SMA Publications

Question (R6.7): Are there examples from US history of competition short of open conflict1 with a regional power? What lessons exist that may be applied to resolving competing US/Iran objectives short of open conflict? Which examples are most relevant—pre- or post-World War II?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

The experts drew on a wide range of examples from US conflicts and moved beyond a focus solely on competition short of armed conflict (CSAC or “gray zone”) to other strategies or forms of competition executed by the US. The examples offered rich source material from which to extract lessons applicable to current US- Iran relations. Lessons might be learned from relations with Iran itself beginning with the Revolution to the present; the US-Soviet Cold War; the US and North Korea (1953-present); the US and Great Britain during the 19th Century, when the US was a rising regional power and Britain was a global power; the US and China during the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1954-55); US-Cuba (1959-now); the US and Venezuela (1998-present); Central America in the 1980s; and conflict in the Balkans (1991-2000). At the most basic level, these conflicts were battles over regional security or global influence (US vs. Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Great Britain, or USSR) or ideology/ideological influence (US vs. Iran, USSR, North Korea, China, Cuba, Central America, or the Balkans). By and large, the most relevant examples were those from the post WWII period.

Iranian versus US Interests

Most expert contributors saw US and Iranian core interests as fundamentally opposed,3 and identified several interrelated factors that are likely to be ongoing impediments to US-Iran relations. These included the perceived—or actual—divides between the two nations in terms of culture and values (Cabán), the persistence of each side’s view of the other as malevolent (Kluver and team), and the persistence of old grievances (O’Shaughnessy). The expert inputs4 mentioned five types of distinct but sometimes interrelated interests: 1) protecting Iran’s national security, 2) defending Iran’s internal sovereignty, 3) minimizing economic stress and associated public dissatisfaction, 4) defending Islamic identity and championing the Islamic worldview, and 5) regional hegemony. As summarized in the table below, the majority of Iranian objectives or activities intended to realize these interests are directly opposed to the interests of the US.5 Dr. Spencer Meredith III of the National Defense University provided a nuance to this view, noting that “Conflict with Iran today is not a harbinger of perpetually conflicting relations, even though it remains necessary for the foreseeable future to define interests clearly and harden US positions in opposition to Iranian ambitions and actions… This does not preclude a potential later broaching of areas of coordination against other common threats, to include a Saudi reorientation towards the PRC, and/or a deeper, more formal Turkish reorientation towards Russia.”

Strategies

Given the variety of seemingly competing US and Iranian differences identified by the experts, it is perhaps unsurprising that tools or strategies discussed by the contributors as successful favored more direct and aggressive approaches (e.g., threat of force, sanctions), whereas strategies such as diplomacy and containment were less frequently emphasized. The experts’ inputs revealed, for example, that when diplomacy and containment were successful, they typically were part of a multi-faceted strategy (e.g., Venezuela) or larger multi-lateral effort (Balkans). As Cabán noted, “Venezuela has attempted to compete with the US for regional hegemony in the political, economic and social realms.” The US has met this competition with a combination of diplomatic, information, military, and economic sources of national power. In the Balkans, the US employed both military and diplomatic strategies, but was also part of a much broader international endeavor to quell the conflict. Successful US strategy also benefits from international alliances that support US-led initiatives, and from strongly limiting interference with these initiatives from any other states (Jeffrey). Though mixed strategies fully employing diplomatic, information, military and economic sources of national power (DIME) have been successful in conflicts such as that between the US and Venezuela, key differences were noted in comparison to the current conflict with Iran (Cabán).

Lessons from the Past

As noted above, the contributors provided a broad range of examples in response to this question. Table 2 below lists these examples, along with associated US strategies and lessons that might be applied to current relations between the US and Iran.

Contributors

Ms. Alyssa Adamson, Oklahoma State University; Dr. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School; Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI; Mr. William Cabán, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Dr. Skye Cooley, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Robert Hinck, Monmouth College; Ambassador James Jeffrey, The Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy; Dr. Randy Kluver, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Dr. Ethan Stokes, University of Alabama

Question (R6.2): In the event that the US/Coalition is challenged by another global power [Russia for the purposes of this response], what are the second and third order effects in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As Russia continues to challenge United States’ power and influence around the world, its activities in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) represent a useful lens with which to view this conflict. In Iraq and Syria, both Russia and the United States (and its Coalition) have been drawn into this layered conflict to challenge or defend the status quo with varying degrees of success and impact. While experts question whether Russia can challenge the United States globally, it can likely operate on the margins of United States interests, with a series of surgical and lower-level policy decisions. To that point, some respondents, including Edward Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Vern Liebl of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Marine Corps University, argue that they do not consider Russia a true peer and challenger of US global influence. Instead of global dominance, Russia is seeking to “marginalize US power and influence in regions they deem important to their interests” (Chow). Contributors agreed, though, that Russia is well positioned to capitalize on opportunities for growth and influence in the Middle East. This report looks at Russia’s interests, actions, and likelihood of success in challenging US global influence through these conflicts.

Conditions Favoring Increased Russian Influence

In order to better understand the opportunities available to Russia in CENTCOM’s AOR, experts provided context on the current situation in the region. Dr. Spencer Meredith III of the National Defense University’s College of International and Security Affairs took note of how Russian opportunism has taken advantage of an environment that allows them to exert outsized influence on events in the CENTCOM AOR. Mr. Liebl noted that Russia is “winning” in the information operations domain, particularly as they have widely publicized successful humanitarian initiatives, specifically the effective missions by Russian Explosive Ordinance Detail (EOD) teams that have benefitted Syrian citizens. According to Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center, this along with other recent Russian activities has afforded them greater credibility among more states in the region. This is reinforced by the successful continuation of a narrative that paints the United States as a regional destabilizer (Meredith). In Liebl’s estimation, this success has been made possible by US forfeiture of the regional narrative space, which is accompanied by waning American influence, wavering commitments, and relinquishing leadership.

This environment of waning influence has also been influenced by what is seen as wavering commitment on the part of domestic policymakers in the United States according to both Dr. Frederick Kagan and Ms. Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute. They concede the possibility that domestic public opinion could swing towards wanting to partner with Russia instead of countering them in the area. Experts have also argued that the US has abandoned its leadership role in the Middle East. Specifically, in negotiations related to Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Dr. Kagan and Ms. Zimmerman note that the United States has not been leading the process. The current environment of sliding US leadership and subsequent Russian usurpation could have consequences stretching across a number of domains.

Effects of Russia Achieving its Objectives in the Middle East on US Strategy and Interests

Military

Mr. Chow argues that the Russian military seeks to diminish US military capabilities in the region. This would be achieved by maintaining their current bases, but also by expanding their operational footprint into Iran, among other states (Chow). Any actions aligned towards this objective could threaten US assets and limit US freedom of movement—an interest that the United States would seek to protect (Kagan, Zimmerman). Russia has worked to be perceived as a reliable partner, which might make states in the region more willing to allow Russia to base facilities and operations within their jurisdictions, according to Dr. Sager. Additionally, Russia is likely to bolster arms sales to regional actors (Sager, Kagan, Zimmerman). Dr. Sager notes that the cost difference between Russian and American systems, as well as the lack of strings attached to Russian purchases privileges the Russian Federation in this arena. Additionally, skepticism by Gulf States of the United States’ commitment to the region has led some countries in the region to hedge their bets and seek deepened relationships with Russia (Kagan, Zimmerman).

Energy

A primary arena in which Russia is well positioned to capitalize on fluid regional dynamics is in global energy markets. Both Chow’s and the Kagan-Zimmerman responses suggested that Russia would seek to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia (and other oil producing states). Such a Russian move could decrease US leverage in Saudi Arabia (Kagan, Zimmerman). Additionally, while this may complicate US economic interests, it may also produce an opportunity for the United States to work with other large oil-consuming states, such as China and India in a context that reflects the common interests that these states share (Chow). Looking beyond Saudi Arabia, increased Russian activity in other regional energy markets (such as Libya) could imperil certain European energy markets, such as Italy (Kagan, Zimmerman). The competitive regional energy landscape has prevented such Russian activities from becoming an inevitability, but they do remain a possibility.

Both the South Stream and the (planned) TurkStream pipelines also represent a major inflection point in the region’s power dynamics. If Russia is to capitalize on the market access that the TurkStream pipeline would provide, it could decide to mitigate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in order to appease Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Meredith). Similarly, the TurkStream pipeline offers an opportunity for Russia to strengthen its hand in the region. This pipeline provides an alternative route to European markets that circumvents Ukraine, and any political pitfalls therein. It also opens up a new front of market vulnerability for the European Union, who will be subject to a fickle Russia as an energy gatekeeper, although US LNG can mitigate this (Meredith). This pipeline would have the dual impact of deepening Russo-Turkish relations, while also motivating Iran to seek a closer relationship with Russia to deepen their energy partnership (Meredith). A renewed Russo-Turkish relationship could also prompt those countries to support each other in projects away from this region.

International Diplomacy

Russia stands to make international diplomatic gains in the new environment discussed above. In the aftermath of the Iraqi state’s campaign against Da’esh, there remain opportunities for Russia to help stabilize political and security events in the country (Chow). Additionally, through initiatives supporting international negotiations, Russia could create alternative fora that run parallel to the United Nations and other Western-oriented organizations (Kagan, Zimmerman). Indeed the diplomatic vacuum mentioned by Dr. Kagan and Ms. Zimmerman serves as an inducement to Russian behavior in this arena and persists despite local wariness of Russian involvement and regional states’ lack of conviction of the viability and benefits of a long-term relationship with Russia. Additionally, Russia may also be constrained by limited diplomatic resources that would prevent them from involvement in a large number of different initiatives (Kagan, Zimmerman). Russia may also seek to seize the mantle of combating global terrorism and fighting global jihadist movements (Chow). This also reflects concurrent domestic Russian priorities in Chechnya and elsewhere (Liebl).

The current situation in the CENTCOM AOR also provides challenges and opportunities for Russia as it considers its bilateral relationships there. Egypt has allowed Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian bases and airspace. While this represents an opportunity for Russia, it is part of a longstanding Egyptian strategy of playing the United States and the Russians (and previously the USSR) against one another (Liebl). In Syria, Russian interests include the preservation of the Assad regime. To that end, they are leading peace talks on their terms (Liebl). Complicating a potential US response is the notion that Russian activities have been more effective in Syria than those undertaken by the United States (Sager). Similar to the Egyptian strategy of balancing Russian and American interests against each other, Iraq is playing a similar game (Liebl). Indeed, Russia has the ability to play a significant part in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, a role that they will likely relish (Kagan, Zimmerman).

The burgeoning Russo-Turkish relationship has been mentioned earlier in the context of energy cooperation. Despite historical competition between those two entities, the current fraught relationship between Turkey and the United States presents an opportunity for Russia to move in (Kagan, Zimmerman). This potential rapprochement will embolden Turkey (and perhaps even Iran) to subdue Kurdish self-determination efforts (Meredith). Iran’s standing distrust of the current US Administration is a potential opening for further improving relations with Russia buttressed by Russian and Iranian convergent interests in containing the opium trade in Afghanistan (Liebl). If Russia does indeed challenge the United States’ strategic imperatives, Iran could be drawn in as well, prompting a likely response from Gulf countries wary of increased Iranian activity in the neighborhood, according to regional expert Mubin Shaikh.

Conclusion

According to Dr. Meredith and Dr. Sager, Russia will be one of several—if not the leading—actors shaping and defining the outcome of conflicts in the central Middle East. These efforts will ensure an enduring Russian presence in the region in terms of military operations and economic trade (Meredith). While the US can do little to halt Russia’s expanding influence in the region, the US could attempt to at the very least, maintain, if not increase, its influence, resulting in a period of “enduring competition.” Even maintaining its current level of influence is challenging though, given Russian advances in the region. Dr. Meredith argues, “The loss of US reputation in the region is inevitable” in part because the natural, historical (and conflicting) interests of regional actors are reemerging—they no longer need or want the US to set the terms, the conditions for success, or most of all, constrain their independent actions. This is in part due to the “success” of US regional capacity building efforts over the years, as much as their own initiative. Dr. Meredith concludes that Russia’s likely entrenchment and success in the Middle East will result in the return of the “’great game’ of power politics with fluid allegiances, amidst fixed interests, all centered on relative gains in a zero-sum international environment.”

Contributors

Mr. Edward Chow, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute; Mr. Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, USMC University; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Consultant; Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, American Enterprise Institute

Blame, Sway, and Vigilante Tactics: How Other Cultures Think Differently and Implications for Planning.

Author | Editor: G. Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Planners require context in order to achieve their goals. While planners understand that colder or more elevated locations have implications for an operation, the capacity to similarly adapt plans and operations based on differences in the population’s cultural or cognitive attributes has not been as readily integrated. The purpose of this SMA White Paper is to synthesize ideas across cognitive science and applied social science and translate their application for use in operations and planning within the span of a single document. The contributors each look at distinct cognitive functions that merit attention. By translating or operationalizing the research and discussing it in terms of real-world scenarios, this paper illustrates how the addition of cultural cognitive diversity research will enable more effective, quick, less violent, and less expensive operations.

Contributors

LTC Xavier Colon (5th BN, 1st SWTG(A)), Dr. Rose Hendricks (University of California, San Diego), Dr. Anatoliy Kharkhurin (American University Sharjah), Brig. Tim Lai (British Army), SFC Matthew Martin (5th MISB(A)), Dr. Abdul-Akeem Sadiq (University of Central Florida), Dr. Moritz Schuberth (Mercy Corps), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.), Ms. Jenna Tyler (University of Central Florida)

Question (R6.4): Knowing that religion is only one (and not the most important) stimulus for disgruntled Islamic youth to join VEOs, what could/should be the domestic messaging to youth to prevent their “radicalization” and joining the VEOs? To what extent could a continued presence of Western military in the Middle East (even only as instructors/trainers) undermine this messaging in the region?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

After the fall of Mosul, as it became clear that Daesh could no longer creditably claim broad swaths of territory for its caliphate, it deliberately reverted to a strategy of insurgency, according to Syrian expert Hassan Hassan.1 Its withdrawal into the rural desert landscape—and to what a radicalization expert, Haroon Ulla, calls the “cloud caliphate”2—has implications for counter-radicalization messaging. Hassan reminds us that when the organization was defeated in the late 2000s, it came back stronger than ever. He notes that its messaging has recently pivoted to attempts to erode trust between Sunni Arab populations and any form of legitimate government. Daesh’s messaging is fueled by the recent memory of the failure of the Sahwa (or Awakening) movement to produce meaningful political reforms for Sunni populations in Iraq. In Syria, Daesh still benefits from the ongoing conflict and enduring Sunni Muslim grievances. At the same time, hardened foreign fighters are leaving Syria and Iraq for other regions where extremism is flourishing including the Sinai region of Egypt and Yemen (Hassan). And, of course, some foreign fighters are returning home across the globe where they can be incubators of future generations of extremists (Hassan).

So given Daesh’s return to insurgency and its embrace of information age recruitment techniques, what are the grievances3 driving the radicalization of youth in Iraq and Syria, and what messages would be effective in tarnishing the appeal of extremism? It bears repeating that effective counter extremism messaging in Iraq and Syria requires state and local governments to match promises of reform with actual reform (Kluver, Sager). Dr. Sager reminds readers that between 2007 and 2009, Daesh disappeared from Iraq as the result of the Sahwa movement. But once promised political reform failed to actualize, Daesh came back. This failure of reform cemented the conclusion that the only way to enact reform is through violence. As Hassan notes, Daesh has already begun sowing doubt along these lines.

What is concerning to Dr. Ian McCulloh, a social science researcher and proponent of field research/population surveys, is that the USG has yet to realize that the remaining population of military aged males in Iraq—those most vulnerable to a new round of recruitment from Daesh, Al Qaeda, or other groups—has been stripped of its hard-core ideologues. Those who have not been killed, captured, or fled are likely to be poor, illiterate, and have limited access to social media. These factors may indicate that social media campaigns will have limited effect on this kind of population.

So if the most effective counter radicalization tool is visible political reform, the primary role for the US in counter extremism messaging is a supporting one encouraging regional governments to make meaningful reforms that address the driving forces7 of radicalization among marginalized Sunni groups (Kluver, Sager). When the USG engages in messaging, it should focus on 1) legitimizing government partners, 2) promoting economic development and regional stability, 3) supporting foreign aid, and 4) reinforcing cultural norms (Sager). For a discussion on how to undermine Daesh’s leadership, please see Dr. Gina Ligon’s article Leveraging Organizational Fissures to Degrade ISIL Top Management Team in the contribution section.

While a foreign military presence may be deemed necessary for a short time, contributors believe US military presence generally fuels radicalization narratives (Styszynski). Dr. Sager emphasized that in order to avoid undermining counter-radicalization messages with the presence of Western forces, the US should be seen as a catalyst for genuine political reform that benefits populations most at risk of radicalization: Sunni Arabs. The USG should exercise caution, however, to not take adopt general guidelines without further critical analysis, according to Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois of NSI. If, for example, hardliners win Parliamentary elections in Iraq, visible US support for an administration that is viewed by many Sunni Arab Iraqi as opposed to their interests could fuel further political marginalization, alienation, and radicalization.

Contributors

Ms. Alyssa Adamson, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Skye Cooley, Oklahoma State University; Mr. Hassan Hassan, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Dr. Robert Hinck, Monmouth College; Dr. Randy Kluver, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska, Omaha; Dr. Ian McCulloh, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London (UK); Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mubin Shaikh, Independent Expert; Dr. Ethan Stokes, University of Alabama; Dr. Marcin Styszynski, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland); Dr. Haroon Ullah, Broadcast Board of Governors

Question (R6.1): What conditions (demographic, political, etc.) should exist on the ground in the Middle Euphrates River Valley and the tri border (Syria/Jordan/Iraq) region to deny the seeds of future conflict from being planted – particularly taking into account the assumed intention of Iranian proxy forces to establish a Shia “land bridge?” Which of these conditions can and should be insisted on as part of a Geneva peace process to end the current conflict in Syria?

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

Ambassador James Dobbins and a team from the RAND Corporation contend, “the Syria civil war is approaching, if not a conclusion, at least a hiatus that might be converted into a conclusion.”1 Major regional players—United States, Russia, and NATO—have a converging interest in ending the conflict and facilitating a stable peace, Dr. Amir Bagherpour of giStrat argues. However, despite an emerging shared preference between Russia and the United States on ending the conflict in Syria, rivalry dynamics between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE will likely have a dampening effect on peace prospects as the proxy warfare intensifies following the military defeat of Da’esh. Mr. Hassan Hassan of Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy warns that the worsening of the various conflicts in the region is still a serious possibility.

As the fight against Da’esh winds down in Iraq and Syria, brewing tensions and conflicts between regional actors and proxy groups is gaining new momentum. We asked thirteen regional experts to identify the top conditions necessary to bring an end to conflict in the region as well as effect a stable peace. Figure 1 captures several thematic categories of conditions posited by the authors in rank order as well as the estimated likelihood of occurrence.

Reduction in Proxy Forces

GiStrat’s computational modeling found that “the most significant factor for creating stabilizing conditions in the Euphrates River Valley is a reduction in proxy support by opposing larger powers,” a condition that seven other contributors agree is an essential criterion. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, and the United States all support or fund proxy forces, but several experts emphasize Iranian proxy operations as the primary aggravating obstacle to peace in the region (Cafarella, Ganor, Jeffrey). Mr. Mubin Shaikh,3 an extremism expert, and Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center both write that undermining pro-Iranian militias are the key to disrupting the Shia crescent “land bridge,” which Shaikh argues already effectively exists across Iraq and Syria.

Removal of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)

The removal of Da’esh and Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria is mentioned by three authors4 who distinguish these groups from other proxy forces in the region. Dr. Martin Styszynski of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poland argues that the “defeat of ISIS’ structures in Syria and failures or withdrawal of Islamist insurgents” has allowed for high-level consolidation of strategic territories between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Ms. Jennifer Cafarella of the Institute for the Study of War views the removal of Sunni VEOs in the tri border region as fueling the Assad regime’s advantage over the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and weakening the likelihood of Assad to negotiate. Both contributors suggest that the demise of proxy groups and VEOs expose the underlying obstacles to a peace accord and the dormant mechanics of any future political settlements.

The Role of the Assad Regime in Peace

Contributors present a spectrum of possibilities on the fate of Assad’s continued leadership in the event of a lasting peace in Syria. One school of thought holds that regime change is absolutely necessary to a 2020 Geneva agreement (Ganor, Itani) while another holds a more moderate view that Assad will only need to exit at some point in the future (O’Shaughnessy, Yacoubian). The middle of the spectrum recognizes that the survival of the Assad regime is likely but his power will be constrained (Jeffrey) and concessions will be made to “opposition groups in Northern Syria, Southern Syria, and the Kurdish territory” (Bagherpour). The other extreme assumes that Assad has all but guaranteed a role in post- conflict Syria, that “the surrender of oppositions groups is certain,” and that Assad will emerge as victor (O’Shaughnessy).

Power Sharing and Territorial Concessions

The fluid and disparate landscape in the triorder region understandingly necessitates a peace process that will be predicated on numerous, multivariate resolutions where stakeholders concede a significant amount of geopolitical capital. Almost all of these concessions described by contributors involve dyadic relationships and are comprised of territorial cessation, decentralizing political governance, or military mobilization/de-escalation. Mr. Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council lists a territorial partition as absolutely essential to peace while Ms. Cafarella contends that de-escalation zones (as a precursor to a peace agreement) do not honor their political or humanitarian purpose and only make the Syrian regime less likely to negotiate. There is also a particular emphasis on Russia committing to a “de-prioritization of the Middle Eastern Theater” (Cafarella) and the Turkey/SDF conflict reaching some sort of armistice.

Ms. Mona Yacoubian of the United States Institute for Peace and Dr. Bagherpour contend that greater political autonomy for Sunni minorities in Iraq and ultimately a significant devolution of power to governorates in Syria is a necessary condition for peace. Furthermore, Dr. Spencer Meredith III of National Defense University notes that the “SDF attaining a functional level of governance” is absolutely necessary for conflict resolution.5 Dr. Meredith also asserts that the US needs to advocate for strategic communication with Turkey on behalf of the SDF, whereas AMB Jeffrey takes this a step further and argues for a continued American military presence in Syria. AMB Dobbins and the RAND team similarly write of the usefulness of maintaining a US presence in counterbalancing Iranian in influence and providing leverage in negotiation over Syria’s longer-term future.

Socioeconomic Reconstruction

As political conventions for peace emerge, plans for the reconstruction of Syria must be correspondingly developed as well. Authors identified three mechanisms of socioeconomic advancement: micro-level community rehabilitation, reintegration, and humanitarian concerns. Both Ms. Yacoubian and the RAND team propose a bottom-up approach6 to development within and across communities to accompany an increase in decentralized governance. The RAND team and Dr. Ganor further articulate the importance of reintegrating refugees to forge economic activity and contribute to political participation in Syria. Ms. Cafarella notes the importance of creating mechanisms for DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform) for former combatants.7 Basic humanitarian challenges are also of primary concern: specifically, the protection of minorities (e.g., Yazidis, Christians, etc.) (Bagherpour), the release of political prisoners and delivery of humanitarian aid (Cafarella), and the “continued monitoring of non-conventional material” (Ganor).

Contributors

Dr. Amir Bagherpour, giStrat; Ms. Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Boaz Ganor, InterDisciplinary Center (Israel); Mr. Hassan Hassan, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Mr. Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Alexander O’Donnell, giStrat; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Analyst; Dr. Martin Styszynski, Adam Mickiewicz University; Ms. Mona Yacoubian, United States Institute of Peace

Question (R6.6): How does USCENTCOM, working within a whole of government approach, coordinate military operations in support of the change in approach towards Iran from the previous to the current administration?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As battlefield successes actualize, decision makers have an opportunity to align tactical and operational policies with a strategic vision. One year into a new presidential administration offers a window wherein actors on the ground can map their plans onto the tone, intent, and objectives of the new commander- in-chief. Despite some continuity between President Trump and his predecessor’s policies, particularly as related to Iran, there remain some significant differences. A wholesale White House-initiated change of approach vis-à-vis Iran has not yet occurred, despite these differences. If no substantive changes are made, CENTCOM is well positioned to build on established success in Iraq. However, if such a change were to occur, it would require a whole-of-government approach; within this framework, CENTCOM would be able to leverage capabilities built up over the course of their engagement in Iraq.

What is the Trump Approach?

Despite President Trump’s commitment to being seen as an abrogator of his predecessor’s policies, there remains some consistency in his policies vis-à-vis Iran. Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center suggests that there is a lack of consensus around what exactly a novel Trump strategy would entail. He sees little daylight between Trump’s and Obama’s use of CENTCOM to contain Iranian influence. Similarly, Ambassador James Jeffrey of the Washington Institute on Near East Policy suggests that President Trump might follow a mixture of policies similar to those of the Obama Administration, i.e., primacy of nuclear issues (though Jeffrey concedes that whereas President Obama sought reconciliation on this point, President Trump has the opposite point of view), counterterrorism operations, and strengthening regional alliances. Despite the differences in approach to the Iranian nuclear issue, Jeffrey argues that insofar as President Obama labeled Iran a regional threat, there is little difference in rhetoric between Presidents Obama and Trump.

Moving beyond a boilerplate classification of Iran as a threat lays bare significant differences in the new administration’s strategy. According to AMB Jeffrey, the Trump administration perceives Iran as both a regional hegemon and ideological threat. This calculation exceeds the characterization that President Obama had for Iran. Similarly, Dr. Spencer Meredith III of National Defense University’s College of International and Security Affairs notes that the current administration perceives Iran as an expansionist power, hoping to recapture historical glory; he contrasts this with the Obama-era observation that Iran was guided more by internal politics than outward-looking objectives. This view is shared by Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, of the University of London, who suggests that President Trump’s view on Iran is characterized by distrust and antagonism. Despite that worldview, Dr. O’Shaughnessy writes that it is unlikely that President Trump would nullify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This view is also shared by AMB Jeffrey who is not convinced that the President’s domestic political allies are willing to pull out of the deal and institute a hard reset on relations with Iran.

A Whole of Government Approach

Despite near-consensus on the necessity of employing a whole-of-government approach if a strategic reset occurs, experts sought clarity on what precisely such an approach would actually entail (Jeffrey, Meredith). According to AMB Jeffrey, the approach taken since 2003 is not aligned with what appear to be the current Administration’s objectives, and suggests that policymakers strive for a clearly articulated approach similar to that employed during the Balkan Wars which specified a distinct political outcome followed by negotiations.

From a technical perspective, Dr. Meredith notes that capability specialization and clearly-defined policy documents bear the best results and suggests that the National Security Council serve as the primary coordinator of a multi-approach Iran policy. In addition to a “nation building” default, Ambassador Jeffrey suggests that apart from the JCPOA, negotiation skills at Foggy Bottom below the Secretary have dwindled. Similarly, Jeffrey argues, the Department of State today is not oriented towards incremental and measured progress working with multiple state actors.

CENTCOM Military Options in a Strategic Reset

There is not yet clarity as to whether or not the United States will commit to a full-scale strategic reset with Iran; such a move would be characterized by a major change in policy, such as the negation of the JCPOA. This lack of clarity makes military planning difficult (Sager).

Even if the current policy is not clarified further, there still exist some mission sets where CENTCOM is well equipped to succeed. AMB Jeffrey notes that the command has technical capabilities, relationships, and know-how to achieve its operational objectives in the region. Dr. Meredith notes that the mission of security force assistance, coordinated along clear lines of efforts, remains critical. He also noted the importance of engaging allies to help CENTCOM achieve its objectives in the region. Dr. O’Shaughnessy echoed this point, stressing the need for a pluralist policy, i.e., one wherein military and non-military entities are aligned on common goals. He notes that the most effective engagement with Iran happens in the diplomatic realm, and military capabilities can be best contextualized as force projection.

An alternative outcome is, as Dr. O’Shaughnessy proposed, an ostensible “cold war,” i.e., a situation typified by tough talk between adversaries, but with little changing below the harsher tone on the surface. This would prevent cooperation in areas of mutual interest between the United States and Iran, such as containing the spread of Da’esh into Afghanistan. On the other hand, O’Shaughnessy concedes, this situation would at least offers some measure of predictability, not just for policymakers, but CENTCOM as well. Experts did not anticipate a more conciliatory strategy; therefore, CENTCOM’s options in that context were not discussed.

Contributors

Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center

[Q22] Can international agreements effectively protect high-value space assets in time of crisis and/or conflict? How could such a treaty be sufficiently verified? How would it be enforced? How would dual- use technologies be treated? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author(s): Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors divided nearly evenly on whether international space agreements can provide protection to space assets. While all contributors agreed that international agreements create norms of behavior, they disagreed on whether these norms create restraints on state behavior that will hold in a crisis. The contributors who did believe that international agreements could provide protection also maintained that focusing on prohibited activities, such as the generation of space debris, rather than prohibited technologies, increased the enforceability and verification of effective international space agreements as well as mitigated the dual-use problem. In short, their argument was that with regard to dual-use technology, ultimately it does not matter what states build, it really only matters how they use what they put into space.

Do Non-Institutionalized International Agreements Provide Asset Protection in Crisis?

The expert contributors were nearly evenly split on whether international agreements can effectively protect high-value space assets in time of crisis or conflict. Twelve experts affirmed the effectiveness of these agreements, whereas the eleven other experts dissented from this view.

Agreements can protect high-value assets

The expert contributors with more sanguine views of the effectiveness of international agreements in protecting space assets grounded their optimism in what they defended as the efficacy of existing space law. For example, Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland describes the existing Outer Space Treaty (OST) as an effective agreement that is likely the best possible international agreement that could arise in the space domain. She avers that “it would be hard to get international agreement on any set of principles that would be better than what is currently laid out.” Buttressing Dr. Gallagher’s view that the OST’s centering common principles makes the agreement quite effective despite low institutionalization, Massimo Pellegrino, a Space and Security Policy Advisor in Geneva, maintains that widely-shared principles increase the enforceability of international space agreements, which helps to prevent and shape crisis behavior. Pellegrino states that, while states can disregard international law, doing so imposes sufficient costs, and these costs are factored into their strategies of compliance and non-compliance: There is enough of a “price to pay” for non-compliance that when “high enough [may] force nation states to restrain themselves” from attacking high-valued assets.

To the extent that international space agreements create and sustain these conditions of restraint by imposing costs, they would be effective in protecting high-value space assets in crisis or conflict. These collectively imposed costs can occur both domestically and internationally, even in the absence of institutionalization. On the domestic front, as Dr. Frans von der Dunk of the University of Nebraska College of Law observes, “it becomes very tricky for governments to be seen as violating [widely-shared] rules because it undercuts their own legitimacy.” With respect to international mechanisms of restraint, Dr. Xavier Pasco of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Paris argues that collective space dependence creates a restraining self-enforcing interdependence functionally regulating state behavior. Pasco suspects that each country possessing space systems likely wants its “own space system to work properly,” creating a condition of “constrained interdependency” concerning “collective behaviors and rules as references for military actions.”

Agreements cannot protect high-value assets

In contrast, the remaining experts were clear that based on their interpretations of norms during historical crises, they believed agreements to be insufficient. For example, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin categorically posits that “neither norms nor formal treaty obligations can be expected to protect high- value space assets in the event of crisis or conflict,” indicating that international space agreements, irrespective of the degree of formalization and institutionalization, provide few protections in crises. Similarly, Dr. George Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration shared that “it’s clear to me that international agreements cannot guarantee the protection of space assets,” but did not appear to embrace Berkowitz’s more expansive claim about norms.

For some of the experts in the ‘yes’ camp, the ability to impose costs was sufficient to conclude that international space agreements are effective in protecting high-value assets. In contrast, the ‘no’ camp adopts a stricter level of scrutiny, wanting something closer to 100% effectiveness to be able to reasonably conclude in favor of the proposition. The experts that viewed international agreements as ineffective in protecting high-value assets seem united in suggesting crisis-resilient protection is likely beyond the capacity of any agreement to obtain. Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation observed that the inability of agreements to provide security in crisis “is not a defect of international agreements, merely a reality of the international political system.” Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland provides a contrasting view, arguing that it is intellectually unfair to require that international space agreements are 100% effective to be considered useful. She challenges proponents of views that unequivocally dismiss international space agreements to identify “a weapon system that is 100% effective” because there are “no doubt legal agreements (i.e., a ban on use of debris creating weapons; or “protection zones” regarding close approach of satellites on orbit) that could actively protect assets in crisis/conflicts and be verified, but need to be explored more thoroughly.”

Unlike many in the ‘no’ camp, Dr. Mark J. Sundahl of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law grounded his pessimism about the effectiveness of international agreements in space in the design of the Outer Space Treaty. He laments that, as currently designed, the OST permits a wide range of state behaviors, including actions that some states may consider aggression. Moreover, the treaty forbids only non-consultation with other governments in the event of potential interference with national activity in space. He states that:

I don’t think anyone believes that all weapons are banned from space…[what is banned is] nuclear weapons, [and] you can’t be aggressive, and you have to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other countries and their nationals. That is a rather soft prohibition on interference because all it really requires is that if you are going to harmfully interfere with the operations of others, then the governments have to consult with each other. It doesn’t say that interference is outright prohibited.

For Sundahl, the OST’s focus on principles, rather than institutionalization and monitoring, creates a weakness in the treaty. He believes that the OST cannot protect high-value space assets in time of crisis or conflict because the remedies for violation are mere consultation, rather than any form of imposed punishment or monitoring.

Enforcement and Verification Concerns as International Space Agreements Evolve

The contributors offered that enforcement issues surrounding international space agreements might be thought of as a specialized subset of those that arise in international arms control agreements. Effective arms control regimes exist in other areas of law plagued by dual-use issues, such as “universal prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons,” notes Michael Spies of the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Therefore, he believes the general mantra of arms control agreements was also true for international space agreements: Verification is enforcement.

A “good set of rules” creates guaranteed penalties “in the case of non-observance,” Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit avers. Well-designed international space agreements “can provide one layer of protection,” according to Nield, via “peer pressure, in terms of expectations of behavior that are held by the international community.” These behavioral expectations, Johnson observes, “establish what is internationally permissible to do.” This provides security benefits to states insofar as the “resources to be spent protecting against” impermissible activities “can be lessened.”

Drawing inspiration from international arms control agreements, the experts suggested three ways that international space agreements could be enforced and verified in the context of dual-use challenges. First, as space agreements evolve, continue to center them on widely-held norms. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, these norms should be “things that promote transparency and are things that are measurable, and not measurable just by one entity but measurable by the community at large.” In the context of arms control agreements, codes of norms function in this way because epistemic communities can achieve verification by “corroborat[ing] or refut[ing] any given event” and then “quantify[ing]…the harmfulness of that event” to determine how to enforce the treaty violation.

Second, as an agreement evolves, participants should seek to regulate activities, not technology. Pellegrino plainly forwards that, “it would be beneficial if international agreements would focus more on the degree of care with which space activities and operations are conducted and communicated, rather than on which kind of orbital system/spacecraft is actually deployed in outer space.” Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College agrees: “Since all space technology is dual-use, and every satellite can be a weapon…you cannot regulate technology, only specify what might be an illegal action.” Hitchens posits that an “Incidents at Sea/Dangerous Military Practices type agreement for space” is an excellent model for international space agreements.

Finally, even if agreements do not allow for institutionalization, detailing mechanisms and practices of transparency can overcome dual-use concerns. Pasco states that the question of dual-use technologies is “additional motivation for extended transparency mechanisms.” Pasco’s views dovetail with Spies’ thoughts on the function of transparency in mitigating dual-use concerns: “transparency and confidence- building measures can contribute to the development of verification measures for arms control agreements and regimes.” These mechanisms should cover three state practices in particular: “major outer space research and space applications programs, major military outer space expenditure, and other national security space activities.”

Conclusion

There was a bifurcation among the expert contributors on whether international space agreements can provide protection of critical space assets in a crisis, with half of the experts arguing ‘yes,’ and the other half arguing ‘no.’ The most effective international agreements, according to the experts, would require continued flexibility as well as clear verification to be enforceable and designed for the long haul. As such, agreements that focus on prohibited activities, such as the generation of space debris, rather than prohibited technologies, both increase the enforceability and verification of effective international space agreements, as well as mitigate the dual-use feature that almost all space technologies evince. To enforce is to verify: Ultimately, from the point of an effective agreement, it does not matter what states build, it really only matters how they use what they put into space and how easily other states can confirm that what a state says it is doing is what it is in fact doing.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Faulconer Consulting Group; Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Michiru Nishida (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Massimo Pellegrino (Space and Security Policy Advisor, Geneva); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Michael Spies (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Report Card.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands. SMA projects focus on complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multidisciplinary solutions (i.e., specialized, research-based technological products including analytic models, reports, and software components) that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. SMA solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-39) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO. SMA efforts are Coalition based and address mission areas spanning Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Countering Proliferation of WMD (State and non-State); Individual, State, and National-level Deterrence Assessment; and Strategic Global and Regional Assessments.

This report provides a scorecard of SMA project assessment results by geographical region: Middle East, Eurasia, Central and South Asia, Pacific, and Africa; as well as by global issue: Cyber, Deterrence, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-WMD.

The SMA projects assessed include:

• FY 07: Sudan Strategic Assessment (CENTCOM)
• FY 07: DAPSE (STRATCOM)
• FY 08: WMD-T (SOCOM), Global Assessment of WMD-T (SOCOM/DTRA Cell established)
• FY 09: Interagency LOE (STRATCOM)
• FY 09: Deterrence (STRATCOM)
• FY 09-10: Support to ISAF (Gens McChrystal/Flynn)
• FY 11: IVEO (CENTCOM/SOCOM)
• FY 11: Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability – CANS (STRATCOM)
• FY 12: Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism (Joint Staff J39)
• FY 12-13: Strategic Short- and Long-term Stability in South Asia (CENTCOM/PACOM/STRATCOM)
• FY 14: A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad (JS)
• FY 14: Megacities RSI (PACOM)
• FY 14: Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the
  Next 5-25 Years (PACOM)
• FY 14: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRICOM)
• FY 14: The Dynamics of ISIL Success in Multi-method Assessment of ISIL
• FY 15: Coordinator’s Mission Review (USSC)
• FY 15: Looking Beyond ISIL: What Would the Region Look Like Beyond the Current Phase? (SOCCENT)
• FY 15: Russia and NATO Post Putin: The Space Between Peace and War (EUCOM)
• FY 16: Gray Zone Conflicts – Challenges and Opportunities (SOCOM)
• FY 16: Counter Da’esh Messaging (USASOC)

Integration Report: Gray Zone Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) requested a Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort “to determine how the USG can identify, diagnose, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against associated types of gray zone conflicts.” This integration report provides a synthesis of all the team projects. Their work has advanced understanding of the contours of the gray zone terrain, and the challenges inherent in navigating that terrain. By identifying the critical features of the gray zone, their findings also provide a guide to where USSOCOM and other DOW entities should focus future efforts in this area to facilitate the development of operational level planning and response strategies. The key results of the effort fall into four areas as summarized below.

What is the nature of gray zone conflict?

• There is no single condition that can identify an action as gray, independent of actor or understanding of the broader strategic context
• We need to think on multiple timescales, across multiple arenas (e.g. political, social, economic), and understand and engage with multiple social levels (state, group, individual)
• Populations are the key dimension in gray zone conflict
• Norm violations help define the threshold between ordinary competition and the gray zone

What motivates actors to engage in gray zone activities?

• Successful US deterrence has not eliminated the motivations of other actors to further their own interests
• Acting in the gray zone is an effective low risk, low cost strategy that has proven difficult for the US and partner nations to counter, and for vulnerable states to defend against
• US military places primacy on physical maneuver, and our adversaries know this

How should the US respond to gray zone activities?

• Incorporate the human / cognitive domain
  • Think and plan beyond kinetic responses alone; expand DOW definitions of maneuver and objective to account for the human aspects of military operations
  • Shape the international environment to reduce the motivations for engaging in gray zone activities
• Develop a clear, compelling strategic narratives
  • Provide alternative narratives and leverage social and mass media to communicate them
  • Build trust and credibility with partner nations to enable unity of effort
  • An enduring, proactive presence and consistent messaging across all USG agencies is a significantly superior approach to taking select actions in response to specific gray actions
• Scope and timing of US response matters
  • Inaction in the face of low level actions (e.g. Chinese Island building in the SCS) can over time create a “new reality” that threatens US interests and security
  • Early and effective response to gray actions and strategies requires a consistent US presence
• Focus now should be less on defining specific actions as gray zone threats, and more on how to leverage all instruments of national power to respond to them

What capabilities does the US need to respond effectively to gray zone activities?

• Human/Cognitive Domain Information & Expertise
  • Gray zone strategies exploit multiple instruments of power. Operating in this environment requires information across all of these instruments
• Conceptual Models and Frameworks
  • Scope of gray zone activities will make information requirements overwhelming without models to guide search and interpretation

A Cognitive Capabilities Agenda: A Multi-Step Approach for Closing DOW's Cognitive Capability Gap.

Author | Editor: A. Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conducted a year-long project for USSOCOM on the growing prevalence of Competition Short of Armed Conflict (CSAC), or use of “Gray Zone” tactics by US adversaries. Key findings from the study include first, the immediate need to incorporate the “human / cognitive domain” into military planning to avoid the strategic surprise that gray zone tactics intend. Second, the study highlighted the current deficit in the joint force of operationally-applicable human / cognitive domain information and expertise. During its final project review, the study’s Senior Review Group (SRG) noted that “…the changing nature of conflict means that the US Department of War (DOW) needs to start changing the way it thinks as a whole, and the results of this SMA effort can play a valuable role” in broadening our understanding of the strategic and operational environment to incorporate the human/cognitive aspects of military operations. Reflecting on the deficit in US capabilities in the cognitive environment the SRG asked: “Who is going to craft the appropriate messages? Who is going to provide the necessary tools? Who is going to use these tools? These are questions that we need to answer.”

This s white paper is a brief effort to suggest an initial outline that might be undertaken to address these questions.

Contributors

CAPT Joseph A. DiGuardo, Jr. (Joint Staff J39), Dr. Hriar Cabayan (Joint Staff J39); Mr. Michael Ceroli (USASOC); Dr. Rebecca Goolsby (ONR); Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM); Dr. Spencer Meredith (NDU); Mr. Randy Munch (TRADOC G-2); Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE), Dr. Robert Taguchi (USASOC); LTC Scott Thomson (OUSD-P)