SMA Publications

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 1: Messaging.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 1 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda?
• What are the USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from counter-messaging efforts in the information domain?
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? – Part 1
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? – Part 2
• The response to QL5 noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures. What effect could this have on Intel efforts?
• The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda. Is there more data available about the types of apps (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 8: Post ISIL Governance.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 8 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population?
• Following the clearance of Da’esh from both Mosul and Raqqah, and beyond that any remaining substantive elements in the Euphrates River Valley, what governing structure is most likely to be effective, and acceptable to the predominant tribes?
• How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 10: Supplemental Transcripts.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

The enclosed reports discuss wide-ranging issues related to the defeat if ISIL and stabilization of Syria and Iraq supplementary to the 9-part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM grouped by theme. Series reports may be obtained from Sam Rhem in the SMA Office at samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

The following discussions are part of the enclosed volume:

• Discussion Session with Naval Postgraduate School – 1 Nov 2016
• Discussion Session with Naval Postgraduate School 18 January 2017
• Interview Transcript – Murhaf Jouejati, National Defense University
• Interview Transcript – An Academic Who Wishes to remain Anonymous
• Interview Transcript – Nader Hashemi, University of Denver
• SMA Speaker Event, ISIS & Religion & Nation-Building in the Middle East, Dr. Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 6: ISIL Support and Recruitment.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 6 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?
• To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL’s ideology, particularly in European, N. African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes?
• What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 5: Sources of Extremism.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 5 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community?
• What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (i.e., external events). For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 7: USG Bureaucratic Requirements.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 7 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 9: Coalition Views.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 9 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-3/DDGO) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?

SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School – May 2017.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc).

On 11 May 2017, NPS convened a panel session and discuss areas related to the 4th round of CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Questions. The speakers are listed below, and their biographies are available in Appendix A.

Speakers:

1. Dr. Craig Whiteside (ISIS)
2. Dr. Hy Rothstein (Afghanistan)
3. Dr. Afshon Ostovar (Iran)
4. Dr. Ryan Gingeras (Turkey)
5. Dr. John Arquilla (General Strategy)
6. Dr. Glenn Robinson (Middle East)

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

At its zenith in 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory. ISIS seized control over major cities, notably Mosul and Raqqa, which contributed to increasing disorder in the Middle East. As late as 2015, the geographic reach of ISIS appeared to pose serious threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria as well as the physical safety of citizens in the region. Nonetheless, as of June 2017, estimates show that about 90% of Mosul had been liberated as Iraqi forces, in coordination with the Coalition, while they continued to regain large portions of the western part of the city. Similarly, a battle to retake Raqqa is in progress. US officials estimate that only around 2,000 ISIS fighters remain in the city, while US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces total around 55,000 fighters. Given these developments, ISIS is likely facing the end of its territorial rule.

Subject matter experts’ hypotheses about the future of ISIS have similarly evolved with changes in ISIS’s geographic holdings. Two years ago, experts converged on the significance of ISIS as an enduring threat. In contrast, in the present study, the experts consulted now indicate near certainty that the current geographic expression of ISIS will meet its demise. A question remains, however: What do these experts believe will happen next?

This paper will review subject matter experts’ opinions about a post-territorial ISIS to showcase what experts believe the organizational future of ISIS will be and what enduring or emergent threats this creates for the US and its allies. At the broadest level, some experts believe that after ISIS’s demise, displaced foreign fighters without allegiance could serve as human resource “kick starters” for other terrorist and insurgency groups, such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Other experts instead believe that former ISIS members are more likely to create splinter groups, an altered version of ISIS (an “ISIS 2.0”), or an entirely new organization in unstable areas where citizens’ grievances have been left unaddressed. Experts also differ in whether they believe ISIS can effectively evolve into a virtual organization. Some experts speculate that ISIS will manifest into an organization where members gather online, are recruited online, and are encouraged via this medium to carry out terror attacks in their home countries. Others assert that a core component of ISIS as an organization is the ownership of physical territory—and thus an entirely virtual ISIS is unlikely. To best present these various schools of thought about the future of ISIS and what that means with relation to the present-day ISIS, this paper is organized around three central questions:

1. Can ISIS exist without territory?
2. What happens to the fighters after ISIS is dismantled?
3. What can the United States do now to prevent the rise of an “ISIS 2.0” after ISIS 1.0’s demise?

10th Annual SMA Conference – From Control to Influence?
A View of—and Vision for—the Future.

Author | Editor: George Popp, Sarah Canna, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

Conference Background

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office hosted the 10th Annual SMA Conference on 25-26 April 2017 at Joint Base Andrews. This year’s conference, formally titled “From Control to Influence? A View of—and Vision for—the Future,” brought together a multidisciplinary group of participants to consider how the US and its allies can more effectively counter the influence that recently re-emerging, capable states (such as China and Russia) and non-state actors (such as ISIS) exert on their neighbors and/or third parties through multiple elements of power.

The rise of Anti-Access Area Denial capabilities and the economic ascendance of China lead some to argue that we are moving toward becoming a more pluralized, multipolar world in which military and economic sources of power are widely distributed. Technologies (e.g., the Internet and rapid means of mass migration) are making nation states increasingly more porous, and a resurgence of nationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics has solidified some states and weakened others. The continuance of these factors may change the way that the US, its allies, and its adversaries consider and prioritize influence, both within the state and across interstate borders. This conference examined these trends, and explored possible implications for how such factors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control” and how influence could exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next 30 years.

Conference Overview

Many of the conference’s panels touched on the human dimension of the challenges and opportunities the United States Government (USG) faces in the 21st century. The human element is a new aspect of competition and conflict that is not in the physical realm where the military typically feels most comfortable, but it is an environment that the military (and, more appropriately, the whole of government and whole of nation) must become more comfortable with.

Operating in this new world requires forms of mental agility that cannot be ordered on Amazon or developed in a military lab; it must be developed and nurtured. Societies must become more resilient— to attacks, to fake news, to unreasonable fears, and to reasonable fears as well. Creativity and surprise will become more important elements of US strategy than simply overwhelming military force. We must also do a better job of crafting and explaining our vision for the future international system, as this is another essential element of successful US strategy.

People will matter more in this new world, which means a successful US strategy must integrate not only whole of government, but whole of society to include industry, community groups, etc. Conflict is no longer solely in the military domain. Partly because of this, unclassified information will increasingly dominate intelligence analysis.

Warfare has always reflected new developments in society. Given the empowerment of individuals fueled by the information revolution, this has several implications for how the USG understands and interacts with populations (not just leaders). First, physical might is not going to always achieve strategic aims. We must use a soft power/influence/information strategy. Second, perceptions matter. We have a hard time accepting or acknowledging the validity of others’ perceptions, especially if we disagree with them. This hampers our effectiveness in communicating our strategy, influencing others’ behaviors, and responding to threats. Third, Target Audience Analysis (TAA) should not just be a Military Information Support Operations (MISO) process. Actions influence just as much, or even more, than messages do. Fourth, people are not persuaded by facts and logic. Neuroscience research show us that humans make decisions based on emotions first, and logic later.

As the conference shifted from defining new challenges brought by the changing environment, its focus turned to trying to understand how the Commands are dealing with these developments. The changing environment theme is not new—it has been a focus of SMA conferences for the last 10 years. But when we ask ourselves what exactly is so alarming about change, it is not only that the world is changing, but that parts of the US paradigm or strategy no longer work. The USG can no longer prevail by sheer application of overwhelming force. However, the US defense paradigm has not properly evolved or adapted to the changing environment. Conference participants suggested that the USG needs a new set of rules that are more adaptive to new and evolving environments. It is difficult for a bureaucracy to change, so this challenge should not be underestimated.

Ultimately, paradigms matter. The way we perceive and frame a challenge conditions and/or limits our responses. We clearly have blind spots. For example, the USG tends to apply the kinetic metaphor to influence operations. However, we cannot “win” in the information space by applying the equivalent of overwhelming force. Instead, we must understand the motivation and intentions of others, understand the environment in which they live, and—most importantly—understand ourselves.