SMA Publications

Question (R6.7): Are there examples from US history of competition short of open conflict1 with a regional power? What lessons exist that may be applied to resolving competing US/Iran objectives short of open conflict? Which examples are most relevant—pre- or post-World War II?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

The experts drew on a wide range of examples from US conflicts and moved beyond a focus solely on competition short of armed conflict (CSAC or “gray zone”) to other strategies or forms of competition executed by the US. The examples offered rich source material from which to extract lessons applicable to current US- Iran relations. Lessons might be learned from relations with Iran itself beginning with the Revolution to the present; the US-Soviet Cold War; the US and North Korea (1953-present); the US and Great Britain during the 19th Century, when the US was a rising regional power and Britain was a global power; the US and China during the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1954-55); US-Cuba (1959-now); the US and Venezuela (1998-present); Central America in the 1980s; and conflict in the Balkans (1991-2000). At the most basic level, these conflicts were battles over regional security or global influence (US vs. Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Great Britain, or USSR) or ideology/ideological influence (US vs. Iran, USSR, North Korea, China, Cuba, Central America, or the Balkans). By and large, the most relevant examples were those from the post WWII period.

Iranian versus US Interests

Most expert contributors saw US and Iranian core interests as fundamentally opposed,3 and identified several interrelated factors that are likely to be ongoing impediments to US-Iran relations. These included the perceived—or actual—divides between the two nations in terms of culture and values (Cabán), the persistence of each side’s view of the other as malevolent (Kluver and team), and the persistence of old grievances (O’Shaughnessy). The expert inputs4 mentioned five types of distinct but sometimes interrelated interests: 1) protecting Iran’s national security, 2) defending Iran’s internal sovereignty, 3) minimizing economic stress and associated public dissatisfaction, 4) defending Islamic identity and championing the Islamic worldview, and 5) regional hegemony. As summarized in the table below, the majority of Iranian objectives or activities intended to realize these interests are directly opposed to the interests of the US.5 Dr. Spencer Meredith III of the National Defense University provided a nuance to this view, noting that “Conflict with Iran today is not a harbinger of perpetually conflicting relations, even though it remains necessary for the foreseeable future to define interests clearly and harden US positions in opposition to Iranian ambitions and actions… This does not preclude a potential later broaching of areas of coordination against other common threats, to include a Saudi reorientation towards the PRC, and/or a deeper, more formal Turkish reorientation towards Russia.”

Strategies

Given the variety of seemingly competing US and Iranian differences identified by the experts, it is perhaps unsurprising that tools or strategies discussed by the contributors as successful favored more direct and aggressive approaches (e.g., threat of force, sanctions), whereas strategies such as diplomacy and containment were less frequently emphasized. The experts’ inputs revealed, for example, that when diplomacy and containment were successful, they typically were part of a multi-faceted strategy (e.g., Venezuela) or larger multi-lateral effort (Balkans). As Cabán noted, “Venezuela has attempted to compete with the US for regional hegemony in the political, economic and social realms.” The US has met this competition with a combination of diplomatic, information, military, and economic sources of national power. In the Balkans, the US employed both military and diplomatic strategies, but was also part of a much broader international endeavor to quell the conflict. Successful US strategy also benefits from international alliances that support US-led initiatives, and from strongly limiting interference with these initiatives from any other states (Jeffrey). Though mixed strategies fully employing diplomatic, information, military and economic sources of national power (DIME) have been successful in conflicts such as that between the US and Venezuela, key differences were noted in comparison to the current conflict with Iran (Cabán).

Lessons from the Past

As noted above, the contributors provided a broad range of examples in response to this question. Table 2 below lists these examples, along with associated US strategies and lessons that might be applied to current relations between the US and Iran.

Contributors

Ms. Alyssa Adamson, Oklahoma State University; Dr. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School; Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI; Mr. William Cabán, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Dr. Skye Cooley, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Robert Hinck, Monmouth College; Ambassador James Jeffrey, The Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy; Dr. Randy Kluver, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Dr. Ethan Stokes, University of Alabama

Question (R6.2): In the event that the US/Coalition is challenged by another global power [Russia for the purposes of this response], what are the second and third order effects in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As Russia continues to challenge United States’ power and influence around the world, its activities in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) represent a useful lens with which to view this conflict. In Iraq and Syria, both Russia and the United States (and its Coalition) have been drawn into this layered conflict to challenge or defend the status quo with varying degrees of success and impact. While experts question whether Russia can challenge the United States globally, it can likely operate on the margins of United States interests, with a series of surgical and lower-level policy decisions. To that point, some respondents, including Edward Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Vern Liebl of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Marine Corps University, argue that they do not consider Russia a true peer and challenger of US global influence. Instead of global dominance, Russia is seeking to “marginalize US power and influence in regions they deem important to their interests” (Chow). Contributors agreed, though, that Russia is well positioned to capitalize on opportunities for growth and influence in the Middle East. This report looks at Russia’s interests, actions, and likelihood of success in challenging US global influence through these conflicts.

Conditions Favoring Increased Russian Influence

In order to better understand the opportunities available to Russia in CENTCOM’s AOR, experts provided context on the current situation in the region. Dr. Spencer Meredith III of the National Defense University’s College of International and Security Affairs took note of how Russian opportunism has taken advantage of an environment that allows them to exert outsized influence on events in the CENTCOM AOR. Mr. Liebl noted that Russia is “winning” in the information operations domain, particularly as they have widely publicized successful humanitarian initiatives, specifically the effective missions by Russian Explosive Ordinance Detail (EOD) teams that have benefitted Syrian citizens. According to Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center, this along with other recent Russian activities has afforded them greater credibility among more states in the region. This is reinforced by the successful continuation of a narrative that paints the United States as a regional destabilizer (Meredith). In Liebl’s estimation, this success has been made possible by US forfeiture of the regional narrative space, which is accompanied by waning American influence, wavering commitments, and relinquishing leadership.

This environment of waning influence has also been influenced by what is seen as wavering commitment on the part of domestic policymakers in the United States according to both Dr. Frederick Kagan and Ms. Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute. They concede the possibility that domestic public opinion could swing towards wanting to partner with Russia instead of countering them in the area. Experts have also argued that the US has abandoned its leadership role in the Middle East. Specifically, in negotiations related to Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Dr. Kagan and Ms. Zimmerman note that the United States has not been leading the process. The current environment of sliding US leadership and subsequent Russian usurpation could have consequences stretching across a number of domains.

Effects of Russia Achieving its Objectives in the Middle East on US Strategy and Interests

Military

Mr. Chow argues that the Russian military seeks to diminish US military capabilities in the region. This would be achieved by maintaining their current bases, but also by expanding their operational footprint into Iran, among other states (Chow). Any actions aligned towards this objective could threaten US assets and limit US freedom of movement—an interest that the United States would seek to protect (Kagan, Zimmerman). Russia has worked to be perceived as a reliable partner, which might make states in the region more willing to allow Russia to base facilities and operations within their jurisdictions, according to Dr. Sager. Additionally, Russia is likely to bolster arms sales to regional actors (Sager, Kagan, Zimmerman). Dr. Sager notes that the cost difference between Russian and American systems, as well as the lack of strings attached to Russian purchases privileges the Russian Federation in this arena. Additionally, skepticism by Gulf States of the United States’ commitment to the region has led some countries in the region to hedge their bets and seek deepened relationships with Russia (Kagan, Zimmerman).

Energy

A primary arena in which Russia is well positioned to capitalize on fluid regional dynamics is in global energy markets. Both Chow’s and the Kagan-Zimmerman responses suggested that Russia would seek to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia (and other oil producing states). Such a Russian move could decrease US leverage in Saudi Arabia (Kagan, Zimmerman). Additionally, while this may complicate US economic interests, it may also produce an opportunity for the United States to work with other large oil-consuming states, such as China and India in a context that reflects the common interests that these states share (Chow). Looking beyond Saudi Arabia, increased Russian activity in other regional energy markets (such as Libya) could imperil certain European energy markets, such as Italy (Kagan, Zimmerman). The competitive regional energy landscape has prevented such Russian activities from becoming an inevitability, but they do remain a possibility.

Both the South Stream and the (planned) TurkStream pipelines also represent a major inflection point in the region’s power dynamics. If Russia is to capitalize on the market access that the TurkStream pipeline would provide, it could decide to mitigate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in order to appease Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Meredith). Similarly, the TurkStream pipeline offers an opportunity for Russia to strengthen its hand in the region. This pipeline provides an alternative route to European markets that circumvents Ukraine, and any political pitfalls therein. It also opens up a new front of market vulnerability for the European Union, who will be subject to a fickle Russia as an energy gatekeeper, although US LNG can mitigate this (Meredith). This pipeline would have the dual impact of deepening Russo-Turkish relations, while also motivating Iran to seek a closer relationship with Russia to deepen their energy partnership (Meredith). A renewed Russo-Turkish relationship could also prompt those countries to support each other in projects away from this region.

International Diplomacy

Russia stands to make international diplomatic gains in the new environment discussed above. In the aftermath of the Iraqi state’s campaign against Da’esh, there remain opportunities for Russia to help stabilize political and security events in the country (Chow). Additionally, through initiatives supporting international negotiations, Russia could create alternative fora that run parallel to the United Nations and other Western-oriented organizations (Kagan, Zimmerman). Indeed the diplomatic vacuum mentioned by Dr. Kagan and Ms. Zimmerman serves as an inducement to Russian behavior in this arena and persists despite local wariness of Russian involvement and regional states’ lack of conviction of the viability and benefits of a long-term relationship with Russia. Additionally, Russia may also be constrained by limited diplomatic resources that would prevent them from involvement in a large number of different initiatives (Kagan, Zimmerman). Russia may also seek to seize the mantle of combating global terrorism and fighting global jihadist movements (Chow). This also reflects concurrent domestic Russian priorities in Chechnya and elsewhere (Liebl).

The current situation in the CENTCOM AOR also provides challenges and opportunities for Russia as it considers its bilateral relationships there. Egypt has allowed Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian bases and airspace. While this represents an opportunity for Russia, it is part of a longstanding Egyptian strategy of playing the United States and the Russians (and previously the USSR) against one another (Liebl). In Syria, Russian interests include the preservation of the Assad regime. To that end, they are leading peace talks on their terms (Liebl). Complicating a potential US response is the notion that Russian activities have been more effective in Syria than those undertaken by the United States (Sager). Similar to the Egyptian strategy of balancing Russian and American interests against each other, Iraq is playing a similar game (Liebl). Indeed, Russia has the ability to play a significant part in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, a role that they will likely relish (Kagan, Zimmerman).

The burgeoning Russo-Turkish relationship has been mentioned earlier in the context of energy cooperation. Despite historical competition between those two entities, the current fraught relationship between Turkey and the United States presents an opportunity for Russia to move in (Kagan, Zimmerman). This potential rapprochement will embolden Turkey (and perhaps even Iran) to subdue Kurdish self-determination efforts (Meredith). Iran’s standing distrust of the current US Administration is a potential opening for further improving relations with Russia buttressed by Russian and Iranian convergent interests in containing the opium trade in Afghanistan (Liebl). If Russia does indeed challenge the United States’ strategic imperatives, Iran could be drawn in as well, prompting a likely response from Gulf countries wary of increased Iranian activity in the neighborhood, according to regional expert Mubin Shaikh.

Conclusion

According to Dr. Meredith and Dr. Sager, Russia will be one of several—if not the leading—actors shaping and defining the outcome of conflicts in the central Middle East. These efforts will ensure an enduring Russian presence in the region in terms of military operations and economic trade (Meredith). While the US can do little to halt Russia’s expanding influence in the region, the US could attempt to at the very least, maintain, if not increase, its influence, resulting in a period of “enduring competition.” Even maintaining its current level of influence is challenging though, given Russian advances in the region. Dr. Meredith argues, “The loss of US reputation in the region is inevitable” in part because the natural, historical (and conflicting) interests of regional actors are reemerging—they no longer need or want the US to set the terms, the conditions for success, or most of all, constrain their independent actions. This is in part due to the “success” of US regional capacity building efforts over the years, as much as their own initiative. Dr. Meredith concludes that Russia’s likely entrenchment and success in the Middle East will result in the return of the “’great game’ of power politics with fluid allegiances, amidst fixed interests, all centered on relative gains in a zero-sum international environment.”

Contributors

Mr. Edward Chow, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute; Mr. Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, USMC University; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Consultant; Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, American Enterprise Institute

Blame, Sway, and Vigilante Tactics: How Other Cultures Think Differently and Implications for Planning.

Author | Editor: G. Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Planners require context in order to achieve their goals. While planners understand that colder or more elevated locations have implications for an operation, the capacity to similarly adapt plans and operations based on differences in the population’s cultural or cognitive attributes has not been as readily integrated. The purpose of this SMA White Paper is to synthesize ideas across cognitive science and applied social science and translate their application for use in operations and planning within the span of a single document. The contributors each look at distinct cognitive functions that merit attention. By translating or operationalizing the research and discussing it in terms of real-world scenarios, this paper illustrates how the addition of cultural cognitive diversity research will enable more effective, quick, less violent, and less expensive operations.

Contributors

LTC Xavier Colon (5th BN, 1st SWTG(A)), Dr. Rose Hendricks (University of California, San Diego), Dr. Anatoliy Kharkhurin (American University Sharjah), Brig. Tim Lai (British Army), SFC Matthew Martin (5th MISB(A)), Dr. Abdul-Akeem Sadiq (University of Central Florida), Dr. Moritz Schuberth (Mercy Corps), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.), Ms. Jenna Tyler (University of Central Florida)

Question (R6.4): Knowing that religion is only one (and not the most important) stimulus for disgruntled Islamic youth to join VEOs, what could/should be the domestic messaging to youth to prevent their “radicalization” and joining the VEOs? To what extent could a continued presence of Western military in the Middle East (even only as instructors/trainers) undermine this messaging in the region?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

After the fall of Mosul, as it became clear that Daesh could no longer creditably claim broad swaths of territory for its caliphate, it deliberately reverted to a strategy of insurgency, according to Syrian expert Hassan Hassan.1 Its withdrawal into the rural desert landscape—and to what a radicalization expert, Haroon Ulla, calls the “cloud caliphate”2—has implications for counter-radicalization messaging. Hassan reminds us that when the organization was defeated in the late 2000s, it came back stronger than ever. He notes that its messaging has recently pivoted to attempts to erode trust between Sunni Arab populations and any form of legitimate government. Daesh’s messaging is fueled by the recent memory of the failure of the Sahwa (or Awakening) movement to produce meaningful political reforms for Sunni populations in Iraq. In Syria, Daesh still benefits from the ongoing conflict and enduring Sunni Muslim grievances. At the same time, hardened foreign fighters are leaving Syria and Iraq for other regions where extremism is flourishing including the Sinai region of Egypt and Yemen (Hassan). And, of course, some foreign fighters are returning home across the globe where they can be incubators of future generations of extremists (Hassan).

So given Daesh’s return to insurgency and its embrace of information age recruitment techniques, what are the grievances3 driving the radicalization of youth in Iraq and Syria, and what messages would be effective in tarnishing the appeal of extremism? It bears repeating that effective counter extremism messaging in Iraq and Syria requires state and local governments to match promises of reform with actual reform (Kluver, Sager). Dr. Sager reminds readers that between 2007 and 2009, Daesh disappeared from Iraq as the result of the Sahwa movement. But once promised political reform failed to actualize, Daesh came back. This failure of reform cemented the conclusion that the only way to enact reform is through violence. As Hassan notes, Daesh has already begun sowing doubt along these lines.

What is concerning to Dr. Ian McCulloh, a social science researcher and proponent of field research/population surveys, is that the USG has yet to realize that the remaining population of military aged males in Iraq—those most vulnerable to a new round of recruitment from Daesh, Al Qaeda, or other groups—has been stripped of its hard-core ideologues. Those who have not been killed, captured, or fled are likely to be poor, illiterate, and have limited access to social media. These factors may indicate that social media campaigns will have limited effect on this kind of population.

So if the most effective counter radicalization tool is visible political reform, the primary role for the US in counter extremism messaging is a supporting one encouraging regional governments to make meaningful reforms that address the driving forces7 of radicalization among marginalized Sunni groups (Kluver, Sager). When the USG engages in messaging, it should focus on 1) legitimizing government partners, 2) promoting economic development and regional stability, 3) supporting foreign aid, and 4) reinforcing cultural norms (Sager). For a discussion on how to undermine Daesh’s leadership, please see Dr. Gina Ligon’s article Leveraging Organizational Fissures to Degrade ISIL Top Management Team in the contribution section.

While a foreign military presence may be deemed necessary for a short time, contributors believe US military presence generally fuels radicalization narratives (Styszynski). Dr. Sager emphasized that in order to avoid undermining counter-radicalization messages with the presence of Western forces, the US should be seen as a catalyst for genuine political reform that benefits populations most at risk of radicalization: Sunni Arabs. The USG should exercise caution, however, to not take adopt general guidelines without further critical analysis, according to Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois of NSI. If, for example, hardliners win Parliamentary elections in Iraq, visible US support for an administration that is viewed by many Sunni Arab Iraqi as opposed to their interests could fuel further political marginalization, alienation, and radicalization.

Contributors

Ms. Alyssa Adamson, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Skye Cooley, Oklahoma State University; Mr. Hassan Hassan, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Dr. Robert Hinck, Monmouth College; Dr. Randy Kluver, Oklahoma State University; Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska, Omaha; Dr. Ian McCulloh, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London (UK); Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mubin Shaikh, Independent Expert; Dr. Ethan Stokes, University of Alabama; Dr. Marcin Styszynski, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland); Dr. Haroon Ullah, Broadcast Board of Governors

Question (R6.1): What conditions (demographic, political, etc.) should exist on the ground in the Middle Euphrates River Valley and the tri border (Syria/Jordan/Iraq) region to deny the seeds of future conflict from being planted – particularly taking into account the assumed intention of Iranian proxy forces to establish a Shia “land bridge?” Which of these conditions can and should be insisted on as part of a Geneva peace process to end the current conflict in Syria?

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

Ambassador James Dobbins and a team from the RAND Corporation contend, “the Syria civil war is approaching, if not a conclusion, at least a hiatus that might be converted into a conclusion.”1 Major regional players—United States, Russia, and NATO—have a converging interest in ending the conflict and facilitating a stable peace, Dr. Amir Bagherpour of giStrat argues. However, despite an emerging shared preference between Russia and the United States on ending the conflict in Syria, rivalry dynamics between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE will likely have a dampening effect on peace prospects as the proxy warfare intensifies following the military defeat of Da’esh. Mr. Hassan Hassan of Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy warns that the worsening of the various conflicts in the region is still a serious possibility.

As the fight against Da’esh winds down in Iraq and Syria, brewing tensions and conflicts between regional actors and proxy groups is gaining new momentum. We asked thirteen regional experts to identify the top conditions necessary to bring an end to conflict in the region as well as effect a stable peace. Figure 1 captures several thematic categories of conditions posited by the authors in rank order as well as the estimated likelihood of occurrence.

Reduction in Proxy Forces

GiStrat’s computational modeling found that “the most significant factor for creating stabilizing conditions in the Euphrates River Valley is a reduction in proxy support by opposing larger powers,” a condition that seven other contributors agree is an essential criterion. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, and the United States all support or fund proxy forces, but several experts emphasize Iranian proxy operations as the primary aggravating obstacle to peace in the region (Cafarella, Ganor, Jeffrey). Mr. Mubin Shaikh,3 an extremism expert, and Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center both write that undermining pro-Iranian militias are the key to disrupting the Shia crescent “land bridge,” which Shaikh argues already effectively exists across Iraq and Syria.

Removal of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)

The removal of Da’esh and Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria is mentioned by three authors4 who distinguish these groups from other proxy forces in the region. Dr. Martin Styszynski of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poland argues that the “defeat of ISIS’ structures in Syria and failures or withdrawal of Islamist insurgents” has allowed for high-level consolidation of strategic territories between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Ms. Jennifer Cafarella of the Institute for the Study of War views the removal of Sunni VEOs in the tri border region as fueling the Assad regime’s advantage over the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and weakening the likelihood of Assad to negotiate. Both contributors suggest that the demise of proxy groups and VEOs expose the underlying obstacles to a peace accord and the dormant mechanics of any future political settlements.

The Role of the Assad Regime in Peace

Contributors present a spectrum of possibilities on the fate of Assad’s continued leadership in the event of a lasting peace in Syria. One school of thought holds that regime change is absolutely necessary to a 2020 Geneva agreement (Ganor, Itani) while another holds a more moderate view that Assad will only need to exit at some point in the future (O’Shaughnessy, Yacoubian). The middle of the spectrum recognizes that the survival of the Assad regime is likely but his power will be constrained (Jeffrey) and concessions will be made to “opposition groups in Northern Syria, Southern Syria, and the Kurdish territory” (Bagherpour). The other extreme assumes that Assad has all but guaranteed a role in post- conflict Syria, that “the surrender of oppositions groups is certain,” and that Assad will emerge as victor (O’Shaughnessy).

Power Sharing and Territorial Concessions

The fluid and disparate landscape in the triorder region understandingly necessitates a peace process that will be predicated on numerous, multivariate resolutions where stakeholders concede a significant amount of geopolitical capital. Almost all of these concessions described by contributors involve dyadic relationships and are comprised of territorial cessation, decentralizing political governance, or military mobilization/de-escalation. Mr. Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council lists a territorial partition as absolutely essential to peace while Ms. Cafarella contends that de-escalation zones (as a precursor to a peace agreement) do not honor their political or humanitarian purpose and only make the Syrian regime less likely to negotiate. There is also a particular emphasis on Russia committing to a “de-prioritization of the Middle Eastern Theater” (Cafarella) and the Turkey/SDF conflict reaching some sort of armistice.

Ms. Mona Yacoubian of the United States Institute for Peace and Dr. Bagherpour contend that greater political autonomy for Sunni minorities in Iraq and ultimately a significant devolution of power to governorates in Syria is a necessary condition for peace. Furthermore, Dr. Spencer Meredith III of National Defense University notes that the “SDF attaining a functional level of governance” is absolutely necessary for conflict resolution.5 Dr. Meredith also asserts that the US needs to advocate for strategic communication with Turkey on behalf of the SDF, whereas AMB Jeffrey takes this a step further and argues for a continued American military presence in Syria. AMB Dobbins and the RAND team similarly write of the usefulness of maintaining a US presence in counterbalancing Iranian in influence and providing leverage in negotiation over Syria’s longer-term future.

Socioeconomic Reconstruction

As political conventions for peace emerge, plans for the reconstruction of Syria must be correspondingly developed as well. Authors identified three mechanisms of socioeconomic advancement: micro-level community rehabilitation, reintegration, and humanitarian concerns. Both Ms. Yacoubian and the RAND team propose a bottom-up approach6 to development within and across communities to accompany an increase in decentralized governance. The RAND team and Dr. Ganor further articulate the importance of reintegrating refugees to forge economic activity and contribute to political participation in Syria. Ms. Cafarella notes the importance of creating mechanisms for DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform) for former combatants.7 Basic humanitarian challenges are also of primary concern: specifically, the protection of minorities (e.g., Yazidis, Christians, etc.) (Bagherpour), the release of political prisoners and delivery of humanitarian aid (Cafarella), and the “continued monitoring of non-conventional material” (Ganor).

Contributors

Dr. Amir Bagherpour, giStrat; Ms. Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Boaz Ganor, InterDisciplinary Center (Israel); Mr. Hassan Hassan, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Mr. Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Alexander O’Donnell, giStrat; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Analyst; Dr. Martin Styszynski, Adam Mickiewicz University; Ms. Mona Yacoubian, United States Institute of Peace

Question (R6.6): How does USCENTCOM, working within a whole of government approach, coordinate military operations in support of the change in approach towards Iran from the previous to the current administration?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As battlefield successes actualize, decision makers have an opportunity to align tactical and operational policies with a strategic vision. One year into a new presidential administration offers a window wherein actors on the ground can map their plans onto the tone, intent, and objectives of the new commander- in-chief. Despite some continuity between President Trump and his predecessor’s policies, particularly as related to Iran, there remain some significant differences. A wholesale White House-initiated change of approach vis-à-vis Iran has not yet occurred, despite these differences. If no substantive changes are made, CENTCOM is well positioned to build on established success in Iraq. However, if such a change were to occur, it would require a whole-of-government approach; within this framework, CENTCOM would be able to leverage capabilities built up over the course of their engagement in Iraq.

What is the Trump Approach?

Despite President Trump’s commitment to being seen as an abrogator of his predecessor’s policies, there remains some consistency in his policies vis-à-vis Iran. Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center suggests that there is a lack of consensus around what exactly a novel Trump strategy would entail. He sees little daylight between Trump’s and Obama’s use of CENTCOM to contain Iranian influence. Similarly, Ambassador James Jeffrey of the Washington Institute on Near East Policy suggests that President Trump might follow a mixture of policies similar to those of the Obama Administration, i.e., primacy of nuclear issues (though Jeffrey concedes that whereas President Obama sought reconciliation on this point, President Trump has the opposite point of view), counterterrorism operations, and strengthening regional alliances. Despite the differences in approach to the Iranian nuclear issue, Jeffrey argues that insofar as President Obama labeled Iran a regional threat, there is little difference in rhetoric between Presidents Obama and Trump.

Moving beyond a boilerplate classification of Iran as a threat lays bare significant differences in the new administration’s strategy. According to AMB Jeffrey, the Trump administration perceives Iran as both a regional hegemon and ideological threat. This calculation exceeds the characterization that President Obama had for Iran. Similarly, Dr. Spencer Meredith III of National Defense University’s College of International and Security Affairs notes that the current administration perceives Iran as an expansionist power, hoping to recapture historical glory; he contrasts this with the Obama-era observation that Iran was guided more by internal politics than outward-looking objectives. This view is shared by Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, of the University of London, who suggests that President Trump’s view on Iran is characterized by distrust and antagonism. Despite that worldview, Dr. O’Shaughnessy writes that it is unlikely that President Trump would nullify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This view is also shared by AMB Jeffrey who is not convinced that the President’s domestic political allies are willing to pull out of the deal and institute a hard reset on relations with Iran.

A Whole of Government Approach

Despite near-consensus on the necessity of employing a whole-of-government approach if a strategic reset occurs, experts sought clarity on what precisely such an approach would actually entail (Jeffrey, Meredith). According to AMB Jeffrey, the approach taken since 2003 is not aligned with what appear to be the current Administration’s objectives, and suggests that policymakers strive for a clearly articulated approach similar to that employed during the Balkan Wars which specified a distinct political outcome followed by negotiations.

From a technical perspective, Dr. Meredith notes that capability specialization and clearly-defined policy documents bear the best results and suggests that the National Security Council serve as the primary coordinator of a multi-approach Iran policy. In addition to a “nation building” default, Ambassador Jeffrey suggests that apart from the JCPOA, negotiation skills at Foggy Bottom below the Secretary have dwindled. Similarly, Jeffrey argues, the Department of State today is not oriented towards incremental and measured progress working with multiple state actors.

CENTCOM Military Options in a Strategic Reset

There is not yet clarity as to whether or not the United States will commit to a full-scale strategic reset with Iran; such a move would be characterized by a major change in policy, such as the negation of the JCPOA. This lack of clarity makes military planning difficult (Sager).

Even if the current policy is not clarified further, there still exist some mission sets where CENTCOM is well equipped to succeed. AMB Jeffrey notes that the command has technical capabilities, relationships, and know-how to achieve its operational objectives in the region. Dr. Meredith notes that the mission of security force assistance, coordinated along clear lines of efforts, remains critical. He also noted the importance of engaging allies to help CENTCOM achieve its objectives in the region. Dr. O’Shaughnessy echoed this point, stressing the need for a pluralist policy, i.e., one wherein military and non-military entities are aligned on common goals. He notes that the most effective engagement with Iran happens in the diplomatic realm, and military capabilities can be best contextualized as force projection.

An alternative outcome is, as Dr. O’Shaughnessy proposed, an ostensible “cold war,” i.e., a situation typified by tough talk between adversaries, but with little changing below the harsher tone on the surface. This would prevent cooperation in areas of mutual interest between the United States and Iran, such as containing the spread of Da’esh into Afghanistan. On the other hand, O’Shaughnessy concedes, this situation would at least offers some measure of predictability, not just for policymakers, but CENTCOM as well. Experts did not anticipate a more conciliatory strategy; therefore, CENTCOM’s options in that context were not discussed.

Contributors

Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center

[Q22] Can international agreements effectively protect high-value space assets in time of crisis and/or conflict? How could such a treaty be sufficiently verified? How would it be enforced? How would dual- use technologies be treated? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author(s): Dr. John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The expert contributors divided nearly evenly on whether international space agreements can provide protection to space assets. While all contributors agreed that international agreements create norms of behavior, they disagreed on whether these norms create restraints on state behavior that will hold in a crisis. The contributors who did believe that international agreements could provide protection also maintained that focusing on prohibited activities, such as the generation of space debris, rather than prohibited technologies, increased the enforceability and verification of effective international space agreements as well as mitigated the dual-use problem. In short, their argument was that with regard to dual-use technology, ultimately it does not matter what states build, it really only matters how they use what they put into space.

Do Non-Institutionalized International Agreements Provide Asset Protection in Crisis?

The expert contributors were nearly evenly split on whether international agreements can effectively protect high-value space assets in time of crisis or conflict. Twelve experts affirmed the effectiveness of these agreements, whereas the eleven other experts dissented from this view.

Agreements can protect high-value assets

The expert contributors with more sanguine views of the effectiveness of international agreements in protecting space assets grounded their optimism in what they defended as the efficacy of existing space law. For example, Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland describes the existing Outer Space Treaty (OST) as an effective agreement that is likely the best possible international agreement that could arise in the space domain. She avers that “it would be hard to get international agreement on any set of principles that would be better than what is currently laid out.” Buttressing Dr. Gallagher’s view that the OST’s centering common principles makes the agreement quite effective despite low institutionalization, Massimo Pellegrino, a Space and Security Policy Advisor in Geneva, maintains that widely-shared principles increase the enforceability of international space agreements, which helps to prevent and shape crisis behavior. Pellegrino states that, while states can disregard international law, doing so imposes sufficient costs, and these costs are factored into their strategies of compliance and non-compliance: There is enough of a “price to pay” for non-compliance that when “high enough [may] force nation states to restrain themselves” from attacking high-valued assets.

To the extent that international space agreements create and sustain these conditions of restraint by imposing costs, they would be effective in protecting high-value space assets in crisis or conflict. These collectively imposed costs can occur both domestically and internationally, even in the absence of institutionalization. On the domestic front, as Dr. Frans von der Dunk of the University of Nebraska College of Law observes, “it becomes very tricky for governments to be seen as violating [widely-shared] rules because it undercuts their own legitimacy.” With respect to international mechanisms of restraint, Dr. Xavier Pasco of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Paris argues that collective space dependence creates a restraining self-enforcing interdependence functionally regulating state behavior. Pasco suspects that each country possessing space systems likely wants its “own space system to work properly,” creating a condition of “constrained interdependency” concerning “collective behaviors and rules as references for military actions.”

Agreements cannot protect high-value assets

In contrast, the remaining experts were clear that based on their interpretations of norms during historical crises, they believed agreements to be insufficient. For example, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin categorically posits that “neither norms nor formal treaty obligations can be expected to protect high- value space assets in the event of crisis or conflict,” indicating that international space agreements, irrespective of the degree of formalization and institutionalization, provide few protections in crises. Similarly, Dr. George Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration shared that “it’s clear to me that international agreements cannot guarantee the protection of space assets,” but did not appear to embrace Berkowitz’s more expansive claim about norms.

For some of the experts in the ‘yes’ camp, the ability to impose costs was sufficient to conclude that international space agreements are effective in protecting high-value assets. In contrast, the ‘no’ camp adopts a stricter level of scrutiny, wanting something closer to 100% effectiveness to be able to reasonably conclude in favor of the proposition. The experts that viewed international agreements as ineffective in protecting high-value assets seem united in suggesting crisis-resilient protection is likely beyond the capacity of any agreement to obtain. Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation observed that the inability of agreements to provide security in crisis “is not a defect of international agreements, merely a reality of the international political system.” Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland provides a contrasting view, arguing that it is intellectually unfair to require that international space agreements are 100% effective to be considered useful. She challenges proponents of views that unequivocally dismiss international space agreements to identify “a weapon system that is 100% effective” because there are “no doubt legal agreements (i.e., a ban on use of debris creating weapons; or “protection zones” regarding close approach of satellites on orbit) that could actively protect assets in crisis/conflicts and be verified, but need to be explored more thoroughly.”

Unlike many in the ‘no’ camp, Dr. Mark J. Sundahl of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law grounded his pessimism about the effectiveness of international agreements in space in the design of the Outer Space Treaty. He laments that, as currently designed, the OST permits a wide range of state behaviors, including actions that some states may consider aggression. Moreover, the treaty forbids only non-consultation with other governments in the event of potential interference with national activity in space. He states that:

I don’t think anyone believes that all weapons are banned from space…[what is banned is] nuclear weapons, [and] you can’t be aggressive, and you have to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other countries and their nationals. That is a rather soft prohibition on interference because all it really requires is that if you are going to harmfully interfere with the operations of others, then the governments have to consult with each other. It doesn’t say that interference is outright prohibited.

For Sundahl, the OST’s focus on principles, rather than institutionalization and monitoring, creates a weakness in the treaty. He believes that the OST cannot protect high-value space assets in time of crisis or conflict because the remedies for violation are mere consultation, rather than any form of imposed punishment or monitoring.

Enforcement and Verification Concerns as International Space Agreements Evolve

The contributors offered that enforcement issues surrounding international space agreements might be thought of as a specialized subset of those that arise in international arms control agreements. Effective arms control regimes exist in other areas of law plagued by dual-use issues, such as “universal prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons,” notes Michael Spies of the United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Therefore, he believes the general mantra of arms control agreements was also true for international space agreements: Verification is enforcement.

A “good set of rules” creates guaranteed penalties “in the case of non-observance,” Dr. Luca Rossettini of D-Orbit avers. Well-designed international space agreements “can provide one layer of protection,” according to Nield, via “peer pressure, in terms of expectations of behavior that are held by the international community.” These behavioral expectations, Johnson observes, “establish what is internationally permissible to do.” This provides security benefits to states insofar as the “resources to be spent protecting against” impermissible activities “can be lessened.”

Drawing inspiration from international arms control agreements, the experts suggested three ways that international space agreements could be enforced and verified in the context of dual-use challenges. First, as space agreements evolve, continue to center them on widely-held norms. According to Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin, these norms should be “things that promote transparency and are things that are measurable, and not measurable just by one entity but measurable by the community at large.” In the context of arms control agreements, codes of norms function in this way because epistemic communities can achieve verification by “corroborat[ing] or refut[ing] any given event” and then “quantify[ing]…the harmfulness of that event” to determine how to enforce the treaty violation.

Second, as an agreement evolves, participants should seek to regulate activities, not technology. Pellegrino plainly forwards that, “it would be beneficial if international agreements would focus more on the degree of care with which space activities and operations are conducted and communicated, rather than on which kind of orbital system/spacecraft is actually deployed in outer space.” Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College agrees: “Since all space technology is dual-use, and every satellite can be a weapon…you cannot regulate technology, only specify what might be an illegal action.” Hitchens posits that an “Incidents at Sea/Dangerous Military Practices type agreement for space” is an excellent model for international space agreements.

Finally, even if agreements do not allow for institutionalization, detailing mechanisms and practices of transparency can overcome dual-use concerns. Pasco states that the question of dual-use technologies is “additional motivation for extended transparency mechanisms.” Pasco’s views dovetail with Spies’ thoughts on the function of transparency in mitigating dual-use concerns: “transparency and confidence- building measures can contribute to the development of verification measures for arms control agreements and regimes.” These mechanisms should cover three state practices in particular: “major outer space research and space applications programs, major military outer space expenditure, and other national security space activities.”

Conclusion

There was a bifurcation among the expert contributors on whether international space agreements can provide protection of critical space assets in a crisis, with half of the experts arguing ‘yes,’ and the other half arguing ‘no.’ The most effective international agreements, according to the experts, would require continued flexibility as well as clear verification to be enforceable and designed for the long haul. As such, agreements that focus on prohibited activities, such as the generation of space debris, rather than prohibited technologies, both increase the enforceability and verification of effective international space agreements, as well as mitigate the dual-use feature that almost all space technologies evince. To enforce is to verify: Ultimately, from the point of an effective agreement, it does not matter what states build, it really only matters how they use what they put into space and how easily other states can confirm that what a state says it is doing is what it is in fact doing.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Faulconer Consulting Group; Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Peter L. Hays (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Tanja Masson-Zwaan (Leiden University, Netherlands); Dr. George Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Michiru Nishida (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Massimo Pellegrino (Space and Security Policy Advisor, Geneva); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Dr. Michael K. Simpson (Secure World Foundation); Michael Spies (United Nations Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Cassandra Steer (Women in International Security-Canada, Canada); Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Joanne Wheeler (Bird & Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q2] How does each entity in the following categories conceive of space operations for military and commercial purposes? How do they approach space operations and services? Is there any difference in how their commercial ventures (if any) consider security during peace, crisis, and conflict? a. PRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea; b. European Space Agency, Japan, India, South Korea, Israel; c. Canada, Brazil, Australia, Singapore, Ukraine, others. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Authors: Weston Aviles (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), Nicole Peterson (NSI, Inc.), and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Kevin Pollpeter of CNA considers China’s approach to space to be motivated by the desire to “increase what [the PRC] calls its comprehensive national power … the basket of everything that makes a country powerful: its military might, its economic power, its diplomatic power, its cultural power.” This assessment is consistent among the contributors who discussed China,7 although there was some deviation regarding the scope of China’s ambitions relative to their military, commercial, and civil/scientific pursuits in the space domain. Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings of the Royal United Services Institute refer to Beijing’s “strategic vision as a global power,” whereas Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation frames such strategic vision as being more regional orientated and not expeditionary in nature. These ambitions are grounded in the long-term “future-orientated,” multi- generational planning (Dr. Namrata Goswami, Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab) characteristic of Beijing’s centralized approach to policy development.

Multiple experts8 consider the PRC’s geopolitical priorities to be driving all aspects of its space operations and services. Every component of China’s space operations effectively serves its objective of increasing national power. The civil, commercial, and military components of the PRC’s space operations have varying operational goals and programs, but all are ambitious and holistic in nature. For example, the PRC’s civil and commercial efforts in space predominantly fall under the yoke of Beijing’s national defense strategy in some form or another, but can still claim objectives independent of military ambitions. Civil space ventures, in particular, are often consistent with the strategy of dual-use technology9 that Nouwens and Stickings argue presents the potential for “degrading US assets in space and on Earth.” Finally, as Cheng notes, Chinese leaders regard US dependence on space infrastructure as a weakness, and will seek to avoid such reliance as it advances its own space capability.

There is broad consensus among contributors that the PRC’s military approach to space operations are, as Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin writes, “central to denying the US its ability to sense, decide, and act effectively and thereby deter intervention.”10 The experts’ discussions of the PRC’s strategic vision for space suggest that there is a concerted effort underway to decrease the United States’ advantage in space. Nouwens and Stickings note that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking “information dominance capabilities in space, while developing capabilities to deny or degrade the capabilities [of the US].” Several of the experts11 discuss the recent successful test of the “unhackable” quantum entanglement as evidence of China’s aspiration for information dominance. Beijing’s development of military space capabilities goes beyond the information domain—the PRC is also developing direct ascent missile hit-to-kill technology which could be used to target satellites or to help it improve the survivability of its nuclear-capable missiles (Grego).

Despite the military focus of the PRC’s space programs, there is significant commercial space activity in China. This activity reflects China’s desire “to position itself as a great power that is at the forefront of humanity’s exploration of space,” and science and technology more generally (Nouwens and Stickings). Nouwens and Stickings note that the PRC “has sought to promote greater innovation in the commercial domain,” with entities such as ExPace demonstrating Beijing’s response to the success of the American SpaceX (Pollpeter). Tempering the growth of innovation and cooperation in the space domain is what the ViaSat, Inc. team characterizes as China’s “lack [of] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation.”

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Berkowitz remark that, despite the advances made by the PRC in cultivating a commercial space industry, such ventures are simply “extensions of the regime” and will completely yield to functions of the state in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command) and Cheng warn that the dual-use nature of many space technologies enables China to mask military ventures in space as civil-science operations. Consequently, commercial interests “will not deviate from PRC goals during conflicts” (Goswami). Commercial space assets may even be aggressively defended by the PRC during a crisis, and their continued operation viewed as a strategic necessity.

Russia

Russia’s approach to space is primarily influenced by its resurgent rivalry with the US. Cheng characterizes Moscow’s space operations and services as “one of the various instrumentalities available to achieve deterrent objectives.” Yet, as several contributors13 note, Russia is falling behind the US in terms of its space capabilities. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation writes of the vagueness of the role space has in current Russian policy, while noting that Moscow is, “just fearful of being left behind and being perceived as being weak.” Nevertheless, Moscow is actively resisting US hegemony, although its efforts are hampered by substantial resource constraints (Theresa Hitchens, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland).

Despite its emphasis on space for defense and national security, Russia has made significant contributions to international civil space by supporting the International Space Station (ISS) and other civil space ventures. Additionally, the development of GLONASS14 and other commercial space services indicates that Russia is interested in exploiting its space capabilities for commercial purposes (Hitchens). Indian Air Force Group Captain (ret.) Ajey Lele of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses notes that Moscow has “succeeded in keeping their space agenda [i.e., ‘orbital cooperation’ and other civil pursuits] shielded from geopolitical tensions [with the US].” Supported by China, the Russian Federation has proposed a treaty15 banning space weaponry. Grego suggests Moscow recognizes that securing space operations as orderly, safe, and secure in peacetime benefits both their national security and commercial interests, and contends that if “a crisis unfolds and the possibility of armed conflict in space is entertained, [we should] expect that they [will] also prefer constraint and predictability and to be able to manage the conflict.” These points of international collaboration speak to Moscow’s interest in limiting US dominance in the space domain as well as ensuring future Russian space operations.

Russia is clearly capable of fielding different types of reversible, nondestructive means of interfering with satellites, and has some capability to field anti-satellite weapons and missile defense technologies that are destructive (Grego). The escalatory potential of such space technology embodies the “Russia[n] concept of ‘escalate to deescalate’ … with its apparent emphasis on a quick resort to irreversible weapons effects” (Berkowitz), and illustrates Moscow’s interest in offensive capabilities (Hitchens). A necessary adjunct to Russia’s military capabilities in space is space-based information capability. Russia’s GLONASS PNT program embodies Moscow’s pursuit of an independent, state-controlled space infrastructure that can support informationalized warfare.

Russia designates over 100 small-to-medium companies as commercial space ventures. However, in contrast to the US, each is administered by, and to a large extent under the control of, Russia’s space agency, ROSCOSMOS (Lele). Although primarily intended for commercial purposes, these companies are subject to Moscow’s agenda and needs. While this degree of control supports defense, the result is that Russia “lack[s] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation,” according to the ViaSat, Inc. team. Goswami notes that Russia’s commercial space efforts have included “build[ing] space infrastructure in countries lacking such expertise and sharing its space technology;” a practice which has become a means of revenue for the Russian military industrial complex (Lele; Samson). In addition to generating revenue, Moscow’s civil and commercial space capabilities bolster national pride, and highlight Russia’s international influence and prestige.

Iran

There is overall agreement among the contributors that Iran’s space ambitions are centered on national security and reflect its desire for both regional hegemony and national prestige. Iran’s antagonistic relationships with neighboring Arab nations and Israel provides the motivation for Tehran to pursue sophisticated information dominance and missile defense and offense, while also growing its civil space operations. Goswami identifies Iran as “the most advanced ‘space-assets nation’ in the Middle-East, especially in relation to the Arab states in the region.” She suggests that, as tensions in the Persian/Arab Gulf continue to grow, a space race may occur between Tehran and the Gulf nations.

Iran has a “large and sophisticated missile program” (Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, National Defense University) that Grego observes has launched a small number of low-mass satellites that have little demonstrated capability. In fact, discussion of Iranian space operations is often dominated by analysis of Tehran’s missile technology and ambitions, although several experts16 point out that Iran has other civil space and technological aspirations as well. Grego explains that Iran has long sought to jumpstart its space scientific efforts through cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) and Italy, and the funding of academic initiatives for space exploration. These efforts, along with their missile program, are seen by Tehran as a means of bolstering nationalistic sentiments and pride associated with such pursuits (Bahgat). The prospect of international prestige and the “dual-use nature of technology” (Lele) also make a sophisticated space program irresistible, perhaps even a necessity for achieving Tehran’s aspiration of becoming the dominant regional actor in the Middle East (Grego). Assistance from Russia is vital to Iran’s missile program. China also has shown interest in cooperating with Iran on civil space projects.

Grego writes that, given Iran’s security and domestic concerns, “good intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications would seem essential for its national security as well as for its economic and social development.” Goswami considers these capabilities to be particularly relevant to Iran’s involvement in Yemen, and its fight against extremist groups such as ISIL. Grego believes that Iran is interested in and capable of anti-satellite techniques such as jamming, dazzling, and cyber attacks that could help repel an adversary’s attacks or intrusive uses of intelligence gathering, but that more sophisticated weapons, such as direct-ascent weapons, are not in their foreseeable future. Hitchens views offensive capabilities in space as a priority for Tehran and, looking forward, identifies counter space capabilities as a long-term ambition.

Again, the contributors are not aware of any Iranian commercial space industry,18 and indicate that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard controls all of its space operations.

North Korea

North Korea’s space activities are motivated by the need to counter what its leaders perceive as the existential threat posed by the US and South Korea. Moreover, to date, North Korea has demonstrated little to no interest in science and technology that does not serve its defense objectives (Samson). Hitchens refers to North Korea as an aspiring actor in the space domain, and despite its lack of significant space capability, Pyongyang places tremendous value on the advancement of space operations. It is likely that North Korea will seek to develop space technologies and capabilities as far as necessary to support its growing nuclear arsenal and oppose regional adversaries.

Perhaps more than any other nation, North Korea’s economy is focused on its primary national security goal of regime survival, and its space program is not an exception to this. Contributors characterize North Korean space operations as either a means of perpetuating the regime or of countering US military superiority, or both. North Korea does not have a commercial space sector; any space operation declared as civil is simply a facade for a military program (Cheng).

Several contributors discuss military space programs that the Pyongyang regime is actively pursuing in addition to its focus on achieving platforms for nuclear ICBM capability. In particular, North Korea seeks counterintelligence technology capable of “jamming GPS signaling to defuse data on its internal developments as well as jam early missile warning signals” (Goswami). However, strategic capabilities such as communication, counter space technology, and other force enhancement pursuits in space are manifested only by a nascent and unsophisticated satellite program. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s missile program transcends all other activity in space. Samson notes that North Korea’s military space operations are tempered by Pyongyang’s awareness that the development of capabilities such as anti- satellite weapons or EMP bursts are probably unattainable and would lead to a regime ending response if they are ever developed.

Grego argues that North Korea “does not have a developed civil society that it must be accountable to at some level. North Korea’s battle is for survival. So, … all its space activities will be tailored very carefully to that aim.” Lele suggests that illegal trade in missile parts or satellite components is the only likely avenue for North Korea to engage in commercial space activity.

European Space Agency (ESA)

The European Space Agency (ESA) is an international space agency, not a state space actor, so it is unique in comparison to the other actors presented in this summary. However, like some of the other space actors presented, ESA appears to be increasingly thinking about dual-use aspects of space capabilities and activities (Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, Planet).

Hitchens and Lukaszczyk explain that ESA was initially established to focus purely on civilian and peaceful uses of space, not on military uses. However, Lukaszczyk notes that Europe’s current geopolitical climate is increasingly driving European interests toward a closer focus on security concerns. She suggests that this is starting to be reflected in ESA’s space interests and operations, particularly with respect to its increasing acceptance of the use of space for security activities, capabilities, and technologies. This is a recent development, according to Lukaszczyk, who notes that just 3-5 years ago there was a clear, distinct separation between civil space and military space in Europe.

ESA is the world’s only regional space agency and its members are, in many cases, involved in other space programs and agencies. Hitchens and Lukaszczyk detail three overlapping types of government space actors in Europe:

• The national space programs, space agencies, and space offices of individual European states.
• ESA, which is comprised of 22 European member states.
• The EU, itself, which has its own space policies, space programs, and space operations that cover its member states.

As Lukaszczyk explains, ESA and the EU are independent from one another and have different member states, different procurement processes, and different ways of spending money. She contends that the key difference between ESA and EU space initiatives is that ESA focuses on activities such as space exploration, research, and the technical aspects of space operations (i.e., similar to NASA in the US), whereas the EU is more policy-oriented and focuses on the strategic aspects of space operations (i.e., similar to the US State Department and Department of Defense). Moreover, the EU has supranational power that requires member states to abide by its directives, an authority ESA simply does not have.

While Lukaszczyk notes that there have been some instances of friction between ESA and the EU, particularly over issues relating to authority and jurisdiction, she suggests that a significant step toward improved coordination and cooperation was made with the development of the European Space Strategy in 2016, which she describes as a space strategy for Europe as a whole. Perhaps most critically, she asserts, the European Space Strategy was developed through a unified, collaborative effort that included all three of the overlapping types of government space actors and programs within the EU (member states, ESA, and the EU itself).

Historically there has been little cooperation or collaboration between civil and military space actors in Europe, and even the idea of dual-use was a sensitive topic of discussion, according to Lukaszczyk. She contends, however, that a perception of increasing regional security threats has opened the door to the idea of strengthening European defense capability by capitalizing on existing civil and commercial space capabilities and technologies for military purposes and dual-use applications.

This change seems to be consistent with wider European perspectives on the role of space. As Lele points out, NATO has historically viewed space as a force enabler and multiplier. He explains that the space domain has been of strategic importance to many EU states for decades, particularly as EU states have served with the US in recent military operations that depended heavily on satellites. Supporting Lele’s point, the experts highlight two particularly relevant European space initiatives, both of which ESA is now involved with: Galileo (the global navigation satellite system [GNSS] of the EU) and Copernicus (an Earth observation program). Lukaszczyk explains that both Galileo and Copernicus were initially established as purely civil and commercial space programs but the EU has adjusted each program’s mandate to incorporate military and security objectives and operations. Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force) highlight the strategic and operational value of Galileo to the EU as the provision of an independent GNSS capability that increases European control over access to its own communications. This reflects what Miller sees as the core reason why actors get involved in space in the first place: the fundamental need to see and communicate over the horizon, for the benefit of national security objectives, civilian objectives, and commercial objectives.

According to Lele, European commercial space activity more commonly occurs at the EU member state level, rather than at the ESA level. However, in general, Lukaszczyk suggests that Europeans tend not to trust the private sector as much as Americans do, despite recognizing the obvious achievements and successes of commercial space actors in the United States. Consequently, she explains, European government and military space actors are typically reluctant to turn over control of aspects of their programs to private sector actors. To illustrate this point, she points to a collaborative (ESA, EU, and EU member state) Europeans space communications initiative, Government Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM). As she explains, Europe has excellent telecom operators (e.g., SES, Eutelsat, etc.) that could, theoretically, meet the necessary security requirements and easily and effectively support GOVSATCOM. Instead, she contends, the EU is planning to build its own, entirely separate satellite constellation in support of GOVSATCOM because, in large part, it does not want to turn over any control to private hands—thus eliminating an opportunity for cooperation with commercial space actors. Ongoing ESA, EU, and EU member state efforts to attract commercial space startups into the European commercial space marketplace does suggest that this reluctance is receding, however Lukaszczyk characterizes the overall progress as quite slow.

Japan

While Japan is an older player in the space domain, it is also a space actor transitioning the way it conceives of its space interests and operations for both national security and defense purposes, as well as for commercial purposes (Dr. Brian Weeden, Secure World Foundation). Japan has historically viewed space as a non-military domain, according to Goswami. However, several of the experts19 assert that this appears to be changing as a result of mounting regional security challenges, particularly the growing threat of from North Korea.

Lele explains that Japan has both an established national space agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), which is the main force behind the country’s space program, as well as commercial space entities that have significant international footprints (e.g., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHI Corporation). Moreover, Hitchens believes that Japan’s efforts to review and revamp its national space policies, plus its continued commitment to encouraging and enticing commercial actors to get involved in the Japanese commercial space sector, have helped the country become a growing force in the space domain.

Japan also appears to be taking steps to expand its own footprint in the domain of military space. There appear to be two primary factors driving Japan’s expanding space interests and operations: security concerns and regional competition. Increasing regional security challenges have pushed Japan to take a more national security and defense focused approach to its space interests and operations (Goswami; Lele; B. Weeden). As Lele notes, Japan launched its first military communications satellite in 2017 and is planning to launch a military space force by 2019. These space operations will increase both Japan’s defense capacity (i.e., boosting the broadband capacity of Japanese Self-Defense Forces) and the security of essential capabilities (i.e., protecting Japanese satellites from dangerous debris orbiting the Earth) (Lele).

Lindsey indicates that nationalism and national pride are also a significant factor in how Asian countries, including Japan, approach space interests, ambitions, and operations. Japan and other Asian countries want to be seen as the “first Asian country to do X thing in space.” This idea of an “Asian Space Race,” (Lindsey) likely provides some additional context and insight into Japan’s space interests and operations. Illustrating this point, Goswami notes that JAXA is conducting futuristic space exploration research relating to asteroid exploration and the wireless transmission of electricity, which she suggests could eventually be used for the transmission of electricity from space solar satellites. These kinds of space operations, Goswami contends, could have a major impact on the future of space resource exploration. They would also certainly represent an interesting, noticeable achievement in the context of the “Asian Space Race.”

As discussed, the experts suggest Japan is transitioning how it approaches space operations, increasingly focusing on national security and defense-related interests and objectives. The experts highlight several key events and decisions that illustrate this evolution in Japanese thinking.

• The reinterpretation of “peaceful use of space” away from meaning “non-military” (B. Weeden).
• The amendment of its national space policy to permit Japanese military activities in space (B. Weeden).
• The decision to utilize satellites for military purposes, including reconnaissance and information gathering efforts pertaining to the seas (Goswami).
• The introduction of ballistic missile defense into its national space policy (Goswami).
• The release of its fourth Space Basic Plan in 2016, putting forward a national space policy as part of an overall national security strategy (Lele).

These actions, together, seem to illustrate an evolving Japanese mindset regarding space operations for military purposes; one that appears to be shifting more toward using space to protect and advance Japan’s national security interests in a time of escalating regional security challenges.

According to Goswami, Japan has shown a clear commitment to encouraging the involvement of commercial entities in the space domain. She supports this argument by pointing to business-friendly initiatives such as the sharing of state-funded research and development funds with private commercial space entities, and also the creation of national legislation to encourage commercial space activity and construct a more attractive marketplace. Building on Goswami’s analysis, Lele points to two particularly relevant legislative accomplishments from 2016: 1) the passing of law that makes it easier for private companies to invest in Japan’s commercial space sector and 2) the establishment of a space activity law that allows commercial companies to launch artificial satellites. Lele asserts that these actions have paved the way for several new, notable commercial entities to enter Japan’s commercial space sector (e.g., Interstellar Technologies, Astroscale, PD Aerospace, and Canon Electronics).

India

Although India does not have a comprehensive national space policy, the experts generally agree that it is working to expand its footprint in the space domain.20 This is evident through both concerted efforts to develop its commercial space sector and an increasing interest in and willingness to capitalize on space capabilities to support national security and defense-related interests.

The experts note that India has historically conceived of space operations primarily as a mechanism to support its civil and national development interests and capabilities, with the goal of developing space technologies for the purpose of societal benefit.21 However, they suggest that how India conceives of space operations appears to be shifting. In particular, Goswami and Samson point to an increasing Indian consideration of security and defense-related factors in relation to space domain interests and operations. As Lele explains, this shift in thinking seems logical given the unique assortment of security challenges India faces in today’s geopolitical environment (e.g., cross-border terrorism, large distances of maritime borders to monitor, and having two nuclear weapon state adversaries). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indian military appears to be increasingly recognizing that it is in its interest to utilize space for security purposes.

India’s approach to space operations is driven by both military and commercial interests. On the military side, Lele notes that India’s increasing interest in exploiting space capabilities for national security and defense has resulted in increased coordination between India’s national space agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), and components of the Indian military. Commercially, Lele and Samson explain that India has demonstrated clear and expanding interest in its commercial space sector and has started to take steps to grow and develop its commercial space environment. However, as is the case in most of the other states discussed in this summary, India’s commercial space sector is still largely dependent on state support.

As mentioned in the discussion of Japan, nationalism and national pride are also a significant factor in how Asian countries approach space interests, ambitions, and operations (Lindsey). As Lindsey explains, India and other Asian countries want to be seen as the “first Asian country to do X thing in space,” and this idea of an “Asian Space Race” likely provides some additional context and insight into India’s space interests and operations. Interestingly, despite the inherent level of competition that naturally emerges from this “Asian Space Race,” Goswami and Lele note that India has demonstrated a willingness to share space services with other regional space actors. For instance, India is offering its satellite services to its neighbors through the launch of the “South Asia Satellite” (Goswami), and has also developed its own regional navigation system (i.e., like that of GPS in the US), the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which it is likely interested in expanding into and/or sharing with surrounding countries (Lele).

Though India’s national space agency (ISRO) is mostly focused on space operations for civilian purposes, Lele and Goswami note that ISRO has been expanding its coordination with, and support to, the Indian military. As several of the experts highlight,23 expanded ISRO coordination with Indian military services has included activities like launching national security-dedicated satellites, using dual-use satellites for national defense activities, and providing augmented data on areas of concern (i.e., India’s disputed borders with China and in the Indian Ocean region), and is expected to expand into activities relating to counter space anti-satellite capabilities. Goswami also suggests that the establishment of an Indian military space agency may be forthcoming, as there have been discussions within India to establish an Aerospace Command separate from the Air Force.

While the experts generally agree that India has a growing commercial space sector, Lele stresses that commercial space operations in India are in their infancy and India’s commercial space actors largely depend on government assistance. There are several examples of startup commercial space actors that have been making investments in the Indian commercial space market, but, as Lele notes, at this point the country’s commercial space actors are mostly dependent on ISRO for jobs and/or funding and are generally expected to simply be service providers.

The expert contributors from ViaSat, Inc. suggest that there is significant interest from Indian commercial entities in developing a robust commercial space sector modeled on those achieving success in Western nations. It appears that both ISRO and the Indian government are taking steps in support of this. Goswami and Lele present three particularly relevant examples to illustrate this initiative:

• ISRO plans to engage the commercial space sector in launch activities by offering technology transfer agreements.
• The Indian government has shown a keen interest in developing ground infrastructure for prospective commercial space clients.
• The Indian government is working to establish national space legislation that will regulate private space actors in accordance with the international obligations laid out in the Outer Space Treaty.

However, despite these steps toward commercial sector development, several of the experts24 highlight concerns about government ownership of commercial space activity, and the true level of independence and openness in India’s commercial space sector. They note that India is not known to have a culture of openness and trust, and underscore concern that this may limit India’s ability to attract private, commercial sector innovation in space operations.25 Goswami and Lele point out that government ownership of India’s commercial space actors and activities likely means that if a crisis were to arise, the commercial actors would have just limited, if any, autonomous influence on security matters and decisions would be made by the government.

South Korea

South Korea’s regional security environment is challenging, particularly given the uncertainty and instability stemming from North Korea. It is not surprising, therefore, that South Korea increasingly conceives of, and approaches, space interests and operations with national security and defense-related objectives in mind (Lele).

South Korea’s approach to space operations appears to be driven largely by national security interests and elements of national pride. As mentioned in the discussions of Japan and India, nationalism and national pride are a significant factor in how Asian countries approach space interests, ambitions, and operations, and this is certainly true for South Korea (Lindsey). Moreover, in what seems to illustrate a fusion of national security and national pride factors, Lele points out that South Korea’s evolution toward a more heavily national security and defense-related approach to space has notably coincided with a growing aspiration for space-related cooperation with the United States, particularly cooperation concerning mutually beneficial security objectives. Expanding space domain cooperation with the US helps to increase South Korea’s operational capability and international standing.

To illustrate this increasing national security and defense-related focus of South Korean space interests and operations, Lele points to South Korea’s development and implementation of a new defense doctrine for outer space. Notably, this new outer space defense doctrine highlights a particular South Korean interest in incorporating advanced technologies with military relevance in space, an interest in which he indicates the burgeoning US-South Korea space partnership has also taken steps to advance. As he explains, space technologies form an important element of any missile defense system, something that will almost certainly remain a key focus for both the US and South Korea for the coming years given escalating tensions with North Korea.

Lele expects South Korea’s commercial space sector to progress significantly in the coming years. This expectation driven by:

• The country’s standing as a technologically advanced state, and the belief that South Korean commercial space operations will be well-positioned to capitalize on these technological capabilities.
• The increasing availability of financial resources as the number of venture capital firms involved in South Korea’s commercial space sector is rapidly growing and the overall investment in commercial space operations is expected to continue to increase.

However, while South Korea seems poised to further develop its commercial space sector, Lele believes that the regional security situation will likely dictate its future. Accordingly, Lele suggests that the nature of the threat from North Korea and the regional security environment overall may be what decides the future of South Korea’s commercial space operations, particularly in a time of crisis.

Israel

Israel is a sophisticated producer and user of space technologies and applications (Dr. Deganit Paikowsky, Tel Aviv University), with space interests and operations that appear to be largely driven by national security and defense-related interests and objectives. Given high levels of government control and ownership within Israel’s commercial space sector (Hitchens), Israeli commercial space interests and operations are certainly influenced by national security and defense-related interests and objectives.

Paikowsky suggests that the significance of space in Israel’s strategic concept shapes its perspective on space security today. Her characterization of Israel’s approach to space suggests a fundamental tension between pragmatic goals and broader ideals. Israel, she contends, views space as a global commons and aspires to contribute to a secure and sustainable space environment. Toward this end, Israel is interested in greater international collaboration and cooperation in the space domain with the goal of maintaining space as a peaceful environment for the benefit of all. However, Paikowsky notes that Israel also acknowledges and accepts the worldwide use of space as a mechanism for supporting terrestrial military activity, as well as for defense and deterrence efforts against harmful activities in space— particularly with respect to the protection of satellites and space systems in its own case.

Israel’s approach to space operations and services appears to be largely driven by national security interests. Paikowsky explains that as a small country, Israel is able to enhance its overall national power through space in ways that might otherwise not be possible. According to Paikowsky, Israel both enjoys and suffers from a growing reliance on space systems for its critical national infrastructure. For this reason, she explains, Israel has concerns about the growing global trend of space militarization because the resulting threats, if realized, could lead to Israel losing any relative advantages it might currently have in the space domain. Therefore, she maintains that Israel is interested in achieving a sustainable space environment, particularly one in which Israeli satellites are not endangered.

Longstanding regional security concerns and threats have driven Israel to commit significant effort and resources toward securing and assuring its overall national security. Israel’s narrow borders, Paikowsky contends, constitute a lack of strategic depth and pose an existential threat that necessitates a search for solutions to avoid strategic surprise and sudden attack. For these reasons, she explains, Israel’s security doctrine demands advanced intelligence capabilities for early warning. An orientation toward space assists Israel in coping with the challenges presented by this aforementioned lack of strategic depth, and Israel’s space program, therefore, is recognized as a critical component of its national security strategy, according to Paikowsky. More specifically, she asserts that Israel is particularly focused on space capabilities for identifying and addressing threats from an intelligence and operational point of view (i.e., early warning; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; deterrence; and self-reliance in advanced technologies). She contends that Israel views these types of interests and operations as force multipliers that boost national space capability and infrastructure in both the military and civilian realms, thus strengthening Israel’s overall national security and regional status.

Despite its space domain ambitions, Paikowsky notes that Israel’s space interests and operations are limited by resource constraints imposed by its relatively small size. She argues that this forces Israel to be more selective in its space operations, necessitating a concentration on those most critical to national objectives (e.g., developing, operating, and launching satellites into space), as well as several specifically targeted niche areas that present potentially high return on investment opportunities (e.g., Earth observation, low-Earth orbit launch capability, and communications). Another notable way in which Israel attempts to neutralize domestic resource constraints is by building partnerships with other space actors. Paikowsky notes that Israel does not build all of its systems entirely on its own (e.g., Israel does not have its own navigation system, weather system, or manned missions), but rather seeks to cooperate with international partners—particularly the United States—on mutually beneficial space- related projects. Therefore, it is important to recognize that while Israel’s size might present some limitations with respect to available resources, the strong US-Israel cooperative partnership does in part help to buffer Israel against domestic resource constraints. As Bahgat notes, the US provides a significant amount of political and economic assistance in support of Israeli space interests and operations.

Since the establishment of its commercial space sector, Paikowsky contends that Israel has developed a robust commercial space industry and a strong scientific sector. Hitchens, however, notes that while Israel does technically have a commercial space sector and commercial space actors, there is a high level of government control and ownership involved. Therefore, these Israeli “commercial operations” might not be as truly independently “commercial” as one might imagine (Hitchens).

Canada

Canada has had a few decades of experience with both military and commercial space (B. Weeden). It is among the group of space-faring nations that utilizes space and have both a strong space policy and a government space agency (Samson). Canada, like most countries discussed by the contributors, implements a different model for commercial space operations than does the US (Hitchens). Canada’s space sector lacks a clear distinction between civil, military, and commercial operations. There is also significant government investment in the commercial sector, which reflects the government’s commitment to building up the nation’s commercial space sector.

Many of Canada’s commercial satellite companies still have broad government investment and therefore cannot be deemed as entirely independent entities, unlike the United States’ commercial satellite companies (Hitchens). For instance, Canada makes frequent use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)28 satellites for both military and commercial use, and is even ahead of the US in its widespread use of such satellites (Hitchens). This is one of Canada’s key areas of investment, and the dual-use (commercial and military) nature of these capabilities is indicative of the lack of segmentation within the Canadian space sector (civil, military, and commercial) as a whole.

Charity Weeden of the Satellite Industry Association states that Canada’s recent defense policy documents indicate a determination to incorporate space capabilities into critical national security infrastructure. This emphasizes Canada’s recognition of the importance of space for national security and defense. In particular, space is vital to the scope of Canada’s Arctic operations and NORAD missions since it requires Automatic Identification System (AIS) and radar satellites to protect its coastlines (C. Weeden).

Canada has its own military space assets, including satellites intended for military use. However, Hitchens emphasizes that many of these assets are connected to US operations, and Canada often requires the United States’ support for its military space ventures. Thus, while Canada appears to have an interest in utilizing space capabilities for military operations, it currently requires outside assistance to achieve its goals.

Canada also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US), whose member nations are currently working to build space relationships with each other (B. Weeden). B. Weeden notes that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC) to organize Five Eyes nations’ operations within a national space integration cell. The CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden).

Canada’s commercial space operations and services are tightly linked with its national security and defense efforts (C. Weeden). Furthermore, based on Canada’s extensive experience with and ownership of satellites, the experts suggest that the nation’s commercial sector is focused on building up this facet of its space industry.

Brazil

Juan Hurtado of United States Southern Command stresses that Brazil has more space capabilities than many other countries in the region. However, it is still not on par with many other more advanced space-faring nations due to its dependence on international support for launches, satellite manufacturing, and orbital mechanics. Despite Brazil’s classification as an emerging space power, Hitchens stresses that the US should keep an eye on Brazil because it may become a larger player in the space domain in the future.

Brazil has its own government Space Agency, the Agencia Espacial Brasileira (AEB), which facilitates the nation’s civilian and commercial space operations. In addition, there are various government organizations that assist with space operations. The Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), which sits under the Brazilian government’s Ministry of Science and Technology, oversees most governmental space research and development efforts (Hurtado). The Center for Space Operations, under the oversight of the Fuerza Aerea Brasileira (FAB), conducts most of Brazil’s space operations (Hurtado). Combined, these government organizations are responsible for administering the nation’s space program, research, education, and operations (Hurtado). While the INPE in particular works closely with Brazil’s military, military benefits are secondary to civilian interests and applications (Hurtado).

As stated above, INPE works closely with Brazil’s military; however, its primary focus is on civilian space operations (Hurtado). This, combined with the placement of Brazil’s government space programs within the civilian sector, suggests that Brazil is primarily focused on commercial and civil space ventures.

Brazil is specifically interested in making advancements in the field of small satellites, with a secondary focus on the development of launch facilities and launch vehicles (Hurtado). In terms of research, the nation’s primary focus is on space physics and heliophysics30 rather than any planetary research (Brent Sherwood, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory). Both Brazil’s commercial sector and its universities augment the activities of its government programs and operations (Hurtado). Brazil’s commercial ventures are not overly active in the security and stability domains (Hurtado), and thus do not view security differently during times of peace, crisis, and conflict.

Australia

Since the 1940s, space has influenced Australia’s national strategy (Brett Biddington, Biddington Research Pty Ltd), and the country recognizes the importance of developing space capabilities. Samson states that Australia “use[s] space, recognize[s] space as being important, and [has its] own space interests and capabilities;” however, the country still lacks some of the capabilities that more advanced space powers possess.

Despite Australia’s long history of involvement in space, several of the experts31 note that it still lacks a national space agency and a central coordination office. However, the government is developing a new space policy (B. Weeden) and has recently announced intentions to establish a central space agency. Although small in terms of population and GDP, Australia is responsible for approximately 15% of the Earth’s surface (Biddington). Earth observation satellites and communication satellites therefore have the potential to significantly enhance efforts to regulate, govern, and monitor Australian territories, and they are a major component of Australia’s space investments (Biddington).

Despite its desire to have a successful space program, the nation’s limited monetary resources restrict its ability to spend on space ventures.32 Nevertheless, Australia has allocated funds to revitalize its space industry (B. Weeden), further highlighting the nation’s interest in investing in satellite launch capabilities. Australia presently has the capability to purchase foreign satellites and operate launches in other nations (Gilmour Space Technologies) but lacks the capability to launch on its own soil. A $3-4 billion project for space-based remote sensing was outlined in a recent Australian defense white paper and investment plan and, according to Biddington, the development of Australia’s own government- owned Earth observation satellites is on the horizon as well.

Australia recognizes and values the benefits that space services from other countries provide Australian military forces and is determined to preserve those benefits (Duncan Blake, International Aerospace Law and Policy Group). Australia has long been a popular location for the US, ESA, and other space-faring nations to place ground stations, and it is starting to build some of its own ground-based space surveillance capabilities (Biddington). The Gilmour Space Technology team contends that they could also see the Australian government looking to domestic commercial space industries to launch military satellites within the next 5-10 years.

The US has helped advance Australian space operations significantly (Dr. Jason Held, Saber Astronautics), and the two countries have worked together quite closely on space ventures for decades (Biddington). The US possesses the money and resources that Australia lacks to conduct these military operations (Biddington), and Australia has the geographic position that provides the US with extended satellite coverage. Much of Australia’s military assets are linked to United States operations, and Australia does not conduct many military activities in space on its own (Hitchens).

Australia also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US) on space technology development and national security-related space matters (Lindsey). B. Weeden explains that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC) in an effort to have all of the Five Eyes nations to operate a national space integration cell. This CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden).

In terms of commercial space, Held suggests that Australian commercial activities drive the nation’s space industry. The nation has a variety of private companies that use space, and these companies have differing relations with government, both in terms of control and funding (Hitchens). The diminishing price of satellites is encouraging small, startup companies in Australia, as elsewhere, to start buying and launching satellites without any government funding or assistance (Biddington; Held; Lindsey). This lowers the barriers for entry for less-experienced companies (Biddington; Lindsey) and removes the need to rely on large-scale government investments.

Despite these developments, Australia’s commercial space sector currently lacks a cohesive identity (Biddington). As Biddington explains, some Australian companies utilize satellites as part of their telecommunications business, but they view themselves as telecommunication suppliers who happen to use satellites to conduct their business rather than as commercial space companies. He also stresses the need for these companies to recognize their role as commercial space companies as well as the extent of their dependence on space.

Singapore

Singapore’s involvement in the space domain is relatively recent (Jonathan Hung, Singapore Space and Technology Association). In fact, Singapore’s commercial space activities began about 5 years ago, and the nation still lacks both a government space agency and a national space policy (Hung). Despite the absence of these institutions, Singapore has identified space as an area of interest for economic development (Samson). The nation recognizes the importance of space, invests capital and resources into space, and has its own space interests and capabilities; however, these capabilities still remain limited (Samson).

The key ambitions and interests of Singapore’s commercial space entities are improving and developing satellite communication, strengthening its telecommunication and imaging services, improving Earth observation on the ground, and providing accurate data (Hung). Singapore also aspires to develop its space capabilities so that it can further extend its commercial services to the rest of the world (Hung). Overall, Singapore’s main area of interest is small satellites, and the nation has chosen to focus on providing commercial space services via small satellites rather than investing in large telecommunication satellites (Hung).

According to Hung, Singapore does not conduct space operations for military purposes, nor is it looking to do so.

Singapore views space as a commercial business opportunity as well as an opportunity to create jobs and conduct groundbreaking research (Hung). Consequently, the nation’s interest in space is driven by its commercial and economic interests, and it is predominantly focused on how it can improve and advance in the realm of commercial space (Hung). Most of the commercial space research being conducted in Singapore focuses on satellite imaging and observation activities and, as the price of small satellites continues to decline, Singapore is investing more in research and development of such capabilities (Hung).

Ukraine

p>According to Samson, in a ranking of national space capabilities, Ukraine belongs in the lower tier of space-faring nations. Ukraine falls into this category it is interested in making advancements in space, recognizes the importance of space, and has its own space interests and capabilities, but does not have the advanced space capabilities and resources that other higher-tiered nations possess (Samson). Nevertheless, due its clear interest in space, further investment in Ukraine’s space operations is anticipated.

Luxembourg

Goswami predicts that along with the United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg will “emerge as a major space player in the future of setting space norms and utilizing insights drawn from space-based information services.” She supports this argument by pointing out that Luxembourg has invested extensively in asteroid mining and has established legislation that allows private companies to settle in Luxembourg by promising ownership of outer space resources. Thus, Luxembourg is primarily focused on its commercial space ventures, recognizes the economic opportunities available in space, and supports ownership of outer space resources.

The Middle East

For most Middle Eastern countries, there are two major barriers to becoming a space-faring nation: money and scientific infrastructure (Bahgat). The Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Kuwait, have the economic resources to conduct space activities, but lack the necessary technical infrastructure and scientific expertise (Bahgat). Despite these shortcomings, Goswami predicts that the UAE will “emerge as a major space player in the future of setting space norms and utilizing insights drawn from space-based information services.” This prediction stems from the UAE’s efforts to partner with more advanced space-faring nations to build expertise, stimulate the process of obtaining space-based capabilities, and gain access to the wealth of space knowledge that these nations possess (Goswami). Other Middle Eastern nations, including Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, do not have the required financial resources to build a space program (Bahgat). According to Bahgat, this helps explain why the only Middle Eastern countries with space programs are Israel and Iran, both of which have resources and infrastructure.

New Zealand

New Zealand does not have a national space agency (Biddington) and, according to B. Weeden, it is not engaging in many space activities at the moment.34 However, it is a member of the Five Eyes, whose member nations are currently working to build space relationships with each other (B. Weeden). B. Weeden elaborates that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined Space Operation Center (CSPOC), and the goal of these efforts would be for all of the Five Eyes nations to operate a national space integration cell. The CSPOC would then act as a set of concepts of operations (CONOPS) for how these national space integration cells would interact with each other (B. Weeden). Therefore, we can anticipate an increase in New Zealand’s interest in space in the near future.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (
Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab); Dr. Laura Grego (Union of Concerned Scientists); Harris Corporation, LLC.; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Juan Hurtado (United States Southern Command); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele3 (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force); Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings (Royal United Services Institute, UK); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Kevin Pollpeter (CNA); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q14] How should space feature in US deterrence strategy? How do space operations, policies, and investments impact multi-domain deterrence? What changes to US deterrence thinking are required to incorporate the space domain? To what extent should space adopt deterrence strategies from other domains? Which is the most critical US national security objective: deterring aggression from space, through space, or in space? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.

How Space Features in US Deterrence Strategy (It Is Integral, but…)

Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and the team from ViaSat, Inc. articulate an underlying presumption that appears in most of the expert contributions to this report. Namely, that strikes against space and cyber assets (whether on orbit or on the ground) will almost certainly feature in the earliest stages of future conflicts. Consequently, there is broad consensus among contributors that space systems should be a “prominent feature” of US deterrence thinking and policy; that they are now integral to the strength of the economy, to US and allied defense in all conflict domains, and are essential facilitators of cross-domain operations. Differences of opinion emerge, however, over what that critical importance implies for US defense postures and policy involving space. Here, two schools of thought emerge regarding whether the exceptionality of the space domain requires a deterrence strategy specifically for space (what we will call ‘space deterrence’) or whether talking about deterrence of space assets independent of deterrence in all other domains is meaningless (i.e., ‘deterrence involving space’).

Space Is Unique

The arguments of contributors5 favoring a space deterrence policy tend to rest on the contention that space is so integral to US national security that it demands a distinct space deterrence policy, albeit one that is ultimately integrated with other defense doctrine and policy. The focus for this group is deterring aggression against specific military space capabilities.

Space Is Just Another Domain

However, for the majority of contributors—proponents of the ‘deterrence involving space’ school of thought— the appropriate question is how to deter aggression in any domain and using any source of national power. This line of reasoning holds that space is so indelibly intertwined in all national security activities that the idea of a separate “space deterrence” is nonsensical. Rather, these contributors— including scholar, government, and commercial views—echo the sentiment of Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK that space is “just another medium of national power” and agree with General Hyten’s belief that “there’s no such thing as war in space; there’s just war.”

How Is This Accomplished? (Hegemony Versus Collective Management)

There were also two schools of thought on what contributors considered reasonable and achievable goals regarding defense of space assets. The first group believes that space superiortity or dominance in space is critical to US and ally defense and thus demands a space policy and posture directed toward retaining US military hegemony there. Jonathan Fox of DTRA points out that potential US adversaries are already working to exploit US dependence on space and calls for a space policy based on “anticipatory self-defense,” while Sergeant First Class Jerritt Lynn of United States Army Civil Affairs argues that US interests are best served by retaining “hegemonic dominance” in space. Lynn caveats his support for a policy of maintaining US space superiority by reminding the reader that “the image of the US amongst the international community affects US power and legitimacy” and asserts that “the United States must use international space relations to create a narrative that showcases how the US is a steward of an open, secure, and reasonably regulated domain.” Lastly, Jack M. Beard from the University of Nebraska College of Law states his argument in terms of the current reality: “The US Air Force has a mission to defend our assets in space and to disable or restrict the other country from operating in space if such actions become necessary in an armed conflict. So, the US Air Force has to have the ability to establish supremacy when it needs to, and it has to be able to control space if that is what is required in order to achieve its mission in an armed conflict.”

The alternative view is that achieving space hegemony, dominance, or superiority is not only infeasible, but the act of pursuing such a goal itself is likely to reduce rather than enhance US security. Many of the experts that take this position mirror the argument of French researcher Dr. Xavier Pasco of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique that also represents current reality: “Space remains an environment that cannot be fully controlled.” As a result, many of the experts suggest that the US must move toward collective international management, in large part by taking the lead in establishing international security norms for space.7 Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen of Air University offers an economic argument regarding the importance of approaching space as a global commons and establishing international norms to manage conflict when it arises. He notes that to date commercial and other activities in space “are financially viable because there remains little need for expensive security measures. It is in US interests for conditions to remain that way.”

The Issue of Credibility

Space effects and services go directly to US capabilities to attribute attack and retaliate, and thus to the credibility of deterrent threats. For example, capabilities like space situational awareness support the credibility of threatened retaliatory strikes on Earth. Berkowitz reminds us that “space systems have been integral to nuclear deterrence for years” and more recently are critical components of conventional deterrence as well. Many of the experts argue that space capabilities significantly enhance the credibility of US deterrence in all domains.8 Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) point out that given the possibility of causing military and potentially economic devestation without necessarily causing loss of life, the response principles and means of escalation control have not yet been well-understood or articulated. As a result, what is required for the credibility of deterrent threats may be different in space than in other domains. Similarly, Fox recommends that the credibility of US deterrence strategy must be shored up with well- articulated response options to a clearly defined series of threats, for example to “national and allied space-based systems, personnel, property, and interests critical to the functioning of core military or civilian societal functions.”

However, the expense of space assets and the US dependence on them may suggest that the credibility of a US threat to take kinetic action in space is difficult to maintain. Cullen argues that “US postures to deter aggression in space with force will be counter-productive and hardly credible … kinetic operations in space risk environmental catastrophe.” Other experts argue that deterrent credibility comes from the ability to threaten retaliation in other terrestrial domains. This, in fact, is the US advantage when it comes to deterrence involving space.

How Do Space Operations, Policies, and Investments Impact Multi-Domain Deterrence?

The majority of the experts appear to reject the basic premise of this question. To make this case, a number of experts highlight the historic interdependence between space assets and capabilities to produce military effects in other conflict domains. With respect to multi-domain deterrence, the contributors see space not only as a critical enabler but in many cases, the critical enabler. While most emphasize additional positives that space capabilities provide to decision makers, like more expansive warning and a wider range of deterrence options, others highlight the added vulnerabilities that relying on space presents (e.g., an additional domain to manage/defend or the greater cost to the US than adversaries of conflict in space).

What Changes to US Deterrence Thinking Are Required?

Although they clearly have different views on other issues, the SME contributors universally point to the prominent place of space within US deterrence and strategic options. Rather than changing how we think about deterrence, Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation begins by reminding us that simply changing the way we think will not be enough to forge an effective deterrent including space. Rather, key conditions must change—namely the obvious dependence of the US security establishment on space assets. In this context, there are a number of suggested changes to thinking as well. Berkowitz, Coletta, and Jackson assert that the first hurdle is for the national security space community to move beyond the post-Cold War notion that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would ameliorate the space threat. Experts also remark on the urgent need for policy makers to shore up deterrence effectiveness by clarifying for ourselves, our allies, and potential adversaries what the US considers a provocation with regard to space systems. These new bounds of behavior should be followed quickly with demonstrations of US resolve to respond.

Primarily experts classified as academics and policy researchers admonished the defense establishment to rethink what they consider to be the critical components of deterrence as it relates to space or otherwise. Namely, these contributors advise that policy makers pay serious attention to the role and formation of international norms as critical features of US deterrence.10 Similarly, quite a few experts question the applicability to the space domain of notions of deterrence as punishment, especially where kinetic actions are involved. Rather, as Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland argues, when thinking about deterrence involving space, one should consider the “cooperative dimension” of deterrence, not just deterrence as punishment. Finally, the contributing experts from ViaSat, Inc. make the point that the national security establishment in the US might take a page from the commercial and private sector playbooks with regard to updating thinking about space- related deterrence or strategic thinking. They point out that these space communities should not think of space systems such as space situational awareness (SSA); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); or communications assets as existing “exclusively in space or the space domain,” but consider them to be “complex ecosystems that exist in multiple domains.” The ViaSat, Inc. experts add that the least attributable, lowest cost, and most effective attack to a space ecosystem could likely not occur in space, and this needs to be considered in regard to the defense of space ecosystems and their space based assets.

Borrowing From Other Domains

There is no single conflict domain that shares the characteristics of space completely. While a number of the experts reference deterrence concepts from other domains that might be used to inform deterrence strategies involving space, most also echo Fox’s caution to avoid “unerring straight-line extrapolation” from other domains to space. Still, as shown in the table below, insight may be gleaned from experience and thinking in different domains for specific conditions. For example, deterrence questions about the impact of difficult attribution on the credibility of deterrent threats might be illuminated by submarine or cyber deterrence operations. Space deterrence problems that involve single or limited attacks that can cause large numbers of fatalities may find applicable instruction in nuclear deterrence thinking, while circumstances in which mass effects can be produced without direct loss of life might be informed by literature on cyber deterrence.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen3 (School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

[Q7] Are other nations outside the West poised to tap into their own commercial space industry for military purposes in the next 5-10 years?. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Background

All the experts who contributed to this question noted that it begins from the incorrect assumption that space industries in other countries are organized in a similar manner to the US—with clear delineations among civil, military, and commercial space industries. Furthermore, most indicate that, taking advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology, many states both non-Western and Western, are already tapping commercial and civil space capabilities for military use. Their responses suggest that a better way to frame this question might be: “Which nations outside the West are tapping into their civil (commercial and/or government run) space industry for military purposes?”

Lack of separation between public and private space sectors

Several contributors comment specifically on the organization of space sectors in countries outside the West. Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin notes that while both our European and Asian allies have separate public and private space sectors, “there is a very permeable membrane between their governments and commercial industry” (see also ViaSat, Inc. and Roberto Aceti of OHB Italia SpA). Faulconer Consulting Group suggests there is no separation at all in China. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation similarly observes that, although the Indian space agency ISRO has a commercial wing (Antrix) that develops a lot of their commercial capabilities, it is funded by the Indian government and not, she argues, truly commercial. Berkowitz mentions that Russia, Iran, and North Korea are comparably organized, with “commercial” space enterprises wholly owned by the government.

In effect, there are fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities and, in many non-Western states Aceti contends, there are in fact institutional incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. Additionally, the “[c]utting edge of technology and performance is being defined by truly private sector capital investments” (ViaSat, Inc.), incentivizing militaries to tap commercial capabilities. Such arrangements also benefit commercial entities, as joint ventures provide protection by national governments (Caelus Partners, LLC). Major General (USAF ret.) Armor4 regards this as part of the development of the industry: “It’s blending in all directions, not unlike the IT industry.”

Military utilization of civil capabilities

An anonymous commercial executive contributor stated that it is a “safe assumption that other countries see the benefits of space from a military perspective and have the vision to know it will only grow in the coming decade.” This view is reflective of almost all of the other experts’ responses, although Matthew Chwastek of Orbital Insight, focusing on capability rather than intent, does offer a qualification to this. He notes that none of these states currently has the “depth of capital formation, governance, and regulatory flexibility” needed to develop civilian (government or commercial) space capabilities that could benefit the military, although this situation could change in the next decade.

How is this being done? Dual use

As Table 1 shows, there was considerable agreement amongst the experts that the crossover from civil (government and/or commercial) to military use most commonly takes advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology. As Brigadier General (USAF ret.) Thomas Gould of the Harris Corporation points out, “the same rocket engines used to boost satellites into orbit can deliver conventional or nuclear warheads” (see also: Adranos, Cheng, and Samson). Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) contends that, with the possible exception of Russia, most space activities outside the US are concentrated on dual use technologies and applications.5 Dr. Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin agrees with her assessment, and adds that the US has been behind in this regard, something he sees as a detriment to the US.

Conclusion

The contributors’ responses to this question all either directly or indirectly challenge the assumption made in the question that other states organize and conceive of their space industry in the same three- part structure—civil, military, and commercial—that we have in the US. In some cases (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India), this is a reflection of the separation, or lack of separation, between public and private sectors in general. In other cases, it reflects the fledgling nature of many state’s space industry, where government funding and private research and investment have been combined for greater efficiency. Furthermore, this type of collaboration is already underway. While, as the summary table shows, there is some difference of opinion among experts regarding which commercial capabilities are currently being tapped by specific countries, their responses collectively reflect Dr. Jason Held’s (SaberAstronautics) comment: “Bottom line answer is: absolutely. Defining the nature and scope of that commercial industry is the big question.”

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia SpA, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Faulconer Consulting Group; Adam and James Gilmour (Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia); Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics Inc.); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global Inc.; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association); John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.