SMA Publications

A Geopolitical and Cognitive Assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Security Conundrum.

Author | Editor: Wilkenfeld, J. ().

At the request of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) the J-39 Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch undertook a Coordinator’s Mission Review in July 2014 and concluded it in February 2015. This SMA project resulted in an unprecedented collaborative effort among over one hundred subject-matter experts from numerous organizations across the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Departments and Intelligence Agencies, Academia, Think Tanks, and Private Industry. The work of these subject- matter experts is summarized in this white paper.

The purpose of the review was to evaluate strategic risks and identify knowledge gaps in order to provide an increased understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. The SMA team focused on producing analyses and tools to address USSC’s questions, which were grouped into three broad categories: internal Palestinian security concerns; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel-Palestinian security. The overall objective was to provide inputs to serve as ongoing planning and training resources for the Security Coordinator’s office. The following document presents a brief summary of the key takeaways from each of the resulting reports.

Chief among the issues that were of concern to USSC was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. USSC was also vitally interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.

Among the key elements reflected in the white paper was a unique collaboration among teams of social scientists to develop and run a simulation exercise designed to identify the key flash points that might result from an increase in autonomy for the West Bank in light of differing security requirements. An international team of area experts, neuroscientists, and social media specialists collaborated with ICONS simulation designers to fashion a unique simulation exercise. USSC staff, along with subject matter experts from the region, took on roles in a fast-paced simulation that first explored areas in which confidence building could take place, followed by a phase of crisis management that put the confidence building to the test. Among the key findings were indications of differing preferences for bilateral versus multilateral talks, potentially constructive use of differing communications pathways in crisis situations, the role that international actors in general, and the US in particular, can play in enhancing security, and key challenges for legitimacy in the face of overwhelming differentials in power and authority.

This white paper outlines insights derived from third-party monitoring missions. The effort derived interesting insights with respect to Israeli-Palestinian joint security and minimum thresholds for security forces. The effort also shed light into insights on internal community investment. Also of interest are case studies the SMA team produced that looked into other states that do not have a significant army. While these case studies are informative and provide interesting insights, the case of the Palestinians is unique with its own set of unique challenges.

This research effort began during a time of considerable optimism that the mission of Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013-2014 would bear fruit at least in terms of the adoption of a framework for an eventual peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, ultimately leading to a two-state solution. Notwithstanding the ultimate collapse of those talks in April 2014 and the fact that the peace process has been in limbo ever since, the authors of this report point out that if and when this process is restarted, the issues addressed in the Coordinator’s Mission Review will again be front and center.

Taken together, the studies reported here can form the basis of effective security sector reform for the Palestinian Authority, and the carving out of a critical role for international actors in general, and the US in particular, in the event that peace talks are resumed and a framework agreement emerges.

Executive Summary

This report evaluates strategic risks and identifies knowledge gaps in our understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. Work on this report began almost at the same time as the US-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace talks were launched by US President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry in July 2013. While those talks are now on hold, the questions dealt with in the report were geared toward issues that would need to be addressed in any framework agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Chief among the issues of concern was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms, particularly when the stronger neighboring country demands an unspecified level of security. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. We were also interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.

Notwithstanding the breakdown of the peace talks in April 2014, followed by the Gaza War and subsequent Israeli elections, there is the sense that sooner or later, these issues will need to be addressed in an inevitable future two state solution to this conflict, and that therefore it is important to lay out these issues and some of their mechanisms in anticipation of this eventuality. In the view of the researchers who put the following reports together, these are still the right questions.

The seven questions were grouped into three broad categories: challenges to Palestinian internal security; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel- Palestinian security. In addition, the SMA research team provided an analysis of the socio-political and social-cultural dynamics of the region by analyzing regional social media activity in Arabic. Finally, an international team applied key insights from psychology and neuroscience to the research questions posed.

Key Takeaways

Challenges to Palestinian Internal Security

Q1. What are the critical areas of security sector reform required to make civil society work within the Palestinian Authority and across the territories versus the status quo?

An analysis was conducted by the NSI team to identify Palestinian security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. A two stage analytic method was used to facilitate the identification of impediments, or barriers, to the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces and in alignment with civil societies expectations. The methodology enabled identifying security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society. The analysis identified several areas of security sector reform measures and development: clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities of the Palestinian security sector, strengthen legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of Palestinian civil society and the population, and improve equipping and training of the security forces.

Q2. What are the challenges and opportunities for sovereignty in a state of limited arms?

While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with defense capabilities, Israel insists on numerous restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. Decades of negotiations have sought common ground to bridge this considerable gap. In this study, ICONS Project researchers at the University of Maryland undertook an empirical analysis of states with limited arms, defined as states with little to no dedicated, external defense capacity. In practical terms, this translates to states without an established military (or only a symbolic force) and low or no military expenditures. Common challenges to sovereignty include a lack of capacity to maintain internal security or defend against non-state actors, dependence on international support, and an inability to cope with external threats. Common opportunities for sovereignty include having more resources to devote to crucial development needs, a more peaceful reputation that demonstrates to regional rivals that they are not a threat, and opportunities to more easily consolidate their independence and internal stability. Mechanisms to preserve sovereignty for limited arms states can be accomplished through the development of robust domestic security forces, international security guarantees and assistance, and international cooperation on defense. In some cases, states also gradually lift the arms limitations and remilitarize to better meet threats as conditions change.

Q3. What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non- contiguous states?

The challenges of non-contiguity are at the heart of the efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state. This report by the ICONS research team seeks to inform conversations about what challenges to anticipate and how they might be over come by applying a comparative case study approach. The study identified common challenges to and mechanisms for preserving sovereignty. States with exclaves often face enormous obstacles to ensuring effective governance and security. Some stem from the local population itself, for instance local grievances due to isolation and state neglect and a lack of national sense of belonging. Others emphasize the vulnerability of exclaves without official or easily securable borders, which open the door to conflict and criminality. Finally, relationships matter immensely. Without communication and compromise, differences in law and culture can complicate the rules under which an exclave operates. In more extreme instances, a lack of trust between home state, host state, and exclave populations – or even openly hostile relations – can badly damage the viability of an exclave altogether. But some solutions exist to many commonnon-contiguous state challenges. Many states rely, for instance, on ongoing processes of negotiation with the host state to ensure access to and the smooth functioning of its exclave. Officially demarcating borders, opening up pathways to integrate with the surrounding state, and focusing on policies to improve exclave residents’ welfare also help eliminate many sources of conflict before they emerge. In some cases, joint decision-making structures or enabling local problem-solving also mitigate the difficulties of administering territory from afar. Finally,the military solution is a common, though possibly not entirely desirable option to preserve sovereignty, especially in the face of domestic threats.

Israeli-Palestine Joint Security

Q4. What are the minimum thresholds for indigenous security forces in protecting its citizens and guarding its borders, particularly when the neighbor country demands an unspecified level of security?

Competing security challenges naturally surface for Israelis and Palestinians as they maneuver to gain West Bank areas for their respective homes. While multiple factors contribute to Israeli- Palestinian tension, this study sought to understand the political positions and security interests of Palestinians and Israelis in order to find potential areas of compromise as well as true sticking points. To achieve that aim, the NSI team conducted thematic and discourse analyses on the speeches of leaders across the breadth of the Israeli and Palestinian political landscapes. The analyses suggest that there are important areas of mutual concern that may serve as starting points for negotiation as well as areas of diametric opposition. These include the need for coordinated policing, access to and protection of holy sites and public places, concern about refugees and displaced persons, and management of border areas and crossings. Competing concerns include blockade and embargo of Gaza, Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners, and IDF activities in Palestinian areas.

Q5. With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?

Question 5 was addressed with two different methodologies. First, the NSI research team derived insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank with Palestinian violence and cross-border and Israeli Defense Forces/ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (IDF/COGAT) activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect the dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. The loop analyses identify risks and suggest implications for international community activities. Key findings include:

• PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform
• PA governing legitimacy is a critical pre-condition for successful security sector institution building and PASF capacity development
• Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy and development of security sector institutions
• Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank and the mainstreaming of settlement populations undermine efforts to re-open settlement talks

In a separate analysis, the ICONS simulation group was charged with developing a simulation to address Question 5. The following objectives for the simulation were identified: (1) Gain insights on opportunities/challenges to effective confidence-building and crisis management when faced with competing security requirements; (2) Identify capabilities and contingencies which will be most useful for helping the PASF cope with legitimacy issues; and (3) Provide insights that can be brought to the inter-agency/broader USG stakeholders as deemed appropriate. The problem space for the simulation exercise focused on potential IDF incursions into Palestinian-controlled territories (Area A on the West Bank). The scenario comprised of two phases – confidence building and crisis management. Key findings were organized into the categories of communications dynamics, political/media dynamics, and key tensions for legitimacy. Key findings addressed communications dynamics (PA preference for multilateral, Israeli preference for bilateral), preferred communications pathways, differing perceptions of international and US responsiveness, and political and media dynamics. Key tensions for legitimacy included misperceptions, the IDF presence, disagreements over investigations, the role of the NSF, PA frustration over competing priorities for their security and political leaders, the role of Israeli public opinion, and strain for the PA viewed as normal by Israel. [See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]

The Role of External Actors in Israel-Palestinian Security

Q6. What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?

A third party monitoring mission could play a potentially significant role in guaranteeing a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. This report by the ICONS team aims to inform conversations about the ideal design by engaging in a qualitative comparative case study analysis of past missions. The report starts with a brief overview of the literature on third party monitoring and a presentation of characteristics that are helpful for analyzing and comparing missions. Five historical cases were selected for in-depth analysis: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT), the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Strategies from each of the missions were collected and synthesized into a list of best practices for future missions. For maintaining legitimacy: obtain parties’ consent and buy-in, establish clear expectations, demonstrate commitment and follow-through, allow for mission evolution, and develop exit strategy in conjunction with the parties. For earning trust: invest in pre-deployment training and diverse teams, exhibit impartiality through mission structure and action, serve as bridge between parties, foster good relations with locals, and work collaboratively with third parties and peace groups. For creating transparency: be visible and accessible, communicate regularly and publicly, develop clear structures and consistent operating procedures, explain when secrecy is required, and distinguish the mission from other actors. The report concludes with an appendix detailing the characteristics of a future Israeli-Palestinian third party monitoring mission focused on earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy.

Q7. With respect to the linkages between security, economy, and governance, and with recognition that each is needed to support a functioning state, where should the international community invest?

This report looks at the multiple factors that contribute to instability in the West Bank. Palestinians face escalating levels of economic, social, and governing instability that, in turn, serve to degrade the governing legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Using the NSI Stability Model (StaM) and Analysis, the NSI team identified key buffers and drivers of economic, social, and governing stability along with their second- and third-order effects. The report also identifies several considerations for analysts on where and how the international community can invest that may help to decrease instability while avoiding investing in channels that could lead to further instability. The key findings include the following: Political stalemate on the West Bank degrades perception of PA legitimacy while the PASF is feared and seen as working with the IDF and violating human rights. Declines in foreign aid and continue VAT withholdings are causing a cascading of impacts that are crushing the economy, preventing payroll payments, harming the environment, and impairing basic human rights and needs. High unemployment among youth and inappropriate job training coupled with a climate of conflict could lead to uprisings in this group. Increased limits on protests and speech further a growing discontent and risk retaliatory actions.

NSI Chapters:

• Internal Palestinian Security Dilemmas (A. Desjardins, S. Pagano, T. Rieger, R. Popp)
• Competing Security Challenges (L. Kuznar, M. Yager, K. Key)
• Legitimacy and Sovereignty in an Environment with Competing Security Requirements (A. Astorino-Courtois, B. Bragg, K. Key)
• Optimizing the Impact of International Community Investment in Security, Economy, and Governance to Support a Functioning State (T. Rieger, S. Pagano, D. Brickman, G. Popp, R. Popp, K. Key)

Contributing Authors

Mr. Ben Riley (OSD), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Ms. Lauren Barr (ICONS), Ms. Belinda Bragg (NSI), Dr. Danette Brickman (NSI), Mr. Jose Miguel Cabezas (ICONS), Ms.
Abigail Desjardins (NSI), Mr. Devin Ellis (ICONS), Ms. Kimberly Key (NSI), Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M University), Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI), Dr. Jacquelyn Manly (Texas A&M University), Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI), Mr. George Popp (NSI), Dr. Robert Popp (NSI), Mr. David Prina (ICONS), Mr. Tom Rieger (NSI), Dr. Sara Savage (University of Cambridge and ICthinking), Dr. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (ICONS), Dr. Nicholas Wright (Carnegie), Ms. Mariah Yager (NSI)

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Operating in the Human Domain 1.0.

Author | Editor: U.S. Special Operations Command.

Building on the vision of USSOCOM strategic guidance documents, the Operating in the Human Domain (OHD) Concept describes the mindset and approaches that are necessary to achieve strategic ends and create enduring effects in the current and future environment. The Human Domain consists of the people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making, and behavior. Success in the Human Domain depends on an understanding of, and competency in, the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence human behavior.2 Operations in the Human Domain strengthen the resolve, commitment, and capability of partners; earn the support of neutral actors in the environment; and take away backing and assistance from adversaries. If successful in these efforts, Special Operations Forces (SOF) will gain military, political, and psychological advantages over their opponents. The OHD Concept integrates existing capabilities and disciplines into an updated and comprehensive approach that is applicable to all SOF core activities.

SOF personnel continuously think about human interactions, building trust, and winning support among individuals, groups, and populations. Drawing on the approach and required capabilities identified in this concept, SOF and its partners use persuasion and compulsion to shape the calculations, decision-making, and behavior of relevant actors3 in a manner consistent with mission objectives and the desired state.4 SOF must win support and build strength, before confronting adversaries in battle. Working in collaboration with capable partners and as part of a whole-of-government approach, SOF enables preemptive actions to avert conflicts or keep them from escalating. When necessary, SOF and its partners confront and defeat adversaries, always mindful that the end goal is an eventual cessation of hostilities and a more sustainable peace.

SOF conduct enduring engagement in a variety of strategically important locations with a small-footprint approach that integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows SOF personnel to nurture relationships prior to conflict. Language and cultural expertise are important, but SOF’s ability to shape broader campaigns with allies and partners to promote stability and counter malign influence is vital. SOF leaders plan and execute operations that support national objectives, while providing continuous analysis and advice to ensure effective strategy. SOF must identify and assess relevant actors, understand their past and current decisions and behavior, and anticipate and influence their future choices and actions across the ROMO.

SOF contribute to the accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives during peaceful competition, non-state and hybrid conflicts, and wars among states. The ideas in the OHD Concept are key to confronting state and non-state actors that combine conventional and irregular military force as part of a hybrid approach. Adversary states are increasingly adapting their methods to negate current and future U.S. strengths, relying on non-traditional strategies, including the use of subversion, proxies, and anti- access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These adversary strategies require a refined U.S. approach for effective counteraction. A critical goal will be to create conditions that shape adversary decisions and behavior in a manner that favors U.S. objectives or develops opportunities friendly forces can exploit to achieve the desired state.

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Comprehensive Deterrence White Paper.

Author | Editor: U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The emerging concept of Comprehensive Deterrence is an initial effort to broaden strategic options for our National leaders to meet current and emerging security challenges. Comprehensive Deterrence internalizes the challenge from then Secretary of Defense Hagel’s Defense Innovation Memorandum (15 November 2014) to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance U.S military superiority for the 21st Century. Comprehensive Deterrence also acknowledges the guidance from General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 January 2015 when he noted that, “We’re going to have to think our way through the future, not bludgeon our way through it.”

Comprehensive Deterrence seeks to expand upon traditional concepts of deterrence to account for the totality and the variety of the threats we face in the early 21st Century security environment. It posits that deterrence, particularly on the left-side of the operational continuum, is not only about preventing something from happening, but also about preventing something from escalating beyond our strategic depth and our capability to respond, in a manner consistent with our National values.

Comprehensive Deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary action through the existence or proactive use of credible physical, cognitive and moral capabilities that raise an adversary’s perceived cost to an unacceptable level of risk relative to the perceived benefit.

Key themes within the concept of Comprehensive Deterrence include: 1) Existing theories of deterrence generally focus on high-end conflict conducted by Nation States on the right-side of the operational continuum. Investment in deterrence thinking on the left-side of the operational continuum is warranted to meet the growing challenges the United States and its Allies face in the Gray Zone; 2) The totality of the security challenges and the varied nature of these challenges require reframing of what constitutes strategic power and strategic risk in a complex and unpredictable world; 3) The growing trans-regional aspects of competition and conflict require new planning models, new operational constructs, new ways of thinking, and fully integrated partner networks to rescale security challenges earlier in their trajectory; 4) Select state and non- state actors are effectively operating in the Gray Zone, which demands study of how we build the nuanced inter / intra governmental multi-year campaigns that are required to successfully compete and win in this space; and 5) Comprehensive Deterrence points to a grand strategy to deliver more effective security for the Nation.

The conceptual lines of effort within Comprehensive Deterrence are; 1) Expanding the Strategic Start Point, 2) Rethinking Strategic Power and Reframing Power Projection with two sub- components, Partner Based Power and Population Based Power, 3) Rethinking Asymmetric Approaches, 4) Rethinking the Strategic Nexus between the Land and Human Domains, 5) Broadening Considerations of Strategic Risk, and 6) Expanding Technology Solutions for the Human Domain.

The concept of Comprehensive Deterrence is an outgrowth of the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) and the United States Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) futures and wargaming platforms. The adjective, comprehensive, speaks to deterrence across the operational continuum and to the application of a Whole of Government / Whole of Partner framework to enable its full realization.

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Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Next 5-25 Years.

Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc).

USPACOM requested that the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct an “Examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests particularly in the East China Sea.” More specifically, USPACOM requested an examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identification of where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests, particularly in the East China Sea; and suggestions as to how USPACOM might best leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context.” The project request also included a series of questions (see Appendix A) that, taken together represent two broad concerns.

• The Nature of the Future Operating Environment. Namely, how should USPACOM planners envisage the threats and opportunities represented by the Asian environment over the next 5, 10 to 25 years? (Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8)
• US Engagement Policy. Specifically, what are the key components of a regional engagement policy centered on China that empowers US partners and allied interests to foster multi-lateral defense of strategic stability in USPACOM’s AOR? (Questions 9, 5, 6, 10 and 11)

The primary objective of this project was to provide decision makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Pacific region and, by doing so, broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.

SMA convened a multidisciplinary group of eleven teams drawn from government, industry, think tanks, and universities. The individual teams employed multiple methodological approaches, including strategic analytic simulation and qualitative, quantitative, and mixed analyses to address USPACOM’s questions. This integration report focuses on the qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted by the think-tank and industry teams (CEIP, CSIS, Monitor 360) and academic teams (START, TAMU, UBC) that informed the simulation and modeling work done by the other teams (GMU, NPS, ICONS).

Executive Summary

Evaluating strategic risk in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two to three decades is a complex challenge that is vital for USPACOM planning and mission success. Based on current trends, it appears that what some have dubbed the ‘Asian Century’ may be taking shape. By 2020, three of the five largest economies in the world and more than half of the ten largest militaries in the world will be located in Asia, and more than half of the world’s population will soon reside in the region. How well the United States (US) responds to emerging opportunities and threats to its interests will be determined by the depth of its understanding of the diverse set of political, economic, and social factors in the region. A better understanding of the priorities and interests that drive the “rise” of China, Asia’s largest country, as well as the likely global consequences of its actions will help planners and policy makers both anticipate and respond to future developments. A multi-disciplinary framework that combines these needs could provide valuable insight in dealing with this complex and evolving issue.

The diverse range of approaches and sources utilized by the individual teams involved in this project is one of the strengths of the SMA approach; however, it also makes comparison and synthesis across individual analyses more challenging. The findings from this project are integrated using an interest- based framework. Most broadly, these interests can be categorized as security (preservation of the state and military security), economic (economic prosperity and development), and prestige (international influence and standing). National interests generate economic, social, and international prestige objectives for states, which in turn inform their foreign policy goals and underpin a state’s position and response to specific issues that arise in regional relations. Domestic constraints and pressures can intervene between national interests and foreign policy objectives, potentially changing the nature of that objective, its relative salience, or both.

Without an understanding of the national interests and objectives of both sides, anticipating the likely consequences of any action to influence an issue becomes a matter of luck. The potential of a situation or action to create conflict or cooperation between states is a function of how those states’ interests align and whether their leadership perceives these interests to align or conflict. When interests lead states to seek or prefer different outcomes, conflict (not necessarily military) is created and all states involved face some risk that their interests will be threatened, although if they prevail, there is also opportunity to further or secure an interest. When the interests of states align and all involved can benefit from the same outcome, opportunity also exists. Consciously or not, state leaders and decision makers attribute objectives, goals, interests, and intentions to other states, and interpret their actions in light of these attributions.

Contributing Authors

Swaine, M. ( Nicholas Eberstadt, M. Taylor Fravel, Mikkal Herberg, Albert Keidel, Evans J. R. Revere, Alan D. Romberg, Eleanor Freund, Rachel Esplin Odell, Audrye Wong, CEIP. Dr. Belinda Bragg, NSI. Dr. John Stevenson, UMd. Lt Gen (Ret) Dr. Robert Elder, Dr. Alex Levis,
GMU. Dr. Rita Parhad, Mr. Jordan D’Amato, Mr. Seth Sullivan, Monitor-360. Dr. Peter Suedfeld, Brad Morrison, UBC. Dr. Randy Kluver, Dr. Jacquelyn Chinn, Dr. Will Norris, TAMU. Dr. Clifford A. Whitcomb, Dr. Tarek Abdel-Hamid, Dr. CAPT Wayne Porter, USN (Ret), Mr. Paul T. Beery; Mr. Christopher Wolfgeher; Mr. Gary W. Parker, CDR Michael Szczerbinski, USN; Major Chike Robertson, USA (Naval Postgraduate School)

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Leveraging Neuroscientific and Neurotechnological (NeuroS&T) Developments with Focus on Influence and Deterrence in a Networked World.

Author | Editor: Fay, T. Brig Gen (Joint Staff) & Barraza, J. (Claremont Graduate University).

This white volume focuses on possible ways that insights from the neurosciences may be incorporated into, and used within the United States Government’s (USG) approaches and ability to conduct optimized influence and deterrence operations for the purpose of maintaining global stability. In this context, neuroscientific techniques, technologies and information are viewed as viable means to build upon and enhance tactical approaches from other disciplines such as the social sciences. Understanding the neurobiology of human behavior can provide an added dimension to formulating deterrence and influence strategies in the context of a security environment that has become more complex and far more fluid over last few decades. In this white paper, the term “neurodeterrence” refers to the consideration and application of evolutionary neurobiological information about, and understanding of cognition and social behaviors that are important to deterrence theory in contexts of conflict.

Key insights provided by contributing authors that are of particular relevance to the operational community include:

• Modern deterrence must draw on multiple disciplines ranging from physics and engineering to the psychological sciences. Neuroscience and neurotechnology (neuro S/T) might well offer new insights and methods to aid military practitioners and to enhance their decision-making.
• Neurodeterrence is the application and consideration of evolutionary neurobiological bases of cognition, emotion and behaviors that are influential to individual and group aggression and violence. Such information is important to deterrence theory in contexts of understanding, predicting and mitigating/preventing conflict.
  • The use of neuro S/T and the information these approaches afford can be important to the interpretation of human behaviors that do not appear to follow rational or mathematical models.
  • Equally important is that while neuroscience affords great potential, it is also limited in particular aspects of technical capacity and applicability and, therefore, does not – and should not – provide a stand-alone or absolute toolkit for understanding aggression and violence. Neuroscience should be integrated into the development and evaluation of approaches to influence and deterrence.
• The field of neuroeconomics and related disciplines can provide unique insights to underlying mechanisms of human decision-making and behavior, and therefore are of importance and value to informing new developments in influence and deterrence.
• Improved understanding of the mechanisms of decision making could make important contributions toward effective deterrence. New approaches to deterrence will require consideration of the biases and motivations of decision makers as they approach complex choices. Thinking about deterrence in terms of social partners – rather than opponents – may improve the process of decision making.
• The psychology of revenge is important to explain the evolution of deterrence, which attempts to prevent aggression and overt violence prior to initiation. While characteristically considered in contexts of nuclear armament strategies, deterrence – as a concept and operational construct – predates nuclear weapons, and evolutionary models are useful to explain how deterrence emerged as an approach to individual and group actions aimed at protecting and defending people, objects, and lifestyles of value.
• There is empirical evidence that experiencing a narrative can be transformational, and can induce long-term effects upon audiences’ beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions and actions. Therefore, the prudent use of narratives may be a crucial approach through which to influence the beliefs of those who (are predisposed to) disagree with the position espoused in the persuasive message.
• It is important to consider not only the perspective of the person being influenced but also the potential for each actor to influence others. Preliminary evidence suggests that brain systems implicated in perspective taking and social cognition (e.g., considering ‘how might this idea be of value to others?’ or ‘what will they think of me if I share?’) may be key to understanding individual differences in being a successful idea salesperson.
• Techniques and recent research findings of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics can be useful to predict changes in individual behavior. Studies have shown, for example that neurobiological information in response to persuasive messages can provide more accurate predictions of behavior change than assessment of participants’ own attitudes toward the behavior in question and their intentions to perform the behaviors in question.
• Individual differences in sensitivity to both rewards and punishments are culturally determined to some extent, but also reflect underlying genetic-environmental interactions on a variety of levels.
• Biological events, affecting the brain, and induced by neural functions (i.e. so-called “bottom-up” and “top-down” effects), have been shown to be involved in the formation of trust. Of particular interest in this research has been the putative role of the neuropeptide oxytocin in neurobiological mechanisms of trust formation and execution. Research to date indicates that oxytocin appears to exert influence upon subliminal (i.e. preconscious) perception of social information by increasing attention given to socially-relevant interpersonal and environmental cues (thinking about the “other-in-contexts”) and by lowering sensations of (social) threat. Neuroimaging studies suggest that humans experience trust as rewarding, through activation of key mid- and forebrain networks, which may be important to functional fortification of these networks activity in various social/environmental conditions to reinforce future trust/cooperation.
• The neural phenomenon of “prediction error” can help U.S. policymakers to cause intended effects, and avoid unintended effects, on an adversary in a diplomatic or military confrontation. Prediction error provides a tool to increase or decrease the impact of our actions. A prediction error framework forecasts important effects such as inadvertent escalation; and it simplifies across existing strategic concepts so it can be operationalized without additional analytical burden. It explains historical cases and makes clear policy recommendations for doctrine and practice in China-U.S. escalation scenarios.
• The human capacity for individual and group empathy, and the behaviors fostered by these cognitive-emotional states (e.g. the extent to which altruism supersedes egoism, and empathic emotions repress self-interest) can affect attempts at deterrence in those situations when “stronger threatens weaker”. Simply put: Humans care about groups, and experience strongly emotional reaction to perceived threats to an “in-group”. Such emotionality can affect, influence (and interfere with) more rationalized decision- making relative to engaging behaviors that affect self, and “in-group” or “out-group” others.
• The intersection of new and iterative cyber-based communication technologies (CBCT) and psychological and neurobiological dimensions of behavior should be regarded as a potentially important – and viable – convergence of S/T. Possible applications and implications of such (cyber-neuro) convergence include:
  • Synthesizing traditional methods of social influence with recent advances in neuroscience, cyberpsychology, and captology (the study of persuasive technology) toward development of an advanced set of personalized persuasion tactics.
  • Establishment and use of chat rooms and other forms of social media to serve as digital echo chambers to effect greater social polarization.
  • Novel approaches to crafting effective messages that capitalize on current neurocognitive and anthropological research about individual and group beliefs. Such research has shown that one cannot start by simply crafting a message; rather it is essential to incrementally prepare a person or an environment to make communicated messages credible.
  • Combining actor-specific approaches to tailored deterrence methods within the broader neuroscience and technology (neuro S/T) framework can provide a model for operationalizable Neurodeterrence approaches.

Contributing Authors

Brig Gen Tim Fay (Joint Staff), Dr. Jorge Barraza (Claremont Graduate University), Dr. Roland Benedikter (University of California, Santa Barbara), Dr. William Casebeer (DARPA), Dr. Jeffrey Collmann (Georgetown), Dr. Nicole Cooper (Univ. of Penn), Dr. Diane DiEuliis (HHS), Dr. Emily Falk (Univ. of Penn), Dr. Kevin FitzGerald (Georgetown), Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown), Dr. Scott Heuttel (Duke), Mr. Hunter Hustus (USAF), Dr. Clark McCauley (Bryn Mawr), Dr. Rose McDermott (Brown), Dr. Ed Robbins (USAF), Dr. Victoria Romero (Charles River Analytics), Maj Jason Spitaletta (JHU/APL), Dr. Rochelle E. Tractenberg (Georgetown), Dr. Nicholas D Wright (Carnegie Endowment) Editors: Dr. Hriar Cabayan (Joint Staff), Dr. William Casebeer (DARPA), Dr. Diane DiEuliis (HHS), Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown), Dr. Nicholas D Wright (Carnegie)

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A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc), Suedfeld, P. (University of British Columbia), Spitaletta, J. (Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory) & Morrison, B. (University of British Columbia).

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary discourse analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

The results are summarized in a two-part report. Part I (this document) provides a summary, comparison of results, and recommendations. Part II describes each analytical approach in detail.

Data: The speeches used in the study were delivered by al-Assad from Jan 2000 to Sept 2013; the past six years was sampled most densely. Additional Twitter feeds were analyzed to gauge his influence in the region.

Analytical Approaches: Five separate methods analyzed the speeches: (a) automated text analytics that profile al-Assad’s decision making style and ability to appreciate alternative viewpoints; (b) integrative complexity (IC) analysis that reveals al-Assad’s ability to appreciate others’ viewpoints and integrate them into a larger framework; (c) thematic discourse analysis of the cultural and political themes al-Assad expresses before taking action or in reaction to events; (d) qualitative interpretations of major themes in al-Assad’s rhetoric; and (e) analysis of the spread of Twitter feeds. We highlight findings that reinforce each other as particularly robust for policy.

Summary Findings: The major findings of these studies include:

• al-Assad is capable of recognizing other viewpoints and evaluates them in a nuanced and context-dependent manner
• al-Assad values logical argumentation and empirical evidence al-Assad’s integrative complexity is relatively high, but might be lower before he takes decisive action or when under intense threat
• al-Assad’s reasoning is consistent with his Arab nationalist Ba’athist political ideology, and with a consistent opposition to Israel and Western domination; al-Assad sees Arab resistance and his leadership, or at least that of the Ba’ath party, as essential

Main Findings

Basic findings from studies of al-Assad’s speeches, 2000 – 2013

1. Various Measures of Cognitive Complexity: Multiple measures converge to show that Assad is capable of appreciating different viewpoints and the nuances between them. al-Assad’s integrative complexity (his ability to differentiate different perspectives and integrate them) is relatively high compared to other leaders in the region. al-Assad furthermore demonstrates an ability to be logically consistent in how he evaluates situations, and is responsive to credible (in his view) empirical evidence.
2. Deterrence: Traditional deterrence theory should apply to al-Assad generally, although during periods of intense stress he may deviate more from such a model.
3. Integrative Complexity (IC): In general his IC has not changed over the course of the conflict. But analysis of specific events suggests his IC tends to be lower when under intense threat, or before taking decisive and violent action, compared to afterwards.
4. Arab Nationalism: al-Assad wants to lead Arab interests; he is a staunch Arab nationalist.
5. Opposition to the West and Israel: al-Assad wishes to oppose Western and Israeli influence in the Arab world; the history of Middle Eastern peace talks makes Assad cynical about Israel-Palestine negotiations, despite his cognitive inclination for negotiation. Assad’s narrative of opposing Israel decreases dramatically once Syrian unrest begins (March 2011); return to this narrative may be an indicator of his baseline rhetoric in times of relative peace within Syria.
6. Secular Ba’athist Political Ideology: al-Assad’s reasoning and values are consistent with a more secular, Ba’athist, political ideology.

Key Recommendations

We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-Assad as a target audience of one, and we absorbed the relevant components of our multi-method analyses into the Target Audience Analysis format. Summary of Key Recommendations along with Supporting Analyses, Part II Location, and Confidence Level are shown in table one. The main practical recommendations are:

• Avoid direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power;
• Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively high baseline level of Cognitive Complexity (ability to see different sides to an issue, flexible decision-making, openness to information), pragmatism, and respect for Arab nationalism to broker a negotiated settlement; and
• Identify and exploit al-Assad’s dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity to assess his relative susceptibility, develop arguments and recommended psychological actions and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time.

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8th Annual SMA Conference: A New Information Paradigm? From Genes to ‘Big Data’ and Instagram to Persistent Surveillance…Implications for National Security.

Author | Editor: Cabayan, H. (Joint Staff) & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

We live in an age characterized by the reshaping of society through the presence of information and networks. The proliferation of information technologies from the micro and instantaneous to the insights hidden in “big data” has generated a range of new issues with implications for global transformation and political power shifts, patterns of conflict and warfare, and potential opportunities for enhancing global stability. The time is right for a thorough consideration of the implications of this “age” on US national security issues. How can we best understand the near-term and long-term consequences of these changes? What adaptations to our current intellectual frameworks, intelligence processes, organizational structures, command and control practices and planning approaches may be necessary? In short, how can the United States Government (USG) and its allies recognize the risks as well as the opportunities for enhanced global security presented by fuller realization of the “information age”?

The intent of the Conference was to examine the implications of the information/network age. What are its key dynamics? What impact do these dynamics have on national security-related topics? And, what changes in USG modes of planning, operation, policy development, and military capabilities are needed to mitigate information age risks while simultaneously recognizing and seizing opportunities?

The 2014 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Conference focused on these opportunities and challenges from various perspectives and disciplines including neuroscience, behavioral and social sciences, and operational strategy. Emphasis was placed on the need to interweave these various disciplines and perspectives. As in previous years, the conference sought to address the needs of the Geographical Commands. Representatives from the Commands discussed their pressing needs and key operational requirements. SMA’s wide network of experts as well as conference participants assisted in identifying and discussing capabilities that could match these needs.

Opening Session

CAPT Todd Veazie, NCTC, opened the conference. He stated that SMA’s objective is to provide deep contextual orientation and decision quality assessment to warfighting commanders on intractable problems. Brig. Gen. David Béen, JS/JL39, added that SMA’s multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach does not exist anywhere else in the Department of Defense (DOD). We are living in challenging times, and we need multidisciplinary expertise from across industry, academia, think tanks, and others.

Mr. Ben Riley, PD DASD (EC&P), then questioned whether we are in a different or unique era compared to any other time in history. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) studied this question and determined that today is similar to the pre-World War I era in terms of a recent revolution (industrial and information respectively), rise of great powers, struggle of traditional nation states, and global communications advances. He emphasized that it is critical that we understand that global events arise from previous conflict, conditions, and events.

Keynote Speaker: LTG Ed Cardon, US ARMY Cyber Command

LTG Cardon stated that he believes we are in a new global paradigm brought about by the information/technical revolution. Due to this, threats and vulnerabilities are increasing, often in highly complex ways. The US military is dominant in the operational environment, but is losing strategically because we struggle in the information environment. We are in a political struggle and cyber operations are key to success in this area. Cyber operations could be used in all phases of conflict, but particularly in phase 0 and phase 1. He hoped that organizations like SMA could help bridge the gap between the operational and information environments.

Keynote Speaker: Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service

ADM Rogers stated that in the digital age, the DOD has to be an agile organization that is capable of quickly building communities of interest in response to wide-ranging, unanticipated crises (such as Ebola). Big data provide new opportunities to distill critical information from the noise to generate insight and knowledge. However, in order to harness the power of information, we have to create partnerships with individuals and organizations we have never worked with before from the private sector, industry, academia, NGOs, think tanks, individuals, and others. That is why the tools and methodologies developed by the SMA community are so important.

Panels

Panel One examined complexity, interdependence, and emergence in an interconnected information age. The demographic/age change we are experiencing is the central issue facing the United States today because of newly emerging threats and opportunities that are arising and will continue to do so. It is essential to understand the nature and character as well as the dynamics of the information age. There is an incredible amount of data constantly being collected in the world today because of the information boom, but the ultimate challenge is figuring out how to make sense of the signal in all of that noise to help better understand the emerging threats and opportunities. The world today consists of a very complex and uncertain environment characterized through interconnectedness and increased competition over resources. Thus, it is time to shift our focus beyond predictability and instead focus more on sense making. We are overwhelmed with data and we need new tools and methodologies to use this data to make sense of an uncertain environment. The United States must start focusing on opportunities to shape the rapidly changing environment and ultimately become more strategic and adaptive in its planning. With the world today being in an age of transition, from the past we learn that the most important factor in determining the success or failure of world systems during times of transition is the system’s willingness or resistance to accept change. However, in reality, today we are rather conservative and overall resistant to change.

Panel Two discussed the information age, networks, and national security. In this new information age, which is defined by huge amounts of data, an abundance of information does not equal power. Instead, power is the ability to use information to define reality. Thus, communication plays a central role power. Using communication to define reality requires creative thinking—something that the intelligence community (IC) struggles with. Historically, the IC has been strong when it comes to critical thinking, but the IC and the US government as a whole often struggle when it comes to creative thinking. When trying to use information to define reality it is important to remember that different cultures use social media differently. If we are going to analyze social media, we must also understand how people in different parts of the world use and understand social media.

Panel Three explored patterns of conflict and warfare in the information age. Information technologies are changing the character of warfare due to advancements in networking, robotics, command and control, etc. This panel also explored how potential US adversaries might employ information technology to create narratives that develop sympathy for their cause and hinder US involvement and decision-making during a crisis. The panel found that the information age has made the world more transparent, which consequently makes the world more lethal for US forces. The panel also concluded that the information age has made political warfare (phase 0) more relevant. Russia and China are both engaged in political warfare with the United States.

Panel Four asked representatives from the Joint Staff and Commanders to discuss how the information revolution is shaping their worlds. They found a correlation of information environment to the national security environment. Adversaries and potential adversaries to US disadvantage are using the same freedoms the USG seeks to protect in an agile manner. Information is a combat multiplier but we are moving into an age where user-generated content allows adversaries the ability to employ the ever-growing list of social media that nation-states cannot match. How do we account for this trend? The panel found that when the USG tries to do information operations, it is sprinkled into the operational plan at the very end. It has to be baked in from the beginning to be effective. Additionally, panel members found that the answers to many of the challenges we face are hidden in the data and are only seen in hindsight. We need to move the identification of key factors closer to the decision-making calculus. Finally, panel members encouraged the DOD to find creative methods to better share information with partners and allies to achieve common objectives.

Panel Five discussed the intersections of big data, neuroscience, and national security. Big data helps allow for neuroscience insights to become operational. Linking big data to neuroscience is crucial in allowing for the use of neuroscience to provide utility in an operational environment. However, while significant advances are being made in the field of neuroscience (specifically in terms of big data collection), significant technology gaps exist. Furthermore, when operationalizing neuroscience it is important to realize there are a number of ethical and legal issues.

Panel Six examined how to understand social systems in phase 0 through human geography, big data, micro information, and the reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence (RSI) paradigm. When analyzing a problem, it is crucial to begin by defining the purpose, perspective, and process to make the best use of available information and have effective intelligence. The distinction between what problems you are trying to solve and why it is important to you drives what kind of intelligence is needed, why it is needed, and who needs it. While data can come in various forms and provide important insights into factors like location, place, region, movement, and human-environment interaction, to actually make use of the data, it is essential that the problem set is well defined in the beginning. Data can come in many different ways, but it is important that something like metadata, leveraged crowd sourced verification, etc. is provided along with the data to illustrate trustworthiness confidence levels, etc. Furthermore, in addition to understanding confidence levels, it is important to understand that very good data can sometimes be at a scale that is inappropriate for a given analysis and if this is the case the data may not be applicable.

Panel Seven explored the implications for US influence and deterrence capability of the nearly instantaneous availability of both large and micro data. The panel used the example of attempts to deter Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) activities to begin its discussion of the impact of immediate, global communications on the effectiveness of US deterrence messages. The panel suggested that a strategic imperative for the US is to make sure that our messages, whether kinetic or informational, do not embolden or inadvertently strengthen potential adversaries. Although some argue that we need to respond quickly to opportunities to discredit or challenge adversary narratives, the USG has extremely limited capacity to change the worldviews of people in different culture and environments. There is some academic research and analysis describing countering specific adversary messages as a means of deterring unfavorable behaviors but very little that supports the notion of changing basic narratives. These research efforts need to be better operationalized for the DOD community. Furthermore, US words and deeds must be synchronized, as they are both forms of communication.

Panel Eight discussed what is in store for the Pacific Region and specifically U.S.L China relations amidst the information revolution. Over half of the world’s population resides in USPACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), which consists of 36 nations and offers a number of unique characteristics and challenges. As two global superpowers, the U.S.-China relationship will shape the Pacific Region going forward. In order to build trust and improve security within the U.S.-China relationship and throughout the Pacific Region overall amidst the ongoing information revolution, we must understand and improve connectivity, communication/language, cultural understanding, confidence/confidentiality, collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. The information revolution has provided us with new methods of communication as well as the ability to better assess our effectiveness in our relationship with China. For the first time, we have the opportunity to fully understand communications with China. The next step will be to use communication as a means to deter and drive a specific outcome. China and the U.S. diverge on some aspects of the Internet including desired regulation levels and hacking and cyber-crime concerns and activities, all of which will influence the U.S.-China relationship going forward.

Panel Nine asked representatives from the Commands to discuss what they have learned at the conference, what they will be taking back from the conference, and where they anticipate needing further assistance. One takeaway was that the USG is not clearly messaging its own narrative. We need to focus on strengthening our own narrative in the information age. A second takeaway was the main targets of insight of many discussions were political officials. If these topics are not raised to these decision makers, we risk talking to ourselves. A third takeaway was that the information revolution is unlike other revolutions that were based on breakthrough inventions; the IT revolution continues to advance and expand. The thing we must manage is not the technology itself, but rather the evolution of that technology. A fourth takeaway is that operating in this new world requires building partnership and communities with unconventional partners within and outside of the USG. But progress in this area is impeded by an overly burdensome classification system. Finally, open source information is underutilized, particularly as non-kinetic (political) warfare become more prominent.

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Understanding Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm.

Author | Editor: Ehlschlaeger, C. (ERDC).

Given the challenges of declining DOW budgets while improving our ability to monitor megacity populations, this white describe many of the issues facing the DOD for phase zero operations and collecting theinformation necessary should conflicts escalate.

The overriding goal of this White Volume is how to best understand the changing population, infrastructure, and environment in complex urban environments so that we can respond to both short‐ and long‐term national security challenges. The SMA research project “Megacity Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Project: Dhaka Pilot” uses the term `Megacity’ in its title to reflect the challenges of under‐ standing rapidly changing urban environments. SMA chose Dhaka, Bangladesh for the case study because Dhaka is one the quintessential urban spaces that traditional DOW socio‐cultural techniques would find most challenging to understand. Dhaka is one of the fastest growing cities in the world, a megacity with no indication that its growth rate will decline.

This White Volume explores issues relevant to understanding urban populations, both today and years from now, and the stability indicators that will help to monitor insecurity and prevent potential crises around the world. While the U.S. Government has long monitored the stability of other regimes, it does not have a long history of extensively monitoring other populations except when U.S. troops are deployed overseas. For example, the South Vietnamese military and the U.S. Army works side‐ by‐side extensively measuring and monitoring populations in rural areas prone to Vietcong activities. This very labor intensive survey was stored in a database man‐ agement system and quantitatively analyzed. It was statistically shown that the col‐ lection and use of this database reduced violence in areas with data collected com‐ pared to similar areas not monitored. Monitoring populations using human terrain teams or U.S. and Partner Nation military units, however, is both risky and labor in‐ tensive. Thus, existing population monitoring in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be per‐ formed across the entire globe due to their costs. It is necessary to change the way we collect, integrate, and disseminate population information to achieve short‐ and long‐term national security goals.

The White Volume’s authors represent practitioners and researchers with extensive experience in their respective fields. While we were unable to include all the experts desired for this effort, the White Volume contains a broad spectrum of perspectives for better understand urban environments. The chapters are organized from the more theoretical and philosophical to the more technical. The following brief de‐ scription of these papers provides an overview of each chapter, but doesn’t express all the content contained within.

Dr. James Knotwell’s “Megacity Place‐Centric Population Analysis” begins the White Volume with a discussion on the need for cultural understanding in RSI using the “Fundamental Four” cultural descriptors. He points out the Fundamental Four doesn’t account for the “analysis of place”, or how geography affects culture. Dr. Knotwell discusses in detail how socio‐cultural analysis could be improved by better understanding of geographic analysis of place.

Next, Marc Imhoff et al.’s “Evaluating Long‐Term Threats to Environmental Security via Integrated Assessment Modeling of Changes in Climate, Population, Land Use, Energy, and Policy” chapter discusses regional environmental security forecasting energy, water scarcity, and climate changes far into the future.

In the third chapter “Understanding Megacities‐RSI – Dhaka’s Design as an Expres‐ sion of Culture & Politics,” Dr. David Ellis and James Sisco explore the socio‐cultural dynamics of Dhaka, Bangladesh from the community level, mahallas, upwards to better understand instability indicators. The chapter discusses the tension between political, religious, and social aspects of the unplanned megacity.

Douglas Batson’s chapter on land tenure and property rights in megacities discusses rural‐to‐urban migration and the piratical power grabs associated with slum for‐ mations. It examines ungoverned urban spaces and the process of building human security by improving poor peoples’ hold on land. Finally, the chapter discusses three tools that will aid in identifying and understanding who occupies and controls megacity spaces.

In the fifth chapter, “Urban Socio‐Cultural Monitoring with Passive Sensing,” Michael Farry et al. propose that passive sensors located in difficult to assess urban envi‐ ronments will provide actionable intelligence in local or tactical situations. The au‐ thors analyze how various measurable social signals can be applied to PMESII vari‐ ables. The use of small sensors, while potentially problematic if used in phase zero environments, could provide valuable information in ungoverned urban spaces when supported by partner nation governments.

While other chapters in this White Volume discuss ways to represent populations geographically or culturally, Randy Pearson’s “A Network‐based Approach to Na‐ tional Security” raises the challenges of understanding illicit financial networks. Pearson discusses the trans‐dimensionality of illicit networks, and the difficulty of representing this information for DOW operational planning. The complexity of fi‐ nancial networks is not an uncommon one for socio‐cultural analysis. Socio‐cultural systems cannot be easily represented in any of the traditional quantitative visualiza‐ tion methodologies (I.e., thematic maps, topographic maps, networks) because the number of dimensions of socio‐cultural factors is greater than what can easily be readily seen.

In Chapter Seven, “Evaluating Slum Severity from Remote Sensing Imagery,” Dr. Karen Owen discusses original research demonstrating remote sensing techniques that will help identify neighborhood‐scale socio‐cultural information in urban areas, especially economic variability. While the techniques require calibration for each megacity, the research provides excellent direction for experienced remote sensing professionals.

Chapter Eight, “Modeling the Discourse of Megacities: Assessing Remote Populations in the Non‐Western Worlds,” Dr. Kalev H. Leetaru & Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger discuss the ramifications of collecting information from the internet in order to understand megacities. They argue that while megacities have unique geographic and social characteristics, the tools and techniques for understanding communication remain the same but that additional foundational information will ease the difficulty of monitoring urban areas in the RSI paradigm.

Chapter Nine, “How Semi‐Automated Analysis of Satellite Imagery Can Provide Quick Turn‐Around Economic and Environmentally Relevant Answers to Large Scale Questions”, by Ms. Ida Eslami et al., provides a technical discussion on re‐ search that can greatly benefit the RSI paradigm. The goal of their research is to de‐ velop techniques for taking satellite imagery and processing it to actionable infor‐ mation. Their technique mainly uses MODIS satellite products updated every 16 days in order to monitor changes and trends over time. Possible socio‐cultural ap‐ plications include urbanization, crop abundance & predicted yields, and the availa‐ bility of natural resources. Given the challenges of monitoring megacities around the world in phase zero, automated techniques will be necessary to derive information from the copious amounts of data collected from satellites and the internet.

The final chapter, “UrbanSim: Using Social Simulation to Train for Stability Opera‐ tions,” Ryan McAlinden et al. discuss modeling urban environments for training. Social and cultural modeling plays a critical role in advancing our situational under‐ standing of these complex, interwoven environs. Academia, government and indus‐ try all continue to make advancements in developing accurate models of human be‐ havior, though significant challenges still remain. These challenges are presented in the context of an existing training application for teaching Battalion commanders how to successfully navigate complex, multifaceted missions where the populace is the cornerstone to success.

Contributing Authors

LTG Michael T. Flynn (DIA), Mr. Douglas E. Batson (NGA), Dr. Eliza Bradley (NGA), Ms. Jill Brandenberger (PNNL), Mr. Bruce Bullock (CRA), Dr. Katherine Calvin (PNNL), Dr. Leon Clarke (PNNL), Dr. James Edmonds (PNNL), Dr. Charles R. Ehlschlaeger (ERDC), Dr. David Ellis (GBH), Ms. Ida Eslami (NGA), Mr. Michael Farry (CRA), Mr. Sean Griffin (NGA), Dr. Mohamad Hejazi (PNNL), Dr. Kathy Hibbard (PNNL), Dr. Randall Hill (USC), Dr. Marc Imhoff (PNNL), Dr. James Knotwell (KG), Mr. Kalev H. Leetaru (GU), Mr. Ryan McAlinden (USC), Dr. Karen Owen (NGA), Mr. Randy Paul Pearson (USNORTHCOM), Dr. Jonathan Pfautz (CRA), Dr. David Pynadath (USC), Mr. James Sisco (GBH), Ms. Allison Thomson (PNNL)

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Implications and Lessons Learned for Megacities.

Author | Editor: Desjardins, A. (NSI, Inc).

Our analysis of Dhaka shows how common problems of governance (lack of capacity, unclear lines of authority) and provision of services are magnified in both scale and impact in the context of megacities.

Although the focus of this analysis was a single megacity, our examination of Dhaka raised some issues and questions that have implications for our understanding of all megacities. Cities have been part of human society for thousands of years. Population demands continue to drive their growth while technology and innovation have helped overcome the logistical problems associated with concentrating so many people in such small areas. But is there a functional limit to the size of a city? Our analysis of Dhaka shows how common problems of governance (lack of capacity, unclear lines of authority) and provision of services are magnified in both scale and impact in the context of megacities. Environmental pressures present another challenge to the effective functioning of Dhaka. Are these problems unique to Dhaka, or megacities in the developing world, or do they also have the potential to affect all megacities?

As a town or city grows, there is a matching need to develop and manage infrastructure, planning, and provision of basic services for the population. As such systems grow in scale they tend to also grow in complexity, requiring greater expertise, technical knowledge, and resources to manage effectively. As bureaucracies become larger, they become more complex and cumbersome, potentially compromising efficiency and accountability. Governance, then, faces a dual problem: scale of task and organizational complexity. In less developed countries (LDCs) these problems have been exacerbated by the speed of growth of megacities. In many such megacities, such as Dhaka, Cairo, and Santiago, the speed of growth has far outpaced urban planning capacity and infrastructure development. This has contributed to the scale of slum developments, which become effectively ungoverned sections of the city with limited access to many basic services. In contrast, New York, Tokyo, and many of the “established” megacities in more developed countries (MDCs) did not experience the same overwhelming speed of population growth that those in the LDCs have faced. Rather they have taken their present form and scale after their national and regional governments consolidated and developed the institutional capacity to effectively govern large urban populations.

One possible solution to the problems created by the scale of megacities is to divide governance of the city into smaller organizational units, or to devolve lines of authority to the sub-city level. This could potentially increase the efficiency of service provision and general governance, both by reducing the scale of these tasks and enabling public officials to focus more specifically on the needs of various groups or geographic areas of the city. This was the approach taken in Dhaka, with the division of the city into parallel administrative entities – Dhaka South City Corporation and Dhaka North City Corporation in 2011. It appears, however, that this approach brings with it a new set of problems, specifically, overlapping areas of responsibility that increase, rather than decrease, bureaucratic inefficiency and reduces transparency and accountability. Recent reporting suggests that the division of the city may have actually further compromised service provision and heightened the chaotic governance.

When considering the governance and administrative needs of megacities several critical factors emerge. First, governing capacity and technical expertise is essential to the creation of a functioning megacity capable of meeting the needs of all of its residents. Second, the speed with which a city grows to become a megacity places increasing pressures on governance and planning; the faster a city grows, the more likely it is to outstrip the ability of any governing authority to keep up. This suggests that identifying cities that are growing at a rapid rate and intervening early to increase governing capacity and plan for future growth could relieve some of the negative (crime, environmental quality, insufficient basic services) aspects of megacities. Better understanding of the causes of rural-urban migration may also offer the potential to slow the speed of growth of some of the most vulnerable megacities, such as Dhaka. It is possible, for example, that greater investment in rural development may help stem the tide of migration to major urban centers, providing greater potential for planned development and strengthening of governing capacity as cities grow.

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A Multi-disciplinary, Multi-method Approach to Leader Assessment at a Distance: The Case of Bashar al-Assad (Part II: Analytic Approaches).

Author | Editor: Kuznar, L. (NSI, Inc) & Suedfeld, P. et al. (University of British Columbia).

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

The results are summarized in a two-part report. Part I provides a summary, comparison of results, and recommendations. Part II (this document) describes each analytical approach in detail.

Data: The speeches used in the study were delivered by al-Assad from Jan 2000 to Sept 2013; the past six years was sampled most densely. Additional Twitter feeds were analyzed to gauge his influence in the region.

Analytical Approaches: Five separate methods were used to analyze the speeches:

• Approach 1: Integrative Complexity (IC) analysis as developed by Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia) is a measure of the degree to which a source recognizes more than one aspect of an issue or more than one legitimate viewpoint on it (differentiation), and recognizes relationships among those aspects or viewpoints (integration).
• Approach 2: Thematic Discourse Analysis based on methodologies developed by National Security Innovations, Inc. (NSI) and conducted by Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne (IPFW). It provides general predictions of which themes will precede conflict and which will emerge as a reaction to conflict, an assessment of the major narratives al-Assad draws on to persuade his audiences, and analyses of themes that emerge around specific events.
• Approach 3: Automated Leadership Trait Analysis using ProfilerPlus and the Language Inventory and Word Count (LIWC) software (JHU-APL). The primary objectives were to examine (1) the cognitive complexity through means independent from the UBC method in Approach 1; and (2) al-Assad’s leadership traits using Hermann’s (2002) method of political profiling. Selections of English translations of al-Assad’s speeches were analyzed using two pieces of software: ProfilerPlus; and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). Automated text analyses ingest and analyze the whole speech not simply randomly selected sections.
• Approach 4: Geopolitical Discourse Development Analysis. CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) analyzed the common corpus of 124 speeches by Bashir al-Assad from 2000 to present. They provided qualitative interpretations of major themes that emerged in al-Assad’s discourse over the course of the 13-year period studied
• Approach 5: Analysis of Influential Arab Twitter Feeds. A team of analysts from Texas A&M University analyzed the twitter feeds of 195 influential Arabs in the Middle East, in each 24 hour period before and after al-Assad delivered a speech for the months of August and September, 2013. They also examined the relative influence of al-Assad and other regional players in the Arabic Twittersphere to determine the extent the regime is able to influence public opinion.

Major Findings: The major findings of these studies include:

• al-Assad is capable of recognizing other viewpoints and evaluates them in a nuanced and context-dependent manner
• al-Assad values logical argumentation and empirical evidence al-Assad’s integrative complexity is relatively high, but might be lower before he takes decisive action or when under intense threat
• al-Assad’s reasoning is consistent with his Arab nationalist Ba’athist political ideology, and with a consistent opposition to Israel and Western domination; al- Assad sees Arab resistance and his leadership, or at least that of the Ba’ath party, as essential.

Key Recommendations: We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-Assad as a target audience of one, and we absorbed the relevant components of our multi- method analyses into the Target Audience Analysis format. The main practical recommendations are:

• Avoid direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power;
• Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively high baseline level of Cognitive Complexity (ability to see different sides of an issue, flexible decision-making, openness to information), pragmatism, and respect for Arab nationalism to broker a negotiated settlement; and
• Identify and exploit al-Assad’s dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity to assess his relative susceptibility, develop arguments and recommended psychological actions and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time.

Main Findings

Basic findings from studies of al-Assad’s speeches, 2000 – 2013

• Various Measures of Cognitive Complexity: Multiple measures converge to show that al-Assad is capable of appreciating different viewpoints and the nuances between them. al-Assad’s baseline integrative complexity (his ability to differentiate different perspectives and integrate them) is relatively high compared to other leaders in the region. al-Assad furthermore demonstrates an ability to be logically consistent in how he evaluates situations, and is responsive to credible (in his view) empirical evidence.
• Deterrence: Traditional deterrence theory should apply to al-Assad generally, although during periods of intense stress he may deviate more from such a model.
• Integrative Complexity (IC): In general his IC has not changed over the course of the conflict. But analysis of specific events suggests his IC tends to be lower when he is under intense threat, or before taking decisive and violent action, compared to afterwards.
• Arab Nationalism: al-Assad wants to lead Arab interests; he is a staunch Arab nationalist.
• Opposition to the West and Israel: al-Assad wishes to oppose Western and Israeli influence in the Arab world; the history of Middle Eastern peace talks makes al- Assad cynical about Israel-Palestine negotiations, despite his cognitive inclination for negotiation.
• Secular Ba’athist Political Ideology: al-Assad’s reasoning and values are consistent with a more secular, Ba’athist, political ideology.

Main Recommendations:

We used the doctrinal 7-Step MISO process to characterize al-Assad as a target audience of one, and we absorbed the relevant components of our multi-method analyses into the Target Audience Analysis format. The main practical recommendations are:

• Avoid direct threats to the Syrian Ba’athist regime’s hold on power;
• Appeal to al-Assad’s relatively high baseline level of Cognitive Complexity (ability to see different sides of an issue, flexible decision-making, openness to information), pragmatism, and respect for Arab nationalism to broker a negotiated settlement; and
• Identify and exploit al-Assad’s dynamic levels of Integrative Complexity to assess his relative susceptibility, develop arguments and recommended psychological actions and/or refine assessment criteria at a specific point in time.

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