Question (R4.9): What are the medium to long term implications to US interests and posture of China’s economic, diplomatic and military expansion into South Asia, Middle East and Africa?

Author | Editor: Hayes Ellis, D. (University of Maryland).

Executive Summary

“It’s the Economy Stupid!”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the contributors to this question devoted attention to the outsized role economics—and especially the quest for natural resources—plays in the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) relationships in the MENA region. In general, the consequentiality of this factor trends negative when assessed through the lenses of either a) US policy goals or b) global liberal economic norms. Chow, for example, characterizes the failure of the US to more aggressively push back on manipulative PRC trade practices as “carelessness” and “empty rhetoric.” He also sees a direct line between the perceived cave-in on Washington’s part and Beijing feeling empowered to seize the initiative in other areas detrimental to US interest, such as increased militarization and aggressive behavior in disputed territorial areas.

Holslag points to a whole different array of challenges, identifying various ways in which the style of PRC economic engagement with developing nations and oil-states encourages those countries to behavior that is counter to western, liberal free-trade norms. He also makes a link directly from economics to geopolitics, claiming China’s economic statecraft “undermines Western economic and political influence.” Serwer and the editor both concur on a convenient shorthand from economic theory, labeling the PRC’s trade behavior essentially mercantilist—that is to say, viewing the world as a zero- sum-game with finite resources, in which a state-directed trade policy is built to benefit strategic national goals—as opposed to the profit and innovation oriented capitalist global order that has defined international norms since the end of the Cold War. However, Chow pushes back against the utility of characterizing China’s behavior as purely mercantilist. He notes that China’s actions are not significantly different than French or Italian investments in the MENA region; the “real difference for US interest is France and Italy are allies and China is seen as a rival.”

Going back to Holslag’s assertion that China’s behavior is generally counter to western, liberal free-trade norms, he bounds his analysis neatly with two hard statistics:

1. China’s share in regional investment stock has increased almost ten fold in the last 15 years, while that of the US has declined and
2. the PRC is the largest creditor in the region—most of it in concessionary loans.

As he concludes, and the editor agrees, this has had the effect of increasing favorable views of future trade and FDI relationships with Beijing, while dimming the view of Western partners.

Finally, the “One Belt One Road” initiative to recreate both an overland and a maritime modern “silk road” must be mentioned. This framework is the clearest articulation of Beijing’s desire to tie infrastructure investments in trade partners directly to an enhanced geo-strategic position for the PRC. The degree to which the proposed elements of “One Belt One Road” can be realistically executed, versus its role as a piece of symbolic rhetoric delineating Beijing’s policy position, is open to debate.

Rising Powers – Be Careful What You Wish For

The contributors also find agreement on the fact that an increasing role for the PRC as an economic, political, and perhaps security player in the MENA region actually drives towards more adherence to the status quo—not away from it. The editor would point out that a theoretical debate has been raging in political science for some years about the extent to which the PRC is a disruptive power that wants to supplant the global order, versus the degree to which it will accede to existing institutions and norms as it grows into a leadership role. In general, the contributors tend to highlight evidence of the latter perspective. Beijing’s incentives in the MENA-South Asia region are largely meant to function as a status quo power when it comes to the international security regime—further destabilization and political violence is very much counter to the interests of the PRC. There is some irony that the mercantilist economic approach reinforces the same goal as that of the liberal international order, but it should not be overlooked. This may be one of the few regions in the world where PRC-US cooperation toward mutual goals is the obvious first-choice policy for both sides.

Holslag and the editor both highlight one particular set of interest as an especially salient example of these dynamics: the issue of PRC citizens living abroad in the region. Historically, the Chinese state’s relationship with its cultural diaspora has been defined as a kind of formal separation. Indeed in Mandarin, “overseas Chinese”—those ethnic Chinese living outside the mainland—are referred to using a different word from ethnic Chinese people living in China.1 This idea of residence on the mainland defining belonging to the Chinese state is very culturally ingrained, and the PRC is now truly entering an era where it may become a challenge that shapes Beijing’s behavior in the MENA-South Asia region. No modern Chinese government has had to contend with the idea that large groups of its own citizens would be living in far flung locales, but still expect the protection and benefits conferred by being “Chinese.” The model for the last few hundred years has been that those Chinese who opened laundries in California, sugar plantations in the Philippines, or fishing operations in Singapore, were on their own. The PRC can no longer operate that way, and much remains to be seen about how that will shape their behavior when Chinese citizens abroad (especially those working on state-backed projects) come under threat of violence, persecution, etc.

Two significant, concrete signs that Beijing’s reflex response to this problem is to sign up for the normative international order: 1) the decision to finally subscribe to the United Nations “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P framework and provide personnel to peacekeeping missions and 2) the deployment of Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships to the Indian Ocean to run shipping convoys during the height of the Somali piracy threat—to date the PLAN’s furthest deployment, and a clear contribution to a massive international effort to protect global trade. Both indicate a recognition by the PRC that the existing international framework helps everyone by recognizing a state’s rights to protect its citizens anywhere in the world, and encouraging all countries to pitch in to keeping that a viable option.

Outside the Box Thinking

In her contribution, Janet Breslin-Smith identifies a possible area of strategic gain for the US stemming from the increase in Chinese economic dominance in the region. She points to the general lack of cultural affinity between regional communities and the Chinese, and suggests that as the PRC comes increasingly to be identified with economic opportunity and investment, so Beijing may also come to bear an increasing share of blame and disgruntlement for what’s not going right. “In a counter-intuitive way” she says, “the healthiest consequence of expanded Chinese interaction in the Middle East would be a recasting of the tension in the narrative of ‘Islam versus the West’ to ‘Islam versus the East. And in that new Chinese/Islamic interaction, an interesting reality emerges.”

Additionally, the editor would seek to add an important caveat to the economics analyses of the other contributors: mixed in with the regrettable elements of the way the PRC tends to structure investment in the developing world are nevertheless some real benefits. Chinese firms are building infrastructure, the Chinese government is pouring money into impoverished governments. It is the editor’s opinion that too often the reflex of US perspective is to view being displaced as the number one as unambiguously negative. Given the failure of the Western world to make so many of the investments in developing countries in the MENA region that are garnering praise for Beijing, one wonders if that’s not a stilted point of view? The overall evidence from 150 years of political science is that a richer, more developed world is a safer one—so from one point of view, the US should welcome Chinese investment in MENA and South Asia, and view it as burden sharing rather than competitive displacement. The US should seek to engage the PRC in defining norms for investment outcomes that promote the long-term economic health of the region and mitigate the negative potential outcomes foreseen by the other contributors.

Contributing Authors

Edward Chow (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Devin H. Ellis (University of Maryland), Jonathan Holslag (Free University of Brussels), Daniel Serwer (SAIS, Johns Hopkins University), Janet Breslin Smith (Crosswinds Consulting)

Author | Editor: Popp, G. (NSI, Inc).

The Senturion Modeling Project Noor video provides a brief overview of the Senturion modeling and simulation effort in support of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor. For more information on Project Noor itself, please visit: Project Noor Video

Question (R4.1): How Strong is Iraqi Nationalism in Countering Iranian Influence?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

History of Iraqi Nationalism

As with all newly formed Arab states following the conclusion of WWI, Iraq struggled to establish an inclusive national identity (Abouaoun, Dagher). Rooted in the Hashim monarchy’s attempts to preserve antiquated patrilineal lines, the rise of Saddam Hussein’s “national republic” in 1979 forcefully instituted a form of non-inclusive Arab nationalism. The success of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) seemingly led to a resurgent rise of a fresh Iraqi nationalism although, in time, this proved to be limited to Iraq’s Sunni population1 (White). The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 once again exposed simmering sectarian tensions, in turn eroding Iraqi nationalism even more (Abouaoun). The establishment of a new Shia ruling elite (post-2003) sowed the seeds of Sunni Arab discontent in addition to opening the floodgates of increased Iranian influence (White). Non-state actors took advantage of the societal decay and positioned themselves as defenders of Iraq’s various sectarian communities (Abouaoun). Non-state actors, emboldened by globalization and the information revolution, were used as proxies by regional powers competing for influence in the region.

Can Iraqi Nationalism Counter Iranian Influence?

There is some consensus among contributors that Iraqi nationalism could be an effective tool to mitigate Iranian influence in Iraq. Today, as cautious optimism emerges from the downfall of ISIS, one recent poll found that 60% of Iraqis see themselves as Iraqis first (Kaltenthaler, Dagher). A significant majority of these nationalists (65%), oppose Iranian military intervention in Iraq against ISIS, and 63% support Coalition airstrikes against ISIS.

Some experts expressed limited optimism that Iraq is approaching an inflection point where the development of Iraqi nationalism can be achieved through competent governance; however, it is not clear how realistic this goal is, given the current climate. To understand this, let us review some of the drivers and buffers of Iraqi nationalism.

What Can Be Done to Foster Iraqi Nationalism?

If an increase of Iraqi nationalism is correlated with a reduction of Iran’s influence in Iraq, several experts note that steps could be taken to allow nationalist platforms to emerge.

First, experts stress the importance of reinforcing Iraqi state institutions, with a particular emphasis on the Iraqi military. As one of Iraq’s most effective institutions, the Iraqi military must lead the way on integration, professionalism, and freedom from corruption (Wahab).

Second, Iraqis need a new model of inclusive government (Abouaoun). He noted that, “a ‘spontaneous’ rebirth or boost of Iraqi national identity is a farfetched aspiration.” It can only be achieved through a process that generates a new governance model—only then can national identity mobilize Iraq’s Shias to minimize Iran’s influence in Iraq.

Third, strong and inclusive institutions must be supported by domestic and international efforts to build a stable, interconnected, and diversified economy (Wahab). This should begin with investment in the physical infrastructure that connects Iraqis across the country with one another as well as with economic opportunities (i.e., roads, railroads, pipelines, etc.).

Experts generally agree that rising Iraqi nationalism could play a critical role in countering Iran’s influence. However, nationalism is quite nascent in Iraq (Saeed) and not all experts agree that it currently exists in any significant way at all—let alone with enough strength to minimize Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics (Seloom).

Contributing Authors

Elie Abouaoun (United States Institute of Peace), Scott Atran (ARTIS), Munqith Dagher (IIACSS), Zana Gulmohamad (University of Sheffield), Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron/Case Western Reserve University), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Yerevan Saeed (Arab Gulf States Institute), Muhanad Seloom (Iraqi Centre for Strategic Studies), Bilal Wahab (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Wayne White (Middle East Policy Council)

Author | Editor: Elder, R. (USAF, ret) & Levis, A. (George Mason University).

Abstract

Mapping political, security, societal and economic trends to the decision calculus of key regional and (as applicable) non-state actors has been used to gain insights into the behaviors of actors conducting multi- instrument operations in the “gray zone” between peace and conflict. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models have been used to identify potential sources of strategic risk, and serve as the foundation for a planning framework designed for use by operational planning teams to support operational and engagement planning by Combatant Commands and their components. Computational experiments were performed using the TIN models. The computational experiments focused on gray zone actor perceptions of the decision calculus to counter the effects of gray zone activities.

Question (R4.4): What does a successfully concluded campaign against ISIS look like? Considering costs, reputation, and balance of influence, how should the U.S./Coalition define success? Is the defeat of ISIS a success if it causes the balance of power in the region to shift towards Iran, Assad, or Russia?

Author | Editor: Hayes Ellis, D. (University of Maryland).

Executive Summary

Scoping “Success”

The responses provided to this question have either directly or implicitly pointed to a divide between what should be considered a “successfully concluded campaign against ISIS” in the operational theater in Syria and Iraq, versus at the global, strategic level. Standards for defining success on both levels tended to coalesce around similar benchmarks across all the responses.

Success at the Theater Operational Level

There is broad consensus among the respondents that a successfully concluded campaign against ISIS at the operational level, does not have to be defined by the total destruction of the group. Rather, a significant degradation of capabilities (particularly the ability to hold territory and the capacity to carry out extensive or highly lethal attacks), coupled with a reduction of the group’s threat to overall U.S. policy interests in the region, may be sufficient. Liebl offers that the total destruction of the group should be an aspirational goal, but acknowledges that this is unlikely in the near term and so success should be defined by different metrics. Braun suggests that the ISIS must be perceived as having been defeated to prevent the remnants from transmogrifying into some other virulent regional or global movement. Itani explicitly states that ISIS is an important threat at an operational level in Syria and Iraq; the danger is not existential to the US. Some respondents (Maye and Serwer for example) also noted the importance of creating stable circumstances for civilian populations, in the aftermath of a kinetic victory over ISIS and their subsequent loss of territory across the region. The challenges of this, particularly in avoiding redistribution of land and other assets away from the original owners, as well as avoiding the Iraqi perception that ISIS is being replaced by a hostile Shia regime, are well noted.

One point of divergence on specific metrics of degraded capabilities is based on the notion of organizational decapitation. Some responses (Lustick, Ligon, et al) make a case that success must include the elimination of ISIS leadership. Ligon and her colleagues make a more tactical argument, analyzing the data on the capacity of ISIS to carry out sophisticated and deadly attacks during times when the leadership is strong and organized, versus times when it is weak and in transition. Their analysis makes a compelling case that decapitation would severely hamper the operational effectiveness of whatever remained of ISIS forces. Other respondents raise doubts over the efficacy of a decapitation strategy noting that the targeted killing of many key militant leaders over the last sixteen years has not produced a long-term degradation of the threat (see Smith for example).

Success at the Strategic Level

“Successful elimination/destruction of Da’ish won’t occur in any conventional sense on the battlefield in Iraq, Syria or elsewhere,” writes Burki. In one sense or another, most of the respondents concur that strategic success against ISIS cannot be measured through the same lens as operational success in Syria and Iraq. Some authors (Ligon, Liebl, Lustick, and Burki for example) point to the ongoing capabilities of ISIS fragments and their tendency to recruit and embed themselves in Iraqi populations, in order to conduct ongoing social media strategies and to generally remain a presence on the global scene. They point out that the vast corpus of media and messaging already produced by ISIS can continue to radicalize individuals around the world and that their message may be just as focused on “martyrdom” as it was when they were highly successful on the battlefield.

An additional argument (Marten, Burki, and Anonymous) raises the prospect that at a strategic level, success against ISIS may not be a relevant concept as long as the overall concept of Salafi Jihad is not defeated. Strategic success in this view is less defined by the existence of the group itself and more by mitigating the circumstance that allow it to proliferate and thrive. The theme of the disenfranchisement of Sunni populations and the broader and more pressing struggle between Sunni and Shia forces in the MENA region, directly links to the rise of ISIS and other groups. These authors also tend to question the ability of the US to play a decisive role in achieving strategic success in this arena—casting much of the regional responsibility back to the local populations in conflict.

In looking at the big picture, Venturelli argues that success can be advanced through two strategies: 1) creating an integrated approach at the theater, strategic, and balance of power levels (Iran, Russia, Syria) and 2) focusing on the ‘exploitation’ of opportunities created by ISIS across these success components. This analysis rests on the belief that the situation in the Middle East presents opportunities to reshape MENA security and order and to mitigate challenges more effectively.

Is a Defeat of ISIS a “Success” if the Balance of Power Shifts to Favor Russia, Iran, or Assad?

Keeping with an orthodox view of US policy goals, the majority of respondents who addressed this sub- question indicate that a shift in the balance of power to favor Russia, Iran, or Assad, would undermine or negate the value of ‘defeating’ ISIS. Conversely a few contributors disagreed with that assessment, parsing the issues into very separate responses by actor, or disputing the validity of the question’s premise altogether.

The most in depth analysis (Itani) casts a post-ISIS state of play that sees an ascendant Iran as anathema to US interests; however, Russia is viewed as an actor that can more easily be accommodated in an acceptable regional framework. “Belei’s analysis views a post-ISIS future that favors Assad as a pessimistic scenario, but one which is very “likely.” Burki’s analysis rejects the entire premise of the sub-question and re-frames it from an operational space to a strategic one, stating that the relevance of the defeat of ISIS is not about a power vacuum in Syria, but rather its impact on the global trends in Salafi Jihadism—pulling us back to the point made above.

Contributing Authors

Anonymous 1, Bogdan Belei (Carnegie Endowment), Shireen Khan Burki (Independent), Aurel Braun (University of Toronto & Harvard University), Faysal Itani (Atlantic Council), Vern Liebl (Marine Corps University), Gina Ligon, Margaret Hall, Michael Logan, Clara Braun, and Samuel Church (University of Nebraska, Omaha), Kimberly Marten (Barnard College), Diane Maye (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University), Ian Lustick (University of Pennsylvania), Pix Team (Tesla Government Services), Daniel Serwer (Johns Hopkins University), Janet Breslin Smith (Crosswinds Consulting), Martin Styszynski (Adam Mickiewicz University), Shalini Venturelli (American University)

Question (R5.5): How stable is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and to what extent can the United States rely on the GCC to influence foreign policy objectives in the region? What are the implications of the changing dynamics between GCC members?

Author | Editor: W. Aviles (NSI, Inc,).

Executive Summary

The Qatari crisis that is presently crippling the GCC has decayed logarithmically into diplomatic ultimatums and blockades, with Kuwait and Oman attempting to restore relations between Doha and the rest of the GCC. While the crisis has reached a relative standstill, the GCC is experiencing the “most severe test of the organization’s cohesion in its nearly forty-year history,” (Feierstein) and the entire affair calls into question the cohesion of the GCC and its potential to advance US interests. The GCC has been a fickle partner for US foreign policy objectives in the past and with political infighting and gridlock, Iranian encroachment, and a host of domestic issues, the GCC appears to be on the cusp of a historic transformation. All contributors in this report suggest that Iran is the primary cause of GCC discord and emphasize different causes and effects, as well as different paths of pursuing policy conducive to American interests.

Fractures within the GCC, which have flared several times since its inception in 1981, have resulted in the failure of the GCC to “make headway on major issues that touched upon sensitive areas of political, security, or foreign policy control,” Feierstein argues in agreement with several other contributors (Aviles, experts from the Global Cultural Knowledge Network [GCKN], Styszynski, and Ulrichsen). There are several factors that the authors note as the root cause for the GCC’s ineffectiveness besides Iranian antagonism. First, member nations disagree over the nature of political Islam vis-à-vis domestic presence and engagement of transnational religious groups (e.g., Muslim Brotherhood) and various elements of the Houthi rebel leadership (Feierstein). Second, economic disputes underpinned by “competitive bilateralism” and a lack of interdependency has produced a lack of economic cohesion (Ulrichsen). Third, the authoritarian and disparate natures of the Gulf regimes decay the integrity of the GCC union and discourage cooperation and make compromise difficult (Aviles).

Authors disagree about the permanence and depth of the fissures within the GCC. One school of thought suggests that the alienation of Qatar intentionally “intensified by the Saudis and Emirates” has permanently damaged the organization while others believe it has only been temporarily weakened (GCKN, Shaikh). A deeper discussion of the division within the GCC (with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain on one side, Qatar and Oman on the other with Kuwait in the middle) is a theme mentioned in a related SMA Reach Back response (R4.8)1 and is also discussed by Feierstein, Ulrichsen, and Aviles. These groupings are posited as a possible end state of the formal dissolution of GCC (Ulrichsen, Aviles) with Dr. Feierstein’s analysis even suggests such an outcome as possible if not likely. Regardless of the final result, all contributors agree that more turmoil is inevitable.

The Qatari crisis is seemingly a symptom of both the Sunni-Shia conflict and other regional/international politics, as well as the internal divisions that prevent the GCC efficiently resolving major disagreements. All of the aforementioned factors (and others) have ultimately created a less than desirable environment for US foreign policy. Several authors make the case for the GCC as being a poor partner for implementing US objectives in the region (GCKN, Feierstein, Serwer, and Aviles), with experts from the Global Cultural Knowledge Network going as far as contending that “America and the GCC do not have the same objectives so we can only influence the GCC through FMS [foreign military sales].” Ulrichsen and Aviles suggest that there is an opportunity to engage individual member states and elements therein, with Aviles criticizing the framework of diplomatic engagement with the GCC bloc instead of leveraging individual member states for foreign policy objectives.

Contributors

Weston Aviles, NSI; Global Cultural Knowledge Network, US ARMY TRADOC G2; Gerald Feierstein, Middle East Institute; Mubin Shaikh, Independent; Martin Styszynski, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland); Daniel Serwer, Middle East Institute; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University

The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity in Cyberspace

Speaker: Libicki, M. (Naval Academy)

Date: July 2016

Martin Libicki (Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley 1978) holds the Richard Keyser Distinguished Professor of Cyber Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy. He wrote three commercially published books, Cyberspace in War and Peace (USNI Press, forthcoming autumn 2016), Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (2007), and Information Technology Standards: Quest for the Common Byte (1994). As senior management scientist at RAND (1998-2016) he wrote numerous monographs, notably Defender’s Dilemma, Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace, Global Demographic Change and its Implications for Military Power, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, How Insurgencies End (with Ben Connable), and How Terrorist Groups End (with Seth Jones). Earlier employment includes adjunct professorships at Columbia University and Georgetown University, 12 years at the National Defense University, three years on the Navy Staff as program sponsor for industrial preparedness, and three years for the GAO.

Question (QL2): What are the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish Army’s recent intervention in northern Syria for the coalition campaign plan to defeat ISIL? What is the impact of this intervention on the viability of coalition vetted indigenous ground forces, Syrian Defense Forces and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly ANF)?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

There is general consensus among the expert contributors that the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish incursion are minimal: each sees the incursion as consistent with previous Turkish policy and long-standing interests. Turkey’s activities should be viewed through the lens of its core strategic interest in removing the threat of Kurdish separatism, which at present has been exacerbated by renewed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency inside Turkey, its influence in northern Iraq, and the expansion of Kurdish territories in Syria more generally. As one commented, Turkey will prioritize itself. This means preventing the strengthening of Kurds at all costs (including indirect support to those fighting them). It also means patrolling borders, harsh treatment of those who try to get through and/or corrupt practices such as involvement in smuggling. One implication of note however is the increased risk of escalation between Turkey and Russia and Turkey and the US-backed Peoples Protection Units (YPG) that the incursion poses.

Establishing a Turkish zone of influence in northern Syria accommodates multiple Turkish interests simultaneously: from the point of view of the leadership, it should increase domestic support for President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP); it should allow Turkey to gain control of costly and potentially disruptive refugee flows into Turkey and reduce the threat of ISIL or PKK activities in Turkey; it prohibits establishment of a unified Kurdish territory in northern Syria; and, it secures Turkey’s seat at the table in any Syrian settlement. In addition, a Turkish-controlled zone could establish a staging area from which Syrian Opposition forces could check PYD expansionism, secure the Aleppo corridor and clear ISIL from Turkey’s borders.

In terms of the impact of the intervention on the viability of coalition-vetted ground forces, Alexis Everington (MSI) argues that in order for the campaign against ISIL to succeed in Syria two conditions must be met: 1) that opposition forces in Syria believe that the effort to defeat ISIL goes hand-in-hand with defeat of the Assad regime; and 2) that there are moderate, “victorious” local Sunni opposition fighters that mainstream society can support. If not, the general population is likely to support more extreme alternatives (like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) simply for lack of viable Sunni alternatives.1 Hamit Bozarslan (EHESS) suggests that unfortunately the ship may have sailed on this condition. He argues that the Free Syrian Army of today, that Turkey backs, has little resemblance to the Free Syrian Army of 2011: many of its components hate the US, are close to radical jihadis and most importantly, in his view are a very weak fighting force. He explains that they succeeded recently in Jarablus because ISIL did not fight (organizing a suicide-attack and destroying four Turkish tanks, simply showed that ISIL could retaliate).

Finally, Bernard Carreau (NDU) argues that “the U.S. should welcome the Turkish incursion into northern Syria and could do so most effectively by reducing its support of the SDF and YPG.” Doing so he believes could make Turkey “the most valuable U.S. ally in Syria and Iraq.” Additionally, the experts suggest that it is important to remember that the Turkish leadership has seen and will continue to see the fight against ISIL through the lens of its impact on Kurdish separatism and terrorism inside Turkey including Kurdish consolidation of power along the Syrian border. The impact on Opposition forces depends on the degree to which they see that the Turkish moves, as well as the campaign against ISIL address their objective of toppling the Assad regime.

Contributing Authors

Natali, D. (National Defense University), Cagaptay, S. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Everington, A. (Madison-Springfield, Inc.), Carreau, B. (National Defense University),Bozarslan, H.(Ecole des Hautes Estudes en Sciences Sociales), Aguero, S. (US Army), Hoffman, M. (Center for American Progress), Sayigh, Y. (Carnegie Middle East Center)

‍

Question (V5): Factors that Will Influence the Future of Syria. What are the factors that will influence the future of Syria and how can we best affect them?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

Experts varied from pessimistic (chronic warfare) to cautiously optimistic regarding their expectations for the future of Syria, yet mentioned many of the same factors that they felt would influence Syria’s future path. Most of these key factors – ranging from external geopolitical rivalries to the health and welfare of individual Syrians – were outside what typical military operations might affect. Instead they center on political and humanitarian recovery, healing of social division.

External Factor: the use of Iranian, Saudi proxies in Syria

Iranian and Saudi use of proxy forces is one of the wild-cards in the future of Syria and is probably quickest way to reignite violence in the wake of any cease-fire or negotiated settlement. In fact, the intensity of the Iran-Saudi regional power struggle and how this might play out in Syria was the factor most mentioned by the SMA experts.

Encouraging the conditions necessary for stability in Syria requires discouraging Iran-Saudi rivalry in Syria. This can be done in a number of ways including offering for security guarantees or other inducements to limit proxyism in Syria (e.g., for Iran promise of infrastructure reconstruction contracts). Unfortunately, Iran stands to have greater leverage in Syria following the war, regardless of whether Assad stays or goes. If Assad or loyalist governors remain in Syria they will be dependent on Iran (and Russia) for financial and military support. As Yezid Sayigh (Carnegie Middle East Center) writes, “even total victory leaves the regime in command of a devastated economy and under continuing sanctions.” Still, if Assad is ousted and Iranian political influence in the country wanes, its economic influence in Syria should remain strong. Since at least 2014 Iran, the region’s largest concrete producer has been positioning itself to lucrative gain post-war infrastructure construction contracts giving it significant influence over which areas of Syria are rebuilt and which groups would benefit from the rebuild. Under these conditions, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and/or Turkey could ramp up their efforts to contain Iranian influence by once again supporting aggrieved Sunni extremists. This would be all the more likely, if as Josh Landis predicts, “Assad, with the help of the Russians, Chinese, Iraqis and Hezbollah, will take back most rebel held territory in the next five years.”

External Factor: the degree of Coalition-non Coalition agreement on the governance and security conditions of post-war Syria

Lt Col Mel Korsmo an expert in civil war termination from Air University concludes that a negotiated settlement is the best path to political transition and resolution of the civil conflict in Syria. Others felt that any resolution of the Syrian civil conflict would depend on broad-based regional plus critically, US and Russian (and perhaps Chinese) agreement on the conditions of that resolution. The first question is whether there remain any elements of 2012 Geneva Communiqué or UN Security Council resolution 2254 which endorsed a roadmap for peace in Syria that might be salvaged. Lacking agreement among the major state actors, the authors expected that proxy warfare would continue in Syria. Moshe Ma’oz (Hebrew University) and others however argued that it may be too late for the US to wield much influence over the future path of Syria; it has already ceded any leverage to Russia and Iran. Others argue that the way the US might regain some leverage is by committing to the battle against Assad with the same effort given to defeating ISIL. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that it is imperative to attempt now to forge agreement on the clearly- stated steps to implementing a recovery plan for Syria.

External Factor: US and Coalition public support for sustained political, security and humanitarian aid for Syria

Another condition that must be met if the US and Coalition countries are to have impact on political and social stability in Syria is popular support for providing significant aid to Syria over an extended period of time. This may be a tall order, particularly in the US where the public has long thought of Syria as an enemy of Israel and the US in the Levant. Compounding this, the experts argue that when warfare comes to an end in Syria the regime will be so dependent on Russia (and Iranian) aid, that the Syrian government will lose its autonomy of action. While encouraging Americans to donate to charitable organizations aiding Syrian families may not be too difficult, gaining support for sustained US government assistance in the amounts and over the length of time required is likely to be a significant challenge. It is also one that could be quickly undermined by terror attacks emanating from the region.

Internal Factor: the role of Assad family

Osama Gharizi of the United States f Peace points to the “‘current strength and cohesion” of the Syrian opposition and argues that a “disjointed, weakened, and ineffectual opposition is likely to engender [an outcome] in which the Syrian regime is able to dictate the terms of peace” –a situation which would inevitably leave members of the family or close friends of the regime in positions of power. Unfortunately, many of the experts believe that while there may be fatigue-induced pauses in fighting, as long as the Assad family remains in power in any portion of Syria civil warfare would continue. Furthermore separating Syria into areas essentially along present lines of control would leave Assad loyalists and their Iranian and Russian patrons in control of Damascus and the cities along the Mediterranean coast with much of the Sunni population relegated to landlocked tribal areas to the east. Such a situation would further complicate the significant challenge of repatriating millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom lived in the coastal cities.

Acceding to Assad family leadership over all or even a portion of Syria is unlikely to offer a viable longer-term solution, unless two highly intractable issues could be resolved: 1) the initial grievances against the brutal minority regime had been successfully addressed; and 2) the Assad regimes’ (father and son) long history of responding to public protest by mass murder of its own people had somehow been erased. The key question is how to remove the specter of those associated with Assad or his family who would invariably be included in a negotiated transition government. Nader Hashemi of the University of Denver suggests that US leadership in the context of the war in Bosnia is a good model: “the United States effectively laid out a political strategy, mobilized the international community, used its military to sort of assure that the different parties were in compliance with the contact group plan … it presided over a war crimes tribunal …” In his view, prosecuting Assad for war crimes is an important step.

Internal Factor: What is done to repair social divisions and sectarianism in Syria

Nader Hashemi (University of Denver) and Murhaf Jouejati (Middle East Institute) observe that the open ethnic and sectarian conflict that we see in Syria today has emerged there only recently – the result of over five years of warfare, war crimes committed by the Alawite-led government, subsequent Sunni reprisals, the rise of ISIL and international meddling. As a result, there is now firmly-rooted sectarian mistrust and conflict in Syria where little had existed before. Other than pushing for inclusive political processes and rapid and equitable humanitarian relief, there is little that the US or Coalition partners will be able do about this in the short to mid-term. As Hashemi says, healing these rifts will be “an immense challenge; it will be a generational challenge; it will take several generations.” On the brighter side, he also allows that in his experience most Syrians “are still proud to be Syrians. They still want to see a cohesive and united country.” While separation into fully autonomous polities is untenable, reconfiguring internal administrative borders to allow for “localized representation” and semi-autonomy among different groups may be a way to manage social divisions peacefully.

Internal Factor: Demographics and a traumatized population

There is a youth bulge in the Syrian population. Add to this that there is a large segment of young, particularly Sunni Syrians who have grown up with traumatic stress, have missed years of schooling so are deficient in basic skills, have only known displacement and many of whom have lost one or both parents in the fighting. There is hardly a more ideal population for extremist recruiters. Murhaf Jouejati (Middle East Institute) calls this “a social recipe for disaster” that he believes in the near future will be manifest in increased crime and terrorist activity. As a consequence, it is important for the future of Syria and the region to assure that children receive education, sustained counseling and mental health services and permanent homes for families and children.

Contributing Authors

Sayigh, Y. (Carnegie Middle East Center), Jouejati, M. (National Defense University), Ma’oz, M. (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Hashemi, N (Center for Middle East
Studies, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver), Landis, J. (University of Oklahoma), Korsmo, M. (Lemay Doctrine Center, Air University),
Gharizi, O. (United States Institute of Peace)

‍

Demystifying Gray Zone Conflict: A Typology of Conflict Dyads and Instruments of Power in Libya, 2014‐Present.

Author | Editor: Gabriel, R. & Johns, M. (University of Maryland, START).

This case study is intended to highlight the dynamics of Gray Zone conflict in Libya since 2014. It places specific emphasis on the roles of non‐state actors within the conflict and how these actors utilize different levels of power to achieve their aims. With a focus on analyzing the dyadic relationships between various types of conflict actors, this research examines which types of dyads employ which instruments of power, as well as to what extent these activities fall within the Gray Zone of conflict as opposed to the more precisely delineated Black and White arenas. This research aims to assist practitioners and policy makers in determining how the types of actors involved in a conflict can influence which instruments of power deserve special consideration in that conflict. This investigation will also aid Special Operations Forces (SOF) in determining which types of belligerents may make effective partners depending on the type of adversary faced, and which instruments of power SOF should train and equip these partners to implement.

This research substantially bounds the scope of what needs to be considered by U.S. forces operating in these environments. Specifically, the analysis shows that aggregating by actor‐type is effective. Aggregating Libya’s myriad actors into four distinct groups, which include internationally recognized governing bodies, rival political factions (hereby referred to as “rival governments”), local religiously‐ affiliated violent non‐state actors (VSNAs) and transnational VSNAs (e.g. the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)), allows practitioners to identify the most relevant instruments of power at play given the actor‐types engaged in the conflict. Moreover, this analysis reduces the number of instruments of power that must be thoroughly considered in each conflict dyad from seven to an average of 4.5. Of these 4.5, an average of just 2 instruments of power are especially salient.

Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that Libya’s conflict is Gray. While Gray Zone dynamics also include White and Black activities, all four of the dyads involve Gray activities. This study finds that competition between the elected and/or internationally recognized governing bodies and rival governments primarily occur across the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial and legal instruments of power. The situation in Libya is such that competing political groups have all had periods of international recognition and legitimacy at certain times and not others. During periods where a government has international recognition and legitimacy, it tends to prioritize White Zone diplomatic engagement and legal activities. When rival political groups are not internationally recognized, they have employed Gray Zone diplomatic negotiations, information engagement and financial activity in addition to Black Zone military and economic action.

Religiously affiliated VSNAs (including ISIL and al‐Qaeda (AQ) affiliates) are also involved in the conflict. Notably, information engagement occurring within the Gray Zone is the most potent instrument of power used by such groups regardless of the adversary, followed by Black Zone military action. When competing against government aligned forces, these VSNAs have similarly engaged in Gray Zone financial activity. Local VSNAs have engaged in Gray Zone diplomatic negotiations with international actors. In its competition against government‐aligned forces, ISIL has employed Black Zone economic activities.

When evaluating responses to conflicts involving governments and rival governments, practitioners should devote significant attention to the use of diplomatic and legal instruments of power as they have proven to be especially consequential. When addressing dyads involving religiously‐affiliated VNSAs, practitioners should pay particular attention to the informational and military instruments of power, as these instruments of power influence the use of the other instruments.

While the approach adopted by this research entails myriad advantages, readers should be cautioned that Gray Zone conflicts are extremely complex. Practitioners ought to consider how an intervention against one type of conflict actor might affect other types of actors operating in the same space. This is necessary to avoid negative externalities, such as inadvertently strengthening other combatants. Moreover, commanders must realize that the successful use of certain tactics within one instrument of power (e.g. military), can have profound effects on the efficacy of their opponent’s use of other instruments (e.g. economic or informational). Finally this case provides numerous examples of government forces collaborating with various VSNAs. While Special Operations Forces are especially well positioned to do so, this requires extensive situational awareness at the micro‐level as the micro and macro conflict landscapes are mutually constitutive and are thus highly reactive to disturbances on all levels. Alliances are fleeting and the willingness to cooperate with Special Operations Forces varies both over space and time.

‍