SMA Publications

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 5: Sources of Extremism.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 5 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community?
• What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (i.e., external events). For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 10: Supplemental Transcripts.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

The enclosed reports discuss wide-ranging issues related to the defeat if ISIL and stabilization of Syria and Iraq supplementary to the 9-part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM grouped by theme. Series reports may be obtained from Sam Rhem in the SMA Office at samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

The following discussions are part of the enclosed volume:

• Discussion Session with Naval Postgraduate School – 1 Nov 2016
• Discussion Session with Naval Postgraduate School 18 January 2017
• Interview Transcript – Murhaf Jouejati, National Defense University
• Interview Transcript – An Academic Who Wishes to remain Anonymous
• Interview Transcript – Nader Hashemi, University of Denver
• SMA Speaker Event, ISIS & Religion & Nation-Building in the Middle East, Dr. Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 1: Messaging.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 1 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda?
• What are the USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from counter-messaging efforts in the information domain?
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? – Part 1
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? – Part 2
• The response to QL5 noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures. What effect could this have on Intel efforts?
• The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda. Is there more data available about the types of apps (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished?

SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 3: Encouraging Regional Stability.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 3 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?
• What are the most likely post-lSIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end state favorable to U.S. and coalition interests?
• What opportunities are there for USCENTCOM to shape a post-ISIL Iraq and regional security environment promoting greater stability?
• What are the factors that will influence the future of Syria and how can we best affect them?
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability?
• What will be Iran’s strategic calculus regarding Iraq and the region post-ISIL? How will JCPOA impact the calculus? What opportunities exist for the US/Coalition to shape the environment favorable to our interests?
• What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post-ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups?
• How does the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict influence, affect, and relate to current conflicts in the region?
• What are the key factors or elements within the Government of Iraq that influence overall stability in Syria and Iraq? What are the tipping points for each?

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SMA CENTCOM Reach-back Reports – Part 9: Coalition Views.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

This is Part 9 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-3/DDGO) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.

Responses were submitted to the following CENTCOM Questions:

• How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?

Question (R2 QL7): What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post-ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups?

Author | Editor: Reedy, K. (RAND).

The primary theme that all of the experts touched upon is that there will be no single unified situation regarding either the military groups or status of northern Syria in a post-ISIL environment. The current fractured nature of the resistance groups in the area will continue, with different sub-regions experiencing different likely outcomes with different actors. Dr. Craig Whiteside (Naval War College) also includes the important caveats that a) post-ISIL means after ISIL loses its ability to control extended territory, as it will likely continue to hold control of villages across Syria and Iraq for some time to come; and b) this question is predicated on continued U.S. strategic interest in engaging in Syria in the near- and medium-term future. A third assumption is that these militant groups continue to operate. If a political solution can ever be reached, some of these militias will likely sign on to the agreement and may disarm or be incorporated into regime security forces, meaning many of them may be removed from consideration.

Assuming that the U.S. will continue some level of involvement in Syria, the wide variety of actors and situations on the ground will necessitate taking a broad variety of tactics, as each organization and population will require different approaches. In some instances, this may mean acknowledging that CENTCOM will be unlikely to be able to engage in effective ways and even where it can, as Mr. Vern Liebl (Marine Corps University) notes, may have to be resigned to only having limited and short-term influence.

Wide Variation by Region and Actors

The experts agree that there will be a wide degree of variation in what happens with the military groups after ISIL loses control over the extended territory of the caliphate. Faysal Itani (Atlantic Council) and Liebl both suggest that the vacuum left by ISIL will be filled by the Syrian regime, Kurdish forces, and the broad spectrum of Syrian opposition groups. Whiteside considers the remainder of the ISIL forces and those they manage to recruit part of this milieu as well.

Itani and Liebl offer that the Kurdish population will be one of the dominant players in northern Syria after the fall of ISIL, with the PYD continuing to serve as the political arm and the YPG as the militant one. The Kurdish groups are likely to hold their current territory along the northern border of the country as well as contest areas in the northeast. Their ability to hold ground much in more ethnically diverse territories may be less effective, but as a militia and a political force, they are likely to remain a key player. Itani notes that some of the Kurdish power in the northeast will be contested by various Arab militias, some of which participated as part of Euphrates Shield. Liebl describes the wide variety of militias that are likely to compete for power, each of which has their own agenda. Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS, formerly al-Nusra) may attempt to gain some control here as well, but is likely to be poorly received by the local population and may instead be coopted by ISIL.

Northwest of Aleppo and into Idlib Province, where ISIL has had no real influence, are likely to continue to see the influence of JFS and the only somewhat more moderate Salafi Ahrar al- Sham. The only major contender for control against them in the region will be the regime coming from the south and Aleppo, but it may take extended periods of counterinsurgency efforts to fully eliminate them (unless they can be brought into a political solution, which JFS has shown no interest in and Ahrar al-Sham seems to be divided on), meaning they are likely to remain active and violent, if underground.

Whiteside focuses on the Salafi groups, particularly on what the remnants of ISIL will likely do in the wake of such an event. Under different names, he argues, the Islamic State has been in a similar position twice before, which will likely serve as an indicator of how they may react in the future. A defeated ISIL would find core areas in Iraq and Syria where the reach of the government is limited, which would include dozens of places in Iraq (particularly in Anbar, the Jazira desert, and Diyala and Salahuddin provinces) and even more in Syria. In these locations, they would try to keep the flames of resistance alive while waiting for opportunities to take advantage of the environment (such as poor governance or sectarian behavior). They would likely not only do so using their own forces, but would attempt to recruit and coopt other Salafi groups and fighters into an umbrella movement, as they did (as Tawhid wal Jihad and later AQI) in Iraq in 2003-2006, using financial and political rewards as a recruiting incentive.

In addition, there are a number of other, more pro-regime militant organizations that will be vying for control, including the regime itself and Hezbollah (as well as the Syrian-based Shi’a militias backed by Iran). These groups will be attempting to solidify the regime’s control, but what and how they do so, and how they interact with other extant militias, is highly uncertain at this point.

CENTCOM Engagement Will Have to Be Tailored

All of the experts agree that future engagement from CENTCOM will have to be tailored to the specific group they are attempting to influence and much of it will depend on how the political situation unfolds. Itani notes that relationships do exist between the US and some groups, but were mainly forged in the covert operations rooms set up in Jordan and Turkey rather than via CENTCOM, and have been strained by local perceptions that the United States is no longer concerned with the war and focuses exclusively on ISIL and, increasingly, JFS. Repairing these relations and re-establishing credibility will be a challenge, but important if CENTCOM wishes to exert lasting influence rather than just transactional engagements. Below are examples provided by the experts of particular militant groups and advice on how to engage them.

• PYD/YPG: Liebl describes the history of U.S. engagement with the Kurdish forces. In essence, the U.S. has been inconsistent with its support, supplying more and less of it at various points since 2013. While the Kurds have generally been happy to work with U.S. forces and will undoubtedly continue to do so, they may not see the U.S. as a “stable” ally, especially when Turkey and Russia are involved. Maintaining credible and consistent relations with them will be an essential part of CENTCOM’s approach, though the Kurds may always hedge.
• Anti-Regime Militias: This umbrella consists of a wide and diverse range of militant groups, each with very different relations toward the U.S. and very different agendas. Some will be more accessible to CENTCOM influence, but some may be out of reach. Liebl cautions that the U.S. will need to be realistic about how much influence it can actually wield with these groups. He provides examples , including
  • The Syriac Military Council, allied to the PYD, but with little connection to the U.S., meaning the U.S. will likely have little ability to influence it
  • The Turkmen Sultan Murid Division, which is anti-PYD and neo-Ottoman, affiliated with the FSA and closely coordinates with the Turkish Army may be another group the U.S. may not be able to influence
  • The Turkmen Seljuk Brigade, which is pro-Kurdish now, may be more amenable to U.S. support in terms of training and financing.
  • The Sunni Arab Hamza Division, associated with the FSA, and Jbhat Thuwar al- Raqqa were both part of the U.S. train and equip program are likely to continue to be amenable to U.S. support and leveage.
  • The al-Mu’tasim Brigade, also with the FSA has received support from the U.S., but is more closely allied with Turkey, so should be treated with caution.
  • The Jaysh al-Thuwar are largely independent in their anti-ISIL fight, and having not yet accepted U.S. aid, are unlikely to do so.
• Pro-Regime Militias: There are a number of these of different ethnic and religious backgrounds that the U.S. is unlikely to ever be able to influence, given the political differences between the regime and the U.S., including, the regime itself, Hezbollah, and smaller regional groups like the Assyrian Gozarto Protection Force and Sootoro.
• Hardline Salafi Groups: The remnants of ISIL and JSF will continue to be a combative one.
• Ahrar al-Sham: Itani notes that engaging this group will be somewhat more complex than the other Salafi organizations, because while it has often worked closely with JFS, it does not aspire to a transnational jihad. This group is internally divided between those who are pushing for outreach to the U.S., and others who are committed to a more hostile form of Salafism. This is a powerful group and an important one. The U.S.’ best bet is to try to separate the reconcilables from the hostiles, by offering a choice between US support (including against ISIL and the regime) and conflict.

Contributing Authors

Mr. Vern Liebl (Marine Corps University), Mr. Faysal Itani (Atlantic Council), Dr. Craig Whiteside (Naval War College)

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The EUCOM video highlights work NSI did in collaboration with the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office and the US Department of Defense to apply NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to examine potential drivers of conflict and convergence in Eurasia over the next 5-25 years. For access to the full ViTTa analysis, please visit: ViTTa Analysis of Eurasia in the Next 5-25 Years.

Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Report Card.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands. SMA projects focus on complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multidisciplinary solutions (i.e., specialized, research-based technological products including analytic models, reports, and software components) that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. SMA solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-39) and executed by ASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO. SMA efforts are Coalition based and address mission areas spanning Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Countering Proliferation of WMD (State and non-State); Individual, State, and National-level Deterrence Assessment; and Strategic Global and Regional Assessments.

This report provides a scorecard of SMA project assessment results by geographical region: Middle East, Eurasia, Central and South Asia, Pacific, and Africa; as well as by global issue: Cyber, Deterrence, Counter-Terrorism, and Counter-WMD.

The SMA projects assessed include:

• FY 07: Sudan Strategic Assessment (CENTCOM)
• FY 07: DAPSE (STRATCOM)
• FY 08: WMD-T (SOCOM), Global Assessment of WMD-T (SOCOM/DTRA Cell established)
• FY 09: Interagency LOE (STRATCOM)
• FY 09: Deterrence (STRATCOM)
• FY 09-10: Support to ISAF (Gens McChrystal/Flynn)
• FY 11: IVEO (CENTCOM/SOCOM)
• FY 11: Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Stability – CANS (STRATCOM)
• FY 12: Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism (Joint Staff J39)
• FY 12-13: Strategic Short- and Long-term Stability in South Asia (CENTCOM/PACOM/STRATCOM)
• FY 14: A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad (JS)
• FY 14: Megacities RSI (PACOM)
• FY 14: Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the
  Next 5-25 Years (PACOM)
• FY 14: US Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRICOM)
• FY 14: The Dynamics of ISIL Success in Multi-method Assessment of ISIL
• FY 15: Coordinator’s Mission Review (USSC)
• FY 15: Looking Beyond ISIL: What Would the Region Look Like Beyond the Current Phase? (SOCCENT)
• FY 15: Russia and NATO Post Putin: The Space Between Peace and War (EUCOM)
• FY 16: Gray Zone Conflicts – Challenges and Opportunities (SOCOM)
• FY 16: Counter Da’esh Messaging (USASOC)

Integration Report: Gray Zone Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) requested a Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort “to determine how the USG can identify, diagnose, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against associated types of gray zone conflicts.” This integration report provides a synthesis of all the team projects. Their work has advanced understanding of the contours of the gray zone terrain, and the challenges inherent in navigating that terrain. By identifying the critical features of the gray zone, their findings also provide a guide to where USSOCOM and other DOW entities should focus future efforts in this area to facilitate the development of operational level planning and response strategies. The key results of the effort fall into four areas as summarized below.

What is the nature of gray zone conflict?

• There is no single condition that can identify an action as gray, independent of actor or understanding of the broader strategic context
• We need to think on multiple timescales, across multiple arenas (e.g. political, social, economic), and understand and engage with multiple social levels (state, group, individual)
• Populations are the key dimension in gray zone conflict
• Norm violations help define the threshold between ordinary competition and the gray zone

What motivates actors to engage in gray zone activities?

• Successful US deterrence has not eliminated the motivations of other actors to further their own interests
• Acting in the gray zone is an effective low risk, low cost strategy that has proven difficult for the US and partner nations to counter, and for vulnerable states to defend against
• US military places primacy on physical maneuver, and our adversaries know this

How should the US respond to gray zone activities?

• Incorporate the human / cognitive domain
  • Think and plan beyond kinetic responses alone; expand DOW definitions of maneuver and objective to account for the human aspects of military operations
  • Shape the international environment to reduce the motivations for engaging in gray zone activities
• Develop a clear, compelling strategic narratives
  • Provide alternative narratives and leverage social and mass media to communicate them
  • Build trust and credibility with partner nations to enable unity of effort
  • An enduring, proactive presence and consistent messaging across all USG agencies is a significantly superior approach to taking select actions in response to specific gray actions
• Scope and timing of US response matters
  • Inaction in the face of low level actions (e.g. Chinese Island building in the SCS) can over time create a “new reality” that threatens US interests and security
  • Early and effective response to gray actions and strategies requires a consistent US presence
• Focus now should be less on defining specific actions as gray zone threats, and more on how to leverage all instruments of national power to respond to them

What capabilities does the US need to respond effectively to gray zone activities?

• Human/Cognitive Domain Information & Expertise
  • Gray zone strategies exploit multiple instruments of power. Operating in this environment requires information across all of these instruments
• Conceptual Models and Frameworks
  • Scope of gray zone activities will make information requirements overwhelming without models to guide search and interpretation

A Cognitive Capabilities Agenda: A Multi-Step Approach for Closing DOW's Cognitive Capability Gap.

Author | Editor: A. Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conducted a year-long project for USSOCOM on the growing prevalence of Competition Short of Armed Conflict (CSAC), or use of “Gray Zone” tactics by US adversaries. Key findings from the study include first, the immediate need to incorporate the “human / cognitive domain” into military planning to avoid the strategic surprise that gray zone tactics intend. Second, the study highlighted the current deficit in the joint force of operationally-applicable human / cognitive domain information and expertise. During its final project review, the study’s Senior Review Group (SRG) noted that “…the changing nature of conflict means that the US Department of War (DOW) needs to start changing the way it thinks as a whole, and the results of this SMA effort can play a valuable role” in broadening our understanding of the strategic and operational environment to incorporate the human/cognitive aspects of military operations. Reflecting on the deficit in US capabilities in the cognitive environment the SRG asked: “Who is going to craft the appropriate messages? Who is going to provide the necessary tools? Who is going to use these tools? These are questions that we need to answer.”

This s white paper is a brief effort to suggest an initial outline that might be undertaken to address these questions.

Contributors

CAPT Joseph A. DiGuardo, Jr. (Joint Staff J39), Dr. Hriar Cabayan (Joint Staff J39); Mr. Michael Ceroli (USASOC); Dr. Rebecca Goolsby (ONR); Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM); Dr. Spencer Meredith (NDU); Mr. Randy Munch (TRADOC G-2); Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE), Dr. Robert Taguchi (USASOC); LTC Scott Thomson (OUSD-P)