SMA Publications

Question (LR3): What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?

Author | Editor: Cragin, K. (National Defense University).

This paper addresses the issue of ISIL recruitment from Literature Review Question #3. To do this, it utilizes a quick look format and focuses on two non-standard ideas approaches to challenge of terrorist recruitment. For readers interested in source materials on this subject, this paper also incorporates a bibliography at the end of the document.

Minimize the impact of existing foreign fighters and returnees

The single most significant policy that nations could employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL fighters in the future is to minimize the influence of returnees. Historically, most foreign fighters have returned home from conflicts overseas to recruit and build local networks. Take, for example, the case of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Approximately 80 per cent of the 20,000 foreign fighters returned home and recidivism rates ranged from 40 per cent (Indonesia) to 90 per cent (Algeria). Moreover, even in the case of Indonesia, which had the lowest rate of recidivism, returnees recruited and expanded local terrorist networks. In fact, recent interviews in Indonesia with Afghan veterans revealed that foreign fighters were instructed to recruit 10 new operatives each, once they got home.

Emphasize programs that reinforce non-radicalization

Another policy that nations could employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL fighters in the future is to implement programs that reinforce non-radicalization. Generally speaking, radicalization can be understood as a process whereby individuals are persuaded that violent activity is justified in pursuit of some political aim, and then they decide to become involved in that violence. However, many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Much of the problem is that the factors identified by experts as contributing to radicalization apply to many more people than those who eventually become involved in political violence. Such limitations are more than academic, because they make it difficult for policymakers to design interventions. These limitations lead to programs aimed at manipulating broad structural actors—for example, education—so that they affect small subsets of populations of people who might or might not decide to become terrorists. One alternative is to instead focus policies on encouraging individuals to reject violent extremism.

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Assessing and Anticipating Threats to US Security Interests: A Bio-Psycho-Social Science Approach for Understanding the Emergence of and Mitigating Violence and Terrorism.

Author | Editor: Giordano, J. (Georgetown University Medical Center).

This white paper represents the work of intra- and extramural subject matter experts (SMEs) from multiple disciplines, convened to provide views and insights to define and further develop a bio- psychosocial approach to understanding, assessing, and influencing the cognitions and behaviors of individuals and groups that are devising, recruiting, training, and implementing organized aggression and violence. In light of current national and international security concerns, a major focus of this report is upon those bio-psychosocial factors that are influential to, and influenced by the activities of the group known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant— ISIL (or Daesh/Da’ish).

Over the past four years, ongoing activities of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) group have focused upon the validity and viability of neuro-cognitive techniques and technologies to be operationalized within national security, intelligence, and defense initiatives. Operationally, neuro-cognitive approaches have been, and are being evaluated, and in some cases iteratively employed, in the assessment, analysis, interdiction, influence, mitigation, and/or deterrence of factors contributory to intent and acts of global aggression and violence that threaten the United States (US) and its allies.

Through these projects, it was recognized that the value of neuro-cognitive techniques and technologies are best—and in some cases only—realized if and when they are incorporated and employed within (and to optimize) a more expansive orientation to human thought and action, which encompasses, appreciates, acknowledges, and engages the interactive dynamics of humans-in-environments.

This approach is known as the bio-psychosocial model, with homage to George Engel, who developed this paradigm—originally in reference to the scope and conduct of biomedicine—to describe humans as biological organisms, who psychologically experience and respond to the social (i.e., physical, group, economic, political) environment(s) in which they are embedded and function.

This whitepaper, Assessing and Anticipating Threats to US Security Interests: A Bio-PsychoSocial Science Approach for Understanding the Emergence of and Mitigating Violence and Terrorism represents the work of intra- and extramural subject matter experts (SMEs) from multiple disciplines, convened to provide views and insights to define and further develop a bio- psychosocial approach to understanding, assessing, and influencing the cognitions and behaviors of individuals and groups that are devising, recruiting, training, and implementing organized aggression and violence. In light of current national and international security concerns, a major focus of this report is upon those bio-psychosocial factors that are influential to, and influenced by the activities of the group known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant— ISIL (or Daesh/Da’ish).

The report is formally divided into five (5) sections:

• Introduction; and Review of Related SMA Projects/Work;
• Biological Perspectives On Behavior;
• Psychological Perspectives On Behavior;
• Social Perspectives On Behavior; and
• Operational Perspectives.

Following the Introduction and Review of Related SMA Projects, each section has been developed in a way such that the reader may delve into each/any of the sections to gain both an overview and subsequently more finely-grained, detailed insight to (biological, psychological, and/or social) aspects of individual and/or group aggression and violence. In keeping with the core principles of the bio-psychosocial model, these sections are interactive and reciprocal.

The reader need not proceed in any particular order, but may elect to begin with any section, so as to gain understanding of how and why certain (biological, psychological, or social) dimensions affect, and are affected by others. In each chapter, reference is made to information in/of other chapters, and the reader can use these references as direction to find related and supportive information. The final section of this report affords an overall operational perspective.

Thus, if and when taken either in part or in sum, this report will provide a working view to the ways that bio-psychosocial variables—and a bio-psychosocial approach—are important to understanding aggression and violence, and informing and articulating national security, intelligence, and defense efforts to analyze, deter, and/or prevent its incitement and occurrence.

NSI Chapters:

• A Review Of SMA Bio-Psycho-Social Investigations (S. Canna)
• Understanding The Social Context: Following Social And Narrative Change Via Discourse And
  Thematic Analysis Surrounding Daesh In The Middle East (L. Kuznar)

Contributing Authors

Canna, S. (NSI), Casebeer, W. (Lockheed Martin), Chen, C. (Georgetown University), DiEuliis, D. (National Defense University), Eyre, D. (System of Systems Analytics), Fenstermacher, L. (Air Force Research Laboratory), Giordano, J. (Georgetown University Medical Center), Hogg, J. (Fielding Graduate University), Kuznar, L. (Indiana University – Purdue University Fort Wayne, NSI), Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha), Linera, R. (USASOC), Martin, M. (USASOC), McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), McRoberts, M. (Department of Defense), Morin, C. (Fielding Graduate University), Morrison, B. (University of British Colombia), Moskalenko, S. (Bryn Mawr College), Otwell, R. (USASOC), Rogers, P. (Bradford University), Romero, V. (Information Science Technology Research), Seese, G. (USASOC), Rutledge, P. (Fielding Graduate University), Spitaletta, J. (Joint Staff/J7 & Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory), Stangle, R. (USASOC), Suedfeld, P. (University British Colombia), Wright, N. (University of Birmingham & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Wurzman, R. (University of Pennsylvania).Votel, J. (USSOCOM)

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Question (V7): Objectives and Motivations of Indigenous State and Non-State Partners In the Counter-Isil Fight. What are the strategic objectives and motivations of indigenous state and non-state partners in the counter-ISIL fight?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

The following are high-level results of a study assessing Middle East regional dynamics based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolve. Expected outcomes are based on the strategic interests of regional actors.

ISIL will be defeated in Syria and Iraq

Based on the balance of actor interests, resolve and capability, the defeat of Islamic State organization seems highly likely (defeat of the ideology is another matter). Specifically, the push for ISIL defeat in Syria is led by Iran and the Assad regime, both of which have high potential capacity and high resolve relative to ISIL defeat. Only ISIL has high resolve toward ISIL expansion in Syria. Iran, Jordan,Iraqi Kurds, Saudi Arabia, and Shi’a Hardline & Militia, show highest resolve for ISIL defeat in Iraq.

Conflict will continue in Syria following ISIL defeat; will escalate significantly with threat of Assad defeat

Whether Syrian civil conflict will cease in the context of an ISIL defeat is too close to call. Assad, Russia and Iran have strong untapped capability to drive an Assad victory against the remaining Opposition although none show high resolve (i.e., the security value gained by an Assad victory versus continued fighting in Syria is not widely different. This reflects the Assad regime’s competing security interests (i.e., one interest is better satisfied by continued conflict, another by Assad victory). Even when we assume the defeat of ISIL in Syria as a precondition, unless actor interests change dramatically, the number of interests served by continued conflict and the generally low resolve on both sides suggests that we should be skeptical of current agreements regarding the Syrian Civil War. Moreover, resolve scores rise sharply when continued conflict is replaced by the possibility of Assad defeat. Together these results suggest that unless Assad’s, Iran’s and Russia’s perceived security concerns are altered significantly, these actors have both the capacity and will to engage strongly to avoid an impending defeat. The high resolve of the three actors to avoid defeat should be taken as a warning of their high tolerance for escalation in the civil conflict.

Implication: Tolerating Russian-Iranian military activities in Syria and redirecting US resources to humanitarian assistance of refugees in and around Syria has greater value across the range of US interests and aligns more fully with the balance of US security interests in the region.

GoI lacks resolve to make concessions to garner support from Sunni Tribes

While the majority of regional actors favor the Government of Iraq (GoI) making concessions to Sunni and Kurdish groups following defeat of ISIL, only the Government of Iraq, Shi’a Hardline and Militia, Sunni Tribes and Iraqi Kurds have significant capability to cause this to happen or not. Unfortunately, the GoI and Shi’a have high resolve to avoid reforms substantive enough to alter Sunni factions’ indifference between GoI and separate Sunni and/or Islamist governance. More unfortunately, when they believe the GoI will not make concessions, Sunni Tribes are indifferent between ISIL governance and the current Government controlling Iraq. That is, they have no current interest served by taking security risks associated with opposing ISIL. However, the outbreak of civil warfare in Iraq does incentivize GoI to make concessions. Iranian backing of substantial GoI reforms changes the GoI preference from minimum to substantive reforms without the necessity of civil warfare.

Implication: Now is the opportune time to engage all parties in publically visible dialogue regarding their views and requirements for post-ISIL governance and security. Engaging Sunni factions on security guarantees and requirements for political inclusion/power is most likely to be effective; Engaging Kurds on economic requirements and enhancing KRG international and domestic political influence encourage cooperation with GoI. Finally, incentivize Iran to help limit stridency of Shi’a hardline in Iraq eases the way for the Abadi government to make substantive overtures and open governance reform talks.

Saudi Arabia-Iran Proxy funding continues; easily reignites conflict

Use of proxy forces by Saudi Arabia and Iran is one of the quickest ways to reignite hostilities in the region, and even though direct confrontation between state forces is the worst outcome for both, the chances of miscalculation leading to unwanted escalation are very high. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have high resolve to continue supporting regional proxies up to the point that proxy funding or interference prompts direct confrontation between state forces. This is driven by mutual threat perception and interest in regional influence. This leaves open the specter that any conflict resolution in the region could be reignited rapidly if the incentives and interests of the actors involved are not changed.

Implication: International efforts to recognize Iran as a partner, mitigate perceived threat from Saudi Arabia and Israel, and expand trade relations with Europe are potential levers for incentivizing Iran to limit support of proxies. Saudi Arabia may respond to warning of restrictions on US support if proxyism is not curtailed.

Contributing Authors

Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI), Berti, B. (Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv; Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute), Bragg, B. (NSI), Brom, S. (Center for American Progress), Canna, S. (NSI), Gengler, J. (Qatar University), Hassan, H. (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy), Hecker, M. (Institut Français des Relations Internationales), Khashan, H. (American University of Beirut), Kuznar, L. (NSI), Lynch, T. (National Defense University), Popp, G. (NSI), Rumer, E. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Tenenbaum, E. (Institut Français des Relations Internationales), Thomas, T. (Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth); Vatanka, A. (Middle East Institute, The Jamestown Foundation), Weyers, J. (iBrabo; University of LIverpool), Yager, M. (NSI)

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Question (R3 QL3): What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Referring to the Shi’a Militias as a unitary or homogenous entity masks the reality that what are now dozens of groups in Iraq were established at different times and for different reasons, and thus have different allegiances and goals. 1 Dr. Daniel Serwer of Johns Hopkins SAIS puts it succinctly, “Not all ‘Shi’a militia groups’ are created equal.” An actor’s defining characteristics have a significant impact on the objectives it pursues. The expert contributors highlight two factors we might use to differentiate the many Shi’a militia groups in Iraq, their aims, objectives and likely post-ISIS actions. These are: 1) the extent to which the group is led by and owes allegiance to Iran; and 2) the span of its concerns and interests. How groups rate on these two factors will tell us a lot about what we should expect of them following the effective defeat of ISIS (see graphic).

Autonomy. Contributors to this Quick Look tended to differ on where the balance of control over the Shi’a militias rests. Some see the Shi’a PMF groups as primarily under the control of Iran, and thus motivated or directed largely by Iranian interests (i.e., they have very little autonomy.) If this is the case, knowing the interests of the leaders of these groups will tell us little about their actions). Other experts view the militias as more autonomous and self- directed albeit with interests in common with Iran in which case their interests are relevant to understanding their objectives. In reality, there are groups that swear allegiance to the Supreme Leader in Iran, those that follow Ayatollah al Sistani, and still other groups that respond only to their commanders. In an interview with the SMA Reachback team, Dr. Anoush Ehteshami a well-known Iran scholar from Durham University (UK) points out that Iran has “shamelessly” worked with groups it controls as well as those that it does not because it sees each variety as a “node of influence” into Iraqi society. As in previous Reachback Quick Looks2, a number of the SMEs note that Iran is best served by taking a low- key approach in Iraq. Ehteshami argues that ultimately Iran has little interest in appearing to control the Shi’a militias: “the last thing that they want is to be seen as a frontline against Daesh” as this would reinforce the Sunni versus Shi’a sectarian, Saudi-Iranian rivalry undercurrents of the conflict against ISIS. In fact he argues that Iran prefers to work with the militias rather than the central government – which is susceptible to political pressure that Iran cannot control in order to “maintain grass root presence and influence … of the vast areas of Iraq which are now Shia dominated.”

Ambition. A second factor that distinguishes some militia groups is the span of their key objectives and ambition. In discussing militia objectives, some SMEs referenced groups with highly localized interests, for example groups that were established more recently and primarily for the purpose of protecting family or neighborhood. Others mentioned (generally pro-Iran) groups with cross-border ambitions. However, the major part of the discussion of militia objectives centered on more-established and powerful groups with national-level concerns.

Key Objectives

Most experts mentioned one or all of the following as key objectives of the Shi’a militia, at present and in post-ISIS Iraq. Importantly, many indicate that activities in pursuit of these objectives are occurring now – the militias have not waited for the military defeat of ISIS.

Controlling territory and resources

For groups with very localized concerns this objective may take the form of securing the bounds of an area, or access to water in order to protect family members or neighborhoods. For groups with broader ambitions, American University of Iraq Professor Christine van den Toorn argues that controlling territory and resources is a means to these militias’ larger political goals. As in the past, this may entail occupying or conducting ethnic cleansing of areas of economic, religious and political significance (e.g., Samarrah, Tel Afar, former Sunni areas of Salahuldeen Province near Balad.) Here too Anoush Ehteshami suggests that different militia groups have different allegiances and motives: some are “keen to come flying a Shia flag into Sunni heartlands and are determined to take control of those areas.” A number of authors indicate that a specific project of Iran-backed militias possibly with cross-border ambitions would be to secure Shi’a groups’ passage between Iraq and Syria (van den Toorn suspects this would be north or south of Sinjar adding that Kurds would prefer that the route “go to the south, through Baaj/ southern Sinjar and not through Rabiaa, which they want to claim.”)

Consolidating political power and influence

Anoush Ehteshami believes that the Shi’a militia groups are keen to gain as much “control of government as possible, as quickly as possible.” These groups are actually new to Iraqi politics and realize that once the war is over their influence and role in the political order may end. Many of the experts identified the primary objective of militia groups with broader local or national ambitions as increasing their independence from, and power relative to Iraqi state forces. Christine van den Toorn relates an interesting way that some Shi’a militias are working to expand their influence: by forging alliances with “good Sunnis” or “obedient Sunnis.” In fact, she reports that the deals now being made between some Sunni leaders and Shia militia/PMF are in essence “laying the foundation of warlordism” in Iraq and potentially cross-nationally. Many experts singled out the law legalizing the militias as making it “a shadow state force” or an Iraq version of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC) – a clear victory for those seeking to institutionalize the political wealth, and likely economic wealth of the militias.

Dr. Harith Hasan al-Qarawee of Brandeis University agrees that the primary goal of the militia groups with national or cross-national ambitions is to gain political influence in Iraq in order to: “to improve their chances in the power equation and have a sustained access to state patronage.” As a result, he anticipates that they will continue to work to weaken the professional, non-sectarian elements of the Iraqi Security Forces, and would accept reintegration into the Iraqi military only if it affords them the same or greater opportunity to influence the Iraqi state than what they currently possess. Finally, a number of the experts including Dr. Randa Slim of the Middle East Institute, mention that an RGC-like, parallel security structure in Iraq will also serve Iran as a second “franchisee” along with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and allow export of “military skillsets/expertise/knowhow, which can be shared with fellow Shia groups in the Gulf region.”

Eliminating internal opposition from Sunni and Kurds

Omar Al-Shahery, a former deputy director in the Iraqi Defense Ministry, along with a number of other SME contributors believe that after the Sunni Arabs are “taken out of the equation” the Kurds are the militias’ “next target.” Dr. Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins SAIS) expects that Shi’a forces will remain in provinces that border Kurdistan, if not at the behest of Iran, then certainly in line with Iran’s interest in avoiding an expanded and independent Kurdistan in Iraq. Al Shahery (Carnegie Mellon) points to this as the impetus for militias pushing the Peshmerga out of Tuzkurmato south of Kirkuk. Similarly, Shi’a concern with Saudi support reaching Sunni groups opposed to the expansion of Shi’a influence in Iraq was motivation for occupying Nukhaib (south Anbar) and cutting Sunni forces off from a conduit to aid. Finally, Al-Shahery raises the possibility that the ultimate goal of the most ambitious militia groups is in fact to form an “integrated strike force” that can operate cross-nationally. This is evidenced he argues, by the centralization of the command structure of the forces operating in Syria.

What to Expect after Mosul

The following are some of the experts’ expectations about what to expect from the Shi’a militias in the short to mid-term. See the author’s complete submission in SME input for justification and reasoning.

• Re-positioning. Iran will encourage some militia forces to relocate to Syria to help defend the regime. However, Iran also will make sure that the “Shia militias which have been mobilized, are going to stay mobilized” as a “pillar of Iran’s own influence in Iraq” (Dr. Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University, UK)

Following ISIS defeat in Iraq …

• Inter and intra- sectarian conflict. The PMFs will play a “very destabilizing” role in Iraq if not disbanded or successfully integrated into a non-sectarian force. The present set-up will result in renewed Sunni-Shia tensions, Sunni extremism (Dr. Monqith Dagher, IIACSS and Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron); Shi’a-Shi’a violence (Dr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, USIP); and/or violent conflict with the Kurds (Dr. Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins SAIS; Omar Al-Shahery, Carnegie Mellon)
• New political actors. Select militia commanders will leave the PMF to run for political office, accept ministerial posts (Dr. Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins SAIS) and/or “major political players in Baghdad” will attempt to place them in important positions in the police or Iraqi security force positions. (Dr. Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle)

Contributing Authors

Ford, R. (Middle East Institute), Slim, R. (Middle East Institute), Abouaoun, E. (US Institute of Peace); al-Qarawee, H. (Brandeis University), Al-Shahery, O. (Carnegie Mellon University), Atran, S. (ARTIS), Dagher, M. (IIACSS), Gulmohamad, Z. (University of Sheffield), Ehteshami, A. (Durham University), Kaltenthaler, K. (University of Akron), Mansour, R. (Chatham House), Hamasaeed, S. (US Institute of Peace), Maye, D. (Embry Riddle University), Nader, A. (RAND), Serwer, D. (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), van den Toorn, C. (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani), Wahab, B. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)

Question (V6): Strategic and Operational Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal. What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition¹s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Prior to the signing of the Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2014, Iran watchers tended to anticipate one of two outcomes. One camp expected a reduction in US-Iran tensions and that the JCPOA might present an opening for improved regional cooperation between the US-led coalition and Iran. The other camp predicted that Iran would become more assertive in wielding its influence in the region once the agreement was reached.

Implications of JCPOA for the Near-term Battle: Marginal

Iran experts in the SMA network generally believe that JCPOA has had negligible, if any, impact on Iran’s strategy and tactics in Syria and Iraq.1 While Iran does appear to have adopted a more assertive regional policy since the agreement, the experts attribute this change to regional dynamics that are advantageous to Iran, and Iran having been on “good behavior during the negotiations” rather than to Iran having been emboldened by the JCPOA. Patricia Degennaro (TRADOC G27) goes a step further. In her view, the impact of the JCPOA on the battle against ISIL is not only insignificant, but concern about it is misdirected: “the JCPOA itself will not impede the Coalition’s ability to prosecute the war … and create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability. Isolation of Iran will impede the coalition’s mission.”

Richard Davis of Artis International takes a different perspective on the strategic and operational implications of the JCPOA. He argues that Saudi, Israeli and Turkish leaders view the JCPOA together with US support for the Government of Iraq as evidence of a US-Iran rapprochement that will curb US enthusiasm for accommodating Saudi Arabia’s and Turkey’s own regional interests. Davis expects that this perception will “certainly manifest itself in the support for proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Specifically, it means that Saudi Arabia and Turkey will likely be more belligerent toward US policies and tactical interests in the fight to defeat ISIL.”

Implications of JCPOA for Post-ISIL Shaping: Considerable Potential

The SMA experts identified two ways in which the JCPOA could impact coalition efforts to stabilize the region in the mid- to longer-term: 1) if Iran were to use it as a means of generating friction in order to influence Coalition actions for example by convincing Coalition leaders that operations counter to Iranian interests (e.g., in Syria) could jeopardize the JCPOA; and, 2) indirectly, as having created the sanction relief that increases Iranian revenue and that can be used to fund proxy forces and other Iranian influence operations.

Provoking Friction as a Bargaining Chip. A classic rule of bargaining is that the party that is more indifferent to particular outcomes has a negotiating advantage. At least for the coming months, this may be Iran. According to the experts, Iran is likely to continue to use the JCPOA as a source of friction – real, or contrived – to gain leverage over the US and regional allies. The perception that the Obama Administration is set on retaining the agreement presents Tehran with a potent influence lever: provoking tensions around implementation or violations of JCPOA that look to put the deal in jeopardy, but that it can use to pressure the US and allies into negotiating further sanctions relief, or post-ISIL conditions in Syria and Iraq that are favorable to Iran. However, because defeat of ISIL and other groups that Iran sees as Saudi-funded Sunni extremists,2 the experts feel that if Iran were to engage in physical or more serious response to perceived JPCOA violations, they would choose to strike out in areas in which they are already challenging the US and Coalition partners (e.g., at sea in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea; stepping up funding or arms deliveries to Shiite fighters militants in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen) rather than in ways that would actually impede ISIL’s defeat.

Increased Proxy Funding. Iran has often demonstrated a strategic interest in maintaining its influence with Shi’a communities and political parties across the region, including of course, providing support to Shi’a militia groups (Bazoobandi, 2014).3 Pre-JCPOA sanctions inhibited Iran’s ability to provide “continuous robust financial, economic or militarily support to its allies” according to Patricia Degennaro (TRADOC G27). An obvious, albeit indirect implication of the JCPOA sanctions relief for security and political stability in Iraq in the longer term is the additional revenue available to Iran to fund proxies and conduct “political warfare” as it regains its position in international finance and trade.4 It will take time for Iran to begin to benefit in a sustainable way from the JCPOA sanctions relief. As a result it is not as likely to be a factor in Coalition prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Syria, but later, in the resources Iran can afford to give to both political and militia proxies to shape the post-ISIL’s region to its liking.

Contributing Authors

DeGennaro, P. (Threat Tec, LLCI -TRADOC G27), Nader, A. (RAND), Eisenstadt, M. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Knights, M. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Alex Vantaka (Jamestown Foundation)

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Question (R3 #2): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support?

Author | Editor: DeGennaro, P. (TRADOC G-2/G-27).

The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) or Da’esh, as the group has become known, transition to insurgency is underway. They may not see it like this since Iraq and Syria are struggling with their own sovereignty and trying to restructure governance to support the basic necessities of the populations.

Daniel Serwer of Johns Hopkins University says we can already see this manifesting “in overt terrorist attacks, which are already frequent, as well as more covert intimidation.” IS is conducting suicide, IED and infrastructure attacks daily. The group will continue to be active in organized crime activities – protection rackets, smuggling of oil and antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, and violent intimidation – against any effort to restore law and order. “Daesh will not fold its tent. It may even spawn a new organization to carry on its campaign for the caliphate and seek to embed with other less brutal Salafists,” says Serwer.

In light of the possibility that U.S. backed Iraqi and Peshmerga forces are pushing IS out of its territory in Iraq and beginning to tackle some locations in Syria, Harith Al-Qarawee, professor at Brandeis University, says, “ISIS insurgents who will survive the Mosul battle will return to underground insurgency and seek to secure safe passages between Iraq and Syria.” He and other experts agree that there must be an effective intelligence effort in urban centers to keep abreast of any movements IS may make if another gap in security and governance should open up. Renad Mansour, an expert at Chatham House, reminds us they IS will continue, even underground to “make sure that Iraq’s political elite are unable to come up with a political solution,” so if a political solution is not found, IS will use this as a reason to resurface. The last U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Ambassador Robert Ford, and Elie Abouaoun, at USIP, feel that in order to prevent this from happening, “a genuine and organic national reconciliation effort” must commence by investing in political reconciliation initiatives that combine both top-down and bottom-up approach and include a regional dialogue between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

SMEs agree that IS will not disappear. They will most likely go into hiding with sleeper cells in Iraqi and Syrian cities. Many may also remain silent in other Western countries looking for future opportunities to act. Noted anthropologist Scott Atran believes IS “will retreat to its pre-Caliphate tactics, as they did during the Iraqi surge, when they lost 60-80% of their foot soldiers and more than a dozen high-value targets each month for 15 consecutive months, yet still survived with a strong enough organization to seize the initiative in the chaos of the Syrian Civil War and roar back along the old oil-for-smuggling routes that Sunni Arab tribesmen and Saddam loyalists.” Randa Slim of the Middle East Institute states that, “there will be post-ISIS territorial and ideological challenges. On the territorial side of the equation, given the range of actors involved in the Mosul fight, there will be increasing stakes, post-liberation, of competing territorial claims between Baghdad and Erbil but also among different ethnic groups. She continues, “Kirkuk is likely to be a major point of competition in the future and will complicate the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad” and losing territory will undermine ISIS’s caliphate narrative.”

All agree that the Iraqi leadership must find a way to bring the Sunni population into the political decision making by cultivating local leaders who have legitimacy and credibility. Sunni groups, that are particularly fragmented, must contribute to reconstruction of liberated territories and participate in security, police and military, to ensure that their grievances are met. These grievances are rooted in divisions that are embedded by continued attacks on their communities by IS, who are dividing Sunnis as well as Sunnis and Shia populations, and Shia forces perceived to be targeting not only Iraqi Sunnis, but all Sunnis as a proxy for Iran.

Many “IS members are Iraqis,” says Bilal Wahab of the Washington Institute, who were brutally coerced to join IS or had little economic choice, they too should be a focus for immediate reintegration into society to help quell animosities perpetuated in this conflict. Remember, says Altran, “many of the leaders of the Sunni Arab militia in Mosul supported IS at the outset (as “The Revolution” – al Thawra – to win back Iraq from Shia control) and turned against IS when they encourage Sunni to go against Sunni. “Military action and humanitarian assistance are critical, but they are mostly addressing the symptoms, and need to be supplemented by civilian initiatives” says United States Institute of Peace expert Sarhang Hamasaeed. In Diane Maye’s words, “An important element of denying regrowth is to use targeting in conjunction with a broader movement to engage the population against the terrorist network.” In other words, take advantage of an IS retreat by rebuilding and improving the livelihoods of people. That is the main IS deterrent.

Bilal Wahab, Washington Institute, encourages coalition members to take into account several lessons from the past when planning next steps. First, “If grievances continue—mass arrests, kidnappings and economic sidelining, insurgency will remain legitimate in the eyes of the population” and second, “cash speaks louder than ideology, be it foreign funds pouring into Iraq, or Sunni politicians funneling money into violent groups to gain leverage in Baghdad. Finally, “in addition to sectarianism, a chronic malaise of Iraq’s security forces is corruption and has impunity.” This must be addressed immediately. Trust in security forces is the only way populations will support and report ongoing IS activities.

Contributing Authors

Abouaoun, E. (United States Institute of Peace), Atran, S. (ARTIS), Al-Qarawee, H. (Brandeis University), Al-Shahery, O. (Aktis), Ford, R. (Middle East Institute), Hamasaeed, S. (United States Institute for Peace), Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska Omaha), Logan, M. (University of Nebraska Omaha), Mansour, R. (Chatham House); Maye, D. (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University); McCauley, C. (Bryn Mawr College), Meredith, S. (National Defense University), Mironova, V. (Harvard University), Serwer, D. (Johns Hopkins University), Slim, S. (Middle East Institute), Wahab, B. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Whiteside, C. (Naval Postgraduate School)

Mosul Coalition Fragmentation: Causes and Effects.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc) & Krakar, J. (TRADOC G-27).

This paper assesses the potential causes and effects of fragmentation on the Counter-ISIL coalition. This coalition consists of three distinct but interrelated subsets:

1. the CJTF-OIR coalition;
2. the regional coalition, de facto allies of convenience, who may provide any combination of money, forces or proxies;
3. the tactical coalition, the plethora of disparate groups fighting on the ground.

The study team assessed how a change in either the CJTF-OIR coalition or regional coalition could influence the tactical coalition post Mosul and the subsequent effect of these potential fragmentations on the GoI¹s ability to control Iraq. The study team established six potential post-Mosul future scenarios. One future consisted of the tactical coalition remaining intact and the other five consisted of different permutations of the tactical coalition fragmenting. The study team then modeled these six futures with the Athena Simulation and quantified their effects on both Mosul and Iraq writ large.

During simulation these six fragmentation scenarios collapsed into two distinct outcomes: one in which GoI controlled Mosul and one in which local Sunni leadership controlled Mosul. The variable that determined the outcome was the involvement of the Sunnis in the post-Mosul coalition—if the local Sunni leadership remained aligned with the GoI, the GoI remained in control of Mosul. If the local Sunni leadership withdrew from the coalition the GoI lost control of Mosul and the local Sunni leadership assumed control of Mosul—regardless of whether any other groups left the coalition. Irrespective of the local Sunni leadership’s involvement in the coalition the GoI was able to maintain control of everything but Mosul and the KRG controlled areas of Iraq. This included historically Sunni areas of Al Anbar including Fallujah and Ramadi.

While several permutations of the regional coalition fragmenting may take place, the centrality of the Sunnis to any outcome puts the actions of the GoI to forefront. PM Abadi’s desire to preserve the unity of Iraq may position the GoI at odds with calls for increased local autonomy from some factions of Kurdish and Sunni leaders. In the event of the chaos that would characterize violent civil conflict among Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’a forces—likely with proxy support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively—the multi-ethnic, multi-sect members of the Iraqi Army and police will be hard pressed to know which battles to fight and more than breaking with the coalition outright, may for reasons of confusion and self-preservation simply fall and recede as effective fighting forces.

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Operating in the Human Domain 1.0.

Author | Editor: U.S. Special Operations Command.

Building on the vision of USSOCOM strategic guidance documents, the Operating in the Human Domain (OHD) Concept describes the mindset and approaches that are necessary to achieve strategic ends and create enduring effects in the current and future environment. The Human Domain consists of the people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making, and behavior. Success in the Human Domain depends on an understanding of, and competency in, the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence human behavior.2 Operations in the Human Domain strengthen the resolve, commitment, and capability of partners; earn the support of neutral actors in the environment; and take away backing and assistance from adversaries. If successful in these efforts, Special Operations Forces (SOF) will gain military, political, and psychological advantages over their opponents. The OHD Concept integrates existing capabilities and disciplines into an updated and comprehensive approach that is applicable to all SOF core activities.

SOF personnel continuously think about human interactions, building trust, and winning support among individuals, groups, and populations. Drawing on the approach and required capabilities identified in this concept, SOF and its partners use persuasion and compulsion to shape the calculations, decision-making, and behavior of relevant actors3 in a manner consistent with mission objectives and the desired state.4 SOF must win support and build strength, before confronting adversaries in battle. Working in collaboration with capable partners and as part of a whole-of-government approach, SOF enables preemptive actions to avert conflicts or keep them from escalating. When necessary, SOF and its partners confront and defeat adversaries, always mindful that the end goal is an eventual cessation of hostilities and a more sustainable peace.

SOF conduct enduring engagement in a variety of strategically important locations with a small-footprint approach that integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows SOF personnel to nurture relationships prior to conflict. Language and cultural expertise are important, but SOF’s ability to shape broader campaigns with allies and partners to promote stability and counter malign influence is vital. SOF leaders plan and execute operations that support national objectives, while providing continuous analysis and advice to ensure effective strategy. SOF must identify and assess relevant actors, understand their past and current decisions and behavior, and anticipate and influence their future choices and actions across the ROMO.

SOF contribute to the accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives during peaceful competition, non-state and hybrid conflicts, and wars among states. The ideas in the OHD Concept are key to confronting state and non-state actors that combine conventional and irregular military force as part of a hybrid approach. Adversary states are increasingly adapting their methods to negate current and future U.S. strengths, relying on non-traditional strategies, including the use of subversion, proxies, and anti- access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These adversary strategies require a refined U.S. approach for effective counteraction. A critical goal will be to create conditions that shape adversary decisions and behavior in a manner that favors U.S. objectives or develops opportunities friendly forces can exploit to achieve the desired state.

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Eurasia Strategic Risk.

Author | Editor: Elder, R. & Levis, A. (GMU).

The GMU Eurasia Strategic Risk project examined future political, security, societal and economic trends as they apply to the decision calculus of key Eurasian regional actors. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States by focusing on actions and behaviors that would be considered adverse by the United States, NATO, and other U.S. partner nations. The goal was to provide planners with a tool that can be used to inform their discussions with military and non-military staffs from both the United States and its partners on potential Eurasia strategies. Among the key observations: When the adverse behaviors the United States seeks to influence are not related to a perceived existential threat to a NATO member, classical deterrence cost-benefit calculations lose importance. However, Russia’s perceived cost-benefit calculations of not acting, and its perception of the decision calculus of the United States and its partners remain important considerations. For this reason, the study concludes that NATO’s Article V will continue to serve as an effective deterrent to actions which the Alliance believes constitute an existential threat to a member country, but is less likely to deter attacks that do not jeopardize a member state’s existence because the political cost of restraint for Russia outweighs the potential cost of a likely NATO response.

Conclusions and Recommendations

NATO’s Article V will continue to serve as an effective deterrent to actions which the Alliance believes constitute an existential threat to a member country, but is less likely to deter attacks that do not jeopardize a member state’s existence: the political cost of restraint outweighs the potential cost of a likely NATO response. However, NATO can favorably influence Russia’s decision calculus for adverse behaviors that do not constitute existential threats by focusing on (1) reducing the cost (and increasing the benefit) of exercising restraint, and (2) altering Russia’s perception of the US/NATO decision calculus so that it does not assess that it must act to preempt US and NATO actions during periods of instability.

The US and NATO can influence Russia’s view of its strategic deterrence posture by using all the levers influencing the Russian strategic posture decision calculus: Increase perceived cost of action (punishment), reduce perception that Russia will benefit from the action, reduce perceived cost of restraint, increase perceived benefit of restraint, and positively influence the Russian perception of United States and NATO objectives in a crisis.

Since the Russian narrative implies that the West will exploit every opportunity to reduce Russian power and status, the United States should avoid behaviors and discourage partner actions that support the anti-Russian narrative. De-escalation of a potential crisis becomes increasingly difficult once the Russian leadership rallies the Russian electorate and their partners outside Russia; therefore, where possible, the United States should focus on Russia’s perceived costs and benefits of exercising restraint when assessing ways to motivate Russian actions to reduce US strategic risk in the EUCOM AOR.

Although the study did not conduct experimentation on the potential for theater engagement and security cooperation to reduce potential strategic risk in the EUCOM AOR, it seems clear that it will be extremely difficult to alter Russian core beliefs regarding the motives of the United States and NATO with respect to its power and international prestige. The United States is capable of influencing the attitudes and behaviors of other regional actors, to include former Russian clients, through its shaping and engagement activities. These attitudes and behaviors become important when regional stability is disturbed and responses to the disturbance are implemented. It is important for all pertinent parties to avoid activities reinforcing the Russian narrative that believes the United States and its allies will exploit every opportunity to diminish Russian power and status.

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Question (R2 QL 11): What major economic, political and security (military) activities does KSA and Iran currently conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to gain influence? What are KSA and Iran’s ultimate goals behind these activities? What motivates KSA and Iran towards these goals? What future activities might KSA and Iran conduct in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen?

Author | Editor: DeGennaro, P. (TRADOC G-2/G-27).

The geopolitical landscape in this region is vast and complex. History, lands, family, culture and economic resources are closely intertwined. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran in particular are opposing influencers in these neighboring countries and populations. KSA sees itself as the Sunni protector and the legitimate rulers of the Arabian Peninsula while Iran takes the position of Shite protector. Religion is often used to veil outright economic and military operations by both countries quite often through group proxies. Both Iran and KSA have vast oil and gas resources with extreme and autocratic rulers that work tirelessly to shape, influence and dominate the region thereby ensuring primacy, longevity and wealth.

There are distinct differences between the nations. Iran’ has a rich history from the time of the Persian Empire while the Saud family came from a waring tribe in the desert cleverly undermining Western colonizers who aligned with its rival ruling family. Both countries have a population with high literacy, but minimal freedoms, Iran’s being a more progressive population with a larger middle class.

To date, each government continues to try project influence internationally, regionally, and locally through statecraft and, sometimes lethally, through proxy actors within and between states. Below are SMA contributions that identify ways in which KSA and Iran influence Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria in the cognitive, economic, political and security realms. Each has a dedicated narrative giving reason to justify influence although, it is important to note that the receiving countries and non-state actors are not so easily manipulated. Although they may not have similar political powers, they are by no means without their own abilities and interests.

Contributing Authors

Jeddeloh, L. (The Institutional Strategist Group), Mazaheri, D. (IL Intellaine), Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services Inc.), Gulmohamad, Z. (University of Sheffield)