclearization process may also have to adjust their existing perspectives and ideologies. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors suggest, will require a shift in the way in which the DPRK thinks about nuclear weapons. More specifically, the Kim regime will have to accept that the security of the regime, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and international prestige of Kim Jong-un and the DPRK would not be harmed—and may actually be increased—without nuclear weapons. Essentially, contributors explain, the DPRK would have to be convinced that there is no threat against the state and, therefore, there is no need for nuclear weapons. If such a shift in the DPRK perspective were to occur, it would likely increase the possibility of FFVD being achieved. This appears to be particularly true, contributors suggest, if the DPRK perspective were to start shifting towards perceiving economic power as being more important than nuclear power, as a more economically-focused mindset may drive the regime towards exchanging nuclear capability for economic opportunity and normalized relations with the international community. Ultimately, however, this type of shift in perspective would require the DPRK to fundamentally change its worldview and raison d’être.

The US may also have to shift the way in which it thinks about the DPRK and denuclearization, including potentially making exceptions to previously held expectations and redlines, in order to achieve FFVD. Achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, contributors contend, may require the US to take a new approach to the DPRK, specifically one in which the US starts to accept and recognize the DPRK and the Kim regime on the international stage. Such a shift in the US perspective may be a particularly impactful move toward achieving FFVD, Dr. Justin Hastings of the University of Sydney suggests, especially if this US acceptance of the DPRK includes a loosening of restrictions on DPRK economic activity and if the US itself commits to economic investment with the DPRK.

Economic, Political, and Social Conditions Conducive to Achieving FFVD Without Militarized Conflict

Beyond the need for mutual trust and new perspectives discussed above, contributors also highlight several more on-the-ground conditions that may be conducive to achieving FFVD in the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict. The lists below summarize the political, economic, and social conditions most commonly cited by contributors. With thirty contributors offering conditions, however, the list of ideas is extensive, with some conditions directly contradicting others.

Inside the DPRK

Reassure Kim Jong-un’s safety and US credibility:

• Significant reassurances are provided to Kim Jong-un that FFVD will not threaten the security of his regime.
• Credible assurance is provided that the US will not renege on its agreements.
• The DPRK is acknowledged as a member of the international community.
• The US commits to not implementing any new sanctions during FFVD negotiations.

Support economic growth:

• Opportunities are created for the DPRK to access international markets and foreign economic aid.
• Economic development is promoted in the DPRK beyond Pyongyang and the Kim regime.

Improve social conditions:

• Social exchanges are facilitated between the DPRK and other countries(e.g., cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges are initiated in the region, particularly with the ROK; DPRK officials are allowed to travel and study abroad; Americans are allowed to live and work in the DPRK).

Regime change:

• Regime change occurs in the DPRK (e.g., peaceful coup occurs within the DPRK; Kim Jong-un suddenly dies and there is an ascension of figures dependent on China or the ROK; isolation from the outside world becomes so profound that the DPRK collapses, leaving its people and territory to fall under ROK or foreign tutelage).

US-China

The US and China cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US and China fully commit to and cooperate on offering the DPRK economic, political, and security assistance and guarantees.
• The US and China exert costly economic pressure on the DPRK to force it into initial FFVD negotiations and keep it on track towards FFVD.

The US and China do not cooperate on the DPRK:

• The US applies maximum economic pressure against both the DPRK and China (e.g., the US strengthens export/import embargoes against the DPRK and China and toughens sanctions against Chinese financial institutions doing business with the DPRK) to isolate the DPRK from China and force the DPRK to comply with US FFVD demands.

Multilateralism

• The US commits to a multilateral approach that incorporates key regional actors (i.e., DPRK, US, ROK, China, Japan, and Russia) to work towards a broader Asian Pacific regional security architecture.

Reduced Tension on the Korean Peninsula

• US-ROK military exercises are reduced or terminated.
• DPRK-ROK talks on the reunification or demilitarization of the peninsula are established.
• The Korean War is formally ended and a peace treaty is signed.
• Missile and weapon verification and limitation agreements are negotiated with the DPRK.
• DPRK-ROK joint military professional exchanges are established.
• DPRK and ROK observers are increasingly invited to regional military exercises.

What is the Best Approach to Achieving FFVD?

The insuperable odds of achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict is a point that is echoed in nearly every contributor response. Not surprisingly, therefore, contributors emphasize the importance of carefully considering the approach that is taken towards achieving FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the approach and order of conditions may matter more than the conditions themselves. Contributors are generally definitive, however, in the view that FFVD should be viewed as a long-term objective that requires a measured approach. Such an approach, contributors explain, must allow the key actors involved ample time to build and establish mutual trust—a fundamental element of any approach to peaceful denuclearization. To help build this trust among key actors, contributors suggest, the US and its regional allies must implement a clearly devised and projected set of executable policies.

As such, contributors reflect on what they envision to be the best approach to achieving FFVD without resorting to militarized conflict, presenting several options for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine and Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann of Texas A&M favor a phased approach in which parties work together to implement a defined set of conditions over time (i.e., limits on testing and missile production, increases in DPRK-ROK joint military exchanges, progression towards regional agreements on cooperative threat reduction measures) rather than immediately pushing for denuclearization. Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University offers a “strategic trust” approach, pointing to US-Soviet arms control process as a potential model. Jenny Town of the Stimson Center advances an approach in which the US extends political concessions and commitments early on to consider what the DPRK is willing to do and how far it is willing to progress towards FFVD. Offering these kinds of commitments up front, she believes, could fuel more advanced negotiations later in the process. Finally Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies highlights the importance of sequencing in any approach to achieving FFVD, arguing that granting the DPRK its “ultimate carrot” (i.e., diplomatic recognition)should be the final step in the process, given only once there is confidence that FFVD has indeed been achieved.

Other contributors advocate for an approach that incorporate elements of both punishment and reward. Dr. Rupal Mehta of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln offers an “ad-hoc carrots and sticks” approach that combines a punishments pathway (e.g., targeted sanctions—particularly against the DPRK military—and cyber intervention) with a parallel rewards pathway (e.g., regional economic incentives and financial assistance, particularly from China). Hastings considers a three-phased approach that combines Chinese pressure, US guarantees, and DPRK compensation (i.e., China exerts economic pressure on the DPRK to begin denuclearization efforts and stay on a pathway toward denuclearization, the US provides security and economic guarantees to the DPRK, and the DPRK denuclearizes and shares the economic benefits it receives for doing so with its military and entrepreneurial elite).

Finally, some contributors advocate for an approach that is more focused on internal, domestic DPRK dynamics. For example, Town posits that the best approach may be one that allows Kim Jong-un to present himself as a hero to his people, which, she suggests, may embolden him to choose a new, nonnuclear path. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies suggests that an approach focused on reunifying the peninsula under Seoul’s leadership is likely the approach that is most certain to achieve FFVD. He reminds us, however, that there can be no guarantees that such an approach would not resort to militarized conflict. Therefore, he advocates for an approach that combines implementing robust economic sanctions and launching an information campaign to erode the regime’s domestic governing power and support. A prolonged erosion of the regime’s power and support, he believes, could eventually compel change.

Ultimately, it is unclear that any approach could truly achieve FFVD on the Korean Peninsula. The best outcome for the US, therefore, may include living with a de facto nuclear DPRK, an improved relationship with the hostile state, and acceptance of the DPRK into the international community. What does seem clear, however, is that in order for progress to be made toward achieving FFVD in the DPRK, major shifts in perspectives and expectations are needed on all sides.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Dr. John Delury, Yonsei University; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. Justin Hastings, University of Sydney; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Dr. Adam Mount, Federation of American Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Todd C. Robinson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Jenny Town, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributing Authors | Editors: Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Lt Col Peter Garretson (USAF), Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Bruce W. MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Kazuto Suzuki (Hokkaido University, Japan), Brian C. Weeden (Secure World Foundation), Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University), and Mariah C. Yager (JS/J39/SMA/NSI)

Executive Summary

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.

(1) Managing space operations now is not the same as in the Cold War Space Age (1957-1990) or the Unipolar US Space Age (1990-2014) – we recently entered a new space epoch, the “Gray Zone-Entangled Space Age.” It has two distinguishing features:

(a) Gray Zone conflict is more than normal competition and less than war. Space strategic conflict mirrors the Gray Zone conflict on earth, with a rising China and resurgent Russia. Space is ideal for Gray Zone conflict, particularly using diverse reversible technologies (Chs. 1 and 8). As James Lewis puts it (Ch. 3): “If America is waiting for the onset of armed conflict, it will miss the game.”

Recommendations: Gray Zone conflict in space is necessarily limited conflict, and thus the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences. Both influence and control are necessary for US success. US space policy and practice must explicitly place influence and control at the heart of space operations.

US decision-makers must have options to respond proportionally to Gray Zone conflict in space, enabling responses without escalation to war. Allies are critical (e.g. Ch. 7 on Japan), as is long-term competition to shape norms (Ch. 8).

(b) Entanglement: Crucial conventional and nuclear space missions are now deeply entangled, so warfighting with near-peers in space for conventional purposes profoundly threatens the nuclear mission. Commercial and military space systems are also increasingly entangled.

Recommendations: In the short-term, US decision-makers must now prepare for space operations during crises to rapidly escalate to the nuclear level (e.g. involving the space-based infrared system; SBIRs). This should be mitigated by dialogue and US deterrent signals. In the medium-term, the US must reduce dependency on fragile, entangled space assets such as SBIRs – and demonstrate that reduced US dependency.

(2) Managing escalation in space operations is not the same as in other domains. The nature of conflict is the same across domains, but the character differs.

Recommendations: Chs. 1, 2 and 7 outline the particular emphases required for space operations, e.g. dealing with ambiguity and offense-dominance.

(3) Chinese strategic thinking on space, escalation, and space escalation differs from US thinking.

Recommendations: To avoid misperception, planners must take seriously different Chinese thinking on space conflict, e.g. related to deterrence or space blockade (Ch. 4). Beyond conflict, the US Government (USG) more broadly must compete for position over longer-term space industrialization (Chs. 5 and 6).