SMA Publications

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Introduction and Purpose of Study

The collapse of the North Korean economy and disastrous famine of the mid-1990s forced the regime to adapt its centrally-planned economy—most notably by allowing limited and small-scale private entrepreneurship among a starving population that the government’s Public Distribution System could no longer support. In this context, the North Koreans had turned to informal markets for sustenance in order to survive (Gause, 2018; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Rinna, 2018). This “bottom up” marketization resulted in policy reforms that followed rather than led the transition (Haggard & Noland, 2005; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Rinna, 2018). While the regime acknowledged the need for these informal markets to meet needs that it could not fulfill, and even instructed state institutions to find profit-making opportunities, the regime nonetheless remained ideologically opposed to marketization and capitalism. The leadership even enacted policy reversals in late 2005 intended to roll back some of this change—including “banning private trade in grain, resuscitating the quantity rationing system, and…rever[ting back] to confiscatory seizures from rural cultivators” (Haggard & Noland, 2005). The regime’s 2007 and 2009 efforts to inhibit private entrepreneurship and decelerate marketization (e.g., through currency reform) were ultimately unsuccessful (Park, 2018).

The informal economy is still in place, represents a substantial sector of the total economy, and has fostered a new stratum of wealthy North Koreans, unattached to the military or traditional elite (Hastings, 2017). The result today is the emergence and continued growth of private entrepreneurs. One estimate is that 20% of the North Korean population is directly or indirectly reliant on “general markets” for survival (DailyNK, 2018). Simultaneously, there are party and military organizations with their own trading companies. This leaves the DPRK with public institutions funded by the state and private corporations liable for paying a percentage of proceeds to the state.

Nonetheless, marketization in the DPRK has remained limited overall. Though Kim Jong Un’s own statements (Kuznar, 2017; Platte, 2018) have highlighted the need for economic development in North Korea, he remains suspicious of further economic liberalization and broad marketization, which he views as a strong threat to the security and survival of his regime (Bennett, 2018; Cheng, 2018; Cronin, 2018; Gause, 2018; Goto, 2018; Park, 2018; Platte, 2018; Sun, 2018). Indeed, observers and scholars continue to question the longer-term implications of these economic developments, and whether there is an insurmountable tension between economic reform and marketization on the one hand, and stability of Kim family political control on the other. This analysis thus addresses the following question: Has marketization put the North Korean regime on a path to near-term collapse?

NSI applied its NSI Pathways™ methodology and model to search for and identify indicators that marketization in North Korea could lead to collapse of the Kim regime.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of seventeen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what political, economic, and social conditions are conducive to achieving a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific that is in alignment with US and US ally interests. This summary details the various conditions that emerge.

Achieving a Stable Regional Order

Nearly all of the contributors indicate, either directly or indirectly, that, if the United States’ desired regional order in the Asia Pacific is interpreted as continued US military presence and dominant US influence in the region, then it is unlikely to be stable. Such a regional order fundamentally conflicts with China’s strategic interest in becoming the dominant regional power and influencer. For China, weakening US alliances, and pushing the US out of the region—politically, economically, and militarily—is essential to achieving its own regional objectives. Contributors, therefore, generally align with the
conclusion put forward by Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that US “efforts to double down on [its] predominance [in the region], with or without allied support, are likely to prove futile and excessively destabilizing.” Accordingly, a stable regional order, contributors
suggest, may require achieving a unique balance between the United States’ force posture and China’s expansionist tendencies. 3 It is clear, however, that the fundamental incompatibility between US and Chinese interests will make any effort to achieve a stable regional order in alignment with US and US ally
interests quite challenging.

When considering specific conditions that are conducive to regional stability in the Asia Pacific, therefore, it is important to recognize that what either the US or China sees as a driver of stability, is likely to be seen by the other as a barrier to stability. The table below summarizes what contributors identify as key conditions of the regional order preferred by the US and its allies, as well as the often conflicting (red cells) nature of these US preferences to those of China and Russia.

Of all the conditions highlighted as conducive to a stable regional order as currently envisioned by the US, only final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) in the DPRK is identified by contributors as an essential condition that should not to be negotiated away. While contributors contend that FFVD will make the region safer and more stable, they also suggest that it has implications for achieving other US objectives in the region. For example, Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University argues that settling for anything less than FFVD in the DPRK could be interpreted by US allies as a signal of declining US regional commitment and, as a consequence, undermine US deterrence credibility. This could lead US allies such as Japan or the ROK to reevaluate their own military capabilities, potentially including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and, consequently, undermine US non-proliferation goals.

The contributors, therefore, emphasize the importance of taking a gradual, multilateral approach to denuclearization that recognizes and accommodates the intermediate objectives of key regional actors. Achieving an agreement that has regional buy-in, particularly from the United States’ regional allies, contributors explain, may counter concerns regarding US disengagement. Moreover, while including China and Russia in the negotiations may increase the complexity of the negotiation process, and the potential for a breakdown in negotiations as a result, it also decreases the likelihood that the US and China, in particular, will come into direct confrontation over any negotiated outcomes.

Conclusion

The contributor response overall highlights the significant impact that competing interests and regional competition between the US and China has on stability in the Asia Pacific region. The ways in which the US and China currently perceive their regional interests seem destined to lead to a clash between the two powers if not amended. A regional order based on continued US military presence and dominant US influence fundamentally conflicts with China’s current interests in increased, if not dominant, regional political, military, and economic power. If the US fails to account for China’s interests, therefore, the actions that the US is likely to take to reinforce its vision of a stable regional order may end up decreasing stability in the Asia Pacific region over the longer-term. Additionally, if the US fails to redress the loss of confidence amongst its regional allies and partners in its economic and security commitments to the region, it is hard to see how the US would continue to exercise regional influence at all. Therefore, the most effective way for the US to balance these two considerations, the contributors suggest, appears to be by working multilaterally with regional allies as well as with China and Russia toward a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Anthony Rinna, Sino-NK; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Yuki Tatsumi, Stimson Center; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University & STRATCOM Academic Alliance)

Executive Summary

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

Certain States of GS-ECE/EU have direct security concerns regarding how U.S.-DPRK relations might develop. These concerns arise in the context of three international frameworks:

1) These States’ membership in NATO and their resultant commitments to the United States and Canada under a possible invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty in the event of war between the U.S. and the DPRK.

2) These States’ concurrent (though separate) strategic and security concerns in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CFSP’s subsidiary Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a party to elements of both the CFSP and the CSDP.

3) These States’ current (as of 31 August 2018) negotiations with Japan for a Strategic Partnership Agreement to address, inter alia, matters of common security interests.

The States of GS-ECE and, by extension, the EU (whether members of NATO or not) have immediate and very substantial economic interests in all possible outcomes of currently developing (as of 31 August 2018) U.S.-DPRK relations. These interests arise primarily via:

1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the United States (as of 31 August 2018). The EU is the PRC’s largest trading partner (ditto).

2) Bi-lateral trade between Beijing and Berlin. In Europe, Germany is the PRC’s principal bi-lateral trading partner in both imports and exports. As of May 2018, Chancellor Angela Merkel has visited Beijing 11 times during her tenure in office which began in 2005.

3) The EU-ROK Free Trade Agreement (EU-ROK FTA). The EU-ROK FTA was provisionally applied as of 2011 and was formally ratified in 2015.

4) The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-Japan EPA). The EU-Japan EPA was finalized in December 2017 and ratified on 17 July 2018.

Reactions in GS-ECE/EU to possible deterioration in U.S.-DPRK relations must be viewed first and foremost through the lens of the withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The U.S.’ withdrawal has proved deeply unpopular in GS-ECE/EU, as well as for non-EU European States. Washington’s action affects vital European security and economic interests in the Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula, and the Mediterranean Basin. Washington’s action also places GS-ECE/EU on the same side of a critical strategic issue as the U.S.’s avowed or potential adversaries, namely Russia and China. It remains to be seen whether GS-ECE/EU commonality of interest with Russia and China in opposition to the United States on the JCPOA will sustain itself over time in the face of threatened U.S. secondary sanctions and separate U.S.-EU arguments over tariffs on steel and aluminum which were imposed by the U.S. government on 31 May 2018. So long as this commonality of interest persists, however, it could adversely affect GS-ECE/EU attitudes and governmental policies towards U.S. decision-making regarding the DPRK, particularly if U.S.-DPRK relations deteriorate as a result of lack of progress toward Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD).

Given serious, existing strains in transatlantic relations dating to 2016, any deterioration in U.S.-DPRK relations would likely generate significantly increased doubts in GS-ECE/EU and elsewhere in Europe about both the quality and the continued value of the United States’ international leadership. This consideration would apply most particularly in the event of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Already-extant animosity towards the United States among European populist parties (of both the Left and the Right) and/or in certain European governments, as well as concomitant sympathy for Russia, would thereby equally likely grow. To the same degree, any such developments would work to the near-term geo-strategic and economic advantage of Russia in Europe and possibly the long-term advantage of China. Exceptions to such a prognosis might be found in Poland and the Baltic States, however, where historically-conditioned suspicions of Moscow’s geo-strategic intentions remains pronounced.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

This study was conducted to address three guiding questions:

1. How does DPRK define its key national interests/regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen to be the major threats to each interest?

2. Does analysis of Kim Jong-un’s discourse provide a cognitive assessment?

3. What are the most effective ways of communicating with Kim Jong-un?

Summary and Implications for Strategic Communications with Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-un is far less geopolitically aware than Kim Il-sung and, similar to Kim Jong-il, is fairly rigid and unchanging in his political discourse. He exhibits more of an interest in economic development and in overall DPRK capability (including military) than his predecessor. The U.S. as leader of a Western, capitalist alliance is considered the ultimate threat to all DPRK national interests. Kim Jong-un appears to be relying less on Juche philosophy (see Changes in Political Ideology below) although he continues to use very abstract religious language such as sacredness and eternity. Based on these patterns and comparisons to his predecessors the following inferences seem reasonable answers to the guiding questions.

• The DPRK’s capability (economic and military) are central concerns upon which he is most likely to focus.
• His lack of geopolitical awareness and mostly rigid discourse indicates a simple worldview and inflexible thinking style.
• Kim Jong-un may be shifting toward a more secular and pragmatic worldview, although Juche philosophy remains an important frame for his thinking, and therefore, Juche philosophy should be well understood when communicating with him.
• However, stressing more abstract transcendent themes over older communist and Juche rhetoric will probably be increasingly effective with Kim Jong-un.

Specific insights concerning each of DPRK’s three historic leaders

Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-un’s worldview as expressed in his political discourse is largely consistent with core concepts central to DPRK politics throughout its history. These core concepts include a dedication to communist ideals and adherence to Juche philosophy, which includes unquestioning obedience to the Kim leaders, the need for strict discipline and rules, unending revolutionary struggle, and dedication to creating a self-sufficient DPRK. However, he exhibits the following departures from his grandfather and/or father.

• Kim Jong-un lacks broader awareness of global politics, being myopically focused on the Korean peninsula and the U.S., in contrast to Kim Il-sung (but similar to Kim Jong-il).
• Kim Jong-il placed great emphasis on religious-like concepts and Juche philosophy, as Kim Jongun continues to do so as well, although less than his father.
• While Juche philosophy is still central to how Kim Jong-un frames nearly every issue, he statistically is moving away from this frame.
• Upon taking power, Kim Jong-un retained his father’s ideological agenda, but added new themes related to economic development and other strength and capability themes he associates with economic or military power.
• Kim Jong-il has changed his political discourse very little in the past six years.

Kim Jong-il

Kim Jong-il was much more ideologically oriented and less globally aware than his father, and exhibited an absolutely rigid adherence to his Juche philosophical frame. He exhibited no ability to adjust his political perspective or interests despite economic crisis and widespread famine in the 1990s.

Kim Il-sung

Kim Il-sung exhibited a broad awareness of global politics, and an ability to adapt his political discourse to historical changes. His pragmatism was most evident during the Korean war when he largely abandoned ideological interests in favor of pragmatic concerns of prosecuting a war and surviving as a nation. Despite originating Juche philosophy, Kim Il-sung exhibits far less ideological speech than his son and grandson.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Lt General (Retired) Robert Elder (George Mason University) and Dr. Alexander Levis (George Mason University)

Abstract

The GMU Korean Peninsula strategic outcomes project sought viable political-military options to achieve U.S. strategic objectives with respect to the Korean Peninsula, and examined whether executing these options will introduce risk to other regional U.S. objectives. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States, and to develop a framework for use by operational planning teams. The TIN model started with possible end-states and examined influence factors that could contribute or undermine attainment of the end-state of interest—in this case Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD). The model explored possible intermediate states that would be likely to occur on a path towards FFVD denuclearization and also considered potential US and partner influence factors that could contribute to the intermediate and end-states. Experiments suggest that denuclearization, if achieved, will require many years to implement and the achievement of political, economic, and military accommodations that seem improbable today.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q2] Is there anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the peninsula?

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Can the US Empower the ROK to Negotiate a Solution?

There is disagreement amongst the contributors as to whether there is anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Many contributors do believe that the US can empower the ROK to implement measures that would remove instabilities on the peninsula. Although Ken Gause of CNA casts doubt on the likelihood of removing Pyongyang’s nuclear and conventional deterrents in the short- to medium-term, contributors who advocate this position generally assess that there are concrete and realistic actions that the US can take to unilaterally empower Seoul in pursuit of stability on the peninsula in the longer-term. Dr. Patrick McEachern of the Wilson Center, however, disagrees, arguing that the ROK lacks leverage and authority and that the US must lead the way: “the US cannot hope to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution…there is no substitute for American leadership.”

Still other contributors, however, fall somewhere between these two positions. Several of these contributors suggest that the US can empower the ROK to act as a mediator between the US and the DPRK, enabling the ROK to engage in “shuttle diplomacy” in pursuit of solutions that could remove instabilities on the peninsula. Some advocate for a stronger role for Seoul overall, arguing that the US should encourage the ROK to take the lead on negotiating a formal end to war with Pyongyang. Several others are a bit more particular, arguing that the US should lead negotiations related to denuclearization while the ROK should lead conventional détente efforts.

Ultimately, the contributors offer several different approaches that may enable the US to empower the ROK to negotiate solutions that would remove instability on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting different mechanisms for resolving the peninsula’s distinct nuclear and conventional dilemmas.

Denuclearization Measures

Several contributors suggest that removing nuclear threats on the peninsula may be more straightforward than removing conventional instabilities. Dr. Bruce Bennet of RAND and Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies echo this assertion, contending that simply holding the DPRK to the Panmunjom Declaration will go a long way toward eliminating nuclear instabilities. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University and Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force advocate for a more aggressive approach, arguing that the US should maintain its extended nuclear deterrence regime with Seoul. McEachern suggests that the ROK recognizes the US as the more appropriate actor to lead denuclearization negotiations, and that President Moon “has prioritized communication” with Washington to ensure robust correspondence. On the other hand, Yun Sun of the Stimson Center believes that the US should facilitate the ROK to “push for a nuclear-free, permanently neutral peninsula,” by allowing the ROK to take the lead on some aspect of denuclearization negotiations. Along these lines, Debra Decker of the Stimson Center proposes that the US utilize track 1.5 diplomacy to express an openness to denuclearization negotiations with the ROK, and suggests that Seoul assist Pyongyang in finishing the KEDO nuclear plants to make discussions with the US more attractive.

Conventional Measures

The path to removing conventional instabilities appears to be more complicated and nuanced than denuclearization measures, according to the contributors, and requires significant commitments from the US, ROK, and DPRK. To this end, however, the US may be able to empower the ROK on a number of confidence building measures with the DPRK. While Dr. Miles Yu of the United States Naval Academy argues that the US must never yield its military presence on the Korean Peninsula, other contributors contend that a gradual and reciprocal de-escalation and repositioning of US forces may help to remove conventional instabilities. These contributors identify several potential approaches for overcoming some of the conventional instabilities stemming from the presence of US forces on the peninsula, including:

• Creating a DMZ Peace Zone.
• Establishing a leader-level hotline.
• Considering limits on conventional forces.
• Engaging in negotiations on the reduction of artillery.
• Considering the elimination of elements of ROK missile program activities in exchange for significant reductions in and limitations on the DPRK missile arsenal.
• Expanding the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts.
• Establishing inter-Korean agreements of conduct in the West Sea.

General Measures

Contributors also highlight several more general approaches to empowering the ROK to negotiate solutions that would abolish instabilities indistinct from conventional and nuclear measures. First, Dr. Steve Sin of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism argues that the ROK must feel that it is leading the discussion and that future policies must “look, taste, smell, and feel Korean,” even if such policies run counter to US interests. In this vein, Dr. John Plumb of RAND suggests that transferring the operational control of Combined Forces Command to the ROK may better empower Seoul to negotiate. Yu, however, warns against ceding such authority to potentially “trigger happy” South Korean leaders. Second, Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists highlights the importance of communication, arguing that “the source of all instability is lack of communication and the misunderstanding that results from it.” He suggests, therefore, that “the US should encourage greater ROK communication with the DPRK by engaging in greater communication itself.” Third, several contributors suggest that the US offer a cautious stream of economic benefits both unilaterally and through the ROK to Pyongyang in return for verifiable limits and to increase confidence in negotiations. Lastly, Plumb recommends that the US apply pressure on Seoul to cease reunification rhetoric, contending that it is overtly “unrealistic and unhelpfully aggressive militaristic” and that a message of “brotherhood and harmony” is much more productive.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Steve Sin, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Contributors: Kuznar, L., Stevenson, J., Polansky (Pagano), S., Jafri, A., & Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

This report provides an analysis of the compatibility of reconciliation and reintegration processes, an assessment of the potential for achieving successful reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan, and an examination of which US government capabilities can best be leveraged in support of these processes.

Reconciliation involves creating an overarching framework for peace. Reintegration establishes the underlying framework for the end of conflict and describes the processes by which fighters re-join society and armed groups cease using violence without government authorization.

Adaptation and application of the NSI PathwaysTM Model approach enabled identification of a set of drivers of—and barriers to—reconciliation and reintegration through “top-down” theoretical work and “bottom-up” empirical case studies. This initial set gave rise to a generic model of reconciliation and reintegration, the components of which could then be classified as being affective, cognitive, or behavioral, as well as social, economic, or political in nature. The generic model was then applied to the case of Afghanistan, revealing three major insights about reconciliation and reintegration:

• There is complete overlap between reconciliation and reintegration objectives in Afghanistan, suggesting that reintegration can be pursued in Afghanistan without undermining or prohibiting reconciliation.
• Afghanistan is characterized by a marked lack of drivers of, and an abundance of barriers to, reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.1 This is true both overall and compared with four historical cases. Moreover, virtually all of the required social, political, and economic components (as well as affective, cognitive, and behavioral) required for reconciliation and reintegration are absent.
• Despite a bleak prognosis, the USG is not powerless to influence reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan. Additional consultation of the DIMEFIL framework and doctrinal sources2 suggests actions that can mitigate barriers and support drivers, including: information operations, key leader engagement, and aiding the host nation (e.g., through intel, air, and ground support; military police; etc.). Key partnerships might include those with the host nation, local civil organizations, UN peacekeeping forces, NATO allies, NGOs, and a variety of organizations, departments, and offices within the USG. The latter include the Departments of State and Justice, USAID, the intelligence community, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and Health and Human Services.

Media Narrative Analysis: Iranian, Russian, and Chinese News Coverage of the Future of Afghanistan

Contributors: Cooley, S.C. (Oklahoma State University) & Hinck, R. S. (Monmouth College)

Executive Summary

This project analyzed Chinese, Russian, and Iranian media narratives concerning interests in, and future prospects of, Afghanistan stability through three phases: Phase I (May-June, 2018; 79 articles), Phase II, (July-August, 2018; 124 articles), Phase III (October-September, 2018; 180 articles). Across these three phases, the analysis revealed consistent narrative patterns regarding the following:
• Chinese, Russian, and Iranian media present their interests in Afghanistan in realpolitik terms: stability is only desired in Afghanistan in so much as it augments their respective, individual, influence in the region.
• Investment in Afghanistan is proposed to occur through multilateral and regional ties with neighboring nations, often seen as alternative means to stabilize Afghanistan outside of US influence.
• US Afghan policy is portrayed as ineffective, both historically and under the Trump administration; consensus among media that the US withdrawal is likely. US presence in Afghanistan is shown as the main driver of instability and serving only US interests.
• No long-term vision of an independent, capable Afghanistan government; nor political desire to substantially get involved in stabilization attempts aimed at improving Afghani governance.
• Iran most interested in investing in Afghanistan as augmentation of their influence and to counter US interests.

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[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This report summarizes the input of eighteen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider political, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region. This summary first highlights the conditions most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation, and then details several non-proliferation regimes and the contributors’ assessments of whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

Conditions Conducive to Non-Proliferation in the Asia Pacific Region

Two key conditions emerge from the expert contributor response as particularly conducive to nonproliferation in the Asia Pacific region: the presence of a multilateral regional security dialogue, and providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees.

A Multilateral Regional Security Dialogue and Framework

The condition most frequently cited as being conducive to regional non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific is the establishment of a multilateral regional security dialogue and framework that encompasses both key regional actors and international organizations. Such an Asia Pacific regional security architecture would have to consider important regional non-proliferation issues, including the region’s principal proliferation concerns regarding the DPRK’s acquisition and export of nuclear technology, materials, and expertise, as well as other regional concerns relating to illicit nuclear proliferation activities.1 Approaching these key regional non-proliferation matters within a formal multilateral regional security dialogue and framework, contributors suggest, is a fundamental prerequisite for any real progression toward developing a regional non-proliferation regime.2 Ultimately, as Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University explains, an Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regime is more likely to materialize as a corollary of a formal multilateral regional security architecture than as something that emerges spontaneously.

Political, Economic, and Security Assurances and Guarantees

Providing the DPRK with political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees is also frequently cited by contributors as a condition conducive to non-proliferation in the Asia Pacific region. Contributors diverge, however, on what they perceive to be the best approach to providing such assurances and
guarantees, as well as in the types of assurances and guarantees they suggest.

Some contributors advocate for economic assurances and guarantees above all else. Ken Gause of CNA and Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, believe that the best way to reinforce regional non-proliferation with the DPRK is through enhanced economic measures, rather than enhanced security measures. Gause contends that if the DPRK is properly compensated in terms of economic and security guarantees, there will be no real reason for the regime to proliferate (i.e., the regime would not want to risk being caught, nor would it want to risk having to further sacrifice elements of its nuclear program as punishment). Kulacki maintains that creating and advancing a clear pathway for economic development in the DPRK is the condition most conducive to regional non-proliferation, as DPRK proliferation activities, he argues, are driven by economic needs, not political ambitions. Ultimately, Gause and Kulacki agree that regional actors may be able to extract compromises or concessions from the DPRK on regional non-proliferation reinforcement and verification initiatives in exchange for economic assistance.

Other contributors advocate for a combination of political, economic, and security assurances and guarantees. Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, for example, highlights political stability, diminished security threats, and steady economic growth as regional conditions that are conducive to non-proliferation. He believes that making serious progress toward all three conditions would be quite desirable to the DPRK and may foster regional cooperation and integration, which, he contends, would also be conducive to regional non-proliferation. Dr. Cindy Vestergaard of the Stimson Center similarly assesses that providing a combination of political, security, and economic assurances is conducive to regional non-proliferation. She highlights strengthening regional relations and decreasing regional tensions as such political measures; developing comprehensive security safeguard agreements
and, notably, DPRK disarmament4 as such security conditions; and implementing trade-related safeguard agreements and oversight mechanisms (i.e., establishing provisions on the trade of nuclear material and technology as part of regional nuclear cooperation agreements) as such economic measures. Finally,
Anthony Rinna of Sino-NK highlights targeted bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly as a means of shifting current DPRK capabilities away from military use and toward peaceful civilian use, as a condition that is both conducive to regional non-proliferation and fundamental to enforcing any eventual regional non-proliferation regime.

Enforcing a Non-Proliferation Regime in the Asia Pacific Region

Contributors also reflect on more specific non-proliferation regimes, considering both existing and potential non-proliferation regimes and whether such regimes could be enforced in the Asia Pacific region.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Several contributors reflect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and whether it could be reinforced in the Asia Pacific region. The NPT is an international treaty, with 191 state signatories, that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. The treaty forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states (Article I) and the receipt or possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states (Article II).8 With such a foundational international non-proliferation regime already in place, it is reasonable to wonder why it has not been enforced in the case of the DPRK. One issue with attempting to enforce the NPT with the DPRK, and in the Asia Pacific region more broadly, contributors explain, is that while all other countries in the region are parties to the NPT, the DPRK is not.9 Consequently, as Vestergaard argues, there ultimately cannot be a strong non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region as long as the DPRK remains outside of the NPT and the international system of nuclear safeguards.

The most straightforward condition for enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region, therefore, may be convincing the DPRK to rejoin the NPT. Knopf reminds us, however, that the role of international organizations in verifying and, therefore, reinforcing non-proliferation commitments cannot be discounted. If the DPRK were to commit to rejoining the NPT, it would also have to commit to allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify compliance, and ultimately enable it to function as a confidence-building mechanism between the key parties. Dr. James Platte of the United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies believes that this may be the ideal outcome in terms of enforcing a non-proliferation regime in the region. He cautions, however, that because the DPRK has failed several times in the past to live up to commitments to not develop nuclear weapons, there may be significant skepticism regarding any future DPRK commitment to rejoin or adhere to the NPT. Therefore, as O’Neil suggests, the utility of an international non-proliferation regime such as the NPT may be limited in the case of the DPRK and the Asia Pacific region. Contributors generally agree, however, that the NPT regime does offer a useful legal and political framework and point of reference for any efforts to develop of a new regional non-proliferation regime tailored to the Asia Pacific.

An Asia Pacific Regional Non-Proliferation Regime

Contributors also reflect on potential alternative options for developing enforceable regional nonproliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Ankit Panda of The Diplomat and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center highlight what may be fundamental conditions for achieving any enforceable non-proliferation regime in the region. According to Sun, the international community would have to embrace the DPRK as a normalized member of the international community and, at the same time, the DPRK would have to embrace full IAEA safeguards. Panda echoes this assessment, expounding that, once such progress is made (i.e., the US determines that it will have to live with a nuclear-armed DPRK in the short-term), the US should endeavor to incorporate the DPRK into contemporary non-proliferation regimes. He warns that doing so may be challenging, however, as the DPRK is inherently skeptical of invasive arms control regimes.

Contributors offer several potential Asia Pacific regional non-proliferation regimes for consideration. Dr. Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine believes that an Asian Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Council (ANNTRC) could be established to form the basis for a non-proliferation regime amongst the regional states, the UN, and both nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states that have a stake in the region. Such a council, he explains, could initially serve as a forum for discussions relating to issues and concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and as a template for constructive conflict avoidance, resolution, or containment, and could eventually be broadened to include nonnuclear-related security and stability issues. Joshua Pollack of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies envisions a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NEANWFZ) Treaty that aims to establish non-transfer commitments as a potential enforceable regional non-proliferation regime. Conceding that non-proliferation commitments are difficult to verify, he believes that a regime that includes stronger assurances against the transfer of weapons could offer a more practical and achievable approach to verifying commitments relating to the cessation of fissile-material production. Finally, Platte presents a regional non-proliferation regime that incorporates measures to target aspects of the DPRK’s nuclear program from both the supply-side (e.g., sanctions on nuclear weapons-applicable materials and technology) and the demand-side (e.g., reducing the desire for nuclear weapons; ensuring alternative, non-nuclear revenue streams; and decreasing the demand for nuclear technology and expertise among
potential foreign customers).13 Reinforcement of such a non-proliferation regime, he contends, will first require strong enforcement of supply-side measures (i.e., sanctions), which he acknowledges are imperfect, and will then require strong enforcement of demand-side measures, which if not appropriately addressed, he explains, may enable the DPRK to exploit the imperfections in the supply-side measures.

Other contributors focus on conditions conducive to reinforcing potential regional non-proliferation regimes in the Asia Pacific. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University believes that reinforcing any DPRK commitment to non-proliferation requires, above all else, strong enforcement capabilities (e.g., strong intelligence capabilities to detect export attempts and regional cooperation to interdict such attempts). Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers a similar assessment, arguing that any significant reinforcement will require an expanded, more binding, and more enforceable version of the Proliferation Security Initiative to include both China and India, as well as improved intelligence, investigation, and detection agreements among key regional actors. He warns, however, that achieving such conditions may require additional funding from the UN and/or participant nations, a more formal oversight structure, and greater transparency. Robert Shaw of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies and Kelly Wadsworth of the University of Pittsburgh argue that establishing strong export control measures is essential to reinforcing regional non-proliferation. Finally, however, Brig Gen Robert Spalding of the United States Air Force offers an alternative perspective and a word of caution, warning that China may play spoiler to any US efforts to reinforce regional non-proliferation. China does not view proliferation as a threat, he contends, but rather as an opportunity to further weaken the US and, therefore, should be expected to enable nuclear proliferation as a means of creating continuing challenges for the US to solve.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Andrew O’Neil, Griffith University; Ankit Panda, The Diplomat; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Anthony Rinna, SinoNK; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Robert Shaw, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Brig Gen Robert Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Cindy Vestergaard, Stimson Center; Kelly Wadsworth, University of Pittsburgh

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Nick Wright (Intelligent Biology)

Executive Summary

To conduct deterrence operations, or manage escalation, requires anticipating how others will decide to respond to our actions. Anticipating your adversary is imperative for offense or defense. Thus, it is crucial to understand audiences’ decision-making. But how can you put yourself in the others’ shoes in space operations?

• Firstly, operations such as deterrence have a crucial cognitive dimension— acknowledged in U.S., Chinese and Russian thinking—and thus here I apply the latest neuroscience and cognitive work to understand how humans really make decisions.

• Second, I identify key features of space operations that require distinctive emphases compared to other domains, and I examine their cognitive foundations to describes implications for space policy.

I apply this understanding of cognitive foundations of space operations to three areas:

• Deterrence and escalation management are examined in Part I. See table below.

• Grey Zone conflict is examined in Part II. The current space epoch is the “Grey Zone Entangled Space Age”, and space is an ideal forum for Grey Zone activities in which the U.S. must have the tools to compete.

• West Pacific security is examined in Part III with a focus on the PRC and Near-term Sino-U.S. scenarios.

FIVE KEY TAKEAWAYS

(1) Influence—not just control—is a principal means by which U.S. policymakers cause intended effects on key adversaries in space, across the spectrum of conflict from Grey Zone to limited war upto and including the nuclear level. Focusing only control denies U.S. decision-makers key tools. Influence is affecting the adversary’s decision-making and U.S policymakers must have the doctrine, policies and capabilities to achieve influence in space as well as control.

(2) Space is ideal for Grey Zone conflict—more than normal competition and less than war—and Grey Zone strategies require different emphases from peace or war. Grey Zone conflict is characterised by the ‘Five multiples’, which can be applied to space operations: multiple interpretations (ambiguity is a key feature in space, see below); multiple levels (e.g. state and population levels may view space activities differently as legitimate reasons for war); multiple audiences (allies and significant third parties are key, see extended deterrence below); multiple instruments of power (e.g. systems such as GPS or Beidou can be sources of economic influence); and multiple timescales (e.g. persistent adversary subthreshold actions can over time cumulatively present a serious threat; norms have a fundamental cognitive dimension that U.S. policymakers can manage). Grey Zone conflict in space is necessarily limited conflict, and thus the central aim is to
influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences – success requires policymakers understand and wield influence in space.

(3) Ambiguity and difficult risk assessment pervade the space environment, due to challenges of attribution, damage assessment, dual use, high classification and reversible actions. Ambiguity makes communicating deterrence much harder, and increases the risk of escalation for instance by muddying mutually understood red lines. U.S. signals will likely have to be much clearer than U.S. policymakers anticipate, and some communication must be performed ahead of crises.

(4) Humans pay large costs to reject perceived unfairness, and this complicates the perceived legitimacy of potential U.S. responses to adversary actions in space. An adversary’s space actions may have large strategic impacts, but because “satellites have no mothers” in comparison to potential U.S. conventional responses they may rouse little moral impact in key audiences (e.g. allies). Such mixed perceptions may cause inadvertent escalation, which may only be ameliorated by clear communication ahead of time before crises.

(5) Extended deterrence and ally perceptions are central to U.S. success in near-term escalation scenarios involving space with Russia or China. Allies’ trust and confidence in the U.S. are the central pillar of extended deterrence – and are inherently psychological. Increase trust and confidence by: increasing allies’ comprehension of space operations during escalation; increase the bandwidth of trust between elites, security apparatuses and populations; and consider how unpredictable behaviour decreases confidence and trust.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.