SMA Publications

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: South China Sea Case Study.

Author | Editor: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar, George Popp, & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese government officials during peak times of conflict in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2016. The leading indicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presented separately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant national concerns.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

The 16-year period examined was divided into six-month periods, and measures of theme use were correlated with the frequency of gray zone activity initiated by each actor in the subsequent period. This enabled identification of indicators and warnings approximately six months in advance of gray zone actions.

• The specific themes that indicated Chinese gray zone activity included Conspiracy, Self-defense, Equality and Rights, Gray Zone Activities, and Domestic Development.
• Criminal/Illegal, Borders/Territory, Crime, Oil/Gas, Materiel, Protests, Friendship, and China were the primary indicators for the Philippine gray zone activity.
• Aggressor/Aggression, Legitimacy, Economy and Trade, UN, and Lexicalization indicated Vietnamese gray activity.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

The themes that occur statistically more often for each actor provide an indicator of what issues are most important for that actor.

• Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments share a mutual concern for their borders, their territories, and their own nation’s prosperity.
• China also outwardly reveals their preoccupations with peace, stability, sovereignty, cooperation, and the South China Sea.
• The Philippines, like the Chinese, also display a strong concern about the South China Sea, cooperation, China, and sovereignty and also have a strong interest in conflict, equality and rights, their economy and trade, and formal agreements.
• Vietnam, like the Philippines, is predominately concerned with conflict as well as peace, like the Chinese, and security.

Use of Emotional Language

The use of emotional language (themes that evoke emotion such as Pride, or rhetorical devices such as Sarcasm) indicates the importance of an issue for an actor.

• The Vietnamese used over twice as much moderate to extremely negative language as the Chinese did when discussing South China Sea matters and the countries involved. This may indicate that they feel most threatened by Chinese actions in the South China Sea. There were no statistically discernable differences between the Chinese and Philippine leaders.

Violent Non-state Actors in the Gray Zone A Virtual Think Tank Analysis (ViTTa).

Author | Editor: Sarah Canna, Nicole (Peterson) Omundson, & George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Using the Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert elicitation methodology, NSI asked six leading gray zone experts whether Violent Non-state Actors (VNSAs) belong in the definition of the gray zone. However, experts were reticent to answer this question; they thought the question missed the point. The focus should not be how to define the major threats that are facing the USG, but rather how to leverage all instruments of national power to respond to them. When pushed to answer the original question, experts largely conceded that VNSAs, by themselves, do not rise to a level of significant threat in the gray zone, but are key tools used by state actors to achieve their ends. They concluded by identifying other challenges and solutions facing the USG in the gray zone.

In January 2016, General Joseph Votel (US Army) requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office examine how the United States Government (USG) can diagnose, identify, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against, associated types of gray zone challenges. More specifically, the request emphasized that if the USG is to respond effectively to the threats and opportunities presented in the increasingly gray security environment, it requires a much more detailed map of the gray zone than it currently possesses. One core question raised by General Votel was whether violent non-state actors (VNSAs), like violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), fit into the definition of the gray zone.

To respond to this question, NSI applied its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert elicitation methodology to the problem set. As part of this effort, NSI interviewed six leading gray zone experts (see Table 1 and Appendix A) on whether, and under what conditions, VNSAs rise to a level of significant threat in the gray zone.

Their answers surprised us.

We Asked the Wrong Question

We initiated this effort with the objective of defining when and under what conditions VEOs and TCOs fit into the definition of the gray zone. However, experts were reticent to answer this question; they thought the question missed the point. The focus should not be how to define the major threats that are facing the USG, but rather how to leverage all instruments of national power to respond to them.

However, despite challenging the premise of the question, David Maxwell suggested that exercises like this one are useful not so much in determining the “right answer,” but rather to engage in a meaningful discussion that will help the nation better assess the challenges it faces, develop effective courses of action, and formulate plans to achieve key objectives. “Ultimately, the focus should not be on whether or not a conflict should fall into the gray zone. The US tends to try to organize everything into a clear category or create a clear label for everything,” Maxwell stated. The gray zone is ambiguous and complex, and is not suited to clear, crisp definitions.

Similarly, Adam Elkus noted that although the US would like to develop a clear dividing line between conflict and competition including who can engage in gray zone activities, other countries (primarily non-Western ones) do not think about achieving state objectives in this way. That makes it easier for them to exploit US relations without severe repercussions. Despite these reservations, we did ask the experts to respond to the original question.

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Question (AR1.Q1): How will the future of ISIS in Syria and Iraq impact the presence of ISIS in Africa?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

While the consideration of ISIS’s fate in Syria and Iraq of course adds significant value to the question of ISIS in Africa, ISIS’s next steps there appear to call upon a far broader set of considerations. Ultimately, the question of ISIS in Africa is complicated by the intricacies of local, state, and regional variation; competing factions and shifting loyalties, as well as the evolving situation in the Levant. Each of these issues could provide its own opportunity for a deep dive. As a first step, this report aims to provide an overview of the various considerations at play.

Three broad framing questions can be used to guide an assessment of what ISIS’s presence in Africa might look like moving forward. These are: 1) whether ISIS’s ideology and approach can sustain supporters in Africa, 2) whether African states are strong enough to withstand ISIS’s influence, and 3) whether ISIS or Al Qaeda will prevail in Africa.

Framing Questions

Can ISIS’s Ideology and Approach Sustain Supporters in Africa?

A key question is whether ISIS’s ideology and approach hold appeal for the varying groups and communities in multiple regions across Africa. Na’eem Jeenah, director of the Afro-Middle East Centre, indicates that the vast majority of Muslim organizations oppose ISIS and even publicly reject its ideology1 As Barfi (New America Foundation) indicates, the core tenets of ISIS’s approach, including its focus on sectarianism, which finds favor in Iraq and less so in Syria, is “non-existent on the [African] continent.” Similarly, he notes that ISIS’s rigid and unyielding interpretation of Islam may hold little appeal to, and may even turn away, the populations of potential ISIS sanctuaries. As two examples, he notes the Bedouin in the Sinai Peninsula who traditionally have adhered weakly to Islamic teachings, and Sahelian nationals who are Muslim in name only—and thus presumably would not be attracted to such an extreme version of the faith. In contrast, Siegle (National Defense University) indicates that when ISIS has had success in attracting African counterparts, its appeal has relied on its “reputational and ideological potency.” He notes, however, that the principal influence for militant Islamic ideology is not ISIS’s brand, but instead the highly conservative Wahhabi model of Islam, which continues to exert a strong influence supported by ample funding and social media and other forms of communication. In addition to its inability to fully root its ideology in Africa, specific groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) also appear to reject ISIS’s extreme tactics (Barfi).

Beyond a rejection of ISIS’s ideology and tactics, it may simply be that the focus in Africa is on more local concerns—such as local resource competition, grievances, or funding (Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations; Hansen, Harvard University / NMBU – Norway; Henneberg, Johns Hopkins University). Barring logistical support (Dele-Adedeji, University of London), ISIS has generally not provided or promised much in the way of resources to its affiliates and others (Campbell; Hansen; Siegle). As such, it cannot reasonably compete or make appeals on those grounds.

In contrast to the view that ISIS’s ideology holds little appeal, multiple contributors discussed counterpoints to this potential weakness. For example, ISIS won some respect due to its early victories, along with its innovative and successful use of social media tools and propaganda—the latter of which also has the potential to influence ISIS’s path forward (Barfi, Henneberg). Grievances against the central government (e.g., in the Sinai Peninsula) also may leave people open to ISIS influence (Barfi). For disaffected youth looking to demonstrate their agency, ISIS’s ideology and action also hold a specific appeal, particularly in Tunisia (Siegle). Finally, when ISIS was on an upward trajectory in the Levant, it enjoyed a reputation in Africa characterized by operational capacity, ability to gain and control large amounts of territory, and a singular vision and purpose—which greatly heightened its appeal among those enticed by jihad (Siegle).

ISIS appears to have had the most success with recruitment in Tunisia, with approximately 6,500 Tunisians having traveled to Syria and Iraq (Siegle). In other areas, despite an initial appearance of success, ISIS’s grasp is in fact tenuous. For example, though Libya has been considered a stronghold for ISIS, it does not particularly enjoy “homegrown support” there, and in fact was aggressively pushed out of Sirte by the Libyan militia and others who viewed ISIS as a hostile foreign presence (Barfi, Siegle). Though this lack of domestic support does not necessarily prevent ISIS from its destructive activities, at a minimum, it removes a source of support, and at worst for ISIS, may provide a source of active resistance. Siegle argues that ISIS’s ability to recruit and build alliances in Africa in fact will diminish as a function of losing influence and control of land in the Levant and the subsequent hits to credibility and reputation.2 Its loss of two strongholds in Libya may also contribute to a perception that it is a failing enterprise (Barfi). ISIS’s symbolic defeat in the face of its increasing loss of territory in the Levant and losses elsewhere, along with its transition to insurgency, renders it less capable of differentiating itself from other groups, and thus undermines its very basis for calling itself a Caliphate.

Ultimately, ISIS’s broader lack of success in persuading broad segments of the African population to adopt its ideology and tactics serves to limit its reach and hold in Africa. According to Siegle, “ISIS is, by and large, not well-rooted in the communities where Africa’s most active violent Islamist groups operate. This is particularly so in Sub-Saharan Africa. ISIS’s closest ties appear to be in Tunisia and the Sinai, plus a cadre of fighters displaced from Sirte in southern Libya and the Sahel.”

Are African States Strong Enough to Withstand ISIS’s Influence?

A second major question is whether African states are strong enough to resist ISIS’s influence, irrespective of how local populations view the organization or its ideology. In Africa, as elsewhere, vulnerability to insurgent activity will depend in part on the strength, stability, and legitimacy of the state. All else equal, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to enable ISIS to carve out safe havens for operation. As such, the specific vulnerabilities within Africa will vary greatly based on location and current status—relative stability or chaos. ISIS’s success may for example center around their focus on targeting rural communities, where little or no government presence is felt (Adeboye, University of Ibadan; Boukhars, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). A related factor is the degree to which formal entities (e.g., the state) or informal entities (e.g., communities) push back against these ongoing or emerging threats.

As several contributors (Barfi, Boukhars, Campbell) note, factors such as (local) ethnic tensions, social and economic dislocation, geography, political instability, weak public institutions, demographic challenges, poverty and unemployment, underdevelopment, and ungoverned spaces all contribute to making the African continent an appealing one to ISIS in terms of developing and strengthening affiliates—particularly in Egypt, Libya, and the Sahel (Barfi). ISIS’s cause is also furthered by a growth in the Sahel and Sahara of radical interpretations of Islam and violent extremism (Boukhars).

ISIS’s strongest presence and base of operations is in Libya,4 where it has been able to exploit political conflict and the security vacuum (Henneberg), though it also faces significant opposition there, and was ultimately displaced from Sirte (as noted above). Siegle suggests that the future success of any ISIS-linked groups in Libya (e.g., a regrouping of ISIS elements combined with fighters displaced from the Levant) would be less a function of local support required for a sustained presence and more a function of the lack of capable and centralized governance. As Barfi notes, “Libya has proved to be both ISIS’ most successful venture into Africa and its worst setback.” Similarly, though extremism has taken hold in Somalia in the face of state weakness, a countervailing factor is clan dynamics, which may stifle ISIS’s pursuit of additional territory there (Henneberg).

The Sahel region may be most deeply at risk, given its expanse of ungoverned space, which ISIS is likely to target (Adeboye). As Campbell notes, the Sahel also may be the poorest majority-Muslim territory in the world, with generally weak governments in the region, and an absence of national identity within the specific states. The Western Sahel may prove particularly vulnerable to ISIS, given its combination of several factors indicated just above (Barfi).5 In West Africa, we would expect politically fragile countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria also to be at risk (Adeboye). While the mix of vulnerability and resilience vary in these and other countries of West Africa, they share a large mixture of factors, all of which contribute to structural fragility (Boukhars).

Campbell argues that the littoral states (with the exception of Tunisia and Libya) generally are in a better position to resist ISIS’s influence (similar to Egypt) than are countries further to the south. Barfi nonetheless suggests that Egypt6—while buffered by a strong sense of nationalism, relative state stability, and a strong military—may become vulnerable in the Sinai Peninsula as its attacks on ISIS’s affiliate cause civilian casualties, resulting in the population’s subsequent sense of alienation.

Will ISIS or Al Qaeda Prevail in Africa?

The third key theme invoked by multiple contributors is the rivalry between ISIS and Al Qaeda (and their affiliates), referred to elsewhere as a “war within a war.”7 Campbell notes that, while ISIS and Al Qaeda share the goal of a pure Islamic state administrated according to their interpretation of Islamic Law, the groups vary in the tactics they use and are hostile to one another. The relative and absolute influence of these groups also varies as a function of geography and socio-politics.

Al Qaeda—which has a much longer history in Africa—may be better positioned to maintain and increase its power. Al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM have also been extremely agile in adapting strategy and tactics both in response to counterterrorism operations as well as to jihadi competition, and have been working to expand their footprint in Africa (Boukhars). While ISIS has, and will likely continue to have, minor footholds across Africa, their influence may be comparatively limited8 and perhaps dwindling. Several of the factors that are indicated as facilitating ISIS’s success are not unique to ISIS, but instead could be leveraged by competing groups such as Al Qaeda. These factors include leveraging social cleavages and communal distrust, migrant populations that provide a ready recruiting pool, people’s disillusionment and distrust of state institutions, ineffective counterterrorism operations, and several others (Barfi, Boukhars).

ISIS has some tangible advantages, such as significant funding enabling it to draw in potential adversaries and attract new recruits, a social media arm that is superior to that of its competitors, and a large supply of human resources that can be leveraged to send operatives to global locations while preserving its base (Barfi). ISIS also may enjoy an advantage to the extent that it is seen as having succeeded where Al Qaeda failed (e.g., fighting where Al Qaeda was less willing to fight) (Hansen). Similarly, ISIS has had other symbolic victories, such as Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance, loyalty from at least one faction of al Mourabitoun in Mali, and support from leaders such as Abdiqadir Mumin, who defected from al-Shabab—though ISIS has ultimately been unable to unseat Al Qaeda from its position of dominance.9 At the same time, Hansen notes that ISIS affiliates are geographically on the periphery of the more powerful Al Qaeda affiliates (AQIM and Al-Shabab), with the potential exception of the Abu Musab al-Barnawi group of Boko Haram.

There are also tensions growing out of competing loyalties that exist within the leadership of other extremist groups. For example, the senior leadership of Al-Shabab is split between those who align with ISIS and those who align with Al Qaeda (Henneberg). However, these loyalties can be transient and oft-changing, as well as subject to convenience (Boukhars). As Siegle discusses, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while affiliated formally with Al Qaeda, also has splinter groups who have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Within this context, Siegle notes, another possibility is that ISIS may gain traction over time as fighters relocate from Iraq and Syria, strengthening these splinter groups.

Further complicating this rivalry, both ISIS and Al Qaeda are also fighting a variety of armies and counter-terrorist organizations as well as fighting one another—the outcome of which will have an effect on Islamic militancy in Africa in the long-run.

Contributing Authors

Wale Adeboye (Institute for Peace & Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan), Barak Barfi (New America Foundation), Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Ambassador John Campbell (Council on Foreign Relations), Ini Dele-Adedeji (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), Stig Hansen (Harvard University / NMBU – Norway), Sabina Henneberg (School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), Joseph Siegle (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University)

Author | Editor: Popp, G., Canna, C., Bragg, B., Stevenson, J. & Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc.).

Overview

At the request of the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team initiated an effort, titled Gray Zone Conflicts-Challenges and Opportunities-A Multi-Agency Deep Dive Assessment, focused on assessing gray zone conflict. The overall objective of this SMA gray zone effort is to determine how the United States Government (USG) can identify, diagnose, and assess indirect strategies, as well as develop response options against, associated types of gray zone conflicts.

On 27 April, SMA held a Gray Zone panel discussion in Crystal City, VA. This panel discussion brought together multiple elements of the SMA coalition to present some of the work and key insights that have been produced in support of USSOCOM.

Question (R2 QL6): What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Despite policy shifts Turkey’s key interests remain the same

The SME contributors to this SMA Reach-back write-up argue that the recent changes in Turkish security policy (e.g., pursuit of ISIL along with the PKK; relaxing of demands for Assad’s removal; warming relations with Russia, etc.) do not necessarily indicate that Turkey’s key interests and intentions have changed. Rather, the shifts should be seen as changes in objectives or tactics that are still thoroughly consistent with Turkey’s fundamental and enduring security interests: 1) containing and ultimately eliminating Kurdish or other threats to Turkey’s internal stability; and, 2) foiling Kurdish (or others’) ambitions that threaten the integrity of Turkey’s borders. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence David Gompert (USNA, Rand) explains that recognizing Turkey’s dire concern with territorial integrity goes a long way in clarifying what may at first blush appear to be inconsistent policies regarding Assad, Syria, ISIL and even its “traditional enmity” toward Russia. Gompert expresses the message clearly: “…we can count on the Turks to do whatever it takes to prevent Kurdish states on their southern border.”

Erdogan’s political ambition: a third fundamental interest?

While most SMEs focused on Turkish threat perceptions and the Turkey—Kurd/PKK conflict as a key motivator of Turkey’s actions in Syria and Iraq, Portland State University Turkey scholar Dr. Birol Yesilada argues that Turkey’s security policy and actions cannot be fully understood without including President Erdogan’s personal political ambitions and domestic political considerations as critical motivators of state behavior. According to Yesilada, President Erdogan is using operations in Iraq and Syria to demonstrate his government’s strength and ability to provide security to Turks in order to advance his domestic political agenda. Erdogan’s ultimate goal is to gain the backing to change Turkey’s constitution to support establishment of his “Turkish-style Presidency” – a highly centralized, some say oligarchic or dictatorial, Islamist regime. (It is interesting to note that to date, Erdogan’s movements and plans for his “Turkish- style” leadership mirror those Vladimir Putin followed to centralize political power in Russia into his hands.)

Key objectives underlying Turkey’s actions

The SME contributors to this write-up provided a number of truly expert and comprehensive essays on Turkey’s short and longer- term objectives in northern Syria and Iraq. Although not always mentioned in this context, as shown in the summary graphic, each objective has a clear and direct link to the two security internal territorial integrity) and/or Erdogan’s domestic political interest.

1) Defeating Terrorism.

Defeating terrorism against the Turkish state has generally meant the PKK in Turkey and Iraq and PYD/YPG in Syria, although once ISIL fighters brought the fight into Turkey, Ankara has expanded the focus of its efforts to include the Islamic State. The question of the impact on Turkey’s security policy of Erdogan’s bid ultimately to change Turkey’s Constitution is a compelling and difficult to isolate. However, Professor Yesilada (Portland State) cites polls that show the political benefit Erdogan gains from these efforts: “91% of Turks support Erdogan’s anti-terror campaign inside the country and 78% support his military intervention in Syria and Iraq (esp. re Mosul) and 88% view his security policies favorably.”

2) Impeding Kurdish political and territorial gain.

Containing Kurdish political and territorial gains and obstructing activities that might by design or inadvertently lead to an autonomous Kurdish entity on Turkey’s border, are critical Turkish objectives in northern Syria. Many experts see Turkey’s pursuit of Operation Euphrates Shield as motivated by the desire to carve out a buffer zone in northern Syria and drive a solid wedge between Kurdish-controlled territory to the east and west to thwart emergence of a contiguous Kurdish region in northern Syria, that from its perspective would threaten both Turkey’s internal stability and potentially control over its own territory.

3) Increasing Turkey’s regional role and influence.

A number of experts noted Turkey’s push to distance itself from EU and NATO. With respect to its recently thawed relations with Russia a number of the SMEs expect that Turkey will move cautiously in its relations with Russia as it seeks to as Gompert tags it, engage in “diversified outreach” to expand its list of international partners and carve out a more independent regional role for itself. They argue that Turkey has little to gain from upsetting the US to the degree that it loses US backing.

4) Assuring domestic support.

Finally, as suggested by the opinion poll results cited above, at present President Erdogan enjoys extremely high public approval for his security policy – especially along Turkey’s border. Continuing to demonstrate the government’s ability to provide security for Turks will be a key facet of Erdogan’s overall popularity and ability to push through his preferred changes to Turkey’s democratic system.

Opening al-Bab: Turkey’s Intentions

Operation Euphrates Shield began with the liberation of Jarabulus in August 2016. In November Turkish forces and allied rebel groups launched the assault to remove ISIL from al-Bab and have been bogged down there since.

Most contributors to this report see Turkey’s mid-range intentions in al-Bab as two-fold: to defeat ISIL and push it away from the Turkish border, and to drive a pro-Turkey wedge between Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria containing the PKK and PYD and strengthening Turkey’s buffer zone in north Syria. A number of the SMEs make the case that one of Turkey’s mid-term objectives in conducting Euphrates Shield is to diminish the prestige the YPG has gained as the US/Coalition’s “go-to” fighters in the area. Specifically, Turkey gains both domestically and internationally if its own Syrian rebel proxies can liberate al-Bab – the last ISIL stronghold in northern Syria — and perhaps help in Raqqah rather than cede those opportunities to the YPG. Benedetta Berti (Institute for National Security Studies, Israel) suggests that Turkey’s objective here is to guarantee itself influence regarding the details of any post-conflict resolution arrangements in particular what happens with regards to Syria’s Kurdish population.

What next?

News reporters, commentators and the SMA SMEs continue to speculate on Turkey’s next move after liberation of al-Bab. Some experts believe that once al-Bab is liberated Turkey-backed rebels will attempt to take the city of Manbij 50 km up the M4 from the YPG forces that helped liberate that city and establish a strong buffer from Jarabulus to al-Bab to Manbij. In fact, in a January 4, speech delivered two months into the battle for al-Bab President Erdogan assured Turks that al-Bab would be retaken from ISIL shortly and after that, that Turkey was “committed to clearing other areas where the terror organizations are nesting, especially Manbij.”

However, on 27 January Erdogan appeared to recant, stating that Turkey would “finish the job” in al-Bab, but not necessarily move beyond al-Bab to other areas of Syria. There is a domestic and a regional concern here: Turkey has taken most of its Euphrates Shield casualties in the fight for al-Bab. Erdogan pronouncement also comes at a time when Syrian government forces are moving toward al-Bab from Aleppo and the southwest. The softening of Erdogan’s rhetoric likely reflects Russian influence as the forces of its two allies – themselves long-time adversaries, could come up against each other in al-Bab. One alternative is posed by Woodrow Wilson Center expert Amberin Zaman6 who is cited in news reports as doubtful that Turkish forces or Turkey-backed rebels would move on Manbij in part because of the Coalition Special Forces that he believes remain there following liberation of the city. Instead Zaman suggests that the next move in Turkey’s battle against the YPG will be against Afrin which is also in Kurdish-controlled territory, but which is less populated than Manbij or al-Bab and so should prove less difficult to secure.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Birol Yeşilada (Portland State University), Dr. Benedetta Berti (Institute for National Security Studies, Israel), The Honorable David Gompert (US Naval Academy, RAND)

Compilation of Round 1 Questions.

Author | Editor: Rhem, S. (SRC & SMA Team).

Round 1 Questions

Quick Look

1. What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?
2. What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)?
3. What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL- held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?
4. To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL’s ideology, particularly in European, N. African and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? What are the general perceptions associated with ISIL endorsed themes, to include: 1) desire for re-establishing the Caliphate; 2) imposition of Shariah law; 3) belief that the Ummah/Islam is under attack from the West; 4) low tolerance for non-Sunni Muslim ethno-religious groups; 5) negative disposition towards gender equality?
5. What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda?

ViTTa

1. What are the USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from counter-messaging efforts in the information domain?
2. What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community?
3. What long-term actions and processes should US government institutions, the Coalition, and the international community examine to position ourselves against a long term ISIL threat? How can the private sector be effectively engaged by government institutions to optimize the effects needed for success?
4. What are the most likely post-ISIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time (PMESII- PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end-state favorable to US and Coalition interests?
5. What are the factors that will influence the future of Syria and how can we best affect them?
6. What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability?
7. What are the strategic objectives and motivations of indigenous state and non-state partners in the counter-ISIL fight?

Literature Review

1. What opportunities are there for USCENTCOM to shape a post-ISIL Iraq and regional security environment promoting greater stability?
2. What will be Iran’s strategic calculus regarding Iraq and the region post-ISIL? How will JCPOA impact the calculus? What opportunities exist for the US/Coalition to shape the environment favorable to our interests?
3. What action and policies can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?
4. What is the strategic framework for undermining ISIL’s “Virtual Caliphate”?
5. Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?

Simulation

1. What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (i.e., external events). For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model?
2. In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the US-led coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia and Iran) or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq and Syria? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the US-led coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?
3. What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs?

Round 2 Questions

• Follow-up questions to the responses to Quick Look Question 3 concerning opinion research data on popular support for ISIL (9 Sept 16 Memo):

1. Have sentiments changed since the December 2014 polling? Have recent IO efforts in Mosul influenced these sentiments? What other means can we use to influence?
2. In countries where polling shows favorable opinions of ISIL (Syria, Nigeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Malaysia), what does this tell us? What do these countries have in common? What is our best approach to influence/inform?

Follow-Up questions to the responses to Quick Look Question 5 on the predominant means by which ISIL promulgates its message (9 Sept 16 Memo):

1. The response to QL5 noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures. What effect could this have on Intel efforts?
2. The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda. Is there more data available about the types of apps (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished?

New Questions:

1. What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?
2. What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab?
3. What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post-ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups?
4. How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?
5. What internal factors would influence Iran’s decision to interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb?
6. What improvements can be made towards the development of a comprehensive process to rapidly Build Partner Capacity (BPC) in select contingency scenarios (acquisition, fielding, distribution, maintenance and accountability of materiel)?
7. What major economic, political and security (military) activities does KSA and Iran currently conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to gain influence? What are KSA and Iran’s ultimate goals behind these activities? What motivates KSA and Iran towards these goals? What future activities might KSA and Iran conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen?
8. How does the Israeli Palestinian Conflict influence, effect, and relate to current conflicts in the region?
9. What are the key factors or elements within the Government of Iraq that influence overall stability in Syria and Iraq? What are the tipping points for each?

Question (R2 Special): What are the indicators of changes in Russian strategic interests in Syria?

Third Round of Questions from CENTCOM

• Quick Look Questions on Iraq (Due mid-Dec 2016)

1. Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population?
2. How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support?
3. What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh?
4. What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence , following the effective military defeat of Da’esh that Iran may view as beneficial?

Quick Look Questions on Syria (Due end of January 2017)

1. Following the clearance of Da’esh from both Mosul and Raqqah , and beyond that any remaining substantive elements in the Euphrates River Valley, what governing structure is most likely to be effective, and acceptable to the predominant tribes?
2. How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions?
3. How does Da’esh ‘s transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da’esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness?

Question (R4.7): What are the respective national interests of the US and Russia in the Middle East, and what are the options for alleviating US/Russian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The geopolitical foundation of the Middle East is undergoing a fundamental shift in paradigm, with both the US and Russia adapting their national interests to fit the current reality. As part of this shift, Bogdan Belei of the Carnegie Endowment contends that US national interests in the Middle East are diminishing due to a combination of affordable and abundant domestic energy sources as well as the end of the Cold War. Yet a calm and stable Middle East remains a critical US security objective that underpins other key US interests in the region (Lamoreaux). As Blago Tashev of the Marine Corps University notes (personal communication), “the US sees itself as a status-quo power, maintaining a particular rules-based international order that was created by the US and its allies after WWII and is based on values shared by America and those allies.”

Yet many of the SMA experts note that a driving Russian interest is to restore its image as a US-peer “Great Power” in part by expanding its economic, military, and diplomatic ties to the Middle East. Specifically, Belei, Tashev, and Marten argue that Russia’s goal is to end what it sees as two decades of American unilateralism in the Middle East. Tashev argues that Russia’s moves in the Middle East should ultimately not be viewed as aimed at eliminating US presence there rather, the goal is to achieve parity with the US in terms of Russia’s influence in the region. Marten emphasizes that Russian national interests are not necessarily the same as Putin’s own interests, and that Putin has and will put his own interests first. While “the US views the Middle East in terms of global interests and a global strategy, Russia by contrast looks at the region more in terms of the political legitimacy of the Putin government (validated by external successes) and in terms of regional tactics” (Braun, personal communication). Ultimately, according to Tashev (personal communication), Russia not only differs from the US and its allies in terms of values, but also uses different strategies and policies to attain outcomes consistent with its national interests.

US versus Russian Interests in the Middle East

US Interests

The collective input of the contributors identifies four categories of US national objectives in the Middle East: stability, security, economic, and democratization, with a strong emphasis on the former two.1 Lamoreaux argues that while a stable Middle East—including a non-confrontational Israel—is important to the US, a stable Europe is an even more pressing interest, largely due to economic considerations. He suggests that the best way to encourage both Israeli calm and European stability is to ensure stability in the Middle East.2 In service of this latter goal, Lamoreaux indicates that the US should continue present policy and interactions both with Saudi Arabia and with Egypt, given the current (relative) stability in those states. Similarly, Turkey must also be dealt with carefully, given the risk of destabilization to the EU posed by President Erdogan’s treatment of Syrian and Iraqi refugees (Lamoreaux).

US security interests include long-term partnerships with reliable allies within the region (Israel, Turkey, GCC, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt) (Belei). “These relationships center on stability within the confines of effective governance, yet do not require a uniform approach either towards ‘democracy,’ nor a standardized bilateral model for US engagement—variable interests and dynamic relationships remain the hallmark of the region” (Meredith, personal communication). Within that flexible approach, firm “red line” strategies include containing Iran (Belei); counter-terrorism/counter-ISIS activities (Belei, Lamoreaux, Tashev); and preventing the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction (Tashev).

US economic interest centers around the free flow of energy from the Middle East to the world (Tashev), including freedom of navigation, as well as maintaining sufficient capacity to monitor and potentially offset Russian naval activities in the Mediterranean (Meredith, personal communication). As Tashev discusses (personal communication), protection of strategic assets, economic, and other interests give rise to the US need to provide security over the non-littoral sea lines in the Middle East; the region is especially important given the presence of three important naval choke points—the Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime traffic through these choke points has and will continue to face multiple threats, even though the US historically has maintained freedom of navigation. This freedom will decline should US capacity and willingness to provide security be reduced—thereby creating an opportunity for actors such as China or Russia to gain increased influence in the region (Tashev, personal communication). A forward naval deployment strategy to protect and control sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa, as well as the greater Indian Ocean, would assist in protecting the US interest in energy security (Belei, personal communication).

Additional economic interests are “the dividend of stability and effective governance, namely the development of competitive, reliable markets for regional and global trade;4 employment growth to absorb and redirect fighting age males who would otherwise not join violent organizations; and broader tax bases for partner nations to establish capable government services and develop more legitimate social contracts” (Meredith, personal communication). Ultimately, the US views stable economic growth in the region as contributing to overall stability in the region, thus serving another core US interest (Tashev, personal communication).

The US interest in democratization (Tashev; cf. Lamoreaux) includes an emphasis on human rights, but also a recognition that democratization destabilizes political and social relationships, which must be managed carefully by partner nations (Meredith, personal communication). However, there was some disagreement among contributors regarding the importance of democratization as a US interest. Lamoreaux argues that the US does not have a current interest in democratization, but instead is focused on stability, even if this stability comes at the expense of the former (personal communication).

Russia Interests

Russia shares with the US one primary interest: security in the Middle East, which at present centers on counter-terrorism/counter-ISIS (Belei, Braun, Lamoreaux), thereby diminishing the threat of its brand of Islamist extremism expanding into Russia and its neighbors (Tashev). To serve this security interest, Russia is motivated to build alliances in the region, especially with friendly states like Iran, Egypt and more recently Turkey; more broadly to also establish good bilateral relations with all states (Belei, Tashev).

Lamoreaux points out that Russia’s interest in counter-terrorism may not be completely straightforward. He posits that Putin may not particularly want radical Islamic terrorism to be completely eliminated because some level of threat assists him in maintaining legitimacy and influence in the old Soviet sphere of influence (the Caucuses region and increasingly in the “Stans” as well), as the threat of terrorism increases across Central Asia. Russia’s interest in controlling terrorism is served by its continued involvement in Syria. Consistent with this claim, Marten notes that Putin’s primary goals in Syria are to support the Assad regime and eliminate Assad’s competitors; a pivot to defeating ISIS will occur after these goals have been achieved.

Russia also has economic interests in the Middle East, including expanding economic ties with the region through arms sales, nuclear technology, and the oil and gas markets (Belei, Marten, Tashev), as well as supporting energy prices by coordination with principal oil and gas producers in the Persian Gulf (Tashev).

Russia’s secondary interests in the Middle East otherwise focus on countering US and Western influence. This includes efforts to weaken the EU and West more generally, as well as a destabilized Syria, which is believed will contribute to a destabilized EU by fracturing it along multiple fronts (Lamoreaux).5 Putin also has an ongoing interest in undermining or complicating US diplomatic leadership in the Middle East and elsewhere in order to enhance domestic and regional perceptions of his strength and US weakness (Marten). Similarly, Putin is likely to use diplomatic overtures to further complicate and harm the US relationship with countries in the Middle East (Marten). Each of these actions serves Russia’s goal to regain global stature and contest US presence in the region (Serwer). Toward this goal, Russia aims to reestablish its influence in Libya, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran by filling the gaps left by the US (Serwer); Russia establishing a military presence in the Middle East will be a likely consequence of this objective (Belei).

Prognosis for Reducing US/Russian tensions and Improving Regional Stability

Several contributors indicated that the prospects for US-Russia cooperation in the Middle East are relatively poor (Belei, Braun, Marten, Serwer, Tashev). Braun (personal communication) notes, “In certain key areas, the differences between Putinite Russia and the US are more than tactical or even strategic; they are fundamental and cannot be bridged.” Meredith asserts that, while global competition has been tempered somewhat by US and Russian desires to control escalation to the point of outright conflict, the mutual restraint in US-Russian relations characteristic of the Cold War has not yet fully re-emerged. “This absence of mutual restraint is in part because the Russian paradigm remains zero-sum at its core—which leads to divergent interests vis-à-vis Iran, Syria, and Turkey as core actors in either the Western or Russian sphere of influence” (Meredith, personal communication). Belei argues that contrasting US and Russian interests also lead to opposing activities in the region that are fundamentally at odds. For example, in Syria and Libya, Russia opposes factions that the US supports; whereas in Afghanistan, Russia bolsters Taliban fighters who target US forces (Belei, Marten). According to Braun and Marten, as long as Putin relies on external events for internal political legitimation, a true resolution of tensions between the US and Russia will be difficult to achieve. This is underscored by Russian investment and military operations in Syria, warming relations with Iran (Braun), and intensification of relations, including with non-state actors, in the region (Tashev). Overall, Marten argues, Putin does not have much incentive to cooperate with the US in regards to defeating ISIS, unless he can portray the West as having capitulated to him and/or the US publicly acknowledges Russia’s leadership in resolving the conflict.

A more optimistic view of the situation suggests that it is possible that the US and Russia can converge on an interest in regional stability6 (Meredith, Tashev) “in the short term—seeking to contain and eventually diminish levels of violence—while recognizing stable governance can become an area for democratic development, itself a stabilizing force over the long term” (Meredith, personal communication). Neither the US nor Russia is interested in a protracted war and thus the tension might also reach a stalemate that would force both countries to engage in a political agreement (Belei). Barring these situations, prolonged conflict—or in the worst-case scenario, direct confrontation—is possible (Belei, personal communication).

Recommendations

The contributors offer a wide range of recommendations for reducing tension between the US and Russia in the Middle East. These are focused primarily on Syria and Russia itself, and include:

Syria

• “Cool off in Syria,” and conclude this conflict as soon as possible. Doing so includes abandoning the policy of regime change in Syria, instead focusing on eroding ISIS-held territory and ensuring that the cities are functional security environments (Belei, Lamoreaux, Meredith)
• Allow Assad to remain in Syria but insist that he work with primary opposition groups and agree to some sort of amnesty for rebel fighters (Lamoreaux)
• Institute more general checks on Assad so that he does not eliminate the competition once talks are done. Ensure that Assad surrenders the majority of his arms with the stipulation that others (Russia, possibly Turkey) enforce the agreement under UN auspices (Lamoreaux)

Russia

• The US and EU should ease sanctions on Russia as these do not seem to be effective, and no one will intervene militarily on behalf of the Ukrainian government (Lamoreaux)
• US policy toward Russia in the Middle East should not be compartmentalized. Take into account that Russia’s activities in the Middle East are tied to its moves elsewhere, as well as its military posture toward the US—all intended to restore Russia’s great power status (Tashev)
• The US should not explicitly include talk of human rights and democracy in its policy discussions with Russia, as the latter views these goals as destabilizing (Tashev)
• Minimize the emphasis on the use of force to achieve US goals in the Middle East as this prompts Russia to engage in asymmetrical response (Tashev)

Contributing Authors

Bogdan Belei (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aurel Braun (University of Toronto & Harvard University), Jeremy W. Lamoreaux (Brigham Young University – Idaho); Kimberly Marten (Barnard College, Columbia University), Spencer B. Meredith III (National Defense University), Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), Blago Tashev (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps University)

Question TAB A: 4th Round Quick Look Questions

Author | Editor: SMA Program Office.

SMA Round Four Questions

1. How strong a factor is Iraqi nationalism in countering Iranian influence?
2. How could DoD and DoS be better postured to address regional and world conflicts to ensure a whole of government approach to identify and synchronize lines of effort in both planning and execution?
3. To what extent is the Iraqi Army apolitical? Do they have a political agenda or other desired end-state within Iraq? Could the Iraqi military be an effective catalyst for reconciliation between different groups in Iraqi society? Could conscription be an accelerant for reconciliation, and if so how could it be implemented?
4. What does a successfully concluded campaign against ISIS look like? Considering costs, reputation, and balance of influence, how should the U.S./Coalition define success? Is the defeat of ISIS a success if it causes the balance of power in the region to shift towards Iran, Assad, or Russia?
5. Does U.S. foreign policy strike the right balance in supporting U.S. interests and its role as a global power? Or, should the U.S. consider a more isolationist approach to foreign policy? What impact could an isolationist policy have on Middle East security and stability, balance of influence by regional and world actors, and U.S. national interests?
6. What are the competing national interests of the U.S. and Iran in the Middle East and what are the options for alleviating U.S. / Iranian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?
7. What are the respective national interests of the U.S. and Russia in the Middle East and what are the options for alleviating U.S. / Russian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?
8. Are there impediments to cooperation amongst GCC nations that reduce their effectiveness towards undesirable or adverse regional issues? If so, how could impediments be overcome?
9. What are the medium to long-term implications to U.S. interests and posture of China’s economic, diplomatic and military expansion into South Asia, Middle East and Africa?
10. Is the current U.S. approach to supporting Afghanistan beneficial? Or does it promote a cycle of dependency and counter-productive activities in the region? What strategic and local factors would need to be considered, managed and accepted in any significant change in military and/or other support?
11. What are the implications for the U.S. and GCC countries if the Arab coalition does not succeed or achieve an acceptable outcome in Yemen?

SMA Reachback: Highlights From CENTCOM Round 1, 2 and 3 Questions.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Overview

ISIS will be defeated militarily. However, whether it is ultimately overcome by containment or by deploying ground forces to apply overwhelming force, the path to mitigating violent extremism in the region is a generations-long one. Military options alone are insufficient to protect US interests and stabilize the region. It will require significant strengthening of State Department and non-DoD capacity to help build inclusive political institutions and processes in Syria and Iraq. Only if these flourish will ISIS — the organization and the idea it represents — have failed and the region been put on a sustainable path to stability

Contents

• Charter
• The Meaning of ISIS Defeat & Shaping Stability: Highlights from CENTCOM Round 1, 2 and 3 Reach-back Reports.
• Individual theme Executive Summaries 17 Messaging Executive Summaries.
• What are the predominant and secondary means by which both large (macro-globally outside the CJOA, such as European, North African and Arabian Peninsula) and more targeted (micro- such as ISIL-held Iraq) audiences receive ISIL propaganda? Executive Summary.
• What are USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from countermessaging efforts in the information domain? Executive Summary.
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Executive Summary Part 1.
• What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Executive Summary Part 2.
• The response to QL5 noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures What effect could this have on Intel efforts? Executive Summary.
• The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda Is there more data available about the types of apps (eg, WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished? Executive Summary.
• The Fight Against ISIS Executive Summaries.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)? Executive Summary.
• What is the strategic framework for undermining ISIL’s “Virtual Caliphate?” Executive Summary.
• What long-term actions and processes should US government (USG) institutions, the Coalition and the international community examine to position ourselves against a long term ISIL threat? How can the private sector be effectively engaged by government institutions to optimize the effects needed for success? Executive Summary.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability? Executive Summary.
• Have sentiments changed since the December 2014 polling? Have recent IO efforts in Mosul influenced these sentiments? What other means can we use to influence? Executive Summary.
• What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah? Executive Summary.
• How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support? Executive Summary.
• Mosul Coalition Fragmentation: Causes and Effects.
• Encouraging Regional Stability Executive Summaries.
• What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors? Executive Summary.
• What are the most likely post-lSIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end state favorable to US and coalition interests? Executive Summary.
• What opportunities are there for USCENTCOM to shape a post-ISIL Iraq and regional security environment promoting greater stability? Executive Summary.
• What are the factors that will influence the future of Syria and how can we best affect them? Executive Summary.
• What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition’s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability? Executive Summary.
• What will be Iran’s strategic calculus regarding Iraq and the region post-ISIL? How will JCPOA impact the calculus? What opportunities exist for the US/Coalition to shape the environment favorable to our interests? Executive Summary.
• What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post- ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups? Executive Summary.
• How does the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict influence, affect, and relate to current conflicts in the region? Executive Summary.
• What are the key factors or elements within the Government of Iraq that influence overall stability in Syria and Iraq? What are the tipping points for each? Executive Summary.
• Regional Actor Interests and Motivations Executive Summaries.
• What are the strategic objectives and motivations of indigenous state and non-state partners in the counter-ISIL fight? Executive Summary.
• In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the US-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the US coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals? Executive Summary.
• What are near and long term Turkish interests and intentions in Syria and Iraq? What are Turkish interests and intentions with respect to al-Bab? Executive Summary.
• What internal factors would influence Iran’s decision to interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb? Executive Summary.
• What major economic, political and security (military) activities does KSA and Iran currently conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to gain influence? What are KSA and Iran’s ultimate goals behind these activities? What motivates KSA and Iran towards these goals? What future activities might KSA and Iran conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? Executive Summary.
• What are the indicators of changes in Russian strategic interests in Syria? Executive Summary.
• What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh? Executive Summary.
• What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence, following the effective military defeat of Da’esh [in Iraq] that Iran may view as beneficial? Executive Summary.
• Sources of Extremism Executive Summaries.
• What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community? Executive Summary.
• What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (ie, external events) For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model? Executive Summary.
• ISIL Support and Recruitment Executive Summaries.
• What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL- held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)? Executive Summary.
• To what extent do populations maintain positive views of ISIL or ISIL’s ideology, particularly in European, N African, and Arabian Peninsula countries most associated with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq? Executive Summary.
• What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters? Executive Summary.
• USG Bureaucratic Requirements Executive Summaries.
• Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050? Executive Summary.
• Post ISIL Governance Executive Summaries.
• Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population? Executive Summary.
• Following the clearance of Da’esh from both Mosul and Raqqah, and beyond that any remaining substantive elements in the Euphrates River Valley, what governing structure is most likely to be effective, and acceptable to the predominant tribes? Executive Summary.
• How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions? Executive Summary.
• Coalition Views Executive Summary.
• How does the US/Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the US/Coalition position on combatting extremists? Executive Summary.

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Question (R3 QL6): How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Similar to points made by other contributors to this SMA Reach-back report, Dr. Kathleen Reedy of Rand includes a caveat in her response to the CENTCOM question. Given international pressure to avoid Salafi expansion in Syria, it is doubtful she argues, that Salafist policies or leaders would be allowed to become dominant over sizeable areas of northwest Syria. Nonetheless, contributors’ input on the likely response to future Salafist political institutions in northwest Syria tends to align with one of two viewpoints: 1) Syrians will reject Salafi efforts to establish political institutions (i.e., to govern); or 2) Salafi governance will be accepted under certain circumstances.

In addition, the experts offer a range of key factors to support either the “reject” or “accept with conditions” conclusions. These factors suggest four areas of inquiry: 1) the cultural salience of Salafism in Syria; 2) the degree to which people differentiate among political groups; 3) popular views of, and experience with political groups; and 4) the relative importance of ideology versus provision of public services.

Questions #1 and #2: The Cultural Acceptability of Salafism & Ideological Differentiation

Professor Murhaf Jouejati of the National Defense University contends that Syrian culture is a more apt foundation for moderate than for extremist Islamic practices. Salafism, which represents the culture of the Arabian Peninsula, is foreign to Levantine culture and as a result Syrians are most likely to reject Salafist institutions or reforms. Jouejati recalls that in the past Syrians living in areas controlled by radical extremists engaged in civil disobedience and demonstrations and sees little reason that these types of activities would not occur in areas taken or retaken by ISIL, Al Qaeda or Jabat Fatah al Sham (JFS). Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, adds that even within the opposition there is a preference for the Syrian national movement “initiated by peaceful protesters advocating for moderate ideals, rather than the transnational jihadis like Al-Qaeda.” He warns though that “that dynamic is not necessarily immovable.”

Mubin Shaik of the University of Liverpool provides a variation on this argument. He maintains that in fact Syrians differentiate between Salafists and “Saudi style Wahhabists” so would not necessarily reject all Salafist governors or political institutions. It is the particular Wahhabism of the Islamic State that is countercultural in this area. Finally, Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma) warns that the issue of the cultural salience of Salafism in Syria may be becoming moot. While he concedes that many Syrians are “fed up with fundamentalism” because of the harsh treatment they received at the hands of JFS and then ISIL, he argues that over the past six years of conflict the Syrian population has been radicalized as, consciously or not, Salafi ideas and practices have been accepted into their psyches and aspects of their daily lives where they were not necessarily present before.

Question #3: Popular Experience with Salafi Groups

Charles Lister (MEI) argues that the fall of Aleppo, the moderate opposition’s key safe haven in Syria, had the effect of diminishing popular confidence in moderate civil society. However, because in his view JFS failed to demonstrate its military value to the Syrian revolution it is now seen as “impotent” by local populations and enjoys “only minimal respect” in civil affairs. Mubin Shaik (University of Liverpool) on the other hand, believes that Salafist groups like Al Qaeda and Jabat Fatah al Sham have succeeded in building the foundation for public support of their leadership by encouraging locals to see them as defenders of the interests of the Syria people as opposed to other groups who they peg as the flunkies of the regime or of the West. As a result, Shaik expects that Salafist groups will be accepted by local populations as long as they continue their gradualist approach to instituting socially conservative (Salafist) practices.

Question #4: The Relative Importance of Goods versus Ideology

Finally, in line with the conclusions of other SMA Reach-back write-ups (e.g., see R3 QL5, V7), Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma) argues that local support for one governing structure over another will not be a function of ideology or religious preference as others intimate, but a function of which government can provide goods and services to its constituents. Landis notes that people in northwest Syria are, and will remain, in dire need of employment, security and education and the government that best provides these goods will receive their allegiance. In a specific instance of this argument Lister (MEI) forecasts that continued civil conflict in Syria will eventually bring the people of the Idlib and Hama governates into the regime’s sights and in urgent need of defense. Lister warns that if the Coalition were to discontinue support for moderate forces, local populations may again see no option but to align with Salafi groups for their defense.

The Result

As is clear from the review of their arguments, there is no clear consensus on the prospects for Syrian acquiescence to Salafi authority and/or attempts to govern in the northwest of the country. It is also unclear which factors would be the most important determinants of popular support or rejection of Salafi control. Producing a more definitive answer to the CENTCOM question requires further study and data collection on the ground. In short, in both cases – expectations and critical variables – the jury is still out.

What the experts’ input does suggest however, is arguably more useful than a single, consensus answer to (any) question of popular desire or preference in such a volatile environment. Taken together the experts’ contributions to this report imply a series of important questions that provide a template for assessing or engaging with local preferences for governing structures (e.g., Salafi, Assad regime, or moderate Islamist, etc.) in both Syria and Iraq. Specifically, analysts and planners should tailor and seek to answer the following questions relative to their areas of interest:

1. Is the prospective government or governing system salient to, and consistent with local culture?
2. Do opponents/supporters of the prospective government or system differentiate among proposed leaders, or are all elements or factions of the proposed governing authority seen as unacceptable/acceptable?
3. What history or past experiences do local constituents have with the prospective government?
4. What is the relative importance of religious and/or ideological beliefs and government provision of goods and services (e.g., security, employment, etc.) in determining popular acceptance of a governing authority?

The Accept-Reject figure above shows these generic questions tailored for the question of popular support for Salafi political institutions in NW Syria, and provides a useful roadmap for further study and on-the-ground data collection.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Kathleen Reedy (RAND), Dr. Murhaf Jouejati (National Defense University), Dr. Amjed Rasheed (Durham University, UK), Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool; independent consultant), Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma), Charles Lister (Middle East Institute)