SMA Publications

Author | Editor: Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University)

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Authors: Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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At present, collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is generally considered to be a remote possibility for three reasons: the Syrian government’s consolidation of power, a fragmented opposition, and the resolve of international actors who are strongly committed to the survival of the regime. The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment authored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted that the Assad regime held momentum and was supported by Iran and Russia as it continued consolidating territorial gains (Coats, 2019). Furthermore, an October 2019 study estimated that the Assad regime holds control over 60 percent of Syria, though “its control outside Damascus is tenuous” (Syria Study Group, 2019). Since that time, the regime has embarked on a campaign against rebel forces in Idlib, which only recently ended in a ceasefire (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Iran and Russia are strongly invested in the Syrian regime, and signs of an impending collapse would likely prompt a decisive response from one or both. This reflects Russia’s strategic economic ties with Syria, ability to project power and enhance its international prestige, and desire to protect basing agreements negotiated with the Assad regime. Iran, relatedly, seeks a geographic link with Hezbollah, understands the Assad regime to be a bulwark against Saudi (and Sunni) influence in the region, and also can use Syria as a basing area for activities against Israel. Furthermore, the Assad regime’s Alawite background is related to the Twelver branch of Shi’a Islam championed by Iran (Khalaji, 2013; Smyth, 2018).

Because of these dynamics, a good case can be made that absent a meaningful and deep political resolution, large numbers of the Syrian population will continue to be subject to many of the regime-initiated horrors that have been inflicted on them for decades. Sadly, if the regime were to collapse, the immediate result for many Syrians would be the same: widespread economic, political, and social chaos in Syria generated by post-Assad warlordism and internecine and state-sponsored violence. Conventional wisdom holds that there are too many conflicting political agendas supported by violent means to produce an inclusive political settlement in the near- to mid-term. In short, the suffering of the Syrian people will likely continue whether the regime remains or collapses from internal pressure (e.g., competition among sub-state power centers) or external interference.

Again, for reasons described in subsequent sections of this report, most scholars see very little possibility of a collapse of the Assad regime in the foreseeable future. Relatedly, it is difficult to identify specific entities or individuals that might assume power if the regime does collapse. This is due to the number of competing interests in Syria today, including tribal affiliations, which for reasons of scope, are not included in this report. These dynamics combine to forecast continued chaos and fragmentation of the country in the event of a regime collapse. The key findings of this report suggest that if a collapse of the regime were to occur:

1. Precipitating factors are likely to include a number of internal pressures including an ongoing financial crisis and competition for resources and influence among the myriad Syrian government and externally- funded security services operating in Syria.
2. Collapse would probably activate armed groups across the country including violent non-state actors and state actors alike.

There are forces at work in Syria that both work to shield the Assad regime from collapse and, if those should fail or recede, could precipitate a collapse. Each is discussed in more detail in the report.

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Authors | Editors: Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.); Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Top-Level Findings

Implicit in USCENTCOM’s Gulf and Levant questions is a sense of inevitable cataclysm. This is typified by assumptions of worsening conflict, diplomatic ruptures, and regime change or collapse. The reports prepared in response to these questions suggest that such an outcome is not preordained. Coupled with drivers that threaten to further mire the region in chaos, there exist buffers against cataclysm. Instability itself does not mean regime collapse is inevitable or even likely across the region. While instability remains a constant in the region, the natural endpoint to that instability is not anarchic failure. Moreover, that Russia and China are seeking different outcomes than the United States does not imply that they are seeking anarchic collapse. In fact, no great powers’ interests are served by regional conflagration.

Authors: Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.) and Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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China and Russia support each other’s political and economic objectives both globally and in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) because, in part, of a strong mutual interest in weakening the United States’ geopolitical influence and power (Solomentseva, 2014; Lons, 2019). However, despite this cooperation, China and Russia do compete, especially in Central Asia where both have long-standing historical connections, manage competing economic initiatives, and seek to exert influence over regional governments (Laruelle, 2019; Ehteshami, 2019; McGlinchey, 2019; Weitz, 2020). In the future, competition between Beijing and Moscow in the Middle East over natural resources and economic opportunities may increase, as both become more economically involved in the region (Wormuth, 2019). However, both do benefit considerably from cooperation, and have diverse enough strengths to make direct competition costly. Furthermore, particularly in Russia’s case, there are no comparable strategic partnerships available to help balance United States and Western regional influence (Weitz, 2020). While there is a wealth of literature discussing how China’s and Russia’s activities affect the United States’ interests in the USCENTCOM AOR, the discussion on what the United States can do to create Sino-Russian competition is sparse and instead mostly focuses on actions to slow either China’s or Russia’s individual geopolitical growth.

Authors: Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Robert Hinck (Monmouth College); and Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

Research on radicalization is more robust theoretically than research on deradicalization. While there are several workable theoretical systems explaining radicalization, no theory of deradicalization exists (Koehler, 2017).

The most commonly discussed characteristic in theories on radicalized individuals is the loss of pluralization of political concepts and values that ultimately lead to violence as a valid course of action. That is to say, radicalization is notably correlated to a reduction in the number of perspectives a person is able to consider.

It has been proposed that by reversing this reduction of considered perspectives and introducing a ‘re-pluralization’ of political concepts and values, a path of deradicalization emerges. This process of re-pluralization includes, “a growing perception of alternative options to solve a decreasingly important (ideologically defined) problem” (Koehler, 2017, p. 81).

“[The] task of working with young radicalized individuals [is] nothing other than engaging with an extreme state of self-centeredness” (Weilnböck, 2014, p. 5).

Deradicalization efforts that focus on re-building, or “re-socializing,” a sense of self-identity that includes relationships with others seem the most promising. Certain techniques of reflection on narrative identity are designed intentionally to help contextualize action by accounting for as much complexity on the environment as possible. Exercises that allow for, and reflect upon, the co-creation of meaning within narratives and narrative roles help individuals tolerate, value and ultimately seek complexity.

Proposed Action

We propose using gaming exercises as intentional tools of narrative reflection among youth at risk of radicalization. These games provide opportunities for an examination of self- identity in relation to the various environments encountered and co-construction of meaning with others. An additional benefit is the cost-effectiveness of the games selected, ease of implementation, as well as the adaptability of these games to differing environmental contexts. This project offers a variety of such gaming exercises for CENTCOM to consider adapting toward various deradicalization initiatives.

Summary

The first objective of this research study was to assess current deradicalization programs and identify how these programs intentionally (or not) incorporate narrative reflection techniques in their programming. Researchers examined deradicalization programs, academic material, and other secondary deradicalization data for ways in which narrative reflection techniques were incorporated and discussed.

The second object of this research was to identify examples of easily adaptable, cost- effective gaming exercises in promotion of narrative reflection that could be used to mitigate, or even prevent, radicalization among refugee youth. Researchers examined the designs of various cooperative gaming exercises for those that illicit narrative construction, perspective sharing, and reflection opportunities.

Key Learning Component in De-Radicalization Programs:

1. Focus on principles of group-dynamic based learning- where participants share their personal narratives and accounts of events that have occurred either in their biographies and/or their social environments.
2. Attempt to develop central personality competencies among radicalized (and vulnerable to radicalization) youth, including emotional intelligence, empathy, the ability to build trust, the ability to form relationships, and, most importantly, tools for personal reflection; often taking the form of exercises where participants are taught how examine their own actions in relation to others. Narrative stimulates personal appraisals of violent acts, develops abilities to empathize and evoke moments of retrospection.
3. Have an emphasis on the pedagogical roots of radicalization, education risks and protective factors that can be identified relevant to prevention and symptomatic treatment. Teach early detection practices, prevention activities, interventions (community empowerment and engagement, family support and alternative narratives) and exit strategies as learning modules.
4. Focus on the role of civil society in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization. Youth are key civil society actors in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization. Dialogue facilitation is identified as a critical practical approach.
5. When implementing deradicalization exercises, it is important to account for the contextual nuances of the radicalizing environment and the local environment of the participants. This means exercises must be custom- tailored for the specific circumstances they are deployed.

Key Element of Narrative Reflection in De-Radicalization Programs:

1. Narrative reflection can manifest itself in participants learning to take an interest in what others do, as well as understanding points of similarities and differences in other people’s paths.
2. Narrative reflection can be used as a tool aspiring to “awaken participants’ attention to what is experienced and narrated, and for the subtleties, contradictions and biographical influences that the worldview of each and every person displays.”
3. Narrative reflection can be considered as the “importance of open and reflective communication for guiding adolescent youth in their search for meaning and identity, commitment to society, dealing with diversity and conflicting values…there must be room for critical reflection.”
4. “Dialogue facilitation … provides opportunities for reflection and constructive debate on themes such as personal and societal development, education, independence, justice, honor, identities, gender norms, belonging and post-conflict reconciliation, etc.”
5. Narrative reflection is a potential mechanism for contextualizing radicalizing environment and local environment in deradicalization.

Games as Tools in Promotion of Narrative Reflection

1. Games and mental exercises are fundamental tools at developing our identity. We are in many ways brought closer together when we share experiences, victories, hardship and growth through one another.
2. It is through proper counsel and the use of tools such as games and exercises that youth can come to a greater understanding of themselves and the world around them and fulfill their psychological needs.
3. Game and exercise examples from: the Youth Counselling Against Radicalisation (YCARE) toolbox, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) toolbox and Maheshvarananda’s (2017) book Cooperative Games for a Cooperative World.

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Authors: Nathan Heath, N. (NSI, Inc.) and Veronica Murdoch (Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA))

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Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The current SMA project, Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO), builds on a strong foundation of prior SMA work on influence and information operations. The themes underlying the research reflect shifting priorities as SMA has responded to requests ranging counterterrorism to deterrence to great power competition. However, the requirement to inform and influence actors and populations through effective, strategic communication remains consistent. This annotated bibliography comprises nearly 50 SMA studies and speaker series events in five areas related to the information environment: 1) bio-psycho-social drivers of instability, 2) messaging & counter-messaging, 3) competition and conflict, 4) influence, and 5) cyber considerations. The following section highlights the type of content that you can expect to discover in each of the five key areas related to information operations.

Highlights from Five Key Areas of SMA Research Related to Information and Influence Activities

Messaging & Counter-messaging

SMA has produced a significant body of work on the ways in which state and non-state actors use messaging to convey narratives and/or to influence populations. Several works in this section focus on effective counter-messaging techniques. These include 1) management of unintended negative consequences from counter-VEO influence operations, 2) maneuver and engagement against ISIS in the narrative space, 3) means of undermining ISIS’s virtual caliphate, and 4) identification of capability gaps in counter-ISIS messaging. Regarding state actors, studies explore the use of narratives to shape Russian and Chinese behavior, as well as narrative analyses of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian media.

Bio-Psycho-Social Drivers of Instability

Much of SMA research over the past ten years has focused on the drivers of instability, particularly in the context of countering violent extremism and destabilizing population dynamics. In trying to understand why individuals and groups choose or reject violence, SMA turned to the neuroscience and cognitive psychology communities for insights. Reports submitted in this area particularly explore the neuro-cognitive basis of deterrence and extremism.

Competition & Conflict

SMA research also considered the theoretical, strategic, and operational aspects of the competition continuum, with particular focus on gray zone activities. In addition to developing a widely-held, theoretically-based definition of “Gray Zone” activities (or, operations below the level of armed conflict), SMA’s work in this area has examined the motivations for actors to engage in “gray activities,” how the US should respond to such activities, and the capabilities needed to respond effectively.

Cyber

Alongside other studies related to information and influence, SMA has explored topics in the “fifth domain” pertaining to cyber and information warfare, emerging technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic ambiguity. While cyber considerations have not been a driving factor in SMA studies, its importance for information and influence activities is acknowledged through papers and speaker events at the intersection of the cyber realm and communications theory.

Influence Operations

All other reports relating to effective communication and persuasion are included in this last category: influence operations. Reports in this section range from managing unintended consequences of messages to understanding target populations to identifying communication techniques and patterns used by adversaries. Reports in this section often grapple with how to best conduct influence operations in an increasingly complex and connected world.

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Authors: Robert Hinck (Monmouth College); Marco Ehrl (Kutztown University); William Stefanism (Monmouth College); Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College); Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

This study examined Egyptian, Russian, and Chinese media perspectives of the Egyptian economy to determine to what extent a future economic crisis in Egypt is probable, and identification of which great powers would most likely lead bailout efforts should an economic crisis unfold. To answer these questions, researchers employed a mixed-method approach analyzing over 500 news articles from the past five years from 18 different Egyptian, Chinese, and Russian native language news sites.

Key Findings

Reports on Likely Bailout Partners

• Convergence in reporting on bailout agents: Egyptian, Chinese, and Russian media similarly report the likely bailout agents being the IMF and World Bank in addition to Middle Eastern partners, such as Saudi Arabia.
• Divergence in reporting of bailout agents: China views itself as a bailout partner, but Egypt does not see China as such. Egypt views Russia as a bailout partner, but Russia does not view itself as such.

Stability of the Egyptian Economy

• Egyptian Government’s Capacity: Egyptian media reports greater governmental capacity in managing its economic crisis, although some indicators suggest the increase reflects the need to garner greater buy-in and support from Egyptian populace.
• Probability of Continued Economic Crisis: Egyptian, Chinese, and Russian media largely indicate that the Egyptian government is capable of successfully managing its economic situation, although references of continued economic crisis factors remain largely consistent over time. Further concerns include the risk of terrorist attacks and political instability which could launch Egypt back into recession.

Russian and Chinese Interests in Egypt

• Chinese Interests: Chinese interests in Egypt take a long-term, strategic view linking its actions in Egypt to its Belt and Road initiative. Chinese media emphasizes more broadly the benefits of Chinese actions supporting Egyptian economy and people.
• Russian Interests: Russian interests in Egypt take a short-term, tactical view highlighting Russian actors as the key agents of change. Key industries of interest in Russian media reports include: energy cooperation, weapon sales, tourism, and development of the Suez Canal.

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Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.); and Jeff Day (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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There is no “one size fits all” approach to disengagement and deradicalization—disengagement and deradicalization programs should be tailored to the specific environments and individuals/groups of interest. However, analysis of historical cases of disengagement and deradicalization programs reveals what appear to be several common characteristics of programs that have demonstrated some levels of success: creating a sense of hope and purpose, building a sense of community, providing individual attention and regimented daily schedules, and ensuring sustainable, long-term commitment following completion of the program (i.e., after- care). While designing disengagement and deradicalization programs to include these characteristics could serve as a useful starting point, they should not be considered universal, or guarantees of successful deradicalization. Rigorous research and analysis is still needed in order to solidify our understanding of, and ability to measure, “success” with respect to deradicalization programs.

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Authors: Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia); Lindsy Grunert (University of British Columbia); and Bradford Morrison (University of British Columbia)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Summary

Governments continue to pour money into deradicalization programs with the goal of rehabilitating violent extremists. Are there lessons in psychological theory and research, and in historical examples, from which current-day programs could benefit? In this paper we highlight lessons that are consistently found throughout a selective review of the psychology literature, give a brief example of these lessons in the context of four case studies, and suggest a way forward that includes these “soft” approaches to rehabilitation and preventive measures that combat the structural and psychological influence of extremist thought that still too often culminates in extremist behavior. Four important points are emphasized for future programs: the need for clear operational definitions differentiating between disengagement and deradicalization, a need for unbiased definition and empirical measurement of success, the need to incorporate relevant cultural and social factors in analysis and planning, and the need to pay attention to the cognitive processes of radicalized individuals and of participants of deradicalization programs.

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Authors: Dr. Maorong Jiang (Creighton University); and Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Abstract and Methodology

This paper addresses potential security concerns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the next 5-25 years if a strong Chinese-Russian alliance develops. It also offers the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) possible approaches to pre-empt both the formation of a China-Russia Axis and subsequent emergence of a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) periphery.

Methodologically, currently available data do not admit of any mechanical prediction in forecasting for years, much less decades, ahead. Instead, borrowing from cosmologist Robert Spitzer, possible outcomes are based upon carefully aggregated and synthesized evidence. This evidence is reasonable and responsible. It creates a network of informal inference possessing strong probative value deriving from consideration of multiple, converging, independently probable data-sets. In such analysis, any single data-set may change, or indeed be proven incorrect, without necessarily disproving the whole.

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