SMA Publications

A Primer on the Neurocognitive Science of Aggression, Decision Making, and Deterrence.

Author | Editor: DiEuliis, D. (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University) & Giordano, J. (Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Georgetown University Medical Center).

Executive Summary

here are numerous national security challenges relative and relevant to the aggressive and/or violent intent and behavior of individuals, groups, and societies. In an ever more networked world, the ways that people think, emote, and behave are being increasingly affected by social, and informational factors; many made possible or fortified by the iterative use of various forms of technology. Despite demonstrably positive outcomes of such trends, there are also clear and present burdens, risks, threats and harms in the geo-political sphere that current and near-future social and technical developments can, and likely will incur.

A recent global risks study by an international forum of experts elucidated such geo-political and societal threats to national security, and emphasized interactive elements including social instability, individual and groups’ vulnerability to social volatility, radicalization, terrorism, and interstate conflict, as being strongly contributory1. Each and all of these factors can be conceptually and practically reduced to the decisions and actions made by individuals, and/or groups, whether acting alone or as state actors. Attempts to investigate contributory variables and possible causes of such threats to social stability and peace have entailed a variety of disciplines (e.g. – social and political sciences, anthropology, psychology, economics, etc.). Thus, resulting theories of correlation and causality reflect the diversity of these disciplines’ approach(es) and focus, to include resource scarcity, perceived unfairness, pride/nationalism, vengeance, anticipation of reprisal, preservation of cultural norms, and risk/threat and fear of harm, and/or death. Such studies have paved the way for various agencies within the United States government (USG) to consider the use of a variety of tools to address these issues in national security, intelligence and defense (NSID) operations to prevent violence, deter unwanted actors, and foster cooperation.

1. How have regional governments responded to Ma’soud Barzani’s announcement of a referendum on Iraqi Kurdish independence to be held in September? 2. How have different sub-state groups responded, to include different Kurdish factions in Iraq and across borders? 3. How are the Kurds using the independence referendum to leverage their interests?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. & Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Why now?

President Ma’soud Barzani has been promising a referendum on Kurdish independence since 2014, so we have to ask the question why now? The non-binding referendum, if approved, will not necessarily mean a declaration of independence (Atran, Rasheed, Wahab). Barzani has admitted that the purpose of the referendum was not to declare independence but to gauge the opinions and rights of the Kurds in Iraq (Anonymous 2). But there are several factors potentially driving Barzani’s decision to announce a referendum now.

1. Strengthen a long-term bid for greater autonomy (Atran, van den Toorn)
2. Create a better negotiating position in any settlement that follows the liberation of ISIS-controlled territory including oil-rich regions (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Atran, Hamasaeed, van den Toorn, Wahab)
3. Push to permit foreign/military aid to go directly to Erbil rather than through Baghdad (Atran)
4. Consolidate Barzani credibility as well as his political, military and economic hold over Erbil and large portions of the KRG (Anonymous 2, Atran). Barzani’s credibility will be particularly important to either secure his legacy as he steps down from the presidency at the end of his term this year or to provide a justification for a third unconstitutional term (van den Toorn)
5. Shore up domestic support for Barzani’s administration, which is facing a “legitimacy crisis” due to 1) the inability of the KRG to pay salaries on time or in full, 2) that Parliament has not met in nearly two years, and 3) that Barzani is in his second “unconstitutional” term (these all contribute to the “crisis of legitimacy,” not just salaries, though that is a big one (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Hamasaeed, van den Toorn)
6. To authenticate Barzani’s nationalist credentials particularly at a time when the PKK is gaining influence across the Kurdish territories transnationally and inside the Kurdistan Region (Anonymous 2)
7. In rejecting all of the above reasons, Amjed Rasheed—a Kurdish specialist at Durham University— stated (in a minority opinion) that Kurdish leadership “genuinely believes that it is a time of the Kurds to achieve their inspiration and dream to become an independent state.”

Expected Outcome for Kurds

The Movement for Change (Gorran) along with the Kurdistan Islamic Group (key oppositional Kurdish political parties) declined to participate in the committee organizing the referendum (Anonymous 1, Atran, Gulmohamad, Wahab). An expert who prefers to remain anonymous concluded, “What you see is that for perhaps the first time in Iraqi Kurdish modern history, the independence project – and thus, Kurdish nationalism itself – has been politicized” internally among Iraqi Kurds. Christine van den Toorn, director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, expects that the referendum will increase divisions within Kurdish political parties as well as between political elites and the people—essentially along the lines of those in favor vs. those against the referendum.

A second anonymous contributor argues that it has already led to targeted threats against those Kurds, mainly independent and opposition groups, who oppose the referendum without a functioning parliament in place. This group, mobilized under the No to a Referendum movement, includes over 100 journalists and writers thus far. Also, the deputy head of the KDP faction in the defunct Iraqi Kurdistan parliament announced on the KDP information website that a campaign against the referendum “will be punished by the court of people and history will never be merciful.” Erbil police also just official closed the Standard Institute office, which is a civil society organization, for “criticizing Peshmerga and the referendum.” Other journalists have received death threats for opposing the referendum.

Hamasaeed suggests that the referendum was essentially part of a long-term Kurdish shaping operation preparing the groundwork for a future Kurdish state. Kurds are particularly motivated to act now, while they still have leverage given their role in fighting ISIS, to push for independence in the event that Nouri Al- Maliki and a pro-Shia/anti-Kurdish government comes to power in the upcoming elections (Wahab). Therefore, success from a Kurdish perspective is a referendum that does not result in a firm public or international “no” (Hamasaeed).

However, the second anonymous contributor disagrees with the assertion that the Kurdish are motivated to act now. She notes that the referendum “is a tactic to divert domestic and international attention away from the Kurdistan Region’s deep-seated internal problems. It is part of the post-ISIS preparations being made among many groups to leverage Baghdad. Even within the KDP officials know that ‘now is not the time’ and that the region needs to build up its institutions first. This can be perceived as a desperate measure by Barzani as he faces challenges to his authority, namely by the PKK, which has gained influence in his region, and a rising Baghdad.”

Regional Responses

There is no official international support for the referendum at this time. Reactions range from mild opposition (not against greater Kurdish independence, but think the timing is not right) to strongly worded opposition. Kurdish leaders were reportedly not surprised by foreign governments’ negative reaction to the announced referendum (Gulmohamad, Rasheed, Wahab). The United Nations has also stated that it will have no role and does not support the referendum. Given this, the second anonymous contributor questioned who would be the independent actors to monitor the referendum vote?

Countries with Kurdish populations strongly opposed to Kurdish independence

As might be expected, countries with Kurdish populations—Turkey, Syria, and Iran—strongly oppose any movement towards Kurdish independence in Iraq (Anonymous 1, Atran). These countries include Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq (Atran).
Turkey called the referendum a “grave mistake” (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Atran, Gulmohamad, Hamasaeed, Wahab, Waziri). Scott Atran, a researcher who conducts field research in Iraqi Kurdistan, suggested that a concerted push for independence could trigger increased Turkish military action not only against the PKK in Iraq, including near the Iranian border, but also more sustain cross-border incursions and de facto holding of Kurdish Iraqi and Syrian (YPG) territory. However, Sarhang Hamasaeed, USIP’s Director of Middle East Programs, questioned whether there is a difference between the public statements of countries, like Turkey, and what they privately discuss with Kurdish leadership. Some speculate that the Kurds would not make an announcement like this if there were not tacit approval or expectation of tacit approval from Turkey (Hamasaeed, Rasheed, van den Toorn, Waziri).
Iran is strongly opposed to Kurdish independence in Iraq (Anonymous 2, Rasheed, Wahab, Waziri), but some say it has not been as vocal as Turkey because the government does not believe this referendum will actually lead towards independence (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, van den Toorn). In fact, the referendum—if interpreted as a sign of increasing internal Kurdish divisions—could increase Iranian influence over Kurdish parties in eastern Kurdistan (Anonymous 1). But Atran argues that the Iranians are taking the threat of Kurdish independence seriously with Qassim Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, demanding that the Kurdish flag be removed from Kirkuk. Hoshang Waziri states that an independent Kurdistan is a red line for Iran—that it will never accept a smaller, Shia-led Iraq.
The Iraqi government also opposes the ability of any one group deciding “the fate of Iraq, in isolation from other parties,” according to Iraqi government spokesman Saad al-Haddithi (Gulmohamad, Rasheed, Wahab). Abadi recognized the Kurds’ political aspirations for greater autonomy, but suggested the time is not ripe for these discussions. Hamasaeed reminded readers that Iraq is in an election season and political leaders stated opposition might be driven by efforts to look strong and patriotic. Moreover, other provinces, such as Basrah, oppose the Kurdish referendum and notions of independence because they would not permit the KRG to take resources and territories that they believe are an integral part of the Iraqi state. A key issue is the disputed territories and whether they will be included in this referendum.

Most other governments think the time is not right

Most other governments with interests in the region—UK, US, EU, Germany, and Russia—are either not supportive or not encouraging at this particularly point in time (Anonymous 1, Gulmohamad, Rasheed, van den Toorn, Wahab). They fear independence would be a distraction in the fight against ISIS (Anonymous 1, Gulmohamad). The US is concerned that a successful push for autonomy would weaken the Abadi government and embolden his pro-Iran rivals, which would undercut long-term US security relations with Iraq (Wahab). The US State Department and US Government does not support the referendum (Anonymous 2).

Regional Kurdish groups support the referendum

Despite evidence of divisions among Kurdish political parties for the referendum, regional Kurdish groups that have fought with the Peshmerga—including the PKK (Turkey), YPG (Syria), and the PAK (Iran) support the referendum (Atran, Rasheed). There are conditions of PUK support (which is fractured), which is that the Kurdish parliament is first reactivated and that all of the disputed territories are included (Anonymous 2).

Shia groups in Iraq strongly oppose the referendum

Shia groups, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), strongly oppose the referendum. Additionally, the State of Law bloc—a Shia-led coalition in parliament—rejected the referendum, which would lead to the division of the country.

Iraqi Sunni group have mixed response

Some Sunni tribes and militia would accept Kurdish independence if they, too, could have autonomy in Sunni areas (Atran). However, Sajida al-Afandi, an influential parliamentarian of the Sunni Union of National Forces stated, “Neither the domestic nor the foreign circumstances are currently ripe for Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq.” Sunni groups are particularly opposed to Kurdish territorial ambitions in disputed areas such as Kirkuk. However, some Sunni Arabs in disputed territories prefer the Kurds to the Shia militias for now (Rasheed, van den Toorn), but this support “is ephemeral and transient” until ISIS is defeated and Sunnis Arab have a new opening to renegotiate their position with the government in Baghdad. Kurds seek to capitalize on this. Other Sunni Arab groups reject Kurdish overreach and have joined Hashd or are waiting for the return of ISF, federal government forces and authority (van den Toorn). The Sunni Arabs have also been less vocal because many are living inside the Kurdistan Region at this moment and are dependent on Masud – at least for the time being (Anonymous 2).

Non-Kurdish minorities want to be left alone

Non-Kurdish minorities in disputed territories, particularly Ninewa, want their autonomy and to be left alone (van den Toorn). While KRG officials claim they have support from minorities, populations near Ninewah most likely would prefer a united province under a united Iraq. The referendum is likely to expose and exacerbate tensions between minority groups and the KRG. Minority groups are also divided (Anonymous 2). Some do support the KDP and Barzani while others lean toward Baghdad. These loyalties are also transactional and can change over time, depending upon who can provide services, security, and jobs.

What does this mean for the US?

A second expert, who prefers to remain anonymous due to frequent travel to the region, stresses that it is essential that the USG does not overreact to this move. She argues that the US has significant leverage over the Kurds and should not give in to the threats Barzani makes. It should not officially endorse or support the referendum, or any other unilateral measure taken by the KRG that seeks to bypass official state institutions. Much of this is for public consumption in the West, as well as to his local constituencies. She warns that “[b]y overly coddling and enabling Barzani, the US will dissuade any necessary negotiation that needs to take place between Baghdad and Erbil, as well as institution building that is sorely needed in the Kurdistan Region. The US should avoid stirring the ire and tensions among local groups seeking their own form of self protection and autonomy, let along the Iraqi government, by supporting the KRG’s extension of territories through a unilateral move (referendum). This is particularly important given the outcomes of the anti-ISIS campaign and the extensive territories that the Kurds have expanded their de-facto control. The U.S, should continue to emphasize its commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Iraqi state. It should enhance Iraqi state institutions and continue to channel any support to Iraqi sub-state actors through the Iraqi government. Any future resolution to Iraq’s territories and borders should be negotiated between the KRG and Baghdad.”

According to this second anonymous expert, many Kurds state that the only people really making an issue of this are non-Kurds. “Barzani can back away from the threat of pushing for independence because he has done so already, and can even use the failure to do so as a conspiracy by outsiders against Kurds. He can play the victim card as save face. Also there is no significant challenge to Barzani at this time – not from Arabs or other Iraqi Kurdish groups. The only real threat is from the PKK.”

Contributing Authors

Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Scott Atran (ARTIS), Weston Aviles (NSI), Zana Gulmohamad (Sheffield University), Sarhang Hamasaeed (United States Institute of Peace), Amjed Rasheed (Durham University), Christine van den Toorn (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani), Bilal Wahab (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Hoshang Waziri (Independent)

US-DiGIA: Overview and Methodology of US Discoverable Government Information Assets Directory.

Author | Editor: Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The United States Government possesses a vast store of information assets that can be leveraged to inform a variety of problem sets, and can be used by a wide range of governmental actors in the formation and execution of whole-of-government strategies. To enable this goal, however, these assets first must be made accessible in a single source that catalogues the information that is held.

What is US-DiGIA?

The US “Discoverable Government Information Assets” Directory (US-DiGIA for short) resource catalogues the discoverable information assets (practical information, data, analysis, and subject matter expertise) relevant to national security and foreign policy held by the USG in a simple, easy- to-use searchable directory.

The US-DiGIA Directory is focused on “discoverable” information assets—that is, those information assets that are both open source (unclassified) and made available and/or identified as information assets held by the organizations that the NSI team examined. By focusing on which information assets are “discoverable,” this mapping does not claim to represent the true distribution of information assets across the whole-of-government, but instead captures what can be observed and obtained through unclassified channels—and thus potentially accessed via an interagency process.

US-DiGIA compiles and categorizes the information assets of 236 offices across 221 combined US government departments, agencies, and corporations (referred to collectively as “USG organizations”). US-DiGIA catalogues 1,305 unique information topics culled from these combined sources, and accounts for 1,980 total information topics (as some offices work on overlapping issues).

To create the US-DiGIA Directory, the NSI team developed a methodological process (detailed below in the section entitled, “US-DiGIA Mapping Methodology Process”) for taking the unstructured data culled from USG organization websites examined and translating them into information assets. The NSI team created an extended record2 of data sources, including mission statements, links to documents and tools, related web pages, and contact information. On the foundation of this rich source of information, the NSI team in turn developed the US-DiGIA Directory.

Gray Zone Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities – Executive Summaries of Team Reports

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.).

Table of Contents

• SPECIFYING & SYSTEMATIZING HOW WE THINK ABOUT THE GRAY ZON
• RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN THE GRAY ZONE
• GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS IN CHINESE MEDIA
• EXAMINATIONS OF SAUDI-IRANIAN GRAY ZONE COMPETITION IN MENA, AND OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO THE UNITED STATES
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN COLOMBIA, 2002-PRESENT
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN LIBYA, 2014-PRESENT
• THE CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS BETWEEN GRAY AND BLACK: THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE STUDY
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS CASE STUDY
• DISCOURSE INDICATORS OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY: CRIMEAN ANNEXATION CASE STUDY
• VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE GRAY ZONE A VIRTUAL THINK TANK ANALYSIS (VITTA)
• THE CHARACTERIZATION AND CONDITIONS OF THE GRAY ZONE: A VIRTUAL THINK TANK ANALYSIS (VITTA)
• DEMYSTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT DYADS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN COLOMBIA, LIBYA AND UKRAINE
• US DISCOVERABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ASSETS DIRECTORY
• US-DIGIA: OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY OF US DISCOVERABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ASSETS DIRECTORY
• US-DIGIA: MAPPING THE USG DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION TERRAIN: SOURCES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION WITH A FOCUS ON GRAY ZONE IDENTIFICATION AND RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
• US-DIGIA: MAPPING THE USG DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION TERRAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• FROM CONTROL TO INFLUENCE: COGNITION IN THE GREY ZONE
• VIOLATING NORMAL: HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS TRANSGRESSIONS MAGNIFY GRAY ZONE CHALLENGES
• GRAY ZONE DETERRENCE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW (NOT) TO DO IT
• QUANTIFYING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: (DE-)ESCALATORY TRENDS IN GRAY ZONE CONFLICTS IN COLOMBIA, LIBYA AND UKRAINE
• MEDIA VISIONS OF THE GRAY ZONE: CONTRASTING GEOPOLITICAL NARRATIVES IN RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MEDIA
• INTEGRATION REPORT: GRAY ZONE CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Question (R4.8): Are there impediments to cooperation amongst GCC nations that reduce their effectiveness towards undesirable or adverse regional issues? If so, how could impediments be overcome?

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

At the time of the writing of this executive summary, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) has experienced a diplomatic crisis with three GCC member states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar (another GCC member state) and remaining GCC members (Kuwait and Oman) attempting to mediate. This event begs the discussion of factors and dynamics that obstruct or cripple cohesion among GCC nations and possible solutions to overcome such obstacles. A thorough understanding of the threats facing the GCC and more specifically, their limitations in responding to them, are crucial to attaining a vigorous and holistic comprehension of the Gulf region.

No SMA contributor contests that there are significant impediments to GCC cooperation. Furthermore, there are no significant disagreements among the authors; rather, each author emphasizes different points of contention and solution. Caban, Feierstein, Ulrichsen, and Sager all agree that the GCC is not a monolithic enterprise; instead, each nation is subject to varied and often competing interests (e.g., economic resources, international political capital, territory etc.). Serwer then further elaborates, “[GCC states] need to all hang together or they’ll all hang separately,” and all authors agree, or at least hint, that effective cooperation among GCC members would benefit each nation domestically and/or internationally. Disagreements and conflicts within the GCC go back decades, and Ulrichsen contends that the formation of the GCC as an institution was completed in such a poor and hasty manner that internal friction was inevitable from the start. The PiX Team provides an overview of the structure of the GCC and explains the purpose and functions of the GCC that span from a forum for joint infrastructure projects to a high level political assembly.

Iran, Foreign Policy, and Political Islam

Continuing the criticism of the design of the GCC, Ulrichsen points out that “the GCC has no explicit treaty- based foreign policy-making power as its founding charter called only for a coordination of foreign policy,” and the rest of the authors all agree that disagreements over foreign policy are a significant source of division within the GCC. Evidence of this division is exemplified by all authors agreeing that Iran is source of attenuation of unity among the GCC (e.g., through proxy conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, as well as encroaching on territory in the Gulf). Feierstein and Sager posit that GCC members cannot come to a unified response to Iranian antagonism for a variety of reasons, ranging from various economic interest in Qatar, to Shia extremism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Feierstein provides a useful model of a spectrum with Saudi Arabia on the extreme anti-Iranian side and Oman on the more Iranian friendly side, with the remaining GCC states in between. This spectrum is evident in the current Qatari diplomatic crisis where Feierstein has contended prior to the rift that Iran is exploiting an opportunity in friendlier Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar to sow discord within the GCC and “isolate the Saudis.”

Iran manifests roadblocks to GCC cooperation through the sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and most prominently, Yemen; however, these flashpoints of conflict can also be viewed through the mechanism of radical/political Islam, through which Iran manipulates them. In this context, the variance among GCC nations in geographical location, socio-economic factors, religious populations and others, present the cracks in GCC cooperation that Iran is able to exacerbate—all to the detriment of the GCC’s ability to produce and implement a coherent and unified foreign policy. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Yemen is a source of strife among GCC states where the Saudis and Emiratis both “opposed the rise of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood” in opposition to Qatar (Feierstein). And yet in Yemen, the UAE is far more opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood presence than Saudi Arabia (Ulrichsen). Political Islam is particularly concerning to GCC nations that must balance religious extremism with the legitimacy granted by religious institutions to the monarchies. Serwer and Caban recognize the divergence of domestic pressures of GCC nations that in turn deviate the interests of GCC nations from one another; different problems necessitate different solutions that make for weak and compromised policies on the international level.

Military Institutions and Security Structures

GCC nations face a diverse set of geopolitical and socio-economic challenges; foremost among them are concerns about security. Given the internal turmoil of sectarianism and external threat of Iran, coupled with the threat of terrorism that plagues GCC nations on all levels, the need for a cogent and reactive security force is paramount for Gulf regimes. Caban argues that GCC nations are “deficient of professional military forces [which] indicates an inability to perform joint operations; because [they] have limited and ad hoc professional military forces, they have insufficient capacity to work together effectively to thwart undesirable or adverse regional issues.” Caban goes on to describe that many GCC nations have a high ratio of migrant workers to “natural-born citizens vested in the sovereignty of the homeland,” which make recruitment difficult and outsourcing security forces necessary. Efforts by GCC nations to have their officers trained and educated outside the Gulf are being explored by the UAE, as well as hiring foreign military professionals, but there are adverse political and logistical consequences still unfolding as a result of these measures (Caban).

Feierstein agrees with Caban that an inability to perform joint operations is a monumental issue facing GCC nations, but instead emphasizes the root of the problem in the political structures of cooperation among member states. Feierstein notes that the disagreements of member states over the brevity of various threats can be explained through a political perspective. Feierstein argues, “GCC cooperation works best when the issues are apolitical and technocratic in nature, and can be framed in a way that benefits rather than challenges the power and authority of individual states,” and cites historical examples of such cooperation.

Solutions/Overcoming Challenges

Each author has proposed solutions to the challenges they each respectively highlighted in their contribution, again, with a high degree of concurrence. Sager asserts that a tenacious and unambiguous US policy in the region is critical to GCC success. Feierstein concurs with Sager’s point of the need for clear US policy in the region, but explicitly stresses Iranian issues as an area of focus. Feierstein also suggests that US must not try to force policy onto the GCC, but rather to cultivate it from within, so as to not feed the propaganda of Gulf regime submission to Western governments. Ulrichsen maintains that political and structural reform of the GCC would be helpful, and the GCC as an organization should focus on ameliorating “administrative mechanisms and less on big-ticket items that are perceived to impinge on sovereignty.” In regards to the problems facing GCC security forces that Caban describes in detail, “Developing a program for military officers at the war colleges and a series of annual military exercises would bring together GCC- only armed forces to promote greater familiarity and the development of common doctrine” (Feierstein).

Contributing Authors

William Cabán (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps University), Gerald Feierstein (Middle East Institute), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Abdulaziz Sager (Gulf Research Institute), Daniel Serwer (Middle East Institute), Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (Rice University)

Question (R4.11): What are the implications for the U.S. and GCC countries if the Arab coalition does not succeed or achieve an acceptable outcome in Yemen?

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Conflict in Yemen is now reaching the third year of its current incarnation, and despite the foreign intervention of GCC nations and several failed ceasefire attempts, the Houthi movement (Ansarullah) has continued to succeed on the battlefield. Several SMA contributors (e.g., Anonymous, Ulrichsen, & Cragin) suggest that the GCC campaign is unlikely to produce a desirable and timely military victory in Yemen. Ulrichsen and Cragin argue that rising domestic socio-economic costs of the Arab coalition campaign are outpacing a realistic timeline of a satisfactory outcome; moreover, Ulrichsen asserts that the Houthis have sufficient Iranian support and that the coalition is unable to combat “a foe that has nearly 40 years’ experience of running proxy groups throughout the Middle East.” Only one author (Styszynski) contends that an impending coalition offensive on the strategic West Coast ports of Yemen will be successful and force Houthi forces to engage in a peaceful, diplomatic end to the conflict.

Nazer notes that while the parties to the conflict generally understand what measures are necessary to end the conflict, they lack the political will to make necessary and difficult compromises. Because Saudi Arabia views a Houthi victory as an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, major concessions are unacceptable to GCC actors. Experts expect this to remain the case for the foreseeable future (Nazer, Ulrichsen, Feierstein and Ibish). However, this raises the importance of exploring realities where the Arab coalition fails to achieve the pre-2014 status-quo of a marginally stable, GCC-friendly Yemeni regime and has to grapple with some form of Houthi victory in Yemen.

Even defining what the success of the Arab coalition in Yemen looks like is not immediately clear among contributors. In large part this is due to the lack of a unified goal or vision of success among the Arab coalition. Feierstein, Ulrichsen, and Ibish all agree that a significant amount of disagreement and discord exists among coalition partners (particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as how to engage and end the Yemeni conflict; furthermore, all three contributors agree that losing the conflict exposes and exacerbates divides among the GCC. Disputes over strategy like engaging the Muslim Brotherhood as allies (Ulrichsen and Ibish) and friction over levels of coalition contributions among member states highlight the cracks in GCC unity. Considering Cragin’s timeline of the Hadi government being unable to regain “full control within the next 3-5 years,” a weakening of GCC cohesion is one of several far-reaching repercussions that extend beyond the borders of Yemen. It is worth noting that among the various implications of the Arab coalition failing to achieve a strategic victory in Yemen, there is remarkably little disagreement among the authors; rather each contributor emphasizes or discusses different consequences.

End State Discussion

Research conducted by the PiX team foresees “no end in sight” for the Yemen conflict. However, three contributors (Anonymous, Ibish, and Styszynski) discuss the possibility of a resolution where Houthis and other factions negotiate a settlement of partition to end the conflict. Ibish contends that the Arab coalition is entertaining the notion of conceding a degree of autonomy to the Houthi rebels in the north, whereas Anonymous puts forth an end of three territories with a southern governate supported by GCC countries and neutral middle governates buffering Houthi control to the north. All three authors agree that this scenario will likely set the stage for future conflict. The historical background provided by Liebl provides the cyclical evidence for such phenomenon.

One other outcome discussed by the contributors (Ibish, Liebl and Nazer) is the transition of the Houthi movement to a Hezbollah-like organization. Nazer states that a Hezbollah-styled insurgency would be considered an unacceptable outcome for Saudi Arabia; but again, as the conflict deepens and the GCC weakens, these difficult outcomes may have to be entertained by Gulf States.

US, Iran, and GCC relationships

The most commonly discussed implications in this corpus are the adverse strain among the various relationships of actors involved in Yemen, both internal and external. Many contributors argue that the Houthi uprising and subsequent Saudi involvement has become a severe liability to the domestic legitimacy of the House of Saud (Ulrichsen, Feierstein, Ibish, and Nazer) and that continued conflict and/or defeat will significantly contribute to the unraveling of the Saudi regime. Financial expenditures coupled with the unpopularity of losing to the less funded Houthi movement reveal the lack of experience and ability of the KSA to engage in a proxy conflict.

Iran is largely perceived as being the aggravating force behind the conflict, although Liebl contends that the Iranian-Houthi relationship is little more than passive and “serendipitous” cooperation. Liebl also argues that the Houthis are not Iranian puppets but Zaydi revivalist/nativists-Yemeni nationalists. Whatever the relationship between Iran and Ansarullah, several authors argue that Iran is risking relatively little for its involvement in Yemen and even more contributors agree that Iran will gain much from an Arab coalition defeat (Ulrichsen, Liebl, Sager). Heightened tensions with Iran is a sentiment that is robustly agreed upon by every author who discusses Iran and a Houthi victory of any kind will only embolden Iranian aggression across the region (Ulrichsen, Feierstein, Ibish and Sager). Iran views Yemen as a highly valuable bargaining chip that it can afford to lose and understands that Saudi Arabia is in no position to retaliate in a meaningful way.

A deterioration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran is one of many reasons why the American interests are threatened by the Yemeni conflict. Ulrichsen, Feierstein, Ibish, Sager, Serwer and Nazer all posit that the US is significantly affected by developments in Yemen but for different reasons. Feierstein and Nazer both emphasize that the U.S. will suffer strategic setbacks with a Houthi/Iranian victory and that a lack of robust U.S. support will severely strain the US-GCC relationship. Both authors also agree that a failure on the part of the U.S. to display overt support in the conflict will lead the GCC nations and Saudi Arabia in particular to seek support elsewhere out of necessity. Another key component at play in the discussion of US interests at risk in Yemen are the counterterrorism operations that will suffer a serious setback if the GCC relationship is called into question. This risk is further heightened by the possibility of Iranian proxies operating without impunity in the Arabian Peninsula.

ISIS, AQAP, and Counterterrorism

Serwer suggests that the US’s main interests in Yemen are counterterrorism and securing passage of trade in the surrounding Yemeni waters. Cragin also emphasizes the negative consequences of the Yemen conflict on American CT efforts and that ISIS and AQAP have and will continue to benefit the most from conflict in Yemen. Ibish also frames a narrative of outcomes that will further fuel extremism and terrorism, namely through inflaming sectarian tensions, continued humanitarian disasters and famine, and lastly a vindication of anti-Western propaganda and disdain. These consequences allow and ISIS and AQAP to further advance their agenda despite their divergent methods and goals in Yemen. Cragin articulates that ISIS and AQAP both ultimately seek to supplant the Yemeni crisis with their sponsorship of revolution and both highly value the strategic nature of basing operations in Yemen. The combined saliency of Yemen and the inherent chaos have provided both terror groups with the ideal platform to extend operations externally from Yemen.

Contributing Authors

Kim Cragin (NDU), Gerald Feierstein (Middle East Institute), Hussein Ibish (Arab Gulf States Initiative), Vern Liebl (CAOCL, Marine Corps University), Shoqi A. Maktary (Search for Common Ground), Fahad Nazer (National Council on US Arab Relations), Abdulaziz Sager (Gulf Research Institute), Daniel Serwer (Middle East Institute), Martin Styszynski (Adam Mickiewicz University), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (Rice University)

Examinations of Saudi-Iranian Gray Zone Competition in MENA, and of Potential Outcomes of the Flow of Foreign Fighters to the United States.

Author | Editor: Capps, R., Ellis, D. & Wilkenfeld, J. (ICONS).

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Executive Summary

The United States is regularly challenged by the actions of states and non-state actors in the nebulous, confusing, and ambiguous environment known as the Gray Zone. Planners, decision makers, and operators within the national security enterprise need to understand what tools are available for their use in the Gray Zone and how to best develop, employ, and coordinate those tools. This report summarizes the results of simulations created and executed by the ICONS Project as part of a larger study to capture at least some of the information needed toward that end.

On October 24, 26, and 28, 2016, under the guidance of the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Multi- Layer Assessment and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of University Programs, staff of the ICONS Project at the University of Maryland executed three simulations. Two of these examined competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gray Zone, both direct and through proxies. The third examined the threat to the homeland of a collapse of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Participants in the simulations were drawn from various U.S. government agencies and from universities, research centers, think tanks, foreign governments and militaries. Within each of the three simulations participants were given start states and asked to react to events introduced into the scenario. Broadly, the start states placed the participants in mid-2017, about six months into a new U.S. administration. They were told the USG had placed a priority on understanding and shaping the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia (in two of the simulations) or in understanding and protecting the homeland against any threat evolving from the competition between Islamic State and Al Qaida (in the third). Play in each of the simulations took place virtually with participants joining via ICONSnet from around the world. Each of the three simulations ran for four hours.

There were five principal take-aways from these simulations:

• It may not be possible for the U.S. to influence or shape Gray Zone activities by other states, especially when those actions are not directed toward the United States. When two states or a mix of state and non-state actors want to engage in the Gray Zone, there may be little the U.S. can do to stop them. Sometimes the only possible action is no action other than planning for likely results.
• Violent extremist organizations may act in the Gray Zone in an attempt to drag state actors out of the Gray Zone. State actors need to have appropriate strategies developed and responses queued for rapid delivery.
• The U.S. is not the sole major power assessing threats and opportunities in Gray Zone conflicts and competitions. It is possible that actions by other major powers could draw the U.S. further into conflicts or drive parties to violence.
• To operate effectively in the Gray Zone, U.S. policy designers and operators need access to every available tool; a whole-of-government approach is crucial to success. In fact, we should begin to think in terms of a whole-of-government-plus structure where government reaches out to non- government regional and technical specialists, subject matter experts, and other “different thinkers” to formulate courses of action.
• Controllers noted a clear bias among the U.S. government participants toward Saudi Arabia and against Iran, and a willingness to move rapidly to kinetic or other military action by some of the military players. Such an overt bias may adversely affect the ability of the U.S. to take advantage of opportunities for influence in Gray Zone conflicts.

Participants in the Iran-Saudi Arabia simulations stated in after action reviews their belief that the U.S. must recruit, train, and deploy the right people with the right skills, including a mix of government and non-government thinkers. There was also a note that the USG lacked a cabinet level information agency dedicated to developing and disseminating the U.S. narrative and to countering enemy narratives.

In their after-action reviews, participants in the foreign fighter scenario focused on the difficulties of developing and maintaining a common operating picture across federal, state, and local entities; on the importance of understanding the roles, capabilities, and authorities of each entity; on the importance of accurate and timely intelligence, and how to share information to best effect across agencies where security clearance levels vary.

Question (V2): What are the key factors that would impact the wave of violent extremism and ideological radicalism that affect the Sunni community?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

The Sunni community is not homogenous, and contributors expressed their discomfort making broad generalizations for a number of reasons. Most Sunni Arabs still consider themselves first a citizen of their respective countries with the exception of populations in the midst of conflict like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (anonymous). Local customs and histories result in a different experience for Sunnis in, for example, France versus Chechnya (Olidort). Furthermore, there is no single Sunni leader (like the Pope or the Ayatollah or even a senior theologian) with religious legitimacy to assert leadership over the Sunni community (Shaikh).

However, experts attempted to broadly categorize risk factors—especially as they pertain to Sunnis inside and outside Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA). Unfortunately, the factors most likely to impact waves of violent extremism and ideological radicalization are already well known to the DoD community.

Conditions that Are Conducive to Radicalism and Extremism

Failure of the Social Contract

While particularly true in Iraq and Syria, it is nonetheless applicable across the all societies that when a government breaks its social contract with its people—through exclusion from government, disenfranchisement, failure to provide equitable essential services, justice, or security—unrest often follows (Abbas, Everington, anonymous; Sheikh). ISIL and other extremist groups thrive in these conditions as people who are left with little-to-no legal recourse choose violence. Filling these voids or assisting governments to address these legitimate grievances may reduce underlying root causes of extremism (Olidort).

Failure to Defeat ISIL

Hammad Sheikh, visiting scholar at the Centre on the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts at Oxford University, stated “only when ISIL is defeated in the field unambiguously will the allure of Jihadi ideology be affected.” Establishing a territorial caliphate is at the heart of ISIL’s legitimacy, so striking at that erodes the appeal and credibility of ISIL. This must be done largely by Sunni Arab forces. Atrocities by any other group will incite tribalism and feed into the narrative of jihadi groups, increasing radicalization of the wider Sunni Arab population (Sheikh).

Lack of Resolution in Syria

Atrocities committed against Sunnis in Syria struck a flint to simmering unrest in the region, allowing for the rapid rise of ISIL. The lack of resolution in Syria remains an open wound that continues to attract foreign fighters from across the globe (Olidort). “A complete resolution designed and carried out with the participation of local moderate actors would have the effect of downgrading the allure of foreign fighters and others to migrate to Syria,” Jacob Olidort, an expert on Islamist groups at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggested. However, as we have already begun to see, the territorial defeat of ISIL will likely force the organization to change its tactics, encouraging sympathizers overseas to conduct lone wolfs against the far enemy.

Lack of Unified Sunni Political Voice

To combat extremism in CJOA, the USG could facilitate a Sunni Empowerment Campaign (Carreau). This kind of strategy would “create the strongest and most effective antidote to ISIL’s magnetism (including for local recruits and foreign fighters) and worldwide expansion (including lone wolf attacks in the west) because it will finally provide an outlet for Sunni grievances and a viable alternative to violent jihadism as protection against various forms of Shi’a oppression,” according to Bernard Carreau, Deputy Director of the Center for Complex Operations at NDU. This strategy would help build Sunni political voice in Iraq and Syria to help answer the question of who/what should file the void caused by the defeat of ISIL (Carreau).

Perception of Expanded Shia Influence in Sunni Areas

There is widespread belief that the USG is in alignment with Iran to expand Shia influence from Tehran to Damascus. There is certainly mistrust in the ability of the world community to use diplomacy to reach a resolution (Shaikh). While this does not fuel radicalization directly, it influences the decision calculus of Sunnis to build what they see as pragmatic alliances with Sunni jihadi groups who they believe to—at the very least—have Sunnis’ best interests and welfare in mind (Olidort).

This is good news for the Coalition as Sunnis in CJOA may be convinced to turn against ISIL and other extremist groups by appealing to the other “hats” local Sunni leaders wear, such as tribal responsibilities, members of political or commercial elite, the old guard, and other kinds of networks (Olidort, Shaikh). This opens the door to other means of engagement and trust building aside from traditional counter-messaging. In fact, resolutions to challenges facing the Sunni community must remain locally generated to have any real, lasting impact (Shaikh)

Personal Motivations

Finally, Sunnis—particularly outside CJOA—turn towards ISIL and other extremist groups for a number of personal reasons (Everington). Theses range from lack of employment opportunities to discrimination to search for personal meaning (Olidort, Everington, Shaikh). These motivations vary widely from person to person even within the same geographic community and are difficult to address.

Contributors

Hassan Abbas (NDU), Bernard Carreau (NDU), Alexis Everington (MSI), Vern Liebl (USMC CAOCL), Jacob Olidort (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool), Hammad Sheik (ARTIS)

Violating Normal: How International Norms Transgressions Magnify Gray Zone Challenges.

Author | Editor: Stevenson, J., Bragg, B., & Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc.)

Overview

The current international system presents multiple potential challenges to US interests. In recent years, state actors, especially but not limited to Russia and China, have taken actions that disrupt regional stability and potentially threaten US interests (Bragg, 2016). Many of these challenges are neither “traditional” military actions nor “normal” competition, but rather fall into a class of actions we have come to call “gray” (Votel, 2015). Here we define the concept as: “the purposeful use of single or multiple instruments of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of [proportional response and] large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten the interests of other actors by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.” (Popp and Canna, 2016).

Many analyses have focused on the material effects of gray zone actions and gray strategies, such as changes to international borders, or threats to domestic political stability, however few have emphasized the role that international norms play in gray actions and gray strategies, and potential response to them. This paper beings to fill that gap by exploring the normative dimensions of gray zone challenges.

The role of norms in international relations

At the broadest level, norms are rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community of nations. In many cases norms go unnoticed until they are violated (Goffman, 1963). International norms represent collective expectations about how other states will act and thus can have significant influence on the behavior of individual actors in the international system. In particular, they can help actors overcome some of the barriers to interstate cooperation. Norms provide solutions to coordination problems (Martin, 1992; Stein, 2004), reduce transaction costs (Ikenberry, 1998; Keohane, 2005), and provide a “language and grammar” for international politics (Kratochwil, 1999; Onuf, 2013). In some cases, such as norms regarding use of chemical weapons or the use of force to change territorial boundaries, norms have been institutionalized and become part of international law. In other cases, such as human rights, international norms reflect widely shared, but not necessarily universal, beliefs.

Among actors in the international system norms provide guidance regarding which behaviors, although not strictly forbidden or illegal are considered unacceptable and liable to censure. Regular compliance with international norms signals that we are dealing with an actor who shares our perspective on how states “should” behave (Shannon, 2000). An actor abiding by relevant norms signals the value it places on those shared standards of behavior, and its intention to play by the established “rules of the game.” Doing so many also increase the willingness of others to engage in political, economic, or security cooperation.

In essence, a pattern of adherence to norms can build trust between actors in an otherwise uncertain system. Trust is “a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it” (Kydd, 2005). Trust is important component of understanding the effects of norms violations because that another actor will comply with international norms significantly reduces the kinds of uncertainty that gray zone challenges nurture. As trust deepens, reliance on norms, rather than explicitly stated and formalized rules to regulate behavior, particularly competitive behavior can increase (Bearce & Bondanella, 2007; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Glanville, 2016; Katzenstein, 1996; Klotz, 1995). While international norms are generally understood by states in the global system, we cannot assume that those rules and supporting norms necessarily reflect the domestic values and interests of all states.

Question (R4.3): To what extent is the Iraqi Army apolitical? Do they have a political agenda or another desired end- state within Iraq? Could the Iraqi military be an effective catalyst for reconciliation between different groups in Iraqi society? Could conscription be an accelerant for reconciliation and if so how could it be implemented?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

The subject of this report touches on a critical issue for the future of Iraq as a unified and stable state: To what degree will the Iraqi Armed Forces be able to serve as the vanguard for resurrection of national identity and tolerance? If the answer is not at all, Iraq as a single independent state is likely doomed.

To address the question posed, many of the expert contributors to this Reach-back report begin with an important observation: the Iraqi Army, like other public institutions around the world, is not a unitary actor with a single political orientation, agenda, or desired end- state. Like other militaries, it mirrors the social conditions and pressures of the population from which it comes. For the Iraqi Army, this means the ethno-sectarian divisions, pervasive corruption, and well-ensconced patronage and power networks that work around and despite military rank or process.

How did the Iraqi Armed Forces get to this point?

A number of the contributors point to the turbulent history of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) as the foundation of its current condition. Hala Abdulla of the Marine Corps University dates the beginning of the deterioration of its professionalism and strength to the Saddam Hussein era, when Saddam assassinated senior leaders that he perceived as threats to his control. Over time, this practice meant that the cohort of professional leaders who might have enjoyed broad popular and military regard had been decimated. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces continued the weakening of the Army as an institution. Importantly, that invasion also had the critical effect of drastically changing the sectarian make-up of the Army leadership from Sunni to Shi’a- dominated; a process that was accelerated under the leadership of Nouri al Malaki. Abdulla argues that the post-2003 Army was weaker than the pre-2003 Army reflecting the fragmentation of society, along with rampant corruption and nepotism.

Does the Army have a political agenda? Not exactly.

The contributors to this report each argue that the Iraqi Army is far from apolitical, but importantly, that this fact is the result of the Army’s demographics rather than its partisanship. Dr. Elie Abouaoun of the US Institute of Peace cautions that we take care in thinking of the Army as a “monolith” with a single set of political views. It is because the force is overwhelmingly Shi’a that it naturally reflects the political and social concerns of the Shi’a-led government and communities.

The experts also agree that the Army does not have its own political agenda or cohesive image of the future of the Army or Iraq. Rather than any political orientation in fact, Middle East scholar Shalini Venturelli’s (American University) research identifies the strongest guiding principle in the Army as preservation of individual and group power and influence. This is done in the Army via the same types of social and familial patronage and influence networks found in the rest of the country. It is this urge and the dynamics of competing hidden power networks within the Army that has stymied its re-professionalization and accounts for the corruption and nepotism with which it is plagued.

Could the Army or Special Forces serve as a force for national reconciliation? No way, unless …

There is wide agreement among the authors regarding the prospect that the Iraqi Army could be a catalyst for national reconciliation: they are dubious at best. Wayne White of the Middle East Institute points out that, in its current guise, the “largely Shi’a force sometimes [has been] in league with abusive militias” and, though the Iraqi Army that fought Iran was more than half Shi’a, the years of ethno-sectarian conflict have embittered many in the Army against Sunni, Turkoman, Kurdish, and other groups. Elie Abouaoun (USIP) explains that “solidarity” among some military units might develop, but “the institutional bonding is not strong enough to overcome the vertical divisions along ethnic and sectarian lines.”

The two areas where the experts disagree are: 1) whether the Army’s successful performance in Mosul has rehabilitated its reputation among minority populations; and relatedly, 2) the degree to which the US-trained Iraqi Special Forces (Golden Divisions) that make up a large part of the Mosul force might serve as a model for professionalizing the larger force and catalyzing national regard for the military. Bilal Wahab (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) and Muhanad Seloom (ICSS, UK) believe that the “highly professionalized” Special Forces have “boosted a sense of nationalism” in Iraq and have significantly improved popular perception of forces that not too long ago were seen not as Golden, but as the “Dirty Division.” Yerevan Saeed (Arab Gulf States Institute) and Macin Styszynski (Mickiewicz University, Poland) observe little change in Sunni or Kurdish views of the Iraqi Army, primarily they argue, because these populations observe little change in the Army—which looks very much like the organization until very recently responsible for “widespread abuse, violence and human rights abuses.” Shalini Venturelli (American University) believes that even if there was improved popular regard for the Special Forces, the exceptionalism of the Golden Division is overstated, and that withdrawal of US trainers and support elements would rapidly show these units to be bound by the same corruption and competing power networks as the larger force.

Although highly skeptical of these occurring any time soon, the experts do offer conditions under which the Iraqi Army might eventually serve as an engine of national reconciliation. The most critical of these is (re)gaining popular trust in both the Government of Iraq and the military that serves it. The only way to overcome popular perception of the Army’s Shi’a favoritism is through sincere political reform in which “Sunnis have a major strategic stake” and are convinced of the government’s “enduring commitment to their security regardless of which party(ies) hold the reins of power” (Shalini Venturelli, American U.) Even if there were to be a professionalized, unified Iraqi Army some time in the future, Zana Gulmohamad of Sheffield University forecasts that “the reconciliation will be partial, and not include the entire country,” but instead be limited to Iraqi Arabs (Shi’a and Sunni). The Kurds, he argues, have their own security forces that they will always trust more than the Iraqi Army.

Is conscription a good idea? Not likely.

None of the expert contributors to this report sees conscription into the Iraqi military as a viable path to reconciliation. In fact, some suggest under current conditions military conscription could very easily deepen rather than reduce the ethno-sectarian tensions that wrack the country. While he allows that, “enrolling in the army—including conscription—might ease up inter-personal relations somehow,” Elie Abouaoun contends that the effect does not scale because Sunni “collective fears” of the Army remain. He points to Lebanon’s experience with using compulsory military conscription to encourage national identity among its warring sectarian groups. The failure to enact political reforms, he says, was a major cause of the lackluster results: “failing to embrace an inclusive governance model undermined the possible—though highly unlikely— impact of such efforts. Iraq is not different, especially with the presence of tens of thousands of fighters now enrolled in militias.”3 Again, the military reflects the nation.

The point is this: prior political reform and social integration are not just important facilitators for development and professionalization of the Army and thus its value as a platform for national identity and reconciliation—they are required pre-conditions. Neither the current Government of Iraq nor the Army is likely to succeed in stabilizing the country until Sunni Arabs and other minority populations are integrated into the state’s political, security and social institutions. As Wayne White of the Middle East Institute cautions, if this is ignored, Sunni resistance will persist. Finally, Shalini Venturelli reminds us that, even if these reforms have been made, restoring the trust of Sunnis, Kurds, and other minority groups in the national Army is a decades-long process.

Contributing Authors

Hala Abdulla (Marine Corps University); Dr. Elie Abouaoun (US Institute of Peace); Dr. Scott Atran (ARTIS Research); Zana Gulmohamad (University of Sheffield, UK); Yerevan Saeed (Arab Gulf States Institute); Dr. Muhanad Seloom (Iraqi Centre for Strategic Studies, ICSS, UK); Dr. Marcin Styszynski (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland); Dr. Shalini Venturelli (American University); Dr. Bilal Wahab (Washington Institute for Near East Policy); Wayne White (Middle East Institute)