SMA Publications

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

This study was conducted to address three guiding questions:

1. How does DPRK define its key national interests/regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen to be the major threats to each interest?

2. Does analysis of Kim Jong-un’s discourse provide a cognitive assessment?

3. What are the most effective ways of communicating with Kim Jong-un?

Summary and Implications for Strategic Communications with Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-un is far less geopolitically aware than Kim Il-sung and, similar to Kim Jong-il, is fairly rigid and unchanging in his political discourse. He exhibits more of an interest in economic development and in overall DPRK capability (including military) than his predecessor. The U.S. as leader of a Western, capitalist alliance is considered the ultimate threat to all DPRK national interests. Kim Jong-un appears to be relying less on Juche philosophy (see Changes in Political Ideology below) although he continues to use very abstract religious language such as sacredness and eternity. Based on these patterns and comparisons to his predecessors the following inferences seem reasonable answers to the guiding questions.

• The DPRK’s capability (economic and military) are central concerns upon which he is most likely to focus.
• His lack of geopolitical awareness and mostly rigid discourse indicates a simple worldview and inflexible thinking style.
• Kim Jong-un may be shifting toward a more secular and pragmatic worldview, although Juche philosophy remains an important frame for his thinking, and therefore, Juche philosophy should be well understood when communicating with him.
• However, stressing more abstract transcendent themes over older communist and Juche rhetoric will probably be increasingly effective with Kim Jong-un.

Specific insights concerning each of DPRK’s three historic leaders

Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-un’s worldview as expressed in his political discourse is largely consistent with core concepts central to DPRK politics throughout its history. These core concepts include a dedication to communist ideals and adherence to Juche philosophy, which includes unquestioning obedience to the Kim leaders, the need for strict discipline and rules, unending revolutionary struggle, and dedication to creating a self-sufficient DPRK. However, he exhibits the following departures from his grandfather and/or father.

• Kim Jong-un lacks broader awareness of global politics, being myopically focused on the Korean peninsula and the U.S., in contrast to Kim Il-sung (but similar to Kim Jong-il).
• Kim Jong-il placed great emphasis on religious-like concepts and Juche philosophy, as Kim Jongun continues to do so as well, although less than his father.
• While Juche philosophy is still central to how Kim Jong-un frames nearly every issue, he statistically is moving away from this frame.
• Upon taking power, Kim Jong-un retained his father’s ideological agenda, but added new themes related to economic development and other strength and capability themes he associates with economic or military power.
• Kim Jong-il has changed his political discourse very little in the past six years.

Kim Jong-il

Kim Jong-il was much more ideologically oriented and less globally aware than his father, and exhibited an absolutely rigid adherence to his Juche philosophical frame. He exhibited no ability to adjust his political perspective or interests despite economic crisis and widespread famine in the 1990s.

Kim Il-sung

Kim Il-sung exhibited a broad awareness of global politics, and an ability to adapt his political discourse to historical changes. His pragmatism was most evident during the Korean war when he largely abandoned ideological interests in favor of pragmatic concerns of prosecuting a war and surviving as a nation. Despite originating Juche philosophy, Kim Il-sung exhibits far less ideological speech than his son and grandson.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Lt General (Retired) Robert Elder (George Mason University) and Dr. Alexander Levis (George Mason University)

Abstract

The GMU Korean Peninsula strategic outcomes project sought viable political-military options to achieve U.S. strategic objectives with respect to the Korean Peninsula, and examined whether executing these options will introduce risk to other regional U.S. objectives. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States, and to develop a framework for use by operational planning teams. The TIN model started with possible end-states and examined influence factors that could contribute or undermine attainment of the end-state of interest—in this case Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD). The model explored possible intermediate states that would be likely to occur on a path towards FFVD denuclearization and also considered potential US and partner influence factors that could contribute to the intermediate and end-states. Experiments suggest that denuclearization, if achieved, will require many years to implement and the achievement of political, economic, and military accommodations that seem improbable today.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Malicious Non-state Actors and Contested Space Operations

Authors: Rachel Gabriel (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)) and Barnett Koven (START)

Executive Summary

This report provides an analysis of potential threats to space-based systems posed by non-state actors. It places particular emphasis on the need to consider the space domain as part of a multi-domain threat environment where domains are interconnected and interdependent. This research devotes significant attention to examining the nexus between space and cybersecurity, and to the strategic vulnerabilities posed by the increasing integration of cyber and space technologies in critical infrastructure.

It proceeds by examining the nature of cross-domain threats, and the space-cyber nexus. It then provides an overview of potential space-based threats and risks. Subsequently, the report develops a typology of malicious actors based on their motives and capabilities. Importantly, this report evaluates the risks that each type of actor might pose individually or in concert with other types of actors. While some non-state actors with malicious intent possess the requisite capabilities to directly threaten space-based systems, many groups possess only malicious intent or the requisite capabilities – not both. Consequently, considering non-state actor collaboration is especially necessary. This report also highlights how space-based capabilities, such as open-source satellite imagery, can be (and indeed, has been) exploited by nonstate actors to further their terrestrial objectives. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations to increase resiliency.

In disaggregating threatening groups by motivation and capabilities, this report finds that of all the types of actors, cyber warriors backed by nation states have the greatest potential and interest to interfere in space. In contrast, more traditional violent non-state actors (VNSAs) have the most limited capability, and probably the smallest interest, in interfering in space. Despite this, it is clear that VNSAs do have much to gain by exploiting space-based technologies (e.g., for intelligence collection, propaganda) in support of their terrestrial activities.

While many of the scenarios contained in this report are largely hypothetical, they are possible. Specifically, at least some non-state groups already possess many of the requisite capabilities and malicious intent. Moreover, there are numerous known security deficiencies in commercial space technologies. As commercialization of the space domain and the number of new commercial entrants increase, existing vulnerabilities will become more pronounced, and additional vulnerabilities will be created. In short, the expansion of multinational commercial space operations is outpacing the ability of governments to anticipate or regulate activities in this domain. Moreover, as space-based capabilities become ever more important to economic activity and terrestrial infrastructure, they also become more attractive targets.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Contributors: Aviles, W. & Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This study was conducted to address the question: How can the US increase the resolve and capability of Pakistan to support political reconciliation in Afghanistan and the region?

Two methods of textual analysis were applied to a corpus of 30 Imran Khan speeches that spanned the period of 2007 to 2018, although most speeches postdated 2013 and represent his recent rise to power. The methods were quantitative discourse analysis (QDA) and the Linguistic and Inventory Word Count (LIWC).

The primary political themes Imran Khan expressed in his public discourse are:

• The political machinery of Pakistan and criticism of his political opponents;
• Fighting corruption;
• Appeals to religion (generic Islamic values) and appeals to the common masses;
• Pakistani domestic terrorism and extricating from American counterterrorism efforts;
• The Pakistan economy; his interest in the economy has surged in recent years;
o Imran Khan has a decidedly left-of-center, welfare state model of economic development that he claims is consistent with Islamic principles.
• His interest in education has increased in recent years, emphasizing improving its quality and access to it, including for women and girls.

Imran Khan foreign policy:
Imran Khan claims to seek positive foreign relations with India, the U.S., Afghanistan and China. His views on India are unconventional within the context of traditional power elites in Pakistan. The extent to which the Pakistani military has dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy and their seemingly close relationship with Imran Khan may limit his ability to act independently on these issues.

His language use indicates the following psychological characteristics
• His language exhibits high status and a need for power;
• He has a negative worldview;
• His interest in economic issues is increasing in time;
• His anxiety levels, although initially high, are decreasing through time.

General implications of these findings:
• Imran Khan is very political and particularly open to positions that would enhance his standing and power
in domestic politics.
• Support that would enable him to contend with incidents of domestic terrorism and to improve both the
Pakistani economy and education system should be particularly attractive to him.
• His appeals to religious conservatism manifested among the common masses (as opposed to formal clergy or Islamic extremists) are vital to maintaining his base; positions that would threaten these appeals
would be contrary to his interests and possibly his genuine sentiments.
Implications for Afghanistan reconciliation and reintegration:
• Imran Khan has stated that he would like to be a broker in Afghan reconciliation efforts. If he is truthful in
this intent, aiding him in shoring up his power domestically is likely to help increase his resolve to support Afghan reconciliation and reintegration. Political issues that matter most to him in his public discourse include:
o Domestic terrorism, the economy, education, and maintaining his common, rural and socially conservative base;
o FightingcorruptioninPakistan;
o ForeignaffairswithIndia,theU.S.,AfghanistanandChina.
• An important caveat is that Imran Khan’s ability to advance his foreign affairs agenda, including
reconciliation in Afghanistan, could well be thwarted by Pakistan’s military establishment.

[Q7] Many analysts indicate that due to the partial marketization of the North Korean economy, the economy has stabilized somewhat. What were the key reasons the regime made the decision to marketize? What factors inhibit a broader marketization of the economy?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 12 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. The expert contributors identify factors that explain the apparent condoning of controlled marketization in North Korea, as well as factors that appear to be inhibiting broader marketization in the country. This summary first discusses the key drivers of North Korean marketization and then considers the primary inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

Key Drivers of North Korean Marketization Efforts

Four key reasons emerge from the expert contributor responses as primary drivers of North Korean marketization efforts.

• The economic downturn and famine that engulfed North Korea and eventually led to the collapse of the country’s Public Distribution System in the 1990s.
• The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans that have started acclimating to marketization.
• The emergence of Kim Jong Un and new economic development policy.
• The reassuring precedent from China integrating itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant economic growth and development while preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime.

Economic Downturn, Famine, and the Collapse of the Public Distribution System

The reason most frequently cited by the contributors to explain marketization in North Korea is the significant economic downturn and famine that engulfed the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, what Dr. James Hoare of Chatham House describes as North Korea’s “economic meltdown.”1 A weak North Korean economy was struggling, as economic infrastructure and equipment decayed and agricultural land wore down. Environmental challenges (e.g., flooding, drought) only made the situation more difficult. All of these obstacles, interacting together, put serious strain on the economy, making an already troubling economic situation even more problematic.2 The situation eventually grew even more dire when, unable to withstand the economic downturn, the regime’s central ration system for providing food and other necessities to its people, the Public Distribution System, collapsed, sparking widespread famine and desperation across the country, with many North Koreans left by their government to survive on their own.

Several contributors point to this collapse of the Public Distribution System as the proximate cause of North Korea’s initial shift toward marketization.4 The collapse meant that the regime was no longer capable of providing basic necessities. No longer able to rely on the regime for basic needs and survival, North Koreans took desperate measures including turning to informal markets for sustenance.5 Despite concerns over the legality of such informal markets, and an overall ideological opposition to marketization and capitalism in general, the regime did not move to quash these activities, seemingly concluding that the seriousness of the situation warranted concession. Soojin Park of the Wilson Center explains that the regime was ultimately left with “no choice but to tacitly condone” and tolerate the spread of commercial activity and marketization across the country, as it offered a means of survival for many North Koreans.6 Thus, an informal market economy emerged to help fill the void left by the failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System.

Importantly, this progression suggests that North Korean marketization initially resulted from what appears to be largely a bottom-up, rather than top-down, process.7 Park states this point directly: “North Korea’s marketization did not come about by design, but rather as a result of the state’s failure to sustain the livelihoods of its population.”

Rising Expectations of North Koreans Acclimating to the Market Economy

The rising expectations and aspirations of North Koreans who have started to benefit from marketization is also cited by contributors as a key reason for the regime’s decisions to allow limited marketization.8 The failure of the regime’s Public Distribution System unintentionally opened the door to private enterprise in North Korea, and introduced many North Koreans to the idea of a market economy. It also provided many North Koreans with an opportunity to witness first-hand some of the advantageous aspects of marketization. Since the regime’s initial limited opening to the idea of individual citizens profiting from informal market segments outside strict government controls, marketizing activity across the country has increased as North Koreans acclimate to the market economy. These activities, in fact, have created a new class of wealthy elites (“Donju”) who have been able to use their new-found wealth to purchase influence in the country’s economic and political institutions, further adding to their gains.9 Seeing the advancements that have emerged from marketization has driven higher the economic expectations and aspirations of many North Koreans, and has increased curiosity about the kinds of economic advancement opportunities that could arise from further broadening marketization within the country.

Any attempt by the North Korean regime to significantly curb marketization, therefore, is likely to face some degree of pushback from the North Korean population.11 Park reminds us of the regime’s unsuccessful attempts to curb private entrepreneurship and decelerate marketization in 2007 and 2009. She explains that “such attempts, including the currency reform measure in November 2009— redenominating 100 won for 1 won—angered the people and were met with direct resistance, though short of rebellion.” This pushback, Park suggests, helped the regime “realize that it would need to tolerate and allow market activities and marketization as a way to counter the people’s complaints.”

North Koreans with rising economic aspirations are likely to look to the Kim regime to establish and maintain an economic environment that will empower them to achieve their ambitions. The onus, therefore, is on the regime to stimulate and develop the North Korean economy. Not doing so, and diverging from popular expectations, could hurt the regime’s legitimacy even more so than maintaining tight centralized control. In fact, Ken Gause of CNA suggests that the Kim regime is already feeling pressure from North Korean elites on this front:

The idea that Kim Jong Un came to the notion of diplomacy and engagement as a result of the Maximum Pressure Campaign is a fallacy. He has been preparing the country for this moment since 2012. That said, he doesn’t have a lot of time. He is on a clock. By opening up the markets, he has exacerbated the differences in economic classes. The so-called moneyed elite (“Donju”) have rising expectations and have suffered as a result of the sanctions. This class of elite is particularly critical to Kim’s hold on power. Only through opening to the outside world, albeit in a controlled fashion, can he satisfy this demand. If left unsatisfied, his legitimacy will begin to suffer.

The Emergence of Kim Jong Un as the Leader of North Korea

Contributors also consider Kim Jong Un’s emergence as the leader of North Korea to be a key driver of the country’s economic decentralization.12 The contributors generally believe that Kim has exhibited noticeable interest in economic development and marketization since taking over control. For example, he frequently discusses economic development in public, has initiated several highly-visible economic development initiatives (e.g., sparkling new apartment blocks in Pyongyang, the Masikryong Ski Resort in Kangwon Province, and a new international terminal at the Kalma Airport in Wonsan), and has instituted market reforms in the interest of promoting development and growth.13 Moreover, Kim appears willing to both accept some degree of marketization in North Korea and capitalize on markets within the country for economic and political gain. Gause even goes so far as to assert that Kim “gave free reign to the markets” upon taking over control. Kim’s objective in doing so, Gause explains, was to help stabilize the North Korean economy by capitalizing on the markets to supply much needed goods and services, as well as to start acclimating the North Korean population to the market economies.

Ultimately, contributors appear to agree with the assessment from Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies that Kim appears to be “serious about improving the North Korean economy” and is willing to “stake some of his personal legitimacy on economicdevelopment.”

Reassuring Precedent from China’s Approach to Reform

Several contributors suggest that China’s approach to reform might be perceived by the North Korean regime as a reassuring precedent.14 Some of the same factors that drove economic reform in China are likely to be behind North Korea’s efforts to reshape its economic policies. Therefore, North Korea may find reassurance in, and be encouraged by, China’s ability to integrate itself into the international system in a way that promotes significant growth and development of its economy while also preserving the security and legitimacy of its political system and regime. China’s success on this front may entice North Korea into employing a similar approach. Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force emphasizes this point, offering a concise assessment of the dynamics:

Many Asian leaders have witnessed China’s stunning growth and realize you can develop economically yet remain authoritarian because the West will open their societies to you if you act peacefully. It is probable that Kim has finally seen the wisdom of the Chinese approach. This will encourage them to copy China’s economic development model.

Hoare, on the other hand, raises doubt about just how far the North Korean regime would be willing to follow any sort of Chinese model. North Koreans, Hoare argues, “have a very ambivalent relationship with China and resent being told that they should follow a Chinese model. And, of course, they were an industrialized nation well before China.”

Key Factors Inhibiting Broader North Korean Marketization Efforts

There are also three key factors that expert contributors cite as inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

• The Kim regime’s perception of economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.
• The Kim regime’s tight grip on the flow of information in the country and its desire to create ideological purity.
• Structural factors (e.g., productive capacity is severely lacking, the economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment, there is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level, legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak, markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption, and international sanctions have prevented the benefits afforded by globalization).

Fear of Economic Liberalization Threatening the Regime’s Fundamental Interests

The Kim regime appears to view economic liberalization and broad marketization as a serious and direct threat to its fundamental interest, the security and survival of the regime.15 Thus, while Kim has demonstrated a willingness to accept some degree of marketization inside North Korea, he is not likely to tolerate any sort of political reform or interference coinciding with economic reform initiatives. Nor is Kim likely interested in fully opening the North Korean economy to broad marketization, as doing so could risk the kind of significant economic and social change that could spark political instability. It would also likely reduce the regime’s ability to maintain absolute control over the population and undermine the regime’s legitimacy.16 As Park explains, “a totalitarian state like North Korea which is maintained under strict control over its people and society becomes increasingly vulnerable when it allows greater liberalization…while willing to accommodate some marketization, the regime is still very vigilant to keep it at a manageable level.”

The Kim regime seems to ultimately be facing an interesting dilemma between balancing its political aspirations, which seemingly best align with a centrally planned and controlled economy, and its economic aspirations, which may be best served by great economic liberalization. Dr. Bruce Bennett of RAND offers further reflection on this dilemma: “the regime knows that if it allows too much market activity, the legitimacy of the regime will be undermined. But if the regime cuts the markets back too much, the North Korean economy will begin to fail.”

Tight Control Over the Flow of Information

The Kim regime’s tight control over the flow of information across the country is cited by contributors as a key factor inhibiting broader North Korean marketization efforts.17 The Kim regime strives to maintain absolute control over the population. In North Korea, this also extends to having absolute control over the flow of information. This information control is a part of Kim’s initiative to create what he calls “ideological purity” across North Korea.18 Platte explains that “to enforce ideological purity and reduce chances for bottom-up political reform, Kim Jong Un likely will retain or strengthen controls meant to limit external influence on North Korean people. News, pop culture, and other media from the outside world, especially from South Korea, will be limited to trusted classes, as will interaction with outsiders.” The current, fully controlled information environment that provides most North Koreans with little to nothing in terms of information freedom, together with the regime’s ideological purity initiative, create conditions that are fundamentally contradictory to the idea of broader marketization.

Structural factors

Finally, the contributors also reference several structural factors that further inhibit broader North Korean marketization. These structural factors are listed below.

• Productive capacity is severely lacking.
• The economy is severely constrained by limited foreign investment.
• There is currently no financing mechanism for providing capital at the individual level.
• Legal protections for foreign businesses are quite weak.
• Markets are still technically illegal and rife with corruption.
• International sanctions have prevented the foreign direct investment, resources, and markets afforded by globalization.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation; Dr. Richard Cronin, Stimson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Soojin Park, Wilson Center; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q2] Is there anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the peninsula?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Can the US Empower the ROK to Negotiate a Solution?

There is disagreement amongst the contributors as to whether there is anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Many contributors do believe that the US can empower the ROK to implement measures that would remove instabilities on the peninsula. Although Ken Gause of CNA casts doubt on the likelihood of removing Pyongyang’s nuclear and conventional deterrents in the short- to medium-term, contributors who advocate this position generally assess that there are concrete and realistic actions that the US can take to unilaterally empower Seoul in pursuit of stability on the peninsula in the longer-term. Dr. Patrick McEachern of the Wilson Center, however, disagrees, arguing that the ROK lacks leverage and authority and that the US must lead the way: “the US cannot hope to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution…there is no substitute for American leadership.”

Still other contributors, however, fall somewhere between these two positions. Several of these contributors suggest that the US can empower the ROK to act as a mediator between the US and the DPRK, enabling the ROK to engage in “shuttle diplomacy” in pursuit of solutions that could remove instabilities on the peninsula. Some advocate for a stronger role for Seoul overall, arguing that the US should encourage the ROK to take the lead on negotiating a formal end to war with Pyongyang. Several others are a bit more particular, arguing that the US should lead negotiations related to denuclearization while the ROK should lead conventional détente efforts.

Ultimately, the contributors offer several different approaches that may enable the US to empower the ROK to negotiate solutions that would remove instability on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting different mechanisms for resolving the peninsula’s distinct nuclear and conventional dilemmas.

Denuclearization Measures

Several contributors suggest that removing nuclear threats on the peninsula may be more straightforward than removing conventional instabilities. Dr. Bruce Bennet of RAND and Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies echo this assertion, contending that simply holding the DPRK to the Panmunjom Declaration will go a long way toward eliminating nuclear instabilities. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University and Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force advocate for a more aggressive approach, arguing that the US should maintain its extended nuclear deterrence regime with Seoul. McEachern suggests that the ROK recognizes the US as the more appropriate actor to lead denuclearization negotiations, and that President Moon “has prioritized communication” with Washington to ensure robust correspondence. On the other hand, Yun Sun of the Stimson Center believes that the US should facilitate the ROK to “push for a nuclear-free, permanently neutral peninsula,” by allowing the ROK to take the lead on some aspect of denuclearization negotiations. Along these lines, Debra Decker of the Stimson Center proposes that the US utilize track 1.5 diplomacy to express an openness to denuclearization negotiations with the ROK, and suggests that Seoul assist Pyongyang in finishing the KEDO nuclear plants to make discussions with the US more attractive.

Conventional Measures

The path to removing conventional instabilities appears to be more complicated and nuanced than denuclearization measures, according to the contributors, and requires significant commitments from the US, ROK, and DPRK. To this end, however, the US may be able to empower the ROK on a number of confidence building measures with the DPRK. While Dr. Miles Yu of the United States Naval Academy argues that the US must never yield its military presence on the Korean Peninsula, other contributors contend that a gradual and reciprocal de-escalation and repositioning of US forces may help to remove conventional instabilities. These contributors identify several potential approaches for overcoming some of the conventional instabilities stemming from the presence of US forces on the peninsula, including:

• Creating a DMZ Peace Zone.
• Establishing a leader-level hotline.
• Considering limits on conventional forces.
• Engaging in negotiations on the reduction of artillery.
• Considering the elimination of elements of ROK missile program activities in exchange for significant reductions in and limitations on the DPRK missile arsenal.
• Expanding the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts.
• Establishing inter-Korean agreements of conduct in the West Sea.

General Measures

Contributors also highlight several more general approaches to empowering the ROK to negotiate solutions that would abolish instabilities indistinct from conventional and nuclear measures. First, Dr. Steve Sin of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism argues that the ROK must feel that it is leading the discussion and that future policies must “look, taste, smell, and feel Korean,” even if such policies run counter to US interests. In this vein, Dr. John Plumb of RAND suggests that transferring the operational control of Combined Forces Command to the ROK may better empower Seoul to negotiate. Yu, however, warns against ceding such authority to potentially “trigger happy” South Korean leaders. Second, Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists highlights the importance of communication, arguing that “the source of all instability is lack of communication and the misunderstanding that results from it.” He suggests, therefore, that “the US should encourage greater ROK communication with the DPRK by engaging in greater communication itself.” Third, several contributors suggest that the US offer a cautious stream of economic benefits both unilaterally and through the ROK to Pyongyang in return for verifiable limits and to increase confidence in negotiations. Lastly, Plumb recommends that the US apply pressure on Seoul to cease reunification rhetoric, contending that it is overtly “unrealistic and unhelpfully aggressive militaristic” and that a message of “brotherhood and harmony” is much more productive.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Steve Sin, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributors: Kuznar, L., Stevenson, J., Polansky (Pagano), S., Jafri, A., & Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This report provides an analysis of the compatibility of reconciliation and reintegration processes, an assessment of the potential for achieving successful reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan, and an examination of which US government capabilities can best be leveraged in support of these processes.

Reconciliation involves creating an overarching framework for peace. Reintegration establishes the underlying framework for the end of conflict and describes the processes by which fighters re-join society and armed groups cease using violence without government authorization.

Adaptation and application of the NSI PathwaysTM Model approach enabled identification of a set of drivers of—and barriers to—reconciliation and reintegration through “top-down” theoretical work and “bottom-up” empirical case studies. This initial set gave rise to a generic model of reconciliation and reintegration, the components of which could then be classified as being affective, cognitive, or behavioral, as well as social, economic, or political in nature. The generic model was then applied to the case of Afghanistan, revealing three major insights about reconciliation and reintegration:

• There is complete overlap between reconciliation and reintegration objectives in Afghanistan, suggesting that reintegration can be pursued in Afghanistan without undermining or prohibiting reconciliation.
• Afghanistan is characterized by a marked lack of drivers of, and an abundance of barriers to, reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.1 This is true both overall and compared with four historical cases. Moreover, virtually all of the required social, political, and economic components (as well as affective, cognitive, and behavioral) required for reconciliation and reintegration are absent.
• Despite a bleak prognosis, the USG is not powerless to influence reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan. Additional consultation of the DIMEFIL framework and doctrinal sources2 suggests actions that can mitigate barriers and support drivers, including: information operations, key leader engagement, and aiding the host nation (e.g., through intel, air, and ground support; military police; etc.). Key partnerships might include those with the host nation, local civil organizations, UN peacekeeping forces, NATO allies, NGOs, and a variety of organizations, departments, and offices within the USG. The latter include the Departments of State and Justice, USAID, the intelligence community, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and Health and Human Services.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

Given the current distribution of actor interests, capabilities and resolve (I-R-C), North Korean denuclearization is highly unlikely without significant change in regional interests and conditions. Under current conditions:

• Neither economic incentives nor threats change the DPRK view of denuclearization –an outcome it can veto.
  • I-R-C analysis demonstrates that achieving final and fully-verified denuclearization (FFVD) would require the Kim regime to agree to a path that is detrimental to multiple of its political, security and economic interests. Neither offers of economic and diplomatic rewards (carrots), nor threats of increased regional tension or US military action (sticks) is sufficient to change the North Korean decision calculus enough to make denuclearization appear acceptable from the perspective of the Kim regime. Moreover, North Korea is the single actor with the power to veto denuclearization, i.e., stalling or half-steps result in de facto international acceptance of its nuclear status.
• China is both incentivized and has the ability to undermine FFVD.
  • The I-R-C analysis shows both China’s and North Korea’s interests to be better served by
    moderate regional tension (as in the pre-summit status quo) than by a US, or South Korean-brokered FFVD. Both also gain more by a drawn-out process of US-DPRK talks that reduce regional tensions but do not make progress on denuclearization. The I-R-C indicates that China’s incentive to undermine FFVD is driven by its interests in gaining regional influence.
• A US-brokered FFVD of North Korea would require change in core US, Chinese, Russian and DPRK threat perceptions and worldviews.
  • US, Russia and China all to prioritize engagement and economic assistance to North Korea (DPRK) over increasing their own regional influence; a broader strategic goal of each.
  • Kim regime to radically alter one of its basis for legitimacy away from protecting North Korea from existential threats (through nuclear capability and economic self- sufficiency), toward provision of economic growth and development.

The current US approach to regional leadership may be out-of-touch with regional interests.

• For regional actors, denuclearization is not primarily about security, but about regional stability and influence.
  • While no regional actor (other than the DPRK) particularly wants to see a nuclear DPRK, most do not consider DPRK nuclear weapons to be a pressing national security issue or threat. The main DPRK-related threats to regional stability are indirect and have more to do with how others like Japan and the US would respond to North Korean provocations. In fact, concern for their future influence in regional affairs is what drives most regional actors’ preferences with regard to the DPRK nuclear issue. For China and Russia this means containing US regional influence and expanding their own. For South Korea, Australia, and Japan preferences over the issue are driven by their common interests in taking on larger roles in regional security achieved by rules-based multilateral diplomacy.

• Multilateral solutions to regional issues are preferred region-wide.
  • he increasingly unilateral US approach to regional issues (such as DPRK
    denuclearization) conflicts with the preference of most regional states to work multilaterally and through international law to resolve disputes and increase stability.

The success of US efforts to balance China in security matters facilitates growth of Chinese regional influence at the expense of the US.

• China’s strategy of regional economic expansion is a major source of its regional influence which in turn, ensures its own domestic stability and regime legitimacy. Historic US security relationships guarantees, together with regional suspicion of China and Japan have been major source of US regional influence relative to that of China.
• China’s economic growth and influence depends on regional stability, which is reinforced by US security guarantees and assurance of allies suspicious of Chinese intentions. As the region becomes more secure, it becomes more stable. Stability allows states to prioritize economic growth and prosperity. Over time, US security and extended deterrence relationships become less important for insuring a safe and stable region.

How the US approaches this issue may be equally important for its long-term regional interests and influence than whether an agreement on denuclearization is actually achieved.

• For most regional actors, heightened tension and competition for influence between the US and China is a greater threat to their interests than the failure to reach an agreement on DPRK denuclearization.
• US allies and smaller states interests will inevitably be compromised if they are forced to chose between China (critical to their economic interests), and the US (preferred security partner).
• Engaging regional actors through multilateral negotiations would reduce concern over US regional commitment and signal US recognition of the preferences and constraints facing smaller regional states. It would also make it more difficult for China and Russia to act as spoilers than does a bilateral approach.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Media Narrative Analysis: Iranian, Russian, and Chinese News Coverage of the Future of Afghanistan

Contributors: Cooley, S.C. (Oklahoma State University) & Hinck, R. S. (Monmouth College)

Executive Summary

This project analyzed Chinese, Russian, and Iranian media narratives concerning interests in, and future prospects of, Afghanistan stability through three phases: Phase I (May-June, 2018; 79 articles), Phase II, (July-August, 2018; 124 articles), Phase III (October-September, 2018; 180 articles). Across these three phases, the analysis revealed consistent narrative patterns regarding the following:
• Chinese, Russian, and Iranian media present their interests in Afghanistan in realpolitik terms: stability is only desired in Afghanistan in so much as it augments their respective, individual, influence in the region.
• Investment in Afghanistan is proposed to occur through multilateral and regional ties with neighboring nations, often seen as alternative means to stabilize Afghanistan outside of US influence.
• US Afghan policy is portrayed as ineffective, both historically and under the Trump administration; consensus among media that the US withdrawal is likely. US presence in Afghanistan is shown as the main driver of instability and serving only US interests.
• No long-term vision of an independent, capable Afghanistan government; nor political desire to substantially get involved in stabilization attempts aimed at improving Afghani governance.
• Iran most interested in investing in Afghanistan as augmentation of their influence and to counter US interests.

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[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of eighteen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider political, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region. This summary first highlights the conditions most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation, and then details several non-proliferation regimes and the contributors’ assessments of whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

Conditions Conducive to Non-Proliferation in the Asia Pacific Region

Two key conditions emerge from the expert contributor response as particularly conducive to nonproliferation in the Asia Pacific region: the presence of a multilateral regional security dialogue, and providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees.

A Multilateral Regional Security Dialogue and Framework

The condition most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific is the establishment of a multilateral regional security dialogue and framework that encompasses both key regional actors and international organizations. Such an Asia Pacific regional security architecture would have to consider important regional non-proliferation issues, including the region’s principal proliferation concerns regarding the DPRK’s acquisition and export of nuclear technology, materials, and expertise, as well as other regional concerns relating to illicit nuclear proliferation activities.1 Approaching these key regional non-proliferation matters within a formal multilateral regional security dialogue and framework, contributors suggest, is a fundamental prerequisite for any real progression toward developing a regional non-proliferation regime.2 Ultimately, as Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University explains, an Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regime is more likely to materialize as a corollary of a formal multilateral regional security architecture than as something that emerges spontaneously.

Political, Economic, and Security Assurances and Guarantees

Providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees is also frequently cited by contributors as a condition conducive to non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific region. Contributors diverge, however, on what they perceive to be the best approach to providing such assurances and
guarantees, as well as in the types of assurances and guarantees they suggest.

Some contributors advocate for economic assurances and guarantees above all else. Ken Gause of CNA and Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, believe that the best way to reinforce regional non-proliferation with the DPRK is through enhanced economic measures, rather than enhanced security measures. Gause contends that if the DPRK is properly compensated in terms of economic and security guarantees, there will be no real reason for the regime to proliferate (i.e., the regime would not want to risk being caught, nor would it want to risk having to further sacrifice elements of its nuclear program as punishment). Kulacki maintains that creating and advancing a clear pathway for economic development in the DPRK is the condition most conducive to regional non-proliferation, as DPRK proliferation activities, he argues, are driven by economic needs, not political ambitions. Ultimately, Gause and Kulacki agree that regional actors may be able to extract compromises or concessions from the DPRK on regional non-proliferation reinforcement and verification initiatives in exchange for economic assistance.

Other contributors advocate for a combination of political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees. Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, for example, highlights political stability, diminished security threats, and steady economic growth as regional conditions that are conducive to non-proliferation. He believes that making serious progress toward all three conditions would be quite desirable to the DPRK and may foster regional cooperation and integration, which, he contends, would also be conducive to regional non-proliferation. Dr. Cindy Vestergaard of the Stimson Center similarly assesses that providing a combination of political, security, and economic assurances is conducive to regional non-proliferation. She highlights strengthening regional relations and decreasing regional tensions as such political measures; developing comprehensive security safeguard agreements
and, notably, DPRK disarmament4 as such security conditions; and implementing trade-related safeguard agreements and oversight mechanisms (i.e., establishing provisions on the trade of nuclear material and technology as part of regional nuclear cooperation agreements) as such economic measures. Finally,
Anthony Rinna of Sino-NK highlights targeted bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly as a means of shifting current DPRK capabilities away from military use and toward peaceful civilian use, as a condition that is both conducive to regional non-proliferation and fundamental to enforcing any eventual regional non-proliferation regime.

Enforcing a Non-Proliferation Regime in the Asia Pacific Region

Contributors also reflect on more specific non-proliferation regimes, considering both existing and potential non-proliferation regimes and whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Several contributors reflect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and whether it could be reinforced in the Asia Pacific region. The NPT is an international treaty, with 191 state signatories, that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. The treaty forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states (Article I) and the receipt or possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states (Article II).8 With such a foundational international non-proliferation regime already in place, it is reasonable to wonder why it has not been enforced in the case of the DPRK. One issue with attempting to enforce the NPT with the DPRK, and in the Asia Pacific region more broadly, contributors explain, is that while all other countries in the region are parties to the NPT, the DPRK is not.9 Consequently, as Vestergaard argues, there ultimately cannot be a strong non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region as long as the DPRK remains outside of the NPT and the international system of nuclear safeguards.

The most straightforward condition for enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region, therefore, may be convincing the DPRK to rejoin the NPT. Knopf reminds us, however, that the role of international organizations in verifying and, therefore, reinforcing non-proliferation commitments cannot be discounted. If the DPRK were to commit to rejoining the NPT, it would also have to commit to allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify compliance, and ultimately enable it to function as a confidence-building mechanism between the key parties. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies believes that this may be the ideal outcome in terms of enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region. He cautions, however, that because the DPRK has failed several times in the past to live up to commitments to not develop nuclear weapons, there may be significant skepticism regarding any future DPRK commitment to rejoin or adhere to the NPT. Therefore, as O’Neil suggests, the utility of an international non-proliferation regime such as the NPT may be limited in the case of the DPRK and the Asia Pacific region. Contributors generally agree, however, that the NPT regime does offer a useful legal and political framework and point of reference for any efforts to develop of a new regional non-proliferation regime tailored to the Asia Pacific.

An Asia Pacific Regional Non-Proliferation Regime

Contributors also reflect on potential alternative options for developing enforceable regional nonproliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Ankit Panda of The Diplomat and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center highlight what may be fundamental conditions for achieving any enforceable non-proliferation regime in the region. According to Sun, the international community would have to embrace the DPRK as a normalized member of the international community and, at the same time, the DPRK would have to embrace full IAEA safeguards. Panda echoes this assessment, expounding that, once such progress is made (i.e., the US determines that it will have to live with a nuclear-armed DPRK in the short-term), the US should endeavor to incorporate the DPRK into contemporary non-proliferation regimes. He warns that doing so may be challenging, however, as the DPRK is inherently skeptical of invasive arms control regimes.

Contributors offer several potential Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regimes for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine believes that an Asian Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Council (ANNTRC) could be established to form the basis for a non-proliferation regime amongst the regional states, the UN, and both nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states that have a stake in the region. Such a council, he explains, could initially serve as a forum for discussions relating to issues and concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and as a template for constructive conflict avoidance, resolution, or containment, and could eventually be broadened to include nonnuclear-related security and stability issues. Joshua Pollack of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies envisions a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NEANWFZ) Treaty that aims to establish non-transfer commitments as a potential enforceable regional non-proliferation regime. Conceding that non-proliferation commitments are difficult to verify, he believes that a regime that includes stronger assurances against the transfer of weapons could offer a more practical and achievable approach to verifying commitments relating to the cessation of fissile-material production. Finally, Platte presents a regional non-proliferation regime that incorporates measures to target aspects of the DPRK’s nuclear program from both the supply-side (e.g., sanctions on nuclear weapons-applicable materials and technology) and the demand-side (e.g., reducing the desire for nuclear weapons; ensuring alternative, non-nuclear revenue streams; and decreasing the demand for nuclear technology and expertise among
potential foreign customers).13 Reinforcement of such a non-proliferation regime, he contends, will first require strong enforcement of supply-side measures (i.e., sanctions), which he acknowledges are imperfect, and will then require strong enforcement of demand-side measures, which if not appropriately addressed, he explains, may enable the DPRK to exploit the imperfections in the supply-side measures.

Other contributors focus on conditions conducive to reinforcing potential regional non-proliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University believes that reinforcing any DPRK commitment to non-proliferation requires, above all else, strong enforcement capabilities (e.g., strong intelligence capabilities to detect export attempts and regional cooperation to interdict such attempts). Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers a similar assessment, arguing that any significant reinforcement will require an expanded, more binding, and more enforceable version of the Proliferation Security Initiative to include both China and India, as well as improved intelligence, investigation, and detection agreements among key regional actors. He warns, however, that achieving such conditions may require additional funding from the UN and/or participant nations, a more formal oversight structure, and greater transparency. Robert Shaw of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies and Kelly Wadsworth of the University of Pittsburgh argue that establishing strong export control measures is essential to reinforcing regional non-proliferation. Finally, however, Brig Gen Robert Spalding of the United States Air Force offers an alternative perspective and a word of caution, warning that China may play spoiler to any US efforts to reinforce regional non-proliferation. China does not view proliferation as a threat, he contends, but rather as an opportunity to further weaken the US and, therefore, should be expected to enable nuclear proliferation as a means of creating continuing challenges for the US to solve.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, SinoNK; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Robert Shaw, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Cindy Vestergaard, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.