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[Q1] Are there any contentious space terms or definitions, or are there any noticeable disagreements amongst space communities about appropriate terminologies and/or appropriate definitions for terms? What are the common understandings and uses of space-related terms, definitions, classes and typologies of infrastructure and access? For example, how do we define different classes of space users (e.g., true space-faring states, users of space technology)? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Operationalizing or defining terms is an important first step to understanding concepts, including their boundaries and how they are distinguished from other, potentially related ideas. Similarly, clarity in communication is an essential condition for ensuring that the message or information that is transmitted is as close as possible to what is received. Within the DOW, definitions matter because they are a necessary component for the establishment and application of doctrine. Given the breadth of the space field as a whole, establishing precise definitions may become an even more pressing task, as coordination is sought over a broad base of space sub-communities (e.g., national security space, civil space, and commercial). Each field as a whole and each sub-domain within it naturally has its own terminology, which tends to evolve over time. To best advance coordination within and across the various US and allied space communities, we must be capable of fruitfully combining the work that is being done in various commands, DOW offices, and other agencies and organizations. This can be best achieved when we identify those terms for which precise definitions are required in order to move forward. Doing so also enables the US to avoid any unintended responses from our adversaries. This coordination begins by getting a broad view of the terminological landscape and any terms for which there is current contention.

Drawing on a wide variety of space expert opinions, we identified three different ways in which terms could be contentious. These include: 1) explicitly acknowledged contention, disagreement, or variation in terminology (inherent contention), 2) contention that was not explicitly acknowledged by respondents but discovered through comparison across contributors’ definitions and commentary (emergent contention), and 3) ambiguous terms, which make contention more likely (potential contention). We refer to these different forms of contention collectively as “contentious space terminology.” This assessment is accompanied by an examination of how membership in a given community of space professionals— government, commercial, and analysts4—relates to the kinds of space terms thought to be in contention.

These terminological issues are not necessarily only epistemological in nature, but instead can have important implications for the space field. While not every term in contention will have an obvious or detrimental effect on the ability of the US to operate in or maintain security in space, other terms in contention—such as “space weapons”—may prove problematic for long-term US security interests. As Michael Sherry of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center notes, “Due to the confusion in terminology and misalignment with DOW regular terminology, we have found it difficult in the space community to build systems clearly aligned to a mission.” As such, this report provides a deeper exploration of a set of space terms whose contention may present major security concerns for the US.

Do experts perceive that there is contention in space terminology?

The original question posed began with the assumption that there are common space terms used by different communities of space professionals. To address this, we began by first examining whether there is commonality or variation overall in the terminology that is used, and whether variation occurs as a function of our experts’ professional affiliations.

The majority of subject matter experts (67% overall) indicated directly or indirectly that there is space terminology that is either inherently or potentially contentious. Those working in an analytic capacity (69%)6 or in the commercial domain (69%) more frequently indicated that there is contentious terminology than did subject matter experts working in government. As Colonel David Miller of the US Air Force indicated, “We have tried to come around to using DOW Joint Doctrine as the basis for our terminology, and I think within the Defense Department, we’re pretty good there.” Despite this organizing doctrine, 56% of government respondents (who tended to focus on security) nonetheless indicated that there is contentious space terminology.

Among the current contributors, the most frequent issue contributing to terminology being contentious is its inconsistent use—both across the national security and commercial sectors and within each of these sectors. The variation in use of space terms within the USG is not really surprising given that, as Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor7 of Orbital ATK indicates, the US emphasizes the separation of space into civil (e.g., NASA, NOAA, and USGS) and national security space (e.g., NRO, DARPA, Services) sectors—sub- communities that we might expect would utilize terminology in different ways. On the other hand, Dr. John Karpiscak III of the Army Geospatial Center suggests that differences in the application of a given term could be due to the differences between military branches that primarily ‘own’ versus those who most actively use assets in space (such as the Air Force and the Army). Those working outside of government also observed some variation in the use of terms within the DOW. Referencing Joint Publications and the US Space Policy, Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin noted that,

• the most authoritative DOW documents defining the US national security space lexicon (DOWD 3100.10, Space Policy, JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and JP 3-14, Space Operations) frequently have been inconsistent over the past few decades. Even the definitions of the basic defense space missions have changed frequently.

Ultimately, we cannot assume that everyone—even within a given sub-community working on space—is using the same set of definitions or has the same perspective on space issues given the segmentation inherent to the organization of the US space enterprise, as well as the variation in expertise, topical focus, and concerns of the diverse US space communities.8 This is problematic because it can impede the application of military doctrine, as implied by Sherry’s comments. Moreover, it can potentially hinder collaboration between the US and its prospective allied or commercial partners, leading to inefficiencies.

Contributors in fact offered several specific examples of terms that are contentious. These inputs address both inherent and potential forms of definitional contention, as described above. Additionally, several terms demonstrated emergent contention when variation was observed across the breadth of space expert contributors. To provide an overview of findings, all contentious terms are captured in the table at the end of this summary response. As can be seen from the table, contentious space terms related to security are most numerous, though contention also arises in other instances, such as legal/regulatory. Not all of these terms are necessarily problematic, however. This report thus will focus on examining two terms whose contention has particularly significant implications for national security.

When do contentious terms become problematic?

In many cases, contentious terminology may not matter—or ambiguity may even be desirable

A small minority of experts indicated that variations in terminology simply may not matter. In general, these contributors argued that any discrepancies that might occur could be easily overcome with communication. In addition, some operations may not require precise definitions of terms and/or individuals can resolve or work around them if necessary. Terminological ambiguity might even be desirable as it preserves options, and has, as several current contributors note, been useful to the US in the past when it comes to space issues. Moreover, David Koplow of Georgetown University suggests that attempting to achieve terminological consistency across national lines, public and private lines, and among different space sectors may be misguided; instead, he argues, the focus should be on clearly indicating how terms are being used when they come up, with the understanding that others may use or interpret these terms differently. Though this is likely to be true in many cases—and in particular when working within the US space community or operating alongside allies with whom we would expect this type of coordination—in other cases, it may not be sufficient to wait until an event (e.g., an ASAT test) invokes a potentially related concept (e.g., space weapons) over which different parties may have varying viewpoints.

In other cases, the stakes are high: space weapons and armed attacks

Broadly speaking, contentious terms become problematic when they have the potential to negatively affect the US and its security and other interests. At the more benign end of this spectrum, contentious terminology can lead to inefficiencies and impede collaboration, as noted above. However, at the other end of the spectrum, the stakes are higher, as contentious terminology can lead to misperception of US capabilities or actions among our adversaries, with unintended downstream consequences including escalation and retaliation. There is also the possibility that the US itself will miss or misinterpret its adversaries’ intentions.

To illustrate how this might be so, this report focuses on two examples9 of terminology identified as being contentious—one of which can be broadly categorized as a capability or object (space weapons) and the other which can be categorized as an action (armed attack).

In her discussion of space weapons, Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation provides an example of when definitional contention can become important: “…when you talk about security issues, of course the concept of what is a space weapon comes up all the time. The way it could be defined, it could be defined so generally that everything is a space weapon or so strictly that nothing is a space weapon.” This matters because, in the absence of a clearly specified and commonly agreed upon definition, different states may perceive the same capability or object in very different ways based on the way that they are defining a space weapon.

This subjective interpretation contributes to a cognitive bias known as naïve realism—the belief that our perception of the world is the true or correct perception of the world,11 and that others must necessarily see things in the same way (Jones & Nisbett, 1987; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996).12 Where one state sees a benign use of a capability, another can see a looming threat—and infer that the other side must therefore intend that threat. The wide application of dual-use space technology13 makes inferring intent from capabilities alone particularly difficult. Unlike the US space sector, in most other states, the private and public space sectors have more permeable—or no—boundaries at all, and neither are there separate civil and military government space sectors.14 Both the organization of space operations and the nature of the technology itself thus increase the possibility that a given state’s intentions can easily be misconstrued. This in turn increases the potential for escalatory or retaliatory behavior when no threat was intended.

This potential for unintended escalation may not yet be fully anticipated in the case of space weapons or weaponization of space, as most experts did not recognize that space weapon (or relatedly, weaponization) was a contentious term. Rather, it was identified as contentious primarily due to the variation in definitions offered by the subject matter experts. Jonty Kasku-Jackson of the National Security Space Institute draws on work by Vasani (2017), noting that the weaponization of space “includes placing weapons in outer space or on heavenly bodies as well as creating weapons that travel from Earth to attack targets in space… [in other words], outer space itself emerges as the battleground.” Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation emphasizes the key aspect of space weapons as being intentionally designed to damage, degrade, or destroy another object in space or something on the ground. The type of variation that can be observed here was also indicated directly or indirectly by several contributors (Pollpeter, Samson, Spies, B. Weeden). For example, Michael Spies of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs indicates that the term space weapon is contested internationally. He discusses the definition of space weapon offered in Article 1 (b) of the draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space,15 noting that the definition does not address terrestrially-based anti-satellite systems (which would, incidentally, be covered under the prior two definitions above). Though there is some cross-over in the definitions offered by the respondents, there is also enough variation among these definitions to suggest that there is not overall coordination among the US space community on this important topic. This is not to say that any one definition is right or wrong—simply that the definitions vary and that this variation has implications. For example, an overall lack of coordination within the US space community on what constitutes a space weapon decreases both the likelihood of coordination with allies and of averting unintended consequences with adversaries.

Similarly, the definition of a space weapon is also likely yoked to the definition of what constitutes an “armed attack,” or relatedly, “[harmful] interference” or the “use of force” in space. As Jack Beard of the University of Nebraska College of Law queries, “Is making a satellite wobble out of its projected orbit an illegal ‘use of force?’ Is it ‘interference’?”16 Having different concepts of where the boundaries of each of these terms lies once again opens up the potential for conflict, and as Beard notes, “what constitutes an armed attack justifying an armed response is a really controversial topic.” At the same time, as Moriba Jah of the University of Texas at Austin indicates, actors such as Russia are strongly in favor of defining terms such as harmful interference, given its interest in invoking “self-defense” in space. As such, the US must balance the need for precision in terminology with the previously indicated utility of ambiguity in serving US interests.

How space weapons and armed attacks are defined also dovetails with another contentious term—outer space. Maintaining ambiguity in the definition and delimination of outer space has generally been strategically useful to the US (B. Weeden). However, defining outer space may matter for security in terms of designating lines of authority, planning, and response. As Patrick Stadter of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory notes,

• if you start to have adversary deploying access that transcend different domains, is it a missile? Does it go into space? At that point, those things become very very important relative to integrated strategic plans and OPLANs and command authority and how that’s reflected in policy. That will matter. It already matters a lot, and it’s a challenge.

Variations in the use of terminology and potential misperception are likely to increase with the widening gap in assumptions, norms, or ideologies that might be observed when different countries come to the table. For example, Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation and Asian Studies Center at the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, provides some initial insight into how other states may view the issue of space weapons, indicating that the Chinese ultimately think about space and military impact on

space as anything that affects the entire holistic space structure.17 The breadth of this classification of course leaves the door wide open for the perception that the use of a given capability may constitute use of a space weapon, and thus require a response. Thus could begin an escalatory cycle that could be avoided if a common agreement instead is reached regarding what does and does not constitute use of a space weapon or weaponization of space. As it is, Kasku-Jackson notes, there are already some concerns that the US will fold under its definition of “peaceful purposes” (National Space Policy, 2010) both the militarization and the weaponization of space for national and homeland security activities. This fear may make others more likely still to misperceive the use of certain kinds of US capabilities in space as being intended as a space weapon—and thus execute their perceived proportional response.

Conclusion

The true power of definitions lies in their ability to facilitate communication within and across groups and states operating in space and, ultimately, in their ability to facilitate the achievement of US goals, including the maintenace of stability in space. As Brigadier General Thomas Gould (USAF ret.) of the Harris Corporation indicates, the US should aim to provide leadership in the definition of norms (and presumably, associated space terms). This view was echoed by Samson, who notes that norms and international cooperation may be the best route by which to achieve stability and predictability in space, with reliable access to space assets. In the case of space weapons, a failure to establish common definitions and associated norms can result in misperceptions that can leave the US and other space actors in a precarious position. Samson cautions, however, that by talking about space weaponization, the conversation is led down a road that may not be necessary or helpful. Instead, she argues, it may be more helpful to talk about stability, which is “a broader concept that contextualizes the domain and allows you to talk about anything that destabilizes the space domain.” Thus, by having a broader understanding of the array of things for which space is actually used, she argues, we might more readily disambiguate some of these points of confusion or contention.

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia, S.p.A. a Subsidiary of OHB, Italy); Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Anonymous US Launch Executive; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Bryce Space and Technology; Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliott Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Deron Jackson (USAFA); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency); Joanne Gabrynowicz (University of Mississippi School of Law); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Dr. Henry Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (US Army Geospatial Center); Jonty Kasku-Jackson (National Security Space Institute); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics Inc.); David Koplow (Georgetown Law); Group Captain (Indian Air Force, ret.) Ajey Lele (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, Centre on Strategic Technologies, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (US Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet, Netherlands); Elsbeth Magilton (University of Nebraska College of Law); Colonel David Miller (United States Air Force); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Kevin Pollpeter (CNA); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Matthew Schaefer and Jack Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); Michael Sherry (National Air and Space Intelligence Center); Brent Sherwood (NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Michael Spies (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs); Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; Dr. Mark Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates); Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Joanne Wheeler (Bird and Bird, UK)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

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[Q9] What are the biggest hindrances to a successful relationship between the private and government space sectors? How can these be minimized? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The 33 individuals or teams that provided input represent large, medium, and small/start-up space companies; 4 USG civil space agencies; academia; think tanks; and professional organizations. Four of these are non-US voices (Australia, Canada, Italy, and Norway.)

The consensus view among the expert contributors to this report is that a successful and sustained government- commercial relationship in the space domain is as essential for achieving US national security goals as it is for achieving commercial profits.5 At present, however, contributors see the ways in which US civil and National Security Space (NSS) operate as barring the attributes that make for an attractive business environment, including: a) clear requirements and data exchange between government and commercial partners, b) persistent and predictable funding and cash flow, c) non onerous and consistently implemented export controls, and d) synchronization of internal government agendas and decision making with regard to space.

The following sections discuss four themes related to US public and private space sector relations (i.e., US civil and National Security Space and the commercial sector) that emerge in the input provided by the expert contributors. While one of the themes focuses on positive aspects of the relationship, the other three themes focus on types of barriers—namely, red tape, culture, and organization of the bureaucracy. The frequency of mentions for each of these themes, as well as for specific examples of each given by the contributors, is summarized in the Figure below. These themes are discussed in greater detail below. It should be noted that, unless specified, there was no association between an expert’s views and his or her professional affiliation. The barriers and mitigation options discussed here were identified as much by NSS and US civil space voices as by commercial and scholarly ones.

First, the Good News…

Although the question of focus prompted experts to address hindrances, nearly a third (30%) of the contributors feel that relations between US public and private space sectors are fairly good. In fact, even among contributors who see significant barriers, several identify specific organizations and programs as exemplars of ways to make USG space a more attractive and accessible business environment.6 NASA is the governmental organization that is most frequently cited as having made progress in cutting red tape and developing innovative ways to work with commercial actors. The FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation is the second most cited, followed by NOAA and then finally, some programs at NGA.7

The Barriers

The majority (70%) of expert contributors mentioned at least one of three types of important barriers that hinder relations between the commercial sector and US National Security Space. “Red Tape” refers to barriers imposed by USG regulatory and acquisition/contracting processes. “Culture” captures barriers that contributors suggest arise from the different goals, expectations, and cultures of the NSS and commercial space communities. Finally, “Organization of Bureaucracy” addresses impediments that result from the organization and structure of the US bureaucracy.

#1: Red Tape

What are described as opaque, convoluted, and slow US regulatory and acquisition/contracting processes are the hindrances that are most frequently mentioned by contributors.

The Barriers

In a sentiment echoed by other contributors, Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK suggests that problems with space acquisition do not just reside within bureaucratic machines, but often emerge at the outset from “a poor requirements process—[the NSS] can’t decide what it wants.” Dr. George C. Nield of the Federal Aviation Administration offers a reason for why this is so: “the nature of the DOD organizational structure, namely lots of people can say ‘no,’ but no one’s empowered to say ‘yes’.”

What is the impact on the commercial sector? In short, the effect is increased costs of doing business with NSS. When acquisition and contracting processes are difficult to navigate, involve so many steps, and require extended periods to reach contract award, the transaction costs of working with the USG can become higher than the value of the work itself—a negative business case that is extremely difficult to defend to shareholders and investors. Lengthy periods of uncertainty involved in securing work with NSS also increase financial risk to companies who must spend up-front capital to pursue NSS work.8 Smaller companies may experience additional barriers. Three contributions from small or start-up businesses find that current acquisition processes may benefit “entrenched interests” and make it difficult for smaller firms to compete with larger, better-known prime contractors.9 Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland sees the issue as reciprocal—that is, the “creakiness/complexity of the acquisition process at DOD and NASA” also makes it harder for the USG to find and work with smaller companies.

While contributors were sympathetic to the necessity of government oversight of dual-use technologies with national security implications, many believe that this oversight is overly restrictive, unfair to US firms, and/or prone to what Joshua Hampson of the Niskanen Center tags as the “capriciousness and opaqueness” of decisions about export controls.10 More than half of the expert responses mention inconsistently implemented, “burdensome” and/or “outdated” mandatory Federal Acquisition egulation (FAR) requirements, International Traffics in Arms Regulation (ITAR), and other compliance requirements as major barriers to successful relations between public and private sector space. There are two inevitable results of restrictive export controls. First, activities such as moving space- related items from general export controls to ITAR put US companies at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors, and create a situation that eventually will incentivize companies to leave the US for areas with more lenient controls.12 Second, as Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) argues, a restrictive environment invites competition from foreign governments eager to attract business away from the US.

#2: Cultural Differences

What experts saw as “cultural” barriers to government-commercial partnerships in the space domain were attitudes and behaviors rooted in the different agendas, priorities, motives, incentive structures, and varying speeds of operations of government and commercial space. Contributors described two specific sources of culture clashes: differences in expectations about the operational environment, and different concepts of information sharing and control.

One critical difference between government and commercial space, unsurprisingly, emanates from the varying operational environments in which each side finds itself. In one example, Hampson observes that the private- and public-sector funding environments “do not neatly overlap.” He points out that even small changes in program funding can strain relations between the government and the private sector. Pressure on businesses to produce revenue—or at least the real possibility of it—to investors and directors as quickly as possible can be stymied by the deliberate pace of the NSS funding processes and decision cycles. In addition, government planning on the single fiscal year is simply out of alignment with commercial investment planning which, by necessity, requires longer lead times (e.g., for staffing- up, engaging capital investment, etc.) than does government planning. This mismatch can be lethal to all but the largest and most mature firms. For smaller, or “new space” innovators, this discrepancy can “de- incentivize entering the market or working with the US government” (Hampson).13 Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy)14 concurs that misunderstanding of commercial funding requirements is a major reason that companies often do not even consider the USG in their business planning. Simply put, the NSS business environment is too slow and thus too risky for the “aggressive go-to-market” strategies that drive many of these privately-funded enterprises.

A number of experts remarked on barriers generated by government versus commercial expectations regarding the control of all facets of space capabilities, systems, and development. An area in which the government culture of “control” appears particularly harmful is the control of information. This includes what experts identified as the tendency of NSS organizations to expect unidirectional information flows from commercial to government but not the other way around. Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) and Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation) are critical of the government’s lack of transparency and tendency for “over-classification” of space-related information. As an example of the former, Dr. T.S. Kelso of Analytical Graphics, Inc. recounts his experience with tracking data disseminated by the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) to commercial space; he notes that this data often is delayed, of questionable veracity, and/or incomplete. He says, “we constantly run into this kind of situation where the government is trying to protect processes or capabilities or systems or whatever it happens to be…but at the same time, we are putting hundreds of satellites that DOD relies on for things like communications at risk because we could think we understand the situation and actually maneuver into a collision rather than avoid one.” In a similar vein, the ViaSat, Inc. team comments on a recent statement by the Secretary of the Air Force on barring proprietary interfaces with government systems. They argue that declarations such as these illustrate a key government misunderstanding of the commercial sector, and should be the foci of efforts to find mutually beneficial common ground.

Nield describes the USG as committed to a “deeply ingrained habit of doing things the way we’ve always done them.” A number of experts identify the ironic result: The standard steps taken by the government to protect NSS systems could generate increased risk to those assets; an effect that these experts expect will only worsen as the space environment becomes more crowded. Contributors argue that ultimately, the key difficulty to overcome in the name of partnership is the reluctance of the NSS community to amend its standard procedures for fear of yielding control to other elements of the USG or the commercial sector.

Dr. Edythe Weeks of Webster University offers a slightly different view of the impact of culture clashes between public and private sector space. Rather than taking sides—or assigning the government most of the blame—Dr. Weeks characterizes the (ultimately self-defeating) conflict between the “myths” of commercial versus government space as one over “who knows the best way.” Commercial space, she argues, believes that it can produce space capabilities smaller, better, and faster than can government space. Given this ethic, it is not surprising to uncover commercial sector frustrations with a government space enterprise that it perceives as following a slower, less effective path. This commercial-government ‘mythology,’ encourages commercial space and the US public to “forget” the significant role played by the government in setting the legal conditions, funding innovative research and development, and purchasing services that underwrite commercial space. The mythology also diverts Congressional attention from the critical role of US government space, with the ironic effect of reducing budget appropriations for public sector space programs. This creates a negative cycle which lies at the heart of much of the budget uncertainty about which commercial actors complain.

#3: Bureaucratic Organization and Structure

The final category of hindrances mentioned by contributors has more to do with the practices and structure of the federal government than with the DOD or the NSS, specifically. Key issues mentioned by the expert contributors were the insufficient staffing and underfunding of US government space as a whole, as well as the legal requirements and other elements of the NSS acquisition process that are outside direct DOD input or control. Examples of the latter include the particularities of Congressional processes that can cause unanticipated roadblocks in program funding; or White House policy and priority changes that can change significantly from one election to the other. Robert Cabana of the NASA-Kennedy Space Center cites deficient policy synchronization among USG space agencies as adding to the confusion felt by firms that may want to do business with the USG. Hitchens in turn identifies the “lack of a clear policy on export controls [as] slowing the licensing process” for commercial space. Finally, Faulconer Consulting Group15 argues that many of the issues are the result of not having clearly established the government’s role relative to commercial space, asking, “Is the US Government client, manufacturer, or regulator?” They further point out the source of conflict: As one of the largest potential investors in the space sector, work done by government agencies is often in direct competition with “what the commercial providers can provide,” while at other times, the government is “purely the customer purchasing commercial services.”

Actions to Minimize Hindrances

If it is agreed that fostering a healthy, globally competitive commercial space sector is not at odds with US national security requirements but is itself a key requirement, then middle ground solutions must be found. To do so effectively requires taking an accounting of where the points of tension are. As such, tensions between commercial and government requirements, together with some steps for mitigating each, are summarized in the table below.

Contributors mentioned the need to “streamline,” “update,” and “reform” both acquisition and regulatory practices by taking steps to make them more transparent, lowering transaction costs to businesses associated with lengthy proposal writing and processing times, and facilitating access to businesses beyond the “old space” firms with which the NSS community currently partners. The majority of recommendations involved expanding the sizes and types of solicitations and funding vehicles available for space acquisition (e.g., increased use of Broad Agency Announcements [BAAs]; Small Business Innovation Research awards [SBIRs]; fixed-price contracts, competitions, demonstrations, and prizes; and space act agreements) to allow the government to leverage private sector investment and capabilities while reducing bureaucratic costs.16 Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin offers several suggestions to facilitate progress, including increasing funding for federal regulatory agencies so that they might be fully-staffed, offering workers incentives for good performance, and modifying personnel policies to attract the best talent to the USG.

Contributors

Adranos Energetics; Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Anonymous Commercial Executives; Anonymous Launch Executive; Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA-Kennedy Space Center); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Chandah Space Technologies; Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Michael Gold (Space Systems Loral); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Jim Norman (NASA Headquarters); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Spire Global, Inc.; Dr. Patrick A. Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; Dr. Mark J. Sundahl (Cleveland-Marshall College of Law); John Thornton (Astrobotic Technology); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Frans von der Dunk (University of Nebraska College of Law); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association, Canada); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Approaches to Space-Based Information Services Among Actors Without Space Capabilities. A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

What is ViTTa®?

NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing our global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used to address 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written and verbal input from over 111 experts from National Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academic communities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked; and 2) the full written and/or transcribed interview input received from each expert contributor organized alphabetically. Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in a companion document.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What insight can the US/partners obtain from the space-based information service approaches used by international actors that lack their own space capabilities?

Expert Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Mark Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Faulconer Consulting Group; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (USAF Air Command and Staff College); Gilmour Space Technologies; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Auburn University Futures Lab); Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); ViaSat, Inc.

Summary Response

The experts’ responses to this question suggest two main insights the US can draw from how actors without space capabilities approach space-based information services. The first relates to the information these actors are seeking: what it indicates about their interests and the potential security implications access to that information has for the US. The second relates to the strategies these states are using to gain access to space-based information, in particular collaboration and reliance on private sector services.

Interests

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor’s3 response to this question focuses on the observation that what actors choose to buy can provide insight into their interests. Consistent with this, the Faulconer Consulting Group, focusing their response on international actors as customers and/or as potential combatants, highlights the potential benefit to the US that knowledge of the service provider satellite type and capability provides. Specifically, it would enable the US to ascertain what type of information is of interest to other actors and thus draw conclusions “as to the need for that type of data/information and its attendant purpose.” Dr. Namrata Goswami from Auburn University Futures Lab identifies Luxembourg, UAE, Israel, and Iran as states that have all shown interest and capability in using insights drawn from space-based information services.

Security Implications and Threats

Mark Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of USAF Air Command and Staff College both consider that the increased access to data that space-based information services provides raises security issues. The availability of high-resolution imagery from commercial providers combined with customized data-analytics makes it possible for actors to track military activities and capabilities as well as non-military factors, including those that could be used to manipulate economic stability (Garretson), without needing their own space capabilities. Berkowitz suggests that space-based information services can provide the US with insight into threats to intelligence sources and methods, force protection and operations security, as well as countermeasures to mitigate those threats.

Opportunities for Collaboration

Data sharing

Dr. Goswami suggests that India’s sharing of satellite services with countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal could be used to mitigate disasters and detect weather patterns, much as the UN does with its UN-SPIDER space-based information systems. She suggests that countries like the US and India could collaborate in similar data sharing to build disaster mitigation capacity. Consistent with this idea, Caelus Partners suggest “that the US consider providing additional space services and support to all of humanity (as is done with GPS).” They contend that “[c]ertain space-based information services are a basic necessity to operating effectively on Earth.”

Capability enhancement

Theresa Hitchens of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland states that reliance on outside providers enables states to gain capabilities faster than they can through domestic development, thus resulting in more up-to-date technology. Furthermore, states currently developing space-based infrastructure have a variety of potential partners to choose from, and thus a wider range of capabilities to choose from. The ViaSat team notes that a similar logic applies to the US/partners, where private sector satellite services are faster to develop and deploy than are government systems, and result in more flexible architectures that allow for “near-instantaneous response to continually evolving cyber threats and related security concerns.” Leveraging private sector services enables international actors that lack their own space capabilities to rapidly improve their capabilities at a fraction of the time and investment of US/partners. Further, without adherence to installed base solutions, these international actors can adopt so rapidly that they could potentially surpass US/partner capabilities.

Dr. Goswami notes that Iran, UAE, and China all jumpstarted their entry into space activities through partnerships with countries with more advanced space program and capabilities. The effectiveness of this strategy for China is reflected in the fact that it is now offering its own Beideu2 navigation systems to countries along the One Belt One Road (OBOR).4 In its contribution, Harris Corporation suggests that utilizing others’ space services also allows actors to benefit from “lessons learned,” making their own choices more cost effective.

Brigadier General (USAF ret.) Tom Gould of Harris Corporation suggests, however, that security considerations may limit the potential for such collaboration in support of military operations, as it will require sharing sensitive information about each other’s capabilities in a domain that has traditionally stove-piped or highly classified its capabilities.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author | Editor: W. Aviles & S. Canna (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

A strong argument can be made that we are moving toward a pluralized, multipolar world, in which military and economic sources of power are widely distributed. Technologies (e.g., the Internet and rapid means of mass migration) are making nation states increasingly more porous, and a resurgence of nationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics has solidified some states and weakened others. Given these properties of human development, the question remains as to how nations and societies position themselves to ride these revolutionary changes with some degree of confidence. The continuance of these factors may change the way that the US, its partners, and its adversaries consider and prioritize influence, both within the state and across interstate borders. The DOD is evolving in ways that demand a more synergistic approach than we have traditionally taken across the human and technical dimensions. To date, military operations have characteristically focused on compelling adversaries through the threat or application of force to achieve victory (i.e. “control”). Changing environmental factors, increased activism by non-state actors, technology, and recent lessons learned suggest that the DOD will be challenged to adopt revised, if not entirely new approaches, to affect and direct the outcomes of military operations. Toward such ends, the DOD will need to focus upon the factors and forces that exert the necessary influence to produce desired behavioral outcomes across complex and intermeshed human and technical systems.

This white paper examines these trends and explores and presents possible implications for how such factors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control,” and how influence could exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next several decades. It assesses these revolutionary changes from political, sociological, biological, and technical perspectives.

In her opening chapter, Ms. Regina Joseph (NYU) examines the coming tests of preserving national security through influence. She reviews the domestic information environment, where corporate interests generate a confluence of content and access barriers, and observes the global influence efforts that will continue to buffet society. While difficult, resilience may be cultivated through an offset that harnesses Western attitudes towards information, education, and cultivation of super-synthesizers. She goes on to say that to envision the future, a forecaster may first look to the past in an effort to find signals and detect patterns.

In the following chapter entitled “From Concepts to Capabilities: Implications for the OPS Community,” Lt General (Ret) Robert J. Elder (George Mason University) examines the implications of the changes in our security environment, considers the ways that different international actors are capitalizing on these changes, and reflects on their implications for the United States and our partners. He notes that today’s national and military leaders have grown up in an environment where the strategic military objective has been to defeat the adversary, but in today’s environment, restoring or preserving stability has often become the primary strategic objective. Competitors understand the U.S. desire to win, and leverage that against us by employing a “don’t lose” strategy. They consider a draw to be a win because they have prevented the U.S. from winning, and like Tic-Tac-Toe, they just wait for the U.S. to make a mistake. This suggests that employing whole of government and partner capabilities to advance overall U.S. national interests, even if it does not lead to a military “win,” may be a preferable strategy, and one that national security leaders should promote. Draws are not in our nature–winning is the American Way– but if a competitor is playing for a military draw, then defeating the competitor’s strategy by employing a comprehensive approach to promote stability may be in our national interest.

In the following article entitled “Net Assessment: Implications for Homeland Security,” Dr. Gina Ligon (University of Nebraska Omaha), Ms. Gia Harrigan (Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University Programs), Dr. Erik Dahl (Naval Postgraduate School), Mr. Timothy N. Moughon (National Counterterrorism Center), Colonel Bill Edwards (Special Operations Northern Command), and Nawar Shora (Transportation Security Administration) examine implications from a homeland security perspective. They address the issue of how net assessment—the practice of considering how strategic interactions between the United States, adversaries, and the environment may play out in the future—may be adopted to advance homeland security (especially as related to threats that emerge outside the homeland). In this chapter with contributors from government and academia, implications of using a net assessment approach to understand influence is discussed. They detail the overarching framework for net assessments. They then review the approach from NCTC on measuring power and the criticality of assessing “Green Actors.” They conclude by highlighting some of the challenges faced by Blue Network, as well as how net assessments can provide greater shared understanding of emerging threats to homeland security by incorporating planning for threats, capabilities, and legitimacy.

Next in a chapter entitled “From Failure to Success: Information Power and Paradigmatic Shifts in Strategy and Operational Art,” LTC Scott Thomson (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), Information Operations Directorate) takes the argument to the next step and examines the underlying assumptions about war, warfare, and other military operations within the DOD, which traditionally focuses on lethal dominance. He makes the argument that strategy is inherently about changing the behavior of relevant actors in support of national interests. This means information must be a primary planning consideration for the joint force rather than an enabling capability. To better link tactics to strategy, the joint force must change both its operational art and its cultural mindset to focus on behavioral outcomes. He concludes by stating that to shift our dominant paradigm will take a concerted effort and direction by senior leaders within the department. The department must realize that while it looks to improve informational capabilities, it is more important to first modify the operating system of the joint force so that it can realize the full power of information to achieve strategy.

Next in their chapter entitled “Rethinking Control and Influence in the Age of Complex Geopolitical Systems,” Dr. Val Sitterle (GTRI), COL (ret) Chuck Eassa (Strategic Capability Office), Dr. Robert Toguchi (USASOC), and Dr. Nick Wright (Univ. of Birmingham) in line with LTC Scott Thompson’s chapter make the case that the future of conflict facing the DOD is evolving in ways that demand a more synergistic approach than we have traditionally taken across the human and technical dimensions. To date, military operations have characteristically focused on compelling adversaries through the threat or application of force to achieve victory (i.e., “control”). Changing environmental factors, increased activism by nonstate actors, technology, and recent lessons learned suggest that the DOD will be challenged to adopt revised, if not entirely new approaches to affect and direct the outcomes of military operations. Toward such ends, the DOD will need to focus upon the factors and forces that exert the necessary influence to produce desired behavioral outcomes across complex and intermeshed human and technical systems.

In the following chapter entitled “Metaphor for a New Age: Emergence, Co-evolution, Complexity, or Something Else?” Dr. Val Sitterle (GTRI), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Dr. Corey Lofdahl (System of Systems Analytics), and CAPT (ret) Todd Veazie locate these challenges in the context of complex adaptive systems paradigm. They ask, as globalization and sociotechnical convergence collide with the continuing evolution of the post-Cold War security environment, do we know the appropriate metaphors to describe our world? Our environment is now characterized by non-uniformity and starts, stops, and leaps across orders of magnitude and across geographical areas and socio-economic- political sectors. They ask how the lenses through which we view and draw conclusions about various aspects of the world and the behaviors within it change and what can we perceive and, hence, act upon? Understanding the nature of paradigms and how we use them to provide insight in the US Defense community is critical to how well we may face future security challenges.

In his chapter entitled “Don’t Shortchange Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade,” Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND) argues that capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are necessary both for national security success and as a cost-effective toolset relative to physical military power. He discusses shortfalls and deficiencies in this area and concludes with recommendations to increase resources for manning and tools for informing, influencing, and persuading, as well as efforts to inculcate communication mindedness in commanders and senior leaders.

In his chapter entitled “Operationalizing the Social Battlefield,” Dr. Spencer Meredith III (National Defense University) argues the diffusion of influence from traditional elites to broader and more diverse sources has raised challenges for the United States, but not inherent risks by itself. The tools used to mobilize individuals and groups within society have for some time existed across a spectrum of industries, academic disciplines, and ultimately, government actions. As such, while the ubiquity of influence has ratcheted up in recent years, it has not fundamentally altered who can be influenced or the means of doing so. Evaluating how these phenomena affect the Joint Force Commander’s range of options and, more importantly, strategic paradigms on ways, means, and ends, must include several elements. These include governance, mobilization potential, and narrative landscapes.

In the subsequent several chapters, the reader is exposed to the neuro-cognitive aspects of control and influence. In the first two Chapters, Dr. Nick Wright (University of Birmingham) encourages the reader to rethink control and influence. He states at the outset that influence and control are two ways to exert power over others’ decisions, where control removes an audience’s ability to choose. Influence is critical in conflicts such as those in the Gray Zone, whose limited nature leaves adversaries and allies able to choose. He concludes by stating many aspects of influence and control do not need rethinking. He goes on to encourage the reader to focus on three key aspects of influence: (1) using more realistic accounts of human motivation, (2) focusing on areas of particular human cognitive bias as a source of low- hanging fruit for performance improvement, and finally (3) using tried and tested tools and techniques from other fields (e.g., medicine) to make evidence available in usable forms for operators.

In the following chapter entitled “Evidence Based Principles of Influence,” Dr. Wright stresses the need for scientific approaches (i.e., what do we know, and how can we know it?). He advances three key considerations: First, the reader should be aware of the replication crisis in the scientific literature in this area. Second, in order to accumulate robust scientific knowledge about the factors that influence people, the reader needs to focus on empirical findings. Finally, there is a level-of-analysis problem. To consider influence and persuasion, you have to think about multiple levels simultaneously.

In the following chapter, Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown) in an article titled “Neuroscience and Technology as Weapons on the Twenty-First Century World Stage” makes the case that neuroscience and neurotechnologies (neuroS/T) can be used as (1) “soft” weapons to foster power, which can be leveraged through exertion of effects upon global markets to impact nation states and people as well as to provide information and tools to more capably affect human psychology in engagements of and between agents and actors; and (2) “hard” (e.g., chemical, biological, and/or technological) weapons: including pharmacological and microbiological agents, organic toxins, devices that alter functions of the nervous system to affect thought, emotion and behaviors, and use of small scale neurotechnologies to remotely control movements of insects and small mammals to create “cyborg drones” for surveillance or infiltration operations. He goes on to say that brain sciences can also be employed to mitigate or prevent aggression, violence, and warfare by supplementing HUMINT, SIGINT, and COMINT (in an approach termed “neuro-cognitive intel”: NEURINT). Such possible applications generate two core questions: (1) to what extent can these technologies be developed and used to exert power? And, (2) how should research and use of the neurosciences be best engaged, guided, and governed? He goes on to address following issues: (1) the current capabilities of neuroS/T for operational use in intelligence, military, and warfighting operations; (2) potential benefits, burdens, and risks incurred; (3) key ethical issues and questions, and (4) possible paths toward resolution of these questions to enable technically right and ethically sound use toward maintaining international security.

Dr. Christophe Morin (Fielding Graduate University) in his chapter argues it is crucial that we recognize the urgency of using better persuasion models to create and evaluate both propaganda and counter- propaganda campaigns. Also, the dynamic and implicit nature of the effect of media content on adolescent minds highlights the necessity of conducting experiments that reveal the neurophysiological effect of messages on young brains. Subjects cannot competently and objectively report how messages work on their minds. However, new research tools used by neuromarkers can reveal critical insights by safely and ethically monitoring different subsystems in the nervous systems while participants view persuasive messages.

Drs. David A. Broniatowski (The George Washington University) and Valerie F. Reyna Cornell University) in their article entitled “A Scientific Approach to Combating Misinformation and Disinformation Online,” argue for a scientific approach to combating online misinformation and disinformation. Such an approach must be grounded in empirically validated theory, and is necessarily interdisciplinary, requiring insights from decision science, computer science, the social sciences, and systems integration. Relevant research has been conducted on the psychology of online narratives, providing a foundation for understanding why some messages are compelling and spread through social media networks, but this research must be integrated with research from other disciplines.

In his article entilted “Neural Influence and Behavior Change,” Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University), argues that military commanders and senior leaders must have a basic understanding of cognitive influence in order to make decisions affecting the Gray Zone and human populations in areas of ongoing military operations. Influence is counter-intuitive. This has led to poor decisions that may have adversely affected the success of US operations. He provides a primer of cognitive influence, set in tactical military terms. The intent is to inform commanders and senior leaders to enable them to make better decisions regarding inform-influence operations in support of US objectives. Success during Gray Zone operations requires commanders to understand influence and employ models of behavior change in the same manner that they understand the elements of patrolling and employ kinetic power.

In his article entitled “The Role of Integrative Complexity in Forecasting and Influence,” Dr. Peter Suedfeld and Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (The University of British Columbia) argue that If control is dependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military, demographic, and other—influence is the product of an even more varied and changing set of variables. The criteria that define the probability of success in exerting or countering influence must include two factors: accuracy in assessing the possible steps of an adversary and shaping persuasive communications so as to advance one’s own position and reduce the power of the opponent’s. The former aspect, anticipatory intelligence, has been a major research focus to date. They briefly look at what may be a fruitful approach to the latter. In short, besides being a tool for anticipatory intelligence analysis, Integrative Complexity may also be used to help shape persuasive communications as well as responses to adversarial attempts at persuasion.

In his article entilted “Neural Influence and Behavior Change,” Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University) argues that military commanders and senior leaders must have a basic understanding of cognitive influence in order to make decisions affecting the Gray Zone and human populations in areas of ongoing military operations. Influence is counter-intuitive. This has led to poor decisions that may have adversely affected the success of US operations. He provides a primer of cognitive influence, set in tactical military terms. The intent is to inform commanders and senior leaders to enable them to make better decisions regarding inform-influence operations in support of US objectives. Success during Gray Zone operations requires commanders to understand influence and employ models of behavior change in the same manner that they understand the elements of patrolling and employ kinetic power.

In his article entitled “The Role of Integrative Complexity in Forecasting and Influence,” Dr. Peter Suedfeld and Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (The University of British Columbia) argue that If control is dependent on actual or at least perceived power—political, economic, military, demographic, and other—influence is the product of an even more varied and changing set of variables. The criteria that define the probability of success in exerting or countering influence must include two factors: accuracy in assessing the possible steps of an adversary and shaping persuasive communications so as to advance one’s own position and reduce the power of the opponent’s. The former aspect, anticipatory intelligence, has been a major research focus to date. They briefly look at what may be a fruitful approach to the latter. In short, besides being a tool for anticipatory intelligence analysis, Integrative Complexity may also be used to help shape persuasive communications as well as responses to adversarial attempts at persuasion.

[Q11] What opportunities are there to leverage ally and commercial capabilities to enhance the resilience of space services for commercial and national security critical space services? What are the major hurdles to doing so? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

The importance of strengthening the resilience of US space capabilities is directly addressed in the 2010 National Space Policy, and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. While these documents identify resilience as central to mission assurance, they do not provide any detail on what comprises resilience in the context of US space capabilities. The 2012 DoD Directive 3100.10 is consistent with these documents and offers the following definition of resilience:

• The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.

The experts who responded to this question represent both the government and commercial space sectors, and academia and think tanks (see above Q11: Contributors figure). Overall, there was consensus among contributors that there are significant opportunities for collaboration between the USG and allies, and the USG and commercial actors. The contributors to this question identified over 70 distinct allied and/or commercial capabilities that could be leveraged to enhance resilience (see Table 1 below). To provide an overview of how these specific capabilities may contribute to US space activities, we grouped them according to the more general service (activity or purpose) that the expert discussions specified. From this analysis, eight categories of service emerged. As shown in Figure 1, information (collection and analysis) was the most frequently referenced category, followed by launch (infrastructure, vehicles, and services).

Approaches to enhancing resilience

From the contributors’ discussions of these capabilities, two general approaches to enhancing resilience, consistent with the DoD definition above, were identified: enhancing capabilities and providing redundancy.

Enhance capabilities

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson of the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College identifies commercial advances in space-based solar power as contributing to resilience, by enabling the powering of systems capable of earth observation from higher orbit. Solar electric propulsion, Dennis Ray Wingo of Skycorp, Inc. suggests, enables the development of spacecraft that would “simply be able to move out of the way of most ballistic threats, thus passively defeating attacks.”5 Furthermore, distance provides protection to space-based assets, as it requires greater capabilities on the part of our adversaries to disrupt them, and is harder to achieve “without revealing intent” (Wingo). It also makes such assets less vulnerable to unintentional damage or destruction from space debris.

Coming from a slightly different perspective, Wes Brown and Todd May of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center note that cooperative efforts with allies or commercial actors could help bridge capability gaps created by politically driven changes in USG budget priorities that potentially impact national security needs. They offer the recent drop in support for Earth science and remote sensing as examples of this.

Increase speed of innovation and adoption of new technology

Discussion of the faster pace of innovation in the commercial sector was also common.6 The underlying message being that leveraging commercial capabilities would bring the added advantage of providing the USG with more advanced technologies more quickly. Use of allied and commercial capabilities would also reduce reliance on the federal acquisitions cycle, which is notoriously slow and cumbersome, resulting in outdated systems and a reduction in the United States’ relative capability advantage over its adversaries (Hampson).

Improve space servicing capabilities

Contributors discussed two ways in which cooperation with commercial actors and/or allies in the provision of space servicing may enhance US capabilities. The first of these was space traffic management—knowing where things are with a greater degree of precision (Dr. Moriba Jah, University of Texas at Austin) and removing objects that are endangering that traffic (Rossettini). The second was the maintenance and upgrading of capabilities in space. In particular, a number of experts7 discussed the potential of commercial developments to increase the feasibility of on-orbit servicing of satellites. Such a capability could increase the lifespan of expensive GEO-satellites, and enable modifications and repairs.

Increase coverage

Dr. Patrick Stadter of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory sees potential for commercial actors to supplement SIGINT capabilities by providing observations and data analysis in areas that are either not covered by existing USG capabilities or in instances where specific data requirements were not predicted in time. Berkowitz suggests that interoperability with commercial and allied communication, PNT, and remote sensing systems would increase distribution (orbit, spectrum, geographically) of US capabilities. Brown and May also see allies and commercial actors as offering the potential for the USG to broaden the geographic location of its ground services to increase coverage and redundancy.

Provide redundancy/back-up

As Steve Nixon of Stratolaunch Systems Corporation points out, “we don’t stockpile anything when it comes to space. . . .War fighting always involves the possibility of living with attrition. We buy extras and we keep them in reserve to put them into conflict as needed. . . .Space is not like that.” His view that this situation needs to change if the US wants to improve its ability to deal with contested space is implicitly reflected in the responses of the other subject matter experts that responded to this question. Several contributors8 suggested that leveraging allied and/or commercial services in addition to existing USG capabilities would add resilience through proliferation (adding to the number of assets serving national security needs) or diversification (different types of assets). Doing so would introduce a level of redundancy in US space capabilities that is currently lacking (Hampson), and thus increase the speed with which the US could resume services interrupted by accidents or attack (Brown and May).

More specifically, Berkowitz suggests that “[a]llied launch infrastructure, vehicles, and services could serve as a backup to US capabilities in extremis” (see also Hampson). Wingo proposes that developing commercial capabilities may, in the future, enable the placement of communications and data storage systems on the Moon, providing back-ups that are “impervious to electromagnetic pulse damage.” The Spire Global Inc. team notes that employing commercial satellite constellations would make systems “nearly impossible to destroy,” and Hampson suggests that commercial satellites could also provide back-up information services to ensure that the US is never “blind.”

Major hurdles to leveraging allied and commercial capabilities for resilience

All of the contributors identified at least one substantial way in which allied and commercial capabilities could be leveraged to enhance the resilience of US space services.9 Almost all, however, also identified barriers (either within the USG or between the USG and allies or commercial actors) to such cooperation.

Security/reliability concerns

Once systems are connected, each is only as secure as the most vulnerable, and as Brown and May discuss, “[t]his is of particular importance when considering US allies have partnerships with our adversaries for use of similar if not the same capabilities.” Faulconer Consulting Group raises a related concern, noting that leveraging external capabilities will mean that the workforce will include a broader set of contractors and civil servants. Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson of the United States Air Force Academy questions whether concerns on the government side over classification will allow for the data sharing that collaboration with allies and commercial actors may require. Finally, a number of contributors indicated that mission assurance and control could prove a barrier (Robert D. Cabana, NASA–Kennedy Space Center; Nield), due to concerns over command and control switch over in times of need (Faulconer Consulting Group) or reliability (Hampson). Berkowitz notes that the “track record is decidedly mixed regarding the reliability of political commitments and commercial contracts in crisis and conflict.”

Attitude

Security concerns also underpin some of the contributors’ observations that the attitude of the US defense community may also prove a hurdle (Berkowitz; ViaSat, Inc.) Still more contributors suggest that the problem is cultural, including a lack of understanding of the breadth and depth of commercial and allied capabilities (Bryce Space and Technology; Wingo), or a vision of how such a partnership would look (Major General [USAF ret.] James Armor, Orbital ATK). Wingo suggests that, for the USG, “anything that is not quantifiable through the lens of past experience is considered risky, and thus downgraded in evaluation and thus unlikely to be funded”—an approach that is diametrically opposed to that of many of the new commercial space ventures. Such divergent perspectives create a significant hurdle to collaboration.

Organizational barriers

Organizational barriers both within the USG and between the USG and allied and commercial actors were also identified as a hurdle to collaboration. Deborah Westphal of Toffler Associates and Hampson both note that it is unclear which USG agency would orchestrate collaboration of this sort, and Dr. T.S. Kelso of Analytical Graphics, Inc. suggests that the procurement cycle presents another internal barrier even when there is need for and interest in an outside capability. Organizational barriers also exist between the USG and allies. Leveraging the assets of another state requires both political and legal arrangements (Berkowitz) and from the US side, there are also export control rules and classification concerns (Hampson). For commercial actors, the lack of clarity and transparency regarding USG timelines, and infrastructure and communication needs in times of conflict, present a hurdle (Stratolaunch Systems Corporation), as does the lack of clarity in policy across government agencies to support commercial activities (Cabana). Finally, just as the USG has concerns over classification, commercial actors may be unwilling to share their information due to concerns over intellectual property and competitive advantage (Jackson; Harris Corporation, LLC).

Interoperability

Even if organizational barriers are overcome, technical barriers remain, in particular the complexity involved in ensuring interoperability across a wider variety and number of service providers (Berkowitz; Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; ViaSat, Inc.). As Hampson states, “Compatibility across systems can be difficult if they are originally constructed with differing end goals in mind,” which will be the case if the USG moves to integrate commercially developed capabilities with its existing custom capabilities.

Divergent goals

Collaboration requires at some level shared goals and priorities, which is not necessarily the case when it comes to the defense and commercial space communities. Commercial actors need to be profitable, and without a good probability that there will be revenue at the end, they will be unwilling or unable to put money toward developing a capability specifically to meet a national security need, if there is no market demand (Harris Corporation, LLC; Hampson; Roesler; Wingo).

Overcoming hurdles to leveraging allied and commercial capabilities

In addition to identifying hurdles to cooperation, the contributors also discussed changes that could reduce some of these barriers.

• The US defense community needs a better understanding of and relationship with the commercial space sector (Roberto Aceti, OHB Italia S.p.A.; Armor).
• Regulatory and policy frameworks and lines of authority need to be developed (Garretson; Hampson; Kelso; ViaSat, Inc.; C. Weeden; Westphal).
  • Areas specified: access and control assurance (ViaSat, Inc.), quality control (Hampson), IP and data protection (Jackson), and space traffic controls (Chwastek).
• Technical and funding support to build a strong, stable commercial sector (Brown and May; Cabana; Carol; Wingo).

Contributors

Roberto Aceti (OHB Italia S.p.A., Italy); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Daniel N. Baker (University of Colorado—Boulder Campus); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Wes Brown and Todd May (NASA—Marshall Space Flight Center); Bryce Space and Technology; Robert D. Cabana (NASA—Kennedy Space Center); Caelus Partners, LLC; Elliot Carol3 (Ripple Aerospace, Norway); Matthew Chwastek (Orbital Insight); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garretson (United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College); Joshua Hampson (Niskanen Center); Harris Corporation, LLC; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. T.S. Kelso (Analytical Graphics, Inc.); Dr. George C. Nield (Federal Aviation Administration); Dr. Gordon Roesler (DARPA Tactical Technology Office); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Spire Global Inc.; Dr. Patrick Stadter (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory); Stratolaunch Systems Corporation; ViaSat, Inc.; Charity A. Weeden (Satellite Industry Association); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University); Deborah Westphal (Toffler Associates); Dennis Ray Wingo (Skycorp, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author | Editor: Wright, N. (Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham, UK).

Executive Summary

Understanding and influencing adversary decision-making in Grey Zones requires anticipating key audiences’ perceptions and decision-making. We apply the neuroscience and psychology of human decision-making to help U.S. policymakers produce intended and avoid unintended effects in the Grey Zone.

Key features of the Grey Zone: the centrality of influence

Grey Zone conflict is necessarily limited conflict, sitting between “normal” competition between states and what is traditionally thought of as war. Thus, the central aim is to influence the decision-making of adversaries and other key audiences, rather than removing their capacity to choose using brute force in itself. Success requires moving the emphasis from control to influence.

What, if anything, differentiates the Grey Zone from other types of conflict? The fundamental nature of conflict is unchanged, but the Grey Zone requires different emphases. I summarise these key challenges as the “Five Multiples” of the Grey Zone.

(1) Multiple levels: The U.S. must successfully influence multiple societal levels, namely at the state level (e.g. adversarial, allied or neutral states); at the population level (e.g. mass communication within states and communities); and at the non-state actor level (e.g. proxies, violent extremist organisations or quasi-states like Da’esh).

We systematically evaluate empirical, real-world evidence to identify key cognitive factors for influence at each level. We integrate these into usable tools. For example, a “Checklist for empathy” (Box 2.1) provides a realistic analysis of an adversary, ally and other’s decision calculus, which includes key human motivations such as fairness, legitimacy, surprise and self-interest.

(2) Multiple domains and instruments of power: Multiple domains—e.g. military, information, economic and cyber—cut across these multiple societal levels.

Key cognitive factors can be common or differ between domains. For instance, managing surprise and predictability (concepts incorporated in a simple “prediction error” framework grounded in neuroscience; Chapters 7-8) is critical across domains and levels to cause intended effects and avoid unintended effects.

(3) Multiple timeframes: One must consider at least two separate timeframes: managing an ongoing process evolving over years; and managing short-term crises in light of that ongoing process.

Combating propaganda, conducting information operations and messaging more generally audience. Trust is fundamentally psychological, and trusted messengers can often only be created with over longer timeframes (e.g. the BBC).

We analyse the two biggest historical cases of inadvertent escalation between European powers since 1815: the road to the Crimean War of 1854 in which some 800,000 soldiers died in the Anglo-French versus Russian conflict; and road to the First World War. Both were preceded by lengthy Grey Zone confrontations. U.S. decision-makers must be aware that each episode in the Grey Zone sets the stage for the next interaction. Violating norms, even for admirable reasons, can escalate Grey Zone conflict on a longer timeframe.

(4) Multiple audiences: Ally and third party perceptions are critical in the Grey Zone – and U.S. actions will inevitably reach multiple audiences. For instance, if it lost allied support inthe South China Sea, the U.S could suffer deterrence by ally denial.

Audience analysis is critical across these multiple audiences. This requires both local knowledge within key local audiences, and also the ability of the U.S. analysts to put themselves in the shoes of their audiences – the type of “outside-in” thinking enabled by our Checklist for Empathy.

(5) Multiple interpretations: Ambiguity is a key feature of the Grey Zone. Ambiguity’s essence is that events or actions are open to multiple interpretations. Ambiguity provides an extra layer of uncertainty even before one consider an event’s risk, and can thus directly contribute to crisis escalation. Ambiguity can also help de-escalate crises, for example enabling compromises that save face on both sides (e.g. the “apology” in the 2001 Sino-U.S. EP-3 incident). In the long run ambiguous actions can change behavioural norms and thus escalate international tensions.

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (GSI, Inc).

GSI’s geospatial relational database visualizes SMA data at a human scale supporting planners and CoA development. The relationships between the actors, groups, socio-cultural attributes and key events are shown as a geolocated network. This allows for navigation of physical and cognitive environments. SMA responses are modelled and compared as if/then scenarios.

[Q3] What are the motivations of nation-state and non-state actors (e.g., violent extremists, etc.) to contest use of space in times of peace, instability, and conflict? What are the political, military, environmental, or social costs associated with acting on those motivations? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr.  John Stevenson (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

Subject matter experts generally agreed that there were multiple motive pathways for nation-states to contest use of space. These pathways were:

1. the vulnerabilities and sensitivities that come from increasing cross-domain dependence on space systems;
2. the national pursuit of space programs as a form of (major power) prestige and status; and
3. the yet unresolved rules about how to project national sovereignty into space.

Experts also agreed that there are very high costs associated with acting on any of these motives, although they disagreed on whether high costs increased or decreased the likelihood of conflict.

Motivations to Contest the Use of Space

Experts proffered three baskets of motives for why an actor would contest space: space domain dependence, the prestige of space capabilities, and the lack of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

The Vulnerability of Terrestrial Components from Space Domain Dependence

Dr. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute observes that “space systems are vital to the functioning of the US economy and society.” In addition to the economic importance, Dr. Davis notes that space systems also are the bedrock of a “Western way of war,” which “exploits precision, high operational tempo, and joint military operations.”

The ViaSat, Inc. team concluded simply that “the most easily identifiable motive of nation-state and non- state actors against space ecosystems…is to disrupt military command and control.” In other words, the centrality of space systems to the United States’ economic and military operations makes those systems an attractive target for adversaries of the United States seeking to gain terrestrial advantages. Colonel Timothy Cullen5 of Air University warns that adversaries would target space systems “to punish the US and its allies economically, to demonstrate the vulnerability of US and allied space weapons or communications systems, to simply test the effectiveness of unfriendly actions, or a combination of all the above.” Targeting assets in the space domain is one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce US military and informational advantages, according to Dr. Namrata Goswami of Wikistrat and the Auburn University Futures Lab. Dr. Goswami notes, “During conflicts, space based assets like military satellites could be taken down by an adversary to deny precision guidance to missile systems, jam early warning for incoming missiles, and deny data and information on enemy positions. Non-state actors with access to space based capabilities could utilize it to deny access to data like jamming GPS, and reconnaissance.”

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor6 highlights that “extremists” who are not dependent on space would risk targeting assets in space to harm terrestrial components that are dependent on space systems. Rather than “unsung nations” looking for prestige, the main risks of conflict in space stem from the “unplugged actors” looking to level the playing field. Theresa Hitchens, of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, buttresses this view that disconnected extremists— which she refers to as “outliers”—are the likely sources of contestations in space: “I don’t see any motivation for anyone, with North Korea being an outlier because who knows what their motivations are, in actually harming space as an environment because there’s too much social and economic and military benefit coming from space for anyone to really want to contemplate ruining space for everybody else.”

The Prestige of Space Capabilities

Dr. Deganit Paikowsky of Tel Aviv University proposes that “space capability became (and still is) an important mark of great powers.” Space capability, therefore, is a marker of status and influence in world politics. It provides tangible and intangible benefits; as such, it is also a source of prestige. Sergeant First Class Jerritt Lynn,7 United States Army Special Operations, observes: “International prestige was a factor during the space race, and it continues to be one as other states are pushing their way into the international spotlight.” Similar prestige motives animate China’s national space program, according to Lynn: “China just recently finished construction on the Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Telescope (FAST) in Pingtung. This is currently the world’s largest radio telescope…As the international scientific community uses this platform, it will garner international prestige, grant the opportunity to conduct cutting-edge research, and aid in China becoming a global leader in the space
and science community.”

Prestige motives, however, are not necessarily identical to the motives to contest other countries’ use of the domain in which prestige is pursued. In the space domain, these motives for great power status are part and parcel of the motives to contest, experts argue, because of the dual-use nature of space systems. Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, of National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study, notes that this dual-use is the source of space programs’ prestige: “A space program consists of satellites and communications infrastructure—it has many civilian uses. This is why space programs are still prestigious.” The dual-use nature of space systems means that any pursuit of advantages in the space domain has major cross-domain implications for the relative strength of various instruments of national power.

Prestige motives can play out regionally or globally. Dr. Martin Lindsey of US Pacific Command characterized regional factors as being the chief drivers of the dynamics of national space program development in the Asia-Pacific: “There are various space races going on in the Asia Pacific region—the big ones being between China and India, and then to a lesser degree between China and Japan, and these are more tied up in nationalism and global prestige.” The interplay of the pursuit of prestige and the cross-domain effects of increased space capability leads Brett Biddington of Biddington Research Pty, Ltd to lament: “I would say that I think that war is already on in space—it’s just not declared…The profound issue here is, of course, that almost everything we do in space is dual-use or can be badged as being dual-use.”

Pursuit of Sovereignty Claims in the Context of Unclear/Unsettled Rules

Our experts generally agreed that only certain actors would have the means and the motive to contest the use of space. That current set is generally the “Big Three” space-faring nations—the United States, Russia, and China—although Dr. Bahgat also included India as a major space-faring nation.

Dr. Goswami posits that the “lack of international regulatory framework that could adjudicate and establish ownership, a dispute may break out during peace time.” Dr. Bahgat provided the most succinct summary of the four potential goals that might lead space-faring nations to contest countries’ use of space:

1. Achieve space domain capability and advantage vis-à-vis adversaries by investing in research and development.
2. Stake territorial claims in outer space once humanity cracks the code of mining precious metals on the lunar surface and beyond.
3. Support growing commercialization of space activities and an emerging lucrative market for space based activities.
4. Build military capacity based on space based assets to sustain the trade links and establish superiority on earth.

Of these four goals, the latter three relate to how the lack of rules about how to articulate sovereignty in space also can lead these (generally sovereignty-obsessed) space-faring nations to contest the use of space.

Costs Associated with Contesting Use of Space

Of the subject matters experts who explicitly advanced a view of the costs of contestation, all were in agreement that contested space operations are very expensive and have hard to anticipate second- and third-order effects. The subject matter experts from ViaSat, Inc. suggested that contesting the use of space could occur in any domain, since the space ecosystems exist in multiple domains, and the means would likely be the least attributable, most detrimental, lowest cost approach considering all the ecosystem domains.

In general, contributors to this response suggested three distinct reasons why contested uses of space, in space, would be (potentially prohibitively) expensive:

1. The novelty of space contestation, according to Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation, means that: “Interfering with or hacking a space object would be a new, unique, ground-breaking activity and would therefore be a nefariously prestigious accomplishment unto itself.”
2. Dominance in space is fleeting given the technological potential of industrialized countries, making a thorough cost-benefit assessment unreliable. Colonel Cullen observes that “dominance in space may not be possible against aggressive and industrialized nations, regardless. It is difficult to express how expensive the net cost of the development and large- scale employment of even ‘low cost’ access to space will be or how unforgiving, harsh, and costly the space environment is to conduct operations, and the space industry has little incentive to state their net estimates either.”
3. The domestic politics of the militarization of space, especially in societies with stark inequalities in income and wealth, is a tricky set of optics for national elites to manage, as Dr. Goswami discerns: “The desire to create space domain advantage would require budgetary allocations, thereby taking away limited resources … from their poverty alleviation programs. This could create a backlash in society thereby raising questions about the feasibility of such outer-space motivations.”

In conclusion, the costs associated with contesting other countries’ use of space, in space, is extremely high, while the cost to contest a space ecosystem in its ground or cyber domains could be much less. Although many experts thought that the costs to a country’s own space assets make contestation in space too risky for most space-faring nations, they did agree that the same nations possessed multiple motives that could lead them to consider it. In addition, if a nation state or non-state actor “considered” contestation, they may also consider targeting the space ecosystem in a non-space domain.

The motives to do so stem from: the vulnerabilities and sensitivities that come from increasing cross- domain dependence on space systems; the national pursuit of space programs as a form of (major power) prestige and status in the context of dual-use space capability; and the yet unresolved rules about how to establish sovereignty space in an environment with increasing demands for stable commercial and/or national property rights in space.

Contributors

Brett Alexander (Blue Origin); Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd, Australia); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Deron Jackson (USAFA); Colonel Timothy Cullen, Ph.D.3 (School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Wikistrat and the Auburn University Futures Lab); Harris Corporation; Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland); Christopher Johnson (Secure World Foundation); Dr. Martin Lindsey (US Pacific Command); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn4 (United States Army Civil Affairs); Colonel David Miller (United States Air Force); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University); Dr. Edythe Weeks (Webster University and Washington University, St. Louis); ViaSat, Inc.

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question (R2 QL8): How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? How does the U.S./Coalition view Sunni extremism?

Experts who volunteered to respond to this set of questions did not directly answer how the US and its Coalition partners view Shia and Sunni extremism. However, there was an implicit assumption that the populations of these countries see Sunni extremism as a greater—or at least more visible—threat. However, Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute argued that they should both be viewed as equally threatening to US and Coalition interests at home and in the Middle East. Vatanka noted that these two forms of extremism differ in degree of threat and sophistication. While the US has been confronted with Sunni extremism in the form of violent caliphate-seeking groups who also espouse attacks against the far enemy in the West, Shia extremism is an equally pervasive—and perhaps less well understood–threat. It is “tantamount to a totalitarian ideology that will pose a threat to both US interests and those of allies in the region” over time. Vatanka pointed out that the Shia/Sunni split is roughly equivalent in the Middle East, and Shia extremists (back by a powerful, ambitious state, Iran), have the numbers to change the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. They have arguably already been quite successful in doing so through the use of proxy nations and Shia militias.

Hayder al-Khoei of the Centre for Shia Studies warned against drawing a false equivalency between Shia and Sunni extremism. He noted that these two phenomena differ remarkably in terms of beliefs, range of targets, and methods. High profile terrorist attacks that have been carried out in Europe and the United States were not conducted by Shia extremists. He noted that “there is a religious hierarchy that exists in Shia Islam which has no equivalence in Sunni Islam, this makes the latter more decentralised, fractured and is what enables groups like ISIS to portray themselves as authentic and legitimate representations of Islam.”

How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?

According to Hayder al-Khoei of the Center for Shia Studies, Shia communities across the Middle East find the US and Coalition efforts to fight extremism “at best half-hearted and at worst complicit.” There is a fundamental and entrenched belief in the Middle East that the US directly aids and abets ISIS (see also Kaltenthaler & Dagher). Shia communities point to a number of reasons for this belief. Shia politicians in Iraq cite the slow response to the looming threat from ISIS as they bore down on Mosul and other cities in June 2014 as evidence of US collusion. While Shias in Iraq accuse the US of standing by while the threat from ISIS grew, in Syria, Shia observed the US actively funding and arming rebel groups who fluidly shared weapons, funds, and allegiance with al-Qaeda affiliated groups as well as ISIS. Furthermore, Syrian Shia question whether Turkey, a NATO ally, intentionally allowed jihadists into Syria as a way to siphon off troublemakers from European societies. Finally, the United States’ strong relationship with Saudi Arabia—whose promotion of Wahhabism is considered by some as the ideological root of today’s jihadism—is cited as further evidence of US tacit approval and support for Sunni extremism.

Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University, and Munqith Dagher, IIACS, in their work surveying populations in Iraq suggested that Sunnis place a greater amount of trust in the US relationship and its countering violent extremism efforts than Shia communities. Iraqi Kurds, who are largely Sunni, also generally have a positive view of the US, but there is a “significant minority of Kurds who have strong Islamist proclivities and show some sympathy toward ISIL and thus animosity toward the US.”

This polarization was clearly illustrated by a summer of 2016 survey in Iraq conducted by IIACS (Kaltenthaler & Dagher). When asked whether the US/Coalition was in Iraq to defeat ISIS, 82% of Sunni Arab Iraqi respondents agreed while only 32% of Iraqi Shia believed this to be the case. Iraqi Shia attribute US/Coalition action, particularly air strikes, in the region to an anti-Shia campaign. This demonstrates a massive trust deficit between the Shia community in Iraq and the US/Coalition.

Contributing Authors

Munqith Dagher (IIACSS); Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron/Case Western Reserve University); Hayder al-Khoei (Centre for Shia Studies), Alex Vatanka (Middle East Institute)a