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Question (S2): In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the U.S. coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?

Author | Editor: Maye, D. (ERAU).

Considering their divergent goals and interests, experts assessed the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, Israel, Russia, France, Bahrain, Iraq, Turkey, the Kurds, the Assad regime, Iran, and jihadist groups to achieve their aims. They assessed where several disparate groups’ interests align and where they diverge. When looking at the broad range of actors, a few patterns emerged. The first is in terms of where national security goals and interests were in alignment. Unsurprisingly, perennial allies such as the U.S., Israel and France had several specific points of convergence, as did Russia and Syria. The second is in areas of divergence. As expected, nefarious actors such as the jihadist groups were completely divergent from the interests of the other actors. When assessed at the macro- level three major generalities surfaced.

Aims – Alignment

Promoting Strong and Stable States. The first overarching theme was the goal of promoting strong and stable nation states. While not all the actors agreed on which nation states should be promoted, nearly each actor in the assessment had at least one state that was a priority. Both Bahrain (Gengler) and Russia seek their own regime’s survival (Thomas). Both the U.S. and France see the value of strong Iraqi state (Maye, Tenebaum). France also seeks to limit instability across the Middle East, avoid destabilization in Lebanon, and promote non-hostile state in Syria (Tenebaum).

Relationship Building and Cooperation. A second major generality that emerged was in relationship- building and cooperation. Each of the actors that the experts assessed is prioritizing their relationships or ability to cooperate with strategic partners. For instance, the Israelis are seeking to expand relations with European powers and Arab states, maintain their strategic alliance with the U.S., and develop relationships with rising Asian powers like India and China (Brom). For military reasons, Bahrain needs to maintain its ties to the British and the Americans (Gengler). France seeks to strengthen strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies (Tenebaum). Strategic cooperation with China and the BRICS is a key tenet of Russian foreign policy (Thomas), yet the Russians are also open to areas of cooperation with the U.S. and NATO on Syria (Thomas). Even the Islamist groups, who are non-state actors, must maintain relationships with wealthy Gulf states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Hassan).

Aims – Divergence

Pressure Other States. The third major pattern emerged is where national security goals and interests diverged. Each of the actors in this study seeks to limit the expansion, interference, or hegemonic aspirations of another state. From the Russian perspective, NATO seeks to contain Russia (Thomas). Israel and Bahrain seek to break/slow Iran from regional hegemony or acquiring nuclear weapons (Brom, Gengler). Russia seeks to put pressure on European Union (Thomas). Assad wants to stop the Gulf States from pursuing regime change in Syria (Hassan). Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran would prefer to see less U.S. support for the Kurds (Carreau).

U.S./ Coalition Partners – Recommended Actions

Due to the complex nature of each actor’s goals and interests, it will be very difficult for the U.S. and Coalition partners to create win-sets that will appease each group, yet nearly each actor (aside from the non-state actors and jihadist groups) would agree to the following generalized courses of action:

1. Develop a front to contain international jihadism (Tennebaum, Carreau)
2. Promote strong, yet sovereign, nation-states (Maye)
3. Uphold formally agreed upon spheres of influence (Carreau)

Points of Divergence / Negotiation

The central points of negotiation for the U.S. and Coalition partners is likely fall into the following three areas:

1. Sovereignty – While promoting strong and sovereign nation states is a goal, the issues of a two- state solution for Israel/Palestine; the independence of Kurdistan; and dispersed security/governance for Sunni Arabs in Syria and Iraq are going to be key points of negotiation.
2. Regime leadership in Syria – Each of the major players in this study would prefer to see stability in the Middle East, especially in Syria. The issue that U.S. policy-makers will face is compromising with Russia and Iran on who exactly will be the face of the regime in Syria; the Russians and the Iranians see value in the Assad regime, but a point of compromise may be in removing Assad yet keeping the regime Alawite (Carreau).
3. Spheres of Influence – It will be in the best interest of the major players to craft a reasonable “spheres of influence” strategy for the region (namely between Turkey, Russia, Iran, the GCC and the Western powers) while still upholding major tenets of the JCPOA, ensuring Israel’s security, and not alienating the Sunni populations of Iraq and Syria (Carreau).

Contributing Authors

Shlomo Brom (INSS), Bernard Carreau (NDU), Justin Gengler (Umich), Hassan Hassan (TIMEP), Diane Maye (Embry Riddle), Eugene Rumor (CEIP), Élie Tenenbaum (IFRI), Tim Thomas (TRADOC), Jeff Weyers (Brabo Inc)

Question (R3 QL7): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da’esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

Da’esh Transition in Syria

The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.

The contributors to this Quick Look indicated that we may observe the following for Da’esh in Syria and abroad:

Ongoing actions in Syria

• continued agitation and exploitation of the uncertainty and dysfunction in Syria
• ongoing efforts to be present and to expand

Change in strategy and associated tactics

• reorientation toward increasing attacks abroad
• shift from acquisition and maintenance of territory to insurgent methods aimed at weakening enemies
• increased emphasis on both terrorist and insurgent tactics (e.g., recent attacks in Paris and Brussels)
• movement away from direct attacks toward scorched earth defensive strategy combined with aggressive insurgency tactics
• return to indiscriminate urban violence, using lone wolves and small militant groups
• increased use of two-tiered attacks (first soft civilian targets, then first responders)
• use of “mobile, dispersed, and flexible units” that operate on behalf of Da’esh Da’esh Alliances

Views among the contributors on the groups with whom Da’esh might align demonstrated some degree of consensus. Both Shaikh and Pagano indicated that a merger or strong alliance between Da’esh and other groups would be highly unlikely. This was due in part to Da’esh’s history of denouncing others as apostates when they failed to conform to its strict rules and interpretations of Islam. Da’esh’s rigid approach has resulted in eventual isolation and the creation of enemies among groups with which it might under different circumstances have allied. Shaikh also emphasized the breadth of the ideological divide between Da’esh and other groups, which would in turn make it difficult for Da’esh to justify any future cooperation with so-called deviant groups. While Pagano cites possible points of Da’esh ideological convergence with either Jabhat Fateh al Sham or the quietest Salafists, the likelihood of collaboration between these groups remains very low. These points of convergence would be dependent on a shift in Da’esh’s goals and subsequent motives as it is faced with the fall of the caliphate, which might make previously unlikely alliances necessary for the sake of survival and future goal pursuit.

Use of “Ungoverned Spaces”

Liebl put forth the view that ‘ungoverned space’ does not truly exist given that formal or informal political institutions will always exist where there are people. Shaikh however focused on likely future contests for “ungoverned” spaces in Syria, suggesting that that the primary competition would be between Da’esh and Al Qaeda given their rivalry and different organizational purpose and approaches. Landis briefly addressed the topic by suggesting that the proportion of ungoverned space in Syria will decrease as Da’esh is weakened, and the Syrian regime retakes the west and parts of eastern Syria. Pagano emphasizes areas of strategic or symbolic importance to Da’esh and the existing or potential loss of these resources. She reviews the status of northern Aleppo province, Raqqa, and Deir el-Zour, as well as the recent retaking of Palmyra, and concludes by briefly listing the conditions under which these spaces would provide the greatest utility or opportunity to Da’esh.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma); Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture, USMC); Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI, Inc.); Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool)

The Characterization and Conditions of the Gray Zone: A Virtual Think Tank Analysis (ViTTa)

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

Within United States government (USG) and Department of Defense (DoD) spheres, the gray zone is a relatively new terminology and phenomena of focus for characterizing the changing nature of competition, conflict, and warfare between actors in the evolving international system of today. Accordingly, in January 2016, General Joseph Votel (US Army) requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct a study of the gray zone. The SMA team was asked to assess how the USG can diagnose, identify, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against associated types of gray zone challenges. More specifically, the request emphasized that if the USG is to respond effectively to the threats and opportunities presented in the increasingly gray security environment, it requires a much more detailed map of the gray zone than it currently possesses.

To properly conduct any effort focused on researching, understanding, and assessing this gray zone space, it is imperative to first ensure that the effort is using sound, appropriate, and comprehensive definitions—to effectively assess the gray zone, one must appropriately define the gray zone. The importance of proper definitions is particularly relevant when it comes to the study of the gray zone, which is an inherently ambiguous concept in itself and has a number of varying definitions already in existence.

Recognizing the importance of properly characterizing and defining the gray zone concept, the SMA team put significant effort into developing a sound, comprehensive definition of the gray zone. Through a series of panel discussions and intense inter-team discussions, and with the assistance of a white paper on the topic, the SMA team, in conjunction with USSOCOM, developed the following definitions for the gray zone, gray zone activity, and gray zone threats.

The gray zone is a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.

Gray zone activity is an adversary’s purposeful use of single or multiple elements of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet apparently fall below the level of open warfare.

• In most cases, once significant, attributable coercive force has been used, the activities are no longer considered to be in the gray zone but have transitioned into the realm of traditional warfare.
• While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of national power, they are activities taken by an actor for the purpose of gaining some broadly-defined security advantage over another.

Gray zone threats are actions of a state or non-state actor that challenge or violate international customs, norms, and laws for the purpose of pursuing one or more broadly-defined national security interests without provoking direct military response.

• Gray zone threats can occur in three ways relative to international rules and norms, they can:
  1. challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms while stopping short of clear violations of international law (e.g., much of China’s use of the “Little Blue Men”);
  2. employ violations of both international norms and laws in ways intended to avoid the penalties associated with legal violations (e.g., Russian activities in Crimea); or
  3. violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and non-state actors integrating elements of power to advance particular security interests

In an effort to validate the SMA team’s definition of the gray zone, NSI applied its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) subject matter expert elicitation methodology to the problem set. As part of this ViTTa effort, NSI interviewed leading gray zone experts to better understand the characterization and conditions of the gray zone, putting particular emphasis on having the experts assess the SMA team’s gray zone definition. NSI recorded and transcribed the interviews, which formed the basis of this report. The goal of this report is to present the experts’ insights relating to the characterization and conditions of the gray zone and, in particular, highlight expert feedback, insight, and commentary regarding the SMA team’s gray zone definition.

Contributing Authors

Canna, S. (NSI)

The Key Role of Human Geography, Culture and Language in Effective Communication.

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services, Inc.).

Overview

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures’ shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

Creating a clear picture for cognitive maneuver should not feel like charting a new frontier simply because the terrain is made up of unfamiliar cultural and linguistic objects. This white paper brings together several approaches from the academic and operational perspectives that describe cultural variation in communication patterns as well as the content of the communications– the complex concepts such as morality, loyalty and motivations– for the purpose of more effective cross-cultural communications analysis and engagement in the IE.

Human Geography, the study of relationships between locations, groups and individuals, provides a foundation for engaging in the cognitive domain, and in fact, in illustrating key aspects of the IE. Humans, after all, possess the cognitive aspects we want to understand. They produce the narratives, hold the beliefs and values, and are the audience targeted within the IE. Human Geography begins with location. Our origin is a significant part of who we are. Our home team that defines our allegiance. Our beliefs and behaviors which can be traced back to the history and events of that location. Perhaps it is the place we strive to protect, the site of an attack that prompts retaliation, the origin of our family name that gives us standing in the community, or the locus of our closest network with whom we share a dialect and a collective memory—our cultural narrative. If we understand culture as learned practices that set one group apart from another, part of that learning is connected to sharing a place. This is how British culture can be separate from American culture and yet still share the English language. Human Geography’s emphasis on location provides a foundation to understand culture, communication and cognitive maneuver.

The white paper is divided into three (3) sections that walk through a definition of the impact of cultural variation for operations in the IE; support for planning from theory, research and the field; and going forward for all USG engagements, several authors discuss approaches that hold promise from strategy to methodology. Authors share key insights on the state of the art in cultural narrative analysis and cognitive maneuver in the IE as well as theory, research and field observation that can support continued development of applied research, policy and training in this area.

Part One unfolds from the premise that most populations that the US Government engages with are bilingual or multilingual. Dr. Loyet writes that this is a contrast with the monolingual experience of many Americans. Multilingualism is one of many cultural differences we need to take into account for effective communications and analysis across the IE. Many populations are adept at shifting between languages for different purposes. From a cognitive perspective, the bi-lingual brain works differently with perception, memory and cognition. Shifting between linguistic identities is part of their daily lives. Dr. Spitaletta, bringing insights from a series of SMA papers on bio-psycho-social communication, writes that, “Cognitive processes such as perception, judgment, and decision- making are the most vital aspect of the IE.” Finally, Ms. Kompaniiets illustrates cultural narrative in action through a Ukrainian language use case.

Part Two steps back to explore theories on culture and communication that can support a sound approach to developing successful narratives and planning cognitive maneuver. Prof. Ess and Ms. MacNulty map out dimensions of culture and values that serve as building blocks for most working in this field. These are fundamental to grounding further practical research, operational methods or analytic products. Dr. Ehlschlaeger is already developing operational means to put theory into practice using human geography to help navigate communications challenges. As a field case in action, Ms. Mushtaq describes on-going efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan to identify and foster local forms of cultural narratives and communication that are seen to be effective for peacebuilding.

Part Three looks forward by focusing on current conflicts where communication, narrative and culture play a vital role in how we engage and how successful we are. This section brings together the operators’ view from Col (Ret.) Robert Jones, applied research on narratives of elite individuals, and a field interview with Mr. Maktary on peacebuilding in Yemen that describes successful and unsuccessful initiatives to influence the situation.

Finally, most authors have read across each other’s works and referenced one another in their papers. This experience has provided these expert contributors the chance to dialog on best practices, shared and conflicting viewpoints, gaps, strengths and ways forward. In this way, we are taking the chance to learn more on this topic ourselves while we contribute to the SMA white paper series.

Contributing Authors

Mr. John DeRosa (GMU), Dr. Charles Ess (University of Oslo), Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger (USACE), Col (Ret.) Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Olesia Kompaniiets (Polizor Centre) Dr. Dianne Loyet (University
of Illinois Springfield), Ms. Christine MacNulty (Applied Futures), Ms. Angie Mallory (Iowa State University), Mr. Shoqi Maktary (Search for Common Ground, Yemen), Ms. Yusra Mushtaq (Visiting Scholar, Pakistan), Dr. Amjed Rasheed (Durham University, Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies), Dr. Jason Spitaletta (JHU-APL, Maj, USMCR), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.)

Question (R2 #5): What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?

Author | Editor: Reedy, K. (RAND).

Predicting the unanticipated is always a challenge, but contributors have identified a couple of considerations for thinking about both potential complications involving external actors such as Turkey (Yeşilada) and what is likely to happen with the combatants themselves (Reedy).

External Factors and a Lack of Stability

One of the main complicating factors in Syria has been, from the outset, the wide variety of external influence on and support for the combatants and groups. Regional countries, world powers, and transnational organizations have all had a hand in shaping the conflict. Turkey in particular has been a volatile player, but has been consistent on its stance on the Syrian Kurds—Erdogan has strongly stated that he will not allow a single bridge of Kurds across the north of Syria. He has also promised, however, that it will be “his forces” and not the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council/Forces (SDF) will be the ones to liberate Raqqah. It is unclear, though, whether he means the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or Turkish forces, though. In any case, apart from the FSA, there are no anti-Assad groups currently operating in Syria that could hold Raqqah even if they could clear it, because they would not have the organic support of the population there. It is possible, then, that if one of these groups is predominantly involved in removing ISIL from Raqqah, they will not have the ability to stabilize the region, and given the animosity between the Turkish forces and the Syrian Kurdish forces, it could lead to outright fighting in the area between them (Yeşilada).

ISIL Fighters and Leaders

The other potential black swan contributors note involves the fighters themselves. There are two broad options for ISIL fighters and leaders: to leave Syria or to stay. There have already been leaders. who have fled the Levant when things began to look somewhat bleak for ISIL, primarily fleeing to North Africa. As they are slowly pushed out of Syria, more leaders and fighters may begin to follow them there. This creates follow-on problems in Africa, as increasing fighters and expertise arrive and challenge already fragile-situations there. However, the fight in North Africa is often more local than that in the Levant in its perspective, and fighters may be reluctant to commit to conflict there because of that and because the territory lacks the ideological impetus of the historical home of the Caliphate. Yemen might be another option to flee to, but given the current conflict and related factors such as food shortages there, that seems a less likely option (Reedy).

The other alternative is to stay in Syria. This may be a more viable option for rank-and-file fighters than leaving because they may not have the resources to flee safely and/or, since many of them are foreign fighters, they may be on watchlists that prohibit them from returning home. Leaders who stay are more likely to do so for ideological reasons. Within this option are two possibilities, which are by no means mutually exclusive. One is that some combatants are likely to either join other groups that continue to oppose the regime and go underground as part of a long-term insurgency scenario. The other scenario is that fighters, feeling backed into a corner, attempt to do as much damage to life and property as they can before they are killed or captured (Reedy).

What Can Coalition Partners Do?

Contributors outlined or implied a few actions that the US government and its coalition partners could do to address these black swans.

1. Keep a tight rein on allies within and outside Syria to ensure they do not fall to fighting among themselves (Yeşilada).
2. Ensure that the clearing and holding of Raqqah are coordinated and that no single force is primarily responsible for its liberation or stabilization (Yeşilada).
3. Coordinate and communicate closely between CENTCOM and AFRICOM to attempt to track, detain, and understand the capabilities of leaders and fighters fleeing from Syria and Iraq to North Africa (Reedy).
4. Prepare to deal with a long-running insurgency, for allies and international organizations involved in stabilizing Syria (Reedy).
5. To deal with levels of extreme violence, more heavily secure civilian populations and key infrastructure to protect them (Reedy).
6. Find methods and means to repatriate foreign fighters to remove them from the battlefield in Syria or elsewhere (Reedy).

Contributors note that unexpected results can involve both external actors and allies (Yeşilada) and the ISIL combatants themselves (Reedy). Ensuring that U.S. forces and partners are ready to address the wide variety of potential complications and are agile enough to adapt to the unexpected rapidly will be essential to minimize the impacts from these types of concerns. Communication and the ability to rapidly react politically and militarily will be paramount.

Contributing Authors

Kathleen Reedy (RAND), Birol Yeşilada (Portland State University)

Question (Sim#3): What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Part 2

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services Inc).

We have acknowledged that the enemy has been very agile in the information environment thus far. It has developed a clear message, understands the most affective narratives to reach audiences, and can shift tactics in messaging without shifting message. Our adversary has demonstrated this with propaganda and recruitment material in the information environment. Each contributor, directly or indirectly, identifies that coalition engagement in the information environment is not as robust because we lack the same cohesion of message, understanding of the appropriate narratives, understanding of audiences, and ability to shift tactics in the information space (such as move between dialects or languages) without losing fidelity to our core mission message. Each contributor offers recommendations, from the high-level objectives to on-the-ground implementation, on how we can begin to more successfully leverage the information environment in pursuit of overall coalition objectives.

Vernie Liebl advises that the US and allies must first define the ‘coalition objectives’ that will drive our engagement in the communication space. MAJ Robert Payne, LTC Brian Steed, and SGM Sohail Shaikh give this idea form with a plan to develop a Campaign Mission Narrative to articulate these objectives across the CENTCOM AOR. David Grompert expresses a clear and simple communication objective– to concentrate on conveying to local audiences that the US and allies offer peace and stability, a chance to return to daily life without constant threat; this contrast to ISIL should be our messaging focus. Defining or agreeing on an objective for the information space is, as Liebl noted, not a straightforward exercise. The discussion from inaugural USASOC-LUCAS (Laboratory for Unconventional Conflict Analysis and Simulation) symposium entitled After ISIL: Stability and Spillover in December 2016 illustrates the ongoing challenge—a challenge which leads to an unclear mission narrative.

Assumptions of an inherent, universal appeal to US values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were countered by arguments that those ideals may exist broadly, but get interpreted and acted upon so differently in different contexts as to make comparisons non- actionable. (Spencer Meredith, ExecSum) Payne, Steed and Shaikh describe the lack of mission narrative cohesion as a challenge to mission objectives. They outline a remedy to create and implement a Campaign (MSN) Mission Narrative for CENTCOM to include Strategic, Operational, and Tactical applications. The purpose is to overwhelm the adversary’s narrative across the AOR and prevent fractures in mission narrative that can be exploited by the enemy.

A key stage in the development of their (MSN) is understanding the relevant narrative forms that will be affective to local audiences and also identifying viable partners to convey that message. Liebl contends it is essential to recognize there are multiple information environments in the region. He suggests the most pressing analytic challenge is to understand these various environments with their distinct socio-cultural factors including religion and ethnicity. Peter Welby provides a valuable resource with a comparative (English and Arabic) narrative analysis of ISIL and other jihadist propaganda. He examined how a group is able to, “tactically shift its narrative emphasis to suit its target audience.” His research points towards how we can observe, learn, and adapt our own approach to audience engagement and narrative development for a multilingual information environment. Clark McCauley presents another resource to help understand local narratives and audiences. He describes the role of emotion in conflict zones for motivation. He also unpacks identity narratives in conflict and argues that the Sunni/Shi’a divide is more of an ethnic conflict that a religious one.

The contributors suggest continued analysis of information environment, audience, and narrative and a way forward to implement analytic findings for the purpose of making the information environment a means to support coalition objectives.

Contributing Authors

Gompert, D. (RAND), Liebl, V. (Prosol Associates, USMC Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Understanding), Payne, R. (United States Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia), Shaikh, S. (Asymmetric Warfare Group), Steed, B. (US Army Command and General Staff College), Welby, P. (Centre on Religion & Geopolitics), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), Meredith, (National Defense University)

Question (R5.3): How much influence can Iran wield in the next Iraqi election?

Author | Editor: S. Canna (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

Overview of Electoral System

Iraq is a parliamentary democracy and, as the April 2018 elections approach, political jockeying for votes and influence has already begun. Iraq has a unicameral house called the Council of Representatives (COR). As in other parliamentary systems, members of the ruling party or coalition choose the prime minister. So regional and domestic actors seeking to influence the election of a particular candidate for prime minister must start by ensuring its preferred political party or parties win enough seats to be in the majority.

Overview of Key Players and Parties

For Iran, its most important regional security priority is maintaining political influence in Iraq and Syria, according to Dr. Paul Rogers of Bradford University. Therefore, ensuring that a pro-Iranian government emerges from the April 2018 parliamentary elections is a critical interest for the country. According to Dr. Gawdat Bahgat of National Defense University and Dr. Anoush Ehteshami of Durham University, Iran does not view the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as foreign wars. It will not accept a Sunni dominated government in either country. Furthermore, Iran cannot tolerate a US-friendly government in Baghdad.

Iran wants to reorder politics in Iraq to remove the American military presence, according to Dr. Munqith Dagher of IIACS, an Iraqi polling firm, and Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler of University of Akron and Case Western University. Iran used to tolerate US military presence in Iraq, but now that Iran believes it can defeat the remainder of ISIS forces, it has begun to see US presence in the country as a threat to Iran’security. US military presence is also a hindrance to its goal of securing a supply and influence route through Iraq and Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Professor Zana Gulmohamad of University of Sheffield. Some refer to this poetically as the Shia Full Moon, according to Dr. Diane Maye of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

While Iran’s interest in the outcome of the election is clear, experts disagree about the extent to which Iran would take direct action to ensure a pro-Iranian outcome. One school of thought contends that Iran will do everything in its power to ensure a pro-Iran government emerges (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Experts point to evidence of this interference in Iranian exhortation to ensure that Shia political factions remain united (Gulmohamad). Furthermore, Drs. Dagher and Kaltenthaler suggest that Iran is behind a strategy to undermine Abadi’s power by accusing his allies of corruption.

The other school of thought suggests that Iran will not directly or overtly interfere in the elections as long as they are satisfied that their interests remain protected (Rogers). The political environment already skews towards the continued, if not increased, influence Iran enjoys in Iraq. An anonymous contributor from TRADOC’s Global Cultural Knowledge Network suggests that Iran is playing a long game. It is unlikely to directly influence the election, but it will continue to pursue establishing a Hezbollah-like strategy in Iraq using Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi (or Political Mobilization Units – PMUs).

Iran has a clear preference for the next prime minister. Within the leading Dawa party, there are two factions: the secular/nationalists lead by current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the Iranian-backed hardliners lead by former Primer Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, Maye, TRADOC). Iran is strongly backing al-Maliki and his associated hardline candidates in the upcoming election (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, TRADOC). Maliki is a natural ally of the PMUs who are increasingly registering as political parties and presenting candidates in local elections (Dagher, Kaltenthaler, Rogers, Serwer). While Iranian-backed political parties are building momentum, Abadi is drawing on the support of a number Iraqis uncomfortable with the extent of Iranian influence in Iraq (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Additionally, Iraq’s Arab national identity remains strong, and support for Abadi’s more secular, nationalistic style of leadership is growing among Sunni and Kurdish populations (Abdulla, Dagher, Kaltenthaler).

Potential Outcomes & Futures

It goes without saying that Iraq has a very fluid landscape due to the maneuvering of new political entities and the changing security environment; therefore, it is difficult to forecast the results of or the degree of influence Iran will have in the outcome of the election, Drs. Dagher and Kaltenthaler note in their contribution. Furthermore, given that Iraq has a parliamentary system, much of the negotiations to determine which parties will comprise the ruling coalition and who will be prime minister will take place after the election. Perhaps the three most important actors are Abadi, Maliki, and the Sadrist party with Abadi or Maliki most likely to emerge as the prime minister (Dagher, Kaltenthaler).

Army TRADOC’s Athena Simulation team conducted a futures analysis to examine the relationship between existing political blocs and the Iraqi population. They assessed the ability of various political coalitions to successfully form a government and to gauge the level of influence of foreign state actors on various political parties. While the study looked at seven potential electoral outcomes, one interesting thread was that Iran was only able to sway the election results by about 20% in some scenarios. This is a significant, but not deterministic, level of influence. Because Iran cannot outright determine the outcome of the election, minor parties such as the Sadrist Movement could become “king makers” (Liebl, Maye, TRADOC). The Sadrist party—a Shia nationalist party with an expansive following—has had shifting alliances in the past (Maye). However, lately it has been building bridges to Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations to push back against Iranian influence (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler, Maye). The Hakim party—the National Wisdom Movement—could also play a role in shifting the election towards one faction of the Dawa party or the other (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler, Maye, TRADOC).

Implications for the US

Ultimately, there is little the United States Government can do to influence the outcome of the election except to continue support Prime Minister Abadi, according to Dr. Daniel Serwer at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The United States’ best bet for continued influence in Iraq is the re-election of Abadi, who wants to balance US and Iranian influence in the country (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). The most serious challenge to USG interests would be the selection of Maliki as prime minister (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). Maliki would likely push hard for the removal of US military forces in the country and further empower PMUs (Dagher, Kaltenthaler). This could enflame Sunni and Kurdish tensions, risking the stability and reconstruction of the country (Dagher, Gulmohamad, Kaltenthaler).

The biggest concern, which Dr. Rogers describes as “one of the worst negative outcomes of the war since 2003,” is the rising influence of PMUs on the government in Baghdad. These Iranian-backed militias have become an essential part of the Iraqi armed forces and their move to create political parties and seek seats in the COR enhances Iran’s grip on the government. With whatever limited influence the USG has, it should encourage Baghdad to restrict armed militias from participating as political parties, according to Perry Cammack at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see also Rogers, Serwer).

Contributors

Hala Abdulla, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), USMC University; Gawdat Bahgat, National Defense University; Perry Cammack, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Munqith Dagher, IIACS; Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University (UK); Global Cultural Knowledge Network Staff, US ARMY TRADOC G2; Zana Gulmohamad, University of Sheffield (UK); Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron/Case Western Reserve University; Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), USMC University; Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; Paul Rogers, Bradford University (UK); Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, TRADOC G-27 Athena Study Team, Data Science, Models and Simulations Operational Environment Laboratory

Question (R5.1): What opportunities and threats should United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) be postured for as the result of a President of the United States (POTUS) visit to the Area of Responsibility (AOR)? What is the impact on stakeholders’ willingness to counter Iran along with the likelihood of partnering with the United States/coalition?

Author | Editor: P. DeGennaro (TRADOC G27).

Executive Summary

Analysts agree the most serious threat during POTUS’s trip to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was, in in the words of Daniel Server, “the risk of doing anything that split the GCC and weakened its will to counter Iran.” In fact, he and our other analysts believe his rhetoric triggered KSA’s regional campaign against Qatar and thereby destroyed GCC solidarity against Iran. Further, the campaign, which included the United Arab Emirates,1 Egypt, and Bahrain actually pushed Qatar, Turkey, and other stakeholders closer to Iran countering the effort.

In his subsequent visit to Israel, POTUS intended to bring together a coalition between the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab leaders, largely arising from their shared view of Iran as a growing national security threat. Though these countries often cooperate in many regional economic endeavors, Serwer reminds us that “rapprochement cannot be complete without progress on an agreement with the Palestinian population,” which seems to be shelved by Israel for the foreseeable future. It is also concerning to regional leaders in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria that Israel has chosen to support Kurdish independence further destabilizing the region, moving counter to US and allied statements against independence and providing Iran with yet another narrative of Israel’s determination to continue its efforts to keep populations fractured and divided.

“The Gulf States believe former President Obama held them in contempt and prioritized détente with Iran over their interests, but they never lost faith in the US-Arab partnership as such,” says Faysal Itani, and not “POTUS is simply restoring it, or attempting to.”

Patricia DeGennaro believes that “[a]ll in all, POTUS’s visit caused more harm than good and stakeholders will be less likely to openly try to counter Iran. Especially in cases where Iran is supporting regimes and seen as working toward stability instead of cultivating Al Qaeda and the Islamic States resurgence.”

The experts consulted by the US Army Cultural Knowledge Center believes that any true US influence to calm the region “requires is the Trump Administration’s putting its own house in order and sharpening its diplomatic instruments in what is most assuredly a complicated environment and set of circumstances not to the allies’ liking.”

Our analysts remain assured that the main threat in the CENTCOM region is the violent extremist elements that will continue to encourage mistrust and insecurity of the people in the region until some semblance of security and governance replaces the mayhem ISIS created. Therefore, the primary focus remains a secure and stable Iraq followed by the same goals in Syria. Only then will the US and its allies be able to cooperatively and comprehensively deal with Iran by bringing them into the international fold or allowing some to influence divisiveness between all Arabs – Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Christians alike.

Contributors

Patricia DeGennaro, TRADOC G27; Global Cultural Knowledge Network Staff, US ARMY TRADOC G2; Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East; Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Question (R5.6): What are the strategic implications of the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) new base in Djibouti? What will be the effect on the Iran-PRC relationship?

Author | Editor: S. Canna (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

Background

There are a number of legitimate reasons that account for China’s decision to break with decades of tradition when it established its first foreign military base in Djibouti in 2009, according to Dr. John Garver, Professor Emeritus at the China Research Center at Georgia Institute of Technology. First, China has a strong economic interest in protecting vital shipping lanes that pass through the nearby Gulf of Aden (Garver, Haddad-Fonda, Payne). Notably, China expanded its maritime security role in the northwest Indian Ocean during the 2008-9 financial crisis in North America and Europe—a time when China’s economic growth seemed “unstoppable” (Garver).

The second stated reason for the base was to support China’s international humanitarian operations, according to Dr. Kyle Haddad-Fonda, an expert in China-Middle East relations. China has an interest in protecting the large number of Chinese citizens now living in every country in Africa and the Middle East. China prides itself on its ability to protect its citizens overseas and extract them from dangerous situations.

Strategic Implications

Looking beyond China’s stated reasons, our contributors noted three particular strategic implications of China’s decision to build its first base outside of the South China Sea.

Signal of China’s Intent to Rise to Asia’s Preeminent Power. No longer content to dominate the South China Sea, the base signals China’s intent to exert strong influence in the northwest Indian Ocean as part of its long-term plan to become Asia’s preeminent power, according to Dr. Garver. However, he cautioned that China does not see itself as becoming a dominant power in the Persian Gulf and Arab Sea, preferring instead that a non-hostile power such as the US, Iran, or maybe even Russia (but certainly not India) take leadership in that conflict-prone region.

Strengthens China’s Capability for Sustained Operations in the Arabian Sea. China’s base in Djibouti also extends its capability to conduct sustained operations in the Arabian Sea (Garver). It suggests that China might be interested in establishing additional People Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) supply points—or even bases—to serve in a time of war (Garver). Mr. Jeffrey Payne, a China expert at Near East South Asia (NESA) Center, suggests that the base may “serve as a staging point and communications hub for PLA forces engaged in military operations other than war (MOOTW).”

Does Not Mean China Will Become Involved in Middle East Conflicts. While the base is positioned to serve as a platform for extending China’s influence and reach into the northwest Indian Ocean, it is unlikely that China will increase its already reluctant participation in counterterrorism operations or take greater responsibility for the security of the commons, Mr. Payne argues. It is instead intended to project strength in the Arabian Peninsula and shore up its power in Africa.

Effect on PRC-Iran Relations

To answer the question about the base’s effect on the PRC-Iran relationship, we have to look at a more comprehensive picture of China’s desired outcomes. China is positioning itself to become the dominant power in Asia and a global maritime power (Payne). To extend its reach, it will need to establish reliable relationships with the governments of nations that have strategic, overland, deep water ports, namely: Myanmar, Pakistan, and Iran (Garver, Payne). Djibouti itself would not be useful during war with the US or India because China lacks overland access to the base (Garver).

China is actively building relationships and influence with these three countries as part of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (Garver). Of the three partners, Pakistan would be the most reliable partner in a conflict with India (if the US remained neutral) (Garver). However, Pakistan would not be willing to enter into a war with the US. Myanmar is a less ideal partner due to its long history of neutrality between India and China and a historical suspicion of Chinese motivations (Garver).

This brings us to Iran. China has a complicated relationship with Iran. Iran would be a reliable partner in a war, but China is cautious about developing strong ties with the country that might upset its relationship with the US, which it sees as fundamental to its economic growth (Garver). The thawing of the relationship between the US and Iran during the last two years of the Obama administration opened the door for China to increase its ties to Iran, which it did through its OBOR initiative (Garver). While China does not want to get drawn into conflicts in the Middle East, its growing ties with Iran threaten this (Payne).

Implications for the USG

In considering what the base means for USG interests in the region, it is helpful to look across a spectrum of time. In the short term, US interests in the Middle East are not undermined by China’s presence in Djibouti (Payne). However, in the long run, the base signals that China is intensifying its global ambitions in terms of its desire to be the dominant power in Asia—both maritime and economically. OBOR is viewed by some as an effort to create an alternative to the US-led international system (Payne). As a potential gray zone threat,1 Mr. Payne asserts that while “China’s base does not pose a direct challenge, … it serves as a clear reminder that China is using our very security system to undermine our position without confrontation.”

Contributors

John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology; Kyle Haddad-Fonda, Independent; Jeffrey Payne, Near East South Asia (NESA) Center; Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

[Q14] How should space feature in US deterrence strategy? How do space operations, policies, and investments impact multi-domain deterrence? What changes to US deterrence thinking are required to incorporate the space domain? To what extent should space adopt deterrence strategies from other domains? Which is the most critical US national security objective: deterring aggression from space, through space, or in space? A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)® Report.

Author: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Response

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.

How Space Features in US Deterrence Strategy (It Is Integral, but…)

Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin and the team from ViaSat, Inc. articulate an underlying presumption that appears in most of the expert contributions to this report. Namely, that strikes against space and cyber assets (whether on orbit or on the ground) will almost certainly feature in the earliest stages of future conflicts. Consequently, there is broad consensus among contributors that space systems should be a “prominent feature” of US deterrence thinking and policy; that they are now integral to the strength of the economy, to US and allied defense in all conflict domains, and are essential facilitators of cross-domain operations. Differences of opinion emerge, however, over what that critical importance implies for US defense postures and policy involving space. Here, two schools of thought emerge regarding whether the exceptionality of the space domain requires a deterrence strategy specifically for space (what we will call ‘space deterrence’) or whether talking about deterrence of space assets independent of deterrence in all other domains is meaningless (i.e., ‘deterrence involving space’).

Space Is Unique

The arguments of contributors5 favoring a space deterrence policy tend to rest on the contention that space is so integral to US national security that it demands a distinct space deterrence policy, albeit one that is ultimately integrated with other defense doctrine and policy. The focus for this group is deterring aggression against specific military space capabilities.

Space Is Just Another Domain

However, for the majority of contributors—proponents of the ‘deterrence involving space’ school of thought— the appropriate question is how to deter aggression in any domain and using any source of national power. This line of reasoning holds that space is so indelibly intertwined in all national security activities that the idea of a separate “space deterrence” is nonsensical. Rather, these contributors— including scholar, government, and commercial views—echo the sentiment of Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor of Orbital ATK that space is “just another medium of national power” and agree with General Hyten’s belief that “there’s no such thing as war in space; there’s just war.”

How Is This Accomplished? (Hegemony Versus Collective Management)

There were also two schools of thought on what contributors considered reasonable and achievable goals regarding defense of space assets. The first group believes that space superiortity or dominance in space is critical to US and ally defense and thus demands a space policy and posture directed toward retaining US military hegemony there. Jonathan Fox of DTRA points out that potential US adversaries are already working to exploit US dependence on space and calls for a space policy based on “anticipatory self-defense,” while Sergeant First Class Jerritt Lynn of United States Army Civil Affairs argues that US interests are best served by retaining “hegemonic dominance” in space. Lynn caveats his support for a policy of maintaining US space superiority by reminding the reader that “the image of the US amongst the international community affects US power and legitimacy” and asserts that “the United States must use international space relations to create a narrative that showcases how the US is a steward of an open, secure, and reasonably regulated domain.” Lastly, Jack M. Beard from the University of Nebraska College of Law states his argument in terms of the current reality: “The US Air Force has a mission to defend our assets in space and to disable or restrict the other country from operating in space if such actions become necessary in an armed conflict. So, the US Air Force has to have the ability to establish supremacy when it needs to, and it has to be able to control space if that is what is required in order to achieve its mission in an armed conflict.”

The alternative view is that achieving space hegemony, dominance, or superiority is not only infeasible, but the act of pursuing such a goal itself is likely to reduce rather than enhance US security. Many of the experts that take this position mirror the argument of French researcher Dr. Xavier Pasco of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique that also represents current reality: “Space remains an environment that cannot be fully controlled.” As a result, many of the experts suggest that the US must move toward collective international management, in large part by taking the lead in establishing international security norms for space.7 Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen of Air University offers an economic argument regarding the importance of approaching space as a global commons and establishing international norms to manage conflict when it arises. He notes that to date commercial and other activities in space “are financially viable because there remains little need for expensive security measures. It is in US interests for conditions to remain that way.”

The Issue of Credibility

Space effects and services go directly to US capabilities to attribute attack and retaliate, and thus to the credibility of deterrent threats. For example, capabilities like space situational awareness support the credibility of threatened retaliatory strikes on Earth. Berkowitz reminds us that “space systems have been integral to nuclear deterrence for years” and more recently are critical components of conventional deterrence as well. Many of the experts argue that space capabilities significantly enhance the credibility of US deterrence in all domains.8 Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy) point out that given the possibility of causing military and potentially economic devestation without necessarily causing loss of life, the response principles and means of escalation control have not yet been well-understood or articulated. As a result, what is required for the credibility of deterrent threats may be different in space than in other domains. Similarly, Fox recommends that the credibility of US deterrence strategy must be shored up with well- articulated response options to a clearly defined series of threats, for example to “national and allied space-based systems, personnel, property, and interests critical to the functioning of core military or civilian societal functions.”

However, the expense of space assets and the US dependence on them may suggest that the credibility of a US threat to take kinetic action in space is difficult to maintain. Cullen argues that “US postures to deter aggression in space with force will be counter-productive and hardly credible … kinetic operations in space risk environmental catastrophe.” Other experts argue that deterrent credibility comes from the ability to threaten retaliation in other terrestrial domains. This, in fact, is the US advantage when it comes to deterrence involving space.

How Do Space Operations, Policies, and Investments Impact Multi-Domain Deterrence?

The majority of the experts appear to reject the basic premise of this question. To make this case, a number of experts highlight the historic interdependence between space assets and capabilities to produce military effects in other conflict domains. With respect to multi-domain deterrence, the contributors see space not only as a critical enabler but in many cases, the critical enabler. While most emphasize additional positives that space capabilities provide to decision makers, like more expansive warning and a wider range of deterrence options, others highlight the added vulnerabilities that relying on space presents (e.g., an additional domain to manage/defend or the greater cost to the US than adversaries of conflict in space).

What Changes to US Deterrence Thinking Are Required?

Although they clearly have different views on other issues, the SME contributors universally point to the prominent place of space within US deterrence and strategic options. Rather than changing how we think about deterrence, Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation begins by reminding us that simply changing the way we think will not be enough to forge an effective deterrent including space. Rather, key conditions must change—namely the obvious dependence of the US security establishment on space assets. In this context, there are a number of suggested changes to thinking as well. Berkowitz, Coletta, and Jackson assert that the first hurdle is for the national security space community to move beyond the post-Cold War notion that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would ameliorate the space threat. Experts also remark on the urgent need for policy makers to shore up deterrence effectiveness by clarifying for ourselves, our allies, and potential adversaries what the US considers a provocation with regard to space systems. These new bounds of behavior should be followed quickly with demonstrations of US resolve to respond.

Primarily experts classified as academics and policy researchers admonished the defense establishment to rethink what they consider to be the critical components of deterrence as it relates to space or otherwise. Namely, these contributors advise that policy makers pay serious attention to the role and formation of international norms as critical features of US deterrence.10 Similarly, quite a few experts question the applicability to the space domain of notions of deterrence as punishment, especially where kinetic actions are involved. Rather, as Dr. Nancy Gallagher of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland argues, when thinking about deterrence involving space, one should consider the “cooperative dimension” of deterrence, not just deterrence as punishment. Finally, the contributing experts from ViaSat, Inc. make the point that the national security establishment in the US might take a page from the commercial and private sector playbooks with regard to updating thinking about space- related deterrence or strategic thinking. They point out that these space communities should not think of space systems such as space situational awareness (SSA); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); or communications assets as existing “exclusively in space or the space domain,” but consider them to be “complex ecosystems that exist in multiple domains.” The ViaSat, Inc. experts add that the least attributable, lowest cost, and most effective attack to a space ecosystem could likely not occur in space, and this needs to be considered in regard to the defense of space ecosystems and their space based assets.

Borrowing From Other Domains

There is no single conflict domain that shares the characteristics of space completely. While a number of the experts reference deterrence concepts from other domains that might be used to inform deterrence strategies involving space, most also echo Fox’s caution to avoid “unerring straight-line extrapolation” from other domains to space. Still, as shown in the table below, insight may be gleaned from experience and thinking in different domains for specific conditions. For example, deterrence questions about the impact of difficult attribution on the credibility of deterrent threats might be illuminated by submarine or cyber deterrence operations. Space deterrence problems that involve single or limited attacks that can cause large numbers of fatalities may find applicable instruction in nuclear deterrence thinking, while circumstances in which mass effects can be produced without direct loss of life might be informed by literature on cyber deterrence.

Contributors

Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor2 (Orbital ATK); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Caelus Partners, LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Dr. Damon Coletta and Lieutenant Colonel (USAF ret.) Deron Jackson (United States Air Force Academy); Colonel Dr. Timothy Cullen3 (School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University); Dr. Malcolm Davis (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia); Faulconer Consulting Group; Jonathan D. Fox (Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Futures Office); Dr. Nancy Gallagher (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Gilmour Space Technologies, Australia; Harris Corporation, LLC; Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (George Washington University); Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland); Dr. Moriba Jah (University of Texas at Austin); Dr. John Karpiscak III (United States Army Geospatial Center); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Dr. Xavier Pasco (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France); Dr. Luca Rossettini (D-Orbit, Italy); Dr. Krishna Sampigethaya4 (United Technologies Research Center); Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Matthew Schaefer and Jack M. Beard (University of Nebraska College of Law); ViaSat, Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation)

This publication was released as part of SMA’s Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.