SMA Publications

Authors: George Popp (NSI, Inc.); Eric Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Skylar Stokes (NSI, Inc.); Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.)

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Paul Astorino (Senior Vice President, Global Merchandizing, Clarks), Catherine Chapman (Founder and CEO, Parenthetic), Cyndi Coon (CEO and Founder, Labratory5 Inc.), John DeBello (President and Chief Creative Officer, Loma Media), Bill Heater (Creative Executive, Real Life Creative), Dr. William McEwen (Advertising Executive and Consultant, Independent), Dr. Jay Rosen (Author and Associate Professor of Journalism, NYU), Shari Rosenfeld (Senior Vice President of International Social Impact, Sesame Workshop), Dr. Don Stacks (Professor Emeritus, Public Relations, School of Communication, University of Miami; CEO, International Public Relations Research Conference), Al Teller (Music Industry Executive, Independent), Sherrie Westin (President, Sesame Workshop), Two Anonymous Gaming Industry Executives.

Question of Focus

[Q4] What are relevant insights from the private sector with respect to using messaging and communication to influence and inform different audiences?

Summary Overview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This ViTTa® summary report reflects on the insightful commentary from interviews with thirteen messaging and communications experts from the private sector. The backgrounds of the expert contributors interviewed as part of this ViTTa® elicitation include advertising, branding, marketing, public relations, storytelling, and journalism. For this ViTTa® report, the expert contributors offer insights from their experiences in using messaging and communication in the private sector to influence and inform different audiences. This summary presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights heard over the course of interviews with the experts.

Please see the PDF below for the complete summary overview.

Author: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Publication Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The objective of the Integrating Information into Joint Operations (IIJO) project is to assess the ways in which the Joint Force can most effectively integrate information1 into its activities across the competition-conflict continuum. During the course of this project, we have spoken to many people familiar with both Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) efforts to integrate information and shape the information environment (IE); their overall assessment has been remarkably consistent.2 Namely, information is playing an increasingly important role in states’ ability to protect and further their national interests, but the United States is not currently equipped or positioned to counter the scope and scale of our adversaries’ information activities.

However, there was also general consensus that if we improve our understanding of the IE and how our actions are perceived by populations (foreign and domestic as well as target audiences), we can proactively shape the environment and make the United States more competitive. Furthermore, if senior leaders and decision makers prioritize and fund information activities, agencies will be incentivized to integrate information across the planning process. In order to do either of these things, however, we need to improve our ability to monitor the IE and assess the informational effects of US actions. This requires the development of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) specifically designed to capture these informational effects—MOE(IE).

In order to examine the issue of MOE(IE) we organized a small, virtual workshop with three sessions. The goal for the workshop was to identify a set of basic guidelines for developing MOEs for information. Session 1 focused on conceptual-level issues, particularly what design principles can and cannot be carried over from assessment of kinetic effects. Session 2 built on Session 1, moving the discussion to consideration of the operational-level challenges to MOE development. Session 3 considered these combined findings in light of the challenges and opportunities presented by monitoring and assessment at the interagency level.

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Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.) and George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

Summary Report Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

This report integrates key insights and lessons learned from the SMA IIJO effort about how those outside of the US government and military (i.e., non-government and private sector organizations) use messaging and communication to influence and inform. Ultimately, what emerges is a collection of best practices for effective communication. The source material for this report consists of final deliverables produced as part of the SMA IIJO effort. In particular, the findings presented in this report are largely built upon the integration of the work done as part of the IIJO Quick Looks and IIJO Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) lines of effort.

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Authors: Gary Ackerman, Douglas Clifford, Anna Wetzel, Jenna LaTourette and Hayley Peterson (CART)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

As part of the modeling and simulation phase of the IIJO effort, the Center for Advanced Red
Teaming (CART) worked closely with the ICONS Project at the University of Maryland to
employ two separate yet integrated human simulation approaches to test and build on the
findings of earlier components of the IIJO effort. The CART portion of the simulation
involved:

1. Distilling 46 propositions from the Net Assessment and TTXs into 12 explorable insights (EIs) regarding the competitive information environment.
2. Testing these EIs in six scenario-based Red Team experiments using 223 U.S.-based proxy participants from similar cultural backgrounds to actual adversary target populations (Taiwan for the Asian context and several Southeast European countries for the European region).
3. Collecting data on several measures of messaging effectiveness and analyzing this data to validate or shed new light on the EIs. The experiments yielded a number of takeaways relevant to the IIJO project

The experiments yielded a number of takeaways relevant to the IIJO project.

1. The United States begins with a reputational / perception advantage over its GPC competitors, but the gap is fairly narrow between the U.S. and China in the European context.
2. Wherever it was tested (Scenarios 2, 4, and 5), there was robust evidence that GPC adversary propaganda that seeks to cast the United States in a negative light is effective in lowering attitudes towards the U.S., trust in the U.S. and U.S. influence among targeted audiences in non-GPC states (in our experiments, Taiwan and the states of southeastern Europe). Given that the perceptions of these audiences can impact their own countries’ and others’ military and political support for the United
   States, these findings confirm that IIJO is crucial and that the United States military needs to place significant emphasis on OIE moving forward. Furthermore, messaging to foreign populations (whether through traditional or new channels such as social media) cannot be left out of operations.
3. What countries do (as opposed to only what they say) matters. Hypocrisy by any GPC state leads to negative perceptions among target audiences, but there is no evidence that this harms the U.S. more than its GPC adversaries.
4. There is some, although not robust, evidence to indicate that messaging regarding U.S. economic success may not go as planned and could actually hurt foreign perceptions of the United States, whereas the jury is still out on the effects of similar messaging for other GPC states.
5. The effectiveness of messaging regarding the economic shortcomings of GPC adversaries like the PRC remains unclear.
6. There is no experimental evidence to suggest that emphasizing U.S. values is advantageous in its messaging and at least a possibility that doing so might negatively affect perceptions about the U.S.
7. Adopting a victimization narrative does not appear to be an effective messaging strategy in OIE, and may in fact backfire, lowering the believability of the message
   and perceptions of the country utilizing this approach.
8. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that a non-U.S. government messenger is preferable to a U.S. government messenger, but more research is required on this point.
9. There was partial support (but only in one AOR) for the proposition that uncrafted and untargeted messages are more effective in influencing perceptions about the U.S., but further research is required to determined when this finding is applicable and when it is not.
10. With the possible exception of how much the message is believed and shared, there was no experimental support for the notion that positive, proactive messages
    are more effective than negative, reactive messages.
11. There is some limited, provisional support for the proposition that adversary messages that attack common values between the U.S. and the target population will have a more powerful (negative) effect.
12. The proposition that messaging that resonates with current beliefs and perceptions of the target audience will have greater believability received no experimental
    support. There were inconclusive findings as to the effects of more resonant messaging on other measures of effectiveness, with contradictory findings in the Asian and European samples.
13. There is evidence that, in a crisis, it is better to send no message than to urge allies to refrain from escalation.
14. There can sometimes be unforeseen effects to OIE. For example, in some experiments, messaging focused on one country actually affected perceptions of other
    GPC states (including the state doing the messaging).

In addition to the substantive findings, at the programmatic level, the experiments demonstrated how human simulation can be used to test emerging phenomena or novel ideas that arise from the insights of experts and various other knowledge artifacts developed during the course of a typical SMA study. By exposing these insights to realistic simulations involving disinterested participants at scale, the use of an integrated human simulation approach (experiments plus table-top exercises) can both validate previous findings and reveal new dynamics in complex systems like the OIE.

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Authors: Devin Ellis (ICONS); Dr. Egle Murauskaite (ICONS); Dr. Gary Ackerman (CART, SUNY Albany); Doug Clifford (CART, SUNY Albany)

Publication Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The ICONS Project, a wargaming and simulation organization at the University of Maryland, was asked by the Joint Staff, Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA), to design, execute, and analyze a Table Top Exercise (TTX) in support of the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) research
effort – which in turn supports the ongoing efforts by the Department of War (DOW) to institutionalize and codify advancements in the area of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE).

The Joint Staff in every Joint endeavor bears responsibility for OIE, as it is developed and promulgated. This particular TTX was viewed as an opportunity to leverage the development of the new Joint Operating Concept for OIE. The efforts of the Joint Staff and the Air Force (HAF/A3), as well as all the other Service, Command, and Component participants, also used this TTX to examine the role of the DOW in OIE for major scenarios of concern going forward. Scenarios for these TTXs were selected on the basis of two criteria, in combination: 1) most likely adversaries the U.S. will face in the OIE space over the near term; 2) critical scenarios for OIE which have different structures – in this case, a crisis, and a slowly evolving competition.

The following report is a summary of the outputs and analytical assessment of the exercises. Included in this report are: 1) the design of the TTX, based on the analytic intent of the project, including team recruitment and exercise format; 2) the scenarios and the guiding Course of Action (COA) questions presented to the teams for response during the TTX; 3) observations derived by the Control Team members and other observers, which are relevant to the DOD OIE enterprise.

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Volume I in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Ms. Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Dr. Ralph Clem (Florida International University), Mr. John Collison (USSOCOM, J59), Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Lt Col Christopher D. Forrest (USAF), LTG(R) Karen H. Gibson, Dr. Erik Herron (West Virginia University), Mr. Daniel R. Lane (USSOCOM, J59), Dr. James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), Dr. Dalton Lin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Lt Col David Lyle (LeMay Center for Doctrine and Education, Air University), Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND), Dr. David W. Montgomery (University of Maryland), LTG(R) Michael K. Nagata (CACI International), Dr. Lawrence Rubin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Dr. Adam B. Seligman (Boston University), Dr. Adam N. Stulberg (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)

Forwards: ADM Charles A. Richard (USSTRATCOM), GEN Richard D. Clarke (USSOCOM)

SMA Perspectives Paper Preview

The future operating environment will present US military leaders and planners with both familiar and unfamiliar problem sets that will test the DoD and partner nations’ ability to maintain strategic stability. These future challenges are anticipated to be significantly different from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are contested norms and persistent disorder. It is expected that adversaries will continue to pursue their national objectives by creatively combining conventional and non-conventional methods to operate below a threshold that they believe would invoke a direct military or other damaging response from the United States or its allies.

This white paper advances the concept of taking action to establish and maintain strategic stability in periods that vary between competition and cooperation. The objective is to create conditions that encourage an adversary to conduct activities that promote cooperation and avoid escalation towards conflict by offering a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both.

Topics addressed include:

• The binary, either-peace-or-war, conception of the operating environment is obsolete, and military power alone is insufficient to achieve sustainable political objectives in the current environment. This necessitates the need for new strategies and a better understanding of what “strategic stability” looks like today, as these differ substantially from past practices.
• This new context includes a decline in popular trust in governments and formal institutions, as well as increased polarization within Western societies that are exasperated by malign influence campaigns and other so-called gray zone actions.
• There are contending elements within respective conceptions of strategic stability applied across various domains for the US, Russia, and China. The concept of strategic stability is increasingly challenged as different countries embrace their own different concepts of strategic stability. Trust and influence are overarching concepts in the context of strategic stability, and trust building is a key challenge.
• If great power competition (GPC) is a contest for “advantage, leverage, and influence,” and influence is a contest for the affinity of relevant actors and populations, great power competition (GPC) is about winning the affinities of people. Power is shifting to populations, and autocratic regimes that have grown increasingly brittle are the threats. China is a “Titanic,” and its population, and those that it negatively impacts around the planet, are icebergs.
• New opportunities and challenges are presented from emerging technologies.
• Predatory economic and business practices, legal actions, public opinion manipulation, and other subversive actions are all means that an adversary might employ to support its competition strategies.

Bottom line: There is a clear need for a “new” security concept that is a blend of legacy deterrence thinking, expanded thoughts on escalation management, and the concept of managing activities along a cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, with the purpose of maintaining strategic stability while promoting US national objectives. To do this requires discussions focused on understanding how the US and its partners should implement recent research about actor behaviors during periods of competition.

SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion – 24 & 25 Aug 2021

Watch presentations by the authors in this companion two-day event, held virtually on 24 & 25 August 2021.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Author(s): Jones, R. (United States Special Operations Command)

Invited Perspective Preview

“The most important aspect of our containment strategy is that it serves to contain ourselves,” former President Dwight Eisenhower reportedly observed after he had left office. Perhaps the greatest problem facing the United States in the post-Cold War era is not our waning ability to deter the problematic peacetime activities of others; rather, it is that we have lost sight of the need to deter ourselves. Therefore, any serious look at updating US deterrence going forward must include a serious look at our own missteps. The world is changing rapidly, and we can neither wish nor force it into staying in some form we deem best for us. To truly lead a rules- based system, the US must first understand the world better for what it actually is and then shape changes in directions favorable to us. To lead, we must also pursue our interests in ways others deem appropriate and see as being in their own interests to follow.

Author(s): Giordano, J. (Georgetown University; US Naval War College); DiEuliis, D. (National Defense University)

Invited Perspective Preview

There is increasing interest and effort in developing improved tools and methods through which political, military, and intelligence operations can influence the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns of peer competitors and adversaries.

The brain sciences are affording new techniques and technologies to assess and affect human cognition, decisions, and actions. Global peer competitor nations and non-state actor groups are already invested in engaging these approaches.

Therefore, we argue that it is important, if not necessary, to fully define the capabilities and limitations of these neurocognitive tools, so as to (1) best evaluate their operational viability and value; (2) develop a neurocognitive “toolkit” that is fieldable and scalable for human terrain, psychological operations (PSYOPS), military information support operations (MISO), and both non-kinetic and kinetic military and intelligence missions; and in these ways (3) remain apace and ahead of current strategic competitors’ neurocognitive sciences’ enterprise that could be used to influence and affect global balances of power.

This IP addresses the current and near-term state of this science and technology (S&T), provides understanding about human cognition and behavior afforded by these methods, and offers recommendations for using a neurocognitive S&T toolkit for achieving and sustaining US tactical and strategic capability and hegemony in global influence operations.

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Author: Dr. Robert Elder (George Mason University)

Invited Perspective Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

Treating information as a form of maneuver can provide powerful advantages to commanders and political leaders responsible for US and partner national security. The components of successful maneuver first proposed by van Creveld, Canby, & Brower in 1994—positioning, tempo, Schwerpunkt, surprise and deception, cross-domain synergy, flexibility, unity of effort, and opportunism—can also serve as elements of a framework to anticipate an adversary’s integrated use of information to undermine US and partner interests. Employed as a form of maneuver, information is valuable because it serves as virtual representations of both physical and cognitive realities which can be created, stored, and exchanged in all environments and, when properly communicated, can influence the actions and behaviors of others. Because of the US military’s traditional reliance on attrition warfare, few US military leaders are experienced or comfortable with the concepts of maneuver and less so with the use of information operations to outmaneuver an adversary as a means to victory. However, as a means to combat the US asymmetric advantage in physical power, many US competitors have turned to information as a means to outmaneuver the United States and deny it the benefits of its asymmetric advantages in other areas.

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Authors: Dr. Haroro Ingram (The George Washington University Program on Extremism), Dr. Craig Whiteside (US Naval War College Monterey) and Dr. Charlie Winter (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, ExTrac)

Invited Perspective Preview

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The Islamic State’s complete loss of territorial control in Iraq and Syria in 2019 forced its central media unit to adapt in order to continue to produce the high-quality products for which it had become infamous. This paper evaluates this transformation, and measures both output, themes, and quality of product in the years since the collapse of the territorial caliphate. We distill some of the elements the group has used to successfully produce and disseminate products from strengthening affiliates abroad, and the impact the central media has had on these distant media cells. Through our research regarding non-state actor influence operations, a sense of the larger, comprehensive character of the ever-evolving information environment can be derived.