SMA Publications

Question (R3 QL4): What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence, following the effective military defeat of Da’esh [in Iraq] that Iran may view as beneficial?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Dr. Omar Al-Shahery of Carnegie Mellon University offers a critical caveat in considering the question posed for this Quick Look. While Iran may see certain “advantages” of the presence of Coalition forces, Iran’s perspective is both relative to the nature of the context and thus transitory as “such benefits might not necessarily outweigh the disadvantages from the Iranian point of view.” If our starting point is that Iran is not happy to have US/ Coalition military forces in the region, then what we are looking for are those Coalition activities that might be seen as minimally acceptable, or “less unacceptable”.

The expert contributors were somewhat divided on whether they believed there were any Coalition elements or activities that they thought Iran might find beneficial. Some believe that there are Coalition activities, primarily related to defeating ISIS, that Iran would find beneficial. Others however do not believe that there is any US military presence in Iraq that would be seen by Iran as sufficiently beneficial to counter the threat that that presence represents. Dr. Anoush Ehteshami, an Iran expert from Durham University, UK, argues that both sides are correct; the difference is whether we are looking at what the majority of experts agree is Iran’s preference, or at Iran’s (present) reality. In other words, it is the ideal versus the real.

However, simply recognizing the ideal versus the real is not sufficient to address the question posed. When the question is essentially what determines the limits of Iran’s tolerance for Coalition activities in Iraq. Context matters. This is because Iran’s perception of political and security threat perception is not based solely on the actions of the West/US, but is the result of (at least) three additional contextual factors: 1) the immediacy of the threat from ISIS or Sunni extremism; 2) the intensity of regional conflict, particularly with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s closest major rival; and, 3) as discussed in SMA Reachback LR2 three-way domestic political maneuvering between Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Rouhani government. This should not be discounted as a key factor in Iran’s tolerance for Coalition presence in the region. The Context can push the fulcrum point such that Coalition activities tolerable under one set of circumstances are not acceptable under others.

The contributors to SMA Reachback LR2 that should be expected to feature in almost any Iranian calculus in the near to mid-term. Relevant to this question these are: 1) expanding Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and the region to defeat threats from a pro-US Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Israel and the US; and 2) eliminating the existential threat to Iran and the region’s Shi’a from Sunni extremism.

Iran’s Concerns in Iraq

In general, the experts suggest that from its perspective, Iran’s ideal situation in Iraq would include the following: ISIS is defeated and Sunni extremism is otherwise under control. Iraq is stable and unified with political and security establishments within which Iran has significant, yet understated influence. The ISF are strong enough to maintain internal calm in Iraq, but too weak to pose a military threat to Iran. The strongest Shi’a militia elements are developing into a single Revolutionary Guard Corps type force that is stronger than the ISF. Finally, the major security threats from Israel and Saudi Arabia are minimal and there is no US military presence in Iraq and it is very limited in the rest of the region. This is the scenario that sets the Iranian reference point. All else is a deviation from this.

The Ideal

Iran needs the Coalition for one thing: security. This is security sufficient to defeat ISIS and to stabilize Iraq without posing a threat to Iranian influence. Of course, ISIS, and Sunni extremism more generally has not yet been defeated in Iraq. Iraq is not secure and the Coalition forces have a different perspective on the requirements for a viable Iraqi state (e.g., an inclusive government, a single, unified and non-sectarian security force). The Saudis are irritated, the US remains present in the region, and who knows what Israel is apt to do. According to Iran scholar Dr. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University, UK), Iranian leaders recognize that they lack the capacity now to defeat ISIS and bring sufficient stability to Iraq to allow for reconstruction. As a result, Iran appears willing to suffer Coalition presence in order to gain ISIS defeat and neutralize Sunni extremism in Iraq – arguably Iran’s most immediate threat. As Dr. Daniel Serwer observes, “for Iran, the Coalition is a good thing so long as it keeps its focus on repressing Da’esh and preventing its resurgence.” Once ISIS is repressed and resurgence checked, the immediate threat recedes (i.e., the context changes) and Iran’s tolerance for Coalition presence and policies in Iraq will likely shift as other interests (e.g., regional influence) become more prominent. The critical question is where the fulcrum point rests, in other words, where is the tipping point at which Coalition presence in Iraq becomes intolerable enough to stimulate Iranian action.

In Reality

In a nutshell, Iran is most likely to find Coalition elements acceptable if they allow Iran to simultaneously 1) eliminate what is sees as an existential security threat from ISIS and Sunni extremism, and 2) expand its influence in Iraq and the region which is a the pillar of its national security approach. Any Coalition element that fails on one of these is unlikely to be tolerated. Put another way, Coalition elements that defeat ISIS but derail Iran’s influence in Iraq will not likely be seen as beneficial. Likewise, as multiple experts point out, Iran is aware that it cannot stabilize Iraq on its own regardless of how much influence it has there.

Contributing Authors

Al-Shahery, O. (Aktis & Carnegie Mellon University), Ford, R. (Middle East Institute); Hamasaeed, S. (US Institute of Peace), Mansour, R. (Chatham House), Maye, D. (Embry Riddle University), Nader, A. (RAND); van den Toorn, C. (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani), Wahab, B. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Meredith, S. (National Defense University), Vatanka, A. (Middle East Institute), Ehteshami, A. (Durham University), Serwer, D. (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)

Foreign Approaches to Gray Zone Conflicts.

Author | Editor: National Intelligence Council.

The purposeful application of multiple elements of power—information, economic, military, political—to achieve objectives in ways that exceed the threshold for normal competition yet fall below the level of major interstate war.

“Gray Zone cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything.” “Gray Zone” conflicts are not synonymous with “Hybrid War.” “irregular War” or “MOOTW.” Intent, not the means, primarily distinguishes “Gray Zone” conflicts from other types of conflict. Why conduct “Gray Zone” conflicts? To avoid major power war and costly penalties, hinder an effective response by intentionally blurring peacetime and wartime operations, and control Escalation.

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Question: What internal factors would influence Iran’s decision to interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb?

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. & Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

Iran’s Strategic Interests

All of the SMEs either directly or indirectly referenced Iran’s strategic interests, and how these are informed by its overarching goal of regional hegemony. Dr. Belinda Bragg and Dr. Sabrina Pagano from NSI characterize these interests into three categories; prestige, economic; and security, all of which are moderated by domestic political constraints and pressures. Iran’s prestige interests center around ensuring that it does not lose face in its interactions with the US, and can increase its regional influence. Its economic interests focus on increasing Iran’s economic influence and security. Iran’s security interests include reducing threats from the US, Israel, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, reducing the threat from ISIL, and broadcasting strength and challenging US influence and position in the region. Its domestic constraints and pressures include resisting cultural infiltration from the west, delivering economic improvement, and broadcasting strength. Together, these interests, and Iran’s overarching regional hegemony goal (Guzansky; Bragg & Pagano), ultimately shape the strategies that Iran pursues, including its decisions regarding the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb.

Iranian naval capabilities and desire for regional hegemony

Dr. Yoel Guzansky, of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, discusses how Iranian strategic thinking on the sea is no longer limited to the Persian Gulf, but instead extends to intended naval bases in Syria and Yemen, as well as influence in the Red Sea or even the Atlantic—ultimately “making every effort to demonstrate that its naval power is not limited to the Gulf alone.” Guzansky further indicates that these are more than just aspirational statements; the Iranian Navy has already extended its reach to the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb, as well as Pakistan, China, and South Africa. These developments are consistent with Bragg and Pagano’s assessment that developing and demonstrating military capability is a key security strategy for Iran, as well as being seen, by hardliners and conservatives in particular, as an integral part of their regional hegemony goal. Guzansky draws a similar conclusion, adding that greater naval power will also increase Iran’s ability to help its regional allies. However, he also notes that “[t]o do so, Iran will need vast resources it doesn’t yet have.”

Guzansky indicates that, historically, Iran has prioritized the development of asymmetric capabilities (including anti-ship missiles, mines, and small vessel swarms), to enable it to better confront the U.S. Navy in the Gulf. Iran can leverage these same capabilities, and others, to interfere with the flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, and to a lesser extent, the Bab el Mandeb.

Internal factors influencing Iranian interference in the Strait or Bab el Mandeb

The contributors identified the following internal factors as potentially influencing Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el Mandeb:

Iran’s revolutionary doctrine

• Frames Iran as involved in an existential fight against US imperialism
• Makes it critical for Iran’s leaders, particularly conservatives and hardliners, to demonstrate to the Iranian people that they will not be bullied by the US
• Supports and informs Iran’s goal of regional hegemony Domestic political competition
• The role of factions—conservative / hardliner; moderate/pragmatist—in the prioritization of Iranian interests and the preferred strategies for achieving these interests
• With an election coming up in May, conservatives have incentive to switch the domestic political focus from cooperation with the US toward confrontation, to both appease their base and put greater pressure on Rouhani

Economic conditions

• Slow pace of improvement following JCPOA leaves moderates such as Rouhani politically vulnerable, and creates the belief that their promised benefits of greater openness and cooperation were unrealistic
• As the salience of economic concerns wanes relative to prestige and security concerns for the Iranian public, there is a greater likelihood that leaders (both conservative and moderate) will employ more bellicose rhetoric with regard to the Strait of Hormuz
• Closing the Straits will have significant short-term negative economic consequences for Iran, and depending on international and US response, may have longer-term consequences for Iran such as the re-imposition of sanctions and loss of trade and foreign investment
• Given Iran’s current economic situation and growing dependence on oil exports, it is unlikely to take action to close the Strait or Bab el Mandeb, as doing so would harm their economic interest further and thus be self-defeating

Popular perception that the US is not living up to terms of JCPOA

• Plays into hardline and conservative narratives emphasizing Western (especially US) hostility and untrustworthiness, giving credence to their own economic strategy, which seeks to limit openness to the West
• Increases the likelihood that the balance between the economic costs of interfering with commerce in either the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el Mandeb, and the perceived benefit of demonstrating Iranian power and status, may swing in favor of the latter

External factors influencing Iranian interference in the Strait or Bab el Mandeb

The contributors argue that external factors also play a role in Iran’s decision-making with respect to its activities at sea.

Competition with Saudi Arabia

• Saudi Arabia’s opening of naval bases in Djibouti and Eritrea affords it an advantage in the Red Sea area
• Iran may wish to do “more to limit the Saudis by pushing harder on the question of access/use of both straits” (Vatanka)
• Retaliation for Saudi’s restricting Iranian access to the SUMED pipeline and selectively blocking Iranian ships in the Bab el Mandeb, which has stifled Iran’s establishment of trade with Europe
• Iran has potential to weaken Saudi government domestically by disrupting oil revenues and thus creating the conditions for greater internal unrest and instability
• Iran’s support of the Houthis, including provision of supplies to which the Houthis already have access, may actually serve to signal to and threaten Saudi Arabia and demonstrate Iran’s reach

Use of proxies

• The “effective blockade on Yemen,” which Iran’s current naval capabilities cannot challenge, creates a barrier to Iran helping the Houthis
• The Houthis may not be particularly dependent on Iran, given that they already have many of the supplies it provides, and Iran is unlikely to provide additional forms of support
• Ultimately, “I don’t think the Houthis want their tail in the trap of the Iran-Saudi conflict anyways” (Ehteshami)
• Yemen imports 90% of its food, much of this using foreign shipping. Further reduction in security in the Bab el Mandeb would threaten this supply, and therefore is not in the interests of the Houthis.

US actions and rhetoric

• Reinforce the perception that the US acted dishonestly with regard to JCPOA, seeking to thwart Iran’s efforts to increase trade and foreign investment
• Given the current domestic political climate, both conservatives and hardliners, as well as moderates, have greater incentive to frame any US action relative to Iran as threatening and conflictual, rather than cooperative

Iran’s strategic calculus with respect to interference in the Strait of Hormuz

Alex Vatanka, an Iran scholar from the Middle East Institute, and Bragg and Pagano of NSI indicate that closing the Strait may in fact work against Iran’s own interests, since it is as dependent on oil moving through the Strait as are its rivals. In this way, Iran may gain more value from threatening to close the Strait, which may increase oil prices, than from actually closing the Strait, which is sure to result in retributive actions, most likely from the US. As Vatanka indicates, a continued US presence in the Strait all but guarantees that Iran will use this strategic lever sparingly, if at all. Both Guzansky and Pagano and Bragg suggest that factors enhancing Iran’s likelihood of plausible deniability (use of asymmetric methods or proxies), by reducing the expected costs of such action, may, if other interests are met, instead increase the likelihood that Iran will choose to interfere.

Iran’s strategic calculus with respect to interference in the Bab el Mandeb

The strategic calculus for Bab el Mandeb may be different, as Bragg and Pagano note. There are two issues to consider with respect to potential Iranian interference in the Bab el Mandeb. These relate to both its capability to interfere and its motivation to do so. At present, Iran’s degree of control over the Houthis is unclear, and thus its ability to exact precise control over their activities may be limited. However, if Iran’s continued support of the Houthis gains them greater influence, then we can expect that the present Houthi control over Yemen’s ports might translate into greater Iranian interference in the Bab el Mandeb, assuming appropriate motivation.

This is where the Iranian calculus for the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb may come to differ. If Iran continues to pivot its trade toward greater interaction with China, India, and Southeast Asia, it will become less dependent on commerce in the Bab el Mandeb. Ehteshami also indirectly provides some support for this conclusion, indicating that the Bab el Mandeb represents more of a security rather than economic interest to Iran. As Bragg and Pagano indicate, this trade pivot means that the Bab el Mandeb becomes less strategically important to Iran as a source of economic power, but more strategically useful to Iran as a source of economic and other manipulation of its perceived rivals, such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this is accomplished while making Iran less vulnerable to economic and other manipulation from its rivals through selective blocking of its own ships’ passage. Iran does not have the same alternatives in the Strait of Hormuz, and cannot decrease its dependence on an open Strait for sea transportation, critical to its economic well-being. In these ways, the strategic calculus in favor of Iranian interference in the Bab el Mandeb, but not the Strait of Hormuz, may come to evolve over time in favor of increasing interference or escalation. For the time being, however, as Guzansky notes, this may be a more distant reality, given some of the present limits of Iran’s naval force, including the effective blockade on Yemen that prevents Iran from accessing Yemen’s shores.

Despite these challenges, Iran’s focus on achieving and maintaining regional hegemony, and its naval and other actions toward this goal, should not be ignored. Iran is increasingly likely to pursue strategies such as new trade partnerships that minimize the harm that its rivals can inflict, as well as those that enable it to increasingly project power, whether through the use of proxies of otherwise. As Guzansky notes, “unless improved Iranian naval capabilities receive a proper response, Iran in the future will be able to threaten crucial shipping lanes, impose naval blockades, and land special forces on distant shores should it deem it necessary.”

Contributing Authors

Bragg, B. (NSI), Ehteshami, A. (Durham University), Guzansky, Y. (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, & Tel Aviv University); Pagano, S. (NSI); Vatanka, A. (Middle East Institute & Jamestown Foundation)

Question (LR1): What opportunities are there for USCENTCOM to shape a post-ISIL Iraq and regional security environment promoting greater stability?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

The expert contributors to this paper agree on the relationship between regional security and stability in Iraq: A strong and stable Iraqi government is a fundamental component of regional stability. The key to stability in Iraq is the popular legitimacy of central and local governance. Rather than operationally specific proposals, the experts suggest shaping objectives that USCENTOCM can use to prioritize and guide planning of shaping and engagement activities in four areas most critical for enhancing stability in Iraq: Political Reform Border Security, Public Safety, and Provision of Public Services. While USCENTCOM may take the lead in assisting Iraqis with issues such as border security and public safety, it likely would play a supporting role on the political and rule of law issues discussed below.

There is (uncharacteristic) agreement among international relations scholars on the factors that determine the stability of a state: 1) the extent to which it is seen as a legitimate governing authority by its population; 2) the degree to which the state has a monopoly on the use of force within its borders (i.e., internal sovereignty); and 3) the state’s ability to secure those borders (a component of external sovereignty).

Dr.’s Belinda Bragg and Sabrina Pagano of NSI use causal loops to illustrate the stability dynamics in Iraq and why it is impossible to ameliorate security concerns without also addressing the political and social factors that determine how people view the government. They write that in Iraq, “security is intrinsically linked to perceptions of governing legitimacy and the dynamics of ethno sectarian relations.” As a consequence, political reform that forges reconciliation between Shi’a and Sunni, and accommodates Kurdish and Arab desires for greater autonomy is an unavoidable prerequisite for a stable and legitimate Iraqi state. Similarly, Dr. Dianne Maye (Embry Riddle Aeronautical University) argues that encouraging local autonomy, decentralizing power out of Baghdad and structuring the government to avoid “concentration of power in any one ethnic, political, or religious group” are prerequisites for stability in Iraq. She recommends that the USCENTCOM should support work to shape the political environment in ways that promote “strong, yet dispersed, self-governance in a federal system” in Iraq that balances central government decision-making with the desire for increased autonomy in the provinces.

Security forces and police are often the most visible reflections of the domestic intentions and capability of the state. This is especially the case in a highly volatile security environment. In Iraq it is likely that a potent, locally appropriate but nationally coordinated security apparatus will be essential for implementing and assuring stability enhancing political reforms. USCENTCOM activities that encourage the capacity and help develop popular trust in the state’s security forces regardless of ethnic or sectarian divisions will be very important. The goal should be to shape Iraqi security activities to demonstrate the professionalism, impartiality and capacity of the security apparatus. The raison d’ etre of a government is to provide service to its citizens. When it is unable or unwilling to do so, it loses the trust of its constituents. Whenever possible and whenever it can be done fairly and impartially, the Government of Iraq, rather than sectarian security forces, Coalition forces, even NGOs should provide citizens with services such as public safety and policing, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and border control. This not only improves internal security and public safety but enhances the legitimacy of the government as well. While allowing non-NGO entities to provide local services may be expedient it is erode trust in the government and thus its longer-term ability to govern. When security forces are not seen as impartial and dependable protectors of all segments of society, more credible alternative sources of security will be found. This is precisely the context that facilitated ISIL’s rapid rise in Iraq.

Bragg and Pagano (NSI) recommend two ways in which USCENTCOM might help shape the situation. First, they suggest that USCENTCOM encourage consolidation of Iraqi security forces. This does not necessarily mean forging a single, central government tightly controlled national security organization, but that there is a single authority that sets the standards for national and regionally appropriate security forces. Second, encouraging recruitment of experienced Sunni officers – many of whom will be former Ba’athists – into the highest ranks of the Iraqi Security Forces and local police may help “alleviate fears that the process of removing ISIL forces will be used as cover for reprisals against Sunni populations … and as a means of bolstering Shia political and military dominance.” Failure to incorporate Sunni in leadership roles “increases the probability that Sunni tribal elders will look to provide their own security in the future” which will expand the number of sectarian militia and the number of security forces laying claims to authority.

Finally, John Collison of USSOCOM offers suggestions for promoting security prior to , and following the liberation of Mosul from ISIL. These efforts not only would help stabilize the volatile environment around Mosul but could serve as a template or set of precedents for post battle shaping in other areas of Iraq. In coordination with USG and Coalition partners USCENTCOM can engage with key military and militia leaders to help manage post liberation expectations and quell jockeying for political position, resources and territory among the groups operating in and around Mosul. Collison (USSOCOM) highlights two issues that demand particular and immediate attention: 1) the need to establish common understanding of the policies and procedures that will be used to return displaced persons to their homes in areas on able and equitable manner; and 2) articulation of reconciliation policies and procedures that will be used for those accused as ISIL sympathizers or having committed sectarian violence (e.g., screening process, arrest criteria, who would stand trial, etc.)

Contributing Authors

Bragg, B. (NSI), Pagano, S. (NSI), Gompert, D. (RAND), Collison, J. (USSOCOM), Maye, D. (Embry Riddle Aeronautical University)

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White Paper on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement.

Author | Editor: Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory).

The recently released White Paper entitled “Assessing and Anticipating Threats to US Security Interests: A Bio-Psycho-Social Science Approach for Understanding the Emergence of and Mitigating Violence and Terrorism” that Giordano discusses in the succeeding section provided a scientific perspective on current operations. The current White Paper provides operational perspectives on that and other relevant sciences. Previous versions outlined WHAT scientific approaches might be relevant; this iteration focuses on HOW to operationalize it.

The underlying concept of this paper is how bio-psycho-social approaches to cognitive engagement, described in greater depth by DeGennaro, may be put to use to collect, analyze, and/or apply information to meet a tactical, operational, or strategic end. This White Paper will focus on the proverbial “rubber meets the road” approaches of behavioral operations in the human domain where the former is “the study of attributes of human behavior and cognition that impact the design, management, and improvement of operating systems, and the study of the interaction between such attributes and operating systems and processes” and the latter is “the presence, activities (including transactions both physical and virtual), culture, social structure/organization, networks and relationships, motivation, intent, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of humans (single or groups) across all domains of the operational environment (Space, Air, Maritime, Ground, and Cyber).” Information Operations (IO) doctrine defines the cognitive domain as the component of the information environment (IE) that encompasses the gray matter of those who transmit, receive, and act upon information. Cognitive operations such as information processing, perception, judgment, and decision- making are the most vital aspect of the IE. Cognition is influenced by individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies and thus requires research and analysis methods from the bio-psycho-social sciences to understand and manipulate. When, how, and most importantly why to apply that understanding to US advantage at the tactical, operational, and strategic level is the focus of this effort.

The volume is focused primary on Military Information Support Operations (MISO), formerly Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as it is the activity that can most benefit from (and reciprocally impact) cognitive engagement. However, IO core capabilities such as Military Deception (MILDEC) and Computer Network Operations (CNO) information related capabilities such as counterintelligence (CI) could also benefit from bio-psycho-social applications to cognitive engagement.

To paraphrase Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, targeting the mind of the enemy commander is more important than the bodies of his troops (Hart, 1967), that recommendation can be extended to all those, belligerents and combatants alike, who comprise the human domain. The contemporary operating environment is growing increasingly contentious, however, the vast majority of those contentions do not necessarily require the use of lethal force. Instead, nuanced understanding of the nature of conflict and the peoples engaged are required to remain competitive. Cognitive engagement entails understanding the individual nodes with the human domain as such and developing appropriate methods for interacting with them. This White Paper is meant not only to continue the dialogue between the academic and operational communities but also to explore more deeply how to apply knowledge gained through bio-psycho-social research to cognitive engagement.

Contributing Authors

Bar, S. (Samuel Neaman Institute for National Policy Research), Baroni, S. (National Intelligence University), Bliner, E. (ForecastFwd), Bumphus, S. (NIU), DeGennaro, P. (TRADOC), Gerrol, S. (SPARK Experience), Giordano, J. (Georgetown University), Greenlee, M. (National Intelligence University), Holmes, B. (National Intelligence University), Jonas, A. (TRADOC), LaFon, D. (DOD), Lejeune, P. (International Institute for Non-Proliferation Studies), Linera, R. (USASOC), Mallory, A. (Iowa State University), Martin, M. (USASOC), McCulloh, I. (Johns Hopkins University), Munch, R. (TRADOC), O’Brien, C. (USASOC), Savage, S. (University of Cambridge), Romero, V. (IST Research), Seese, G. (USASOC), Spitaletta, J. (Joint Staff/J7 & Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory), Steckman, L. (Marine Corps Information Operations Center), Thomson, R. (Army Cyber Institute, United States Military Academy), Tovo, K. (USASOC), Vanderberg, N. (USASOC), Whalen, G. (DOD), Worret, C. (TRADOC), Wurzman, R. (University of Pennsylvania), Zak, P. (Center for Neuroeconomics Studies, Claremont Graduate University)

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Question (LR5): Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?

Author | Editor: Holliday, R. (National Defense University).

The contributors to question LR 5 diverge widely on their recommendations for ensuring that the USG prevails in future conflicts, while also preserving the US constitutional system. The divergence is attributable to the breadth of the question, as well as the diversity of the contributors’ backgrounds.

The most common areas for improvement that arose from the contributions are:

• Refinement of the USG and military strategy making processes
• Emphasis on strategic communication to multiple audiences and through multiple channels
• Improvement of civilian and military operations prior to and during conflict
• Enhancement of capabilities for understanding varied operational environments
• Creation of new authorities and organizations to deal with fluid events as they develop
• Development of resource channels and education opportunities that empower decentralized action

The contributors’ recommendations are arranged in this report based on the original question’s categories of inquiry, which were: changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, and education; with the addition of two categories, risk calculation and strategy formation.

Due to the broad scope of the question, multiple contributors also encourage further exploration of the topics through deliberate networking and research in order to develop additional solutions.

The Projected Future Operational Environment

Among the contributors there is a general expectation that future military operations will increase in complexity, with a commiserate increase in requirements for information on the environment. Among the risks seen are the impacts of climate change, which as one contributor states, “will present more, more frequent, and more severe instances for the US to respond (or NOT). ” “These events will include humanitarian responses to severe weather events, as well as global crisis and conflicts…spawned by the effects of this change and variability.”

The assumed result by commentators is that the Joint Force will increasingly be required to engage globally. One concern raised with the expansion of DODs requirements is that a, “corresponding ‘militarization’ of foreign policy through the dominance of the military instrument of national power to address increasingly complex issues/problems/challenges, supplants the other departments/agencies constitutional and legal (i.e. FAA) roles and responsibilities.”

One contributor assumed that the creation of additional requirements is also likely to accompany an increase in the force being used to fill, “‘non-traditional’ roles due to our capacity and capabilities.” Another contributor believed that, “the increasing number of countries, cultures, and languages of interest,” in which DOD will be employed, will require the force to “focus on producing agile cultural generalists rather than stable long-term specialists.

Another contributor stated that the Joint Force will face resource limitations that impact its capacity to respond to events.6 This limitation was assumed to be partially offset by an increase in the US’s utilization of coalitions to achieve its desired end states for a range of different contingency scenarios.

One planning model was recommended in order to address these new challenges. The model states that future planning and engagement may be more fruitful if it is divided into Short, Medium, and Long-Term challenges. Short-term challenges consist of those that can be addressed between 2017 and 2021 under the current POM. Medium-term challenges consist of those between 2022 and 2030, which can be extrapolated based on current and newly identified trends. Long-term challenges are those between 2030 and 2050, which cannot be extrapolated based on current trends.8 This model was not incorporated into the current report, but may be useful as a stepping off point for future inquiries.

Contributors Recommendations

The contributors made several recommendations for improving the force’s ability to address the various aspects of Question LR 5.

Organization

One group of contributors asserted that increases in the complexity of problem sets, as well as greater demand for specialized subject matter expertise, can be partially mitigated by the creation of, “Standing Civilian-military teams or increased civilian-military teaming.” 9 Among the examples provided by the contributor was, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghan & Iraq); USSOF ‘teamed’ with FBI for sensitive site exploitation efforts; USSOF ‘teamed’ with USAID development representatives to assess local vulnerabilities and development (Afghanistan/Iraq); Conventional Force and Reserve elements ‘teamed’ with FBI and ISCTAP elements to support building partner law enforcement capabilities; and Conventional Force and Reserve elements ‘teamed’ with USDA elements to build agricultural capabilities in Afghanistan.”

Two other contributor strongly cautioned however that the future civilian-military teams must not be created from previous templates, without incorporating lessons learned from their past performance. Critiques on some of the above listed examples can be obtained through the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University.

Legislation

One contributors stated that, “alignment of DOD and DoS regional boundaries,” will also, “support agility and sustainability in ‘competition’, crisis, and conflict.” Their recommendation was, “aligning DoS Bureaus and desk areas of responsibility and GCC AORs to facilitate better opportunities to coordinate, align, synchronize and integrate programs, initiatives, activities, actions and operations in support of US interests, and discrete foreign policy objectives.”

The contributor went on to argue that interdepartmental conflicts may also be offset by the creation of, “Civilian-led JIATF (i.e. USAMB, POTUS Special Representative, other; ISO ‘competition short of armed conflict’) in order to support agility in engagement options.” In the contributors own words, the recommendation has not been, “fully analyzed and developed in terms of providing civilian leaders with traditional ‘command authority’ over military assets to address complex, multi-agency, and essentially non-military challenges, issues or threats over an extended period of time approximating an ‘integrated campaign’ effort.”

Authorities

One contributor’s recommendation is to develop, “a shared DoS and DOD authority to proactively build resilience and resistance with threatened partners.” Their assertion is that such an authority will enable the, “integration of instruments of national power earlier and more proactively.” 15 Once implemented, the authority would, “support broader USG engagement with partners to build resilience and resistance capabilities and capacity to overt or clandestine threats from another state actor, proxy, or non-state actor,” as well as “identify opportunities, threats and challenges early.”

Resources

The resource issues identified by contributors focused on the impact that centrally controlled resource distributions strategies have on developing agile organizations. One author contended that a, “deliberate efforts need to be made to empower leaders and soldiers in edge organizations that can obtain the most rapid feedback from the operating environment.” It was also recommended that senior leaders ensure junior leaders have access to the resources and time necessary to pursue self- initiated projects.

The same contributor stated that, “improvements in collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence on sub-national and low-collection priority areas prior to conflict,” needs to take place. They also stated that based on current capabilities, new tradecraft must be developed that, “enable rapid in-depth understanding of populations, mobilization, and other human factors, using advanced analytic and data analysis methods.”

Infrastructure

One contributor argued that new organizational infrastructures must be developed with two goals in mind. First, “ensuring that whole-of-government and coalition participation supports a strategy as opposed to institutional equities and advancement within functional stovepipes,” and second, “managing continuity of effort over time.”

Another group of contributors recommended creating opportunities and incentives that are structured for specialists to, “develop and build long-term relationships with people in power, people coming into power, people who influence them, and people who may be able to advise and support the development of recommendations and Courses of Action (e.g., foreign partners, members of NGOs, etc.).”22 The contributor believe that these specialists should be developed to augment the current generalist mentality within DOD.

Education

One group of contributors stated that, “Defeating ISIL’s effective use of terrorism, media messaging, and inspiration and cooptation of lone wolf attacks, requires using modular means of national power – influence operations across diplomatic, economic, and social settings.” 23 Their recommended solution was the creation of “integrated, overlapping interagency working groups focused on core challenges and tasks in the Gray Zone.”

Another contributor recommended an alternate solution to terrorism messaging. Their assertion was that, “more nuanced audience analysis of different segments of target populations is necessary to determine how best to create and disseminate counter-messages to these different segments.” 25 This approach would allow for messaging to, “children in at-risk populations,” with the assumption that, “CENTCOM may have more success in stemming violent radicalization among that age group, thereby mitigating the possibility of ISIL-type ideologies from taking root in the young.”

Finally one contributor recommended that, “training and encouragement within the Joint Force to establish social networks prior to identification of tasks or missions, along with opportunities to mobilize social networks to achieve self-directed results,” will be important to developing a more agile force.

Other (Strategy)

One contributor recommended, “Improvements in the communication of strategic intent from principle level decision makers, to the Joint Force and interagency as a whole, in order to better empower subordinate organizations to plan and act in support of national objectives.”

Another contributor made specific recommendations on achieving that end state, stating the Joint Force needs to, “properly conceptualizing the nature of strategy,” “articulating a theory of change to guide strategy execution,” “developing a campaign specific strategy management office,” “clearly articulated goals and strategy that are agreed upon and understood by coalition partners.”

A final contributor stated that improving US strategy formation and communication needed to include: “increased coordination of mission specific pre-conflict authorities and authority requirements between the COCOMs, SECDEF, and the NSC; including identification, analysis, definition, and preparation for action along multiple contingencies.”

Other (Risk)

One contributor asserted that the Joint Force should, “realign its risk tolerances (balance of likelihood of failure, cost of failure, and benefits of success), in order to provide opportunities for breakthrough successes, at the cost more numerous failures.” The recommended approach was based on lessons learned in leadership from Silicon Valley. A group of contributors also recommended that, “anti-fragile” approaches can be used as alternative approaches to leadership, in order to encourage situation in which and people, “can more easily make small errors without failing.”

Contributing Authors

Braddock, K. (Pennsylvania State University), Bornmann, J. (MITRE-RAND), Collison, J. (SOCOM), Costa, B., MITRE-RAND, DeCamp, J. (MITRE-RAND), Holliday, R. (National Defense University), Meadows, S. (MITRE-RAND), Meredith, S. (National Defense University), Overton, M. (MITRE-RAND), White, N. (National Defense University), Williams, K. (MITRE-RAND)

Maneuver and Engagement in the Narrative Space.

Author | Editor: Munch, R. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC).

The paper leverages and melds the latest thinking of academic and operational subject matter experts in fields of organizational and social dynamics, network analysis, psychology, information operations and narrative development, social media analysis, and doctrine development related to aspects of maneuver and engagement in the narrative space.

This paper was produced in support of the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) led by Joint Staff in support of the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The paper leverages and melds the latest thinking of academic and operational subject matter experts in fields of organizational and social dynamics, network analysis, psychology, information operations and narrative development, social media analysis, and doctrine development related to aspects of maneuver and engagement in the narrative space.

The authors emphasize the concept of countering ISIL in the narrative space in synchronization with combat operations. While maneuver and engagement in the narrative space could be conducted independently of combat operations, conducting maneuver and engagement in the narrative space in support of combat operations is more likely to achieve lasting effects in the human domain. These ideas reflect a new view of what is required to succeed in future conflict because of the growing realization that decisive effects are often achieved in the narrative space.

The concept of maneuver and engagement in the narrative space belongs under the broader US Army Functional Concept for Engagement.i Narrative is one of the key elements of engagement, which is defined as,

…the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that allows bridging language barriers, bridging lines of communication and connections with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting.

As stated by Master Sergeant Sohail Shaikh of the US Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group, “…narrative must be harnessed by the warfighter to reach friendly, opposition, and neutral populations in ways that might not otherwise be possible.” The capability for warfighters to use narratives and counter-narratives to reach and influence friendly, threat, and neutral elements of the human domain will be a critical capability for successful engagement during future conflicts.

Contributing Authors

Moore, C, (Joint Staff), Steed, B. (US Army Command and General Staff College), Shaikh, S. (US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group) Eyre, D. (System of Systems Analysis Corps) McCulloh, I. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab), Spitaletta, J. (Joint Staff J7), Munch, R. (TRADOC G27), Worret, C. (TRADOC G2)

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Question (V1): What is Missing from Counter Messaging in the Information Domain. What are USCENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL coalition missing from countermessaging efforts in the information domain?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

“Western countries have failed to match the coordination, intensity, not to mention zealotry of the communication effort of [Daesh’s] global, decentralized movement.” Peter Welby, Centre on Religion & Geopolitics. One way for evaluating CENTCOM and the global counter-ISIL Coalition messaging is to break the idea into its three component parts: the content, the medium (the way the message is transmitted), and the messenger (see Beutel).

Content

To be most effective, messaging need to be targeted to specific populations, politically/ethnically correct, and entertaining. First, while there is a need for transnational messages (often those that seek to introduce alternative narratives—a mass targeting technique that uses non-linear messaging to achieve desired outcomes [see Beutel and Ruston]), messaging is most effective when it is tailored to local circumstances; presented by trusted, local voices; and in a format preferred by the target audience (radio, television, social media, religious services, etc.). This requires that information operators clearly understand the motivations, interests, and world views of potential adherents (Zalman). Based on analysis of extremist narratives by Scott Ruston at Arizona State University, an effective system of alternative narratives must recognize the need for justice, recognize threats faced by the target audience, must offer some route to glory (resolution), and must offer some subjection to a higher ideal (whether that is family, tribe, or nation). Nuanced understanding of the target audience can serve to not only contextualize the type of messaging effort and its aims but also to provide a necessary constraint upon the expected return of these programs (Huckabey & Picucci).

Related to this, because existing rivalries, ethnic differences, and stereotypes are so difficult to unravel in MENA, extra caution should be employed not to inflame tensions during conditions requiring a fast response (Briant). Unsuccessful counter-sectarian messaging could exacerbate or entrench divisions. Erring on the side of caution is better than attempting and failing counter- sectarian messaging.

Third, compared to ISIL messaging, Coalition messaging is frankly boring (Bean & Edgar, Taylor, Welby). MAJ Patrick Taylor, 7th Military Information Support Battalion USASOC, noted that “to entertain is to inform and to inform is to influence.” Yet, Coalition messaging lacks humor and is sonically sterile. ISIL frequently utilizes music and sound (often via nasheeds) to strengthen and complement its written or spoken message (Bean & Edgar). Aside from incorporating music and sound into Coalition messaging, satire and humor may be used to expose ISIL’s failings, inconsistencies, and false claims (Taylor).

Medium

Effective messaging conveys targeted messages to local communities via preferred channels (Beutel). This could be via radio, television, trusted religious leaders, etc. Social media is not the only or best way to reach all audiences. Therefore, information operators need to develop “multiple access points” so that populations have various way to access and interact with the message in familiar formats (Taylor).

Messenger

Experts largely agreed that a significant obstacle facing Coalition messaging efforts is that it lacks credibility. Government entities are not credible voices (Beutel). While there is a significant cohort (Abbas, Braddock, and Ingram) that argues in support of better leveraging and supporting local, credible partners to disseminate messages, there is another cohort (Briant, Beutel, Everington) that believes that credible voices have to be free of any kind of government support, which threatens to taint the source if discovered. But one thing the USG can credibly do is to amplify the voices of defectors and refugees from ISIL-held areas to call attention to ISIL’s failure to live up to its promises (Elson et al).

Strategies for Filling in the Gaps in Coalition Messaging

A team of experts from George Mason University, led by Dr. Sara Cobb, argued that engagement, rather than countermessaging, is the most effective shaping tool. Efforts to transform existing narratives through engagement would satisfy the same objectives often achieved through traditional messaging while still “disrupting” adversary conflict narratives and shaping conditions conducive to later stability and/or peace operations.

Similarly, Alexis Everington, who has conducted primary research in Syria, noted that we are in a post-messaging phase in the region where “messages are no longer useful and their potential ran out several years ago.” Efforts should now be focused on narrowing the “say/do” gap (Beutel, Briant, Everington, Mallory). Beutel and Mallory argue for a narrative led operation that closely ties US messaging to the operational action plan.

As the Coalition narrows its say/do gap, it should work to create a wedge between ISIL and its target audience by highlighting ISIL hypocrisies and failures (such as violence against Sunnis, failure to provide services, or evidence of corruption of its leaders) (Ingram, Elson et al). It is important also to respond quickly to contradict disinformation (Beutel). Another effective strategy would be to prepare messaging ahead of time for anticipated events in order to be able to disseminate quality messaging as events unfold in real time (Mallory, Ingram).

In terms of enhancing effectiveness of current messaging, recognition of how red understands the goal and vulnerabilities of its own messaging efforts can provide improved guidance on where counter-messaging can be effective and where non-response may be a more productive approach (Huckabey & Picucci). Furthermore, the authors suggest that implanting a graduated process toward achieving desired end-states can be leveraged to provide a stronger linkage between measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

Finally, Alejandro Beutel, a researcher at the University of Maryland’s START center, believes that one of the best things the USG can do is to play the role of “convener.” While CENTCOM may not be credible to the target populations, CENTCOM is at least credible to the credible messengers. So what CENTCOM might be able to do is to play the role of convener to have gatherings where actors in the region can interact with one another and start to establish some mediums of communication and relationship building.

Contributing Authors

Abbas, H. (National Defense University), Bean, H. (University of Colorado Denver), Edgar, A. (University of Memphis), Beutel, A. (University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), Blakely Jr., C. (George Mason University), Bornmann, J. (MITRE), Braddock, K. (Penn State University), Briant, E. (George Washington University), Cobb, S. (George Mason University), Elson, S. (MITRE), Everington, A. (Madison Springfield Inc.), Geitz, S. (MITRE), Grenlin, E. (George Mason University),Huckabey, J. (Institute for Defense Analysis), Ingram, H. (Australian National University), Kuznar, L. (NSI), Lewis, M. (George Mason University), Mallory, A. (Iowa State University), Martinez, A. (George Mason University), Maye, D. (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University), Parks, M. (MITRE), Picucci, P. (Institute for Defense Analysis), Ruston, S. (Arizona State University), Shaikh, M. (University of Liverpool), Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory), Taylor, P., (USASOC), Welby, P. (Centre on Religion and Geopolitics), Zalman, A. (Strategic Narrative Institute)

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Question (R3 #1): Are Government of Iraq initiatives for political reconciliation between the sectarian divide moving in step with military progress against Da’esh, and what conditions need to be met in order to accommodate the needs of the Sunni population?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Winning the War, but Losing the Peace

“With every step of the military operation, the gap is widening between Shia and Sunnis.” – Scott Atran, ARTIS

The general consensus among contributors to this essay is that not only is political reconciliation lagging behind military progress, but that the gap is widening every day (Atran, Dagher & Kaltenthaler, Hamasaeed, Mansour). The government is not focused on reconciliation, it is focused on the anti-ISIL fight, budgetary issues, and Shia in-fighting (Slim). Furthermore, among the Shia population, there is a general sense that Sunnis lost twice already and that there is little need for reconciliation with them (Slim).

So why are national reconciliation efforts failing? It is not due to lack of initiatives; in fact, there are so many that they are perceived to be more like pronouncements rather than planned, meaningful efforts (Abouaoun, Al-Qarawee, Ford, Wahab). Furthermore, many of these initiatives are being led by international organizations (Liebl). Lack of meaningful national reconciliation efforts have convinced some Sunni Arabs that the Iraqi government intends to revert to the political status-quo ante after ISIS is defeated militarily (Dagher & Kaltenthaler).

The “Historical Settlement” initiative announced at the end of October seemed to hold promise of a post-ISIS reconciliation until parliament passed a law in November legalizing and recognizing Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which Sunnis find an abhorrent form of government- sanctioned sectarian violence (Atran, Hamasaeed). Other unhelpful actions have included the failure to pass the National Guard Law and stripping the amnesty law of important content, according to Hamasaeed. Because of this, other GoI “initiatives” have largely been perceived as lip service to vague promises of reconciliation. These kinds of efforts will not address Sunni Arab or Kurdish grievances (Abouaoun).

One expert pointed out that reconciliation cannot just take place at the national level, it must also occur locally (Hamasaeed). Local efforts will be needed to remediate revenge violence among tribes as well as prepare for the return of over three million displaced people that could undermine military gains (Hamasaeed, Natali, Yahya). “Tribal and other forms of local violence could become a game changer” and should not be ignored, according to Hamasaeed.

However, other experts noted—without discounting the daunting challenges of reconciliation—that there are a few positive signs. First, there is a group of advisors around Prime Minister Abadi who believe that a new compact must be struck with the Sunnis, but this group is not powerful enough to effect change by itself (Slim). Second, two experts noted that in speaking with people on the ground that there is a general sense that reconciliation efforts have proceeded better than expected (Natali, Serwer). Third, in general, Sunni Arabs continue to largely see themselves as Iraqi nationalists and are committed to Iraq’s territorial integrity (Natali). Finally, while Sunnis are completely opposed to the presence of Iranian-backed PMFs in their communities, many expressed a willingness to cooperate with Iraqi Security Forces (Natali).

Experts mentioned five underlying barriers to effective reconciliation.

• PM Abadi lacks the support of his Shia alliance, which he has not been able to secure due to intra- Shia rivalries (Abouaoun, Al-Qarawee, Ford, Liebl, Natali, Serwer). It is not clear that Shia hardliners will ever agree to reconcile or share power with the Sunni population (Hamasaeed).
• Intra-Sunni competition means that Sunnis are not united behind a single, clear agenda and likely will not be until free elections can be held (Al-Qarawee, Al-Shahery, Liebl, Maye, Natali, Wahab, Serwer).
• Regional powers are taking advantage of the power vacuum to promote their own agendas under the guise of protecting the Sunni population (Al-Qarawee).
• Budget: Iraq has an 18 billion dollar budge deficit (Yahya). Iraq’s huge financial outlay combined with an inadequate inflow of funds means the Iraqi government cannot afford reconciliation initiatives (Liebl).

Conditions for Reconciliation

Sunnis do not speak with a single voice and do not have a unitary agenda, but the list below comprises some of the most frequently mentioned grievances. Experts noted that these grievances are not sectarian in nature—like most populations, they desire elements of basic good governance: security, justice, jobs, and equality under the law (Natali, Liebl). Furthermore, the Sunni population has to feel that they have a secure, just, and prosperous future in the country (Dagher & Kaltenthaler, McCauley, Natali, Serwer). The failure to deliver these demands may lead to further instability and unrest.

The list below touches on the most frequently noted demands from the Sunni population. For more detail, please refer to the cited contributions.

1. Security. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned issue is security (Serwer, Van Den Toorn). This encompasses many elements: freedom from tribal-based revenge and retribution for offenses committed during ISIS’s rule (Serwer, Van Den Toorn) and removal and disempowerment of Iranian-backed militias, which Sunnis consider to be a bigger threat than ISIS (Abouaoun, Al- Shahery, Atran, Liebl, Nader, Natali, Yahya).
2. Justice. Reconciliation efforts must address forms of structural discrimination against Sunnis (Al- Shahery, Meredith). This broad category emphases many complaints: 1) need to moderate retributive justice (Meredith), 2) national policies that discriminate against Sunnis in government and military positions (Al-Shahery), 3) due process for those accused of supporting ISIS (Al- Shahery, Slim, Yahya), equal treatment under the law (Natali, Yahya), and 4) insistence on public accountability for those guilty of government abuses and corruption (Ford).
3. Self Determination. Local reconciliation efforts are just as important as national ones (Hamasaeed). Sunnis want more control over their lives (Maye, Wahab). Sunnis desire the authority to control their own territory and resources, determine local power sharing arrangements, provide security through local police force, hire for local government positions, and have meaningful participation in decision-making (Al-Shahery, Hamasaeed, Ford, Maye, McCauley, Natali, Serwer, Van Den Toorn)
4. Humanitarian Assistance. Experts agreed that humanitarian assistance must be an immediate priority following the liberation of ISIS-controlled territory (Al-Shahery, McCauley, Natali, Slim). Assistance will be needed far beyond what has already been promised by the international community.
5. Reconstruction Aid. It is clear that areas liberated from ISIS control will need massive and immediate reconstruction aid; however, there is deep skepticism about the political will to provide this assistance (Al-Shahery, Ford, Maye, Serwer, Yahya). There was a plan to rebuild Fallujah, but no progress has been seen on the ground yet (Al-Shahery, Natali).

The failure of the GoI to seriously address the grievances of the Sunni community could lead to a three- fold threat of destabilizing outcomes: a power vacuum where regional powers and their proxies escalate the fight (Mansour); a failed state where warlords, extremist groups, and transnational criminals thrive (Buddhika, Petit, Reno); or the rise of a ISIS 2.0 (Dagher & Kaltenthaler, Natali, Yahya). Hamasaeed underscored the severity of the political climate in Iraq by stating that “today Iraq has more ingredients for violence than before Da’esh took over one-third of the country.”

What Can Coalition Partners Do?

Contributors outlined a few actions that the US government and its coalition partners could do to facilitation reconciliation.

1. Do not approach reconciliation through an ethno-sectarian lens—it not only ignores complex political realities on the ground, but it threatens to reverse important political and societal shifts that have happened in the last two years (Natali).
2. Demonstrate genuine and firm support for PM Abadi if he adopts an effective and detailed plan for re-integrating Sunni communities. If he fails to do so, threaten the withdrawal of this support. However, this must be communicated in a way that recognizes the pressure he is facing from Shia hardliners (Al-Qarawee).
3. The USG and its partners can allow Sunni areas the protected breathing space to reorganization themselves and hold election of new, local leaders (Dagher & Kaltenthaler, Meredith, Serwer). This also includes acting as a neutral intermediary to bring together international, regional, national, and local leaders to facilitation communication and reconciliation (Hamasaeed, Meredith, Van Den Toorn).
4. Reinforce Iraqi state capabilities and sovereignty by preventing regional powers from impeding the stable future of Mosul and other Sunni-majority areas (Dagher & Kaltenthaler, Natali).

Conclusion

Contributors noted that reconciliation efforts need to begin now while there is still military cooperation against a common enemy (Mansour, Yahya). As ISIS is defeated, local and regional actors may devolve into violence if a political vacuum emerges. One danger is that if legitimate Sunni grievances are not acknowledged and addressed, the emotions that gave rise to nationalism may once again become a powerful source of political mobilization in Iraq (McCauley). The intractable nature of the challenges listed in this essay led at least one contributor to conclude that there is little-to-no chance for reconciliation in Iraq at this time (Liebl). We may be in a situation where many of the actors’ interests are better served by continued conflict than resolution (Liebl, Astorino-Courtois).

Contributing Authors

Abouaoun, E. (United States Institute of Peace), Al-Qarawee, H. (Brandeis University), Al-Shahery, O. (Atkis Strategy), Atran, S. (ARTIS), Dagher, A. (IIACSS), Ford, R. (Middle East Institute), Hamasaeed, S. (United States Institute of Peace), Jayamaha, B. (Northwestern University), Kaltenthaler, K. (University of Akron), Liebl, V. (Center for Advance Operational Cultural Learning), Mansour, R. (Chatham House), Maye, D. (Embry Riddle University), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), Meredith, S. (National Defense University), Nader, A. (RAND), Natali, D. (National Defense University), Petit, K. (George Washington University), Reno, W. (Northwestern University), Serwer, D. (Johns Hopkins University), Slim, R. (Middle East Institute), Van Den Toorn, C. (American University of Iraq Sulaimani), Wahab, B. (Washington Institute), Yahya, M. (Carnegie Endowment)

Geopolitical Visions in Russian Media.

Author | Editor: Hinck, R. et al. Hinck, R. (Texas A&M University).

This study sought to examine future political, security, societal and economic trends to identify where U.S. interests are in cooperation or conflict with Russian interests, and in particular, identify leverage points when dealing with Russia in a global context.

USEUCOM requested that the SMA team initiate an effort to provide the Command analytical capability to identify emerging Russian threats and opportunities in Eurasia. The study sought to examine future political, security, societal and economic trends to identify where U.S. interests are in cooperation or conflict with Russian interests, and in particular, identify leverage points when dealing with Russia in a “global context.” In order to provide insight into these questions, this report conducted a cross-platform media analysis of Russian language media to discover emerging geopolitical threats and opportunities. This joint study was completed by researchers at Texas A&M University, University of Alabama, and Mississippi State University using the Multi-media Monitoring System (M3S) at Texas A&M University.

Media, in numerous formats, has an inordinately large role in shaping and conditioning public opinion, as well as in social organization and mobilization. Recent media in Russia reflects a deterioration of relations with the West, and seems to be contributing to a general distrust of the West among Russian citizens. This distrust is not just expressed in international politics, but in the everyday lives of many Russian citizens, leading to a palpable change in their relations with Westerners. This study sought to investigate the contours of the Russian geopolitical worldview by a close analysis of a diverse array of media sources, to determine the key narratives driving perceptions of Russia’s current economic status, its role in geopolitical relations, and its rivalry with the West.

In order to better understand the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making by the leadership of Russia, this study analyzed Russian language media (broadcast and web) to understand key frames and cultural scripts that are likely to shape potential Russian political beliefs and attitudes. Three separate studies were conducted. The first focused on Russian media coverage of economic issues. The second examined Russian multilateral engagement. The third looked at Russian media portrayals of NATO. The studies covered several months of media reports from web-based news sites, journals, and commentary, as well as broadcasts from the state-owned broadcaster Rossiya 24. Altogether, the researchers monitored over 2,500 news items from fourteen different news sources.

Key Findings:

• Russian media narratives provide a glimpse into the contours of an emerging geopolitical worldview in Russia that could dramatically impact the international order.
• Overall, this worldview positions Russia as a rational and moderate geopolitical actor, standing against the corruption and recklessness of the “Euro-Atlantic” world; namely, the United States and the European Union.
• Russian policy is committed to deflecting the economic impact of Western isolation on the Russian economy.
• Russia is committed to the development of alternatives to global political and economic institutions that are dominated by the United States and the EU. Such alternatives include increased economic ties with China and other Central Asian nations, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the BRICS nations. Russia is actively attempting to cast doubt on the credibility and integrity of Western- dominated institutions.
• hiRussian propaganda comments, refutes, and covers an expansive range of issues, tracking U.S. policy, NATO and exploits dissension within U.S., EU, and NATO ranks, leaving the United States at a communication disadvantage.

Implications & Recommendations

• Although Russian media typically portrays the West as seeking to constrain Russian interests (as well as the interests of other developing nations), there are gaps within those narratives that provide openings for more meaningful engagement. Potential weaknesses within these narratives include the over- dependence on resource-based economics, discomfort among Russia’s neighbors over Russian actions, and comparisons of contemporary Russian life with narratives of political openness.
• Blanket condemnation of Russian policy and Vladimir Putin are likely to fail, as they are interpreted primarily as indicative of an indiscriminate anti-Russia doctrine. U.S. messaging that seeks to strengthen groups within Russia that are seen as anti-Putin are unlikely.
• Within the Russian Federation itself, given the centralization of political discourse in Russian media, messages that merely critique or dismiss Russian messages are unlikely to break through dominant narratives anchored in historical and cultural experiences. Developing transcendent narratives that both acknowledge Russian concerns and perceptions but build upon common interests and aspirations are likely to have a greater impact than narratives that seek to isolate Putin from the Russian populace.
• Audiences exterior to the Russian Federation are more likely to be receptive to messages that highlight incoherence or lack of fidelity within Russian geopolitical narratives.
• Without clearly stated goals, U.S. involvement in countries surrounding Russia’s borders allows for Russia to present U.S./NATO activity as a threat to their own national interests.

Contributing Authors

Cooley, S. (Mississippi State University), Hinck, R. (Texas A&M University), Kluver, R. (Texas A&M University), Manly, J. (Texas A&M University), Stokes, E. (University of Alabama)

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