SMA Publications

Russia and the Arctic.

Author | Editor: Levis, A. & Elder, R. (GMU).

The receding of the Arctic ice presents the Russian Federation with complex opportunities and challenges, both domestic and international. Russia is investing heavily in developing the infrastructure on its Arctic coastline to support both destination shipping in the Arctic and transit shipping through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The estimated resources in the Russian Arctic Region in energy and minerals are very large but their extraction requires major long term investments and such investments are high risk ones because of harsh weather and the insufficiency of the existing infrastructure; some of the existing infrastructure is degrading because of the thawing of the permafrost. Russia’s effort to modernize its Armed Forces has included the creation of the Arctic Joint Strategic Command that includes the Northern Fleet. Old bases are being re‐opened and new bases are created in the Arctic region. These developments in the Arctic show clearly that the Far North is expected to have a major role in the future of Russia not only for economic reasons but also as a common theme, a common narrative that resonates with the Russian people. It will be unwise to interpret all Russian actions in the Arctic as being statements to the West or to the East. It will be helpful if they are also interpreted in terms of internal domestic (and nationalistic) considerations.

Clearly, the Arctic plays a major role in the future of Russia not only for economic reasons but also as a common theme, a common narrative that resonates with the Russian people. It will be unwise to interpret all Russian actions in the Arctic as being statements to the West or to the East. It will be helpful if they are also interpreted in terms of internal domestic (and nationalistic) considerations.

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Authors: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.) and Tom Rieger . (NSI, Inc.)

Quick Look Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

In the current environment of contested norms, increasing great power competition, and rapid technological change, protecting and furthering US interests requires the ability to compete effectively in the information environment (IE). In recent years, the IE has seen the proliferation of actors, channels of communication, and messages. To compete in this crowded and contested environment, we must be able to communicate effectively. Yet, the IE is complicated, available information is often vast and imperfect, time is constrained, and additionally, we are limited by our own cognitive capacity.

Humans have developed several adaptations to address these cognitive limitations, including heuristics and other mental shortcuts that facilitate survival by enabling more efficient processing of information from the environment. Unfortunately, these same shortcuts hardwire biases into our thinking and communication, which render messaging efforts ineffective and open to manipulation by adversaries seeking to mislead or confuse. These cognitive biases can lead to inaccurate judgments and poor decision- making that could trigger either unintended escalation or failures to identify threats in a timely manner. Understanding sources and types of cognitive bias can help minimize miscommunication and inform development of better strategies for responding to adversary attempts to leverage these biases to their advantage.

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Author: Farwell, J. (King’s College, U. of London and Middle East Institute.)

Executive Summary

This report addresses the elements of narrative that lend coherence to US military activities that could help shape Chinese and Russian behaviors. From there, the paper looks at kinetic and non- kinetic tactics that are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade. These responses do not factor in the potential impact of emerging technologies, including G5, Artificial Intelligence, and Quantum Computing. These seem likely to have a significant impact and the Pentagon would seem well advised to conduct new research that anticipates the scope and capacity of each technology and how each or all of them confluently affects tactics, strategies, and operations.

This essay focuses on tactics, not the broader questions of operations or strategy as the United States wrestles with the implications of New Generation Warfare (NGW). Russia’s term is “hybrid warfare.” China’s approach is expressed in its Three Warfares concept. The West talks about “Gray Zone” warfare.

NGW is usually discussed in military circles. But it is more distinctly a political notion, not a military one, although its strategies incorporate military aspects and, especially for Russia, kinetic activity. All three nations’ notions think of NGW as action short of warfare.

The Russian notion of hybrid warfare emanates from the “active measures” employed by Russian intelligence during the Cold War and preceding it. Its approach seeks to create disruption, chaos, fear, uncertainty, and loss of confidence in the media as well as in public and private institutions. The approach includes weaponized social media, coercion, bribery, disinformation, intimidation, and unattributed kinetic action.

The Chinese notion is more sophisticated and builds upon a late 1990s concept of combination warfare that was adapted from its perception of US approaches, based on observations about how the United States operated during Desert Storm in Iraq. China has evolved its approach into a “Three Warfares” concept that confluently employs lawfare, psychological warfare, and media warfare. China leverages the state’s authoritarian power to integrate its concept with diplomatic, intelligence, and economic strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative. China is vigorously promoting its version of 5G for the Internet, tying it to Huawei, and requiring users to employ Chinese standards and technology. It has been well observed that China’s “aid” turns nations into debtor states, could hamper free trade, and “could set global and regulatory and technical standards for new technology that could provide advantages to Chinese companies over others.” Its use of media warfare and other tactics helps present Chinese actions in a deceptive light that the United States and its partners should expose, discredit, and de-legitimize.

This report proceeds to examine the Russian hybrid warfare and the Chinese Three Warfare concepts in depth. It suggests elements both of a US and a multilateral allied narrative that could lend coherence to US military activities and could help shape Chinese and Russian behaviors in a manner that better serves US national interests. Understanding how to address their concepts and forging new strategies and tactics that leverage our unique strengths to gain a competitive edge is vital to our current and future security.

Author | Editor: Kuznar, E. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and income distribution were analyzed for Croatia’s country report: the 2017 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income and data collected by Croatia’s government that provides the mean monthly income and number of employees for specific occupations.

Results

Croatia’s Arrow-Pratt score is one of the lowest scores in this study, ranking it 151 of 158. Its low Arrow- Pratt score indicates that Croatia’s population is highly risk acceptant. This risk acceptance is constant across both datasets, with those who earn the highest incomes scoring as the most risk acceptant.

Implications for US Interests

Croatia is strategically valuable to the US and other Western countries due to the role it plays in the Balkans. Its acceptance into the European Union during 2013 gave the US and its allies in NATO and the EU an important ally that can be used to confront Russian encroachment into the region and help other former Yugoslavian states democratize and potentially join the EU. Croatia’s highly risk acceptant population poses a risk to the US and its Western allies in the EU that rely upon its political stability to lead other Balkan nations away from Russia and toward a more democratic state.

Implications for China’s Interests

China has been increasing its bilateral trade with Croatia in order to curry favor and further its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Beijing has designed to flow through the Balkans and continue further into Europe. However, Croatia’s membership in the EU creates roadblocks for pursuing deeper economic or political interests in Croatia. The Croatian population’s risk acceptance provides Beijing the potential to influence Croatia through its BRI, if China can demonstrate how its increased influence will translate to socioeconomic opportunities for a population seemingly eager to take risks on new partners and opportunities.

Implications for Russia’s Interests

Croatia stands as a roadblock to Russia’s influence in the region. As a result, Russia only has minor economic investments in Croatia. It is plausible that Croatia is a larger threat to Russia’s aspirations in the Balkans more than ever before as Croatia has achieved both EU membership and has pledged to bring other Balkan states into the EU. Croatia and Russia’s somewhat confrontational relationship gives Russia little opportunity to increase its influence in the country even with Croatia’s risk acceptant nature. However, the ability to disseminate Russian propaganda and political influence is still possible for Moscow as in recent years Croatia has narrowly dodged political crisis after a 2016 vote of no confidence in its Prime Minister (Skrpec, 2017).

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Author(s): Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); Elder, R. (George Mason University); Kuznar, L. (NSI); Olsher, D. (Integral Mind); Popp, G. (NSI); Sleevi, N. (TRADOC); Suedfeld, P. (University of British Columbia); Wright, N. (Intelligent Biology)

Report Preview

Over the course of this project, multiple sets of questions were edited and added to the effort, resulting in a total of 29 questions. In this document, the individual teams have addressed as many of the questions in this list as addressed by their research and analytic efforts for this SMA project.

The list of 29 questions is divided into five sections throughout this report.

Section I: Regional Analyses includes questions examining the ins-and-outs, implications, and potential outcomes from a regional perspective. These questions investigate: key actor interests, the interplay of conceivable actions by these actors, conditions that would support or lead to potential outcomes. Many of the SMA teams were able to apply their individual methodologies or tools to address these questions. The modeling teams included TRADOC’s ATHENA, GMU’s Timed Influence Net (TIN) modeling, and Integral Mind’s cognitive simulation. The analytic approaches included: NSI’s I-R-C Analysis and Pathways Analysis, UBC’s Integrative Complexity, Intelligent Biology’s Cognitive Assessment, NSI’s Quantitative Discourse Analysis, and OSU’s Strategic Media Messaging Analysis. Finally, the SMA teams incorporated subject matter expert via NSI’s ViTTa effort and analysis from an expert from Western Carolina University.

Questions from Section II: DPRK Analyses focus internally on the stability of the DPRK state and economy. DPRK state stability are explored by modeling teams of ATHENA and Integral Mind modeling teams alongside the NSI analytic and ViTTa approaches.

In Section III: Proliferation v. Denuclearization, the I-R-C and ViTTa analyses thoroughly review conditions and options for denuclearization while the OSU team examines the messaging narratives from Russian and Chinese media. Three SMA teams, Intelligent Biology, UBC, and Integral Mind, take a cognitive approach to examining the way towards denuclearization.

Section IV: Regional Objectives, Actions & Implications covers future outcomes and explores the implications of regional actions. In this section, the modeling efforts by GMU and TRADOC submit future scenarios and examine the steps taken to get there. Two ViTTa analyses and work by the cognitive assessment and discourse teams address how the US can work with partners in the region.

In Section V: Cognitive Assessment of KJU Confidence, Cognition, and Discourse, four SMA teams shared a common corpus and conducted seven different analyses: quantitative discourse analysis, cognitive mapping, thematic content analysis, integrative cognitive complexity analysis and motive imagery scoring, application of the empathy checklist, basic emotive analysis, and discourse of deception. From these initial analyses, the teams went on to address questions of KJU’s regime confidence and assurance, and recommended communication strategies that would appeal to KJU’s communication styles and cognitive proclivities. For more in-depth reading, please refer to the full reports submitted by the individual teams. Links to these reports can be found in the appendix. Review the Part I report for a summation of the key findings across all of the individual efforts.

Authors: Dr. Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College); Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University)

Quick Look Preview

Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This Quick Look specifically assesses and describes how one area of social scientific research, called Inoculation Theory, can be used to build individual resistance to attitude change, especially as it relates to force protection against misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. An essential part of understanding how individuals are persuaded to change their attitudes involves understanding how they resist persuasion and attitude change (Banas & Rains, 2010). Inoculation Theory has continued to receive scholarly support and attention for the past two decades. As the name suggests, inoculation to persuasion operates in basically the same way as medical inoculation (Compton, 2013). When you get a flu shot, a weakened form of the virus is injected into you, enabling your body to build up resistance to future attacks from the virus (Banas & Rains, 2010). Similarly, Inoculation Theory maintains that when individuals are exposed to weakened versions of arguments against attitudes they currently hold, they are able to build up resistance and counterarguments to future threats to those attitudes.

Applications of Inoculation Theory have been made to health, politics, and commerce (Compton, 2013). We can also see, and recent research supports, how Inoculation Theory can be applied to help solve pressing twenty-first century issues related to information spread, propaganda, and source credibility. Recent studies, which will be explored in this report, focus on how we can potentially “vaccinate” citizens against misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. This report begins with a summary of the original conceptualization of Inoculation Theory, followed by updates and advancements designed to address early conceptual and data limitations, and ends with a summary of current research, including practical applications (Banas & Miller, 2013).

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Author | Editor: Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning [CAOCL]); Yager, M. (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Invited Perspective Preview

Note: This assessment was written before the death of Sultan Qaboos on 20 January 2020.

While the death of Sultan Qaboos is inevitable, the succession will likely fall well within the purview of the Basic Law and will be done with minimal national or regional disturbance. Who that successor will be and the ability to navigate and lead as Sultan Qaboos has done for 49 years is at this time unclear. It is very likely that the people of Oman will express a desire for greater local and regional self-governance as well as more freedom of expression and the rolling back of restrictions on the cybersphere, but for actual internal violence, there is no way to predict this.

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Author: Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Introduction

In 2020, the States of the European Union (EU), as well as NATO’s European members and those States not enjoying membership of one or both organizations (e.g. the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland, and others), confront a serious multi-faceted challenge. This challenge takes the form of popular radicalization and mass migration (PRMM) of both refugees and non-refugee migrants originating in the portion of US Central Command’s Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) located in the Middle East and Central Asia and by extension into North Africa within the AFRICOM AOR.

This analysis examined specifically the concerns of the States of the EU2 + 1 (the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany) and the other States of German- speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE). The latter include German-speaking Austria and Switzerland but also Hungary, the Czech Republic/Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland.

In varying degrees, but nonetheless consistently, these States view PRMM as posing: 1) a serious potential (or actual) Islamist terrorist threat to their national security (despite the fact that not all refugees or migrants are Muslim), and 2) an increasing likelihood for generating potential (or actual) socio-political instability in their domestic affairs.

To the degree to which PRMM is exacerbated by Russia’s military action in support of Syria in the latter’s civil war (the term is used generically), PRMM may be viewed as fostering Russia’s larger geo-strategic objectives of causing the greatest possible weakening of both the EU and NATO. Further, to the degree to which current Russo-Turkish cooperation continues— and Turkish-EU/NATO estrangement lasts—Turkey may well continue to serve as the principal corridor through which PRMM may be “exported” into Europe via Greece and the Balkans.

Key Findings

• Historically conditioned attitudes in the EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE complicate effective and rapid responses, whether national or collective, to PRMM.
• Barring major “Black Swan” events, EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE will continue to stress the importance of an international rules-based, preferably UN-led, effort to mitigate PRMM insofar as it threatens Europe directly. This would include on-site de- radicalization efforts in MENA itself and anti-mass migration efforts both on the EU’s borders and within individual States.
• EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE participation in a US-led “coalition of the willing” to mitigate PRMM is unlikely. Of the States in question—based upon the examples of the Sahel, the Mediterranean, Iraq and Afghanistan—exceptions might be found in the United Kingdom, France, and Poland. German participation in any large-scale combat role or safe-zone protective function is unlikely given both the current “lame duck” status of Chancellor Angela Merkel in the run-up to national elections currently scheduled for 2021 and other domestic concerns.

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Research to Identify Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in Eurasia in the Next 5-25 Years: Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) Summary Report.

Author | Editor: Canna, S., Bragg, B., Desjardins, A., Popp, G. & Yager, M. (NSI, Inc).

From July through November 2015, NSI employed its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to systematically interview 26 subject matter experts in support of a Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort to research and identify drivers of conflict and cooperation in Eurasia in the next 5-25 years. Representatives from the United States European Command (EUCOM) provided 37 questions to guide the interview effort (see Appendix A). This report summarizes SME knowledge and insights on these questions—grouped into nine chapters.

The executive summary focuses on the issue of deterrence, which was a recurrent theme amongst the expert responses. From a social science perspective, we first need to ask, what behavior do we want to deter (i.e., Russian “aggression”?) and why (i.e., how does deterrence serve US strategic interests?)? The executive summary focuses on the element of conflict and cooperation with Russia: deterrence, strategic interests, and implications.

Background

ViTTa is a virtual network of trusted subject matter experts, unconventional thinkers, brightest minds, foreign voices, and varied perspectives. ViTTa Subject Matter Experts enable NSI to craft timely and cost effective analyses of critical and complex problems.

Under tasking from USEUCOM, the effort identified emerging Russian threats and opportunities in Eurasia (with particular emphasis on EUCOM AOR countries). The study examined future political, security, societal and economic trends to determine where US interests are congruent or in conflict with Russian interests, and in particular, detect possible leverage points when dealing with Russia in a “global context.” Of particular interest were Russian perceptions of US activities in Eastern Europe and what impact (positive or negative) those activities are having on deterring Russian aggression in the region. Additionally, the analysis considered where North Atlantic Treaty Organization interests are congruent or in conflict with Russian interests.

Strategic Interests

Russia
Russia’s rhetoric and actions suggests that it is dissatisfied with the international status quo. It wants a return to Russian greatness in the international community. Expert opinion indicates that, for Russia, a return to greatness would comprise the following elements:

• international prestige and recognition;
• acknowledged sphere of influence in near abroad; and
• economic, military, cultural, and political power and vitality.

These desires are driving Russian domestic and foreign policy and are clearly entangled with Russia’s aggressive foreign policy actions, including the annexation of Crimea, military intervention in Ukraine, and support for Bashar al Assad in Syria. From its perspective, Russia is hindered in achieving its strategic interests by international and domestic factors including Western attempts to “keep it down” (e.g., NATO enlargement, sanctions, etc.), low oil prices, slow economic growth, and demographic decline.

United States
The United States Government (USG) has multiple objectives in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR)—with regional stability being arguably the foremost among them. To achieve this end, the experts felt that USG decision-makers have reverted into a Cold War mindset that engenders a reflexive preference for containment of Russia. They pointed to efforts to expand NATO—an organization established after World War II specifically to contain the Soviet Union—and economic sanctions as evidence of a preference for containment over engagement. However, experts were evenly divided over whether containment or engagement strategies would be most effective in restoring stability in Eurasia. This summary does not weigh in on the optimal strategy, but highlights two competing pathways to stability addressed by the expert elicitation effort: containment and engagement.

The Centrality of the Russian Economy

Few issues exist in Russia that have greater potential to destabilize the country by creating internal dissatisfaction among both the elite and the general population than the economy. Experts felt USG leaders do not fully appreciate the importance of Russia’s economy as the driver of Russian decision- making. The USG uses sanctions as a sort of tier two punishment—below the threshold of military force. However, in Russia, sanctions are viewed essentially as an act of war. There is a mismatch in perception between the USG and the Russian government and people about economic levers of power that is fundamental to this study.

Experts noted that economics dominates Russian media and government speeches, more so than Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria—as is supported by thematic analysis conducted by Dr. Larry Kuznar. Even absent economic sanctions, Russia’s economy is in serious jeopardy due to low oil prices, lack of economic modernization and diversification, and a shrinking workforce. It is important to remember that Putin’s initial popularity and legitimacy rested on strong support for his policies that resulted in economic growth from 1999-2008.

The USG sees Putin as a nationalist and, therefore, aggressive, but Putin does not draw his support from a sense of populist nationalism; he draws his support from economic reform and improvement. It is easy to get caught up in the mistaken belief that ultranationalism is driving Russia aggression, but this term is often misused in the USG. Ultranationalism is not influential in Russian politics, but nationalism is. Experts felt this is concerning because by punishing Russia economically, the West is undermining both the economic and political stability of the nation. So the question then becomes, what does the West fear more: a failed Russian state or a stable, powerful Russia?

Containment and engagement actions taken by the United States (both USG as a whole and EUCOM more specifically) can influence Russian stability. Each of these paths create both risk and opportunity for US interests and has implications for EUCOM engagement activities in the EUCOM AOR as a whole.

Central Question

Pathways
Is it better for the USG to have a stable, strong, and prosperous Russia (satisfied) or an unstable, contained, and weak Russia (unsatisfied)?

The first thing we need to know is what conditions are associated with each type of Russia? That is, what do we know about what Russia needs to make it stable/satisfied, and what do we know about is making it unstable/unsatisfied?

Because this analysis represents a thought exercise, and requires some simplification, we associate US engagement and cooperation with Russia leading towards a satisfied Russia versus continued US containment and conflict with Russia leading towards an unsatisfied Russia. We then explore the risks and opportunities associated with each pathway.

The second part of this thought exercise is to evaluate the implications (at the extreme end of the spectrum) of these pathways for US interests.

Engagement/Satisfied Russia

Benefits
A stable, economically and politically strong Russia may better serve USG strategic interests as they relate to stability in the Middle East, the shake up of Western-leaning Eastern European nations, the balancing of East and West, and the development of the Arctic. Experts believe the West may be able to find common ground on these issues through a more cooperative relationship with Russia, but an uncooperative Russia could—and does—act as a spoiler for many of these critical issues.6 Furthermore, a more cooperative relationship with the West undermines Putin’s ability to deflect blame for domestic problems—although at least one expert stated that Putin would always be able to spin the relationship in his favor given his control of the media. Because of this, experts believe the only effective mechanism of communicating to Russian elite and the population a willingness to engage is through action—not words. By focusing on engagement vs. conflict with Russia, the West erodes Putin’s ability to message that the USG is the enemy of Russia. It opens the door for the population and elite to see the potential for economic prosperity through cooperation.

Risks
Additionally, while a satisfied Russia may serve US long-term, strategic interests, this pathway raises significant concerns for Western interests: losing face and fueling Russian ambitions. An overly confident Russia might mistake Western cooperation for weakness and use its new political, economic, and social stability to challenge the international system. This poses a difficult conundrum where long-term US strategic interests are best pursued in a way where any concessions made could be perceived or framed by adversaries and competitors as weakness. The significant Russia information operation complex will likely play up these developments as a win for Russia at the expense of the West.

Containment/Unsatisfied

Benefits
The benefits of a contained Russia include the maintenance of the status quo for the international community in terms of continued US leadership, the reduction of a conventional military Russian threat to Europe, and support of US allies.

Risks
While a contained Russia may serve Western interest in maintaining the international status quo, this policy runs the risk of undermining the political and economic stability of Russia in the longer term. A perfect storm of a prolonged, weak economy; rising nationalism; significantly decreased quality of life for Russian citizens; and restricted economic opportunity for the political elite may result in a weak or failed state or the replacement of the current administration with one that is less stable or favorable to the West. State failure and political change in Russia is often abrupt, leaving little time for the West to respond or alter its strategy. Furthermore, the lack of any clear successor to Putin means we have scant information regarding the type of leader – and thus policies – that would ensue.

Additionally, Western efforts to contain Russia may increase its reliance on gray zone activities, increasing conflict via proxies, and increased reliance its nuclear threat if its conventional military and other means of influence and deterrence fail. Experts believe that containment of Russia may have unintended consequences fore US strategic interests and regional stability.

Levers of Influence

Third we need to explore the effects of US levers of influence, particularly sanctions and NATO enlargement.

Sanctions
The more force we apply to economic levers (such as sanctions), the more we cause Russia to turn away from the West towards Iran and China. Right now, Russia sees itself as more European than Asian, and would prefer to retain ties to the West. However, sanctions are pushing Russia to form alliances with countries outside the sanctions regime, countries we do not want to see getting more powerful.

Sanctions may also weaken Putin’s legitimacy, driving him to increase the use of nationalism and aggressive foreign policy to shore up his political support. This may provoke a geopolitical crisis that the West would like to avoid. In the absence of sanctions, Putin is not likely to give up his nationalism rhetoric, but it might give him options other than aggressive actions, to enhance his legitimacy.

NATO Enlargement
NATO was expressly created to contain the Soviet Union. It is not hard to imagine why Russia perceives NATO expansion as a real threat—particularly expansion into the area Russia considers to be its near abroad.

The danger of NATO expansion in this day and age is that power is increasingly about generating political will and less about sheer capacity. Experts pointed out that expansion has broadened NATO’s membership, but in doing so has weakened the organization’s collective political will. NATO has not demonstrated the political will to defend its newer states from aggression, weakening the effectiveness and credibility of the alliance—although some SMEs challenged this assertion pointing to the recent increase in NATO military exercises. Taken together, these factors point to a critical weakness at the heart of NATO: as the alliance grows bigger, member states’ interests become more diversified, making it increasingly difficult to command unified action in the event of external aggression.

Conclusion

When Russia cannot express its power economically, it seeks to do so militarily (not so dissimilar to Iran). The implication of this for EUCOM is that there are risks and benefits to both the containment and engagement pathways for US strategic interests. This summary report covers many issues facing decision makers in the EUCOM AOR and dives deep into expert knowledge from multiple disciplines and perspectives to challenge assumptions and provide nuanced understanding of the issues.

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ISIL Influence and Resolve.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

During FY 2014, the SOCCENT Commander requested a short-term effort to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural, and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. As shown below, the SMA1 team really addressed two related questions: “What makes ISIL attractive?” or how has the idea or ideology of ISIL gained purchase with different demographics; and “What makes ISIL successful?” or which of the organization’s characteristics and which of the tactics it has employed account for its push across Syria and Iraq.

The effort produced both high-level results and detailed analyses of the factors contributing to each question. The central finding was this: While military action might degrade or defeat factors that make ISIL successful, it cannot overcome what makes ISIL’s message and idea attractive. The complete set of products from the effort is available by request from Mr. Sam Rhem in the SMA office (samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil).

For the follow-on effort, the SOCCENT Commander has requested an effort to address the following question: Given that when the dust settles and some degree of durable stability has been established in the Middle East, it will no longer look as it did prior to the start of the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIL; therefore, the question is what will the Middle East look like, and how is it likely to operate both within its own regional community and in interactions with external powers and actors, after the ISIL threat has been defeated and the Syrian Civil War has come to an end.

The articles in this white paper summarize work on going and completed by different SMA-affiliated teams in response to this request. The focus is primarily on one of the regional actors: ISIL and the nature of that organization’s interests, influence capabilities, support, and resolve. There has not yet been an effort to consolidate the insights presented by each of the pieces. Rather, they are presented as stand-alones from which analysts and practitioners might gain insight. A final project report including additional regional actors will be available from the SMA office in December 2015.

The question posed for follow-on SMA support to the SOCCENT Commander broadens the look at ISIL undertaken during the first phase, and considers the group in the context of regional dynamics. Essentially, this is a question about the relations embedded in the dynamic, multi-actor system that comprises the Middle East region, and will determine the outcome of regional events. Figure 2 represents the analytic model that serves as the framework for the larger study. It posits that how the system evolves over time is a function of the interests at stake for the actors, their ability to pursue those interests, and the alignment of interests between actors.

An individual actor’s ability to influence the outcome of regional events is a function of three resource factors: its capability, popular support, and resolve, relative to other actors in the system. However, how actors chose to influence the course of regional events will be a function of how well their interests can be met by specific event outcomes. We assume that actors will prefer outcomes that protect or further their interests.

The alignment of interests between actors will determine the set of potential outcomes for any particular regional or sub-regional event. However, common interests or alignments between actors may vary across events or conflicts; we cannot assume that a preference for the same outcome in one event will result in shared interests among the same actors in other events. While the alignment of actor interests determines possible outcomes, the distribution of actor capabilities, popular support, and leadership resolve across those outcomes will govern the likelihood that an outcome will emerge. The framework also accounts for the potential effects of exogenous factors on the region (such as environmental or demographic changes) and how these may influence the individual actors.

Analytic Framework

Evaluation of the range of possible futures that the region may see begins with identifying the relevant set of actors. The framework includes five types of actors:

• Status quo (ante bellum) regimes – current state governments within recognized borders (for example, the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the elected parliament in Turkey);
• Parasitic organizations – such as trans-national criminal organizations that operate in the area;
• Government opponents – challengers to the status quo from within. This includes opposition parties or groups who are opposed to a current government but seek change through existing institutions, rather than regime change (e.g., the Iraqi List in Iraq; Labour in Israel);
• Regime opponents – groups fighting for significant change in the type of regime or political system either within or across existing borders (e.g., ISIL, Free Syrian Army); and,
• Population groups – many of whom have limited political or ideological interests but seek mainly to survive in the midst of the conflict ranging around them.

The ability of each actor to influence the evolution of the system toward different outcomes is a function of its relative capability, popular support, and resolve.

Capability. There are many types of capabilities that an actor might use to achieve its ends in a conflict. These include: material resources and coercive capabilities (e.g., money, weapons); non-physical means of influence or coercion (such as salient narratives and persuasive messages); a reputation for horrific violence; possession of territory; and alliances including external funding sources and the allegiance of local elites. Importantly not all influence capabilities are equally relevant to all conflicts or objectives. For example, the United States is certainly the world’s greatest military power, but may not have the non-physical influence capabilities needed to achieve its desired ends. Similarly, ISIL may have significant ability to control populations through the threat of horrific violence, but lack the organizational capability needed to occupy and control large population areas.

Popular Support. Some degree of popular support for or acquiescence to the programs or policies of an organization or government can be a critical enabler. Likewise, a population that does not see a leadership as legitimate or is at odds with its priorities can pose a significant barrier to action and place limits on the resolve of a government to sustain certain actions.

Resolve. Finally, a government or organization’s willingness or need to fight to the bitter end for an objective or principle has been shown to a deciding factor in achieving one’s preferred outcome in a conflict—even when capabilities are lacking.

The framework assumes that actors are motivated to protect and further their interests. To determine how an actor will apply its ability (capability, popular support, and resolve) to an event or conflict, therefore, we need to understand which of that actor’s interests are at stake in the context of a particular event or conflict. Once we identify those actor interests, they can be linked to a specific outcome, or outcomes, where we can then construct a map that specifies the sub-set of actors that prefer different outcomes and estimate the total resources and resolve behind each outcome. This is a critical element of the framework, as, by definition, the outcomes of conflicts are not the result of a single actor’s actions or desires, but are a product of the interactions of opponents. In other words, the forces that determine one or another future reflect the confluences of actors’ capabilities, resolve, and popular support. How stable that outcome is likely to be, however, will be determined not so much by the resources of those who support it, but the resources of those who oppose it. By considering the resources of the actors whose interests are blocked or destroyed by a particular outcome, we can also estimate the potential durability of a particular outcome. In effect, the framework posits that the outcome of an event will be a function of the preferences of the subset of actors with the greatest resources, while the durability of that outcome will be determined by the resources of those whose interests remain unfulfilled.

Contributing Authors

Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI), Barr, N. (Valens Global), Bedig, A. (Monitor-360), Canna, S. (NSI), Chinn, J. (Texas A&M), Eyre, D. (System of Systems Analysis Corps), Gartenstein-Ross, D. (Valens Global), Jensen, B. (Marine Corps University), Kluver, R. (Texas A&M), Kuznar, L. (Indiana University, Purdue University, Fort Wayne), Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska, Omaha), Miles, D. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Moreng, B. (Valens Global), Moreno, C. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Munch, R. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Norton, A. (Monitor 360), Parhad, R. (Monitor 360), Potter, P. (University of Virginia), Spitaletta, J. (JS/J-7 & JHU/APL), TRADOC G-27 OEL, Venturelli, S. (American University), Watts, J. (Noetic), Willcox, J. (System of Systems Analysis Corps), Worret (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Wright, N. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

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