SMA Publications

Authors: Sabrina (Pagano) Polansky (NSI, Inc.); and Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is generally thought to be an important one (Miller, 2020; Sharp, 2019; Wisner & Salem, 2017). However, some experts suggest that the benefits obtained by the United States for its assistance to Egypt may be overstated (Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020). Some members of Congress are similarly critical of this relationship (Barfi, 2020; Salem, 2020). Despite these criticisms, the expert contributors generally believe that the relationship will not undergo any fundamental shifts in the near-term (Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). Several experts note that this question has in part been “stress tested” in the past—with Egypt undergoing several notable events (e.g., protest, a bloody crackdown, Islamist control, military coup) during the 2011-2014 period—with only a temporary suspension of United States assistance to Egypt implemented as a result (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020). The continuity and durability of US policy toward Egypt highlights the strategic significance of the relationship and suggests that the tipping point threshold for a severe United States policy response to Egyptian events is high (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Miller, 2020).

The experts nevertheless cite a variety of events that could, in theory, prompt a strong response from the United States, characterized by major policy shifts and mil-mil restrictions. These can be classified into seven broad categories, with the first two being the most likely: a) deepening ties between Egypt and Russia, b) violent crackdowns by the Egyptian state, c) coups of a different kind than those seen in the recent past (e.g., coup by junior military officers), d) Egyptian misuse of American weapons, e) an Egyptian violation of its peace treaty with Israel, f) events that bring into question whether Egypt is a friendly and reliable partner, and g) events that fundamentally violate the nature of the US-Egyptian relationship. In deciphering how the United States is likely to respond to these events, it is also important to consider the role that administration preferences and priorities play (M. Dunne, 2020; Former White House and State Department official, 2020; Hanna, 2020; Miller, 2020; Salem, 2020).

From an Egyptian strategic perspective, it would be unwise to react punitively to a shift in United States policy by degrading or denying current access, basing, and overflight (ABO) agreements or otherwise endanger its military relationship with the United States. However, several expert contributors (C. Dunne, 2020; M. Dunne, 2020; Miller, 2020) indicate that a drastic reduction or permanent termination by the United States of its provision of aid to Egypt may lead the Egyptians to violate the ABO agreements or pursue an alternative foreign partner, such as Russia, China, or one of the Gulf states, for military assistance. Precipitating factors are likely to include a number of internal pressures including an ongoing financial crisis and competition for resources and influence among the myriad Syrian government and externally- funded security services operating in Syria.

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“Radical Leveling and Emerging Technologies as Tools of Non-Kinetic Mass Disruption”

Authors | Editor: Giordano, J. (Georgetown University Medical Center); DeFranco, J. (George Mason University); Bremseth, L. R. (Retired); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

America’s wars and longstanding military doctrine, established by the Department of Defense (DOD), emphasize kinetic warfare. Principles of kinetic warfare, however, do not necessarily or appropriately apply when addressing, mitigating, or preventing non-kinetic threats (i.e., “left of bang” engagements). As well, existing and emerging developments in science and technology are being used to leverage power in non-kinetic engagements. Such radical leveling technologies (RLTs) and emerging technologies (ETs) are being used as “weapons of mass disruption” (versus destruction in the classical sense) to incur rippling effects in and across targeted individuals, societies, and nations. Strategic competitors and adversaries are increasingly integrating and employing RLTs and ETs for synergized attacks against the United States and its allies. This paper will describe and define the viability and value of non-kinetic engagements that are synergized by the use(s) of RLTs and ETs, and will propose a paradigmatic whole-of-nation approach to assessing, quantifying, mitigating, preventing, and developing/using offensive capabilities to thwart competitors’ and adversaries’ progress in RLT and ETT development and use.

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Authors: Howard Lee (US Army TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate); Dr. Jumanne Donahue (US Army TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate); Nathan ‘Luke’ Roth (US Army TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate); and Dr. David Hunter-Chester (US Army TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Executive Summary

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) conducted a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The SMA considered drivers of instability in the region to include long-term internally displaced persons and refugees, spread of radical ideologies and extremism, great power competition, disruptive non-state actors, and the potential for “black swan” scenarios.

In support of USCENTCOM and the SMA, the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Directorate (MSD) employed the Athena Simulation to address a series of research questions posed by USCENTCOM to better understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. USCENTCOM provided 24 questions for assessment; of those, two were selected for Athena-based analysis:

Question A7 – What happens if there is a revolt in the House of Saud? What happens if there is a collapse of the House of Saud? Will Wahhabi clerics seize or attempt to seize control? Do Saudi forces (especially SANG) stay loyal?

Question B5 – How do you protect an at-risk population from extremism in an IDP/refugee camp? How do you build community resilience to help prevent radicalization? How do you triage and segregate persons in IDP/refugee camps that have varying degrees of radicalization?

This Final Report compiles the insights derived by the Athena team from research, Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements, Athena Simulation runs, and the collaborative analysis conducted with other members of the SMA community of interest.

The Athena Simulation is a sociocultural modeling capability that provides decision makers an improved understanding of the intended and unintended consequences, the second and third order effects, of their engagement options (police/military force activities, economic engagements, information operations, etc.) upon noncombatant populations when viewed across the entirety of the Operational Environment.

Two separate instantiations of the Athena Simulation were used to model potential regional futures. In the first, an assessment of possible regime change dynamics in the House of Saud was conducted. In the second assessment, various radicalization disengagement intervention strategies were modeled and evaluated using a simulated population from the Al-Hawl Refugee Camp in Hasakah, Syria.

To inform the study objectives and provide an improved understanding of the underlying political, economic and sociocultural dynamics at work in each of these studies, multiple scenario use cases were employed to provide a range of possible futures. These use cases defined conditions leading to modeling outcomes that enabled a comparative analysis of Athena results to be conducted.

Use Cases (Saudi Arabia Regime Change Database):

• Use Case #1 (Progressive) establishes a set of conditions in Saudi Arabia reflecting the implementation of a progressive agenda by of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman upon his assumption of the throne.
• Use Case #2 (Traditional) reflects conditions in Saudi Arabia during a period in which the leadership of the country reestablishes a more traditional set of Islamic standards of conduct under the leadership of Mohammed bin Nayef.
• Use Case #3 (Coup) introduces a set of conditions in Saudi Arabia reflecting a period of significant turmoil following the death of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in which hardline traditionalists launch a coup to seize control of the regime.

Use Cases (Syria Refugee Camp Radicalization Database)

• Use Case #1 (Status Quo) reflects conditions of the Al-Hawl Refugee Camp with 400 SDF guard personnel and approximately 70,000 ISIL affiliated detainees, no official economic activity or legitimate jobs, and insufficient social services.
• Use Case #2 (Diversion through Work) represents a disengagement intervention that establishes an official economy in Al-Hawl along with jobs and consumables. All other factors (guard force, ISIL affiliates, etc.) in the camp remain unchanged. There are insufficient SDF personnel to properly secure the detainees and they are not given sufficient food and health services.
• Use Case #3 (Holistic Disengagement) portrays a disengagement intervention that combines increasing the size of the SDF guard force and reflecting that they are more culturally sensitive and compassionate towards detainees. Additionally, detainees are provided sufficient health and food services, while an official economy is simultaneously being established.

A combination of research, SME engagements, and Athena Simulation modeling and analysis produced the following insights:

Saudi Arabia Regime Change Insights:

• Insight #1. The Progressive Agenda (Vision 2030) being implemented by Saudi leadership could be at risk if implemented too aggressively.
• Insight #2. The civilian population has greater overall satisfaction with the conditions in Saudi Arabia established under the Progressive Agenda than they do under the more hardline traditionalist future.
• Insight #3. The Saudi youth population is a key societal demographic that can sway Saudi Arabia towards the progressive agenda goals or toward more traditional hardline values depending on how it is engaged and/or influenced.
• Insight #4. A coup in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to succeed unless a significant portion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard supports the rebellion.
• Insight #5. The Progressive Agenda (Vision 2030) being implemented by Mohammed bin Salman leads to economically better conditions across all population groups despite how particular groups feel about the Progressive Agenda.
• Insight #6. The Wahhabi clerics will not have sufficient long-term popular support to effectively seize control of the government.
• Insight #7. Population satisfaction declines across all civilian groups if US forces remain deployed indefinitely in control of the oil producing region and resources of Saudi Arabia.

Radicalization Insights:

• Insight #1. To mitigate radicalization, increases in social services and economic support need to be paired with the introduction of a robust, competent and ideologically compatible security force.
• Insight #2. Establishing a conditional process for managing the distribution of social services and economic incentives is an effective strategy for disengaging at-risk populations from potential radicalization.

Conclusions.

The Athena Simulation was utilized to computationally model potential futures in order to assess the implications of regime change in Saudi Arabia, as well as for gaining an improved understanding of how Syrian refugee populations might be radicalized. Results of this Athena modeling provided insights that informed the development of conclusions which have been aligned the two primary CENTCOM research questions.

Question A7 – What happens if there is a revolt in the House of Saud? What happens if there is a collapse of the House of Saud? Will Wahhabi clerics seize or attempt to seize control? Do Saudi forces (especially SANG) stay loyal?

1. If there is a revolt in the House of Saud leading it to shift away from the emerging progressive agenda, it appears unlikely that the House of Saud would collapse and enable another external actor to take control.
2. If there is a transition in the House of Saud from its progressive agenda towards a more hardline future state, the existing regime/royal family line would be expected to continue to exert control over the kingdom.
3. The Wahhabi clerics will continue to exert significant influence over the leadership and agenda of the Saudi royal family; however, they do not appear to have the popular support necessary to shift the KSA into becoming a theocracy (like Iran).
4. Portions of the SANG might be expected to align with many of the hardline religious beliefs espoused by the royal hardliners and Wahhabi clerics; however, there does not appear to be sufficient support across the SANG to generate the strength necessary to create a regime change.

Question B5 – How do you protect an at-risk population from extremism in an IDP/refugee camp? How do you build community resilience to help prevent radicalization? How do you triage and segregate persons in IDP/refugee camps that have varying degrees of radicalization?

1. Employing a process that distributes economic resources and social services on a conditional basis can be an effective means for mitigating the amount of influence exerted by an extremist organization over a refugee population.
2. Refugee populations are less at-risk of becoming radicalized if the distribution of social services and economic assistance is paired with a robust, competent and ideologically compatible security force.

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Authors: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), and Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

NSI Reachback Report Preview

In advance of the Turkish incursion into Syria last October, warnings about the security risks of “the children of ISIS” and radicalized youths in internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugee camps in Syria and Iraq increased. Media outlets reported that women in Al Hol camp in northeast Syria were setting up their own “mini Islamic State” within the camp and terrorizing other residents in the already under-resourced camp (Sancha, 2019). The shredding of ISIS’s physical caliphate and the horrifying realization of the depths of derangement of ISIS’s treatment of Cubs and Pearls of the Caliphate—young children who serve as perpetrators, witnesses, and victims of the horrors—have raised inevitable questions about the appropriate security, moral, and legal “next steps” for these children.

Tragically, a focus on just these “children of ISIS” or “children with extremist families” is too narrow to properly address a self-perpetuating cycle of Islamist extremism and violence in the region and beyond. Here is the critical point: If we consider the “radicalization cycle” only among “children of ISIS,” we run the considerable risk of missing factors that will have severe behavioral and cognitive impact on “non-ISIS” young peoples in Syria and Iraq who have lived similarly violent and traumatic lives in prolonged conflict (Moreland, 2019).

Protracted civil conflict in which terror-inducing tactics are used (e.g., deliberately targeting civilians at home or in school, enslavement and rape of women and children, forced recruitment, and abductions) are particularly devastating for young people as they inevitably bring them to the frontlines of traumatic violence. Responding to the needs only of children who are known to have been directly in the control or care of radicalized adults is not enough. Any child who has been exposed to prolonged conflict and violence is at risk of turning to violence as a means of conflict resolution. Therefore, the focus of USCENTCOM and the USG as a whole should be on preventing violence first and foremost, rather than radicalization. It is critical that we recognize that all children—former child soldiers, IDPs, refugees, and victims—who have been touched by warfare in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere—even indirectly—are candidates for experiencing the neurological, psychological, and physical impacts of war. They have all been habituated to violent means of conflict resolution and, in the future, are more likely to turn to these destabilizing tactics, regardless of ideology or religious belief.

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Authors | Editors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) & Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.)

Executive Summary

Four panelists with deep knowledge and experience in the USCENTCOM AOR and with complex systems modeling were asked to reflect on how to think about and anticipate surprises in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), especially Black Swan surprises that are the product of non-linear relationships between interacting variables. The panelists shared a wealth of knowledge on the region and complexity. Key takeaways included:

• The aim of complex modeling is to provide strategic success—the US needs to be able to anticipate surprises and their likelihoods to plan against them instead of reacting to events as they unfold.
• Black Swan surprises emerge as a result of non-linear relationships between system variables, but also high dimensionality and the interdependence of key variables.
• Examples of the variables that interact in complex ways in the USCENTCOM AOR include unstable governments and economies, ineffective conflict management, uncoordinated development, ethnic and religious diversity, and climate change.
• Actual modeling must be done, and not simply using metaphors of complexity. The warfighter users of complex modeling need the skills to build models and understand them and, at a minimum, they must understand assumptions and actionable results.
• Data are a problem. Data exist at the country level, but the complex dynamics that really need to be understood operationally are sub-national if not local. Efforts must be undertaken to fill this gap, which also includes data on past known Black Swans in the AOR.

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Authors: Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), & Tom Rieger (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Bottom Line

What would be the strongest catalyst leading to a civil war/revolt in Jordan?

It is highly unlikely that a single catalyst could lead to a civil war or revolt in Jordan. Significant regime crisis in Jordan would more likely require a ‘perfect storm’ of severe popular grievance aimed at the government (including the monarchy), multiple catalysts, and the failure of the regime’s considerable sources of resilience (i.e., buffers).

Will His Majesty King Abdullah (HMKA) and his tribal affiliates be able to contain the level of violence?

Yes. In all likelihood, HMKA and his tribal affiliates would be able to quell a civil uprising, unless significant numbers of the tribal affiliates themselves took part in the violent opposition.

Who/what would succeed HMKA?

The answer to this question depends wholly on whether the pathway to regime change involved primarily institutional change or violence. Thus, those who assume control could range from members of Parliament and government ministers (more likely) to violent extremists ruling over a fractured state (less likely).

How would a civil war/revolt impact the broader region?

Violent non-state actors are likely to be the only “winners,” as a violent uprising in Jordan would present opportunities for resurgence in ungoverned spaces. This in itself would present significant security threats to Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other actors currently battling these groups. The most stricken would be the Jordanian people and well over one million refugees in Jordan who would quickly become the victims of a massive humanitarian crisis.

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Authors: Zachary Kluver (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College); Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University)

Quick Look Preview

Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

Propaganda has evolved significantly alongside the economic and technologically-driven forces of globalization. What was once the domain of pamphlets, posters, radio, and television has adapted within an ever-expanding virtual landscape of information, as societies are increasingly linked across social and digital networks. This change has brought new challenges to countering propaganda’s effect, as the expansion of media platforms has made determining what propaganda is increasingly challenging. Depending on one’s definition, propaganda can include everything from a Chinese anime biography of Karl Marx to digital armies of coordinated social media accounts converging on targets. Given the rapidly evolving manifestations of propaganda, and the threats posed, it is important to understand the fundamental operations of how propaganda works, how it functions in societies, and how it can be countered (Nemr & Gangware, 2019).

In social networks, every citizen is a targetable node and potential weapon to help direct the flow of disinformation. This Quick Look argues that the effectiveness of propaganda on social networks relates to techniques of indexing and framing being accentuated by the selective targeting of audiences. Combating propaganda on social media relies on the powers of network exclusion and programming (or counter-framing), as well as long-term media literacy training.

Ultimately, the purpose of this piece is to provide an updated conceptual framework from which to understand how modern propagandists have harnessed the accessibility of social media networks to unleash information warfare across virtual public spaces—corrupting the stories being told about societies from within. Toward that end, this Quick Look applies the Network Society theory expounded by Manuel Castells’s Communication Power (2009) to digital propaganda. The report also reviews recent scholarship on the topics of disinformation and propaganda and provides an appendix discussing the three main types of disinformation, offering possible solutions (See Appendix A).

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Authors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Mariah Yager (NSI, Inc.)

Quick Look Preview

Introduction

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

In July 2019, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) endorsed a list of specific actions for the Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR). A requested action under item 1b asks for a “process to develop a baseline understanding of the IE (Information Environment) and subsequently modify the model of relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive behaviors.” To that end, Lt. Gen Mark Kelly, Operations (AF/A3), requested Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiate an effort to better understand and integrate information and influence into operational-level planning, execution, and assessment activities across the competition continuum.

Information influences behavior through the process of communication, and so this report provides a review of formative communication models that underly the baseline SMA Effective Communication Framework (Modeling Effective Communication), developed in support of the A3 request. That generic model of communication establishes a baseline understanding of the information environment (IE), as well as the role of relevant actor perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior. The models reviewed in this report are considered key developments in the theory of communication that undergird that model, and each provides a critical insight into operating in the IE.

Models are essential in the sciences for focusing attention on relevant variables and exposing predictive, or when possible, causal relationships (Bankes, Lempert, & Popper, 2002; Cioffi-Revilla, 2014). The models reviewed here are essential for decomposing the communication process into its constituent elements, and the lines, arrows, and shapes in the models described below represent different communication interactions. These interactions provide hypotheses to be tested when thinking about and conducting IO, and the elements define what aspects of the communication process need to be measured in order to provide measures of effectiveness (MOEs), not just measures of performance (MOPs).

The history of models of communication reveals that as new models were created, the concept of the information environment was expanded; that is, more variables contributing to communication and their interactions were considered. The report begins with a review of linear models that describe communication as a process of transmitting a message from a sender to a receiver. A review of transactional models that describe how the exchange and interpretation of messages between communicators creates meaning follows. Subsequent Quicklook reports describe how strategic communication models build upon this basis to model how communication can be done effectively.

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Authors: Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College); Dr. Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College)

Quick Look Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

Key Points

• The economic and technological connectivities of globalization have created a “Network Society.”
• The Network Society is comprised of interconnected social, organizational, and strategic networks capable of sending information globally at the speed of human thought.
• Connections between networks create information channels that give the Network Society its form.
• Control of message meaningjo between connected networks is not possible.
• Connections in the Network Society rely on trust.
• Trust is a function of communication.
• Networks have specific target points relevant to communication functions.

Strategic Insights

• The Network Society is an approachable conceptualization of integrated global society that argues patterns of established communication create access points between actors, whose connection then fundamentally alters the structure of the overall system, as if weaving fabric.
• Evaluating how to clearly communicate intention, value, and worth to another network is more important than attempts to control message meaning.
• Locating communication access points between networks is critical.
• To the extent that information can move at the speed of thought across the Network Society, an idea now has the power to alter the functional structure of a vast enterprise of integrated and coordinated human activity.

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Authors: Dr. Sabrina Polansky (Pagano) (NSI, Inc.); and Weston Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Report Abstract

Despite significant challenges to its stability, Lebanon has long survived politically and economically. Nonetheless, poor governance and a severe economic crisis, coupled with ongoing public outrage, signal that the Lebanese government may no longer be able to withstand its enduring pressures. In this report, we consider two recommendations for how the United States should react to the current situation in Lebanon: continuing aid and political support while exerting diplomatic pressure, and limiting aid and political support to the government while supporting those who would disrupt it. Expert observers are largely oriented toward maintaining aid (primarily through assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF]) and political support. Underlying this recommendation is the belief that the LAF can be distinguished from the political elites, most notably, Hezbollah. Though less commonly proffered and more controversial, it is important to similarly consider the logic underpinning the latter recommendation, as it reflects certain political realities within the United States. This recommendation is predicated on the view that all Lebanese political actors—whether individual politicians, Hezbollah, the security forces (viz., Internal Security Forces, LAF), or otherwise—remain tied to the sectarian system and are therefore all inextricably linked through this system as an organizing principle. According to this viewpoint, the LAF may consequently be unlikely to provide a significant counterweight to Hezbollah.

While there is some disagreement over Russia’s motivation to engage with Lebanon, several experts indicate that Russia not only would stand to gain from involvement in Lebanon but has been purposefully positioning itself for such involvement, which is arguably motivated by competition with the US. While there is no inherent Lebanese motivation to ally with Russia, the Lebanese are likely to be practical and act in their own self-interest during this period of crisis. A frequent refrain among observers considering US actions that could cause Lebanon to fall into Russia’s orbit is that cutting funding to Lebanon and to the LAF in particular at this juncture could leave Lebanon susceptible to exploitation by US adversaries, including Russia. More generally, US disengagement from the region may present an ideal environment for great power competition.

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