SMA Publications

Special Operations Forces Operating Concept – A Whitepaper to Guide Future Special Operations Force Development 1.0.

Author | Editor: U.S. Special Operations Command.

Agility and flexibility are the foundational strengths that allow Special Operations Forces (SOF) to rapidly seize opportunities and adapt to unforeseen requirements and operational challenges. Facing a complex and uncertain future, the Nation expects SOF to apply these strengths to more fully integrate with partners and better identify and develop strategic opportunities to advance and protect US interests.

In an increasingly interconnected world, a broadening array of state and non-state actors employing irregular and hybrid approaches challenge US interests. Identifying activities and intentions of these malign actors within disordered societies and disenfranchised populations is challenging, but not impossible. To achieve this, persistent operations and deep understanding of the human domain will be necessary to identify and influence relevant actors to produce outcomes acceptable to the US.

The risk of not acting, or acting late, can dramatically alter the world landscape, eroding the Nation’s security, influence, and standing while allowing nefarious actors to inflict horrific human catastrophe as demonstrated by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Limited and reactionary responses are the result of insufficient awareness and understanding of emerging indicators of instability.

SOF will always provide critical capabilities to resolve crises and support major operations. However, SOF’s value to the Nation lies in our global perspective, coupled with the ability to act early with partners to provide a range of options for policy makers. Operating ahead of crisis allows SOF and partners to develop long-term and cost-effective options to prevent or mitigate conflict, providing decision space and strategic options to achieve outcomes favorable to the US.

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Unpacking the Regional Conflict System surrounding Iraq and Syria—Part II: Method for Assessing the Dynamics of the Conflict System, or, There are no sides—only interests.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

This is Part II of a larger study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part I described the system and why it is critical to assess US security interests and activities holistically rather than just in terms of the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the US is most interested. Part II described the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actors for five conflicts. It uses the Syrian Civil War as a use case.

In this region in particular, the absence of warfare does not translate either to stability or to peace. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey suggested in testimony to Congress1, the key question is not how to manage or avoid warfare in the Middle East, but which are the general conditions for peace and stability and what might the US and international community do – or avoid doing – in order to promote those.

What are the dynamics embedded in the region’s current conflicts that will drive it toward one future or another? The outcomes of conflicts are not the result of a single actor’s actions or desires, but are a product of the interactions of opponents; the forces that determine one or another regional future reflect the confluences of actors’ interests, capabilities and resolve. Thus, one way to assess the dynamics that propel the system is to consider three factors that condition the behaviors of state, sub-state and non-state actors:

• Interests — the various security, political, social, economic, and influence interests that an actor perceives to be at stake;
• Capability — the ability to directly influence or cause an outcome to occur; and
• Resolve — the intent or willingness to do so.

The alignment of interests between actors will determine the set of potential outcomes for any particular regional or sub-regional event. However, common interests or alignments between actors may vary across events or conflicts; we cannot assume that a preference for the same outcome in one event will result in shared interests among the same actors in other events. While the alignment of actor interests determines possible outcomes, the distribution of actor resources and resolve across those outcomes governs the likelihood that an outcome will emerge. In other words, the dynamics that determine one or another future reflect the confluences of actors’ interests, resources and resolve.

How stable that outcome is likely to be, however, will be determined not so much by the resources of those who support it, but the resources of those who oppose it. By considering the actors whose interests are blocked or destroyed by a particular outcome, we can also gain insight into the potential durability of a particular outcome. In short, the outcome of a conflict is a function of the interests and preferences of the actors with the greatest resources and resolve relative to that conflict. The durability of that outcome on the other hand, is determined by the resources and resolve of those whose interests remain unfulfilled by the outcome. In shorthand the analytic model is this: Interest + Resolve + Capability = Expectations for the Region.

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Risk and Ambiguity in the Gray Zone.

Author | Editor: Wright, N. (University of Birmingham & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

Risk and ambiguity are central to activities in the Gray Zone. Policymakers can manipulate risk, and use it as a tool for deterrence or escalation management. They can also manipulate ambiguity. In the Gray Zone understanding risk and ambiguity is key to achieve intended and avoid unintended effects.

(I) What are risk and ambiguity? Defining risk and ambiguity are highly contentious because there are multiple overlapping definitions across different disciplines. This is a classic case of different languages in different disciplines (and in normal language) that can’t be resolved here. However, the basic concepts are not that complicated or confusing.

Here we use a common perspective in economics, psychology and neuroscience. This makes “a distinction between prospects that involve risk and those that involve ambiguity. Risk refers to a situation in which all of the probabilities are known. Ambiguity refers to a situation in which some of the probabilities are unknown”

This maps on to Sec. Def. Rumsfeld’s famous distinction: “Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”

(II) Ambiguity in international confrontations: Ambiguity in events and actions gives an extra layer of uncertainty, so they are open to multiple interpretations before we even consider their risk. Cases include: (1) Ambiguity is a key tool in diplomacy. E.g. the 2001 Sino-US crisis where an EP-3 reconnaissance plane force-landed on Hainan Island was resolved by a letter that could be interpreted one way by the Chinese for their public, another by the US for their public. (2) The use of “Little green men” makes an offensive action more ambiguous and so more easily deniable – e.g. at least for observing populations in key allies even if not for US security analysts. (3) How far is a specific action of a local proxy directed by the adversary? (3) Ambiguous thresholds for deterrent threats enable less loss of face if they are crossed, e.g. compared to hard “red lines”. (4) Concessions are critical to managing escalation, and essential when dealing with a nuclear-armed adversary. Ambiguity means they can be offered deniably, e.g. Nixon and Mao. Indeed, clarity too early can prevent later compromise. (5) Economic actions by possible proxies carry ambiguity, e.g. Chinese companies investments on key Pacific Islands. Robert Jervis (1970) includes an excellent chapter on ambiguity, particularly in diplomacy.

(III) Risk in international confrontations: Risk arises when potential outcomes are uncertain, and this pervades all human decision-making. (1) Consider US, UK and German troops currently deploying to NATO’s east, such as the Baltic Republics. Their placement is unambiguous, and provides a tripwire so that there is the risk of escalation if there were serious aggression. This is a classic use of the risk of escalation, as described by Thomas Schelling who devotes a chapter to the “Manipulation of Risk “in his seminal Arms and Influence (1966). Schelling describes how the risk is that escalation can develop its own momentum and this must be managed, e.g. as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. (2) Schelling also argues that “limited war, as a deterrent to continued aggression or as a compellent means of intimidation, often seems to require interpretation … as an action that enhances the risk of a greater war.” – and in the same way, the purpose of entering the gray zone at all can be to manipulate risk. (3) A key distinction from ambiguity is that probabilities are better understood with risk, and thus good baseline data can help turn events from ambiguous to risky.

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Options to Facilitate Socio-Political Stability in Syria and Iraq.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc) & Cabayan, H. (Joint Staff).

This White Paper presents the analytic results from Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) project touching on the Middle East and North Africa. The objective is to suggest options to manage conflict in the region and to facilitate socio-political stability in Iraq and Syria. Options that are discussed are intentionally “out-of-the-box”, non-kinetic, and focused on potential Coalition efforts to:

1. Diminish the allure of the ideology that Da’esh presents to radicalized and potentially radicalized and other youth in the region; and
2. Shape the context to best support reduced regional turmoil and defeat of the Da’esh organization while minimizing the risk of further spread of the jihadist ideology.

The findings are the result of the SMA’s standard multi-disciplinary approach and belief that no single discipline by itself can provide a comprehensive approach to this global and regional conundrum. The analyses were conducted unconstrained by policy, legal, and operational consideration and attempts were made to garner insights from historical precedent.

Following are brief summaries of the articles in this white paper.

In his opening article, Mr. Bob Jones (SOCOM) argues that we live in revolutionary times and ISIL leverages the energy in Sunni populations to their advantage. In revolutionary times, revisionist powers see and seize opportunities; while status quo powers tend to be defensive, reactive, and see agents of change as “threats.” Iran saw an opportunity to expand its sovereign privilege across the region with the fall of Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda saw opportunity to reduce foreign influence, remove corrupt autocrats, and restore dignity to the Ummah; Da’esh saw the opportunity to best AQ in Syria and Iraq by offering “Caliphate today” in lieu of AQ’s more patient approach.

In his article entitled “Managing the Strategic Context in the Middle East: A Preliminary Transitivity Analysis of the Middle Eastern Alliance Network and Its Operational Implications“, Dr. Larry Kuznar advances balance theory to gauge the overall stability of the conflict system that surrounds the battle against Da’esh in Syria and Iraq. This system is characterized by multiple simultaneous conflicts engaging numerous state and non-state groups in the region and from outside of the region. The analysis focuses on the relations between 24 of the key state and non-state actors in this system and indicates that the region is locked in a well-established system of conflict that is likely to persist given the high degree of transitivity in established relationships.

In “An Analysis of Violent Nonstate Actor Organizational Lethality and Network Co-Evolution in the Middle East and North Africa”, Drs. Victor Asal, Karl Rethemeyer (SUNY Albany) and Dr. Joseph Young (American University) use new data that spans the years 1998 to 2012 to model the behavior of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Middle East. Using several statistical techniques, including network modeling, logit analysis, and hazard modeling, they show that governments can use strategies that influence a group’s level of lethality, their relationships with other groups, and how long and whether these groups become especially lethal.

In his “Countering the Islamic State’s Ideological Appeal”, Dr. Jacob Olidort (Washington Institute) discusses an options-focused assessment for policy and practitioner communities in the United States government concerning the ideological threat posed by the Islamic State. The paper examines the possible evolution of the Islamic State in the event that it loses its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and the nature of the threat it could pose to Western targets and interests. The assessment is based on the recently-published Washington Institute report, Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom, as well as the author’s cumulative research on the texts and ideas of the Islamic State and other Salafi and Islamist groups.

In their paper entitled “Framework for Influencing Extremist Ideology”, Drs. Bob Elder and Sara Cobb (GMU) discuss negotiation research, drawing on rational choice theory which provides a wealth of findings about how people negotiate successfully. They also describe some of the pitfalls that have been associated with negotiation failures. Building on narrative theory, they attempt to expand the theoretical base of negotiation in an effort to address the meaning making processes that structure negotiation as the basis of a framework for influencing extremist ideology. This research is combined with decision-related research conducted in support of deterrence planning as a means to discover potential influence levers for possible use as a counter to extremist ideology. Recognizing that conflict resolution is complicated because it involves changing the story from within the interactional context from where it arises, the framework assumes a staged approach to address the narrative structure of the ideologically-based conflict which anchors the influence actions on the strategic positions and identities, embedded in the narrative logics of the key characters.

The focus of the article entitled “Off-Ramps for Da’esh Leadership: Preventing Da’esh 2.0”, by Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska Omaha and Dr. Jason Spitaletta, The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is two-fold. First, they discuss the underlying theory of TMT (Top Management Team) collaboration, and provide practitioners with some tactics to foment barriers and distrust to aid the operations meant to degrade the organization (e.g., retaking of Mosul). Second, given their analysis of what motivated each of these leaders to join and remain in Da’esh, they provide a set of tailored off-ramps to be considered to deter captured leaders from reconstituting Da’esh 2.0.

In their article entitled “Comprehensive Communications Approach,” (excerpted from their 2016 report, “Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter,” available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html), Drs. Todd Helmus and Elizabeth Bodine- Baron (RAND) argue the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), like no other terrorist organization before, has used Twitter and other social media channels to broadcast its message, inspire followers, and recruit new fighters. Though much less heralded, ISIS opponents have also taken to Twitter to castigate the ISIS message. Their article draws on publicly available Twitter data to examine this ongoing debate about ISIS on Arabic Twitter and to better understand the networks of ISIS supporters and opponents on Twitter in order to craft more effective counter-messaging strategies.

Finally, in “A Human Geography Approach to Degrading ISIL” Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services Inc.) argues that stabilizing the region and degrading ISIL will be an international effort with geopolitical and large network engagements. Ultimately, the activities proposed will have an impact for families and their homes on the ground in Syria and Iraq; therefore, the perspectives and priorities of these populations should be foregrounded in any approach, including the involvement of key stakeholders from the earliest possible phase, to lay the groundwork and build partnerships for the long-term stabilization process.

Contributing Authors

Asal, V. (SUNY Albany), Bodine-Baron, E. (RAND), Cobb, S. (George Mason University), Elder, R. (George Mason University), Helmus, T. (RAND), Jones, R. (SOCOM), Kuznar, L. (NSI, Indiana – Purdue U Fort Wayne), Ligon, G. (Univ. of Nebraska Omaha), Olidort, J. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Rethemeyer, K. (SUNY Albany), Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory), Sutherlin, G. (Geographic Services, Inc.), Young, J. (American University)

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SMA Reachback Panel Discussion with Experts from Naval Postgraduate School.

Author | Editor: Robinson, G. (Naval Postgraduate School) & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

On 1 November 2016, a team of experts from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) prepared a two-hour panel discussion based loosely on the first round of CENTCOM¹s reach back questions. The team addressed the following topics:

Topic 1: How the Mosul Campaign Shapes the Future of Iraq

John Arquilla, Chair of the Defense Analysis Department, spoke about how the Mosul campaign will shape the future of Iraq.

Topic 2: Potential of Dispersing Foreign Fighters

Mohammed Hafez, Chair of the National Security Department, is a major contributor to the literature on local Jihadism writ large and discussed the issue of dispersing foreign fighters.

Topic 3: Two Trajectories of a Future ISIS Insurgency in Iraq Post-Mosul

Dr. Craig Whiteside, a professor in the Naval War College, spoke about the two trajectories of a future ISIS insurgency in Iraq post-Mosul.

Topic 4: Lessons from ISIS’s Use of Social Media

Dr. Sean Everton, Co-director of the CORE lab and faculty member of the Defense Analysis Department. Dr. Everton will talk about lessons learned and not learned yet from ISIS’s use of social media.

Topic 5: Thoughts on War-gaming the Coming Instability of a Nation after ISIS

Rob Burks, Senior Lecturer in the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Director of NPS’ Wargaming Activity Hub, spoke about wargaming and the potential instability of Iraq after ISIS.

Topic 6: The Future of the Global Jihad after the Loss of the Caliphate

Glenn Robinson, political scientist and on the DA faculty at NPS, spoke about the future of global jihad and the loss of the caliphate.

Contributing Authors

Arquilla, J., Burks, R., Everton, S., Hafez, M., Robinson, G., Whiteside, C., (Naval Postgraduate School)

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Identification of Security Issues and their Importance to Russia, Its Near-abroad and NATO Allies: A Thematic Analysis of Leadership Speeches.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. & Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

This study addresses key questions posed in the SMA EUCOM project by using thematic analysis of speeches from leaders of state and non-state polities in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Caucasus. The importance of an issue is measured by the density (mentions/words in speech) with which it is mentioned and the use of associated emotive language.

Key Findings by EUCOM Questions

Regional Outlook
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Q04. Who are Russia’s allies and clients and where is it seeking to extend its influence within the EUCOM AOR?

Analysis of how strongly Russia’s allies express their allegiance to Russia and Russian culture indicates that Crimea is Russia’s staunchest ally. Transnistria also expresses a strong allegiance to Russia, followed by Donetsk. Luhansk and Armenia express pro- Russian sentiments, but only weakly.

Q10. How does Russia see its great power status in the 21st century?

Russian leaders do not mention aspirations for super-power status. Russia’s desire for great power status should be treated as a hypothesis that requires testing – it should not be assumed.

Q20. How might Russia leverage its energy and other economic resources to influence the political environment in Europe and how will this leverage change over the next 15 years?

Economic issues rank high in Russia’s security concerns. They express concern over the value of their energy resources, indicating that it is a key value. They often mention the reliance of European nations on Russian energy. To a lesser extent they mention expanding markets for their energy to Asia.

Media and Public Opinion
Q07. Conduct analysis of open source Russian media to understand key frames and cultural scripts that are likely to frame potential geopolitical attitudes and narratives in the region.

Cultural Frame: A key cultural frame that Russia and its allies use is their history of overcoming odds against aggressive adversaries to uphold their Russian independence. References to the need to defend Russians from the Nazi threat (historically and today) are used. Emotive Frame: Russia sees the US and NATO as a threat, and state that the US is conspiring against them.

Q08. How much does the U.S. image of Russia as the side that “lost” the Cold War create support for more aggressive foreign policy behavior among the Russian people?

Russia and its allies do not speak of losing to the West, but blame past leaders for giving away their power. Some leaders express nostalgia for Soviet power.

Q09. How might ultra-nationalism influence Russia’s foreign policy rhetoric and behavior?

As expected, Russian Nationalists, express nationalist sentiments strongly. However, both Putin and Lavrov use Russian nationalist arguments to some degree.

NATO

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Q16. If conflict occurs, will NATO be willing and able to command and control a response?

NATO leaders use language in a manner (mention of security concerns, high emotive content) that indicates a relatively high commitment to addressing Russian threats.

The larger EUCOM effort integrates different teams’ findings in terms of how they relate to security issues, economic issues, domestic constraints, and prestige.

The security issues and themes identified through thematic analysis can be binned under these four interest areas and their densities analyzed. The Putin government exhibits the following patterns:

• Security – The Putin government mentions security concerns more than any other polity; this is related to their engagement in conflicts in the region and to the pervasive threat they perceive the US and NATO to be.
• Economic Factors – The Putin government has one of the highest densities for economic factors indicating that economic interests are a key factor in their decision calculus.
• Domestic Constraints – The Putin government seldom mentions domestic issues.
• Prestige – The Putin government ranks among the lowest of all the polities for the density of prestige-related themes. This is consistent with thematic analysis of the importance of emotive language. Compared to other polities, the Putin government exhibits a cool, measured rhetoric in discussing regional security concerns. This could be a form of deception or evidence of a patient approach to political developments in the region.

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Question (Follow-up QL3): The response to QL5 (see Appendix A) noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures. What effect could this have on Intel efforts?

Author | Editor: Robinson, S., Perez, E., Derrick, D. & Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska, Omaha).

Through our research into Da’esh cyber messaging (Derrick et al., in press), we have identified an emerging trend in Da’esh forum, propaganda, and fundraising websites: the use of the ZeroNet application. ZeroNet, a peer-to-peer application, uses the same technology as Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies using shapeshift.io. As Da’esh users begin publishing their websites off servers using this ZeroNet application, visitors are then only able to visit that website (e.g., blogs, chat forums) using that ZeroNet application. This facilitates/mandates that visitors then seed that content to other viewers, as the website is distributed to and from many locations and from multiple small servers. When the website is updated, the update is pushed out to all seeders. Each website visited is also served/seeded by the visitors, thus creating a distributed publishing system that permeates more than just one physical site owner.

Implications

The use of this application is another instance of Da’esh as an early adopter of IT Innovation (Ligon, Derrick, Logan, Fuller, Church, Perez, & Robinson, 2016). ZeroNet is built for hosting all types of dynamic websites, and any type of file can be distributed on it (e.g., VCS repositories, databases, etc). Creating ZeroNet websites is facile and instructions can be located on a variety of open source websites1 and easily installed. Implications we have identified are 1) DDOS is no longer an option for technical interdiction unless all seed accounts can be hit at one time, 2) taking down a website that violates user terms (e.g., suspicious content, hate speech) is no longer an option, 3) social engineering will play a larger role to gain access to protected sites, and 4) cyber interdiction may need to focus on heavier preventative measures rather than post hoc take-downs/removal. However, one positive implication is that Blue could also use the seeding to find supporters of Da’esh in the following ways. First, by seeding real or other content, analysts can become part of the network that hosts these websites. This can allow them to monitor who seeds the content to identify other potential supporters. However, this technique is limited if the other seeders use an anonymizer, such as an anonymous VPN or tor. The ability to find other seeders will often (not always) be limited to the organizations ability to analyze the tor network. Finally, as with other Da’esh endorsed applications (e.g., Dawn of Glad Tidings, monitoring who downloads the ZeroNet application in months following its 1 Websites such as https://zeronet.readthedocs.io/en/latest/faq/ walk users through the pros and cons of ZeroNet and are available in at least 22 languages. Endorsement on Da’esh communication channels (circa October 2016 and weeks following, one could track IP addresses for those who do not use TOR to mask their identity (this instruction was not included on the initial post about downloading ZeroNet . Second, because the content is secured in same manner as bitcoin wallet, bitcoin hacking and identification techniques would also be effective on this application. Finally, an innovative way to take down content is to infiltrate creator accounts and make updates with blank content to disrupt files of seed accounts.

Conclusions

Our assessment indicates that site destruction of user content employing ZeroNet will be more difficult due to its crowdsourced, distributed platform. However, collection of data may in fact be easier. Moreover, using the techniques we recommended and others developed to harvest data from bitcoin users, it may in fact be easier to identify other seeders and downloaders than it has been from 2014-present.

Question (R2 Special): What are indicators of change in Russian strategic interests in Syria?

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. (NSI, Inc).

This paper found that Russia¹s strategic interests in the Middle East are fairly stable. What could change is how Russia prioritizes its interests in the wake of the US election and change in administration. Indicators of change might include troop movement or alteration in leader discourse.

Russia’s strategic interests in Syria are fairly stable

Timothy Thomas, a Russia expert from the Foreign Military Studies Office and former US Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) believes that a fair articulation of Russia’s long-term strategic interests is right where they should be: in the country’s 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS).1 The only “changes” that Thomas expects will be the result of the “gradual accomplishment” of several interests. First among these is strengthening Russian national defense, which in Syria has meant Russian forces taking the opportunity to test new weapons systems and command procedures while working to keep ISIL and Islamic extremists from Russia’s southern borders. Second, Thomas reports that “consolidating the Russian Federation’s status as a leading world power” in a multipolar international system has been accomplished by Russian actions in Syria and Ukraine “in the eyes of many nations.”

What could change? How Russia prioritizes its interests

Thomas points to optimistic versus pessimistic Russian views on how the recent US election will impact US policy in Syria. Optimistically, some feel that the election of Donald Trump may diminish the US security threat, offer Russia new opportunities in the region, and thus allow Russia to prioritize other interests than it has been. This logic is based in the belief that the new US Administration will be willing to tolerate Assad in order to work in concert with Russia to defeat terrorist threat from ISIL and other groups. Russians taking a more pessimistic view however argue that forging a US-Russia partnership in the region will not be as simple as a change of Administration.

What might signal a change?

Dr. Patricia Degennaro (Threat Tec, LLCI -TRADOC G27) believes that “the key to understanding signals for change include Russian rhetoric and key troop maneuvers. The Russian President’s messaging is the signal to change.” Dr. Larry Kuznar (Indiana-Purdue; NSI) reports empirical analysis of President Putin’s language use and whether Putin’s language patterns might be used as indicators of Russian change of strategy in Syria. Dr. Kuznar uncovers a “blip” then “brag” pattern in Putin’s public discourse that may be used as an indicator. Specifically, Kuznar finds that prior to a major event (like invading Ukraine) Putin begins mentioning a few key emotional themes (e.g., pride, protection, unity, strength and Russian superiority) and political themes (e.g., Russian security, Russia’s adversaries, Russian energy), a “blip,” then goes silent presumably during the planning and execution phase. Once the activity or goal is complete however, Kuznar finds that “Putin is characteristically tight-lipped about his interests and intentions, but tends to brag after he achieves a victory.” He habitually “relaxes his restraint and releases a rhetorical flourish of concerns and emotional language”, i.e., some major bragging.

In short, Dr. Kuznar (Indiana-Purdue) finds an empirical basis to suggest that specific linguistic themes such as pride, Russian superiority and France2) as well as more general emotional and political themes “may serve as early indicators and warnings of Putin’s intent.” Currently Putin’s mention of pragmatic themes in relation to Russian energy resources and his recent concern with Turkey, and emotive themes, such as the threat of Nazism, may serve as indicators of his activities if his past patterns are retained. And as such, “may have direct implications for his intentions in Syria.”

Contributing Authors

Kuznar, L. (NSI & Indian University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne), Thomas, T. (Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army), (TRADOC), Degennaro, T. (Threat Tec, LLCI – TRADOC G27)

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Speaker: Brig Gen (Sel) Rob Spalding (Joint Staff)

Date: June 2016

Brig Gen (Sel) Rob Spalding is the Chief, China, Mongolia, Taiwan Division, Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs – Asia, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. As Division Chief, he directs activities and operations to develop planning guidance for Unified Commanders, prepares Joint Staff/DoD positions on National Security Council matters, and develops informal and formal briefings dealing with major national and international policy matters for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Brig Gen (Sel) Spalding received his commission through Fresno State University’s Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1991. He is an Air Force Command Pilot with more than 2,300 hours flight time in two major weapons systems; B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress. His prior tours include Command of the 509th Operations Group where he launched B-2s in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, and Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs at the Pentagon. During the Iraq surge in 2007, he deployed and directed the Personal Security Coordination Center, and was responsible for security of the top five leaders in Iraq.

Prior to his current assignment, he was the Air Force Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY. Brig Gen (Sel) Spalding speaks Chinese-Mandarin and Spanish.

EDUCATION

• 1987 Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural business, Fresno State University, CA.
• 1993 Master of Science degree in agricultural business, Fresno State University, CA.
• 1998 Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare Course (Correspondence).
• 1999 Squadron Officer School (Distinguished Graduate), Maxwell AFB, AL.
• 2001 Defense Language Institute Chinese-Mandarin Course (Distinguished Graduate), Monterey, CA.
• 2003 Air Command and Staff College (Correspondence).
• 2006 Air War College (Correspondence).
• 2007 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
• 2007 PhD economics and mathematics, University of Missouri, Kansas City, MO.
• 2008 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.
• 2008 Masters of Science degree in strategic studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL.
• 2013 Graduate Certificate, Nuclear Weapons Effects, Policy & Proliferation, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. 03/1992 – 08/1993, Officer in Charge, Strategic Plans, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, CO.
2. 08/1993 – 09/1994, Student Pilot, 87th Flying Training Squadron, Laughlin AFB, TX.
3. 11/1994 – 05/1995, B-52 Upgrade Training, 11th Bomb Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA
4. 06/1995 – 05/1998, B-52 Pilot and Aircraft Commander, 23rd Bomb Squadron, Minot AFB, ND.
5. 05/1998 – 05/2001, T-38 and B-2 Pilot, Wing Life Support Officer, Conventional Strike Officer, and Chief of Training, 325th Bomb Squadron, Whiteman AFB, MO.
6. 06/2001 – 06/2002, Chinese-Mandarin Student, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA.
7. 07/2002 – 04/2004, Olmsted Scholar, Tongji University, Shanghai, PRC.
8. 04/2004 – 06/2006, B-2 Instructor/Evaluator Pilot and Assistant Director of Operations, 393rd
   Bomb Squadron, Whiteman AFB, MO.
9. 06/2006 – 07/2007, Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs Office, Pentagon, Washington, DC.
10. 08/2007 – 01/2008, Director, Personal Security Coordination Center, MNF-I, Baghdad, Iraq.
11. 01/2008 – 06/2008, Deputy Director Strategic Plans and Initiatives Directorate, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs Office, Pentagon, Washington, DC.
12. 07/2008 – 06/2009, Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL.
13. 06/2009 – 06/2010, Chief of Safety, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, MO.
14. 06/2010 – 03/2011, Deputy Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, MO.
15. 03/2011 – 04/2012, Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, MO.
16. 04/2012 – 06/2013, Vice Commander 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, MO.
17. 07/2013 – 06/2014, Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY.
18. 07/2014 – Present, Chief, China, Mongolia, Taiwan Division, Joint Staff, J-5 Pentagon,
    Washington, D.C.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

• Rating: Command Pilot
• Flight hours: More than 2,300
• Aircraft flown: B-2, B-52, T-38 and T-37

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

• Legion of Merit
• Defense Meritorious Service Medal
• Air Force Meritorious Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster
• Joint Service Commendation Medal
• Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster
• Air Force Achievement Medal with one oak leaf cluster

PUBLICATIONS

“A Micromovement Model with Bayes Estimation via Filtering: Application to Measuring Trading Noises and Trading Cost (co-author),” Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications, 2006“Businessmen’s Risk Perception in China following the 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing and the 2001 EP-3 Incident,” doctoral dissertation, Proquest Dissertations, 2007.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

• Second Lieutenant Oct 16, 1991
• First Lieutenant Oct 16, 1993
• Captain Oct 16, 1995
• Major Aug 1, 2002
• Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 2006
• Colonel Aug 1, 2011
• Current as of Dec 2015

Identifying Predictive Gray Zone Indicators Through People’s Values

Speaker: MacNulty, C. (DoD Consultant)

Date: July 2016

Christine MacNulty has forty years experience as a consultant in long-term strategic -planning for concepts as well as organizations, futures studies, foresight, and technology forecasting, technology assessment and related areas, as well as socio-cultural change. For the last twenty years, most of her consultancy has been conducted for the Department of Defense, including: The Joint Staff, OSD (OFT), the DON (Under Secretary, Secretariat, OPNAV N3/N5, N6, N7, CNET, NAVSEA, NAVSPECWARCOM, ONR, CNO’s SSG), the USMC (HQMC – Commandant), the USCG (HQ – Commandant), the USA (SMDC), JTAMDO, (then) BMDO, USSOCOM, (then) USACOM, JFCOM J9, and other COCOMs. She has also conducted projects for NATO ACT and NATO NEC, the British Army’s Force Development & Training Command, and the German BBK.

During the last thirty-five years Christine MacNulty has contributed methods and models for understanding social and cultural change. She developed the European version of SRI International’s Values & Lifestyles Program, and worked with the International Research Institute on Social Change to develop their social models. In the last twelve years she has applied her knowledge of strategy, cultures and cognition to “understanding adversaries” – using that information for planning and assessing non-traditional operations, information warfare, information operations, and strategic communication. She has also used these social models for training in network-centric operations and C2.

She was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in 1988 for her contribution to British industry. She is the coauthor of two books: Industrial Applications of Technology Forecasting, Wiley, 1971 and Strategy with Passion – A Leader’s Guide to Exploiting the Future, to be published in 07/2016. Her paper: “Method for minimizing the negative consequences of nth order effects in strategic communication actions and inactions” was published in NATO Defence Strategic Communications Journal, p 99, Winter 2015. Her monograph “Truth, Perception & Consequences” was published by the Army War College, 09/2007, and “Transformation: From the Outside In or the Inside Out” was also published by the Army War College in 09/2008. Her paper, Perceptions, Values & Motivations in Cyberspace appeared in the IO Journal, 10/03/2009, and The Value of Values for IO, SC & Intel was published in the 08/2010 edition of the IO Journal.