SMA Publications

In pregNSI participated in a large effort focused on identifying areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. A rising China resides within a very dynamic Asia-Pacific region. A long list of Chinese influence and investment activities abroad together with an active military enhancement program indicate that China is positioning itself to pursue national security interests well beyond the Pacific Rim. As Chinese interests and policy objectives broaden to farther reaches of the globe there is greater likelihood that they will run up against key US international interests. The intersection of US and Chinese interests could represent either a source of conflict or opportunity for cooperation. The main question that US policy makers and planners must consider carefully is: Where and which Chinese interests are most likely to conflict with US global interests, and where may there be opportunities for cooperation? The current problem this project addressed is uncertainty about the likely trajectory of increasingly global Chinese national interests abroad and how these relate to key US interests. The primary objective was to provide decision-makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Asia-Pacific region, and broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.

NSI utilized techniques from our human behavior analytics to examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identify where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests worldwide, and in particular, to the East China Sea; and assess drivers of divergence, conflict, and convergence when dealing with China in a global context. NSI developed the US-PRC Global Engagement Framework based on the inputs and variety of analytic results produced by other team members to facilitate consistent and coherent integration. Some “key parameters” of the US-PRC Global Engagement Framework included US-China economic trade barriers, imbalances, opportunities, environmental concerns, food security, agricultural policies, water management, carbon-based fuel alternatives, scarcity of resources (competition and cooperation), freedom / denial of access and intrusion issues, military challenges and opportunities, technology and academic exchanges, human rights, national demographics and their impacts on economies, human migration, and third world development. NSI also helped bridge strategic level analysis and operational level needs to ensure the concepts, analyses and results were actionable for end-users such as military planners, strategists and/or decision-makers.

The following is the list of reports completed in support of this effort. Reports and events can be accessed via the links provided

*Reports without a link can be requested by emailing mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil from a .mil or .gov email address.

Reports

In progress

SMA Megacities: Deep Dive Application of two socio-cultural frameworks to a flood event in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B,, Brickman, D., Canna, S. & Desjardins, A. (NSI, Inc).

The Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Megacity Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence (M- RSI) project seeks to aid United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in understanding socio-cultural dynamics within megacities. For this portion of the project, USPACOM socio-cultural analysis (SCA) planning frameworks (“the SCA approach”) were used to guide remote data collection for a proto-type assessment of the risk of humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The SCA approach consists of five distinct, yet related frameworks1 that are designed to provide planners with a quick triage tool to assess risk, as well as provide a guide for analysts conducting longer-term assessments. The five frameworks are structured to reflect USPACOM’s mission objectives and planning process. Given this was a proof of concept effort, analysts were asked to apply two of the five SCA frameworks—the SCA Humanitarian Crisis (HC) Framework and the Intra-state Violence (IV) Framework—to Dhaka, Bangladesh.

In addition to identifying the key risk factors for humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, this study considered the following question regarding the connection between a humanitarian crisis and the risk of intrastate violence/VEO activity in Dhaka:

1. Could government/NGO failures to provide immediate relief and rescue in the event of a humanitarian crisis in Dhaka enhance support for VEO-affiliated groups in the city?

The effort represents an initial attempt to expand the use of the SCA frameworks by linking risks in one framework to risks in another as well as determining relationships between, and joint impacts of, framework elements.

During non-crisis (Phase 0) periods, the SCA Humanitarian Crisis framework described below can be used to help analysts and planners track the general nature of the risk of humanitarian crisis. As shown in Figure 1, humanitarian crises can be triggered by one of a number of factors—some environmental (floods) and some socio-political (conflict). All create a unique set of risks for those affected and those seeking to respond. The level and type of risk of humanitarian crisis is determined by the level of services (law enforcement, health and medical, and utilities) the government provides, the readiness and response capabilities, and the recovery capacity of the affected area.

Utilizing data and information remotely collected—to include quantitative and qualitative data, academic research, news reports, and international and NGO policy documents and reports—analysts were able to conduct a quick triage risk assessment of the area of interest, in this case of Dhaka, Bangladesh. For example, they were able to determine how the quality of roads in Dhaka (route trafficability) affected the risk of humanitarian crisis in the event of a natural hazard such as a flood. Analysts employed a simple five-point qualitative coding scheme ranging from no appreciable risk to severe risk to quickly measure risk factors. Roll-up to higher levels was accomplished by applying a simple ordinal measure to these assessments. The “no appreciable risk” elements were scored as 1 (color coded green); low risk of failure as 2 (color coded yellow); moderate risk as 3 (color coded orange); severe risk as 4 (color coded red); and elements that had insufficient information to evaluate were scored as 0 (color coded grey).

Analysts began with a triage assessment of the overall humanitarian crisis factors before delving into analysis of risk in the context of severe flooding. The HC Framework contains factors relating to three stages of disaster relief: immediate impact, disaster response and responsibilities, and recovery and reconstruction. It was important to separate these phases/functions as the information on even the same elements (e.g., actors, procedures, and risk conditions) differs for each. Conducting a deep dive on a single factor allowed analysts to tailor the information related to each element in the risk framework to a specific condition and thus produce more tactical and operational analyses. For example, how flooding may impact the risk of humanitarian crisis due to the flood effects on potable water or delivery of medical supplies to areas in need. Upon completing analysis of the risk of flood-driven humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, analysts conducted a preliminary assessment of how such conditions may increase the risk of intrastate violence emerging as the result of such a flood.

Chapter Two provides an overview of Dhaka as well as a quick holistic assessment guided by the SCA HC Framework of individual factors relevant to assessing the risks of humanitarian crisis. Chapters Three through Five contain detailed assessment of a subset of framework risk factors of importance in the context of a flood in terms of immediate impact, institutional plans and responsibilities, and recovery. Chapter Six discusses how these risk factors relate to, and impact, the IV Framework as applied to Dhaka. Chapter Seven discusses implications for USPACOM and Chapter Eight provides a short discussion on the importance and unique challenges associated with megacities.

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Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL in Support of SOCCENT: Subject Matter Expert Elicitation Summary Report, July – November 2014.

Author | Editor: Canna, S. & Rieger, T. (NSI, Inc).

From July through November 2014, NSI conducted a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Elicitation study to gather insights from interviews, panel discussions, seminars, and personal communications with over 50 SMEs from the United States, the Middle East, and Europe. The interview questionnaire and transcripts from the SME elicitation effort are available upon request. CTTSO provided the Apptek Talk2Me platform to expedite the transcription of the SME Elicitation interviews. In addition, all of the data (human edited and original audio) are posted on the Web-based Talk2Me platform for the SMA study for further analytics and reporting.

This report summarizes SME findings that help us understand ISIL’s intangible appeal. However, it does not attempt to adjudicate or force convergence of the findings.

Conditions: The Perfect Storm

Some SMEs described conditions on the ground as a “perfect storm” for the emergence of ISIL. The confluence of the conditions listed below allowed ISIL to rise rapidly.

• Failed states of Iraq and Syria: The power vacuum in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria opened the door for an alternative governing force to coalesce and gain the acquiescence and/or support of the civilian 3 population.
• Sunni grievances: The combination of political exclusion of Sunnis from government in Iraq and Syria along with the abuses visited upon Syrian Sunnis by the Assad regime have fed narratives of Sunni grievance, victimization, and marginalization.
• Arab world undergoing rapid change: ISIL is an expression of rising Islamist fundamentalism, declining sense of state-based nationalism, and a sense of empowerment spurred by the Arab Spring.
• Information Age: The advent of the information age makes it easier for people to communicate across large distances, to create a platform for sharing experiences and beliefs with like-minded individuals, and to actively persuade others to sympathize with or join a cause.
• Youth bulge: Like many parts of the developing world, Syria and Iraq are experiencing a youth bulge that, when combined with unemployment and lack of political voice, has resulted in a reservoir of young, angry men.

On the whole, SMEs felt that these conditions made it possible for ISIL to seize the opportunity to push for an alternative form of governance in the region. However, while these conditions were extremely important, ISIL’s sustainability and longevity is also based on its capacity to control the population and to garner sympathy and support from the broader Sunni Muslim population both inside and outside the region.

Capacity to Control

SMEs believed that ISIL’s capacity to control is based on several factors.

• Fear and coercion: ISIL has a monopoly over the use of force in areas it “governs.” It uses the implicit and explicit threat of violence against civilians to ensure acquiescence.
• Provision of better governance and order: Some argue that ISIL provides better governance and essential services than what was experienced under Iraqi and Syrian rule. Furthermore, ISIL provides some degree of stability and order in a previously uncertain environment.
• Lack of a viable alternative: There are currently no alternative forms of Sunni-empowered governance available. ISIL draws on the power of collective Sunni identity and Sunni grievances to establish its legitimacy.
• Strong leadership: ISIL has a strong, agile, pragmatic leadership and organizational structure. It has a highly motivated and a dedicated rank and file under the leadership of a disciplined and experienced cadre, supported by consistent and compelling messaging.
• Success breeds success: ISIL’s momentum and its ability to survive coalition attacks to date plays a role in convincing civilians and local power brokers that it will be around for the long-term, which reinforces support or acquiescence to ISIL, and in turn further reinforces ISIL’s capacity to control.

ISIL’s capacity to control is largely based on its interactions with the local population. However, ISIL also enjoys sympathy, support, and recruits from the global Sunni Muslim population. SMEs interviewed felt that the primary way ISIL achieves support from the global Sunni Muslim population is through persuasive use of narrative. SMEs identified over 20 narratives ISIL uses to persuade, the most powerful of which are described below.

Persuasive Narratives

Narratives are messages that represent the ideals, beliefs, and social constructs of a group. ISIL uses them within the civilian population to consolidate control and amongst the global Sunni Muslim population to garner sympathy, support, and recruits.

• Moral imperative: ISIL uses a variety of narratives to convey the idea that Muslims have a moral imperative to support them. These narratives include the restitution of the caliphate, creation of a utopian society based on Muslim laws and values, ISIL as a representative of the pure form of Islam, ISIL bringing back the Golden Age of Islam, al Baghdadi as a direct descendent of the Prophet, and that ISIL’s caliphate will unite all Sunni Muslims.
• Sunni grievances and victimhood: ISIL uses shared feelings of marginalization, repression, and lack of power to gain legitimacy and support. They draw on sub-narratives of victimization among Sunnis at the hands of Shias and the West to cement this powerful narrative.
• Immediacy: ISIL rejects al Qaeda’s core narrative that it needed to wait for the right time to establish a caliphate. ISIL claims that they did it within months. ISIL touts its willingness to take action, combined with its success in establishing what it calls a caliphate, as evidence of their proclaimed righteousness and destiny.
• Reinvention of self: No matter what kind of life you led, when you convert to Islam and join the fight, all previous wrongdoing is washed away. ISIL offers a new start and a new sense of identity and purpose to anyone who joins them.
• Thrills, adventures, and heroism: Some individuals are particularly drawn to ISIL because it advertises thrills, adventures, and opportunities for heroism (and violence) that appeal to some young men’s sense of masculinity.

Schools of Thought

While these factors represent areas of qualified agreement on key factors explaining ISIL support, SMEs differed on which factors were the most important, which led to two primary schools of thought regarding ISIL’s longevity.

1. The first school of thought is ISIL has resilient properties via its capacity to control people and territory stemming from pragmatic leadership and organization, intimidation tactics, tapping into existing Sunni grievances and use of a well-developed narrative and media outreach to attract and motivate fighters.
2. The second school of thought is ISIL is not a durable organization. It has taken advantage of a pre-existing sectarian conflict to acquire land, wealth, and power. It only attracts a narrow band of disaffected Sunni youth, is alienating local populations by over-the-top violence and harsh implementation of Sharia, is unable to expand into territories controlled by functioning states, and does not possess the expertise required to form a bureaucracy and effectively govern.

In reviewing the effort, a third school of thought emerged: that the real challenge is not ISIL as an organization, but rather the sense of disempowerment, anger, and frustration in the Muslim world. This condition is evidenced by rising Islamist fundamentalism found within Sunni Muslim populations around the world combined with a declining sense of state-based nationalism. It is fueled by a perception of inequality and thwarted aspirations in addition to the conditions mentioned earlier in this chapter: failed states, demographic shifts, unemployment, drought, spread of communication technologies, marginalization, etc. If the problem is larger than ISIL, then solutions that only seek to undermine ISIL’s capacity to control are insufficient to address the underlying cause of conflict, as they address only the symptoms of the problem and not the underlying root cause.

Additional Factors

This summary presents a cursory review of the many topics addressed by over 50 SMEs interviewed for this effort. In addition, the report also touches on a number of other controversial topics. These include:

• whether ISIL is primarily ideological or opportunistic;
• whether the local elite power base in Iraq and Syria sincerely supports ISIL;
• situational factors contributing to the sustainment of ISIL;
• the degree to which regional Sunni Muslim states support or oppose ISIL; and
• a brief look at whether the rise of other historical violent social movements could be instructive.

SME elicitation through the SMA SOCCENT Speaker Series will continue. To be added to the distribution list for the series, please contact Mr. Sam Rhem at samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil.

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Barriers to Civil Order in Palestinian Security Sector

Author | Editor: Desjardins, A., Polansky (Pagano), S., Popp, R. & Rieger, T. (NSI, Inc).

The origins of the Palestinian security sector can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord, which established divisive security and policing responsibilities between the Palestinians and Israelis and the Oslo II agreement, which codified interim boundaries, including the division of the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of different jurisdictions. These divisions of land and security responsibilities remain in place to this day and have fostered a unique, complicated, and at times perplexing situation for both the Palestinian security sector and the civil society it serves to protect. The environment in the West Bank is replete with confusion over security sector authorities and responsibilities, frustration over barriers1 to the provision of security and justice, and fear and mistrust of the security sector forces. Moreover, the absence of publically available mission statements and codified legal documents, that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities, adds to the complex situation.

At the request of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) staff, an analysis was conducted to identify security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. To this end, we focused on assessing the performance of the Palestinian security sector in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society via a two stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment comparing Palestinian security sector functions and activities that are authorized based on legal documents with those that are reported via news reports and by civil society, and, second, we compared this with acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. To simplify and clearly convey our analysis, we utilized “living” Venn diagrams, which allows for the rapid integration of additional data and information as they become available. This was followed by a barrier analysis identifying internal and external barriers and their associated root causes in the provision of security that is not in alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations. The identification and classification of barriers and their root causes facilitates the detection of points for security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society.

Overall, our analysis identified five primary barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear and limitations on movement or other activities). These factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank and, in many cases, may be rooted in an intractable problem. However, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the Palestinian security sector were identified. This suggests that mitigating actions can be taken by the Palestinian security sector in partnership with international partners, even given the currently limiting socio3political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen their effect on the provision of security.

Thus, drawing from our analysis, several high3level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies emerged. Our analysis suggests several focus areas for security sector reforms and development. Each is critical to the provision of security in the Palestinian Authority, is consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces, and should facilitate civil society involvement.

Clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities—support the creation of clear, comprehensive, and codified legal documents laying out the missions and duties of each Palestinian security sector entity; this helps ensure accountability of and trust in the Palestinian security sector and its ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.

• Guide Palestinian security sector toward completion of comprehensive legal documents that delineate Palestinian security sector forces mission and duties in clear language;
• Ensure that guidelines establish the lines of authority and purview within and across the forces;
• Emphasize common Palestinian identity and goals as part of a superordinate ingroup, but avoid the pitfall of reinforcing Israel as the outgroup;
• Work to establish a more cohesive security philosophy that can guide all of the Palestinian security sector forces in pursuit of a common goal.

Strengthen legitimacy—take measures to re3establish the trust of Palestinian civil society in its security sector forces in order to promote cooperation and adherence, as well as smooth the path for the Palestinian security sector to perform its duties once they are more clearly and explicitly defined and established.

• Guide Palestinian security sector toward establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, which will not result in retribution;
• Establish protocols and training that facilitate respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society and avoid human rights abuses;
• Emphasize the proper selection of candidates for jobs at the individual and aggregate level
• Work to reduce cronyism and other forms of bias in employment selection;
• Encourage organizations to take responsibility for missteps and apologize to the population as needed when mistakes are made;
• Work to establish an effective witness protection program;
• Work to more generally increase transparency and accountability;
• Work to establish independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizens’ complaints.

Improve equipping and training of forces—critical for Palestinian security sector to effectively execute its duties is having sufficient equipment and training, although this issue may be less easily resolved due to dependence of the Palestinian Authority for Israeli approval of materiel.

• Prioritize the establishment and funding of an improved communications infrastructure for security;
• Work to centralize training facilities;
• Streamline training curricula to emphasize common principles and needs across security organizations, while maintaining differentiation as needed;
• Perform an audit of existing training;
• Assess remaining training needs based on pain points after the higher priority goals have been met and/or barriers have been mitigated;
• Ensure that training maps to the overarching security philosophy that should be established in advance.

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The Dynamics of Israeli and Palestinian Security Requirements in the West Bank—Cross-border activities, sovereignty and governing legitimacy.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A., Bragg, B. & Key, K. (NSI, Inc).

This report presents insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and PA sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank territories with Palestinian violence and cross-border attacks against Israeli citizens, as well as IDF/COGAT activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect those dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. Specifically, the loop analyses suggest that:

PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform. PASF capability enhancements seen to also improve security for Israelis can degrade popular support for the PASF, increase social frustration and worsen the security situation in the West Bank. They can also reduce PA legitimacy and reduce the effectiveness of successful security sector reform and institutional capacity building.

Implications for USSC/USG

PASF training/routine emphasizes protection of Palestinians. PASF capability enhancements and training geared toward providing publically observable protection for Palestinians especially in areas associated with Palestinian livelihoods (e.g., orchards) and other areas traversed by Israeli settlers;

Emphasize PASF protection role. Together with visible reemphasis of PASF activities, public affairs communications including outreach to civil society to reinforce message that purpose of PASF is to protect Palestinians can enhance public regard and PA legitimacy;

Emphasize service provision and inclusiveness to enhance PA legitimacy. Other activities to strengthen PA governing legitimacy (e.g., inclusion of alternative views, dependable provision of services) are essential for PA legitimacy and ultimate success of security sector institution building.

Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy and development of security sector institutions. IDF activity in Areas A and B impact perceived PA governing legitimacy in two ways. Most immediately, IDF security actions, targeted killings, arrests and imprisonment represent an affront to Palestinian national sensitivities and thereby increase the level of social tension in the West Bank. Together with demonstrating the failure of the PA to provide the most basic public service, i.e., security for its citizens, they can diminish popular perceptions of PA legitimacy. Because effective implementation of security sector reforms and institution building require Palestinians to see the PA as legitimate and the PASF as credible, IDF activities also indirectly degrade efforts to build PASF capacity and ultimately to provide security services for Palestinians which feeds into one of the central challenges to the stability of the Fatah-led PA government: the popular appeal and credibility of its phased, institution-building approach versus the approach of Hamas and other actors that highlights rejection and resistance. Completing the feedback loop, impeding the PASF capacity to provide effective security to Palestinians and Israelis in Areas A and B does nothing to reduce Israeli security concerns and reinforces the same, or rising, level of IDF activity in those areas.

Implications for USSC/USG

Advocating for return to more restrictive IDF ROE in the WB including restrictions on live fire, roadblocks and training exercises along with visible reduction in IDF presence in Areas A & B can reduce Palestinian social tension and, if representing observable change can help stabilize day- to-day security situation.

Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank makes re-opening peace talks more difficult. Uncertainty about the permanence of the current setting in the WB generates two means of decreased WB security. On the one hand it is a direct source of the type of Palestinian social frustration that can lead to violence. On the other, it is a driver of the Israeli government’s accelerated settlement and military establishment construction and consequent illegal seizure and/or destruction of Palestinian land by the Israeli government. This in turn poses an affront to Palestinian notions of national identity, rights and sovereign control, also feeding social frustration and diminishing the popularly perceived governing legitimacy of the PA. Perceived failures of the PA also strengthen the appeal of resistance-based approaches as the only means for dealing with Israel. Given that PA governing legitimacy is so indelibly tied to the phased, institution-building approach established by the Oslo process and the promise of eventual Palestinian statehood (i.e., sovereignty) it significantly weakens any claim to PA governing legitimacy. Unfortunately, it is the PA with which Israel and the US are committed to negotiate a final status agreement and the loss of popular support for the PA coupled with insecure conditions in the Palestinian territories have been used by Israeli leaders as reasons for pulling out of or even engaging in peace talks.

Implications for USSC/USG

US policy supporting “independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian state” has led Israeli governments to create ‘facts on the ground’ and literal barriers to negotiated settlement via land confiscation and military and settlement construction. To Palestinians, US statements, together with settlement construction, can ring hollow or at best are confusing given the intimation of sovereignty associated with “statehood.”

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Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies (2015 Edition)

Author | Editor: Fenstermacher, L. (Air Force Research Laboratory)

[Note: 2011 edition available here]

Why are we reissuing the paper collection, “Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies”? The answer is simple. Five years later, violent extremism is still an issue. In September 2014, President Obama spoke at the United Nations, calling on member nations to do more to address violent extremism. This was followed by a three-day summit in February 2015 to bring together local, federal, and international leaders to discuss approaches to counter violent extremism. The wisdom contained in this paper collection is more relevant than ever. I encourage everyone to read it, again or for the first time, in whole or in part.

If there were a simple solution for countering violent extremism, a solution would have been found centuries ago. Countering violent extremism successfully requires a balanced approach between security-related strategies and initiatives and those that address the underlying motivations and causes for participation in, and support of, a violent extremist organization (VEO). These strategies and initiatives need to be based on nuanced understanding of the various aspects of violent extremism—not only the environments that are likely to spawn violent extremism and sympathetic supporters, but also

• the types of grievances that predispose those individuals to join and support violent extremist organizations and how they are framed in local contexts;
• the ways in which ideologies, media, messages, and narratives are used to instigate/radicalize, mobilize, indoctrinate, inform, or de-radicalize;
• the social dynamics, capabilities, and resources of organizations that are violent or that are likely to become violent and their relationship with competitors (for attention, resources, etc.); and
• the underlying motivations of individuals (whether revenge, status, identity or thrill seeking1) who join violent extremist organizations.

No single solution or solution set generalizes to all groups or locations, necessitating continuous acquisition of information and updating/adaptation of assessments and strategies.

This paper collection, entitled, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Multi-disciplinary Perspective,” aims to provide new insights on the spectrum of solutions for countering violent extremism, drawing from current social science research as well as from expert knowledge on salient topics (e.g., development programs, cultivating community partners and leaders, conflict and de-radicalization). So what is new? There is a large body of literature on terrorism and violent extremism, much of which focuses on developing a better understanding of the problem, including environmental and social/cultural factors and the role of ideology. This paper collection focuses less on root causes and more on solutions for risk management, disengagement (including delegitimization), and prevention of violent extremism. It also tackles the thorny issue of state terror, a subject that must enter any discussion of solutions for countering violent extremism. Ultimately, it is hoped that the paper collection can inform a better understanding of, and suggest sets of solutions for, motivating individuals and groups to desist from violence and preventing other individuals and groups from seeking involvement in movements/groups that seek to bring about change through violence.

Throughout the collection, there is an undercurrent of “do no harm”; that is, concomitant with suggestions for stopping or preventing violent extremisms, there are cautions an errors to avoid. These cautions implicitly ask the reader to think about things in a different way, in a way that avoids mirroring and simplistic assumptions of what others think or value and widens the timeframe in which we measure success or failure. Many goals related to countering violent extremism, especially disengagement/risk management and prevention require patience and a commitment for the long haul Patience is required to cultivate the right partners, support the building of institutional capacity and development of leaders, fund appropriate development programs to address local grievances, and support and amplify existing programs that support moderate discourse or develop new programs to deradicalize or disengage individuals from beliefs or attitudes. Likewise, messaging must match actions and must stem from someone who is credible and has a thorough understanding of the key ideological, political, and socio-cultural issues as well as the language, narratives, and symbols.

Some of the viewpoints in the collection are surprising and challenge popular conceptions. For example, in some cases, countering violent extremism requires doing nothing; well, not nothing exactly, but rather supporting/amplifying from behind (e.g., supporting social movements seeking governance change) or supporting other leaders, organizations, or states in leading initiatives. A prime example of this is the events of the Arab Spring, which yielded the inherent lesson that, in regions with social injustice and governance grievances , and political opportunity, social movements can and will emerge that motivate change virtually on their own. Another example where a supporting role is often called for is in implementing delegitimization strategies. Delegitimization involves the initiation of a discourse questioning the legitimacy of the violent extremist organization including their performance in other assumed roles/functions (e.g., shadow government, rule of law). This questioning is often best done by others who are more credible, knowledgeable, and steeped in history, ideology, narratives, and culture.

The Crown Prosecution Service defines violent extremism as the “demonstration of unacceptable behavior by using any means or medium to express views which foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs”2 including those who provoke violence (terrorist or criminal) based on ideological, political, or religious beliefs and foster hatred that leads to violence. Thus, countering violent extremism is something that must address instigators; however, first, countering violent extremism involves understanding and countering the ideas that leverage emotions, narratives, and ideologies that impel violence. Countering violent extremism is not the same thing as countering an ideology. This is not to say that ideology is not important or can be ignored. Current research points to ideology as a framing device or tool to rationalize or impel actions. Some believe that a group ideology is effectively an appliqué on top of an ideology, using the ideology for reinforcement and justification or, said another way, “religion and questions of identity (are) interwoven with questions of resources and political economy.”3 Success requires decoupling religious and political ideologies and acknowledging and addressing aspects that can foster the behavior changes we ultimately seek.

• This collection of papers yielded several insights. It is best to seek a balance between reflexive (security based) and reflective (addressing grievances, motivations) actions. Right now, solutions are overly focused on reflexive actions and thus actually create more of the problem we are trying to solve.
• Violent extremist organizations are effectively systems; thus, solution sets must contain tailored (kinetic and/or influence related) solutions for each system component (foot soldiers, instigators, leaders, supporters, logisticians, etc.) in ways that are appropriate for the culture, language, locality/region, and underlying motivations.
• Decision makers should avoid missing the “forest for the trees” by overly focusing on ideology. Local grievances trump global issues and need to be understood and addressed.
• Messengers are only effective when perceived as credible and knowledgeable; simply, if you are not credible, you should not be the messenger. Messages stick when they resonate with grievances, motivate behavior when they provoke affect, and persuade when the actions of the messenger match the words. Our adversaries understand this and employ this understanding in their messaging; thus, our counter messaging should take a “page from the same book.”
• Partners, chosen wisely, are critical in countering violent extremism with, in many cases, our partners in the lead. Without ownership, solutions will not be as successful or lasting,
• Many good things (messaging in Arab popular culture, music, grassroots de-radicalization efforts), are already going on to counter violent extremism around the globe. Success, in many cases, will come from amplifying and supporting what is already working,
• Focus on small, achievable wins over the long haul (e.g., disengagement or risk management versus de-radicalization, delegitimization of strategic objectives or outcomes).
• Delegitimization can be effective in exploiting vulnerabilities and inconsistencies (e.g., disconnects between the fantasy of violent extremism and the reality).
• Our timeframe for countering violent extremism needs to lengthen and the resources for strategies whose payoff is not immediate (e.g., development) must increase. Success will come with sustained efforts with appropriate partners, resources, and (adaptive) strategies.

The collection is organized in four sections, each of which contains papers that provide a tomography for violent extremism, highlighting factors that engender violent extremism and highlighting some of the options of the spectrum of solutions from prevention to changing the (violent) behaviors of already radicalized individuals or groups. The first section provides perspectives on factors and processes underlying violent extremisms and motivates the development of multi-layered tailored strategies. The second section focuses on the prevention of violent extremism: who is at-risk, what is important to many vulnerable populations, who should we partner with, and a variety of proposed solutions. The third section addresses solutions for affecting support for violent extremism, including delegitimization and support or amplification of existing programs (popular culture and music). Finally, the fourth section provides insights on solutions and attributes for solutions whose objective is changing the behavior and/or attitude of violent extremists including de-radicalization/disengagement, deterrence, and coercion.

NSI Chapters:

• Not All Radicals are the Same: Implications for Counter-Radicalization Strategy (T. Rieger)

Contributing Authors

Alahdad, Z. (independent), Belarouci, L. (l’Université d’Amiens), Benard, C. (RAND), Braddock, C. (Pennsylvania State University), Casebeer, W. (US Air Force, Joint Warfare Analysi Center), Corman, S. (Arizona State University), Davis, P. (RAND), DeRouen, K. (University of Alabama), DiEuliis, D. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Policy & Planning), Early, E. (Air University), Farooq, M. (World Organization for Resource Development and Education), Gupta, D. (San Diego State University), Hamid, T. (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies), Horgan, J. (Pennsylvania State University), Huda, Q. (United States Institute of Peace), Larson, E. (RAND), Lemieux, A. (Emory Unversity, START), Mirahmadi, H. (World Organization for Resource Development and Education), Nill, R. (Department of Homeland Security), Speckhard, A. (Georgetown University Medical Center, American College of Greece), Pospieszna, P. (University of Konstanz), Rieger, T. (Gallup Consulting), Sageman, M. (Foreign Policy Research Institute), Shanahan, J. (Joint Staff), Thomas, T. (Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), Vidino, L. (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)

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9th Annual SMA Conference: No War/No Peace…A New Paradigm in International Relations and a New Normal?

Author | Editor: Canna, S., Popp, G. & Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

Background

Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent of the new century, new geopolitical realities have emerged that have made classical wars with national military forces pitted against each other far less likely. What we are witnessing are new categories of conflict that cannot be considered full1scale wars in the classical sense but cannot be described as “peace” either. Small1scale conflicts are complemented with intense engagement in the Information and other Spheres. These will almost certainly have great implications in the legal domains as well new forms of alliances. Multiple factors have come into play for these trends to emerge. This is a story of change versus continuity, and the conference focused on what has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As such, there are structural and intellectual challenges that prevent the United States Government (USG) from adapting and thriving is this new environment.

Such blurring of war and peace is directly related to the softening of previously considered “solid” categorical binary distinctions (state/non1state, criminal/noncriminal, licit/illicit, etc.). Much of our diplomatic, legal, and military affairs have been predicated on being to able draw clear distinctions between these categories, and many actors are realizing that blurring them provides “strategic ambiguity.” Many of the issues associated with the blurring of these categories are most obvious in the cyber realm. Many of our adversaries are much better than we are at dealing with and, indeed, exploiting these fluid situations.

There are several factors contributing to the issue of “blurring of war and peace.” These include changes to the

1. type of actors involved characterized by the blurring of state/non1state, licit/illicit, organized crime/militant actions, etc.;
2. intent of those actors (i.e., actors’ willingness to exploit ambiguity);
3. capabilities/means that make ambiguous action more viable (e.g., cyber, media operations, the use of proxies, etc.); and
4. changes to the strategic context of international political1security dynamics, which will foster and enable such approaches.

Some of these concepts have been around for many decades like Military Operations Other Than War, but there are some fundamental differences that require very different framing and structure, and we simply have not gotten our heads around it as a nation. Government control of information is fading, which has given rise to the global citizen phenomena and globalized what were once geographically bounded, nationalist movements. Even terrorism is globalizing. We read headlines, discuss, and face things today that just did not exist 40 years ago…but our structures to cope were built 70 years ago. We are structured for regime change, to fight nations, and now, by proxy, “groups,” but we have not got a clue how to defeat “movements” that do not possess the familiar nation1state center of gravity and, increasingly, that is what we will face. This all speaks to the limits of power as the sources, derivation, and locus of power is being completely reinvented. The question is do we need a new plan to orient ourselves to face these challenges?

The intent of the conference was to examine the root causes of these new types of conflicts and their implications and provide a contextual understanding. The emphasis was predominantly on the diagnosing of the underlying causes, about orientation, and getting to a meaningful articulation of the problem. In so doing, the conference emphasized and highlighted the need for a “whole1of1government” approach to facing and coming to grips with these challenges. These include military power, diplomacy, and criminal justice, etc. The Panels ranged from those with holistic understanding of these trends to others with a regional focus.

Strategic Multi1Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi1agency, multi1disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD (EC P).

Executive Summary

This executive summary highlights key insights derived from speaker and participant interactions. This summary is meant to be comprehensive but does not force consensus. In fact, this summary should highlight that there is a high degree of ambiguity regarding what the gray zone is, what the USG should do about it, and what key questions remain.

The gray zone seems to be a return to an older, more expansive view of how an actor pursues its interests on the international scene. Yet, it only seems “gray” or “new” to us because we have defined a black and white lens through which to see the world. Others clearly do not feel they get value from adopting a similar black and white lens and act in ways that transgress our starker worldview.

Our tendency to think about the world in terms of black and white originates from our success in constructing a world system after World War II that conformed to our values and preferences, making us perfectly adapted to that initial state1base system of global order. As each technological advance concentrated power in fewer and fewer actors, the USG established its hegemony in the international system.% Then the USG created the cyber domain, and it had the opposite effect. It empowered individuals everywhere.

What is our goal in the gray zone?

Conference participants seemed to agree that the US goals with regard to the gray zone should push the USG “left of boom.” The goal is to identify and mitigate threats before they erupt into militarize conflict. Staying in phase zero is victory.

Conference participants spoke about the gray zone in a number of ways. Understanding how we talk about the gray zone will have implications for the conclusions you draw about it. The word cloud below highlights predominant words conference participants used to describe the gray zone during the conference.

Participants nearly all agreed that gray zone challenges take place primarily in the human domain. However, there were two schools of thought regarding the concentration of power. One school of thought felt that state power (as employed by Russia and China) are resurging in news sorts of ways in the gray zone. Both Russia and China have seen the rise of strong, autocratic leaders such as Putin and Xi. The other school of thought acknowledged that while some strongmen remain, in general, power is fragmenting as individuals are empowered. Proponents of the second school of thought argued that the problem with the concentration of power idea is that it correlates wealth concentration with power concentration, which is the exception not the norm in this environment.

Regardless, we seem to be seeing the breakdown of global institutional order, which has changed the distribution of power. This is complicated by the fact that our adversaries now have access to tools and weapons systems previously reserved for states, especially with regard to cyber, drones, and miniaturization. Furthermore, adversaries and competitors will not be constrained by artificial boundaries like the law, bureaucracy, authorities, etc. They operate seamlessly and make decisions quickly.

The gray zone has been alternating and described as an operating environment, a type of conflict, and a strategy. Some felt it exists outside (left of) of the conflict spectrum, some felt it primarily took place in phase zero, and some felt it occurs across the full range of conflict. If you look for opportunities within the gray zone, you realize that the area right of boom is the domain of threats and military conflict, the area left of boom is the domain of opportunity. This domain includes acceptable, if not preferable, competition that we take in order to protect our national interests. The USG clearly sees the gray zone as a threatening, but we should not discount opportunities as well.

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Stability Model Users' Guide: Incorporating StaM Analysis of Nigeria for Illustration.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B., Brickman, D., Desjardins, A., Popp, G. & Polansky (Pagano), S. (NSI, Inc).

Over the past decade the United States Government has recognized the importance of obtaining a rich contextual understanding of the operating environment, specifically focusing on the human terrain element, when addressing the current threats facing United States security interests, at home and abroad. This emphasis reflects a desire to obtain insight into the motivations underlying others’ intended or actual participation in violence against the United States, as well as the engagement strategies and initiatives that would be effective and sustainable within a given area of interest (AOI). However, this shift in thinking requires analysts and planners to quickly develop a nuanced understanding of the AOIs in which they are working in order to systematically assess their overall stability and identify areas of strength and weakness. A holistic understanding of the operating environment makes it possible to identify critical points in the system – both for stability and instability – and target engagement strategies and initiatives accordingly. This assessment also examines not only the first-order effects, but also potential second- and third-order effects, of US actions across multiple dimensions (governing, economic, and social).,

StaM Overview

NSI’s Stability Model (StaM) represents both a conceptual framework and an analytic methodology to guide users through a systematic process of obtaining a rich contextual understanding of the operating environment. The StaM aids users not only in identifying the factors that explain the stability or instability of a nationTstate, region, or other area of interest, but also in making the connections between and among the various stability factors apparent—allowing users to derive all implications of a potential engagement strategy. The StaM methodology involves an iterative process of “tailoring” or customizing the generic framework to a specific geographic or political area of interest. The output of a StaM effort includes identification of immediate and longerTterm buffers to political, economic, and social stability and sources of population resilience, as well as immediate and longerTterm drivers of instability and collapse. Once a tailored StaM has been prepared, it can be used to address further questions; these include questions regarding the impact of external actors or the most effective and stabilityTpromoting means of engaging with the AOI., , The generic StaM framework consolidates political, economic, and social peer-reviewed quantitative and qualitative scholarship into a single stability model based on these three dimensions, and, critically, specifies the relationships among them. As such, the StaM represents a cross-dimension summary, which draws on rich traditions of theory and research on stability and instability from diverse fields, including anthropology, political science and international relations, social psychology, sociology, and economics. Five key assumptions, shown in Table 1 below, serve as the foundation of the generic StaM.

StaM Assumptions

• A1: Political, economic, and social stability are necessary, but not sufficient, to explain or predict the durability (overall stability) of a political system.
• A2: A governing system will be stable if it is perceived by its constituents to meet their needs (i.e., provides material or nonBmaterial “goods”) and expectations.
• A3: Constituent needs and expectations are culturally and contextually dependent and adaptive.
• A4: The primary “goods” expected from a governing authority are the provision of internal order and external security sufficient for people to meet their physical and psychological needs.
• A5: People do not seek to change systems from which they benefit. Dissatisfaction with the provision of goods by a governing authority reduces the perceived legitimacy of and encourages opposition to that entity.

The overall stability of an AOI—which can be defined within the StaM as either a nation-state, sub-state region, or city—is defined as a compound function of its political, economic, and social stability. Note that the StaM is agnostic to form of governance. Democratic governance is not presumed. It is also agnostic to the type of economic system, and typically will include formal, grey (or informal), and black economic elements. Finally, within the StaM, neither overall stability nor social stability suggest violence- or unrest-free societies, but those where social structures are known and durable, and social cleavages and conflicts are for the most part manageable. Furthermore, stability does not imply a lack of change. Rather, it denotes the flexibility and resilience of a system to adapt to changes over time, without economic, social, or political consequences that threaten the viability of the system.

Analytic Uses of the StaM

Identifying AOI-specific stability conditions

A fully tailored StaM provides analysts and planners with a holistic picture of the governing, economic and social conditions within a specific AOI, and whether that AOI is moving toward or away from conditions consistent with stability in both the short and longer term. It also enables the identification of AOI-specific drivers of instability, buffers to stability and the exogenous conditions that can intensify these effects. Tailoring a StaM requires systematically considering all of the central concepts theory and research have shown effect stability; following the model process allows the planner or analyst confidence that significant current or future sources of stability or instability have not been overlooked.

Monitoring and early warning

Once a tailored StaM has been created for an AOI, and the drivers, buffers and intensifiers identified, the analyst or planner effectively understands what components of the model to pay attention to. This can significantly decrease the time and data requirements for monitoring an AOI over time. Furthermore, as the StaM also maps the crosscutting effects model components have on each other, we can monitor how changes in other components of the model may influence the condition of individual drivers and buffers. This increases the probability that changes with the potential to significantly increase or decrease stability will be identified early in their development.

Assessing the second and third order effects of engagement activities

One of the strengths of the StaM as an analytic tool is its ability to map the interrelationships between model components (crosscutting effects). This makes it possible for analysts and planners to trace the possible consequences of a proposed action and identify possible unintended consequences prior to undertaking an engagement activity. In effect, the model allows users to gain the “lessons learned” without having to make the mistakes that teach the lesson. More importantly, perhaps, the model enables planners and analysts to identify the location and causes of those negative effects. If identified in advance it is possible that such obstacles can be avoided and unintended consequences minimized.

Maximizing the effectiveness of engagement activities

The same crosscutting effects in the StaM that enable the identification of unintended consequences can also be used to determine how engagement activities can be structured and positioned to maximize their effect. By tracing the crosscutting effects from the component that is directly influenced by an engagement action, the planner or analyst can determine the system-wide implications of a specifically targeted action. By comparing different points or methods of influence, the relative impact of various COAs can be compared. In effect, you can determine where you get the most “bang for your buck”.

Improving coordination across USG agencies and international partners

In many cases more than one USG agency may be operating in an AOI, this creates opportunities for coordination, but also risks of duplication or even counteraction of effort. By assessing the second and third order effects of all USG efforts in a particular AOI, the planner or analyst can identify the areas where coordination of effort is most critical. Such an assessment can also bring to light opportunities where interagency collaboration allow individual agencies to achieve mission objectives in areas that they cannot influence effectively working alone. This also holds for working with international partners.

Assessing the implications of external actor actions

It can often be the case that the U.S. is operating in an AOI in which other external actors – either states or non-state actors – are present. The actions of these external actors have potential to impact the stability of the AOI. The StaM allows analysts and planners to map the effects of specific external actor actions (e.g.: presence of VEOs, large-scale economic investment by a foreign power) on the stability of the system as a whole. This in turn can provide a fuller picture of the possible implications of those actions for U.S. interests broadly, and ongoing or planned engagement activities more specifically.

Assessing the second and third order effects of shocks to the system

An AOI-tailored StaM can also be used to assess the likely indirect effects of a particular system shock or crisis event (e.g.: natural disaster, global financial crisis, major terrorist attack). The immediate effects of the shock (for example displacement of populations, crop destruction and infrastructure damage after a natural disaster) can be located on the StaM and then their second and third order effects mapped across the model. Identification of these effects prior to a shock occurring can improve planning and response.

The Science of Decision Making Across the Span of Human Activity.

Author | Editor: Wright, N. (University of Birmingham & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) & Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI, Inc).

The US is affected by the decisions of highly diverse actors, ranging from individuals, to groups (e.g. Violent Extremist Organizations; VEOs) to large and sophisticated states. The behavior of actors at any of these levels can seem “irrational” or “incomprehensible” and thus difficult to deter or influence. Understanding seemingly incomprehensible decision making is even more crucial given the growing centrality of hybrid warfare to the challenges US planners face.

Decisions are made in context and, except for the most extreme (either dire or trivial), they bear on the multiple concerns, preferences and interests a decision maker may have. The choice problems that prompt decisions are comprised of three elements: 1) the options for action an actor believes he/she has; 2) the dimensions (concerns, interests) that determine his preferences over those options; and 3) what he believes other relevant actors will do (i.e., the options and preferences attributed to others, in some cases including the state of nature.) The range of outcomes and actor expected is determined by combining his own options with what he expects others to do. In general, the difference between decision models based on strict rationality assumptions (i.e., rational choice, game theoretic approaches, expected utilty/cost benefit analyses) and those that relax or eliminate these assumptions lies in their suppositions about the nature of the processes by which multi- dimension choice problems are solved and the factors that impinge upon those processes.

Decision Making and Deterrence

Deterring unfavorable actions either by an adversary or a friend is an issue of perception; it has to do with our ability to influence how others construct their choice problems. From a decision-making perspective then, successful deterrence requires the power to alter another’s perception of the demands associated with achieving his objectives to the degree that he chooses to forego actions he would otherwise take. It is important to note that even decision approaches that include “non-rational” factors such as a decision maker’s affective state, health problems, or fatigue, still rely on assumptions about basic human or group behavior. Namely, that their actions are purposeful and that people seek to avoid self-injury or harm however they may define it. Grasping a potential adversary’s understanding of what is injurious or harmful, the interests that impinge on a choice of action, the constraints imbedded in that choice problem, and the process by which it is solved are the critical information requirements for planning to deter terror attacks, regional conflict, nuclear proliferation and even weaponization of space.

US planners and decision makers will require sophisticated analyses related to each of these factors to evaluate how deterrence messages and signals are likely to be received by adversaries and even which alternative, less unfavorable adversary behaviors might be encouraged. They will need the same types of understanding regarding ally decision making in order to send the most effective messages regarding US resolve to extend our deterrent capabilities to their shores.

A final note involves something very often overlooked in US deterrence planning: understanding the political, bureaucratic and social preferences and obligations that condition our own choice problems and decisions. This helps us better appreciate and plan against those circumstances in which we may be self-deterred, and when our own choice processes pose barriers to effective implementation of deterrence messaging or actions.

The Science of Decision Making across the Span of Human Activity

The types of hybrid conflicts that appear to have become the “new normal” in global affairs require equally hybrid response including deterring decisions being made by individuals, groups and states operating simultaneously (e.g. in Ukraine) in various parts of the globe. Taken together the chapters that comprise this volume describe how seemingly incomprehensible decisions made at different levels of analysis most often arise from the predictable ways that individuals, groups and states function. This is a first step in generating the sophisticated understanding of deterrence decisions.

In Chapter 1 Nick Wright draws from neuroscience research to explain adversary behaviors in terms of brain functions and behavioral responses. This predicts different responses to threats intended to deter adversaries versus threats intended to compel other behaviors – and when identical threats provoke attack. He also points out how easy it is to misinterpret an adversary’s activities and response to our own activities simply by our failure to consider the impacts of perceived unfairness.

In Chapter 2 Peter Suedfeld describes the conceptual progress of less dynamic to more dynamic decision theories and models. He presents his cognitive managerial model to help explain how cognitive factors and decision processing at the individual level are conditioned by the nature of the circumstance that the decision maker finds himself at the time of decision.

Clark McCauley moves the discussion to the level of group decision making in Chapter 3. He explains why group decisions are more than just the sum of individual choices. He presents an evolved group dynamics theory to explain how the type of attractiveness that defines the group can result in either: hyper consensual and often premature choice (groupthink); or can polarize the group beyond where its individuals members would have gone alone (e.g. with implications for radicalization).

In Chapter 4 David Gompert, Hans Binnendijk and Bonny Lin discuss twelve cases of war and peace decision making by national leaders and the role that the leaders’ cognitive models and personality traits play in marking the difference between what have been seen as state-level blunders and national security successes.

In Chapter 5 Gina Ligon and Douglas Derrick point out that there are decision dimensions included in VEO decision making that are unique to those types of organizations, including for example, the need for increasing violence both for reasons of organizational credibility and to maintain public attention. VEO decisions can appear to be incomprehensible or unpredictable if we consider violence as a VEO decision variable or concern rather than just a tactic.

In Chapter 6 Timothy Heath and Cortez Cooper provide an analysis of Chinese national security decision making, and in the final chapter Ed Robbins and Hunter Hustus provide the practitioners view of the value of deterrence over compellence in achieving US national security goals.

In addition to their individual contributions, two broader themes emerge when the chapters in this white paper are taken together:

• Internal Structures Condition Decisions and Behavior at all Levels of Analysis. Observable decisions are often the result of competition and interaction between internal systems, beliefs, interests, factions, components or bureaucracies. Even if not the intention, seemingly inconsistent or even self-defeating behaviors and decisions can arise even from normal functioning of these internal components as internal struggles play out in different contexts. This is true at the level of the individual decision maker where different systems in the brain constitute those structures; at the group level where the attractiveness or source of cohesion and the form of interdependence among group members significantly impact group norms and decision; and at the organization level where internal structures such as bureaucracies can incentivize certain choices and make decisions and actions inconsistent.
• Especially in Ambiguous Operating Environments the Analysis of Adversary Decision Making must be Multi-level. Decision making has common features across levels as well as features specific to the each level. As the categorical boundaries between forms of conflict are increasingly replaced by ambiguous operating environments, the best insight into an adversary’s behavior will require study of decision process and contextual factors on multiple levels of analysis (e.g., individual leader integrative complexity within the context of the structure and norms of his decision group and the bureaucratic pressures of his organization).

Contributing Authors

Maj Gen (Sel) Tim Fay (USAF/A3-5), Dr. Allison AstorinoCourtois (NSI), Mr. Cortez Cooper (RAND), Dr. Douglas C. Derrick (University Nebraska Omaha), Mr. Timothy Heath (RAND), Mr. Hunter Hustus (AF/A10), Dr. Gina Ligon (University Nebraska Omaha), Dr. Bonny Lin (RAND), Dr. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr College), Dr. Edward Robbins (AF/A10), Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia), Dr. Nicholas D. Wright (Carnegie)

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The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 7.0.

Author | Editor: TRADCOC G2.

The premise of the program at the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) is that people and organizations court failure in predictable ways, that they do so by degrees, almost imperceptibly, and that they do so according to their mindsets, biases, and experience, which are formed in large part by their own culture and context. The sources of these failures are simple, observable, and lamentably, often repeated. They are also preventable, and that is the point of ‘red teaming’.

Our methods and education involve more than Socratic discussion and brainstorming. We believe that good decision processes are essential to good outcomes. To that end, our curriculum is rich in divergent processes, red teaming tools, and liberating structures, all aimed at decision support.

We educate people to develop a disposition of curiosity, and help them become aware of biases and behavior that prevent them from real positive change in the ways they seek solutions and engage others.

We borrow techniques, methods, frameworks, concepts, and best practices from several sources and disciplines to create an education, and practical applications, that we find to be the best safeguard against individual and organizational tendencies toward biases, errors in cognition, and groupthink.

Red teaming is diagnostic, preventative, and corrective; yet it is neither predictive or a solution. Our goal is to be better prepared and less surprised in dealing with complexity.

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