SMA Publications

The Characterization and Conditions of the Gray Zone: A Virtual Think Tank Analysis (ViTTa)

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

Within United States government (USG) and Department of Defense (DoD) spheres, the gray zone is a relatively new terminology and phenomena of focus for characterizing the changing nature of competition, conflict, and warfare between actors in the evolving international system of today. Accordingly, in January 2016, General Joseph Votel (US Army) requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct a study of the gray zone. The SMA team was asked to assess how the USG can diagnose, identify, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against associated types of gray zone challenges. More specifically, the request emphasized that if the USG is to respond effectively to the threats and opportunities presented in the increasingly gray security environment, it requires a much more detailed map of the gray zone than it currently possesses.

To properly conduct any effort focused on researching, understanding, and assessing this gray zone space, it is imperative to first ensure that the effort is using sound, appropriate, and comprehensive definitions—to effectively assess the gray zone, one must appropriately define the gray zone. The importance of proper definitions is particularly relevant when it comes to the study of the gray zone, which is an inherently ambiguous concept in itself and has a number of varying definitions already in existence.

Recognizing the importance of properly characterizing and defining the gray zone concept, the SMA team put significant effort into developing a sound, comprehensive definition of the gray zone. Through a series of panel discussions and intense inter-team discussions, and with the assistance of a white paper on the topic, the SMA team, in conjunction with USSOCOM, developed the following definitions for the gray zone, gray zone activity, and gray zone threats.

The gray zone is a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.

Gray zone activity is an adversary’s purposeful use of single or multiple elements of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet apparently fall below the level of open warfare.

• In most cases, once significant, attributable coercive force has been used, the activities are no longer considered to be in the gray zone but have transitioned into the realm of traditional warfare.
• While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of national power, they are activities taken by an actor for the purpose of gaining some broadly-defined security advantage over another.

Gray zone threats are actions of a state or non-state actor that challenge or violate international customs, norms, and laws for the purpose of pursuing one or more broadly-defined national security interests without provoking direct military response.

• Gray zone threats can occur in three ways relative to international rules and norms, they can:
  1. challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms while stopping short of clear violations of international law (e.g., much of China’s use of the “Little Blue Men”);
  2. employ violations of both international norms and laws in ways intended to avoid the penalties associated with legal violations (e.g., Russian activities in Crimea); or
  3. violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and non-state actors integrating elements of power to advance particular security interests

In an effort to validate the SMA team’s definition of the gray zone, NSI applied its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) subject matter expert elicitation methodology to the problem set. As part of this ViTTa effort, NSI interviewed leading gray zone experts to better understand the characterization and conditions of the gray zone, putting particular emphasis on having the experts assess the SMA team’s gray zone definition. NSI recorded and transcribed the interviews, which formed the basis of this report. The goal of this report is to present the experts’ insights relating to the characterization and conditions of the gray zone and, in particular, highlight expert feedback, insight, and commentary regarding the SMA team’s gray zone definition.

Contributing Authors

Canna, S. (NSI)

Question (R4.10): Is the current U.S. approach to supporting Afghanistan beneficial? Or does it promote a cycle of dependency and counter-productive activities in the region? What strategic and local factors would need to be considered, managed and accepted in any significant change in military and/or other support?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Asked about any constructive aspects of the current US approach in Afghanistan the experts who contributed to this Reach-back report, to a one responded with lengthy, well-considered but scathing reviews of the past fifteen years of US/NATO policy and operations in Afghanistan. The majority of the experts — who include practitioners and political scientists, historians and hydrologists with years of on-the- ground experience with Afghanistan — felt there is nothing to commend current US policy toward Afghanistan. The others did not address the question.

In fact, most experts took the tack that the current US approach to Afghanistan (which they date to the “mission creep” that began in 2001) is itself the source of the insecurity, instability and Taliban resurgence happening now in Afghanistan.

The US Approach in Afghanistan

The central themes of the experts’ arguments can be summarized in two main points:

#1: State-building efforts detract from the real US interest in Afghanistan: security

Professor Shalini Venturelli (AU) argues that US activities in Afghanistan have drifted away from what is the true national interest in Afghanistan (security) to focusing on governance and state-building. Along with Spencer Meredith (NDU) she argues that the US must refine the focus of its approach to jettison objectives such as state-building and democratization that have distracted the US from issues that we have the relevant power to impact. Venturelli sees no value to US security from getting involved in the highly culturally- dependent issue of how a nation governs itself.

Instead: Venturelli argues in favor of a major reconceptualization of US policy in Afghanistan that focuses strongly on what is truly the core (and only reasonable) US mission there: US security. She suggests “three concrete components” of a reconceived US mission: 1) preventing and deterring terror group gains in Afghanistan by “expanding counter-terrorism operations in the AF-PAL region;” 2) preventing Afghanistan from becoming a major terror safe haven; and 3) building the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) guided by a more sophisticated and culturally relevant training model that taps into the “indigenous fighting tradition” – (what Dr. Shireen Khan Burki refers to as Afghanistan’s “xenophobic warrior” population.) She cautions that continuing with the current approach of incrementally changing the US approach around the margins as circumstances dictate has already had “devastating consequences” and could be worse than withdrawing US military support altogether.

#2: There is insufficient socio-cultural foundation and local trust to support construction of centralized democracy in Afghanistan: These efforts were doomed to fail from the start

The experts who commented on the political or state-building aspects of the US approach did not mince words, referring to it as: “impractical and expensive,” the result of “overconfidence bordering on insanity” and “hopelessly corrupted and detrimental.” Spencer Meredith (NDU) believes that the US approach is based on the faulty assumption that localized/decentralized governance is at odds with a legitimate and capable national government. Others are highly critical of efforts to construct a Western-style centralized political system in Afghanistan with a very feeble foundation in Afghan political history, social organization or culture. It was doomed from the start. Shalini Venturelli (AU) reckons that “not all the wealth and expertise of the US and its NATO allies” would be sufficient to build a sustainable democratic state in Afghanistan because it would be out of line with the social, cultural and political traditions and expectations of the majority of the Afghan population.

Instead: The contributors who commented on this point agreed that rather than Western expectations of good governance and social and political stability, if the US chooses to remain involved in state-building in Afghanistan, its efforts must refocus on the expectations of the Afghan people. Venturelli points out that Afghan society already contains “highly evolved, complex and variable systems of social order that fall outside the capabilities of Western administrative science.” Specifically, Spencer Meredith (NDU) recommends that the US should patiently pursue a bottom-up, culturally and historically grounded approach to political development. Despite the fact he says that analysts in DC and certainly political elites in the central government in Kabul for obvious reasons do not like this option, it is the only one with a reasonable chance of producing a broadly accepted and legitimate government.

Does the US approach promote a cycle of dependency and counter-productive activities?

The majority opinion among the expert contributors to the Reach-back report is that the current US approach in Afghanistan does promote dependency and is counter-productive. Vern Liebl (CAOCL) among others questions why anyone would be surprised by the negative consequences of pouring billions of dollars of donor money into a devastatingly impoverished country. This aid has fueled elite corruption at the expense of the poorest Afghans which has in turn soured public opinion even more on the US-imposed central government and likely aided the resurgence of the popular acceptance of the Taliban. Benjamin Hopkins (GWU) sees the question of Afghan dependency itself is insulting to Afghans arguing that it is the West’s pursuit of “unrealistic policies” in Afghanistan not some Afghani flaw that has generated deleterious cycles. In addition to fueling government corruption for example, US policy has strapped the Kabul Government with unsustainable government institutions including a security force that “is well beyond the ability of the country to sustain. That said, “anti-corruption” measures are not the solution here. Shalini Venturelli cautions that Westerners/outsiders can easily misunderstand local norms of human networking and in correctly label some social-required activities as corruption. Rather than dismissing social influence networks outright, Venturelli recommends leveraging this existing system of relationships to advance security interests in Afghanistan.

What strategic factors should guide changes in US military or other support?

The authors are clear on this point: we cannot assess our strategic approach without a strategic vision. Reflecting the perspectives of her fellow contributors, Shireen Khan Burki asks the essential question: “What exactly is the strategic mission of the US vis-à-vis Afghanistan?” There is consensus among the experts who feel that the US approach has lacked a clear articulation of US goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Many are skeptical that there is a coherent strategic vision or set of mission objectives that would align with all the foreign activities and aid in Afghanistan. At the very least if they have been articulated, they have not been stated clearly in public. The experts pose a number of other questions that might serve as guides to review US policy in Afghanistan:

• “What are American goals in the country and how do they relate to US national interests?”
• “Who is the enemy?” There is a line of reasoning among the contributors that common responses to this question, for example, counter-terrorism, denying terror groups safe havens, ring hollow. First, there are many other places around the world including Pakistan that violent political networks can easily establish a presence, and secondly our own presence in Afghanistan has in fact exacerbated not minimized the ability of terror networks to recruit and operate in the country.
• “What if any interest [does] the US [have] in a stable vs. democratic Afghanistan?” In other words, what are US priorities regarding an acceptable political outcome if not all aspects can be achieved.
• Is it the mission of the US to fundamentally change Afghanistan?

Contributing Authors

Dr. Shireen Khan Burki (unaffiliated); Dr. Benjamin D. Hopkins (George Washington University); Dr. Shalini Venturelli (American University); Mr. Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, CAOCL); Dr. Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS); Dr. Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies, LLC); Dr. Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs), Dr. Spencer Meredith (National Defense University)

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 8: Post ISIL Governance.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 8 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population?
• Following the clearance of Da’esh from both Mosul and Raqqah, and beyond that any remaining substantive elements in the Euphrates River Valley, what governing structure is most likely to be effective, and acceptable to the predominant tribes?
• How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 6: ISIL Support and Recruitment.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 6 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?
• To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL’s ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes?
• What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 4: Regional Actor Interests and Motivations.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 4 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the strategic objectives and motivations of indigenous state and non-state partners in the counter-ISIL fight?
• In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.- led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the U.S. coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?
• What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab?
• What internal factors would influence Iran’s decision to interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb?
• What major economic, political and security (military) activities does KSA and Iran currently conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to gain influence? What are KSA and Iran’s ultimate goals behind these activities? What motivates KSA and Iran towards these goals? What future activities might KSA and Iran conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen?
• What are the indicators of changes in Russian strategic interests in Syria?
• What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh?
• What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence, following the effective military defeat of Da’esh [in Iraq] that Iran may view as beneficial?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 2: The Fight Against ISIS.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 2 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)?
• Question (LR 4): What is the strategic framework for undermining ISIL’s “Virtual Caliphate?”
• Question (V3): What long-term actions and processes should U.S. government (USG) institutions, the Coalition and the international community examine to position ourselves against a long term ISIL threat? How can the private sector be effectively engaged by government institutions to optimize the effects needed for success?
• Question (V6): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability?
• Question (R2.1): Have sentiments changed since the December 2014 polling? Have recent IO efforts in Mosul influenced these sentiments? What other means can we use to influence?
• Question (R2.5): What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?
• Question (R3.2): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support?
• Question (R3.7): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da’esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness?
• ViTTa Special Topic: Mosul Coalition Fragmentation: Causes and Effects

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 7: USG Bureaucratic Requirements.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 7 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?

Question (R5.3): How much influence can Iran wield in the next Iraqi election?

Author | Editor: S. Canna (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

Overview of Electoral System

Iraq is a parliamentary democracy and, as the April 2018 elections approach, political jockeying for votes and influence has already begun. Iraq has a unicameral house called the Council of Representatives (COR). As in other parliamentary systems, members of the ruling party or coalition choose the prime minister. So regional and domestic actors seeking to influence the election of a particular candidate for prime minister must start by ensuring its preferred political party or parties win enough seats to be in the majority.

Overview of Key Players and Parties

For Iran, its most important regional security priority is maintaining political influence in Iraq and Syria, according to Dr. Paul Rogers of Bradford University. Therefore, ensuring that a pro-Iranian government emerges from the April 2018 parliamentary elections is a critical interest for the country. According to Dr. Gawdat Bahgat of National Defense University and Dr. Anoush Ehteshami of Durham University, Iran does not view the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as foreign wars. It will not accept a Sunni dominated government in either country. Furthermore, Iran cannot tolerate a US-friendly government in Baghdad.

Iran wants to reorder politics in Iraq to remove the American military presence, according to Dr. Munqith Dagher of IIACS, an Iraqi polling firm, and Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler of University of Akron and Case Western University. Iran used to tolerate US military presence in Iraq, but now that Iran believes it can defeat the remainder of ISIS forces, it has begun to see US presence in the country as a threat to Iran’security. US military presence is also a hindrance to its goal of securing a supply and influence route through Iraq and Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Professor Zana Gulmohamad of University of Sheffield. Some refer to this poetically as the Shia Full Moon, according to Dr. Diane Maye of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

While Iran’s interest in the outcome of the election is clear, experts disagree about the extent to which Iran would take direct action to ensure a pro-Iranian outcome. One school of thought contends that Iran will do everything in its power to ensure a pro-Iran government emerges (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Experts point to evidence of this interference in Iranian exhortation to ensure that Shia political factions remain united (Gulmohamad). Furthermore, Drs. Dagher and Kaltenthaler suggest that Iran is behind a strategy to undermine Abadi’s power by accusing his allies of corruption.

The other school of thought suggests that Iran will not directly or overtly interfere in the elections as long as they are satisfied that their interests remain protected (Rogers). The political environment already skews towards the continued, if not increased, influence Iran enjoys in Iraq. An anonymous contributor from TRADOC’s Global Cultural Knowledge Network suggests that Iran is playing a long game. It is unlikely to directly influence the election, but it will continue to pursue establishing a Hezbollah-like strategy in Iraq using Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi (or Political Mobilization Units – PMUs).

Iran has a clear preference for the next prime minister. Within the leading Dawa party, there are two factions: the secular/nationalists lead by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the Iranian-backed hardliners lead by former Primer Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, Maye, TRADOC). Iran is strongly backing al-Maliki and his associated hardline candidates in the upcoming election (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, TRADOC). Maliki is a natural ally of the PMUs who are increasingly registering as political parties and presenting candidates in local elections (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, Rogers, Serwer). While Iranian-backed political parties are building momentum, Abadi is drawing on the support of a number Iraqis uncomfortable with the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Additionally, Iraq’s Arab national identity remains strong, and support for Abadi’s more secular, nationalistic style of leadership is growing among Sunni and Kurdish populations (Abdulla, Dagher, Kaltenthaler).

Potential Outcomes & Futures

It goes without saying that Iraq has a very fluid landscape due to the maneuvering of new political entities and the changing security environment; therefore, it is difficult to forecast the results of or the degree of influence Iran will have in the outcome of the election, Drs. Dagher and Kaltenthaler note in their contribution. Furthermore, given that Iraq has a parliamentary system, much of the negotiations to determine which parties will comprise the ruling coalition and who will be prime minister will take place after the election. Perhaps the three most important actors are Abadi, Maliki, and the Sadrist party with Abadi or Maliki most likely to emerge as the prime minister (Dagher, Kaltenthaler).

Army TRADOC’s Athena Simulation team conducted a futures analysis to examine the relationship between existing political blocs and the Iraqi population. They assessed the ability of various political coalitions to successfully form a government and to gauge the level of influence of foreign state actors on various political parties. While the study looked at seven potential electoral outcomes, one interesting thread was that Iran was only able to sway the election results by about 20% in some scenarios. This is a significant, but not deterministic, level of influence. Because Iran cannot outright determine the outcome of the election, minor parties such as the Sadrist Movement could become “king makers” (Liebl, Maye, TRADOC). The Sadrist party—a Shia nationalist party with an expansive following—has had shifting alliances in the past (Maye). However, lately it has been building bridges to Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations to push back against Iranian influence (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler, Maye). The Hakim party—the National Wisdom Movement—could also play a role in shifting the election towards one faction of the Dawa party or the other (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler, Maye, TRADOC).

Implications for the US

Ultimately, there is little the United States Government can do to influence the outcome of the election except to continue support Prime Minister Abadi, according to Dr. Daniel Serwer at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The United States’ best bet for continued influence in Iraq is the re-election of Abadi, who wants to balance US and Iranian influence in the country (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). The most serious challenge to USG interests would be the selection of Maliki as prime minister (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Maliki would likely push hard for the removal of US military forces in the country and further empower PMUs (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). This could enflame Sunni and Kurdish tensions, risking the stability and reconstruction of the country (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler).

The biggest concern, which Dr. Rogers describes as “one of the worst negative outcomes of the war since 2003,” is the rising influence of PMUs on the government in Baghdad. These Iranian-backed militias have become an essential part of the Iraqi armed forces and their move to create political parties and seek seats in the COR enhances Iran’s grip on the government. With whatever limited influence the USG has, it should encourage Baghdad to restrict armed militias from participating as political parties, according to Perry Cammack at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see also Rogers, Serwer).

Contributors

Hala Abdulla, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), USMC University; Gawdat Bahgat, National Defense University; Perry Cammack, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Munqith Dagher, IIACS; Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University (UK); Global Cultural Knowledge Network Staff, US ARMY TRADOC G2; Zana Gulmohamad, University of Sheffield (UK); Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron/Case Western Reserve University; Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), USMC University; Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; Paul Rogers, Bradford University (UK); Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, TRADOC G-27 Athena Study Team, Data Science, Models and Simulations Operational Environment Laboratory

Question (R2 #2): In countries where polling shows favorable opinions of ISIL (Syria, Nigeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Malaysia), what does this tell us? What do these countries have in common? What is our best approach to influence/inform?

Author | Editor: Steckman, L. (MITRE).

The contributors to this Quick Look responded to GEN Votel’s follow-up question, “In countries where polling shows favorable opinions of ISIL (Syria, Nigeria, Tunisia, Senegal, and Malaysia), what does this tell us? What do these countries have in common? What is our best approach to influence/inform?” To examine the complexity of the issues surrounding the question, the authors take both broad and country-specific approaches. There is general agreement that many Muslims worldwide are undergoing processes of Islamization for religious, social, economic, or political reasons, and that in some cases, built-up grievances have resulted in growing support for extremist movements, such as ISIL. Because each country varies, sometimes significantly, in terms of its domestic situation and its external relations, it is paramount to address those variations in crafting an effective approach to influence/inform.

This volume contains the following expert opinions:

Kathleen Reedy, a social scientist at RAND, argues that political Islam, of which Islamic extremism is one manifestation, has been gaining support worldwide with its “calls for social and political justice, and its ability to cut across a variety of ethnic lines.” In recent years, populations around the world have developed grievances around their political and economic situations, and in response, have pursued political Islam as a solution. While the circumstances causing grievances vary per country and region, the best approach to mitigating support for extremist groups such as ISIL involves identifying and addressing underlying grievances and delegitimizing groups that espouse military and political violence.

Ini Dele Adedeji, a Junior Teaching Fellow at the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), concludes that the countries under examination have all experienced one or more forms of religious, political, or economic upheaval, which have led to more favorable polling regarding ISIL support. In Syria, dissatisfaction with President Bashar al-Assad has created a Sunni versus non- Sunni divide within the country. That division has led to a dichotomy of “the enemy of my enemy is my political friend” that is sometimes expressed as support for ISIL or another anti-government faction. In Nigeria, Islamist movements have historically aligned with transnational movements as a form of protest against the state. Coupled with growing resentment of the West’s perceived war against Islam, some Muslim Nigerians have chosen to support ISIL, even when they do not condone all of the group’s methods. To influence populations, Dele Adedeji suggests promoting pro-Western sentiment among local clerics and using them to inject jihadist counter-narratives.

Sabina Henneberg, a Ph.D. candidate at John Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), focuses on the intersection of Tunisia’s recent history with international extremist movements and how they are “partially linked to support for ISIL.” Within Tunisia, the main Islamist political party’s move toward democracy and other domestic pushes toward secularism have not led to increased freedoms and civil rights, but rather have frustrated Muslims, intensified local grievances, and increased anti-Western sentiment. In order to improve the situation, Henneberg recommends reducing suspicion of outsiders and promoting capacity- building programming, to include rehabilitation programs for returning fighters.

Laura Steckman, a social scientist at MITRE, provides responses to the three-part question with recommendations for the way ahead. She points out some of the challenges with current polling efforts, arguing for the need to “craft and implement updated survey instruments that incorporate local cultural, social, and political norms and sensitivities in the appropriate languages.” Through a discussion of the Malaysia, Nigeria, and Senegal cases, she outlines how recent experience with Islamization and related ideologies have led to increased support for movements like ISIL outside of the Middle East. In order to lessen the attraction of ISIL or other extremist groups, Steckman recommends multiple campaigns across traditional and non-traditional media per country affected by significant pro-jihadist leanings, tailored to each country’s susceptible populations.

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, a research fellow at the Middle East Forum, provides a more implicit answer to the question with an outline summarizing the macro- and micro-levels of ISIL’s online propaganda. At the macro level, primarily areas outside of Syria and Iraq, early propaganda centered on “the supposed success of the statehood project of ISIL,” while more recent production focuses on the group’s militant activities. At the micro level, “dissemination of ISIL propaganda material on the ground must be considered the primary means of reception…rather than online broadcasting.” Jawad al-Tamimi further expounds on ISIL’s outreach strategy as one of external and internal da’wa (proselytization), where internal da’wa depicts the Islamic State as a strong state that protects Muslims and their rights, and external da’wa, designed to show non-Arab, non- Muslims the power of the Islamic State and of Islam. The purpose and content of ISIL propaganda must be considered in any influence/inform approach.

Contributing Authors

Kathleen Reedy (RAND), Sabina Henneberg (Johns Hopkins University), Ini Dele Adedeji (School of Oriental & African Studies, London), Laura Steckman (The MITRE Corporation), Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (Middle East Forum)

SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School – May 2017.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc).

On 11 May 2017, NPS convened a panel session and discuss areas related to the 4th round of CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Questions. The speakers are listed below, and their biographies are available in Appendix A.

Speakers:

1. Dr. Craig Whiteside (ISIS)
2. Dr. Hy Rothstein (Afghanistan)
3. Dr. Afshon Ostovar (Iran)
4. Dr. Ryan Gingeras (Turkey)
5. Dr. John Arquilla (General Strategy)
6. Dr. Glenn Robinson (Middle East)