SMA Publications

Author: Dr. Nick Wright (Intelligent Biology)

Executive Summary

To conduct deterrence operations, or manage escalation, requires anticipating how others will decide to respond to our actions. Anticipating your adversary is imperative for offense or defense. Thus, it is crucial to understand audiences’ decision-making. But how can you put yourself in the others’ shoes in space operations?

• Firstly, operations such as deterrence have a crucial cognitive dimension— acknowledged in U.S., Chinese and Russian thinking—and thus here I apply the latest neuroscience and cognitive work to understand how humans really make decisions.

• Second, I identify key features of space operations that require distinctive emphases compared to other domains, and I examine their cognitive foundations to describes implications for space policy.

I apply this understanding of cognitive foundations of space operations to three areas:

• Deterrence and escalation management are examined in Part I. See table below.

• Grey Zone conflict is examined in Part II. The current space epoch is the “Grey Zone Entangled Space Age”, and space is an ideal forum for Grey Zone activities in which the U.S. must have the tools to compete.

• West Pacific security is examined in Part III with a focus on the PRC and Near-term Sino-U.S. scenarios.

FIVE KEY TAKEAWAYS

(1) Influence—not just control—is a principal means by which U.S. policymakers cause intended effects on key adversaries in space, across the spectrum of conflict from Grey Zone to limited war upto and including the nuclear level. Focusing only control denies U.S. decision-makers key tools. Influence is affecting the adversary’s decision-making and U.S policymakers must have the doctrine, policies and capabilities to achieve influence in space as well as control.

(2) Space is ideal for Grey Zone conflict—more than normal competition and less than war—and Grey Zone strategies require different emphases from peace or war. Grey Zone conflict is characterised by the ‘Five multiples’, which can be applied to space operations: multiple interpretations (ambiguity is a key feature in space, see below); multiple levels (e.g. state and population levels may view space activities differently as legitimate reasons for war); multiple audiences (allies and significant third parties are key, see extended deterrence below); multiple instruments of power (e.g. systems such as GPS or Beidou can be sources of economic influence); and multiple timescales (e.g. persistent adversary subthreshold actions can over time cumulatively present a serious threat; norms have a fundamental cognitive dimension that U.S. policymakers can manage). Grey Zone conflict in space is necessarily limited conflict, and thus the central aim is to
influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences – success requires policymakers understand and wield influence in space.

(3) Ambiguity and difficult risk assessment pervade the space environment, due to challenges of attribution, damage assessment, dual use, high classification and reversible actions. Ambiguity makes communicating deterrence much harder, and increases the risk of escalation for instance by muddying mutually understood red lines. U.S. signals will likely have to be much clearer than U.S. policymakers anticipate, and some communication must be performed ahead of crises.

(4) Humans pay large costs to reject perceived unfairness, and this complicates the perceived legitimacy of potential U.S. responses to adversary actions in space. An adversary’s space actions may have large strategic impacts, but because “satellites have no mothers” in comparison to potential U.S. conventional responses they may rouse little moral impact in key audiences (e.g. allies). Such mixed perceptions may cause inadvertent escalation, which may only be ameliorated by clear communication ahead of time before crises.

(5) Extended deterrence and ally perceptions are central to U.S. success in near-term escalation scenarios involving space with Russia or China. Allies’ trust and confidence in the U.S. are the central pillar of extended deterrence – and are inherently psychological. Increase trust and confidence by: increasing allies’ comprehension of space operations during escalation; increase the bandwidth of trust between elites, security apparatuses and populations; and consider how unpredictable behaviour decreases confidence and trust.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q5] How does the US, working with its partners, best contest DPRK operations?

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the US can work with its partners to contest DPRK operations. This summary details the various approaches that emerge.

How the US Can Work With Its Partners to Contest DPRK Operations

The expert contributor response reveals several ways in which the US and its partners can best contest DPRK operations. Ultimately, three prevailing approaches and four additional approaches emerge. The three prevailing approaches are:

• Multilateral engagement.
• Strengthening US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation and commitment.
• Cooperating with the DPRK rather than contesting it.

The four additional approaches are:

• Conducting an information campaign to empower the people of the DPRK and possibly bring about change in the decision making calculus of DPRK leadership.
• Putting pressure on China elsewhere in Asia.
• Maintaining maximum sanction pressure on the DPRK until it takes meaningful steps toward
  denuclearization.
• Addressing the wider problem of nuclear weapons proliferation in Asia.

Multilateral Engagement

The most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is with multilateral engagement.2 Contributors that advocate this approach highlight the advantages of strong multilateral alliances and partnerships for advancing US interests vis-à-vis the DPRK. Ariel F.W. Petrovics of the University of California, Davis offers a broad reflection of this approach, assessing that a multilateral regional engagement strategy, particularly one that “integrates persistent cooperative efforts with direct negotiations,” best positions the US to contest and overcome DPRK operations that run counter to US interests, and may “offer tangible benefits that simultaneously provide pathways for developing future leverage over Pyongyang.” Petrovics notes that the DPRK has historically been more receptive to sustained engagements that necessitate repeated cooperative interaction, while attempts at coercion have primarily generated hostility.3 There is also a clear lack of trust between the key regional actors with interests on the Korean Peninsula. Taken together, these factors suggest that a multilateral approach to engagement is likely to be more successful than a bilateral engagement approach when dealing with the DPRK. Petrovics explains that, “when trust between the necessary players is very low—as is the case with North Korean negotiations—engagement has the best chances of success when executed through a multilateral framework.” The prevailing absence of trust may also mean that multilateral engagement is most likely to be successful if participants can agree to delegate negotiating oversight and enforcement powers to an agreeable third party.

Several contributors echo this assessment, but advance it a step further, highlighting the value of a cohesive US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance for effectively contesting DPRK operations. Dr. Patrick McEachern of the Wilson Center highlights the benefit of the three countries working together, explaining that “the most effective and seamless responses to DPRK operations benefit from the national capabilities of all three states.” While long-standing and deep-rooted South Korean distrust of Japan has served as a barrier to advancing the cohesion of the ROK-Japan bilateral and US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliances,5 the current situation on the Korean Peninsula may present an opportunity for the ROK and Japan to overcome some of their differences to expand cooperation in light of a common threat.6 Prioritizing a cohesive US-ROK-Japan trilateral approach may position the US to effectively contest DRPK operations; the same, however, cannot be said about prioritizing a US-China bilateral approach. Though the latter may be tempting, McEachern contends that it would be “an example of a tactical approach that loses sight of the strategic importance of prioritizing the allies.”7 While China certainly plays an important role on the peninsula, the US should not overlook the misalignment of US and Chinese values and interests.8 Attempting to contest DPRK operations by way of a US-China bilateral approach alone, therefore, may not be the best approach for the US to achieve an outcome that is in line with its interests. Rather, contributors agree that the US will be better enabled to effectively contest DPRK operations if it operates according to a fundamental guiding principle of “allies first.”

Strengthening US-ROK-Japan Military and Defense Cooperation and Commitment

The second most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is by strengthening US-ROK-Japan trilateral military and defense cooperation and commitment.10 Yun Sun of the Stimson Center and Dr. William Tow of Australian National University both highlight the importance of enduring US military and defense commitment, stressing that the US “needs to remain steadfast in its efforts to coordinate its regional defense and security policies with its South Korean and Japanese allies”11 and “provide unswerving, consistent commitment to the defense of [both countries].”12 Not doing so, Tow contends, could increase the likelihood of regional instability.

Contributors specifically underscore the critical role that the US plays with respect to deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region more broadly. The US maintains significant levels of troops in both the ROK and Japan,13 and its commitment to the defense of both countries is central to ensuring stability in the region. US deterrence capability is also central to contesting DPRK operations.14 However, while US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation and commitment has continued to deepen,15 McEachern contends that “much work remains to be done.” Dr. Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations echoes McEachern’s sentiment, highlighting several vulnerabilities that currently challenge the US-ROK-Japan alliance. These vulnerabilities include the missile threat to Japan,16 the lack of trust between the ROK and Japan,17 the need for the US and Japanese militaries to address how they will fight together, and the need for a broader understanding between the US and Japan on how to operationalize Article Five protections in the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.

Ultimately, contributors that advocate strengthening US-ROK-Japan security relations as the preferred approach for contesting DPRK operations generally echo Tow’s assertion that “there should be no visible let-up in the scale or tempo of [US-ROK-Japan] defense cooperation.” Moreover, these contributors also identify several potential opportunities for advancing US-ROK-Japan military and defense cooperation efforts in the interest of contesting DPRK operations, including:

• Integrating missile defense strategies and capabilities.
• Improving intelligence collaboration.
• Pursuing new forms of anti-submarine warfare.
• Working with allies to form constant maritime patrols to eliminate illicit trade with the DPRK.
• Enhancing surveillance and monitoring mechanisms along the China-DPRK border to prevent trade.
• Developing and implementing tools, procedures, and weapons to find, fix, and finish the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs, including its mobile missile systems and command and control infrastructure.
• Planning for and practicing rapid surgical strikes against DPRK nuclear systems and long-range missile systems.

“Cooperate” Rather Than “Contest”

The third most frequently cited way in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations is, in fact, by not contesting the DPRK but instead cooperating with it to build mutual trust.25 Contributors that advocate this approach challenge the premise of the original question, arguing instead that the US would be better off if it started focusing on cooperating with the DPRK. Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists emphasizes this point, asserting that “this is not a constructive question. If you view the US and allied role as contesting, rather than cooperating with the DPRK, it will undermine efforts to build the mutual trust necessary to resolve the root causes of the DPRK’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons and maintain a robust and threatening military posture.”

Contributors that endorse cooperation over contestation as the preferred approach generally assess that by altering the adversarial nature of the US-DPRK relationship (i.e., stop contesting), relations between the two countries could begin to normalize and the motivations that have driven the DPRK’s antagonistic and threatening operations could start to dissipate as a result.26 In this scenario, developing mutual trust between the US and DPRK is important. Focusing on getting to know the DPRK better and creating opportunities for the DPRK to become less limited in what it can do (e.g., assist the DPRK in developing alternatives to weapons sales) will go a long way toward building mutual trust and advancing cooperative relations.27 Ultimately, as Ken Gause of CNA proposes, “we can continue the endless game of whack-a-mole or we can begin to think differently about North Korea. Not as an adversary, but as an opportunity.”

Additional Approaches

Finally, contributors offer several additional ways in which the US and its partners can effectively contest DPRK operations. These additional approaches are generally cited by just one contributor and, therefore, are not classified as prevailing approaches28 in this summary. Each, however, merit
consideration. These additional approaches include:

• Conducting an information campaign to empower the people of the DPRK and possibly bring about change in the decision making calculus of DPRK leadership.
• Putting pressure on China elsewhere in Asia.
• Maintaining maximum sanction pressure on the DPRK until it takes meaningful steps toward denuclearization.
• Addressing the wider problem of nuclear weapons spread in Asia.

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennett, RAND; Dr. Stephen Cimbala, Penn State Brandywine; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. Patrick McEachern, Wilson Center; Ariel F.W. Petrovics, University of California, Davis; Dr. James Platte, United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Dr. Jaganath Sankaran, University of Maryland; Dr. Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. William Tow, Australian National University; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College), Dr. Randy Kluver (Oklahoma State University), and Dr. Ethan Stokes (University of Alabama)

Selected Findings

• U.S. lost its narrative initiative following the Trump-Kim summit, making future achievement of US goals on the Korean Peninsula less likely.

• Post-summit, Russian and Chinese narratives describe the dispute as largely resolved, making substantive DPRK CVID less likely.

• The Trump-Kim summit legitimized and normalized the Kim Jung Un regime.

• U.S. concessions made during Trump-Kim summit narratively constrain future U.S. policy and credibility.

• Future CVID demands by the U.S. will be difficult to resonate within the framework of the narratives established in the news media of these nations following the Trump-Kim summit.

Executive Summary

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

Certain States of GS-ECE/EU have direct security concerns regarding how U.S.-DPRK relations might develop. These concerns arise in the context of three international frameworks:Our analysis of Chinese and Russian news presentations on the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK indicates that neither the Chinese nor Russians have any real expectation that the DPRK will agree to future denuclearization terms, or procedures, in the shortterm. A pivotal moment used to express these sentiments across media narratives is that of the Trump-Kim summit. Prior to the summit we predicted Chinese and Russian cooperation on DPRK denuclearization would occur if disputants followed their jointly proposed dialogue-based, dual track peace process. Post-summit, quantitative and qualitative narrative assessment of Chinese and Russian media cast the DPRK’s cooperative advances and subsequent U.S. concessions as marking
the successful result of their dual-track process; this narrative suggests that major progress on DPRK’s denuclearization has already been achieved and thus resolving the major concerns by all parties, inhibiting future U.S. demands. Figures 1 and 2 show post summit descriptions of CVID possibilities and win-win scenarios with key stakeholders significantly dropping following the Trump-Kim summit; with discussions post summit detailing current political and economic partnerships in progress between the DPRK and its regional neighbors. Narrative portrayals of the “successful” resolution of the dispute legitimized the Chinese and Russian dual-track process as shown by the post-summit spike in descriptions of Chinese and Russian international influence. Media in both nations present the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula, and region, as important, but only as a product of ending provocative DPRK and U.S. actions, not complete denuclearization.

With that referenced perspective in mind, the narratives from both Chinese and Russian news media use the cooperative outcomes of the Trump-Kim summit as evidence that their recommended approach toward peace is effective and, in the process, legitimized the rule of Kim Jong-un as within that of a normative state. Media in both nations present the notion that long-term stability and peace in the region, and the international order, requires a new type of global leadership that is more collective and dialogic in nature. The U.S. is shown as declining in its international influence; cast as a self-interested actor in the region willing to take escalatory risks to maintain its dominance. Kim Jong-un is presented by media of both nations in ways that demonstrate his negotiation ability, rationality, and attempts to advance the DPRK toward normative relations with the international community. Such presentations make it easy for media in these nations to vilify future actions taken by the U.S. attempting to create timelines for denuclearization with substantive deadlines. Finally, media in both nations mention investment potentials and economic cooperation with the DPRK, and newly formed regional agreements in cooperation with the DPRK.

Overall, our assessment is that the results of the Trump-Kim summit allowed Chinese and Russian news media to make strong narrative cases to their audiences supporting the strength of their own positions and influence in the Korean Peninsula, region, and international system, and place doubt upon U.S. intentions and methods. Prior to the summit the range of possible U.S. actions toward the DPRK in both media systems was more broadly considered; following the summit both Chinese and Russian media were quick to constrain possible U.S. actions by clearly broadcasting U.S. concessions within narrative discussions of long-term disarmament and a normalizing of relations with the Kim Jong-Un regime, thus allowing any future demands or actions of the U.S. concerning fixed deadlines, or accelerated timelines, toward CVID by the DPRK to be cast by these media systems as U.S. aggression or disingenuousness toward the peace process.

Primary Take-Aways:

• Insights: Demonstrates willingness of both China and Russia to present themselves as leading international powers with a new global vision for power distribution. Shows both nations as willing to work together toward regional stability and security, as well as having shared economic interests. Russian media is much more expressive in its intentional stated alignment with that of China. Both present regional stability and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a concern, with the primary goal of halting DPRK’s missile testing and public nuclear testing. Chinese and Russian media both suggest that if the U.S. wishes to exert influence in the region it must do so fairly and in coordination and concert with all of the actors involved. The DPRK’s public halting of its nuclear development in conjunction with US concessions made during the Trump-Kim summit resulted in the US losing its narrative initiative and legitimized the DPRK making future achievement of US goals less likely.

• Implications: Future CVID demands by the U.S. will be difficult to resonate within the framework of the narratives established in the news media of these nations following the Trump-Kim summit. More importantly, the conveying that U.S. influence and trustworthiness are in decline creates possibilities of justifying and legitimizing new alliances and a recasting of image for existing political actors to their populations. US actions following the summit reduces US influence and bolsters Chinese prestige.

• Findings at a Glance: Kim Jong-un legitimized, CVID long-term process, stability of Korean Peninsula important to both nations, Russia & China cooperative with one another, shifting of regional influence/U.S. decline. Future U.S. actions easily repackaged into narratives of aggression and dishonesty following summit.

Secondary Take-Aways:

• Specific Chinese Media Insights: Highlights Chinese regional influence by providing tangible evidence, through the summit, that its approach to dialogue and cooperation leads to a reduction in tensions. This is shown in sharp contrast to U.S. concerns of wanting significant and tangible denuclearization of North Korea. The U.S. commitments made at the Trump-Kim summit are presented in such a way that any resumption of economic or military pressure tactics by the U.S. would appear as contradictory to its previous actions and commitments made during the summit from the Chinese perspective. Chinese media clearly presents China as commanding strong, and reasoned, regional influence, with the DPRK now acting in good faith.

• Specific Russian Media Insights: Highlights the relationship and alignment between the Russian Federation and the PRC, noting Russia as in support of a multi-lateral international system and in agreement with positions taken by the PRC toward the DRPK. Presenting of Russian strategic alignment with the PRC, noting a decline in U.S. influence, and attempting to place future U.S. actions in the region within similar narrative constraints as Chinese media. Actual concern for political or economic relations with the DPRK is of seemingly less concern than presenting those aforementioned narrative elements.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.); Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); and LTG (RET) Bob Elder (George Mason University)

Summary of Findings

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI and Dr. Robert Elder, GMU

The following are key findings from eleven quantitative, qualitative, and simulation studies conducted for the 2017-2018 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Space Project requested by the Headquarters Air Force (HAF/A3) in cooperation with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).

Commercial vs. National Security Space

• The National Security Space (NSS) community and its potential commercial space partners think about space differently, have different agendas, and different perspectives on responsibility for space activities and which partner “is in the driver’s seat.”
• In the US and elsewhere, National Security Space is rapidly becoming a minority player in the space environment. Commercial satellites significantly outnumber those operated primarily for military purposes.
• US national security and the profitability of commercial space are indelibly linked.
• The USG and commercial space must establish a clear and integrated set of national security and commercial space objectives, along with a strategy for achieving these.
• The ways in which US civil and National Security Space (NSS) operates presently is at odds with the attributes that make for an attractive business environment.

Resiliency of Space Services

• Commercial satellite capabilities offer resiliency for military operations and increased stability during crises, reducing the benefit of pre-emptive attacks on satellites.

Space as a Conflict Domain

• Space operations are significantly more important for expeditionary military operations than for defense of the homeland.
• Space operations provide information services for use by all domains, so it is critical that operators in other domains understand what it means to “operate in space,” the time scales in space operations, etc.
• Because space has been seen as “separate” or a set of assets in space, vulnerabilities in the entire system from ground station to space and back can be underappreciated. Counter-space activities executed against the ground and communication link segments are perceived and treated differently than activities directed against the satellite segment.
• Space operations are not homogenous: To improve cross-domain understanding of space operations, it is useful to describe the actions using unambiguous terminology commonly used in other domains.
• There is a pressing need to clarify and clearly articulate deterrence and operational concepts involving space.
• Space superiority or dominance in space are not always critical to US and ally defense.
• Conflict domains are interdependent, but absolute space dominance is not a necessary prerequisite for success in other domains.

Bolstering Security Partnerships via Space

• The US must act rapidly to use its advantages in space to strengthen ties to regional partners.

DOTMLPF Insights

Doctrine

• Impacts of the rapidly increasing priority of space as a critical economic domain, which arguably is greater than its importance as a military operations domain.
• Difficult to contain the effects of combat operations in space to prevent unacceptable collateral damage or even fratricide.
• Importance of commercial space in reducing risk of unacceptable behaviors affecting the domain.
• Importance of differentiating (and understanding the relevance of) strategic, operational, and tactical military space operations.
• Use of space for military operations is of significantly less importance to actors operating with easy access to alternative means for communication, navigation, and surveillance operations.
• Space community would benefit from developing terminology for use when communicating with members of other communities to reduce potential for confusion or errors.

Organization

• Use of commercial and partner space capabilities requires Unified Action processes and organizations, as well as joint military and tactical coordination processes—and to be effective, these should be established well ahead of when they might be needed.
• Organizations are needed to develop and vet strategic courses of action and associated comprehensive risk assessments of non-defensive military space operations for national-level decisionmakers.
• Joint C2 organizations would benefit from greater space integration than just embedded liaison cells.

Training

• Non-space military personnel lack sufficient understanding of tactical-level space operations to integrate them properly into multi-domain operations.
• Military operators need training on how to leverage the capabilities available through commercial space.

Materiel

• Military platforms cannot leverage commercial space capabilities without compatible terminal equipment (e.g., waveforms, spectrum, encryption).
• Military capabilities should be adapted for use with commercial rapid launch capabilities.

Leadership

• Military commanders from outside the space community must understand space operations at the operational level to properly integrate them into multi-domain operations.
• Senior officers need leadership development to understand use of military force in concert with other instruments to influence competitor and partner decisions, particularly when military operations would have detrimental economic and/or civilian safety effects.
• Senior space leaders need better understanding of how other domains exploit space to achieve joint effects, as well as cross-domain opportunities to minimize risk of critical space capabilities.

Personnel

• Benefits demonstrated from civilian government participation in space C2 cells suggests opportunities to leverage additional non-military government civilian participation in military space C2 organizations.

Facilities

• Value of resiliency and redundancy in the space ground segment, perhaps leveraging multi-domain military, government agency, and allied partners.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Randy Kluver (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Ethan Stokes (University of Alabama)

Report Preview

This report details Russian and Chinese media presentations of operations and intentions in the space domain to their respective populations. These presentations provide us insight into how members of these nation states understand their government’s intentions and activities in the space domain, the opportunities and challenges their government’s face in approaching those intentions and activities, the alliances and norms necessary for space usage, and which actors are attempting to destabilizing the space domain. In both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, state influence, oversight, and, in varying degrees, control of media mean that presented narratives are often quite likely to be a reflection of positions of the state itself; or, at least, that lean themselves toward the positions that the state wishes its population to understand. As a result of such oversight, often times even oppositional media sources are constrained to simply respond and react to the narratives reflecting positions of the state.

The narratives generated by these media are extremely important because how a population understands the scope, history, and significance of an issue or event, in many ways dictates how a government can respond to changes, challenges, and opportunities related to those issues or events. Media narratives in a managed state thus become a sort of self-created box of responses and directions that state can take toward a given issue or event. The ability to look inside those narrative boxes provides insights into how to best approach an issue or event, in relation to such managed states, because, in many ways, we can anticipate the responses they themselves have committed to their populations regarding those items.

This report tracks Russian and Chinese media presentations of the space domain from September 2017 to April 2018, and further includes analyses of government issued documents related to space dating back to 2014 in order to provide context to the contemporary data. Researchers conducted a content analysis on media presentations related to the questions posed by the SMA group, as well as qualitative reads of the media presentations of the space domain toward identification of the strategic narratives used. Generally speaking, the results of this report show media in both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China present the militarization of outer space as being led, and instigated by, the United States. Escalations between the U.S. and Russia over events in Syria led Russian media to present the U.S. as much more aggressive and unstable compared to presentations in Chinese media. Media in both nations present the development of offensive and defensive space related armaments as being in response to the actions of the United States in the space domain. Further, media in both nations overwhelmingly project their governments as seeking peaceful space developments, political alliances and treaties to de-weaponize outer space. While media in both nations demonstrate their nation as a leader in outer space, Russian media project far more concern for the economic benefits of commercial space development; while Chinese media are more likely to present economic incentives for commercial developments as part of larger geo-political partnerships.

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Vladimir Putin’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space: An Analysis of Public Discourse

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

A corpus of Vladimir Putin’s speeches was drawn from his official Kremlin website. The corpus was examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Putin’s concerns with space and how these are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Putin’s perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.

Putin’s Perspectives and Worldview Regarding the Space Domain

• Putin primarily associates space with missile capabilities and deterrence but he also discusses a wide range of other space-related topics including satellite technology and space travel.

• In all cases, these endeavors are developed and executed by the government run company, Roscosmos.

• Putin is beginning to consider the development of a military-industrial complex that would serve both the civilian as well as the government sectors.

• Pride, success and the military are discussed in association with all space themes, indicating a strong, positive emotional connection to space issues.

• Missiles are the most often discussed space topics and are associated with cultural emotive themes such as pride, sacrifice, victory, enemies, and adversaries. This indicates a strong emotional connection and an association with Russia’s enemies.

• Missiles are associated with military operations, troops, and deterrence.

• Putin’s rhetoric regarding satellites reinforces the pride associated with space ventures and also the involvement of civilians and the private and military sectors.

• Pride, success and Russian nationalism are associated with space travel, as is courage and loyalty to Russia for those who venture into space. These are potent sentiments attached to how Putin regards Russia’s space travel.

General Worldview and Values

• Putin’s primary concern, as expressed through thematic density is the Russian economy, followed by the Russian military. The findings of this latest study parallel earlier analyses with respect to Russian influence in Eurasia and the Middle East (Kuznar, 2016b; Kuznar, Popp, & Peterson, 2017a, 2017b; Kuznar & Yager, 2016).

• Russia itself is associated with ominous themes such as competition, danger, and threat.

• The US is involved with themes that have negative connotations such as threat, adversaries, international violations, the Cold War, and economic sanctions.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Effects of Investment on Pathways to Space Security

Author: George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Introduction

Over the past year, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)2 team employed NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) methodology to reach out to a global network of space subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, government, and national security space to elicit expert insight on 23 key questions relating to contested space operations.3 Responses were received from over 111 experts from institutions in the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK. These written and telephone interview responses were compiled into a robust corpus of expert insights that provided the foundation for Space ViTTa summary reports, which were produced for each of the 23 questions. The Space ViTTa summary reports each contain two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked and 2) the full corpus of expert contributor responses received for the question. This report highlights some of the themes and findings that emerge from the Space ViTTa initiative. An abstract of each of the Space ViTTa reports follows the summary overview below. Of course, neither the summary overview nor the report abstracts can fully convey the finer detail of the full Space ViTTa reports and contributor responses, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

Summary Overview

23 Space ViTTa questions can be broadly categorized into four areas of focus: ally, adversary, and partner use of space; commercial use of space; national security and space; and space law and norms. Throughout nearly all of the contributor responses across each of these categories of questions, a central theme emerges clearly: Space is a domain that is evolving rapidly, and US initiatives, planning, and operations for space require particularly close consideration and attention as a result. Contributors emphasize the vital importance of the US government (USG) deciding how it wants to approach and manage US interests in this rapidly changing domain. Failing to establish a clear and coordinated set of national security and commercial space objectives now will put the United States’ decades-old strategic advantage in space at risk in the future. In short, the need for a serious effort to develop a clear and adaptive strategy for achieving US national objectives given a rapidly changing operational environment in space cannot be overstated. The implications of this theme for US space interests and activities across all four of our categories of questions are discussed below.

Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

A key aspect of the rapid evolution of the space domain is the increase in the number and types of actors operating in space. New actors, both state and non-state actors, are entering the space domain in a variety of capacities, from fully-capable space-farers to launch service providers and owners of small satellites. For many of these actors, space domain activities are viewed as sources of national pride and international prestige, as well as economic opportunity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the contributors expect these space actors (whether state or non-state actors, whether well-established or new players in space, etc.) to continue to actively pursue and expand space interests and opportunities into the foreseeable future.

In one sense, more actors operating in the space domain presents new and potentially fruitful opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. Several contributors detail space as a domain in which there is considerable cooperation, both between states and between public and private sectors. This cooperation offers states with fewer resources the potential to quickly and cheaply gain access to space technologies and space-based information and services. Contributors suggest that there is great opportunity for the US to take advantage of its strength in the space domain to expand existing relationships with ally and partner nations. Time is of the essence, however, because other states, notably China and Russia, are already moving ahead with partnerships and developing regulatory environments to attract commercial space actors. China, in particular, appears to be committed to building new partnerships in the space domain. Chinese activity here appears to be particularly robust— China is currently working with developing nations to provide space services to those with little independent space capability, as well as with the European Space Agency and individual European states.

In another sense, more actors operating in the space domain brings with it increased risk and potential threats to US security and economic interests, as well as to US infrastructure in space. Moreover, an increasing number of threats in space increases the opportunity for contestation or conflict, whether the result of unintended activities (i.e., an accident) or intentional attack. Contributors agree that the impact of a warfighting event in space would be historic, and would have no comparable precedent. Planning and preparing for increasing risk and potential threats, therefore, is essential, as the immense consequence of a space conflict cannot be overstated.

US, Russian, and Chinese space domain operations over the past decade demonstrate that space is integral to the national security and defense interests of each country.5 The contributors suggest, however, that other countries, including some that have traditionally conceived of space as a non- military domain, are increasingly starting to demonstrate similar thinking to that of the US, Russia, and China. Contributors cite growing interest in dual-use space technologies and capabilities among space actors across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East as evidence of this shift in thinking. This increasing interest in the national security applications of dual-use aspects of space technologies amongst these states, according to contributors, can be attributed in part to perceptions of instability in their surrounding regions. This is an insight that should not be overlooked. A scenario in which terrestrial instability spreads to a space environment in which a large number of actors consider space as integral to their national security and defense could be prone to rapid and unintended escalation, posing serious threats to US space interests.

Commercial Use of Space

The contributors clearly detail a rapidly expanding and evolving role of commercial actors in the space domain. They caution, though, that it is important to recognize that commercial actors do not have the same interests or objectives in space as those of government and military actors, nor do government and commercial actors always think about security in the same ways. Companies are ultimately focused on the health and success of their business ventures (their key interest), while the US national security community is focused on security and defense and preparing for a conflict or a kinetic attack in space. Contributors from the commercial realm stress that it is imperative that the USG recognizes this difference in thinking, particularly as it continues to expand its reliance on commercial space capabilities for national security purposes. Ensuring that commercial and government actors have a shared understanding of fundamental concepts, such as security, will be critical to avoiding costly misunderstandings and miscommunication. Ultimately, the consensus view among the contributors is that a successful and sustained government-commercial relationship in the space domain is as essential for US national security goals as it is for commercial profits. This, however, will require overcoming the present barriers to cooperation between the commercial space community and US civil and national security space community, namely the barriers posed by undue government red tape, cultural differences between the two communities, and impediments wrought by the bureaucratic organization and structure of the USG.

National Security and Space

The contributors highlight several national security implications stemming from the rapid evolution of the space domain. First, most contributors agree that increasing levels of overall investment in space by both government and commercial actors may enhance space security by providing a disincentive for kinetic military action.6 This is especially true, contributors suggest, if those investments come in the form of public-private partnerships. Almost every contributor who believes that increased spending disincentivizes kinetic military action argues that regardless of whether the source of the spending is commercial or government, the disincentive to kinetic action would be the same. The few contributors who deviate from this view, however, present concerns about the potential for wasteful spending, adversaries that are less invested in the space domain, increasing the number of targets for the US to defend, and political conflict over the rules of the road governing space cooperation.

Contributors also point out that rapid developments in the space domain present new and significant opportunities for USG collaboration7 to enhance resilience, most notably in the form of leveraging information (collection and analysis) and launch (infrastructure, vehicles, and services) capabilities.8 However, as mentioned earlier, more actors operating in space with broadening technological capabilities means more potential threats to USG space interests and infrastructure. The salience of this point is evident when we consider the implications of rapid innovation in space launch. Contributors agree that wide-ranging national security challenges will arise from decreased launch costs that enable a broader array of actors to deliver a wider variety of payloads into space—some of which will inevitably add to the amount of junk in space. They also indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs have significant effects on military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

There is noticeable variation in how the contributors envision non-government space actors operating relative to US security interests in the future (i.e., as disruptors or solid partners for national security). Those who currently work in commercial space tend to foresee commercial entities serving as solid partners of the government, whereas those from think tanks and the US national security space community largely view commercial actors as potential disruptors to US security interests. The majority response in fact is that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners. It appears that “disruption” is considered a necessary part of the development of space capabilities and activities. Commercial actors have organizational advantages with respect to innovation that are likely to better enable them to be the dominant innovators in the space domain in the medium- to long-term. The effect this will have on US national security operations involving space will be determined largely by how the USG deals with these changes. Most contributors acknowledge that there are significant potential security benefits to be gained by partnering with commercial actors. At the same time, however, encouraging the growth of the commercial space sector and relying on its capabilities and services reduces the USG’s level of direct control. Regardless, the USG may not have much option—commercial space actors are here, and their relative capabilities are growing. Moreover, if the USG attempts to limit or control commercial activities to the point that space companies cannot meet their objectives, there is nothing preventing these companies from relocating to another, more favorable business environment. This would diminish USG influence within the commercial space sector, and could position commercial space actors to disrupt US security interests.

Space Law and Norms

The contributors generally do not view the existing legal regime in space (i.e., current international agreements, treaties, and conventions governing the use of space) to be either overly burdensome or restrictive on US space operations. However, despite overwhelming support for foundational agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST),9 most contributors see existing space law and norms as insufficient to manage the rapidly evolving nature of space activities and the range of potential threats these activities may present. As space becomes more crowded, the risk of accidental or intentional harm to an actor’s assets increases. As space capabilities become more critical to actors’ national security, economic, and social well-being, the cost of losing those assets also increases. As a number of contributors note, these conditions create a collective action problem that further refinement of international norms and regulation could help mitigate. With that said, however, most contributors do not think that amending or replacing the OST is either necessary or advisable. Contributors are clear in their warning that opening up the possibility of amending the OST would likely trigger a long and uncontrollable process of negotiation that in itself would create uncertainty and undermine the legitimacy of the OST. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the final treaty would work as well as, let alone any better than, the current one.

The contributors generally agree on the need to develop norms by way of both informal and formal channels in order to maintain a peaceful space domain. At the same time, however, contributors point out that an increase of diverse actors (global powers, countries recently entering the space domain, commercial actors) with diverse interests (domination, deterrence, profit) increases the difficulty of developing shared norms, since norms by definition imply shared values. Given the historic difficulty in achieving effective formal agreements, several contributors share a hope that less formal norms might be an option for regulating a responsible use of space. Overall, however, contributors often fall back upon discussion of the value of formal agreements, exhibiting a bias toward formal rules given their explicitness. In doing so, these contributors largely also stress the need for measurable verification of how space is being used by actors, both to mark norm violations and to support guidelines set forth in formal agreements.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The Clash of Sectors: Why Public Private Partnerships Can Reduce ‘Coerced Cooperation’ in Commercial-Government Joint Ventures

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Abstract

Many experts believe that one of the best investments to expand opportunities for United States’ multi-and cross-domain dominance lies in the successful joint investment of the United States’ government alongside commercial space actors to increase the US technological lead. Yet, as the commercial space market grows, there are greater numbers of private actors, some of whom have the ability to operate independently (or even disruptively) in the space domain. This potential for disruption and autonomy begs the question of what forms cooperation between the national security space (NSS) sector and the commercial space sector (CSS) will take in the future. In so far as breakthroughs in the space domain offer both benefits and potential danger from a national security perspective, the NSS would likely want some say in the direction of research, and be able to limit the potential buyers of the tech. Conversely, the more regulated the technology is likely to be, the less the CSS would want to consensually invest resources in developing a technology with limited number of buyers. We theorize that when commercial and government interests in the space domain intersect, joint commercial-public ventures can take on one of the following forms: coerced cooperation and consensual joint ventures. We suggest that a specific type of consensual commercial-public joint venture should most successfully optimizes the USG to expand its multi-domain advantage—the public-private partnership—which we distinguish from four other types of consensual commercial-public joint ventures, namely commercial acquisition, commercial leasing, government acquisition, and government leasing. PPPs differ from other forms of consensual joint ventures because they, by their nature, offer an equilibrium solution in which the concerns of both the NSS and CSS are addressed.

Citation

Aviles, W. & Stevenson, J. (2018). NSI Concept Paper, The Clash of Sectors: Why Public Private Partnerships Can Reduce ‘Coerced Cooperation’ in Commercial-Government Joint Ventures. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Kim Jong Un’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space: An Analysis of Public Discourse

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

A collection of Kim Jong Un’s speeches from 2012 to 2017, translated and published online by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Kim Jong Un’s concerns in the space domain and how these concerns are articulated with general political and cultural themes. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as the DPRK’s (i.e., Kim Jong Un’s) perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.

Kim Jong Un’s Perspectives and Worldview Regarding the Space Domain

• The DPRK’s space operations are described in Kim’s speeches in entirely martial and threatening terms and the need to deter aggression.

• Kim Jong Un discusses the DPRK’s space endeavors within the framework of national security rather a commercial perspective.

• Space events, such as missile launches and satellite deployments, and space discourse are associated with negative themes such as danger, threat, instability, adversaries, and nuclear weapons.

• The US and the DPRK are frequently mentioned together when Kim Jong Un discusses space, and in association with actual space events. President Trump is highly associated with space discourse and space events in Kim Jong Un’s discourse. This may indicate that Kim Jong Un values the space domain as a critical venture to counter U.S. ambitions.

• The frequency of space themes and actual space events escalate through time, indicating that both Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric and action track with one another.

• Kim Jong Un’s language regarding space is highly charged and negative, especially in speeches where he mentions President Trump.

• Despite increases in missile testing over the coding period, missiles and military are not often mentioned in Kim’s discourse. However, satellites are mentioned, and are associated with success, authority, legitimacy and economic development. These associations must be understood in the framework of national security, and economic development is only pursued insofar as to serve the interests of bolstering regime survival.

General Worldview and Values

• The most common themes include Juche philosophy, and Kim Jong Un’s predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, emphasizing the importance of the legacy of the Kim family. Other frequently mentioned themes are related to the DPRK’s strength and ability.

• The analysis suggests that Kim Jong Un is most concerned with his adversaries, namely, the US, Japan and South Korea.

• The US and the DPRK share close associations with many themes as a reflection of the adversarial relationship Kim Jong Un sees between the U.S. and the DPRK. These themes are largely negative and similar to themes associated with space, including instability, injustice, danger, threat, extremely negative themes and hyperbole, war, and adversaries.

• The occurrence of only a few themes increase over the 5-year coding period for this study, namely: space, Trump, the US and danger.

• Space themes, President Trump, the U.S. and danger are the only themes that increase through time, and all these themes have accelerated in the past two years.

• Discussion of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un and religious themes decreases through time. Similar decreases in religious themes has been related to increased state leader aggression in previous studies (Kuznar, Yager, Clair, & Stephenson, 2012).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain

Authors: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Abstract

Because limitations space situational awareness functionally limit direct observation of adverse events in space, actors in space instead rely on other methods of making inferences about the causes behind adverse events, including communicating with each other. As a result, miscommunications that lead to incorrect inferences about the causes of adverse events can pose great risks to stable governance and crisis management in the space domain. One solution to reduce the risks of miscommunications is creating transparency by sharing SSA-relevant information, particularly in times of crisis. An under-appreciated (and under-theorized) aspect of this process is the key space terms used to describe events and causality in the space domain. Key space terms shape and reflect how actors ascribe intentionality and describe threats within the space domain. In this Concept Paper, we argue that disagreement over key terms related to events in space form barriers to creating communication transparency. While the consequences of these discrepancies in the use of key space terms are in some cases benign, in other cases, disagreement over key space terms can negatively impact US national security when terminological disagreement stifle effective, transparent communication among space actors.

Citation

Pagano, S. & Stevenson, J. (2018). NSI Concept Paper, How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain,. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.