SMA Publications

Authors: Benjamin Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) and Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL])

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Questions Addressed

1. What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?
2. Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict?

Framing the Problem

In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well.

All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

Thus, we believe that the front-line of risks is not the weapons systems themselves, or the co-location of nuclear and conventional forces. Instead, the key drivers of instability are the threats to dual purpose command and control and military situational awareness systems. Technological developments in the cyber and outer space domains created a number of new non-nuclear threats against both nuclear forces and their command and control systems. With the rapid advancements in conventional precision-strike capabilities, today there is a wide array of kinetic and non-kinetic threats that could undermine the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and create new sources of crisis instability. As a result of the growing number of threats, command and control systems have also become more vulnerable. Since the end of the Cold War, many redundancies have been eliminated in command and control systems, making them less resilient, and creating strong incentives to strike first in a crisis. Although these actions remain risky, there is a strong potential for a high pay-off. In parallel to these changes, the United States, Russia and China have all increased their reliance on dual use command and control assets that support both conventional and nuclear operations. These overlaps make it more likely that nuclear command and control would be under threat from the early onset of a conventional conflict between the great powers. Lastly, important doctrinal changes have also contributed to increased nuclear-conventional intermingling. All three major powers have military doctrines that in case of a conventional conflict would call for attacks on space- and land-based command and control systems. Due to the dual use nature of these systems, this could also include assets that are essential for nuclear operations, like for example early- warning radars. As a result of these factors, nuclear-conventional intermingling is likely to be a salient factor in U.S. and competitor decision making in crisis and conflict, and threats to dual use command and control will be the significant factor driving up the risk of miscalculation.

The emerging strategic environment between the U.S., Russia and China with cyber and counterspace weapons backed by kinetic strike capabilities presents a new set of options to strike at command and control systems. These threats to command and control present new avenues to first strike instability, in that military actions grounded in emerging doctrine and force structure at the outset of a conventional conflict could very conceivably result in inadvertent nuclear escalation. In a crisis, each side will be considering what risks they can take that will gain them an upper hand in bargaining and a greater potential to win if the crisis escalates. One of the early risks each side will consider is whether to attack the other side’s command and control, specifically using cyber or counterspace capabilities that are largely unseen by the public eye and by third parties. Attacks against these systems that are either reversible or of limited scale—limited to a region rather than the system as a whole—are likely to be attractive as they convey a willingness to run risks in a way that is both unseen by the international community, and that provides a military advantage for the next stage of the crisis. Besides, such attacks can also create disruptive effects without directly resulting in casualties, and the likelihood of delayed attribution could further benefit the attacker. As crisis turns to conflict, these same systems will likely become targets for kinetic or irreversible attack, as will the end weapon system platforms themselves. Thus, dual-purpose command and control is the key intermingling driver for crisis instability and miscalculation in the years ahead, not the co- location of nuclear and conventional forces nor the fielding of dual capable systems.

This report will proceed in four parts. First, we will assess the nature of nuclear- conventional entanglement on the U.S., Russian and Chinese sides. Second, we will assess each state’s means of potential attack against these systems. Third, we will evaluate how these attacks may affect decision making, as well as crisis stability and the potential of miscalculation. And fourth, we will discuss measures that each state can take to reduce these new risks.

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Authors: Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler (University of Akron/Case Western Reserve) and Dr. Arie Kruglanski (University of Maryland)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What can we learn from the process of radicalization into extremism that can be applied to information operations to make them more successful? We contend that the 3 N model of radicalization applies more generally to the process whereby information is absorbed and is having impact. This process assumes that information absorption and impact are driven by motivation—that is, human needs. The 3 Ns refer to needs, narratives, and networks, which together help us understand why some individuals become radicalized. Radicalization, the internalization of an extremist narrative, is driven by exposure to an extremist narrative validated by a social network of trusted others who—through the narrative—provide a means to satisfy the crucial human need for significance. The need for significance refers to the innate human desire to feel that one matters, that one is respected, and that one has dignity. The US government has paid major attention in information operations to the role played by social networks and narratives. We recommend an additional focus in information operations on the needs that drive human cognition and behavior, primarily the need for significance, which is the preeminent social need.

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Authors: Dr. Alex Levis (George Mason University)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The Services and the Joint Staff provide both professional military education as well as academic education through the various schools, colleges and academies. These elements are currently working on developing courses and modifying curricula to address the guidance provided by the 15 May 2020 policy CJCSI 1800.01F. However, there is need for a short-term, temporary approach to inculcate rapidly the force across all levels on the challenges of operating in the information environment. Such an approach, based on a similar challenge faced by the USAF in the early 2000s, is outlined in a short paper.

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Authors: Alexa Courtney (Frontier Design); Jess Williams (Frontier Design)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

Abstract

Change is hard; it humbles us all. Yet, it is possible to succeed. This article explores the why, what, who and how of successful change initiatives. Despite wildly different organizational cultures in the U.S. Navy, Walt Disney, Major League Baseball teams, Police Departments, and in the technology and banking sectors, common practices employed by change champions yielded success. This article will demonstrate the importance of messaging change clearly, demonstrating how to live the change, aligning your people’s behaviors with new organizational values, using data to make change actionable and your organization accountable and cultivating strategic patience to sustain change initiatives over time. We hope this invited perspective provides confidence among the curious that, despite how difficult undertaking change is – and the many competing perspectives in the marketplace about how to do it well – this roadmap can set you up for success.

Introduction

The bad news: Attempting to change at any scale is hard. Change humbles: whether we seek healthier habits in our personal lives, are charged with implementing new strategies in our organizations, or take part in grass-roots social movements that aspire to create national impact, it eludes most everyone. Seventy percent of change management efforts fail. Up to forty percent of our lives are spent in auto- pilot mode, living and working based on previously formed habits. And yet, a recent Amazon search for change management best practices reveals well over a thousand books by leading academics, management consultants and practitioners such as Dr. John Kotter, Chip and Dan Heath, Edgar Schein, Gary Hamel, Dan Coyle and many others. They offer ways to be successful in change efforts. With myriad resources focused on different flavors of change management, it’s overwhelming to discern what works, why and how.

The good news: We can always count on change. In fact, “the only constant in life is change.” Given that, we should push ourselves, our organizations, and our communities to become better at it. But what does implementing change actually entail, and how will we know if we succeed?

This paper provides a brief exploration of effective change pathways, based on our interviews with change champions, change management scholars, and our many client projects focused on organizational transformation. We hope this invited perspective provides confidence among the curious that, despite how difficult it is to change and the many competing perspectives about how to do it well, it is possible to succeed. We will share key patterns about how change has been realized — for individuals, teams, and organizations at varying levels of scale. By “standing on the shoulders of giants” and heeding the hard-earned insights of change champions, we trust this paper will inform a roadmap for effective organizational change at scale.

Author: Dr. Jason Spitaletta (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This paper conceptualizes operational cyberpsychology as a field that supports missions intended to project power in and through cyberspace (Joint Staff, 2018) by leveraging and applying expertise in mental processes and behavior in the context of interaction amongst humans and machines (Norman, 2017). Operational psychologists can improve the effectiveness of cyber operations by contributing to (1) supporting online psychological operations (PSYOP), (2) facilitating and supporting online intelligence operations, (3) assessment and selection of personnel, (4) operationally focused mental health support, and (5) hostage negotiations (Staal & Stephenson, 2013). The US government’s cyberpsychology initiative applies operational psychology to cyber operations (LaFon & Whalen, 2017) and should serve as the foundation for a broader operational cyberpsychology capability. Operational cyberpsychology can be a force multiplier for an increasingly critical operational capability in support of US national security, but its maturation will require additional resourcing to ensure that the research and development, as well as the operational integration and evaluation, are conducted with not only the appropriate understanding of the problem but also the perspective of those actively engaged in addressing it.

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Authors: Tom Rieger and Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

A recent Quick Look prepared as part of a Joint Staff and Air Force (A3)-sponsored effort to examine the effectiveness of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) examines how cognitive biases can affect the communication process (Polansky & Rieger, 2020). During review of that analysis, a discussion arose regarding how cognitive biases can affect not only communication, but also decision-making, including more structured processes such as the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop analytical framework. To address those questions and concerns, in the present paper, we explore how some common types of cognitive bias can impact an OODA Loop analysis, potentially leading to a sub-optimal result.

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Authors | Editors: Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.); George Popp (NSI, Inc.); and Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Question of Focus

[Q8] What are key analytic approaches that USSTRATCOM planners might use to assess competitors’ behaviors, intentions, and capabilities holistically, including common and divergent national interests? Which are most appropriate for identifying the interrelationships among US and competitor interests and objectives, and for crafting strategies to counter those that undermine US interests and encourage those that satisfy US interests and objectives?

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This Guide to Analytic Techniques, developed for SMA’s 2011 Concepts & Analysis Of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project for USSTRATCOM, is offered in response to the following question from SMA’s 2021 Reachback Effort on Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.

What are key analytic approaches that USSTRATCOM planners might use to assess competitors’ behaviors, intentions, and capabilities holistically, including common and divergent national interests? Which are most appropriate for identifying the interrelationships among US and competitor interests and objectives, and for crafting strategies to counter those that undermine US interests and encourage those that satisfy US interests and objectives?

CANS was conducted by the SMA team at USSTRATCOM’s request to assess the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. This guide is one of the CANS deliverables. It was a supplement to the “5D Framework” (named after the five dimensions of the operational context it specifies: policy objective, actor type, phase of conflict, threat, and the international political context) developed during this effort. Its purpose is to enhance deterrence planning and analysis by guiding analysts through the necessary steps for selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques. The framework directs the analyst through a three-step process beginning with characterizing the issue or question of focus according to adversary, international, and US policy contexts.

This guide includes brief description of each technique, the resources required to implement the analysis, and the utility of the technique for deterrence-related analyses. The intent is not to guide application of each technique, but to provide an introduction thorough enough for a user to determine the utility and practicality of a technique. At the end of each description is a requirements section that discusses the data, time, tools, cost, skill set, and expertise required to implement such a technique. A coding scheme (see Appendix: Requirements Section Coding Specifications) was developed to provide users with a rapid way of comparing different techniques. Techniques selected for this report deal primarily with adversarial behaviors, intentions, and interests.

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Author(s): Lewis, H. H. (College of William & Mary), Kabbara, A-R. (College of William & Mary), & Matthews, H. (College of William & Mary)

TRADOC G-2 E-Intern Initiative

In 2016, TRADOC G-2 launched a virtual/telework intern program for college students to work side-by-side (in a virtual environment) with Army leaders to gain practical, real-world experience within TRADOC. This effort is known as the E-Intern initiative. The virtual space allows students to remain at their universities while they complete their internship. The E-Intern Initiative provides meaningful work to college students, opportunities to contribute to hard problems and an opportunity to serve the Nation. The E-Intern Initiative demonstrates possible approaches to help the Army rethink its approach to maintaining a high quality, diverse, talented and professional workforce.

In 2021, the SMA leadership team collaborated with TRADOC G2 on a pilot that explores the added value of TRADOC E-Interns from the College of William & Mary. The intent is to create a network of emerging leaders who contribute high-quality unique perspectives, such as those that inform and shape Joint Force capabilities in the information domain.

Summary Report Previews

The Future of Genomic Surveillance by Henry H. Lewis

While maneuvering in the information environment (IE), it is important to consider the actions of National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy adversaries, such as China, and understand how their present actions indicate their intentions for future operations. If we can understand the intentions of our adversaries and forecast their intentions over time within the IE, we are better positioned to shape Joint Force (JF) strategy and inform planning approaches in effective ways to achieve a position of relative advantage. Emerging signals within the IE point towards an advanced new tool: genomic surveillance, which threatens our competitive edge across the globe. China is building vast databases of genetic material that will, absent American action, give them a comparative advantage over American forces in future cyberconflicts and in the continuing struggle to assert global leadership. The United States must act now to implement adequate defenses to ensure the protection of our genomic assets and to challenge the rising threat of Chinese dominance in this new arena of the IE.

Bots & Deepfakes by Abdul-Rahman Kabbara

This paper explores the impact of two applications that artificial intelligence (AI) will have on information operations, bots, and deepfakes. Artificially created bots are automated accounts, while deepfakes are cases of manipulated visual and auditory content; both are powered by AI algorithms. Due to increasingly integrated and capable technology, the reach of AI applications is broadening. Bots and deepfakes are preferred tools of non-state and state actors due to their accessibility, wide reach, difficulty of detection, and difficulty of attribution (potential for blackmail). Digitally manipulated content, which is propagated from the likes of bots and deepfakes, are highly effective at generating false perceptions and diminishing trust in existing figures and institutions. These technologies have public facing consequences, and an examination of the ramifications of these applications will be explored. Possible solutions will be suggested to coordinate methods of restraint on these developing platforms and technologies whose influences and potential are just now beginning to be realized and thought out.

Social Media as Information Warfare by Hannah Matthews

The flow of disinformation through social media, combined with the illusory truth effect, establish social media as an emerging threat in information warfare (IW). The illusory truth effect is the idea that repeatedly seeing information makes it more likely to be seen as true. Artificial intelligence (AI) can create articles containing false information that will then be distributed to the public. These articles are entirely computer generated and require little to no human input. Quantum computing can get into most computer encryptions, with the ability to place false information into trusted online formats. With social media being the main way that people receive their news, this intrusion of false information will cause the degradation of trust in news sources, leading to a similar decrease of trust in democracy. Social media combined with AI and quantum computing may allow for disinformation to be easily distributed and immediately read. Depending on the frequency of this dissemination based on the illusory truth effect it may also be believed to be true. Artificial intelligence is currently developing further as is quantum computing. Within the next ten years, the growth of technological capabilities will further bring social media into information warfare, in new and dangerous ways. In order to be successful, it is necessary for the United States to examine social media and its role in information warfare and adopt it into US tactics. This paper will demonstrate that disinformation combined with the illusory truth effect will establish social media as a powerful tool in IW.

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

Publication preview:

The basic cognitive nature of how human brains process information hasn’t changed for millennia, including how we use information in strategy. Information is crucial for strategy aimed at others, whether that is outwitting adversaries or cooperating with allies. And even a superb strategy must be conveyed to one’s own people. Humans remain central. But drivers like technology change the character of communication, societies and how we use information in strategy. This report examines key future technologies—including Artificial Intelligence (AI)—to ask: What will be the future character of information in strategy in 2031? To answer this question we follow a simple equation: Information in strategy (Part I) plus key technological drivers (Part II), are then combined to anticipate the character of information in strategy (Part III).

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Authors: Howard Lee, Dr. Jumanne Donahue, Dr. David Hunter-Chester, Neil Sleevi, and Nicole Jobe (TRADOC G-2)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

In support of the USAF and the SMA, the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Office (M&SO) employed the Athena Simulation to assess a series of research questions posed by the Air Force, as well as to test a series of explorable insights (hypotheses) developed during the project’s Net Assessment and Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements. A total of 35 explorable insights were identified during the Net Assessment from which four specific study topics were derived for analysis utilizing the Athena Simulation. These included:

• Study Topic #1. Messaging Integrity. Assess how populations are influenced by messaging and actions that reflect U.S. values.
• Study Topic #2. Perceived Domestic Stability. Assess how incidents of domestic instability and civil disorder undermine Chinese and/or Russian ability to contest U.S. influence in international spaces.
• Study Topic #3. Use of Proxies. Assess how the effectiveness of U.S. messaging is impacted when it is communicated through third parties or proxies.
• Study Topic #4. Relevancy of Messaging. Assess how the effectiveness of messaging is impacted when it is oriented on issues of significance to the local noncombatant populations.

This Final Study Report compiles the results and insights derived by the Athena team from research, SME engagements, Athena Simulation runs, and the collaborative analysis conducted with other members of the SMA community of interest and provides a series of conclusions addressing the overarching SMA project objectives and questions.

The Athena Simulation is a sociocultural modeling capability that provides decision makers an improved understanding of the intended and unintended consequences, the second and third order effects, of their engagement options (police/military force activities, economic engagements, information operations, etc.) upon noncombatant populations when viewed across the entirety of the Operational Environment.

Two separate instantiations of the Athena Simulation were used to model information operations (IO) and competitive messaging dynamics to assess potential regional stability effects. The first scenario was primarily centered in the South China Sea and focused on the Philippines with China as the major international actor. The second scenario was primarily centered in the Eastern Mediterranean and focused on the counties of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, with Russia as a major actor.

To inform the study objectives and provide an improved understanding of the underlying political, economic and sociocultural dynamics at work in each of these studies, multiple use cases were employed for each scenario to provide a range of possible futures. These use cases defined conditions leading to modeling outcomes that enabled a comparative analysis of Athena results to be conducted in this report.

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