SMA Publications

Question R2 (QL4): The wide-spread, public access to smartphones has been a game-changer for the distribution and production of propaganda. Is there more data available about the types of apps (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, Viber) used on smartphones to distribute propaganda, and the methods through which this is accomplished?

Author | Editor: Ziemke, J. (John Carroll University).

Twitter & Facebook?

Todd Huffman and Ryan Paterson shared their analysis of the top fifty applications and services used over the last three months to spread VEO propaganda. Top on the list are applications for Twitter, Facebook, and WordPress, among others as shown in the Appendix. Our contributors also highlighted others: Fred Morstatter (ASU) flagged Telegram, as well as custom-made apps, while Randy Kluver (TAMU) remarks that alternative platforms tacitly supported by foreign governments (such as Wechat or VKontakte) “re-create the geographical and political divisions that most assumed were ending with the rise of a globalized world.” However, many authors argue that the issue is truly platform neutral, and that message circulation is just as effective in any number of other platforms. Rebecca Goolsby (ONR) additionally surmised that the way in which the question was asked explains the “Twitter and Facebook” answer received. Contributors felt that gaining traction on this issue first requires understanding how VEO’s leverage social media and vulnerable audiences to attain their goals. We turn to Rebecca Goolsby to elaborate on this issue.

“Anyone that is a true believer in X must also believe Y”

Goolsby asserts that a goal of any VEO is to transform, create, and reframe a conversation by deploying “side-step logic”, which amounts to: If you truly believe X, then you must also believe and support Y. The crafty use of this logical fallacy is what leads hyper-connected yet vulnerable audiences to leverage social media to recirculate and thus amplify the message. She says a VEO wants “to turn the conversation so that the audience believes if they support Healthy Kittens for America, then they must naturally support . And if you don’t support , how can you call yourself a Friend of All Kittens?”

Since the narrative is pitched to the target audiences’ deep biases, values, and worldview, the audience does not engage in critical thinking about the information. Because the audience emotionally ‘knows’ that X is true (and right) in its emotional mind, then it accepts the parasite narrative without thorough consideration of its origins, implications, or agenda. And since the audience finds that more and more of its trusted peers are echoing this information, critical evaluation is further suppressed.

At the same time, the VEO insinuates itself into the information networks of the target audience in a way that displays this vulnerability, repeating and amplifying the motifs and sub-narratives that reflect its agenda, until it is hard to find where the host narrative and the parasite narrative are differentiated. The target audience is then repeatedly exposed to the parasite narrative through covert means, using computerized amplification methods (e.g. botnets, fake news).

Audiences as unwitting vectors of amplification

How do the VEO’s reframe the conversation that makes this ‘logical’ side-step possible? By manipulating vulnerable audiences into recirculating this information for them. Messages are amplified by vulnerable audiences and paid intermediaries who recirculate these messages, drowning other views. Goolsby asserts that “the reason phones are a game changer is that it is the easiest and cheapest access to the Internet available to most of the world. Newer users–the newbies- – are not especially sophisticated in their understanding of news and fake information, but everyone has cognitive vulnerabilities–hot button issues–that can be exploited.” Nitin Agarwal (U. of Arkansas) elaborates on message amplification by noting that messages emerge in one medium but are then massively disseminated across several other platforms: “Strategies such as thread jacking, smoke-screening, hashtag latching, etc. are used to multiply the messages.”

Why share?

Youth in particular share or create these messages for a variety of different reasons. As digital natives, they want to be seen sharing insider information as a way to boast about privileged access to content from the frontlines. Youth compete to post information that shows just how enlightened they are about an issue relative to their peers, and to do so faster than anyone else. Jen Ziemke’s (John Carroll University) young students remark that when their friends spread information and pictures of weaponry and battlefield activity they do so “to make themselves look good amongst their friends who do not have such access to such exclusive content.” Still others share in order to feel like they belong to something, or to “feel cool,” or even to feel “morally superior to have shared something that helps craft one’s identity around an issue.”

Content Consumption & Recirculation

Many who end up sharing content start out by passively looking through media on their phone (their ‘feed’), mostly out of boredom, curiosity, or force of habit. For many, it is an obsession born out of an addiction to their phones. Their ritual includes checking several different feeds, nearly all of the time. They often do not start out with the intent to circulate something in particular, rather, they share based on the serendipity of their feed.

Snapchat, Instagram & YouTube

Ziemke’s interviewees report that youth generally prefer receiving messages via pictures and video rather than words, which is another reason they increasingly turn to platforms like Instagram, Snapchat, and Youtube. “Pictures make you feel like a part of the battlespace” and powerful imagery “gets stuck in your head” in ways that narratives without visuals do not. Nitin Agarwal likewise finds that millennials are particularly vulnerable to YouTube messaging. Agarwal calls YouTube “the platform for crafting the narrative and setting the agenda.”

Another reason youth are moving toward other channels seems to be due to differences in the design and user experience across the platforms. Millennials report being tired of “all of this scrolling” and thus are likely to continue to move away from the Facebook and Twitter environment and towards Instagram, YouTube & Snapchat. Others remarked that Twitter and Facebook are quickly gaining negative reputations as increasingly full of garbage, spam and propaganda, and that many are drifting away from it, and turning to Snapchat and Instagram as platforms which have less “noise” in their feeds compared with the conventional channels.

It’s so easy

However, it is the ease of sharing that sticks with one young student of Ziemke’s, who relayed that what actually seems most important is simply how easy all of this is, which is independent of platform. Picking up his phone he noted that he could get access to anything he wanted in a moment through knowing just one contact. What stood out for him was the stupendous simplicity and ease with which the exchange of information can happen, literally in just seconds, and on a phone that is already in your hand.

The heart of the matter

What are the relevant important next steps one might suggest in light of these trends?

Willow Brugh of the Center for Civic Media cautions that simply shutting down the same tools that populations use when infrastructure collapses seems like a terrible idea. After all, these are the same tools that help vulnerable populations self-organize when living under repressive regimes.

Clearly there is an urgent need to solve the structural problems that contribute to what makes a VEO’s narrative attractive in the first place. Randy Kluver remarks that alternative platforms “re-create the geographical and political divisions that most assumed were ending with the rise of a globalized world. Political, social, and cultural discussions that could happen on globally accessible platforms are moving into different platforms, where there is less ability for US citizens to interact, and thus the technological platforms re-embody the geographical differences.”

Brugh elaborates: “Are we yet spending as much (hopefully far more) on youth opportunity and other vectors we know that decrease the likelihood of finding ISIL et al as undesirable? All the tools I know about from online harassment, escalated (aka “weaponized social”) which monitor or nudge people’s online communications are far more often used to quash meaningful dissent than to actually help anyone.”

In conclusion, while we may have taken some limited steps toward answering one question, we know that the question itself is really the core of the matter, and are therefore grateful for this and any future opportunities to engage.

Contributing Authors

Agarwal, N. (University of Arkansas at Little Rock), Brugh, W. (Center For Civic Media, MIT Media Lab), Goolsby, R. (Office of Naval Research), Huffman, T. (IST Research) Kluver, R. (Texas A&M University), Morstatter, F. (Arizona State University), Paterson, R. (IST Research)

Question (S#1): What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (i.e., external events). For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model?

Author | Editor: Ziemke, J. (John Carroll University).

The contributors weigh in on this question, doing their best to read the tea leaves. If Mosul should fall, what’s next? Where, when, and why?

Getting to the Where: Location

Jen Ziemke (John Carroll University) suspects that, in Iraq, as the primary focus otherwise shifts westward as the main front retreats toward Syria, it would be very prudent to continue to protect the rear from attacks on cities like Kirkuk. Regionally, continuing signs of instability in Saudi Arabia might place sites there at greater risk vis-a-viz some others. Due to their relative proximity to the battlefield, Beirut, Istanbul, or Amman continue to be at risk. Cafes, nightclubs, & bars in these locations are more imaginable choices than many other alternatives because such targets would serve to both maximize casualties and send a culturally-relevant message. Further afield, given the state of aggrieved populations in certain European suburbs, we suspect locations in Italy, France, and symbolic targets like the London Eye to continue to be at risk.

What about American targets? Victor Asal & Karl Rethemeyer (University of Albany SUNY) find that, despite the fact that “anti-Americanism is probably the most universal and widespread of attitudes,” the relative risk to American targets is low. However, the authors find that VEO’s are more likely to attack countries with American military bases, and that the risk of targeting is particularly acute when a significant number of American troops are stationed inside non-democratic countries, suggesting that their presence “may be generating a great deal of resentment. In addition to creating a motivation, the stationing of US troops abroad provides convenient military and civilian targets that can be killed without travelling to America.”

Timing is Everything: Battlefield Rhythms & Op-Tempo

Drawing from the literature on Complex Systems, Neil Johnson (University of Miami) argues that the timing of attacks follows reasonably well the “progress curve” (known from organizational development and learning literature). Similarly informed by a complex systems perspective, Ziemke asserts that converting conflict data into sonic landscapes for pattern analysis allows us to hear the battlefield rhythm and op-tempo of the conflict.

When micro-level event data (battles, massacres, ceasefires, etc) on the 41 year long Angolan war are played over time, we learn just how slowly these campaigns tend to begin. Like drops of water slowly coming out of a faucet, each individual event stands out because of the silence between events. From such analysis and observation, Ziemke asserts that losing groups do not go down quietly, nor without a fight, and what begins as individual events eventually turns into a firestorm of violence. But then, and even more rapidly, the fire dies, the losing side scatters, and the storm subsides. A few chirps amidst the silence mark the end, and the war dies in much the same way it starts, as an inverse refrain on how it began, little by little, punctuated by silences: an event here, an event there. Adagio crescendos to an absurdist cacophony, but just as quickly, it reverts to the same Adagio in the end. Thus, the start of the war helps to inform how it ends; it is actually the same melody, played again, but this time in reverse.

Severity

Neil Johnson (University of Miami) notes that the severity of any given attack “always seems to follow a so-called power-law distribution”, an occurrence repeatedly noted in the literature on conflicts and a feature of complex systems. This means that in every war, there are many events with relatively few casualties, but only very few events that are utterly catastrophic. Since extreme events and black swans are of heightened interest, when would we expect the risk of experiencing a catastrophe to be the highest?

Ziemke finds from her analysis of the Angolan war that when UNITA began to lose, they lashed out against civilians, and both the pace and severity of each event vastly increased. Losing is what accelerated the war into a new period, and a veritable cacophony of incredibly destructive events followed. It was as if an aggregation of losses on the battlefield ushered in a kind of phase transition in the war where extreme, rare events became more likely.

While in some ways ISIL strategy markedly differs from other violent groups, its tendency to lash out against civilians nevertheless may end up mirroring other quite different rebellions and insurgent organizations in history in terms of pattern, tempo, and timing. Consider, for example, the behavior of the RUF in Sierra Leone during their reign of terror under Operation No Living Thing, or UNITA’s appalling treatment of civilians during the latter half of the second Angolan war (1991-2002), or the surge in civilian deaths in Sri Lanka just before the LTTE was defeated in Sri Lanka in early 2009. Despite how different these organizations may be from one another, they share a common battlefield rhythm: when they began to lose the war, lose territory, and lose fighters, each group escalated their campaign to deliberately target civilians, and in increasingly grotesque ways, and even more than before.

Taken together, one might expect that if ISIL finds itself facing an imminent, existential threat to its survival, they might commit an unimaginable mass atrocity in whatever city they are entrenched, even if this behavior risks destroying a large number of their own fighters along with everyone else. As coalition forces continue to advance, one could imagine a David Koresh- style cult-like suicidal response, as many in their ranks might actually prefer this horrific outcome to defeat by another hand.

In the short term, as coalition forces render ever more devastating blows to ISIL, we fear that civilians in the area of operation may face even worse fortunes. However, when we begin to see ISIL commit massive atrocities on a previously unseen scale, the horrific events themselves likely are signals of their imminent defeat. The war (at least in the kinetic space, and in the near-term) will be nearing an end.

So what can be done to hasten ISIL’s demise?

Is targeted killing effective?

Rich Davis applies these questions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He asks whether Israel’s targeted killing and apprehension program reduced the ability for Palestinian militants to project violence back into Israel. He finds that targeting Hamas’ militant network was effective and indeed led to a significant decline in both the number and lethality of suicide attacks by Palestinians inside Israel. The “further up the production line” the Israeli’s were able to penetrate, the better. As new militants who lacked experience replaced their deceased and/or imprisoned predecessors, less attacks occurred in general, and the attacks that did occur were less lethal. Additionally, as more and more of the network began to disintegrate, Hamas tended to allocate more resources “toward self-preservation, and less towards suicide attacks.”

Implications of Davis’ work applied to the Counter-ISIL campaign seem to suggest that missions targeting ISIL leadership might in the long-run lead to a decline in the ability of ISIS to project power and terrorize elsewhere, and that “the further up the production line” one was able to target, the better.

Somewhat in line with what Davis suggests, Johnston and Sarbahi also find that “drone strikes decrease the number and lethality of terrorist attacks,” at least in the short run. Taken together, the moral seems to be: “targeting works”. However, As Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer point out, research on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation, in particular, is mixed. Bryan Price suggests that leadership decapitation is only effective when applied to young groups. As groups mature, the effectiveness of leadership decapitation diminishes altogether. So if decapitation stands a chance of influencing outcomes with respect to the VEO under consideration here, the sooner, the better, and focus on the violence production line.

However, Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer suggest the reduction in violence might actually be due to the reconciliation efforts instead, and not the targeted killings. To conclude, one should ask: Historically, how effective has the use of violence been in terms of counteracting violence? Is using violence to counteract violence better than any of the alternatives?

Contributing Authors

Asal, V. (SUNY Albany), Davis, R. (Artis), Johnson, N. (University of Miami), Rethemeyer, R.K. (SUNY Albany), Ziemke, J. (John Carroll University)

Demystifying Gray Zone Conflict: A Typology of Conflict Dyads and Instruments of Power in Colombia, Libya and Ukraine.

Author | Editor: Koven, B. (START).

The author of this report is Barnett S. Koven, Senior Researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Questions about this report should be directed to Barnett S. Koven at bkoven@start.umd.edu.

This report is part of START project, “Shadows of Violence: Empirical Assessments of Threats, Coercion and Gray Zones,” led by Amy Pate, Research Director at START.

This research was supported by a Centers of Excellence Supplemental award from the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs, with funding provided by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch of the Department of Defense through grand award number 2012ST061CS0001‐05 made to START. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Defense or START.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START) has been tasked with providing support to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Gray Zone project undertaken as a Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiative. Part of this support included the preparation of qualitative case studies covering three diverse Gray Zone conflicts: Colombia (2002‐present), Libya (2014‐present) and Ukraine (2014‐present). Each case study builds upon the following working definition of Gray Zones:

“The Gray Zone is a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple instruments of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.”

More specifically, extensive focus is directed to the role of the myriad, violent non‐state actors (VNSAs) present in each conflict. The case studies elucidate that given the confluence of a diverse array of actors and the seven distinct instruments of power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and legal), which can be leveraged in prosecuting the conflict within White, Gray and/or Black domains, Gray Zone environments are particularly complex. Beyond merely illustrating this fact, the country reports are designed to help bound the scope for practitioners attempting to understand and possibly intervene in these dynamics. This is accomplished in two ways. First, we observed that actors of the same type largely behave comparably when facing the identical types of adversaries within the same conflict. Consequently, actors can be aggregated by types (e.g., treating various leftist insurgencies as a group or collapsing the myriad localized Islamist groups into a single category in Libya) without substantial loss of fidelity.

While the use of the aforementioned typology is helpful, the studies’ real innovation is that they focus on conflict dyads. Rather than consider the entire conflict – with its still numerous actor‐types – as a whole, these reports break down and analyze the conflict one dyadic configuration of belligerents at a time. We found that belligerents of the same type prioritize certain instruments and Zones when facing one type of actor and other instruments and Zones against other actor‐types. For example international legitimacy is very important for some types of VNSAs. Consequently, these groups may prioritize White and/or Gray diplomatic and informational instruments when confronting the government. However, Gray and/or Black Zone activities within the military instrument may predominate in their conflict with other VNSAs, since these dyads are less likely to affect international perceptions. The average Colombian conflict dyad involves just 2.5 of the seven instruments. In Libya, the average is a bit higher at 4.5 instruments. However, on average, just 2 are particularly salient. Ukraine similarly experiences an average of 4.5 relevant instruments of power across all dyads. Nevertheless, this average is inflated by the Ukrainian government versus Russian government dyad, which involves all seven instruments.

This report proceeds in four sections. The first section provides background on each case and the relevant actors therein. The subsequent section describes the data leveraged and the methodology employed by the studies. The penultimate section elaborates on the approach utilized and key findings. The final section concludes. In doing so it also offers advice for practitioners.

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Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

This video is a brief overview of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor effort in support of USCENTCOM. Over the past year, the SMA Reach Back Cell has produced a vast corpus of knowledge and insight in support of key USCENTCOM questions regarding Syria and Iraq. On its own, this 1000+ page (and 50+ report) collection of documents is a valuable resource, but due to its sheer size and density, it might prove difficult to fully consume and absorb. Therefore, Project Noor seeks to provide USCENTCOM with a quicker, easier, and more effective way to search through and make effective use of this vast treasure trove of information.

Question (S2): In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the U.S. coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?

Author | Editor: Maye, D. (ERAU).

Considering their divergent goals and interests, experts assessed the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, Israel, Russia, France, Bahrain, Iraq, Turkey, the Kurds, the Assad regime, Iran, and jihadist groups to achieve their aims. They assessed where several disparate groups’ interests align and where they diverge. When looking at the broad range of actors, a few patterns emerged. The first is in terms of where national security goals and interests were in alignment. Unsurprisingly, perennial allies such as the U.S., Israel and France had several specific points of convergence, as did Russia and Syria. The second is in areas of divergence. As expected, nefarious actors such as the jihadist groups were completely divergent from the interests of the other actors. When assessed at the macro- level three major generalities surfaced.

Aims – Alignment

Promoting Strong and Stable States. The first overarching theme was the goal of promoting strong and stable nation states. While not all the actors agreed on which nation states should be promoted, nearly each actor in the assessment had at least one state that was a priority. Both Bahrain (Gengler) and Russia seek their own regime’s survival (Thomas). Both the U.S. and France see the value of strong Iraqi state (Maye, Tenebaum). France also seeks to limit instability across the Middle East, avoid destabilization in Lebanon, and promote non-hostile state in Syria (Tenebaum).

Relationship Building and Cooperation. A second major generality that emerged was in relationship- building and cooperation. Each of the actors that the experts assessed is prioritizing their relationships or ability to cooperate with strategic partners. For instance, the Israelis are seeking to expand relations with European powers and Arab states, maintain their strategic alliance with the U.S., and develop relationships with rising Asian powers like India and China (Brom). For military reasons, Bahrain needs to maintain its ties to the British and the Americans (Gengler). France seeks to strengthen strategic partnerships with Gulf monarchies (Tenebaum). Strategic cooperation with China and the BRICS is a key tenet of Russian foreign policy (Thomas), yet the Russians are also open to areas of cooperation with the U.S. and NATO on Syria (Thomas). Even the Islamist groups, who are non-state actors, must maintain relationships with wealthy Gulf states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Hassan).

Aims – Divergence

Pressure Other States. The third major pattern emerged is where national security goals and interests diverged. Each of the actors in this study seeks to limit the expansion, interference, or hegemonic aspirations of another state. From the Russian perspective, NATO seeks to contain Russia (Thomas). Israel and Bahrain seek to break/slow Iran from regional hegemony or acquiring nuclear weapons (Brom, Gengler). Russia seeks to put pressure on European Union (Thomas). Assad wants to stop the Gulf States from pursuing regime change in Syria (Hassan). Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran would prefer to see less U.S. support for the Kurds (Carreau).

U.S./ Coalition Partners – Recommended Actions

Due to the complex nature of each actor’s goals and interests, it will be very difficult for the U.S. and Coalition partners to create win-sets that will appease each group, yet nearly each actor (aside from the non-state actors and jihadist groups) would agree to the following generalized courses of action:

1. Develop a front to contain international jihadism (Tennebaum, Carreau)
2. Promote strong, yet sovereign, nation-states (Maye)
3. Uphold formally agreed upon spheres of influence (Carreau)

Points of Divergence / Negotiation

The central points of negotiation for the U.S. and Coalition partners is likely fall into the following three areas:

1. Sovereignty – While promoting strong and sovereign nation states is a goal, the issues of a two- state solution for Israel/Palestine; the independence of Kurdistan; and dispersed security/governance for Sunni Arabs in Syria and Iraq are going to be key points of negotiation.
2. Regime leadership in Syria – Each of the major players in this study would prefer to see stability in the Middle East, especially in Syria. The issue that U.S. policy-makers will face is compromising with Russia and Iran on who exactly will be the face of the regime in Syria; the Russians and the Iranians see value in the Assad regime, but a point of compromise may be in removing Assad yet keeping the regime Alawite (Carreau).
3. Spheres of Influence – It will be in the best interest of the major players to craft a reasonable “spheres of influence” strategy for the region (namely between Turkey, Russia, Iran, the GCC and the Western powers) while still upholding major tenets of the JCPOA, ensuring Israel’s security, and not alienating the Sunni populations of Iraq and Syria (Carreau).

Contributing Authors

Shlomo Brom (INSS), Bernard Carreau (NDU), Justin Gengler (Umich), Hassan Hassan (TIMEP), Diane Maye (Embry Riddle), Eugene Rumor (CEIP), Élie Tenenbaum (IFRI), Tim Thomas (TRADOC), Jeff Weyers (Brabo Inc)

Question (R3 QL7): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da’esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness?

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

Da’esh Transition in Syria

The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.

The contributors to this Quick Look indicated that we may observe the following for Da’esh in Syria and abroad:

Ongoing actions in Syria

• continued agitation and exploitation of the uncertainty and dysfunction in Syria
• ongoing efforts to be present and to expand

Change in strategy and associated tactics

• reorientation toward increasing attacks abroad
• shift from acquisition and maintenance of territory to insurgent methods aimed at weakening enemies
• increased emphasis on both terrorist and insurgent tactics (e.g., recent attacks in Paris and Brussels)
• movement away from direct attacks toward scorched earth defensive strategy combined with aggressive insurgency tactics
• return to indiscriminate urban violence, using lone wolves and small militant groups
• increased use of two-tiered attacks (first soft civilian targets, then first responders)
• use of “mobile, dispersed, and flexible units” that operate on behalf of Da’esh Da’esh Alliances

Views among the contributors on the groups with whom Da’esh might align demonstrated some degree of consensus. Both Shaikh and Pagano indicated that a merger or strong alliance between Da’esh and other groups would be highly unlikely. This was due in part to Da’esh’s history of denouncing others as apostates when they failed to conform to its strict rules and interpretations of Islam. Da’esh’s rigid approach has resulted in eventual isolation and the creation of enemies among groups with which it might under different circumstances have allied. Shaikh also emphasized the breadth of the ideological divide between Da’esh and other groups, which would in turn make it difficult for Da’esh to justify any future cooperation with so-called deviant groups. While Pagano cites possible points of Da’esh ideological convergence with either Jabhat Fateh al Sham or the quietest Salafists, the likelihood of collaboration between these groups remains very low. These points of convergence would be dependent on a shift in Da’esh’s goals and subsequent motives as it is faced with the fall of the caliphate, which might make previously unlikely alliances necessary for the sake of survival and future goal pursuit.

Use of “Ungoverned Spaces”

Liebl put forth the view that ‘ungoverned space’ does not truly exist given that formal or informal political institutions will always exist where there are people. Shaikh however focused on likely future contests for “ungoverned” spaces in Syria, suggesting that that the primary competition would be between Da’esh and Al Qaeda given their rivalry and different organizational purpose and approaches. Landis briefly addressed the topic by suggesting that the proportion of ungoverned space in Syria will decrease as Da’esh is weakened, and the Syrian regime retakes the west and parts of eastern Syria. Pagano emphasizes areas of strategic or symbolic importance to Da’esh and the existing or potential loss of these resources. She reviews the status of northern Aleppo province, Raqqa, and Deir el-Zour, as well as the recent retaking of Palmyra, and concludes by briefly listing the conditions under which these spaces would provide the greatest utility or opportunity to Da’esh.

Contributing Authors

Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma); Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture, USMC); Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI, Inc.); Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool)

The Key Role of Human Geography, Culture and Language in Effective Communication.

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services, Inc.).

Overview

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures’ shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

Creating a clear picture for cognitive maneuver should not feel like charting a new frontier simply because the terrain is made up of unfamiliar cultural and linguistic objects. This white paper brings together several approaches from the academic and operational perspectives that describe cultural variation in communication patterns as well as the content of the communications– the complex concepts such as morality, loyalty and motivations– for the purpose of more effective cross-cultural communications analysis and engagement in the IE.

Human Geography, the study of relationships between locations, groups and individuals, provides a foundation for engaging in the cognitive domain, and in fact, in illustrating key aspects of the IE. Humans, after all, possess the cognitive aspects we want to understand. They produce the narratives, hold the beliefs and values, and are the audience targeted within the IE. Human Geography begins with location. Our origin is a significant part of who we are. Our home team that defines our allegiance. Our beliefs and behaviors which can be traced back to the history and events of that location. Perhaps it is the place we strive to protect, the site of an attack that prompts retaliation, the origin of our family name that gives us standing in the community, or the locus of our closest network with whom we share a dialect and a collective memory—our cultural narrative. If we understand culture as learned practices that set one group apart from another, part of that learning is connected to sharing a place. This is how British culture can be separate from American culture and yet still share the English language. Human Geography’s emphasis on location provides a foundation to understand culture, communication and cognitive maneuver.

The white paper is divided into three (3) sections that walk through a definition of the impact of cultural variation for operations in the IE; support for planning from theory, research and the field; and going forward for all USG engagements, several authors discuss approaches that hold promise from strategy to methodology. Authors share key insights on the state of the art in cultural narrative analysis and cognitive maneuver in the IE as well as theory, research and field observation that can support continued development of applied research, policy and training in this area.

Part One unfolds from the premise that most populations that the US Government engages with are bilingual or multilingual. Dr. Loyet writes that this is a contrast with the monolingual experience of many Americans. Multilingualism is one of many cultural differences we need to take into account for effective communications and analysis across the IE. Many populations are adept at shifting between languages for different purposes. From a cognitive perspective, the bi-lingual brain works differently with perception, memory and cognition. Shifting between linguistic identities is part of their daily lives. Dr. Spitaletta, bringing insights from a series of SMA papers on bio-psycho-social communication, writes that, “Cognitive processes such as perception, judgment, and decision- making are the most vital aspect of the IE.” Finally, Ms. Kompaniiets illustrates cultural narrative in action through a Ukrainian language use case.

Part Two steps back to explore theories on culture and communication that can support a sound approach to developing successful narratives and planning cognitive maneuver. Prof. Ess and Ms. MacNulty map out dimensions of culture and values that serve as building blocks for most working in this field. These are fundamental to grounding further practical research, operational methods or analytic products. Dr. Ehlschlaeger is already developing operational means to put theory into practice using human geography to help navigate communications challenges. As a field case in action, Ms. Mushtaq describes on-going efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan to identify and foster local forms of cultural narratives and communication that are seen to be effective for peacebuilding.

Part Three looks forward by focusing on current conflicts where communication, narrative and culture play a vital role in how we engage and how successful we are. This section brings together the operators’ view from Col (Ret.) Robert Jones, applied research on narratives of elite individuals, and a field interview with Mr. Maktary on peacebuilding in Yemen that describes successful and unsuccessful initiatives to influence the situation.

Finally, most authors have read across each other’s works and referenced one another in their papers. This experience has provided these expert contributors the chance to dialog on best practices, shared and conflicting viewpoints, gaps, strengths and ways forward. In this way, we are taking the chance to learn more on this topic ourselves while we contribute to the SMA white paper series.

Contributing Authors

Mr. John DeRosa (GMU), Dr. Charles Ess (University of Oslo), Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger (USACE), Col (Ret.) Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Olesia Kompaniiets (Polizor Centre) Dr. Dianne Loyet (University
of Illinois Springfield), Ms. Christine MacNulty (Applied Futures), Ms. Angie Mallory (Iowa State University), Mr. Shoqi Maktary (Search for Common Ground, Yemen), Ms. Yusra Mushtaq (Visiting Scholar, Pakistan), Dr. Amjed Rasheed (Durham University, Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies), Dr. Jason Spitaletta (JHU-APL, Maj, USMCR), Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services, Inc.)

Question (R2 #5): What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?

Author | Editor: Reedy, K. (RAND).

Predicting the unanticipated is always a challenge, but contributors have identified a couple of considerations for thinking about both potential complications involving external actors such as Turkey (Yeşilada) and what is likely to happen with the combatants themselves (Reedy).

External Factors and a Lack of Stability

One of the main complicating factors in Syria has been, from the outset, the wide variety of external influence on and support for the combatants and groups. Regional countries, world powers, and transnational organizations have all had a hand in shaping the conflict. Turkey in particular has been a volatile player, but has been consistent on its stance on the Syrian Kurds—Erdogan has strongly stated that he will not allow a single bridge of Kurds across the north of Syria. He has also promised, however, that it will be “his forces” and not the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council/Forces (SDF) will be the ones to liberate Raqqah. It is unclear, though, whether he means the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or Turkish forces, though. In any case, apart from the FSA, there are no anti-Assad groups currently operating in Syria that could hold Raqqah even if they could clear it, because they would not have the organic support of the population there. It is possible, then, that if one of these groups is predominantly involved in removing ISIL from Raqqah, they will not have the ability to stabilize the region, and given the animosity between the Turkish forces and the Syrian Kurdish forces, it could lead to outright fighting in the area between them (Yeşilada).

ISIL Fighters and Leaders

The other potential black swan contributors note involves the fighters themselves. There are two broad options for ISIL fighters and leaders: to leave Syria or to stay. There have already been leaders. who have fled the Levant when things began to look somewhat bleak for ISIL, primarily fleeing to North Africa. As they are slowly pushed out of Syria, more leaders and fighters may begin to follow them there. This creates follow-on problems in Africa, as increasing fighters and expertise arrive and challenge already fragile-situations there. However, the fight in North Africa is often more local than that in the Levant in its perspective, and fighters may be reluctant to commit to conflict there because of that and because the territory lacks the ideological impetus of the historical home of the Caliphate. Yemen might be another option to flee to, but given the current conflict and related factors such as food shortages there, that seems a less likely option (Reedy).

The other alternative is to stay in Syria. This may be a more viable option for rank-and-file fighters than leaving because they may not have the resources to flee safely and/or, since many of them are foreign fighters, they may be on watchlists that prohibit them from returning home. Leaders who stay are more likely to do so for ideological reasons. Within this option are two possibilities, which are by no means mutually exclusive. One is that some combatants are likely to either join other groups that continue to oppose the regime and go underground as part of a long-term insurgency scenario. The other scenario is that fighters, feeling backed into a corner, attempt to do as much damage to life and property as they can before they are killed or captured (Reedy).

What Can Coalition Partners Do?

Contributors outlined or implied a few actions that the US government and its coalition partners could do to address these black swans.

1. Keep a tight rein on allies within and outside Syria to ensure they do not fall to fighting among themselves (Yeşilada).
2. Ensure that the clearing and holding of Raqqah are coordinated and that no single force is primarily responsible for its liberation or stabilization (Yeşilada).
3. Coordinate and communicate closely between CENTCOM and AFRICOM to attempt to track, detain, and understand the capabilities of leaders and fighters fleeing from Syria and Iraq to North Africa (Reedy).
4. Prepare to deal with a long-running insurgency, for allies and international organizations involved in stabilizing Syria (Reedy).
5. To deal with levels of extreme violence, more heavily secure civilian populations and key infrastructure to protect them (Reedy).
6. Find methods and means to repatriate foreign fighters to remove them from the battlefield in Syria or elsewhere (Reedy).

Contributors note that unexpected results can involve both external actors and allies (Yeşilada) and the ISIL combatants themselves (Reedy). Ensuring that U.S. forces and partners are ready to address the wide variety of potential complications and are agile enough to adapt to the unexpected rapidly will be essential to minimize the impacts from these types of concerns. Communication and the ability to rapidly react politically and militarily will be paramount.

Contributing Authors

Kathleen Reedy (RAND), Birol Yeşilada (Portland State University)

Question (Sim#3): What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Part 2

Author | Editor: Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services Inc).

We have acknowledged that the enemy has been very agile in the information environment thus far. It has developed a clear message, understands the most affective narratives to reach audiences, and can shift tactics in messaging without shifting message. Our adversary has demonstrated this with propaganda and recruitment material in the information environment. Each contributor, directly or indirectly, identifies that coalition engagement in the information environment is not as robust because we lack the same cohesion of message, understanding of the appropriate narratives, understanding of audiences, and ability to shift tactics in the information space (such as move between dialects or languages) without losing fidelity to our core mission message. Each contributor offers recommendations, from the high-level objectives to on-the-ground implementation, on how we can begin to more successfully leverage the information environment in pursuit of overall coalition objectives.

Vernie Liebl advises that the US and allies must first define the ‘coalition objectives’ that will drive our engagement in the communication space. MAJ Robert Payne, LTC Brian Steed, and SGM Sohail Shaikh give this idea form with a plan to develop a Campaign Mission Narrative to articulate these objectives across the CENTCOM AOR. David Grompert expresses a clear and simple communication objective– to concentrate on conveying to local audiences that the US and allies offer peace and stability, a chance to return to daily life without constant threat; this contrast to ISIL should be our messaging focus. Defining or agreeing on an objective for the information space is, as Liebl noted, not a straightforward exercise. The discussion from inaugural USASOC-LUCAS (Laboratory for Unconventional Conflict Analysis and Simulation) symposium entitled After ISIL: Stability and Spillover in December 2016 illustrates the ongoing challenge—a challenge which leads to an unclear mission narrative.

Assumptions of an inherent, universal appeal to US values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were countered by arguments that those ideals may exist broadly, but get interpreted and acted upon so differently in different contexts as to make comparisons non- actionable. (Spencer Meredith, ExecSum) Payne, Steed and Shaikh describe the lack of mission narrative cohesion as a challenge to mission objectives. They outline a remedy to create and implement a Campaign (MSN) Mission Narrative for CENTCOM to include Strategic, Operational, and Tactical applications. The purpose is to overwhelm the adversary’s narrative across the AOR and prevent fractures in mission narrative that can be exploited by the enemy.

A key stage in the development of their (MSN) is understanding the relevant narrative forms that will be affective to local audiences and also identifying viable partners to convey that message. Liebl contends it is essential to recognize there are multiple information environments in the region. He suggests the most pressing analytic challenge is to understand these various environments with their distinct socio-cultural factors including religion and ethnicity. Peter Welby provides a valuable resource with a comparative (English and Arabic) narrative analysis of ISIL and other jihadist propaganda. He examined how a group is able to, “tactically shift its narrative emphasis to suit its target audience.” His research points towards how we can observe, learn, and adapt our own approach to audience engagement and narrative development for a multilingual information environment. Clark McCauley presents another resource to help understand local narratives and audiences. He describes the role of emotion in conflict zones for motivation. He also unpacks identity narratives in conflict and argues that the Sunni/Shi’a divide is more of an ethnic conflict that a religious one.

The contributors suggest continued analysis of information environment, audience, and narrative and a way forward to implement analytic findings for the purpose of making the information environment a means to support coalition objectives.

Contributing Authors

Gompert, D. (RAND), Liebl, V. (Prosol Associates, USMC Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Understanding), Payne, R. (United States Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia), Shaikh, S. (Asymmetric Warfare Group), Steed, B. (US Army Command and General Staff College), Welby, P. (Centre on Religion & Geopolitics), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), Meredith, (National Defense University)

Question (R5.1): What opportunities and threats should United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) be postured for as the result of a President of the United States (POTUS) visit to the Area of Responsibility (AOR)? What is the impact on stakeholders’ willingness to counter Iran along with the likelihood of partnering with the United States/coalition?

Author | Editor: P. DeGennaro (TRADOC G27).

Executive Summary

Analysts agree the most serious threat during POTUS’s trip to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was, in in the words of Daniel Server, “the risk of doing anything that split the GCC and weakened its will to counter Iran.” In fact, he and our other analysts believe his rhetoric triggered KSA’s regional campaign against Qatar and thereby destroyed GCC solidarity against Iran. Further, the campaign, which included the United Arab Emirates,1 Egypt, and Bahrain actually pushed Qatar, Turkey, and other stakeholders closer to Iran countering the effort.

In his subsequent visit to Israel, POTUS intended to bring together a coalition between the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab leaders, largely arising from their shared view of Iran as a growing national security threat. Though these countries often cooperate in many regional economic endeavors, Serwer reminds us that “rapprochement cannot be complete without progress on an agreement with the Palestinian population,” which seems to be shelved by Israel for the foreseeable future. It is also concerning to regional leaders in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria that Israel has chosen to support Kurdish independence further destabilizing the region, moving counter to US and allied statements against independence and providing Iran with yet another narrative of Israel’s determination to continue its efforts to keep populations fractured and divided.

“The Gulf States believe former President Obama held them in contempt and prioritized détente with Iran over their interests, but they never lost faith in the US-Arab partnership as such,” says Faysal Itani, and not “POTUS is simply restoring it, or attempting to.”

Patricia DeGennaro believes that “[a]ll in all, POTUS’s visit caused more harm than good and stakeholders will be less likely to openly try to counter Iran. Especially in cases where Iran is supporting regimes and seen as working toward stability instead of cultivating Al Qaeda and the Islamic States resurgence.”

The experts consulted by the US Army Cultural Knowledge Center believes that any true US influence to calm the region “requires is the Trump Administration’s putting its own house in order and sharpening its diplomatic instruments in what is most assuredly a complicated environment and set of circumstances not to the allies’ liking.”

Our analysts remain assured that the main threat in the CENTCOM region is the violent extremist elements that will continue to encourage mistrust and insecurity of the people in the region until some semblance of security and governance replaces the mayhem ISIS created. Therefore, the primary focus remains a secure and stable Iraq followed by the same goals in Syria. Only then will the US and its allies be able to cooperatively and comprehensively deal with Iran by bringing them into the international fold or allowing some to influence divisiveness between all Arabs – Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Christians alike.

Contributors

Patricia DeGennaro, TRADOC G27; Global Cultural Knowledge Network Staff, US ARMY TRADOC G2; Faysal Itani, Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East; Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies