SMA Publications

The Conflict in the Donbas between Gray and Black: The Importance of Perspective.

Author | Editor: Finkel, E. (University of Maryland, START).

The current case study analyzes the presence and importance of Gray Zone conflict dynamics and the employment of various instruments of power during the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) since its beginning in 2014. More specifically, it studies the use of various instruments of power across a number of conflict dyads, present in the conflict. The case study’s findings can better inform practitioners and analysts about the presence, content, and effectiveness of utilizing different instruments of power in the Gray Zone.

The analysis covers the participation of various entities and groups, operating in the Donbas: the governments of two states, Russia and Ukraine; the initially independent volunteer formations on the Ukrainian side; and two quasi-state insurgent entities. The analysis uncovers numerous Gray Zone interactions across several dyads, but also demonstrated the limits of the Gray Zone both as a set of empirical actions and as a conceptual approach to understanding the conflict itself. This study shows that Gray Zone activities exist to varying degrees in all dyads, but they are most pronounced in the Ukrainian versus Russian governments dyad.

In addition to uncovering and analyzing the existing Gray Zone dynamics, the case study also argues that Special Operation Forces should pay substantial attention to preexisting perceptions, media framings and worldviews in devising general Gray Zone policies and actions. Thus, the analysis shows that the classification of the conflict in the Donbas as a Gray Zone conflict is possible only if the emphasis is put on the interactions between the Russian and the Ukrainian governments as the primary driver and cause of the violence. However, if the attention is shifted towards domestic, rather than geopolitical causes of the violence, the conflict is more properly classified as a Black Zone conflict. These differences in classification can have substantial impact on the specific policies and actions, adopted by Special Operations Forces.

The analysis also shows that in practice, Gray Zone dynamics are extremely complicated and involve numerous actors and activities, often operating independently of one another. Based on the analysis of the Russian government’s actions, the report demonstrates the inherent difficulties and limitations of Gray Zone actions, especially under conditions of large scale conflict. The report also shows that Gray Zone activities that utilize some instruments of power can and do operate simultaneously with both Black and White Zone activities that leverage other instruments. This suggests that the Zones are not exclusive across the entire spectrum of instruments. Rather, they are instrument-specific, thus offering Special Operation Forces a wide spectrum of potential actions to choose from.

Finally, the analysis shows that many of the Gray Zone activities, utilized by non-state actors on both sides of the conflict are driven by primarily financial considerations and have a substantial criminal component. Practitioners, devising the application of Gray Zone tactics by non-state actors should be aware of potential implications of Gray Zone activities for law and order.

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Question (QL1): What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

The experts who contributed to this Quick Look agree on an essential point: Pakistan’s beliefs regarding the threat posed by India are so well-entrenched that they not only serve as the foundation for Pakistan’s foreign policy and security behavior, but represent a substantial barrier to changing it behavior. Christine Fair a Pakistan scholar from Georgetown University is specific as to the target of any influence efforts – difficult as they may be: “the object of influence is not ‘Pakistan;’ rather the Pakistan army’ and so security behavior change if possible requires change in the Army’s cost-benefit calculus. The essential components of Pakistan’s security beliefs are first that India is an existential threat to the state; and second that Pakistan is at a tremendous military and economic disadvantage to its stronger neighbor. Tom Lynch of the National Defense University adds a third: Pakistan’s national self-identity as an ‘oppositional state, created to counter India.’ The nature of behavior change is relative and can occur in (at least) two directions: one aligning with the observer’s interests (for the sake of brevity referred to here as ‘positive change’), and one in conflict with those interests (‘negative change’). Encouraging positive change in Pakistani security behavior was seen by each of the experts as an extremely difficult challenge, and one that would likely require dramatic change in Pakistan’s current internal and external security conditions. The experts also generally agreed that negative change in Pakistani behavior is easily generated with no need for dramatic changes in circumstance.

Negative Change: Easy to Do

According to long-time Pakistan scholar and Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow Shuja Nawaz, Pakistan’s current state is to “to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the US and its coalition partners.” Moreover, Pakistan’s willingness to cooperate with US/Western regional objectives can deteriorate rapidly if the Pakistani security establishment believes those states have dismissed as invalid, or take actions that exacerbate their concerns. Specifically, actions that reinforce the perceived threat from India (e.g., Indian military build-up, interest in Afghanistan) or Pakistan’s inferior position relative to India (e.g., US strengthening military and economic ties with India; Indian economic growth) stimulate negative change. Importantly, because the starting point is already “negative” relative to US interests, these changes can take the form of incremental deterioration in relations, rather than obvious and dramatic shifts in behavior. Examples may include increased emphasis on components of Pakistan’s existing nuclear weapons program, amplified use of proxy forces already in Afghanistan, or improved economic relations with Russia.

Levers Encouraging Positive Change: A difficult Challenge

While the experts agreed that Pakistan’s deep-rooted, security-related anxieties inhibit changes in behavior toward greater alignment with coalition objectives; they clearly diverge on what, if anything might be done to encourage positive change. Two schools of thought emerged: what we might (cheekily) refer to as a “been there” perspective; and a longer- term, cumulative influence view.

“Been there” School of Thought

Tom Lynch (NDU) argues that the security perceptions of Pakistan’s critical military- intelligence leaders have been robustly resistant to both pol-mil and economic incentives for change2 as well as to more punitive measures (e.g., sanctions, embargos, international isolation) taken to influence Pakistan’s security choices over the course of six decades. Neither approach fundamentally altered security perceptions. Worse yet, punitive efforts not only failed to elicit positive change in Pakistan’s security framework but ended up reducing US influence by motivating Pakistan to strengthen relations with China, North Korea and Iran. As a consequence of past failure of both carrot and stick approaches, both Lynch and Christine Fair (Georgetown) argue that motivating change in Pakistani security behavior requires “a coercive campaign” to up the costs to Pakistan of its proxy militant strategy (e.g., in Afghanistan by striking proxy group leaders; targeted cross-border operations)3. Moreover, Lynch feels that positive behavior change ultimately requires a new leadership. Raising the costs would set “the conditions for the rise of a fundamentally new national leadership in Pakistan” and be the first step in inducing positive behavior change. Lynch believes these costs can be raised while at the same time US engagement continues with Pakistan – in a transactional way with Pakistan’s military-intelligence leadership and in a more open way through civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan. However, Christine Fair points to US domestic challenges that mitigate against the success of even these efforts given what she argues is a lack of political will “in key parts of the US government which continue to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements.”

Cumulative Influence School of Thought

Other contributors however believe are not ready to abandon the possibility of incentivizing positive change in Pakistan’s foreign policy and security behavior. They argue that there are still actions that the US and coalition countries could take to reduce Pakistani security concerns and encourage positive change. Admittedly, the suggested measures are not as direct as those suggested by abeen there, done that approach and assume a significantly broader time horizon:

• Do not by-pass civilian authority. Equalize the balance of US exchanges with Pakistani military and civilian leaders rather than depending largely on military-to-military contact. Governing authority and legitimacy remain divided in Pakistan, and while dealing directly with the military may be expedient, analysis shows that by-passing civilian leadership and continuing to the treat the military as a political actor inhibits development of civilian governing legitimacy, strengthens the relative political weight of the military, and will in the longer term foster internal instability in Pakistan and stymie development of the civil security, political and economic institutions necessary for building a stronger, less threatened state.4 In this case the short-term quiet that the military can enforce, is off-set by increased instability down the road.
• Reduce the threat. A direct means of reducing the threat perceptions that drive Pakistani actions unfavorable to coalition interests is to actually alter the threat environment. One option suggested for doing this is to use US and ally influence in India to encourage that country to redirect some of the forces aimed at Pakistan. A second option is to develop a long-term Pakistan strategy (“not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies”) was seen as a way to signal the importance to the US of an enduring the US-Pakistan relationship.
• Remember that allies got game. Invite allies to use their own influence in Pakistan rather than taking the lead on pushing for change in Pakistan’s behavior. According to Shuja Nawaz, “…the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan!”
• Enlist Pakistan’s diplomatic assistance. Finally, Raffaello Pantucci of the Royal United Services Institute (UK) suggests enlisting Pakistan to serve as an important conduit in the dispute that could most rapidly ignite region-wide warfare: that between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has sectarian-based ties with Saudi Arabia as well as significant commercial ties with Iran. Although as MAJ Shane Aguero points out increased Saudi-Iranian hostilities could put Pakistan in an awkward position, Pantucci believes that the US and allies could leverage these relations to open an additional line of communications between the rivals. Importantly, doing so would also important signal US recognition of Pakistan’s critical role in the region, which would enhance “Pakistani sense of prestige which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns in the country.”

Contributing Authors

Nawaz, S. (Atlantic Council South Asia Center), Abbas, A. (National Defense University), Lynch, T. (Institute of National Strategic Studies – National Defense University),
Aguero, S. (US Army), Venturelli, S. (American University), Pantucci, R. (Royal United Services Institute), Fair, C. (Georgetown University)

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Counter-Da’esh Influence Operations: Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights.

Author | Editor: Linera, R. LTC, Seese, G. MAJ (USASOC) & Canna, S (NSI, Inc).

At the request of Joint Staff, the SMA program, in coordination with United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), participated in a second Counter-Da’esh Messaging Simulation that brought together nearly 100 Psychological Operation (PSYOP) operators, USG and international observers, interagency representatives, population experts from Iraq and North Africa, Da’esh experts, universities, and think tanks. This exercise served as both a test bed for messaging techniques and a training opportunity for PSYOP operators.

The simulation was run on a synchronous, virtual, and distributed platform called ICONSnet, designed and managed by the University of Maryland (see Chapter 6: Designing a PSYOP Wargame). ICONSnet was designed to advance participants’ understanding of complex problems and strengthen their ability to make decisions, navigate crises, think strategically, and negotiate collaboratively. This platform was selected for the following, critical reasons.

• Online, distributed platform: ran across a dozen time zones, three continents, and with over ninety participants
• Operationally relevant: provided an infrequent opportunity to test the effectiveness of USG messaging
• Regional expertise: allowed 30 regional experts to provide real-time feedback from the perspective of various population segments
• Realistic: supported the integration of audio, video, imagery, and other types of formats so that messaging came to the target audiences through the appropriate means or messengers
• Synchronous: provide live feedback that challenged USG’s operational tempo

Key Takeaways

Compared to the December 2015 Counter-Da’esh Messaging simulation, “This time the anti-ISIL side was doing it right. Volume of messaging? I know my wrist was cramping up! – Mubin Shaikh, Red (Da’esh) team member, former Salafist activist, participant in both December 2015 and April 2016 simulations.

This was a simulated environment, but preliminary results suggested lessons not only for PSYOP training but also for increasing the impact of messaging in forward operations. These results are described below.

The pre-simulation preparation and consequent volume of messaging that the Blue team was able to deploy during the April 2016 simulation appeared to confound Da’esh team efforts to deliver its own messaging and forced it into a reactive position vis-à-vis interacting with the White teams. What emerged from this simulation was the realization that an increased operational tempo within the narrative space, combined with embedded, virtual expertise from a cadre of multidisciplinary experts, appeared to increase the effectiveness3 of DoD messaging in the simulated narrative space.

Several insights from the simulation suggest means of enhancing PSYOP training and message formation:

1. Develop a high level strategy that aligns with operation objectives, which is flexible enough to allow PSYOP operators agility to maneuver in the narrative space
2. Set clear objectives for narrative campaigns conducted in support of overall strategy
3. In advance of a narrative campaign, prepare a reservoir of tested, well developed messaging aimed specifically at target populations
4. Develop messages in coordination with cultural and technical experts to take advantage of multidisciplinary insights from the fields of neuroscience, political science, modeling, and marketing, etc.
5. Identify strategies for responding in real time to messaging that may be particularly effective or ineffective
6. Test the effectiveness of messaging and continually refine the PSYOP training process in safe, simulated environments before fielding when possible

Degrading Da’esh Message Effectiveness

Several generalizations emerged from the simulation regarding the effectiveness of various kinds of messaging between the USG, Da’esh, and population teams.4 In an environment devoid of trust, the population teams often rejected USG messaging as lacking a credible voice. They suggested that USG messaging would only been seen as credible is if it were reinforced through action by Coalition forces. Instead, they preferred to hear counter-Da’esh messaging from local religious and cultural leaders. A surprising number of population segments were open to USG’s counter-Da’esh messaging in principle, but wanted to engage in a deeper conversation about how to effect change.

This exercise illustrated the benefit of using virtual, simulation platforms for testing not only message effectiveness, but also PO training and operational effectiveness.

Contributing Authors

Moore, C. (Joint Staff), Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI), Canna, S. (NSI), DeGennaro, P. (TRADOC G-27), Ellis, D. (University of Maryland, ICONS), Hare G. (Fielding Graduate University), Harrigan, G. (Department of Homeland Security), Hogg, J. (Fielding Graduate University), Jonas, A (TRADOC G-27), Koelle, D. (Charles River Analytics), Krakar, J. (TRADOC G-27), Liette, A. (USASOC), Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska, Omaha), Linera, R. (USASOC), Mallory, A. (Iowa State University), Martin, M. (USASOC), Mereish, K. (DHS), Morin, C. (Fielding Graduate University), Reiley, P. (SOCOM), Rutledge, P. (Fielding Graduate University), Seese, G. (USASOC), Szmania, S. (Department of Homeland Security), Taylor, P. (USASOC), Wilkenfeld, J. (University of Maryland, ICONS), Wurzman, R. (University of Pennsylvania)

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Question (S3): What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs?

Author | Editor: Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory).

The following set of responses to Question S3 represent an attempt to distill the input from individuals who have contributed to any number of OSD-SMA efforts in recent years. Giordano’s Access, Assess, Engage (AAE) framework will be used to categories these recommendations. The recommendations are an attempt to distill the concepts proposed in a set of recent OSD-SMA publications . CENTCOM may improve cognitive engagement by producing a broader, more expansive joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). An expanded JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment) could potentially identify the behaviors of target audiences necessary to achieve US objectives, to develop possible psychological effects and leverage operations as a cognitive scheme of maneuver that could lead to synchronizing actions and messages to achieve coalition objectives. Below is a very high-level summary — details are in the report.

Access

Determining the accessibility of a target audience, the sixth step in the doctrinal target audience analysis process), identifies how a particular audience may be reached through various media.

Assess

Employing the Strange Model of Centre of Gravity (COG) analysis to identify critical capabilities, critical requirements (CR) and associated critical vulnerabilities (CV) of the threat. This type of functional decomposition could identify cognitive aspects of the threat that are exploitable through the information dimension. Our working hypothesis is that the COG lies in the cognitive domain.

Engage

CENTCOM should consider the combination of informational and physical powers in concert with members of the interagency to drive CENTCOM actions through an operational narrative. Leverage existing MISO programs Actions and messages are synchronized to generate the behaviors necessary to achieve coalition objectives.

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What long-term actions and processes should U.S. government (USG) institutions, the Coalition and the international community examine to position ourselves against a long term ISIL threat? How can the private sector be effectively engaged by government institutions to optimize the effects needed for success?

Executive Summary

Expert contributors agree that terrorism will remain a long-standing global threat. In addition, there is emphasis on the leadership of the USG as a whole of nation concept. The military alone cannot position parties against lasting terrorism threat but it certainly can shape and influence them through stability operations and other people centric maneuvering. It must work in close cooperation with other USG colleagues and coalition partners to do this while mitigating not only ISIL global impact, but other people and groups that strive to commit the devastating acts of violence. Further the USG should take deliberate measures to lessen underlying factors that lead parties to terror responses. Some specific ideas from this group of contributors include:

As war perpetuates and airstrikes continue the USG and its partner’s further loose legitimacy

There already a strong narrative present in the region that the USG instigated the rise of ISIL in order to manipulate governments it did not support and, as necessary, depose them. The USG would be better suited to take its narrative and support it by action. Some examples may include bringing in foreign direct investment that will jump start reconstruction and economic prowess, stabilize Iraqi and Syrian government institutions, and supporting local initiatives that find creative ways to resettle, rebuild and resume ways of life.

Learn to maneuver in the narrative space

It is not a necessity to engage ISIL or other actors on in the social sphere. Simple counter messaging is not going to deter opponents in the battle space. However, it is essential to know what is being said in this space and understanding its impact. Learn the stories and acquire the knowledge about those stories in the historical, cultural, religious and lingual context of the people as a whole. The USG should not take sides, it must operate in site and transparent while working with the host countries to directly solve problems. If people do not feel empowered they will not take ownership, this is how ISIL and others grow. Keep in mind that the narrative space has its threats, but there are also friendly and neutral players that can help the USG show itself under its own narrative of a “moral and democratic” proponent.

Data is your friend

At the CENTCOM reach back center, experts can work with you to streamline real-time data for the warfighter and help enhance decision making and improve the visual battle ground. This is also an area where the military can cooperate directly with the private sector. TRADOC G-27 is increasing improving tools for advanced data and network analysis as it the private sector by researching and looking for partners in the private sector. IBM has introduced Watson, a computer that can complete immense amount of data and information for analysis, visualization, and decision making. Finally, in addition to companies conducting biological and neurological research, some small companies are focusing on sentiment analysis that can support the translation of motivations in populations. For example, one would be able to read popular emotions to see if people support or despise ISIL.

Engaging Academia

The SMA Reach Back effort has shown that the academic community is eager to contribute to national security challenges. CENTCOM can maximize the value of the nation’s intellectual capital by sharing unclassified primary adversary data. This could foster a deep bench of accessible expertise built on empirical, academic studies. Additionally, individuals who straddle the operational/academic divide can be leverages to build an analytic framework that supports systemic evaluation in lieu of ad hoc analysis so often associated with crisis situations.

Everything is local

The ongoing conflict in the region has increased fragmentation in society. There are splits between families, tribes, and religions. Mitigation of ISIL must begin first and foremost at the local level empowering individuals to take charge of their own security and stability. In CENTCOM planning, it will be difficult to do much more than ensure wide area security so the Iraqi government can take the lead to incorporate wayward militias into the Iraqi forces, build strong community policy enforcement, and create space for reconciliation and rebuilding of these fractured nations.

Summary

Taking a realistic view of the expectations of current Arab governments in identifying and alleviating the causes that gave birth to ISIL is essential. It is beyond the existing regimes’ capacities to address the socioeconomic and political conditions of their societies, however, they must be strongly encouraged to do so. To be sure, these regimes can no longer postpone tackling the roots of their citizens’ grievances, which resulted in political violence we see today. In addition, response to these grievances has been brutal leading to injury, jail and death. These collective choices by all governments, for what has been decades, in the region to marginalize or destroy those who do not directly conform or stay silent will plague USG and coalition forces in any long-term defeat of terrorism disseminating from the regions.

It is difficult to see how the above recommendations might be implemented while USG policy in the Middle East policy lacks clarity or cohesiveness. Further the West, most notably the USG, already lacks credibility and what is left continues to dwindle as military maneuvers continue in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Finally, allowing Israel to also join in their own air campaign deteriorates what is left of USG credibility and the most recent $37 billon US aid package awarded by USG to Israel will no doubt further corrode America’s credibility in the region.

Contributors

Hassan Abbas (NDU), Bernard Carreau (NDU), Patricia DeGennaro (TRADOC G-27), Alexis Everington (IAS), Garry Hare (Fielding Institute), Noureddine Jebnoun (Georgetown Univ.), Spencer Meredith (NDU), Christine M. van den Toorn (IRIS), Todd Veazie (NCTC), Kevin Woods (IDA), Amy Zalman (SNI)

Specifying and systematizing how we think about the Gray Zone.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B., Polansky (Pagano), S., & Stevenson, J. (NSI, Inc).

In their continued work on the changing nature of the threat environment General Votel et al (2016) forecast that the majority of threats to US security interests in coming years will be found in a “gray zone” between acceptable competition and open warfare. They define the gray zone as “characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war,” (pp. 101). While this characterization is a useful guide, it is general enough that efforts by planners, scholars and analysts to add the level of specificity needed for their tasks can generated considerable variation in how the term is applied, and to which types of actions and settings it applies.

What lies between acceptable competition and conventional war?

Far from an unnecessarily academic or irrelevant question, this is a critical question. How we define a condition or action, in other words the frame through which we are categorizing certain actions as threatening rather than “normal steady-state” impacts what we choose to do about them. The “I know it when I see it” case-by-case determination of gray vs not gray limits identification of gray zone actions to those that have already occurred. Gaining some clarity on the nature of a gray zone challenges is essential for effective security coordination and planning, development of indicators and warning measures, assessments of necessary capabilities and authorities and development of effective deterrent strategies.

The ambiguous nature of the gray zone and the complex and fluid international environment of which it is a part, make it unlikely that there will be unanimous agreement about its definition. Our first goal in this paper then, is to describe the gray zone as much as define it. We begin with a review the work of a number of authors who have written on the nature and characteristics of gray zone challenges, and use these to identify areas of consensus regarding the characteristics of the gray space between steady-state competition and open warfare. We next use these to suggest a more systematic process for characterizing different shades of gray zone challenges.

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Question (V4): Post-ISIL Iraq Scenarios. What are the most likely post-lSIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end state favorable to U.S. and coalition interests?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

“The biggest danger is to assume we know the answer.” Alexis Everington, Madison Springfield Inc.

“The unpredictable nature of the country’s social sentiment, lessons from history, the culture, regional influencers, the corrupt political elite with their sectarian-based agendas, and lack of statesmanship and political and strategic prowess are among the factors that suggest that even the most seasoned expert on Iraq might be misled in his or her attempt to predict the next phase.” Hala Abdulla, Marine Corps University

Seventeen experts contributed their thoughts about the future of Iraq and Syria in a post- ISIL environment. Summarizing their insights, warnings, and predictions in under five pages runs the risk of over simplifying and incredibly complex challenge, which is why this summary is heavily cited to encourage the reader to seek further details in the texts provided.

This summary is divided into three parts: 1) a table that describes the PMESII-PT elements essential to understand the current and future trajectory of Iraq and Syria, 2) a brief description of various friction points, the resolution of which may influence the future of the region, and 3) the suggested elements that may encourage the transition to stability.

Friction Points (Including Most Acute)

If the number of grievances listed in the table above are not addressed after the fall of ISIL, the fear is that the region will descend once again into a number of conflicts, including continued extremism (Van den Toorn). This section lists friction points identified by the contributors as fulcrums in the future of Iraq and Syria that could tip the scales toward stability or violence.

The Battle for Mosul

“A victory over ISIL will not be the end of Iraq’s problems, rather the beginning of an internal political battle over territory,” according to CSU professor Ibrahim al-Marashi.

The way the battle for Mosul is conducted, as well as its outcome, may be the greatest determinant of the future of the Middle East (Dagher; Abdulla). If it is done wrong, it could lay the groundwork for the re-emergence of ISIL or a successor group. If it is done right, it could provide a model for integration, governance, and recovery for the region (Dagher). In a comparative study of Mosul vs. Fallujah, Zana Gulmohamad listed three major contributors to successful operations: effective coordination of Iraqi forces, coalition airpower, and intelligence from Sunni tribes and townspeople—even in the face of unauthorized incursions by Shi’a militias.

But there are many dangers along this path. First, one of the greatest fears of the Sunni population is that Shia militias will once again be allowed to dominate Sunni populations under the guise of liberation (Dagher). Second, the new governance structure in Mosul must address political grievances of diverse population groups in Mosul. The government must draw its leadership from a new political elite that is of and from Mosul. The existing sources of political power in Ninewah represent the nexus between Islamist extremists and the organized businesses that thrived during ISIL’s occupation of Mosul and should not be allowed to dominate the regional government. Likewise, the new government should pay close attention to minority groups, to pose a model for integration and representation in the country and the region (Dagher, al-Marashi).

Finally, the battle for Mosul poses risks to the cohesion of the Coalition itself. There are any number of occurrences, described in a report by Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI, that could cause partial or severe fracture before, during, or after the battle. The longer cohesion is required, the likelihood of a spoiler event increases. Zana Gulmohamad notes that unless conflicting agenda among regional powers can be resolved, any victory in securing the city could be fleeting.

Transformation of ISIL from Proto-state to Insurgent Group

The battle for Mosul may effectively push ISIL out of Iraq and into Syria (Abouaoun). This will likely be the turning point of ISIL from a proto-state to an insurgency group (al Marashi; Abouaoun) with the intent to encourage violence on near and far enemies, especially through the encouragement of lone wolf terrorism. This pressure could also result in jihadists leaving ISIL for other groups or inspire some to create new ones (Abouaoun). The bottom line is that ISIL will decline, but the ideology will not.

Even after ISIL’s defeat, individuals, groups and networks of fighters and terrorists will be motivated to continue violent jihad, whether against local regimes, the West, Shiites, or apostate Sunnis. In a post-Caliphate ISIL, threats will take two main forms, according to David Gompert, a national security expert at the US Naval Academy and RAND: 1)R remnants of fanatical forces in the region, including in Iraq, Syria, and Libya and 2) radicalized individuals in or returning to the West. This former group could lead to increase terrorism in the West.

Federalization of Iraq

There were two major schools of thought regarding the idea that the federalization of Iraq is one way to address popular grievances, governance issues, and mistrust of the central government. Several experts suggested that a federalization model based on Kurdish semi- autonomy might provide a stable way ahead (Maye, McCauley). The arguments in favor of this stance include self-determination, freedom from domination by other ethnic groups, and potential for buy in from Iraqi Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds (McCauley). The primary US role in this effort would be to bring the parties to the table to negotiate and enforce an agreement (McCauley).

However, another cohort of experts argued that constitutional autonomy will not work in Iraq—particular in traditionally Sunni-held areas (Dagher; Abdulla). The people of Iraq all want unity except for the Kurds (Abdulla). Furthermore, Sunni territories in western Iraq are not economically viable (Abdulla). As people tire of sectarian conflict, one way forward may be to support a secular, technocratic party (Maye). However, the success of this kind of party would undermine all existing political actors and is likely to be undermined unless it receives strong international support.

Power Sharing in Syria

The issue is not how Assad should share power in a post-ISIL world, but the fact that he cannot share power without unraveling the entire government (Sayigh). Assad’s goal in Syria is not total victory (because that only allows him to become the king of ashes); his goal is to regain access to capital and markets and get sanctions lifted (Sayigh) (Sayigh). Assad cannot do this with diplomacy, so he is using the conflict to coerce the US, EU, GCC, and Turkey to make economic concessions. Russia and China will endorse this demand as will Lebanon and Jordan in order to ease pressure on their domestic concerns.

Settlement of Intra-group Tensions

The greatest threat to long-term stability in Iraq is not tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, but intra-Sunni, intra-Shia, and intra-Kurdish tensions (Abdulla; Liebl). Sunnis lack any kind of unified political voice and efforts to consolidate power may lead to tribal conflict. While the Kurdish government faces significant rivalry between its two main political parties, the KDP and the PUK, for power (Abdulla). However, the real determinant of stability in Iraq hinges on the settlement of Shia-Shia tensions in the country (Sayigh; Abdulla). Although Iraqi Shia present a united façade, there are serious divisions among its main blocs, leaders, and elites (Abdulla). Shia-Shia competition for influence over the Iraqi state could lead to bloodshed (Sayigh).

Environment

Long-standing tensions are often inflamed by disagreement over scarce water resources (Palmer Moloney). This is particularly true in the Tigris-Euphrates Watershed, which is shared by Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and largely controlled by Turkey (Palmer Moloney, Meredith).

Achieving a Stable End State Favorable to US and Coalition Interests

This section briefly lays out suggested actions and conditions to promote a stable end state in Iraq and Syria favorable to US interests in the days after Daesh.

New Regional Framework

The most important action the USG and the Coalition can take to promote stability in the region is to bring all actors to the table to agree on a new regional framework (van den Toorn, Trofino, Abouaoun; Meredith). Iran, Saudi, and neighboring Sunnis states must be encouraged to form a new regional framework. Real stability in the region cannot be accomplished without bringing these actors in general agreement (van den Toorn).

Economic Revitalization of Iraq & Syria

Funds for the reconstruction of Iraq and Syria are essential not only to prevent humanitarian crisis, but to shore up the economic stability of the region. How reconstruction funds are handled could either serve as a foundation for a new transparent and accountable economy system or entrench the population’s perception of government corruption and negligence (van den Toorn).

Focus on Capacity, Autonomy, and Legitimacy

No matter what kind of states emerge from the post-ISIL environment—be they unified states of Iraq and Syria or federalized zone within each country—they all require three things: capacity, autonomy, and legitimacy. The Coalition can take action to support these three elements in a number of ways outlined in Spencer Meredith’s contribution including the encouragement of nationalism and ensuring the reduction of violence.

Be Ready to Take Advantage of Cognitive Openings

Even if groups fight efforts to establish good governance or to lay down arms, there is often a few windows of opportunity to encourage these groups to join the fold (Meredith). These cognitive openings do occur. The USG has to be ready to take advantage of them. The Coalition should be looking for indicators of cognitive opening by conflicting parties through 1) moderated speech, 2) evidence of factional divisions within a group, and 3) failure to claim ownership for violence.

Increased Faith in Iraqi Special Forces

The fight against ISIL has proved that Iraq has at least one reliable force: the US-trained Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF) and Counter Terrorism Forces (ICTF), which includes Iraqis from all ethnic and religious backgrounds (Abdulla). The danger is that a prolonged infantry war for a unit designed for short, special operations might soon experience significant fatigue. But this unit provides a model and hope for what Iraqi forces could look like in an integrated Iraq.

Bilateral Power Engagement

The USG has soft power tools at its disposal to conduct symbolically meaningful engagement with the populations in Iraq and Syria. These tools “carry major weight in the MENA,” according to van den Toorn. The USG could promote education exchanges, business opportunities, and cultural exchanges.

Contributing Authors

Abbas, H. (National Defense University), Abdulla, H. (USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture), Abouaoun, E. (United States Institute of Peace), Al-Marashi, I. (California State University, San Marcos), Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI), Dagher, M. (Independent Institue for Administration and Civil Society Studies), Everington, A. (Madison Springfield Iinc.), Gartenstein-Ross, D. (Valens Global), Gompert, D. (US Naval Academy, RAND), Gulmohamad, Z. (University of Sheffield), Liebl, V. (Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), Meredith III, S. (National Defense University), Palmer-Moloney, J. (Visual Teaching Technologies), Maye, D. (Embry Riddle Aeronautical University), Sayigh, Y. (Carnegie Middle East Center), van den Toorn, C. (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani)

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Finland, After ‘hybrid warfare’, what next? – Understanding and responding to contemporary Russia.

Author | Editor: Bettina Renz ja Hanna Smith (Office of the Prime Minister of Finland).

More than two years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the West continues coming to terms with the implications of this event. As discussed by the project’s the first report, the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ quickly established itself, because it seemed to be particularly useful to explain recent changes in Russian defence and foreign policy. The report highlighted that the concept was indeed valuable in drawing the attention of policymakers to some new security challenges. At the same time, the report cautioned that beyond this initial usefulness, the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ as an explanation for almost every Russian policy move is likely to do more harm than good to our understanding of developments in Russia, as well as to the process of identifying and implementing realistic responses.

The central purpose of the second report is to emphasise that there is no simple answer or concept, such as ‘hybrid warfare’, that can evaluate developments in Russia in all their complexity. In order to gain a nuanced understanding of changes in Russian foreign, security and defence policies differentiated questions should be asked about strengths and limitations of Russian military capabilities, developments in Russian thinking on the use of armed force, Russian foreign policy goals and intentions and possible responses to Russia, all of which need to be tailored to the concerns and requirements of specific actors and states. Such an approach enables a detailed understanding of what is really new as opposed to what merely appears to be new in accordance with the ‘hybrid warfare’ idea. Towards this end, members of the project’s panel of experts provided detailed studies on the difficulties relating to the manipulation of morel forces in war (‘information warfare’); Russia’s international image projection; changes in the use of Russian military force and conventional military power as a foreign policy tool; improvements in Russian capabilities to coordinate complex, 21st century military operations; long-term implications of inefficiencies in Russian military spending; the relevance of coercion and deterrence for understanding recent Russian military action; and international lessons in civil-military relations and their particular relevance for Finland.

The report concludes with the following recommendations:

1. Russian politics is more complex than macro-level concepts, such as ‘hybrid warfare’ suggest. Responses to recent changes in Russian foreign and defence policy need to bear this in mind.
2. Strong Russian area studies should be supported. In-depth understanding of Russia requires wide-ranging expertise of the country’s politics, history, culture, society and economy.
3. Context is key for understanding contemporary Russia. The recent focus on ‘hybrid warfare’ has overstated the newness and uniqueness of recent Russian actions, both militarily and in terms of foreign policy. This has come at the expense of historical and comparative context, which has tended to overstate the ‘uniqueness’ of the Russian case.
4. Unnecessarily overstating Russian strengths and Western weaknesses can have unintended consequences. Western countries, Finland included, should stress their own strengths first and foremost.
5. While making a strategy to deal with long term challenges coming from Russia, an important factor is openness and inclusion – a key strength of liberal democracies, such as Finland.
6. Bilateral relations with Russia are always also a part of larger context – it is important not only to understand Russia, but also the perceptions of other actors, states and regions on contemporary security and Russia.

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Question (QL3): What does primary source opinion research tell us about population support for ISIL in ISIL-held Iraq and globally outside the Combined Joint Operation Area (CJOA) (Syria and Iraq)?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Opinion polls conducted by independent outfits in 2015 and 2016 derive the same result: the vast majority of Muslims in the region—both inside and outside of the CJOA—do not support ISIL. In fact, ISIL enjoys very low support as a percent of the population across all countries covered by the surveys included in this compilation. Syria showed the highest level of support (20%) while most Muslim-majority countries fall in the single digits (Mauro, 2015). These low numbers recede further when support is defined as providing active or material support rather than sympathy for the cause (Burson-Marsteller, 2016).

Among those who do support ISIL, the reported reason has less to do with religion or ideology than with social, economic, and governance grievances. However, experts interviewed identified two populations of concern: young men across the Arab world who they believe are showing growing complaisance toward ISIL and the radicalized population in Northern Africa. According to Mark Tessler, survey data suggests that North Africans who support ISIL are more severe in their adherence to ISIL’s extremist ideology and espousal of violence support for ISIL is very low. In the five countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer in spring 2016, it is less than 2% in Jordan, less than 3% in Jordan and Morocco, and slightly higher, in the 8-9% range in Algeria and the Palestinian territories. This is the case both for overall populations and for poorly educated younger men, the primary target of ISIL messaging. (see also, Marcellino et al).

It should be noted however, that being widely seen unfavorably does not mean that ISIL is therefore considered the sole enemy. For example, an IIACS poll conducted in Mosul in December 2015 indicated that 46% of the population believed that coalition airstrikes were the biggest threat to the security of their families compared to 38% who said that ISIL was the greatest threat to their family. The poll suggests that US government is just as unwelcome in CJOA as ISIL.

Contributing Authors

Abbas, H (National Defense University), Aguero, S. (US Army), Cragin, K. (National Defense University), Dagher, M. (IIACS), Everington, A. (Madison Springield Inc.), Bahar Firat, R. (Georgia State University), Gulmohamad, Z. (University of Sheffield), Jamal, A. (Arab Barometer), Kaltenthaler, K. (University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), McCulloh, I. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab), Moskalenko, S. (Bryn Mawr College), Revkin, M. (Yale University), Robbins, M. (Arab Barometer), Tessler, M. (Arab Barometer)

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Demystifying Gray Zone Conflict: A Typology of Conflict Dyads and Instruments of Power in Colombia, 2002-present.

Author | Editor: Koven, B. (University of Maryland, START).

This case study elucidates the dynamics of Gray Zone conflict with particular emphasis on the role of non- state actors. It does so through a detailed examination of the most recent phase (2002-present) of Colombia’s internal conflict (1964-present). More specifically, this research analyzes conflict dyads occurring between different types of conflict actors. It further examines which types of dyads leverage which instruments of power and to what extent activities are Gray versus Black or White across each type of dyad and instrument of power. Consequently, this research will help practitioners determine which instruments of power warrant careful consideration in Gray Zone conflicts depending on the types of actors engaged in conflict. This investigation will also aid Special Operations Forces in determining which types of belligerents may make effective partners and which instruments of power they should train and equip these partners to implement.

This research substantially bounds the scope of what needs to be considered by state forces operating in these environments. Specifically, the analysis shows that aggregating by actor-type is effective and that actors of the same type (e.g. leftist insurgents) behave very similarly. Moreover, it reduces the number of instruments of power that need to be considered for each type of conflict dyad. Even though five of the six types of conflict dyads entail multiple instruments of power, and the most complex dyad (government versus insurgents) involves six of the seven instruments, the average type of conflict dyad includes just 2.5 of the seven instruments.

Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that Colombia’s conflict is Gray. While, Gray Zone dynamics also include White and Black activities, five (Government versus Insurgents, Government versus BACRIM Syndicates, Insurgents versus Insurgents, Insurgents versus Paramilitaries, and Insurgents versus BACRIM Syndicates) of the six types of dyads involve Gray activities. Gray Zone activities are especially prominent in four (Government versus Insurgents, Insurgents versus Insurgents, Insurgents versus Paramilitaries, and Insurgents versus BACRIM Syndicates) of these cases. The only dyad (Government versus Paramilitaries) that did not include Gray activities was extremely short-lived and involved the paramilitaries quickly acquiescing to government pressure to demobilize.

While the approach adopted by this research entails myriad advantages, readers should be cautioned that Gray Zone conflicts are extremely complex. Practitioners ought to consider how an intervention against one type of conflict actor might affect other types of belligerents. Only by doing so will they avoid negative externalities such as inadvertently strengthening other combatants. Moreover, commanders must recognize that the successful use of certain tactics by the state or their proxies within one instrument of power (e.g. military), can have profound effects on the efficacy of their opponent’s use of other instruments (e.g. informational). Finally, this case provides numerous examples of government forces collaborating with various, violent non-state actors. While Special Operations Forces are especially well positioned to do so, this requires extensive situational awareness at the micro-level. Alliances are fleeting and the willingness to cooperate with Special Operations Forces varies both over space and time.

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