SMA Publications

R4 Question #2: How could DOW and DoS be better postured to address regional and world conflicts to ensure a whole of government approach to identify and synchronize lines of effort in both planning and execution?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

Not many experts were willing to tackle this problem of synchronizing whole of government planning and execution processes across the Department of War (DOW) and the Department of State (DoS). While there seems to be a growing acceptance that greater cooperation between DOW and DoS is essential for responding to adversaries that act like complex adaptive systems, no single governmental organ which can, through its own effort, ensure that institutionalized planning and execution cooperation occurs regularly.

In other words, there is no single individual or agency that knows how to implement a whole of government approach or that has the authority to do so, even just between the DOW and DoS, which is a fundamental problem (Serwer). Despite the promising observation that DOW and DoS are “more in alignment than anytime in the last 20 years” (Serwer), some experts passionately concluded that whole- of-government “is an empty slogan and a cruel joke” (Chow).

Both assertions are an accurate and problematic portrayal of the status quo.

This paper outlines some of the challenges facing DOW and DoS Synchronizations as well as some recommendations for what the DOW can do within its current authorities. Bureaucracies resist change, so, ultimately; our contributors suggested two additional recommendations that lie outside DOW jurisdiction and would need to be implemented out by senior US policy makers.

Obstacles to DOW and DoS Synchronization

Focusing solely here on DOW and DoS synchronization—and leaving a true whole of government approaches for another time—, the contributors list five challenges preventing closer collaboration.

1. Giant Imbalance in Capacity: The biggest challenge, for which there are many causes, is the “giant imbalance in capacity” between DoS and DOW (Chow, Serwer). In recent history, the US military instruments of power have been much more powerful than the civilian ones (Serwer).
2. Decreased Funding for State: The State Department budget is a fraction of the Defense budget. Serwer notes this imbalance is about to get worse as proposed budget cuts would take more funding away from DoS and increase funding for DOW (see also Chow).
3. DOW Called Upon Too Late: The DOW often does not get called in until a crisis has already developed (Chow). Waiting to collaborate with DoS until an active conflict threatens makes it even more difficult to work with DoS given the lack of communication, trust, and training between the two organizations.
4. Operational Differences: DoS resists formal plans for its operations (Serwer), given that due to resource constraints, human resource assets are often involved in multiple lines of effort with dynamic prioritization. This approach creates difficulties for synchronization with the DOW , which has the resources for formal planning with specific human resource assets devoted to executing those plans. DOW , as a result, often finds it difficult to know when or how to reach out for assistance and collaboration.

What Can the DOW Do?

Building off the last point, the DOW does not have the ability to fashion a whole of government framework on its own, but contributors note places where DOW can take the lead to start bridging the divide between the two organizations. They suggest two ways forward.

Option 1: Training

Serwer noted that shared DoS/DoW training would go a long way to building mutual trust, esteem, and communication between the two organizations. However, he believes this is nearly impossible in today’s environment. The best he feels the organizations can hope for is some commonality in training material.

Option 2: Start by Cooperating on One Issue: Science Diplomacy/Smart Power

Moloney and Dehgan suggest that DOW and DoS begin working together on an issue of mutual concern: water security. History has shown us that water insecurity is a major driver of conflict, particularly in the Middle East. In particular, Iran is increasingly feeling the pressures of water insecurity, which is could be potentially destabilizing to the country and the region, perhaps compelling it to act in ways unfavorable to US interests. Creating a mutual understanding of the problem and building a plan together to address it could act as a confidence building measure between the two organizations.

Option 3: Reach Out to Experts Outside the DOW

Breslin Smith notes the “national security community faces a unique hurdle in gathering insights in these areas from the academic community,” particularly from Middle East scholars. Breslin Smith notes that policy suffers as a consequence from this divide. Happily, as the successful partnership between USCENTCOM and SMA has shown over the last several months, the DOW is taking steps to reach out to experts than can provide a deep understanding of our partners and adversaries. Over 190 experts have contributed to this effort to date and there are other organizations that also bring DOW and outside experts together.

What Has to Be Done by Policy Makers?

Option 4: Combine National Defense and International Affairs Budget Functions

Breslin Smith suggests combining the National Defense (050) and International Affairs (150) budget functions to get a comprehensive understanding of how National Security funds are allocated. This was last attempted during the Reagan administration. Combining budget functions would allow one to compare all “strategic communication” or “public diplomacy” being done across the DOW and DoS. This would “help the ‘whole of government’ idea, save redundancy, and better focus our efforts,” Breslin Smith argues. This might also help minimize the funding imbalance between DoS and DOW.

Option 5: Develop a Grand Strategy

Coordination is more effective when everyone is moving in the same general direction. The first step is to understand the deep cultural, historical, economic, and political knowledge related to an issue or region of concern (Breslin Smith). The second step is to develop a strategy for addressing the issue. Strategy will not be effective with deep understanding. Only after these first two steps have been accomplished can we design a national security architecture to execute that strategy. Breslin Smith suggested convening a competitive strategy study for addressing challenges facing the USG in the Middle East along the lines of Project Solarium, which was conducted by the National War College for President Eisenhower in response to emerging threats from the Soviet Union.

Contributors

Edward Chow (CSIS), Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs), Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies, LLC), Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of International Studies), Janet Breslin Smith (Crosswinds International Consulting)

SMA CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Feedback and SMA Publication Website Statistics.

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

Feedback from CENTCOM

CENTCOM after receiving the Reach Back Cell Reports distributes them to the staff for their review and the reports ultimately are disseminated throughout the Command and placed on the “Strategic Studies” portal on the CENTCOM Homepage (under “Community of Interests”) and available for download and search by members of the Command. The NSI team also posts the reports on their website (URL above) and they are also searchable on the NSI website. There exists a feed-back loop on the SMA SIPR page. The command will solicit feedback from the various directorates and sub-Commands there and then distill a succinct response after reviewing each paper to give confidence that the findings have reached and been reviewed with the relevant Plan Teams. CENTCOM is also planning to conduct a survey and feedback from that survey will be disseminated. Feedback that has been provided so far included the following:

• These assessments bring added value for CENTCOM since at least they provide context and different perspectives. Most likely, these papers inform different divisions at a time depending on the subject.
• SMA products are geared for general planners, those that need to increase their knowledge on the region, and should be perused as a matter of professionalism.
• SMA is free, casts a wide net, and provides quality products – it is an excellent resource to address leaders questions that aren’t taken up in other venues. SMA products are a great starting point for those that need to brush up on prevailing expert opinion.
• The Operational Assessments Group (OAG) are a small group and are tasked to think bigger picture, like Weapons of Mass Destruction and Virtual Caliphate (projects that last weeks/months). For example, OAG provided the Commander with a lot of the information for the Virtual Caliphate article he published in the Center for a New American Security. SMA products are right in line with the types of information they process and for the types of projects they work on.
• The largest portion of the CENTCOM J2 is the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), and most JIC analysts are geographic or regional experts who are tasked to provide mostly quick turn (1hr/1day) products based on SIGINT/HUMINT “intel facts.” The SMA info is generally too long and not directly traceable to intel facts to be plugged into their products.
• I think these assessments bring added value for CENTCOM since at least they provide context and different perspectives. We intend to read a few of the most recent reports and apply a bit of a checklist to key findings – determine what, could be/needs to be, purposefully tasked for inclusion in our campaign design or perhaps referred to other agencies for policy action – CCJ3 Plans.

SMA Publications Statistics

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) is a multidisciplinary, multi-agency portfolio of projects that assesses and studies challenging problems associated with planning and operations of DoD, military services, and Government agencies.

The SMA Publications is the collection of analytical reports, proceedings, white papers, and various other related materials that correspond to the multitude of SMA projects from 2007 to current date, all organized and metadata tagged to facilitate easy and efficient document discovery, retrieval, search and filtering.

The SMA Publications is hosted and maintained at NSI’s website. Below is the URL for the SMA Publications along with the URLs for various related publication listings:

• SMA publications
• NSI publications archive
• Reachback Cell publications
• SMA Speaker Series publications

Google Analytics – Google’s web analytics service – is used to track and report website traffic to the SMA Publications and Reachback Cell publication listings, along with traffic to some of the key publications found in those publication listings. Below is a summary of some of the website traffic for Feb 2017. In the charts that follow, a “view” corresponds to a pageview in Google Analytics parlance, which is the total number of times the page was viewed (note: repeat views of the page by a single user are each counted).

The Meaning of ISIS Defeat and Shaping Stability — Highlights from CENTCOM Round 1, 2 and 3 Reach-back Reports.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Conclusion

ISIS will be defeated militarily. However, whether it is ultimately overcome by containment or by deploying ground forces to apply overwhelming force, the path to mitigating violent extremism in the region is a generations-long one. Military options are insufficient to protect US interests and stabilize the region. It will require significant strengthening of State Department and non-DOD capacity to help build inclusive political institutions and processes that protect minority rights in Syria and Iraq. Only if these flourish will ISIS — the organization and the idea it represents — have failed and the region been put on a sustainable path to stability.

Since September 2016 the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team has pulsed its global network of academics, think tank scholars, former ambassadors, and experienced practitioners to respond to three rounds of questions by USCENTCOM.3 We received responses from 164 experts from institutions in the US, Iraq, Spain, Israel, the UK, Lebanon, Canada, France and Qatar. 4 The result was 41 individual reach- back reports, each of which consists of an executive summary and the input received from the experts.

This report summarizes key points from the first three rounds of questions. It compiles what the experts had to say about three critical questions: 1) Will military defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq eliminate the threat it poses? 2) What are the implications of ISIS defeat for regional stability? and 3) What should the US/Coalition do to help stabilize the region?

Question (R2 QL1): Have sentiments changed since the December 2014 polling? Have recent IO efforts in Mosul influenced these sentiments? What other means can we use to influence?

Author | Editor: McCulloh, I. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab).

Data suggests that sentiment toward DA’ESH1 has changed since the December 2014 polling conducted by USCENTCOM. The SMA team cannot adequately assess recent IO efforts in Mosul due to lack of clarity on programs conducted, their specific objectives, and an understanding of the associated assessment plan. A limited assessment of DA’ESH online propaganda and impacts of US Government (USG) and coalition efforts to restrict this propaganda is provided. Insights for future influence operations are recommended.

USCENTCOM understanding of the population on the ground is significantly hampered by a lack of continued polling and survey research in critical areas of strategic significance. It is clearly possible to conduct this type of research throughout DA’ESH controlled territory as well as other non-permissive environments with proper risk mitigation measures in place. While polling in these environments is dangerous and should not be left to inexperienced staff officers to plan and manage, it provides critical insights for effective operations in the Gray Zone. The first and foremost recommendation in this report is for the Commander, USCENTCOM to personally intervene to obtain the necessary authorities and resources for on-the-ground polling in areas of strategic importance.

Dr. Munqith Dagher of IIACSS, a polling and research firm in the Middle East, has provided independently funded data collected in Mosul between the December 2014 poll and March 2016. These data show that general popular support for DA’ESH increased through December of 2015 and then dropped sharply. As of March 2016, popular support for DA’ESH in Mosul had nearly returned to pre-invasion levels. The SMA could not identify more recent data to support objective assessment.

Atmospherics from IIACSS pollsters indicate that the decline in popular support to DA’ESH is primarily due to increased harsh treatment of the local population by DA’ESH in response to fears of locals providing active support to the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the coalition. They also cite deteriorating economic conditions as a result of low oil prices, closed borders, and economic sanctions against DA’ESH.

DA’ESH’s internet presence has changed over the last year. Their focus has shifted from highlighting positive messages of “Life in the Caliphate” to messages of battle statistics and a narrative that losses on the ground do not translate into the elimination of the Caliphate. It is the opinion of the authors that this shift in narrative is less effective for DA’ESH securing popular support, but may be more effective at reducing military defection and maintaining a source of foreign fighters for their ground campaign.

The USG campaign to remove DA’ESH cyber personas from the internet (e.g. Twitter suppression) may make it more difficult for potential recruits to find, however, it makes it equally difficult to collect information on the DA’ESH narrative, priorities, objectives, and lines of persuasion. Given DA’ESH guidance to members to limit individual accounts suggests that they may be attempting to limit their online footprint as a matter of strategy and not in response to online information operations activities by the USG. Increased restrictions on the internet has resulted in on-the-ground distribution of offline media (CDs, DVDs, etc). There is insufficient data to understand the nature or effectiveness of these materials. It is the opinion of this author that USCENTCOM should pursue a more sophisticated campaign of operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to support a wider range of options for military engagement and foreign policy.

An assessment of individuals who have joined, defected, or provide tacit support to DA’ESH reveal two major reasons for support: governance and ideology. People throughout Iraq seek economic prosperity free from sectarian prejudice. They seek an equitable distribution of government services. The coalition must be prepared to fill the governance vacuum with micro-economic development programs, restore oil revenues, and most importantly ensure that non-local sectarian militias do not take control of former DA’ESH occupied areas. Governance will be more successful if it is decentralized at the local level. As a matter of ideology, Iraqis culturally value dignity and family. Fears of reprisal, treatment of civilians, and the inappropriate use of Islam are cultural levers that can quickly turn the population away from reconstruction efforts. The coalition must prioritize efforts to create checks and balances that monitor and prevent corruption and reprisals.

Although not included in this report, Johns Hopkins University and University of California Los Angeles recently conducted social neuroscience experimentation in Amman, Jordan. One of the findings was that Jordanians and Iraqis in the study resented the use of Islam in persuasive messaging. They also found that the use of Islam provided a more effective influence channel. The coalition must be very careful in whether they use Islam and how they use Islam in any information operations activities. While Islam can provide an effective line of persuasion, it may also develop resentment toward the messenger. It is the opinion of the authors that messaging involving Islam should be left to Muslim non-governmental organizations.

The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. The first chapter provides on- the-ground data for popular sentiment in Mosul since 2014. The second chapter provides an assessment of DA’ESH propaganda online. The third chapter offers recommendations for future operations in Iraq. Biographies of contributors are provided. These authors can be contacted through the Joint Staff.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Munqith Dagher (IIACSS Research), Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (Middle East Forum), Ms. Sheila Young (USAID), and Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University)

Author | Editor: Popp, G. & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

This report represents the views and opinions of the participants. The report does not represent official USG policy or position.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), and jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and US Government (USG) Agencies, the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team established a virtual Reach Back Cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, has provided USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region. This Panel will discuss the main findings from the SMA Reach Back Cell.

Panel members:

• Ms. Sarah Canna (NSI), moderator
• Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)
• Dr. Munqith M. Dagher (IIACSS)
• Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University)
• Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)
• Dr. Diane Maye (ERAU)
• Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE)
• Ms. Tricia DeGennaro (TRADOC G-27)
• Dr. Jon Wilkenfeld (University of Maryland)

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

At its zenith in 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory. ISIS seized control over major cities, notably Mosul and Raqqa, which contributed to increasing disorder in the Middle East. As late as 2015, the geographic reach of ISIS appeared to pose serious threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria as well as the physical safety of citizens in the region. Nonetheless, as of June 2017, estimates show that about 90% of Mosul had been liberated as Iraqi forces, in coordination with the Coalition, while they continued to regain large portions of the western part of the city. Similarly, a battle to retake Raqqa is in progress. US officials estimate that only around 2,000 ISIS fighters remain in the city, while US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces total around 55,000 fighters. Given these developments, ISIS is likely facing the end of its territorial rule.

Subject matter experts’ hypotheses about the future of ISIS have similarly evolved with changes in ISIS’s geographic holdings. Two years ago, experts converged on the significance of ISIS as an enduring threat. In contrast, in the present study, the experts consulted now indicate near certainty that the current geographic expression of ISIS will meet its demise. A question remains, however: What do these experts believe will happen next?

This paper will review subject matter experts’ opinions about a post-territorial ISIS to showcase what experts believe the organizational future of ISIS will be and what enduring or emergent threats this creates for the US and its allies. At the broadest level, some experts believe that after ISIS’s demise, displaced foreign fighters without allegiance could serve as human resource “kick starters” for other terrorist and insurgency groups, such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Other experts instead believe that former ISIS members are more likely to create splinter groups, an altered version of ISIS (an “ISIS 2.0”), or an entirely new organization in unstable areas where citizens’ grievances have been left unaddressed. Experts also differ in whether they believe ISIS can effectively evolve into a virtual organization. Some experts speculate that ISIS will manifest into an organization where members gather online, are recruited online, and are encouraged via this medium to carry out terror attacks in their home countries. Others assert that a core component of ISIS as an organization is the ownership of physical territory—and thus an entirely virtual ISIS is unlikely. To best present these various schools of thought about the future of ISIS and what that means with relation to the present-day ISIS, this paper is organized around three central questions:

1. Can ISIS exist without territory?
2. What happens to the fighters after ISIS is dismantled?
3. What can the United States do now to prevent the rise of an “ISIS 2.0” after ISIS 1.0’s demise?

10th Annual SMA Conference – From Control to Influence?
A View of—and Vision for—the Future.

Author | Editor: George Popp, Sarah Canna, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

Conference Background

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office hosted the 10th Annual SMA Conference on 25-26 April 2017 at Joint Base Andrews. This year’s conference, formally titled “From Control to Influence? A View of—and Vision for—the Future,” brought together a multidisciplinary group of participants to consider how the US and its allies can more effectively counter the influence that recently re-emerging, capable states (such as China and Russia) and non-state actors (such as ISIS) exert on their neighbors and/or third parties through multiple elements of power.

The rise of Anti-Access Area Denial capabilities and the economic ascendance of China lead some to argue that we are moving toward becoming a more pluralized, multipolar world in which military and economic sources of power are widely distributed. Technologies (e.g., the Internet and rapid means of mass migration) are making nation states increasingly more porous, and a resurgence of nationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics has solidified some states and weakened others. The continuance of these factors may change the way that the US, its allies, and its adversaries consider and prioritize influence, both within the state and across interstate borders. This conference examined these trends, and explored possible implications for how such factors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control” and how influence could exert effects on national, regional, and global levels over the next 30 years.

Conference Overview

Many of the conference’s panels touched on the human dimension of the challenges and opportunities the United States Government (USG) faces in the 21st century. The human element is a new aspect of competition and conflict that is not in the physical realm where the military typically feels most comfortable, but it is an environment that the military (and, more appropriately, the whole of government and whole of nation) must become more comfortable with.

Operating in this new world requires forms of mental agility that cannot be ordered on Amazon or developed in a military lab; it must be developed and nurtured. Societies must become more resilient— to attacks, to fake news, to unreasonable fears, and to reasonable fears as well. Creativity and surprise will become more important elements of US strategy than simply overwhelming military force. We must also do a better job of crafting and explaining our vision for the future international system, as this is another essential element of successful US strategy.

People will matter more in this new world, which means a successful US strategy must integrate not only whole of government, but whole of society to include industry, community groups, etc. Conflict is no longer solely in the military domain. Partly because of this, unclassified information will increasingly dominate intelligence analysis.

Warfare has always reflected new developments in society. Given the empowerment of individuals fueled by the information revolution, this has several implications for how the USG understands and interacts with populations (not just leaders). First, physical might is not going to always achieve strategic aims. We must use a soft power/influence/information strategy. Second, perceptions matter. We have a hard time accepting or acknowledging the validity of others’ perceptions, especially if we disagree with them. This hampers our effectiveness in communicating our strategy, influencing others’ behaviors, and responding to threats. Third, Target Audience Analysis (TAA) should not just be a Military Information Support Operations (MISO) process. Actions influence just as much, or even more, than messages do. Fourth, people are not persuaded by facts and logic. Neuroscience research show us that humans make decisions based on emotions first, and logic later.

As the conference shifted from defining new challenges brought by the changing environment, its focus turned to trying to understand how the Commands are dealing with these developments. The changing environment theme is not new—it has been a focus of SMA conferences for the last 10 years. But when we ask ourselves what exactly is so alarming about change, it is not only that the world is changing, but that parts of the US paradigm or strategy no longer work. The USG can no longer prevail by sheer application of overwhelming force. However, the US defense paradigm has not properly evolved or adapted to the changing environment. Conference participants suggested that the USG needs a new set of rules that are more adaptive to new and evolving environments. It is difficult for a bureaucracy to change, so this challenge should not be underestimated.

Ultimately, paradigms matter. The way we perceive and frame a challenge conditions and/or limits our responses. We clearly have blind spots. For example, the USG tends to apply the kinetic metaphor to influence operations. However, we cannot “win” in the information space by applying the equivalent of overwhelming force. Instead, we must understand the motivation and intentions of others, understand the environment in which they live, and—most importantly—understand ourselves.

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Crimean Annexation Analysis Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders prior to and during the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s leading indicators, those of Crimean leaders and the Russian-supported President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, are presented separately.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

The primary findings regarding Russian government leading indicators are focused on Putin and include:

1. As a general pattern, Putin is more restrained in his language than most Western leaders, making indicators of his intent rare.
2. The rarity of these indicators increases the ability to detect them as statistical “blips” in his language use; a thing that rarely appears is noticeable when it occurs.
3. When Putin mentions key emotive issues, they occur suddenly as a “blip” in his general discourse in advance of operations. However, he is disciplined in subsequently silencing himself during apparent planning and execution phases.
4. However, once his goal is achieved, he relaxes his restraint and releases a rhetorical flourish of concerns and emotional language (a “brag”).
5. After a rhetorical flourish, Putin again restrains his discourse when planning and executing operations to achieve his next strategic goal.
6. The blip patterns that may be detected are manifest in emotional themes such as Pride, Protection, Unity, Strength, and Russian Superiority, and political themes such as Russian Security, mentioning Adversaries, Russian Energy, and the Ceasefire.
7. Putin exhibits a sustained and increasing apparent concern with Russian Energy Resources and the Threat of Nazism, consistent with earlier studies.
8. Putin is demonstrating an increasing concern with Turkey, which may have direct implications for his intentions in Syria.

The primary findings regarding Crimean leaders and government include detectable blips approximately a month and a half before the annexation in emotive themes that include:

1. Fear of Extremism, Failure of the Ukrainian government (an enemy), desire for Stability, Independence, Legitimacy of Crimean cause, Unity of Crimeans, Separatism, Sovereignty for Crimea, a sarcastic claim to be open to Cooperation, and use of the rhetorical device of Accusation.
2. There is a curious “blip and brag” pattern in the mention of the ingroup (Crimea), their friend (Russia) and primary enemy (Ukraine).

Russian-supported President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych

1. There were no detectable leading indicators for the Russian-supported Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovch, but this may be due to the fact that his speeches ended four months before the annexation of Crimea, and perhaps more relevantly, Yanukovych may have had more pressing concerns as his hold on power was failing at this time.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

1. The pervasive concerns of the Putin government were Economics and Trade, not expansion, Russian imperialism, or national pride.
2. The pro-Russian President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, expressed views identical to those of the Putin government, indicating his ideological alignment, if not direct control, by the Kremlin.

SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School – Jan 2017.

Author | Editor: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Speakers were John Arquilla, Ryan Gingeras, Glenn Robinson, and Hy Rothstein of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Glenn Robinson:

Let me go over the agenda very briefly. As I mentioned yesterday Doc, unfortunately Craig Whiteside has come down with a very nasty stomach virus so unfortunately will not be joining us today.

We’ll start with Ryan Gingeras, who is a Turkey expert at the Naval Postgraduate School, and then I will follow Ryan. Then let’s have a discussion at that point, some Q&A.

At which point John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein will be able to join us, and they will each speak, John on strategic narrative, development, and information operations more generally and Hy Rothstein on some of the lessons learned in Iraq when it comes to influence operations.

After those two sets of comments, we can again open up discussion and Q&A. Does that sound reasonable to everyone?

Doc Cabayan:

Sounds good. Adam, okay with you?

Adam Gable

No. Hey Doc, sorry, pressed the wrong button. That sounds good, Doc.

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Russian-Estonian Relations Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders and has the potential to provide leading indicators and reveal key issues and concerns.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

• Putin exhibits a sustained concern over Europe and the threat of Nazism, consistent with earlier studies (Kuznar, 2016b).
• The overall sentiment between the Putin and Estonian governments demonstrates increasingly negative relations between the two countries.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

• The Putin government predictably stresses the plight of Russian Minorities in Estonia, and the need for Cooperation in its discourses on Estonia.
• Ethnic Russian-Estonians emphasizes their ethnic Identity.
• The Estonian government stresses the need for Cooperation.

Use of Emotional Language

• The Estonian government used nearly five times the amount of emotional language (emotional themes and rhetorical devices) used by the Putin government.
  • This pattern reflects other studies that have demonstrated that the Putin government generally uses much more restrained language than other leaders (Kuznar, Popp, & Peterson, 2017; Kuznar & Yager, 2016).
  • This restrained language may be an indicator that the Putin government is more vulnerable to traditional deterrence operations (USSTRATCOM, 2006), provided that their values are accurately identified.