SMA Publications

Authors: Lt. Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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George Mason University (GMU) worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to model risk of strategic deterrence failure, identify potential indicators and factors the U.S. and its partners can influence, and explain this risk to members of Congress and other organizations in a position to influence strategies to protect against a catastrophic strategic deterrence failure. The model examines strategic deterrence risk using an adversary restraint-centric course of action (COA) selection approach that decomposes into two primary causes of deterrence failure: (1) Adversary perceived need to act (adversely to U.S. interests) and (2) adversary perceived advantage after executing the COA and experiencing a likely U.S. response. The strength of this approach is that by understanding the adversary’s perceived need to act due to a scenario, the U.S. and its partners can take steps to influence selection of a COA that meets the adversary’s need to act but does not undermine U.S. vital interests or national survival. Recognizing that the U.S. may have limited control of the scenario, the report further decomposes the risk factors to suggest Adversary COA selection Causal Factors that the U.S. can influence as a means to deter critically unacceptable actions from a U.S. perspective. It also describes an approach to identify indications and warnings of an impending situation that could lead an adversary to contemplate courses of action posing threats to U.S. vital interests or national survival.

Authors: Roy Boone (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska); David Rehbein (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska); John Swegle (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska); Christopher Yeaw (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Significant and enduring US/NATO advantages in aircraft and precision-guided munitions drives the Russian need for a varied and large stock of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). NATO nations, particularly those on the eastern periphery of the alliance, perceive a need for this defensive air combat capability to ensure their security. Russia views events – such as the Kosovo War and Desert Storm – as validating its fear that these capabilities could be used offensively against it. Moreover, for historical and geographical reasons, Russia is apprehensive about threats all along its dynamic European border. Against large numbers of truly fifth-generation F-22s and F-35s, backed by fourth-plus-generation F- 15EXs and Block III F-18E/Fs, Russian air defenders will likely experience high early attrition rates in a military conflict. The United States is expected to retain this advantage well into the future, as it is already flight testing is latest sixth-generation fighter aircraft. Based on this firm sense of technological and numerical inferiority, Russian political and military leadership perceives the need for a range of non- strategic nuclear capabilities.

Supportive Russian research into, and presumptive development of, much lower-yield nuclear warheads in the range of tens to hundreds of tons for non-strategic nuclear weapons has reduced the barriers to use. As examples of conventional explosions in this range, we note that ten tons is comparable to the GBU-43/B Massive Ordinance Air Blast bomb dropped in Afghanistan, while a yield of several hundred tons is comparable to the 2020 fertilizer blast in Beirut that killed over 200 people. Underwriting this dependence on NSNW, Russian military analysts perceive a “gap” between NSNW use at some very limited level of violence and the necessary conditions perceived as credible for even a limited strategic nuclear response. Fundamentally, in this paper, we argue that Russian military planners and political leaders perceive a need for theater range, very- and ultra-low-yield nuclear systems in order to blunt the US/NATO air war that it expects as the inevitable opening gambit of any conflict with the West. Further, this employment of NSNW should be seen as Moscow’s most probable pathway across the nuclear threshold.

Despite a renewal in the bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue, the “trades” involved in attempting to limit the class of NSNW applicable to the air-superiority issue would be highly asymmetric and would involve weapons on each side that are regarded as fundamental defensive capabilities by their holders and as highly threatening by the other side.

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Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Report Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This report integrates key insights and lessons learned from the SMA IIJO effort about how those outside of the US government and military (i.e., non-government and private sector organizations) use messaging and communication to influence and inform. Ultimately, what emerges is a collection of best practices for effective communication. The source material for this report consists of final deliverables produced as part of the SMA IIJO effort. In particular, the findings presented in this report are largely built upon the integration of the work done as part of the IIJO Quick Looks and IIJO Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) lines of effort.

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Author: Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question of Focus

[Q1] Does deterrence theory change if the US faces two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors? If so, how? What are the impacts to strategy? If not, what impacts to strategy still exist in that scenario? What are the implications for US strategic defense, escalation control options, and the deterrent value of the nuclear triad? In a game theoretic approach, how can the three-body problem be applied to this scenario?

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This NSI Reachback report is part of an effort requested by USSTRATCOM to the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Office, Joint Staff (J39). The essence of the question is how to develop an approach for assessing and developing strategy in the current environment. As in all analytic endeavors, the critical first step is diagnosing the problem. Because theory and research on the strategy and policy implications of facing two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors is very thin, this report offers an initial framework for distinguishing types of deterrence. The intention is not to provide “the” answer but to incite serious discussion and theorizing.

By way of introduction, the first section touches briefly on three variations of deterrence theory to make the case that there is not just one. Section two focuses on problem framing. It discusses the impact on deterrence theory of broadening the (often hidden) bipolar, single adversary assumptions when it comes to deterrence strategy and analysis. It offers a network theory-based framework for differentiating deterrence settings involving two or more peer competitors. This is a particularly crucial exercise for strategists and planners because deterrence objectives and activities change along with the characteristics of the deterrence setting.

Section three lists a number of implications for deterrence strategy highlighted by subject matter expert (SME) interviewees. These are items that teams tasked with upcoming defense reviews should consider carefully. Because theory and empirical scholarship on deterrence of two or more peer competitors is still emerging, the list presents an important set of topics for further study and even the basis for a Three-Peer research agenda. Finally, an appendix contains some comments on value and limitations of game theory for assessing the current international environment and suggestions on other ways to assess three peer deterrence problems.

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Authors: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.) and Carl Hunt (US Army, Retired)

Invited Perspective Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

We argue that the concept of escalation thresholds remains salient in national security and may be even more important than ever. However, the Cold War model is no longer useful given the multi-dimensional and complex nature of information in today’s world. We argue that escalation thresholds regarding information need to be conceived of in terms of complex systems. Qualitatively, analysts and decision makers must learn to intuit the dynamics of information in a complex world. Quantitatively, analysts must bring to bear complexity theory, and appropriate modeling and data collection. These changes have implications across the spectrum of activities that include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

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Authors: Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sara Kitsch (Monmouth College); Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College)

Quick Look Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This brief discusses a new form of communication within networked societies—Castells’ so-called mass self-communication. The brief highlights how barriers between old and new media are disappearing as increasing technological access creates new forms of labor, challenges traditional understandings of the communication process, and empowers individuals to make otherwise inconceivable system-wide impacts.

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Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Skylar Stokes (NSI, Inc.); Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Paul Astorino (Senior Vice President, Global Merchandizing, Clarks), Catherine Chapman (Founder and CEO, Parenthetic), Cyndi Coon (CEO and Founder, Labratory5 Inc.), John DeBello (President and Chief Creative Officer, Loma Media), Bill Heater (Creative Executive, Real Life Creative), Dr. William McEwen (Advertising Executive and Consultant, Independent), Dr. Jay Rosen (Author and Associate Professor of Journalism, NYU), Shari Rosenfeld (Senior Vice President of International Social Impact, Sesame Workshop), Dr. Don Stacks (Professor Emeritus, Public Relations, School of Communication, University of Miami; CEO, International Public Relations Research Conference), Al Teller (Music Industry Executive, Independent), Sherrie Westin (President, Sesame Workshop), Two Anonymous Gaming Industry Executives.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What are relevant insights from the private sector with respect to using messaging and communication to influence and inform different audiences?

Summary Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This ViTTa® summary report reflects on the insightful commentary from interviews with thirteen messaging and communications experts from the private sector. The backgrounds of the expert contributors interviewed as part of this ViTTa® elicitation include advertising, branding, marketing, public relations, storytelling, and journalism. For this ViTTa® report, the expert contributors offer insights from their experiences in using messaging and communication in the private sector to influence and inform different audiences. This summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights heard over the course of interviews with the experts.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University, University College London (UCL), Intelligent Biology and New America)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

How can we defend the humans in the Joint Force—and its key support networks—from adversarial information operations in our digitizing world? Service personnel, their families and friends are human. Adversaries and other destabilizing forces threaten to sow disruption amongst these millions of humans, in order to degrade collective capabilities. “Deepfakes” illustrate how such threats’ character may evolve as part of “combined arms” information operations alongside other dual-use Artificial Intelligence (AI) tech. Success for the Joint Force is to react effectively, but within the democratic constraints of a free society.

Part I of this report delineates the challenge for the Joint Force in our digitizing world. Part II describes a practical, effective response through a strategy centered on “3 Ds.” (1) DETECT: Build capabilities to detect and characterize influence operations against the Joint Force – who is targeted, by what means and for what purposes? (2) DEFEND: Human cognition always contains vulnerabilities, which can be minimized and so denied to others. Mass personalization of influence operations is coming; countering it requires new human-AI teams and organization. (3) DEMOCRATIC COMPATIBILITY: Make new capabilities compatible with a free society, whilst also mitigating the gaps this entails – a challenge that speaks directly to the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Biden, 2021). Restraint is not just a bug of the U.S. system, it is a strength.

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The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

Author: Bragg, B. (NSI)

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In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries. This report addresses two of those questions:

[Q2] What are US competitors (Russia, China, Iran, DPRK) doing to shape the operational environment for future conflict?

[Q4] What are the biggest perceived threat to, and opportunity for, the interests of these US nuclear competitors? And what are the internal and external factors currently constraining them from acting on these?

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.

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Author: Bragg, B. (NSI)

Video Preview

In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries. This report addresses two of those questions:

[Q2] What are US competitors (Russia, China, Iran, DPRK) doing to shape the operational environment for future conflict?

[Q4] What are the biggest perceived threat to, and opportunity for, the interests of these US nuclear competitors? And what are the internal and external factors currently constraining them from acting on these?

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.

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