SMA Publications

[Q5] Is it possible to realistically quantify the economic impact of warfighting events in space (e.g., increase in insurance costs for commercial satellites, stock market perturbations of a space attack, change in consumer behavior due to disruption of communication or PNT services)?

Author: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report captures the input of 19 responses contributed by experts from the National Security Space community in the US and an array of commercial space actors in the US, Australia, Italy, and Norway. Industry perspectives on this question are surprisingly varied in both their explicit responses (i.e., “yes,” “difficult,” “impossible,” etc.) and their use of methods for assessing the fallout of hostility in space. While the contributors offer a variety of useful insights, there does not appear to be an easily accessible and comprehensive analysis of the financial impact of conflict in the space domain. In fact, due to the cascading nature of warfighting events in space, contributors disagree on whether any analysis would produce a satisfactory answer, but the clear consensus is that further research needs to be done on this topic.

Not an Easy “Yes” or “No” Answer

Only three contributors4 responded to this question using a “yes” or “no” binary, suggesting that a more nuanced approach to the feasibility of modeling the economic impact of warfighting events in space is necessary. Contributors from Caelus Partners, LLC contend that a holistic simulation can quantify the impact of warfighting events in space. Toward this same end, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and contributors from Harris Corporation point to previous work by the Department of Commerce as useful groundwork that might be combined with applied “economic principles and econometric(s).”5 On the other hand, several contributors6 suggest that it would be virtually impossible to accurately measure such a shock to a system that is “integrated into almost every nook and cranny of the economy” (Hitchens). Despite these more categorical assertions, the central theme highlighted by the majority of the experts is that the economic impact of warfighting events in space can at best be measured in relation to certain aspects of commerce that are contingent on space operations. However, even these estimates will be unable to account for the second- and third-order economic impact of warfare in space.

Broadly speaking, the expert contributors tend to define first-order effects as more easily measurable, direct damage to space assets that might be calculated by material replacement costs. Second-order effects involve damage to, or degradation of, systems that are dependent on space systems, while third-order effects involve the more intangible opportunity costs resulting from second-order effects. For example, first-order effects of the destruction of a Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellite might be measured by the cost to replace that satellite. Calculating the costs associated with second-order loss or degradation of point-of sale (PoS) and ATMs capabilities that rely on the PNT satellite may be possible, but is likely difficult to do. Finally, calculating the third-order loss of potential revenue of all businesses affected by the loss of those systems is essentially impossible to quantify. Table 1 below7 outlines potential effects of warfighting events in space explicitly mentioned by contributors, and whether those effects can be realistically quantified.

Methods and Challenges of Quantification

As can be seen in the table above, the contributors who contend that quantifying the impact of warfighting events in space is possible, limit their assessments to only first-order effects and second-order effects only for select space-dependent systems. Given the challenges of quantification, contributors indicate only a few approaches that could be used to measure consequential outcomes. For example, the contributors from Chandah Space Technologies suggest a ground-up methodology10 for aggregating the equities of stakeholder assets that would be affected and “summing it across all the categories of interests.” The Harris Corporation team intimates that other approaches are being taken: “insurance companies and financial underwriters for commercial satellite owner/operators have most likely done more detailed estimates of these impacts.” However, they also caution that the “associated variability and uncertainties are likely to pose significant uncertainties to many of their estimates and, for all practical purposes, represent just a fraction of the overall financial impact.” In short, multiple contributors agree that there are fundamental challenges to any methodology aimed at capturing a comprehensive picture of the economic fallout of conflict in space.

How Bad is Conflict in Space?

Almost half of the contributors12 stress that the impact of a warfighting event in space would be a historic event with no comparable precedent (and therefore, extremely difficult to quantify for this reason). The Gilmour Space Technologies team writes of significant satellite damage leading to the “equivalent of a limited nuclear war in terms of economic damage,” and the Adranos Energetics team categorizes such an incidence as likely to result in a “total panic” in the financial world. To illustrate further the magnitude of such a warfighting event, two experts discuss how current political tensions surrounding the space domain are already limiting economic growth, commerce, and cooperation in peacetime.13 These effects would be magnified several times over in any warfighting scenario, and thus speak to the seriousness of such a potential event.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia, S.p.A., Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous US Launch Executive; Chandah Space Technologies; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliott Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q18] What are the principles (e.g., flexible vs. controlled response; proportionality, etc.) upon which international policy makers should develop response options for aggression in space? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author(s): Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Upon considering the question of focus, several expert contributors argue that it is confusing or even misleading (Cheng; Gallagher; Hertzfeld; Masson-Zwaan). The contributors maintain that this confusion comes from two sources: the ambiguity of the language used in the question and the ambiguity of existing space treaty law. Noting the inherent contention in the legal realm of space, the contributors as a whole nonetheless work to articulate how the US might derive a set of principles for response to aggression in space. Contributors divide into two camps: those who argue that principles already exist that can be used to guide a response to aggression, and those who argue that these principles are—and must be—emergent. Although distinct reasons are given between the two camps, the chief principle on which all camps agree is what we might call the “precaution principle.”

Two Sources of Question Ambiguity: Terminology and Existing Space Law

Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland believes that the phrase “international policy makers” is vague, and Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation contends that the phrase represents “the language of UN bureaucrats and academics in the arms control community” rather than a pertinent characterization of decision-makers with power. Cheng queries: “what is an ‘international policymaker?’ You mean US policymakers? Or, do you mean the international consortium of space policymakers that meets in Geneva or someplace like that?” His elaboration of his
confusion is worth quoting at length:

One of the big problems we have when you use terms like “international policymakers,” is that you actually are talking about a conglomeration of different groups and entities with very different perspectives. You have space technical policy people. You have space policy people from different countries. You have experts on countries, some of whom have some knowledge of those countries’ space policies.

In addition to the ambiguity inherent in the language, contributors cite the ambiguity of current space law. For many expert contributors, it was difficult to articulate principles of response because the antecedent action—aggression in space—is poorly defined in the law. According to Dr. Henry Hertzfeld of George Washington University, “a lot of these things are still not well defined in the space environment. There is no good definition of a weapon, for example. There’s no good definition of what an armed attack might be.” Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland echoes this viewpoint, noting that, “There is no legal or agreed definition of ‘aggression’ in space; either under the UN Charter or in any other body of law.”

Are There Already Principles of Response Appropriate to the Space Domain?

In determining specific principles of response to aggression in space, contributors divide into two groups: a camp that argues that principles of response apposite to the space domain already exist in international law, and a camp that forwards that whichever principles exist will require further development in order to be useful in the space domain. The first camp largely defends existing principles as requiring little to no amendment for use in developing responses to aggression in space. The second group postulates that the principles will emerge out of interactions in the space domain, as long as actors curate their understanding and responses to potential adversarial action with all deliberate speed.

Principles of Response to Aggression Already Exist

Contributors in the first group identify the United Nations Charter, the Outer Space Treaty (OST), and the Law of Armed Conflict as the three sources of principles governing responses to aggression in space (Hitchens; Johnson; Nishida; Spies; Steer). Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation explains that, “Article III of the Outer Space Treaty makes it clear that general international law, including the UN Charter, apply to the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space.” Michael Spies of the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs further points out that in the United Nations Charter there are “a number of principles applicable to the development of international policy responses to prevent aggression in outer space.” The experts argue that, just as they do in other domains, these principles can guide policymakers in formulating responses to aggression.

Principles from the United Nations Charters and the Outer Space Treaty

In fact, the principles of the UN Charter, reiterated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, are the foundational principles for policymaking in space, according to Johnson, because the language of the Charter itself specifies that there is “a hierarchical relationship between special regimes such as space law,” such that the UN Charter “takes precedence of any special regime of international law.” Michiru Nishida of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan buttresses this view, and suggests that the “most important principle that should be reaffirmed would be the application of existing international law and obligations to all outer space activities, scientific, civil, commercial and military.” He stresses the importance of existing international law governing all activities, inclusive of military activities, because “some states dispute the scope of agreements adopted at UNCOPUOS…claiming that the mandate of the UNCOPUOS only deals space activities other than military.”

The specific principles that Spies and Johnson explicitly identify within the UN Charter/OST treaty system as governing responses to prevent armed conflict in space are: The principle for states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” (Spies) and long-standing principles such as “good faith, pacta sunt servanda, the sovereign equality of states, non-interference, non-aggression, the prohibition on the use of force, the right of self-defense” (Johnson), as well as the precautionary principle.

Principles from the Law of Armed Conflict

Offering a concurring, but more narrowly-tailored view, several experts (Beard; Simpson; Steer) identify the Law of Armed Conflict (jus in bello and jus ad bello) as the most applicable principle of response to aggression in space. Jack M. Beard of the University of Nebraska College of Law agrees that the more concrete legal debates about principles and responses to aggression are situated within the Law of Armed Conflict, noting: “The more you study space and the importance of things like GPS satellites, the more that you are able to make an argument that an attack generating huge debris fields might violate the Law of Armed Conflict.”

According to Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada, the most important principles drawn from the Law of Armed Conflict for the space domain are the “principles of proportionality and precaution in attack.” Dr. Michael K. Simpson of the Secure World Foundation notes, however, that the principle of proportionality, when applied in the space domain, “may be complicated by the asymmetry of impact of actions in space.” Expounding further, he warns that “eliminating a single satellite upon which a country depends for critical terrestrial services clearly has an effect that is disproportionate to that of eliminating a single satellite in the fleet of major space faring countries with multiple options to work around the loss.” Responses to aggression that target space assets trigger proportionality concerns through their humanitarian impact, according to Spies: the “destruction of dual-use satellites could negatively impact essential civilian infrastructure, health-care services and humanitarian operations,” which rely on “satellite communication, navigation and timing, and imagery networks.” Precaution, as a principle guiding militarized responses in the space domain, dovetails with the doctrine of necessity, Steer observes, because the “use of force must only be employed when the aggression is “instant, overwhelming, and leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

Principles of Response to Aggression Are (and Must Be) Flexible

The second group of contributors, which argues that principles of response are emergent, prefer to categorize “aggression” as an unwanted behavior in an interdependent social system (Bevilacqua; Broniatowski; Caelus Partners, LLC). Dr. David Broniatowski of George Washington University notes that systems that operate in the space domain are designed and therefore possess an architecture that defines how specific components will carry out functional requirements to achieve needed capabilities. Appropriate selection of this architecture can enable flexible response options, such as the ability to carry out new capabilities, or resilience to attempts to disrupt existing capabilities, in the event of unexpected behaviors or other changes in the space environment. Conversely, selection of an inappropriate architecture can inhibit flexible response options by making changes too complex or costly to implement after the system has been fielded. The contributors from Caelus Partners, LLC hypothesize that this architecture can be leveraged to “create a community for the purpose of the coordination and management of participant activities.”

The contributors in this second camp jointly identify three specific principles of response as being effective within the emergent social system of the space domain: flexibility with firmness, precaution, and multi-lateral punishment.

The first principle of response is being “flexible, but firm,” as Adam Gilmour of the Gilmour Space Technologies elegantly puts it.3 Gallagher delineates the mechanisms of how this principle would work in practice. Respondents to aggression should “determine the objective of the response”:

If something bad happens, you could say, ‘Well, our primary objective really is to just condemn the bad thing.’ Or, the US could say, ‘Our primary objective is to punish the bad thing, or to reverse whatever gains the bad actor achieved so they don’t get any kind of military advantage for it.’

In other words, actions taken in response to aggression should have end goals in mind before they are undertaken. Because the goals of the response may vary by actor and technological capability among other factors, flexible but firm responses are seen as ideal in this view.

The second principle of response is best described as a “precautionary principle.”4 Gallagher describes this principle in the space domain as one of prudence, so that responses to aggression occur with all deliberate speed because an “informed response is better than a quick one”:

Don’t act before you know what actually happened. And it may or may not be obvious what happened—whether it was a deliberate attack, whether there was some form of inadvertent or human interference, whether it was a satellite malfunction, whether it was a result of a natural hazard.

Information helps prevent a combination of errors inherent in the space domain that could result from mis-attribution, mis-estimation (of harm), and mis-identification of what the event was. Specific factors used to determine response “could be derived from three elements: characteristics and purpose of the spacecraft; operational environmental factors, and demonstrated behavior,” the contributors from ViaSat, Inc. maintain. It should be noted, however, that Broniatowski does not endorse the precautionary principle as equal to the principle of flexibility. In his view, precaution is not applicable in all cases, whereas flexible response options should allow for selection of a response based upon what is contextually appropriate.

The third and final principle identified by this camp is that of multi-lateral punishment. For these contributors, acting as a community grants coordinating nations a number of agenda-setting and distributional advantages. As one example of the potential role of this community, Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua of the University of Florida posits that “a nation engaging in aggressive behaviors in space should be banned from operations for a certain time, in proportion to the gravity of its actions.” Nations operating within the community, if they possess a technological advantage over the aggressive actor, could, according to the contributors, enforce such a ban.

Conclusion

In conclusion, though several subject matter experts note sources of ambiguity in the question of focus, the experts as a whole go on to identify sources of principles that can govern responses to aggression in the space domain. These experts can be categorized into two groups: one that draws principles of response from existing laws and practices; and another that believes that new or emergent principles, specific to the space domain, are necessary. Across these two groups of experts, several explicit principles emerge:

1. The resolution of conflict by peaceful means
2. Respect for the sovereign equality of states operating in the space domain
3. The principle of proportionality
4. The principle of precaution
5. Flexibility with firmness in response
6. Multi-lateral punishment

Although distinct reasons are given between the two camps, the chief principle both camps articulated is the principle of precaution, largely due to the potential for suboptimal outcomes resulting from the low-information environment of the space domain.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. Riccardo Bevilacqua (University of Florida); Dr. David Broniatowski (George Washington University); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); David Koplow (Georgetown University Law Center); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Michiru Nishida (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Michael Spies (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q19] What international legal codes or norms are needed to govern the increasingly crowded space domain?

[Q23] Fifty years of space has seen much change. Which aspects of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are still valid and which need updating? Is it better to add to/amend the 1967 Treaty or to establish a new framework for the 21st century?

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the lynchpin of the current international legal regime for space. 105 countries have ratified the treaty, while another 25 are signatories.6 The OST extends the UN Charter and its underlying principles to outer space (Berkowitz), and provides additional principles to guide activities in space. These principles have been elaborated and further codified in three subsequent UN treaties related to space activity: the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, and 1975 Registration Convention.

OST: Retain, Amend, Replace?

The OST and the other “core” treaties were drafted in a relatively short time in the late 1960’s to mid-1970s. The principles upon which they rest—peaceful use of space, free access, and non-territoriality—clearly reflect a shared contemporary concern that Cold War competition could spill over into space. Today, these principles can often be found at the center of arguments that the OST is obsolete, or at least in need of amendment.

However, when asked whether they thought the OST should be amended or replaced, a large majority of the contributors (see Figure 1) respond that the treaty should not be changed at all. Furthermore, contributors who favor amendment specified changes that are limited in scope, rather than a more comprehensive revision of the treaty.8 As Figure 2 shows, opinion does vary between different groups of expert contributors. Academics overwhelmingly favor keeping the OST without change, while the majority of contributors representing commercial enterprises favor amendment or replacement.,

OST: Comprehensive Law or Guiding Principles?

The division in opinion over whether to keep the OST unchanged, or amend or replace it, appears to derive primarily from how the contributors conceptualize the role of the OST in space governance. Those favoring amendment or replacement appear to be considering the OST as a stand-alone and independently comprehensive legal document. In light of the enormous changes in the actors involved in the space domain, this perspective leads them to conclude that the OST cannot provide the legal structure necessary for ensuring the development of either commercial space, or the national security interests of the US in space.

In contrast, those who oppose changing the OST consider it as a set of guiding principles for governing space, rather than a comprehensive set of regulations. David Koplow of the Georgetown University Law Center, Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada, and Dr. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation compare its role to that of the US constitution. In a similar vein, Dr. Mark J. Sundahl of the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Koplow evoke the Magna Carta. However, as Koplow notes,9 just as statements of foundational principles are insufficient to govern a state, they are also insufficient to govern space.

It’s as if, in the case of the United States, we had adopted the Constitution, but then Congress did not get around to passing any laws after. The Constitution sets out the general principles, but you have to flesh those out.

Understood in this light, the continued relevance of the OST is not a function of whether it can address all contingencies and legal requirements for current and future activities in space. Rather, what matters is whether it provides an operative framework for creating subsidiary treaties, agreements, and norms to regulate activities in space. Those who support the continuation of the OST unchanged, judge it to be capable of doing this (Armor; Blount; Gabrynowicz; Gallagher; Hitchens; Johnson; Meyer; Steer; Sundahl). Furthermore, they state, it has been successful; enabling safe and secure access to space (Gabrynowicz; Meyer; Sundahl), blocking the placement of nuclear weapons in space (Gabrynowicz; Sundahl), and preventing national appropriation of the Moon or other celestial bodies (Sundahl). This success has, in turn, given the OST a level of legitimacy and influence that would be difficult to recreate in a new treaty. Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation concludes:

This demonstrates that, rather than the treaty showing its age after fifty years, this long- standing treaty has facilitated five decades of the peaceful and profitable uses of the access, exploration, and use of outer space, and that states respect and observe the treaty.

Arguments for Leaving the OST Alone

Supporters of the OST in its current form tend to see amendment (and even more so replacement) not only as unnecessary but as potentially perilous as well. They do not take this position out of a belief that there is no need to further develop international space law and norms. In fact, all identify very similar areas of activity that need further codification to those presented by the contributors who argue that the OST should be amended or replaced. Rather, their concerns arise from the potential threat to the legitimacy and support for existing space law, more generally, that changes to the OST could trigger.

Several argue that if the OST were opened to amendment, the process may be difficult to control,10 as amending one section of the treaty would put other sections “on the table” as well (Hertzfeld). This, as Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital OTK puts it, may “encourage mischief” and be counter to US interests. Similarly, Joanne Gabrynowicz of the University of Mississippi School of Law and an Anonymous Contributor11 see opening the OST as inviting the potential loss of the prohibition on nuclear weapons and WMD in space. Although not in favor of altering the OST, Paul Meyer of Simon Fraser University notes12 that some see a potential for supplementing the OST without running the risks of opening up the treaty text itself. In multilateral diplomacy this is often accomplished through developing an "Optional Protocol" that can supplement the original treaty in some way (e.g., extend the ban on WMD to all space-based weapons, or provide for the type of institutional support such as annual meetings of states parties that is common now but which the OST lacks).

The OST has Provided a Durable Set of Principles

As Steer argues, recent negotiations over new legal codes for space, which have stalemated over key national security concerns,13 should serve as a warning that the fundamental principles of the OST are not necessarily undisputed. Is this not an argument for amendment or replacement? Not according to a number of the contributors who provided input for this report.

When the OST and three core treaties were negotiated, there were only two nations active in space, and less than 20 members of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS). There are now 85 members, as well as many countries with assets in space and a quickly expanding set of commercial space actors (Hertzfeld; Simpson; Steer). Given the current international and space environments, contributors are doubtful that a new or significantly amended treaty could reach greater consensus than the OST (Anonymous Contributor; von der Dunk), and any new treaty is expected to take years, even decades, to complete, if it is at all (Anonymous Contributor; Armor; Hertzfeld). During this time, as an Anonymous Contributor notes, “new customary international rules” for space may emerge14 that may not work or serve US interests as well as the current treaty (Blount; Gallagher). That is to say, simply engaging in the process of renegotiation could undermine the authority the OST by creating competing principles for actions in space. Meyer makes an important point regarding the influence of the OST over the past 50 years:

We are repeatedly told that space is ‘congested, competitive, and contested’ but not reminded that it has been a realm of remarkable international ‘cooperation’ as well. The Outer Space Treaty embodied this cooperative approach.

Spillover Effect

Steer notes that the key “principles and clauses are today considered to be customary international law, thus binding on all states, regardless of whether they are party to the OST or not.” When considered in conjunction with the observation of Dr. P.J. Blount of the University of Luxembourg, that “there is a regime of treaties and UNGA resolutions that elaborate on particular aspects of the Outer Space Treaty, and there is a growing body of domestic law and policy that reveals how states are interpreting ambiguities in the treaty,” the broader implications of amending or replacing the OST become clearer. If the legal regime in space is indeed rooted in the OST, then any changes to the substance or standing of the treaty would spillover to affect other legal codes for space.

Governance in Space

As noted above, regardless of their position on the OST (amend, replace, retain), when asked what changes to international legal codes or norms are needed to govern the increasingly crowded space domain, contributors raise a fairly consistent list of issues. Nevertheless, differences of opinion and interpretation do emerge.

State-Centrism of Current Codes

Dr. Henry Hertzfeld of George Washington University sees the state-centric focus of existing legal codes as problematic given the rapid increase in the number of non-state actors involved in space activities. He suggests that while “[t]echnically, nations are responsible for their activities in outer space and even liable for them,” there is “a whole set of commercial law that is not that precisely defined for space.” Relatedly, Steer notes that the rise to prominence of commercial space actors was “either not foreseen by the drafters of the OST, or, given the political pressures at the time, simply not a priority.”15 As a result, many contributors identify commercial space activities as an area in which clearer legal codes and regulations are needed. Differences of opinion involve whether commercial activities can be accommodated within the OST in its present form. Dr. Frans von der Dunk of the University of Nebraska College of Law and Armor believe that they can. Among those who think not, Jonathan Fox of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and contributors from Faulconer Consulting Group point to Article VI16 of the OST in particular as needing “to be substantially modified to provide protection of space- related commercial rights arising in the coming years” (Fox).

Barriers to Commercial Development

As space actors are diversifying, so are the activities in which they engage. Article II and the non- appropriation principle17 have been the focus of arguments that the OST stands in the way of commercial development in outer space (Blount). Article II is seen to present significant barriers to commercial actors and investors operating beyond Earth (space tourism, space hotels) (Cheng), as well as those interested in developing space mining (Faulconer Consulting Group; Fox). Fox contends that, as it stands, the OST prevents “legitimate exercise of market-based commercial activities (including natural resource mining, refining, exploration, extraction, transportation, and other related functions) as may safely and practicably be undertaken under the license and authority of space-faring nations, in accordance with their applicable laws.”

Countering this, Armor notes: “the recent [US] Commercial Launch Competitiveness Act allowed ‘ownership’ of resources removed from planetary bodies. It does not violate the OST at all but clarifies commercial exploitation consistent with original intent of the Treaty.”18 Weeden agrees that there is a lack of clarity in the existing principle but notes that lawyers and economists have used fishing laws as a potential model which would enable resource extraction and use without requiring territorial ownership. This view is shared by Blount, who sees the implications of such changes as far-reaching and potentially detrimental to the United States’ national security interests:

It would be foolish to discard a foundational security treaty that helps to maintain international peace over the question of property rights...While the Outer Space Treaty may increase the cost of doing business for commercial operators, their investments would not be safe without such a treaty.

Governance of Space Debris and Traffic

As the space domain becomes more crowded the need for regulation to protect assets and valuable orbits has become apparent if space is to remain sustainable (Sundahl). Space debris is in many ways a classic collective action problem—it creates potential risk to every space actor, if not addressed it could ultimately render space unsafe for all, and it cannot be “solved” without cooperation between most or all space actors.

Orbital debris guidelines, such as those developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), have been effective but need to be updated to account for new capabilities, such as large constellations of satellites (Spire Global Inc.). While Steer notes that these guidelines have generated “a very high level of compliance,” Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit and contributors from Spire Global Inc. argue that binding rules and some enforcement mechanism are required. Matthew Schaefer of the University of Nebraska College of Law notes, however, that ownership issues may create a problem here. Specifically, whether objects owned by another actor can legally be removed without the owner’s consent.

Space traffic is also seen by the contributors to be an area in which the need for better regulation is becoming more pressing, as it threatens the collective interest of all space actors in the long-term (Steer; Sundahl; Weeden). Commercial plans for satellite servicing, refueling, and outer-orbit inspections will involve getting close to and docking with satellites (Weeden), and Rossettini argues that regulation and clear norms need to be created “to ensure the use of space becomes a controllable or at least verifiable.”

Surveillance and Irresponsible Behavior

Traffic and proximity issues also raise national security concerns. Sundahl and Weeden both give the example of a state actor flying satellites close to those of an adversary. As Weeden ponders:

What is the space equivalent of an Incidents at Sea Agreement that is going to kind of give a bright line of ‘you should do this, this is how you behave responsibly, and this is how we do it normally,’ and if there is deviation from that, it suddenly becomes an indication or warning that something is not right.

Without agreed upon norms of behavior, the potential exists for either unintended escalation or loss of security. To this point, Steer suggests further development of data sharing and transparency norms. This approach is consistent with discussions by Tanja Masson-Zwaan of Leiden University, Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, and Johnson, and reflects the assessment of Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin that there is a need to strengthen mechanisms for consultation, crisis management, and dispute resolution.

Bottom Line

Regardless of their stance on the OST, all of the contributors see existing space law and norms as insufficient to manage the rapidly evolving nature of space activities, and the current and potential threats these activities present. As space becomes more crowded, the risk of accidental or intentional harm to an actor’s assets increases. And, as space capabilities become more critical to actors, the cost of losing those assets also increases. Both of these conditions create a collective action problem that the further articulation of international norms and regulation could potentially mitigate for all. However, most contributors do not think that amending or replacing the OST is either necessary or advisable. These contributors warn that opening up the OST would likely trigger a long and uncontrollable process of negotiation that in itself would create uncertainty and undermine the legitimacy of the OST. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the final treaty would work as well, let alone any better.

Contributors

Anonymous Contributor;2 Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor3 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele4 (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India); David Koplow (Georgetown University Law Center); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Paul Meyer (Simon Fraser University, Canada); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Michiru Nishida5 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D- Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); Anne Sweet (NASA); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question (R6.10): What can the U.S. and Coalition partners realistically do to enable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to combat a long-term ISIS insurgency? Recognizing the enormous resources the U.S. poured into the ISF from 2003 until 2011, only to see much of the force collapse in 2014, what can we do to avoid making the same mistakes when training the ISF?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

At the beginning of the Reach Back effort in 2016, Drs. Belinda Bragg and Sabrina Pagano from NSI Inc. created a qualitative loop diagram1 of security dynamics representing Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni populations in Iraq using NSI’s Stability Model (StaM).2 They found that security dynamics in the region were driven in large part by perceptions of social accord and governing legitimacy. These findings apply today to the study of why Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) failed in 2014, why they are strengthening today, and what pitfalls they may face in the future.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs have voiced fears that, once areas of Iraq controlled by ISIL have been liberated, Kurdish and Shia Iraqis will seek to exact retribution against Sunni populations in these areas for the actions carried out by ISIL (Amnesty International, 2016; Fahim, 2016; Hauslohner & Cunningham, 2014; Rozen, 2016). “There are many barriers [to Sunni IDP’s WHAT CAN CENTCOM DO? Decreasing Sunni fear of retribu-on In Iraq there are a mul-tude of military and paramilitary groups and organiza-ons, with various levels of allegiance to and control by the central government. At present, they are at least loosely upeople accused—rightluynity or wrongly—of complicity and lack of coordination among local strongly iden-fied sectarian mili-a is likely to significantly reduce percep-ons of security and increase the likelihood of sectarian violence reemerging. authorities and security forces” (United States Institute of Peace Staff, 2016). (Bragg & Pagano, Specifically as this sec-on of the loop diagram below illustrates, the nature of the various military and paramilitary forces present in Iraq contributes significantly to Sunni fear of reprisals. Human SOCIAL Sunni sense of r i g h t2s a0b u1s e6s )

The loop diagram in Figure 1 suggests Sunni percep-on of equality R Sunni fear of retribu.on R Sunni tribal elite percep.on of SECURITY situa.on Sunni percep.on of LEGITIMACY of ABADI GOVERNMENT Lack of trust Corrup-on & patronage Sunni Ideological radicalism (New ISIL) Equal administra-on of rule of law & jus-ce GOVERNING CAPACITY Local / na.onal among Sunni, Shia, Kurd Sunni sense of to enhance Sunni perception of the aliena-on from Shia-led government’s legitimacy, Sunni government Cross-represectnaritaan ltanidon in the police become an Sunni representa-on in police force Lack of trust in Shia led ISF essential part of the professionalization disputes Sunni Sa-sfac-on with resource R Credibility of na-onal security apparatus of the ISF going forward (Bragg & quality ofmdistribu-on process & life Pagano, 2016). Failure to do so may turn Sunni populations, particularly in areas where ISF forces must operate in Ability / willingness of Sunni IDPs/refugees to return the fight against Daesh, against them (Hamasaeed, Kaltenthaler). However, as this type of analysis shows, there is also a “virtuous” loop where in crease Sunni perception of equality enhances perceptions of legitimacy, which enhances security, which ultimately enhances a sense of fair political representation (Bragg & Pagano, 2016). This loop highlights the centrality of political and social factors to the potential for stability and security in Iraq moving forward, which is also supported by Mr. Hamasaeed.

By updating the loop diagram to focus primarily on the role and function of the ISF, we can get beyond a list of the sources of failure and potential solutions to get at the heart of the problem: large segments of Iraq’s population (primarily Sunni Arabs and Kurds) do not trust the government, and by extension, the ISF. Where there is no trust, there can be no legitimacy.3 A government that protects the interests of Shia over Sunnis results in institutions, like the armed forces, that promulgate a negative feedback loop where the unwillingness of forces to protect Sunnis erodes Sunni trust in the government, resulting in the ISF being perceived as an illegitimate and ineffective force.

Experts note that ISF has made marked improvement in combating Da’esh over the last year (Liebl, Whiteside). They point to a new sense of nationalism among the citizens of Iraq and the ISF in the face of an adversary that has come to be seen as an existential threat. However, it begs the question of what will happen when the threat that has unified the country to some degree recedes. It also raises concern that while the population on average may experience rising nationalism, specific groups may not share in that experience, which can lead to unrest that affects the country. This is even more pertinent as ISF chases the remnants of Daesh fighters to rural, Sunni dominated areas with a military force led and comprised primarily of Shia personnel.

Figure 2 above provides a visual summary of the dynamics at play in the professionalization of the ISF. As mentioned above, the key drivers of ISF failure as identified by experts since 2003 include 1) lack of Sunni political representation, 2) weak national identity, 3) exclusionary policies within the ISF, and 4) negative perception of US policies and actions. This last point highlights the role the United States has played in undermining the success of ISF. Starting in 2003, the dissolution of the Iraqi army not only emboldened exclusionary policies that sidelined Sunni participation and trust in the armed forces, but also eroded US standing with Sunni populations in Iraq (Hamasaeed). Since then, inconsistent support (in terms of both training and funding) opened a vacuum, particularly after 2011, for Prime Minister Maliki to hollow out the officer corps to make it “coup proof” instead of effective and representative (Hamasaeed, Jeffrey, Kaltenthaler, Liebl, Sager, Whiteside).

The most frequent recommendation made by experts to ensure the ISF becomes a force able to combat a long-term Da’esh insurgency would be a US commitment to consistent, sustained engagement with ISF in the form of advice and, particularly, training. Figure 2 shows that a long-term US commitment consisting of a light footprint, training, and advice would help professionalize the army and build an institution built on strictures that would enhance the ISF’s standing as a legitimate, representative, rules-based organization. The population’s trust in the ISF is a necessary component to ensure that ISF can operate in and amongst Sunni populations where Daesh is likely to hide.

The threat and subsequent successful campaign against Daesh in Iraq has presented an opportunity for the country to build on a nascent sense of nationalism to professionalize and institutionalize Iraqi Security Forces as a legitimate guarantor of security for the people of Iraq. However, this transformation requires the consistent, sustained commitment of the US and Coalition partners to provide training and advice to Iraqi forces. As we saw in 2011, disengagement creates an opportunity for sectarian policies, fears, and grievances to emerge that would quickly erode any trust Sunni population might have for the ISF, making Iraq’s efforts to combat Daesh ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.

The stability model constructed in 2016 tells us that “attempting to isolate security engagement efforts from the broader political and social forces at play in Iraq is futile…Security is intrinsically linked to perceptions of governing legitimacy and the dynamics of ethno-sectarian relations. Thus, whatever diplomatic, informational, military and economic levers the U.S. employs in Iraq, attention must be paid to the influence they might have on both of these factors.” (Bragg & Pagano, 2016). As happened in 2011, if OIR is declared a success and the US pulls out, ISF risks becoming once again into the tool of Shia sectarian forces. In the event that a Maliki-aligned, pro-Iranian government is elected in May, Dr. Kaltenthaler concludes, “it is better to be forced to leave Iraq rather than withdraw before the long term mission of stabilizing Iraq is complete.”

In closing, we will leave you with a disruptive thought presented by Dr. Craig Whiteside of the Naval Postgraduate School: it is the local police, not the army that has the primary role in combating terrorism. He argues that army units should be employed to prevent Islamic State fighters from openly grabbing territory and having access to the population, but it is the local police that are best poised to adjudicate relations between the population and insurgent groups.

Contributors

Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, United States Institute of Peace; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University; Dr. Michael Knights, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Vernie Liebl, ProSol Associates & Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, US Marine Corps University; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, London University (UK); Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Council; Mubin Shaikh, Indepdendent Analyst; Anonymous Smith; Dr. Craig Whiteside, Naval Postgraduate School

Question (R6.3): What is most favorable for the stability and the future of Iraq after the defeat of Da’esh: continued presence of an international Coalition or normal state-to-state bilateral relations? If a Coalition is the preferred option, what could be the “unifying factor” for a post-OIR coalition in Iraq and what situations could exist/emerge to prevent/dissolve this unity?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As the United States and its Coalition partners examine the situation in Iraq and Syria after a sustained military campaign against Da’esh, they face a significant inflection point regarding the nature of their engagement. In the United States, policymakers must decide whether continuing to work within the existing Coalition is preferable to normalizing the relationship between the United States and Iraq. The central question is whether the Coalition or a bilateral relationship would best ensure the region’s stability and secure Iraq’s future. A number of the respondents argued that continuing within the Coalition framework is preferable to pursuing a normalized bilateral relationship with Iraq. While there exist benefits and drawbacks of both relationships, it is important to examine the potential contributions and risks of each path for post-Da’esh stability in Iraq.

Working Within a Coalition

In the case of US engagement with Iraq, respondents generally preferred the prospect of continuing to work within the existing Coalition. The table displays selected responses from experts on questions related to coalition or bilateral relationships in general. Experts cited resource pooling as a significant benefit of continuing to work with the Coalition. Dr. Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that a coalition, including Iranian commercial partners such as Germany and France, could limit malevolent Iranian actions that run counter to Coalition interests. Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy of the University of London also recognized that a coalition would serve as a capabilities multiplier and would be able to offer more collective military capabilities.

As already noted, Mr. Hamasaeed argues that any sincere effort to bring stability to Iraq must work beyond the just the military dimension. For this reason, he suggests that a coalition would be better equipped to handle a wider mission set. Ambassador James Jeffrey of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy also supported this point, noting that an expanded Coalition will also allow states whose polity may not support a “boots on the ground” engagement to contribute to the effort. Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, of the University of Akron and Case Western Reserve argues that the United States can use help to develop the capacity of Iraqi security forces with a possible a second-order effect of preventing Iranian entities from filling that vacuum. He also believes a coalition effort would also be viewed more favorably and would be imminently more “sellable” to skeptical populations. Separately, leading the Coalition could give international legitimacy to the United States’ objectives in Iraq, according to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Ms. Jennifer Cafarella of the Institute for the Study of War. They argue that maintaining the Coalition would give the United States more leverage in pursuing its policy objectives. They also suggest that the domestic climate in Iraq would not favor a long-term US military commitment absent a Coalition-style framework.

Continuing the Coalition effort would not come without some drawbacks. A concern shared by a number of experts was that organization, management, and maintenance of a coalition is a complex endeavor. To that point, each member of a coalition has its own risk tolerance and domestic political limitations. Therefore, a coalition effort to stabilize Iraq may be relatively more fragile and susceptible to rupture, particularly as the narrow goals of a battlefield victory against Da’esh become actualized (Cafarella, Kagan). Additionally, working within a coalition could also pose tactical challenges to the United States. Several experts1 argue that such an environment would limit the United States’ freedom of action. Specifically, a coalition could create conditions wherein the Iraqi government and its citizens fall victim to the costs associated with being perceived as a rentier state, namely the cycle of dependency that is triggered after the receipt of large amounts of foreign assistance, and the resultant stunted development of domestic political organizations.

Operating Within a Bilateral Context

Despite the elucidated benefits of continuing with the Coalition, some respondents suggested that a managed bilateral relationship was a clearer path to stability in Iraq. Mr. Hamasaeed suggested that a bilateral relationship could hasten reconciliation between the Kurdistan Revolutionary Government (KRG) and the Government of Iraq because fewer stakeholders involved may result in a smoother process. It might also increase freedom of action on the part of the United States (Cafarella, Jeffrey, Kagan). To that end, a bilateral relationship could allow partners to efficiently map resources to their areas of expertise and orient towards their strategic interests (Hamasaeed, O’Shaughnessy). The primacy of this sentiment was also echoed by Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center who argued for the efficiency of a bilateral relationship. This context also creates conditions that are favorable for Arab partners. AMB Jeffrey notes that bilateralism offers a level of credibility with those who seek an open-ended US commitment in Iraq. Similarly, a bilateral relationship can help the United States fend off allegations of occupation if it is not permanently basing troops in country (Kaltenthaler). Bilateralism also allows for local institutions to mature, particularly when a main source of discontent (i.e., the very existence and presence of the coalition) is allayed (Meredith).

The drawbacks to a bilateral context remain significant. Such an environment could create even more space for Iran to operate according to their interests (Jeffrey, Kaltenthaler). There will be attendant political risks, and the sum of bilateral efforts would, by nature of its lessened capabilities, be outpaced by a coalition effort (Hamasaeed). Focusing on a purely bilateral effort would also risk marginalizing United States efforts (Jeffrey, Meredith). The United States also opens itself up to having to negotiate a new Status of Forces agreement, a process that has been fraught in the past (Cafarella, Jeffrey, Kagan). Furthermore, it also opens up the United States to the possibility of being made a scapegoat if progress is stalled or difficult to establish (Meredith).

Contributors

Ms. Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War; Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, United States Institute of Peace; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University; Dr. Michael Knights, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Ian McCulloh, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’ Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Analyst

Authors: Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Abstract

We define space deterrence as preventing intentional attacks against space capabilities, regardless of their physical location. Intentional attacks may target space capabilities to deprive space-dependent nations of the ability to leverage space capabilities to either (1) provide indirect assistance to war fighting capabilities located in other domains, or (2) directly base weapons in space. We specify two types of deterrence (Type 1 and Type 2) corresponding to the two aforementioned ways in which space-faring nations leverage space capabilities. Type 1 deterrence concerns the defense of space assets which indirectly assist warfighting capabilities. Type 2 deterrence, on the other hand, concerns the prevention of the basing of weapons in space. Type 1 deterrence exhibits a distinctive vulnerability-credibility tradeoff due to peculiar characteristics of the space domain and how the United States leverages space to enhance other elements of national power. We conclude that unlike what classic deterrence models would predict, in space deterrence remaining reliant or dependent upon vulnerable space capabilities makes commitment to Type 1 deterrence more credible and thereby stable, lessening incentives for (kinetic or other forms of) aggression in crisis and conflict.

Citation

Jafri, A. & Stevenson, J. (2018). NSI Concept Paper, Space Deterrence: The Vulnerability-Credibility Tradeoff in Space Domain Deterrence Stability,. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA).

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q20] What are the current international agreements, treaties, conventions, etc., governing the use of space, and what specific limitations and constraints are placed on space operations?

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors identified 26 separate international agreements, treaties, and resolutions (legal codes) that have implications for space operations (Figure 1). The core of the legal space regime is composed of five UN-sponsored space treaties3 centering around the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST). Subsequent non-binding resolutions, and the ITU Treaty, reflect the evolving nature of space operations, and the perceived need for legal codes to develop in response.

Not all the legal codes that have implications for space operations are specific to space, however. UN general treaties, in particular regimes governing the use of force by states and the right to self-defense, inform space-specific legal codes. Furthermore, Article III of the OST states that all activities in space must be carried out “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security” (Steer).

Multilateral and bilateral security agreements (NTBT, START I, New START) place restrictions on the placement, testing, and use of weapons in space by signatory states, and efforts are underway through the UN to prevent all states placing weapons in space. Some experts also argue that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) are applicable to space operations (Hitchens; Kasku-Jackson; Steer).

Figure 2 provides a timeline of all legal codes identified by the expert contributors, and any identified constraints they discussed. Full details of all legal codes and links to the documents are provided in Table 1. The majority of the constraints identified (21 of 40) deal with the placement, testing, or use of weapons in space, which are present in eight of the legal codes. The remaining constraints and limitations identified are, for the most part, not focused on placing prohibiting or limiting specific activities. Rather, they are designed to regulate and reduce interference in the activities of others, create accountability and transparency in space activities, and encourage compliance with international law. One exception to this is the 1978 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which Dr. Cassandra Steer of Women in International Security-Canada suggests could provide a legal basis for prohibiting the use of kinetic ASATs.

Bottom Line

Overall, the expert contributors do not view the existing legal regime in space to be overly burdensome or restrictive. Starting from the basic tenets of international law—sovereign equality, non-interference, prohibition on the use of force, right of self-defense, peaceful dispute resolution—it explicitly applies these to activities in space (Steer). The emphasis on accountability, transparency (Blount), and coordination of activities reflect the underlying principles of the OST.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Faulconer Consulting Group; Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Jonty Kasku-Jackson (National Security Space Institute); David Koplow (Georgetown University Law Center); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question (R6.8): What is the role of the United States and coalition partners in maintaining stability as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, as other groups grapple with the Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum?

Authors | Editors: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

Overview

Since the controversial September referendum for Iraqi Kurdish independence, the political stability of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its relationship with the Iraqi government has been in crisis mode. The political uncertainty of the KRG has been clouded by the de jure resignation of President Masoud Barzani, an increase in violence and protests, and mounting economic woes. The precarious political balance between Erbil and Baghdad is not only subject to the tensions of internal Kurdish affairs, but also by the complex interests of regional and sub-state actors and the looming Iraqi parliamentary elections in May. Contributors to this response largely agree that actual Kurdish independence is very unlikely in the short-medium term and, moreover, that maintaining the territorial unity of Iraq and Kurdistan is critical to security in the region. However, contributors differ slightly on how to approach facilitating and maintaining stability in Iraq and how to balance competing interests from the KRG, sub-state actors in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and the international community.

Referendum for Independence

The independence referendum continues to be both a source and symptom of tension between Erbil and Baghdad. Furthermore, opposition from regional and international actors has resulted in significant setbacks for the KRG. Several experts cite the referendum as the catalyst for the territorial losses, decay of the ruling political class of the KRG, and the punitive measures the KRG has received from the Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran—all of which makes independence more unlikely (Gulmohamad, Liebl). Concurrent with expert consensus from an earlier reachback report,1 Dr. Muhanad Seloom of the University of Exeter (UK) contends that the referendum was a gambit of political posturing intended to “maximize the KRG’s political and economic gains,” rather than an honest bid for independence. Experts are less decided on the long-term possibility of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan as can be seen in Table 1.2 Since the referendum is responsible for a large portion of the KRG’s current political strife, Dr. Gulmohamad of University of Sheffield (UK) argues that the referendum will be utilized as bargaining chip as a “long-term strategy if/when the relationship with Baghdad gets worse or fails to improve.” As Erbil struggles to consolidate resources and political unity, the fallout of the referendum continues to expose and personify the underlying tensions between the KRG and the Iraqi government.

Sources of Instability

The movement for Kurdish independence in Iraq has a contentious history that has overlapped into the many conflicts and turmoil of Iraqi politics on both a national and regional level.3 It is therefore not surprising that mechanisms of instability can be attributed beyond the political implications of the September referendum. Experts discuss three interdependent sources of controversy between the KRG and other political elements in Iraq, namely economic revenue, political representation/power, and territorial governance. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) (with militia support of the Popular Mobilization Forces) have mounted several successful campaigns against Daesh that have reinvigorated federal authority, which resulted in the eventual reclamation of the Kirkuk governorate and other disputed territories from the Peshmerga (Gulmohamad, Liebl). These areas are coveted by both Erbil and Baghdad for their petroleum resources and smuggling routes, which both entities heavily rely on for revenue. These territorial losses ran concurrent with the disunity and fractionalization of the KRG political elite following the referendum and have left the KRG in a weak position to negotiate for a share of the resources found in the region. Baghdad’s reassertion of authority, coupled with current weakness of the KRG cited by several experts, present opportunities for negotiation and to resolve these crises (Gulmohamad, Liebl). Dr. Muhanad Seloom of the University of Exeter (UK) contends that these conflicts between Erbil and Baghdad are not new and, moreover, that “the secret behind the agreements and concessions between Baghdad and the KRG has been the elections and formations of government.” Another scholar argues that such an engagement cannot occur under the current Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) hegemony due to their personal financial interests. This is critical as a meaningful reconciliation between Erbil and Baghdad hinges on a foundational overhaul of the KRG leadership.

What Can the US Do?

A majority4 of contributors argue that the US is best positioned to play the role of mediator and facilitate negotiations5 between Erbil and Baghdad, but suggest alternate methods of diplomacy. Dr. Ofra Bengio of Tel Aviv University emphasizes the KRG as the most consistent ally to the US and that Washington should demonstrate strong support for the KRG over the Iraqi government and other Shia and Turkish interests. Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center stresses the need for the US to maintain the current sovereign integrity of Iraq and that “anything else opens a Pandora’s box with incalculable results and consequences.” AMB James Jeffrey and Dr. Michael Knights from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy continue this calculus but recognize the importance of maintaining the KRG as a pro-Western influence element within Iraq. They suggest that Erbil-Baghdad disputes endanger this paradigm. Dr. Knights goes on to clarify that “we are not on Baghdad or Erbil’s side, we’re on the [Iraqi] constitution’s side” and so the US has a strong interest in facilitating legal resolutions to all political disputes. Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy of University of London suggests military aid to both the KRG and Baghdad could be used as a useful negotiating asset in mediation. Interests of Iran and Turkey Both Tehran and Ankara aligned with Baghdad on sanctions against the KRG following the referendum and, for the most part, share an interest in preserving the territorial sovereignty of Iraq (Gulmohamad, Jeffrey, Seloom). Turkey has a vested interest in the petroleum production of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (Jeffrey), Iran seeks to preserve their smuggling/patronage networks (Seloom), and both entities want to ensure the KRG is free of adversarial (e.g., Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] and anti-Iran Sunni) influence. While contributors note the importance of perpetuating the US as the primary ally of the KRG, experts favor cooperation between the KRG with Ankara over Tehran (Jeffrey, Knights). Such cooperation is framed in the scenario of Baghdad becoming increasingly entangled into the yoke of Iran and by granting Ankara stakeholder influence with the KRG, Erbil could better balance an Iranian controlled Baghdad. Despite the interests of Iran and Turkey, contributors have not stressed the importance of their influence on Erbil-Baghdad dynamics but again, emphasize the role of the US in forging stability in Iraq.

Contributors

Dr. Ofra Bengio, Tel Aviv University (Israel); Dr. Zana Gulmohamad, University of Sheffield (UK); Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Michael Knights, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mr. Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), Marine Corps University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London (UK); Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Dr. Muhanad Seloom, University of Exeter (UK); Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent.

[Q21] What can the US do to best facilitate development of verifiable norms that maintain a peaceful space domain?

Authors: Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report describes expert views on the existence and non-existence of space norms and the challenges and opportunities norms represent for peaceful space use. At the broadest level, norms are informal but generally accepted rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community, 3 in this case a community of nations. Norms can emerge from either formal or informal channels, as Jonty Kasku-Jackson of the National Security Space Institute argues. Informal means of norm development include persuasion emerging from being a good exemplar of norm-based behavior, such as: the “creation of domestic legislation and regulations that serve as a model for others to adopt, publication and acceptance of academic papers, and shaping the discussion during ‘Track 2’ (non- governmental, informal, and unofficial) conferences and meetings” (Kasku-Jackson). Formal rule development examples consist of: “negotiation and implementation of binding international treaties, non-binding codes of conduct, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and state declaratory policy” (Kasku-Jackson).

The expert contributors generally agree on the need for norms from both informal and formal channels to maintain a peaceful space domain. The most verifiable norms, the contributors emphasize, would generally stem from more formal channels in so far as the US could facilitate norm development by leading in the responsible and transparently measurable use of space, and through the use of treaties.

Are Norms Necessary for a Peaceful Space Domain?

An increasingly large and diverse array of actors, both state and commercial, are actively seeking to exploit and explore the space domain, dramatically shifting the political context of space. The contributors indicate that states newly entering the space domain (India, North Korea, Germany, Australia), competing major powers (US, Russia, China), and commercial actors (SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, many new satellite companies) have different interests and perspectives on space. The diversity of the actors is likely to represent a range of potentially incompatible interests. According to the contributors, it appears that competing major powers are attempting to maintain their advantages within the space domain, new states are seeking affordable and perpetual access to the space domain, and commercial actors are seeking partners and initiatives that will expand the size and profitability of space markets and ventures.

Maintaining a peaceful space domain amidst the growing heterogeneity of interests in space, Dr. P.J. Blount of the University of Luxembourg notes, will require the United States to develop “norms for responsible space activities that help to ensure coordination among all space actors.”4 Norms can function to coordinate a range of interests because norms, as detailed by Kasku-Jackson, “outline good behavior and bad behavior for the [space] community.” By identifying problematic areas of space use through active engagement with diverse space actors, the United States can shape a consensus with wide-spread buy-in.

Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation concurs that norms are based on shared expectations and that a diverse array of actors in the space domain often lack these critical commonalities. Cheng questions, however, whether United States leadership and engagement with those interests will lead to stable norms that, whether verifiable or not, will help maintain a peaceful domain: Americans “talk about creating norms because we live in a rule of law society governing through mediation, and we believe that the law itself has value, separate from whoever comes before it,” but “what is the purpose of these norms and when are these norms supposed to operate?” For Cheng, norms advocates have not fully appreciated that developed and verifiable norms can also be used to entrench competing interests in ways that limit the United States’ options. In his words, the United States can “go ahead and create as many [restrictive] norms as possible,” our adversaries will sign on to these norms and hold us to them. They will make the United States “live by [its] rules,” although our adversaries may not abide by them, making these norms “self-straightjacketing.”,

Achieving Verifiable Norms: Codification, Enforcement, and Measurement

There was disagreement among the contributors on whether norms require formalization (in treaties) to be effectively verifiable. Blount concedes that “norms need not come in the form of a binding treaty,” but rather could “come in a variety of mechanisms that solidify what constitutes responsible space activities.” Blount’s optimism that non-codified norms could still be verifiable and enforceable notwithstanding, most of the contributors feel that formal agreements are the best pathway to verifiable, enforceable norms.5 The mantra that verification is enforcement typifies the views the contributors.6 Some contributors focus on the potential usefulness of formal agreements versus norms. For instance, David Koplow of Georgetown University emphasizes the usefulness of formal agreements and proposes that they would provide a vehicle for regulating space use. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, these norms should be “things that promote transparency and are things that are measurable, and not measurable just by one entity but measurable by the community at large.”

In fact, many of the contributors stress the need for metrics to verify space use, which, as Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin indicates, would be difficult as it entails the measurement of behavior that may not be obvious, or have clear intent as in dual-use technologies. The contributors also lament that the US does not currently have adequate capabilities to verify actions in space and must invest resources to strengthen verification capabilities, particularly in space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. As Kaksu-Jackson notes, SSA is a foundationalcapability thatfacilitatesattribution of activities in space and therefore supports norm enforcement.”

Conclusion

After considering whether norms are necessary for a peaceful space domain, the expert contributors address how enforcement applications of norms could provide an avenue for verification. They generally agree that an increase of diverse actors (global powers, states recently entering the space domain, commercial actors) with diverse interests (domination, deterrence, profit) increases the difficulty in developing shared norms, since norms by definition imply shared values. Given the historic difficulty in achieving effective formal agreements, the contributors share a hope that less formal norms might be an option for regulating a responsible use of space. However, they often fell back upon discussion of the value of formal agreements, exhibiting a bias toward formal rules given their explicitness. Another issue the contributors stress is the need for measurable verification of how space is being used by actors, both to mark norm violations and to support guidelines set forth in formal agreements.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Dr. P.J. Blount (University of Luxembourg); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Harris Corporation; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Jonty Kasku-Jackson (National Security Space Institute); David Koplow (Georgetown Law); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Paris, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Michael Spies (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Mark Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation),

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question (R6.9): How does Iran prioritize its influence and presence in the region?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

Hoping to answer the question of how Iran prioritizes its influence and presence in the Middle East, we asked fifteen experts to list—in rank order—Iran’s key interests, how it seeks to realize those interests, and how successful it is likely to be in the next 18-24 months.1 As is evident in Figure 1, a clear majority of experts consulted identified regional hegemony as Iran’s primary regional goal.2 However, while listed only once as a top three interest, Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy of the University of London argues that the primary objective of the Iranian government is the continuity of the theocracy in power in Iran. “Everything else flows from this,” he writes. Indeed, many of the other interests listed in Figure 1 could be construed as mechanisms for establishing and expanding Iran’s desire for regional hegemony and, more importantly (and implicitly), regime continuity.

Appendix A briefly describes the interests listed in Figure 1. The task of identifying and grouping interests from the expert contributions was complicated because 1) many of the interests are interrelated, 2) some are policies or tactics that are the means to achieving higher objectives, and 3) some are at different levels of generality. However, the interests listed do tend to cluster around four key areas—Islamic identity, national security, regime security/continuity, and domestic support. Iran’s interests and how they choose to prioritize and implement them is a complex system perhaps best represented by a loop diagram, see Figure 2.

Once you have interests mapped into a looped diagram—representing Iranian interests as a complex system—it is possible to dive more deeply into the related factors driving, hindering, and complicating a particular interest or tactic. For example, based on the high-level information provided by experts in their contributions, Figure 3 shows how Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony is linked to other factors, tactics, and policies. This visualization is an example of how Iran’s interests might best be displayed in a diagram. We did not ask the experts to explicitly support this kind of visualization, so it is primarily a notional representation. The SMA team in conjunction with the experts could complete the loop diagram as part of a future reach back effort.

Land Bridge

The Iranian idea of creating a land bridge to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria is closely linked with Iran’s goal of reducing US influence in the region (Ostovar). Maintaining this block of allies is crucial not only for reducing US influence and maintaining deterrence leverage against Israel but for denying Saudi Arabia a platform to expand its influence among Sunni populations, particularly in Iraq (Biglari, Ostovar). However, Dr. Zana Gulmohamad of Sheffield University would caution that Iran is not rigid in only working with Shia groups. He writes, “Iran does not necessarily look for actors that are similar (Islamic Shia) or have the same sectarian visions or doctrines as this would ease and facilitate its hegemony (Gulmohamad). Rather, it aims to expand its power and influence with other actors that have similar interests, which would bolster its influence in the region. Therefore, it is willing to cut deals with any external power that serve its interests, but Iran’s interests also serve its religious doctrines as well as the elites in Tehran.”

Influence in Iraq and Syria

Closely related, Dr. Ostovar contends that Iran tends to view the region in black and white terms, making long-term US presence and influence untenable to the Iranian government. However, Mr. Biglari notes that Iran has “no qualms coordinating and cooperating with the US and US-back forces when and where it advances their purposes.”

Leader of Islam

Mr. Mubin Shaikh, a regional expert, argues “Iran sees itself as the cultural superior to the Arabs, which they believe are wrongly seen as automatic inheritors of the Islamic tradition.” To reinforce its leadership role in the Islamic world Iran has successfully used Shia militias (Watkins) to defend both Sunni and Shia religious sites in Iraq and Syria (Luce). Not to do so “would force Iran to forfeit any claims to leadership of the entire Muslim umma.”

Global Champion of Shia

AMB Jeffrey observes that Iran sees itself as both a state and cause: it is a nation-state with sovereignty and obligations to the people it governs, but it is also a defender of Shia everywhere. This is seen as their destiny, which brings Iran into direct conflict with Sunni traditions—particularly Wahhabism— seeking the same path. Therefore, the best way to deter attacks against Shia is to develop and project Iran’s hard power image primarily by expanding Iran’s military, para-military, and defense forces, Dr. Mark Luce states.

Export the Islamic Revolution

It is not enough to be the defender of Shia Islam; the Iranian government seeks to export its particular form of theocratic governance known as Waliyat-al-Faqih (Gulmohamad). In this interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, Iranian leadership has a duty to bring its form of government to Shia populations, particularly those in nearby Iraq and Syria. They do this through soft power: by protecting Shia religious sites, providing resources and services to the impoverished, refurbishing mosques, and appealing to emotion, tradition, and shared experience, Dr. Diane Maye of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University notes.

Domestic Economic

Going back to the point made in the first paragraph, first and foremost, the Iranian leadership seeks to maintain its form of governance and stability in Iran (O’Shaughnessy). After years of economic sanctions, reviving the domestic economy is a pressing concern, Dr. Luce argues. The economic challenges facing Iran are made even worse by projections suggesting zero population growth by 2036.

Weaken US Leadership in Middle East

Similar to the objectives of Expanding Influence in the Iraq and Syria and Creating a Land Bridge to Lebanon, Iran would like to weaken, but not eradicate, US and Coalition presence and influence in the Middle East, according to Dr. Skye Cooley and his team. The US and Coalition forces create a stabilizing force in the region that paradoxically allows Iran to increase its influence in the Iraqi government while at the same time casting doubt on the US as a stable, long-term partner in the Middle East.

Strengthen Conventional Forces

Dr. Frederick Kagan and Ms. Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute suggest that Iran is using its efforts to uphold the Assad regime to develop and test conventional force capabilities as well as improve joint operations and command and control efforts. Developing a strong conventional capability acts as a deterrent as well as serves its interest in establishing regional hegemony.

Develop Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Maye believes that Iran continues to desire the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the ability to enrich uranium. This goal is interesting because it speaks to ambitions on the international stage as well as on the domestic or regional front. Developing even a latent capability provides diplomatic gravitas and strengthens its bargaining position against stronger governments and institutions.

Protect Syria

Dr. Kagan and Ms. Zimmerman write about Iran’s existential interest in protecting its long-standing ally in Syria. It is likely to continue to provide diplomatic support for the Assad regime and pursue favorable political resolution through the Astana talks. A favorable political resolution is one in which Iran may sustain deployments of IRGC, Shia militias, Hezbollah, and other proxy forces in the region as well as minimizing US presence and influence in the country.

Conclusion

By and large, our experts conclude that Iran is likely to continuously and incrementally increase its role and influence in the Middle East. Dr. Luce warns that “[a]bsent a serious effort (e.g. equivalent to JCPOA, Iraq Surge, post-Nov ’15 ops against ISIS level) the U.S. will fail” to halt the spread of Iranian influence and power in the region. He suggests that instead of playing into the sectarian tensions in the region—and attempting to balance or influence which side wields the most influence—the USG should have as its motive “the preservation of a rules-based security order in the turbulent Middle East.”

Contributors

Mr. Nader Biglari, Geographic Services Inc.; Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University; Dr. Skye Cooley, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Zana Gulmohamad, University of Sheffield (UK); Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Randy Kluver, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Mark Luce, US Special Operations Command; Dr. Diane Maye, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University; Dr. Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy, London University (UK); Dr. Afshon Ostovar, Naval Postgraduate School; Dr. Glenn Robinson, Naval Postgraduate School; Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mubin Shaikh, Independent Analyst; Anonymous “Smith”; TRADOC G-27 Athena Study Team; Dr. Ethan Stokes, University of Alabama; Dr. Eric Watkins, Independent Analyst; Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, American Enterprise Institute