SMA Publications

Authors: James Giordano, PhD (Georgetown University) & Bob Williams (Georgetown University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Instability of the international system and order is arising from competition among great powers, who possess large, thermonuclear arsenals, and from greater multipolarity of both established and aspirational nuclear weapons states to exercise their own aims for possessing “tactical-size” yields. The capacity of the United States arsenal to deter a nuclear attack on its partners and/or allies—as affirmed in the combined 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review—will be challenged in an emerging Third Nuclear Age by threats of nuclear weapons use with far lower yields (i.e., tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons) than those of the Cold War. The First Nuclear Age clearly began in 1945 and was characterized by the bipolarity of US-Soviet relations. The collapse of the USSR ended this era, but a Second Nuclear Age had already started, overlapping with the first. This intervening period proliferated the bomb to rising powers, regimes with starving populations, and those with revisionist agendas; it began sometime after China’s first test in 1964 and has matured through the present aspirations of North Korea and Iran. Still, the world has remained free of nuclear weapons use in conflict for nearly 78 years, driven by fears of global catastrophe from megaton exchanges.

The emerging Third Nuclear Age, however, will be dominated by more probable threats of low-yield nuclear use in regional conflicts rather than the classic dyadic promise of mutually assured destruction. We predict high-precision, low-yield nuclear weapons that are measurable by the hundreds or even tens of tons will become as strategically important to adversaries engaged in their own violence escalation with neighbors as the existing US nuclear arsenal is to deterrence of city-evaporating power. In the emerging Third Nuclear Age, the capacity for Washington to respond to threats of such limited nuclear use in conflicts that do not directly threaten the homeland will depend on the credibility of strategic messaging for assured US capabilities to respond in kind through retaliatory nuclear use—with conventional force or in other domains, such as cyber. We anticipate the proliferation of low-yield nuclear options during this new era to generate challenges to the credibility of at least in-kind US nuclear response options, given a perceived paradox of American ethics and jus in bello principles entwined in scenarios of strategic nuclear use. We also expect regional belligerents to reconsider limited first-use as viably below the US appetite for an assured, devastating response.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) & Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This report provides a concise, highly visual overview of the food security subsystem of the AECM (AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model). In addition to enabling analysis of causes and consequences of food security (and insecurity) in USAFRICOM’s AOR, it identifies three possible leverage points where interventions by the US could improve food security on the continent:

1. Expanding US support for agricultural training in culturally relevant and sustainable ways.
2. Maintaining government stores and emergency food funds, along with established distribution systems.
3. Expanding US support for public health initiatives in countries experiencing food crises, which could mitigate some of the longer-term physical health impacts on vulnerable populations.

It also takes a more detailed look at the current (as of May 2022) stressors on food security in Africa, identifies vulnerable country locations, and examines factors fueling that vulnerability.

Examination of the implications of food security for competition with China finds that China’s activities in Africa are part of a larger, multi-layered strategy to enhance its international influence, often in direct opposition to that of the US and its partner countries. Though individual Chinese influence activities in this area may appear non-threatening, when combined, they can threaten US or partner interests. NSI’s Quick Looks are concise reports on a specific sub-system of one of our models, in this case the AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM). The analyses in Quick Looks are centered around a focus node (variable) of particular interest. They are designed to present complex information in a highly visual, clear, and consistent format that enables the reader to quickly gain an overview of a concept of interest, as well as its implications— both direct and indirect—for their mission and priorities.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Volume III in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI, Inc.); Hriar Cabayan, PhD (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

Editorial Board: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University); Lt Gen (Ret) Timothy Fay, Robert Jones (USSOCOM), Robert Toguchi, PhD (USASOC)

Contributing Commands: USAFRICOM; USCENTCOM; USCYBERCOM; USEUCOM; USINDOPACOM; NORAD and USNORTHCOM; USSOCOM; USSOUTHCOM; USSPACECOM; USSTRATCOM

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In this report, entitled “Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands,” ten military Combatant Commands provide overviews of the challenges they face in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) and how they plan to ameliorate the risks and maximize the opportunities that these challenges present. The report provides the Commands a platform to articulate how they plan to manage the multiplicity of challenges they face. By doing so, it helps identify the types of capabilities and activities the Services must be able to plan for and field in defense of US interests in a competitive future international environment.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

‍Author: Popp, G. (NSI); Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI); Bragg, B. (NSI)

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In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:

• An overwhelming majority of respondents (79%) believe that some level of expansion of US nuclear force capability is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.
• 38% of respondents believe that the likelihood of US-China or US-Russia conflict with serious consideration of nuclear use falls within the range of quite possible to highly likely over the next 15 years.
• 36% of respondents believe that the likelihood of US vs. regional state conflict with serious consideration of nuclear use falls within the range of quite possible to highly likely over the next 15 years.brag

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Integrating effectively has always provided a strategic edge, from the ancient world to the present day. Integration is a central theme of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Here we ask: Why is the United States seeking to integrate now—and how can it integrate better? Now, for the first time since winning the Cold War, the United States must respond to a competitor strong across all levers of power—and so if it wants to compete it must integrate for the character of our new era of competition. This report traces integration as a strategic edge from the 1500s to the present, to identify key themes for the success (or failure) of US integration in the 2020s and 2030s. Three overarching sets of issues emerge: integration militarily; integration across multiple sources of power; and civil-military integration within the state. Integrating with allies and integrating technology will also be key for the United States. All are complex, so to help make them more tractable for practitioners we introduce simple concepts to deal with complex environments (e.g. the “adjacent possible”). We also introduce a powerful new field of cognitive science (metacognition or “thinking about thinking”) that can give the United States an edge for developing the humans, and human-machine teams, that will always lie at the heart of integrated US power.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Authors: Devin Ellis (ICONS); Dr. Egle Murauskaite (ICONS); Dr. Gary Ackerman (CART, SUNY Albany); Doug Clifford (CART, SUNY Albany)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

The ICONS Project, a wargaming and simulation organization at the University of Maryland, was asked by the Joint Staff, Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA), to design, execute, and analyze a Table Top Exercise (TTX) in support of the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) research
effort – which in turn supports the ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to institutionalize and codify advancements in the area of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE).

The Joint Staff in every Joint endeavor bears responsibility for OIE, as it is developed and promulgated. This particular TTX was viewed as an opportunity to leverage the development of the new Joint Operating Concept for OIE. The efforts of the Joint Staff and the Air Force (HAF/A3), as well as all the other Service, Command, and Component participants, also used this TTX to examine the role of the DOD in OIE for major scenarios of concern going forward. Scenarios for these TTXs were selected on the basis of two criteria, in combination: 1) most likely adversaries the U.S. will face in the OIE space over the near term; 2) critical scenarios for OIE which have different structures – in this case, a crisis, and a slowly evolving competition.

The following report is a summary of the outputs and analytical assessment of the exercises. Included in this report are: 1) the design of the TTX, based on the analytic intent of the project, including team recruitment and exercise format; 2) the scenarios and the guiding Course of Action (COA) questions presented to the teams for response during the TTX; 3) observations derived by the Control Team members and other observers, which are relevant to the DOD OIE enterprise.

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Volume I in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Ms. Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.)

Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Dr. Ralph Clem (Florida International University), Mr. John Collison (USSOCOM, J59), Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Lt Col Christopher D. Forrest (USAF), LTG(R) Karen H. Gibson, Dr. Erik Herron (West Virginia University), Mr. Daniel R. Lane (USSOCOM, J59), Dr. James Lewis (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), Dr. Dalton Lin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Lt Col David Lyle (LeMay Center for Doctrine and Education, Air University), Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND), Dr. David W. Montgomery (University of Maryland), LTG(R) Michael K. Nagata (CACI International), Dr. Lawrence Rubin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Dr. Adam B. Seligman (Boston University), Dr. Adam N. Stulberg (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology)

Forwards: ADM Charles A. Richard (USSTRATCOM), GEN Richard D. Clarke (USSOCOM)

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The future operating environment will present US military leaders and planners with both familiar and unfamiliar problem sets that will test the DoD and partner nations’ ability to maintain strategic stability. These future challenges are anticipated to be significantly different from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are contested norms and persistent disorder. It is expected that adversaries will continue to pursue their national objectives by creatively combining conventional and non-conventional methods to operate below a threshold that they believe would invoke a direct military or other damaging response from the United States or its allies.

This white paper advances the concept of taking action to establish and maintain strategic stability in periods that vary between competition and cooperation. The objective is to create conditions that encourage an adversary to conduct activities that promote cooperation and avoid escalation towards conflict by offering a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both.

Topics addressed include:

• The binary, either-peace-or-war, conception of the operating environment is obsolete, and military power alone is insufficient to achieve sustainable political objectives in the current environment. This necessitates the need for new strategies and a better understanding of what “strategic stability” looks like today, as these differ substantially from past practices.
• This new context includes a decline in popular trust in governments and formal institutions, as well as increased polarization within Western societies that are exasperated by malign influence campaigns and other so-called gray zone actions.
• There are contending elements within respective conceptions of strategic stability applied across various domains for the US, Russia, and China. The concept of strategic stability is increasingly challenged as different countries embrace their own different concepts of strategic stability. Trust and influence are overarching concepts in the context of strategic stability, and trust building is a key challenge.
• If great power competition (GPC) is a contest for “advantage, leverage, and influence,” and influence is a contest for the affinity of relevant actors and populations, great power competition (GPC) is about winning the affinities of people. Power is shifting to populations, and autocratic regimes that have grown increasingly brittle are the threats. China is a “Titanic,” and its population, and those that it negatively impacts around the planet, are icebergs.
• New opportunities and challenges are presented from emerging technologies.
• Predatory economic and business practices, legal actions, public opinion manipulation, and other subversive actions are all means that an adversary might employ to support its competition strategies.

Bottom line: There is a clear need for a “new” security concept that is a blend of legacy deterrence thinking, expanded thoughts on escalation management, and the concept of managing activities along a cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, with the purpose of maintaining strategic stability while promoting US national objectives. To do this requires discussions focused on understanding how the US and its partners should implement recent research about actor behaviors during periods of competition.

SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion – 24 & 25 Aug 2021

Watch presentations by the authors in this companion two-day event, held virtually on 24 & 25 August 2021.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Volume II in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.),
Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI, Inc.)

Contributing Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Mr. Alex Campbell (LLNL), Dr. Zachary S. Davis (LLNL), Mr. Abraham M. Denmark (The Wilson Center), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Dr. Scott W. Harold (RAND Corporation), Mr. Mark Hoffman (Lockheed Martin), Mr. David Kirkpatrick (LLNL), Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Maj, USAFR) (USINDOPACOM; Stanford University; AEI), Mr. Marshall Monroe (Marshall Monroe Magic; National Center for Soft Power Strategies), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jack Shanahan (USAF, Retired), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), Dr. Yi E. Yang (James Madison University)

SMA Perspectives Publication Preview

It is not an exaggeration to state that China is and will remain a significant challenge to the US on all aspects of national power for the foreseeable future. This situation has been in the making for quite some time. This SMA Perspectives paper will not delve into the historical roots of why the US got to where it is, however. Nor will it dwell on the purely military aspects of the conflict. These are important considerations that are amply discussed elsewhere in numerous scholarly publications. This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.” It is also a follow-on to a previously published paper, entitled “Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition.” The focus of the previous paper was on the conditions that encourage actors to act in ways that promote cooperation and avoid escalation to conflict. It offered a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both. In the current SMA Perspectives paper, we apply this paradigm and the general insights from the previous paper to the US-China relationship specifically.

In the context of this SMA perspectives paper, “constructive competition” is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issue to be in some degree of non-threatening, non-damaging opposition.” It is “tolerable and productive,” and it is “the ideal mode in a dynamic global system, as it stimulates innovation and movement” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). It assumes that the main actors can cooperate on common interests. It requires agreed upon norms or boundaries of accepted behavior and assumes that there is some degree of agreement between them. In this context, mutualism implies that both sides see the potential for gains.

“Destructive competition,” on the other hand,is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issueto be in opposition and potentially damaging to their respective interests. Tactics consistent with destructive competition can range in severity from international rules violations (e.g., stealing intellectual property) to actions seen as sufficiently harmful to necessitate shows of armed force to signal or demonstrate willingness to escalate. Thus, it is possible for two actors to be in a state of constructive competition on some issues and in a state of destructive competition on others” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). In this context, the animosity between the actors is such that they are willing to undermine themselves to take the other down. It is also possible for destructive competition to interfere with constructive competition. This occurs when two actors’ interests do not align. In this context, it is assumed that the US and China will use all forms of competition to include selective use of direct confrontation and/or conflict when a state’s vital interests are at risk or perceived to be at risk.

Maintaining balance among competing interests in international security affairs is both a leadership and a management issue. Major leadership and management objectives include satisfying specific security objectives, while simultaneously 1) avoiding escalation (to the right) on the cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, 2) looking for opportunities to cooperate and compete constructively with long-time partners and competitors alike, and 3) retaining escalation control in the case of destructive competition and conflict. The ideal states are cooperation and constructive competition, given that US security objectives are met. Thus, the US objective would not necessarily be to “gain advantage,” particularly where cooperation better serves overall US interests. “Gaining advantage” implies asymmetry, which in and of itself is the foundation of destabilizing escalatory security spirals. Rather, the US objective would be to defend against disadvantage and seek to “create dilemmas for the adversary,” if these dilemmas would lead to cooperation or de-escalation, but not if the dilemmas would lead to destabilizing choice options. Key to all this is a viable risk management strategy.

There are wide differences in perception between the US and China (and other authoritarian governments) in terms of what is “acceptable” behavior in competition below armed conflict. Examples from China include forced technology transfer, economic and military espionage to fuel China’s military advantage (i.e., military-civilian fusion), influence operations, offensive cyber operations, biological attacks, and the use of non-traditional intelligence collectors. Some of these aspects are examined in this SMA Perspectives paper.

The US perspective of this competition with China is discussed by Lt Gen (Ret) Jack Shanahan, who proposes exchanging a single-note (specifically, containment) strategy for a five “C-note” scale—cooperate, compete, contest, confront, and conflict—to enable the US to tune its policy response to specific issues, approaching each on its merits and allowing progress to be made (or not be made) independently.

China’s perspective of US-China competition is discussed by four respective contributors:

• Dr. Michael D. Swaine argues that China is well aware that the US possesses huge advantages, both internal and through its allies and partners, that make conflict a risky strategy of dubious benefit.
• Dr. Scott W. Harold notes that the Chinese Communist Party has consistently framed the US as a threat to China’s interests and security, and this has enabled them at various times to promote a narrative that places the responsibility for regional tension and instability with “anti-China forces” within the US.
• Mr. Abraham M. Denmark notes that for China’s leadership, competition with the US is not an end in itself, but rather a necessary part of their effort to build an international system in which the CCP can achieve its own interests and objectives.
• Dr. Yi Edward Yang argues that China’s policies are both issue- and domain-dependent and, drawing on a broad literature, presents three models to explain various aspects of China’s behavior: the Social Identity Model, the Opportunistic Multilateralism Model, and the Centrality-Heterogeneity Model.

Other aspects of the US-China rivalry are addressed by several authors throughout the course of the paper:

• Dr. Zachary S. Davis and Mr. Marshall Monroe highlight the scope and purpose of the movie and media aspects of the CCP’s soft power crusade and propose several options for countering it.
• Mr. Alex Campbell and Mr. David Kirkpatrick advocate a regional cyber pact in the Indo-Pacific that suits the nature of cyber competition and builds on a unique American asset.
• Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro states that the US must avoid relying on Cold War tools and strategies of competition. Instead, the US needs to demonstrate to its allies and partners that it can protect them not only from military attacks but against other costly behaviors that Beijing may enact against them, such as economic coercion or diplomatic isolation.
• Mr. Mark Hoffman argues that the nature of peer competition is in essence that of a complex adaptive system, and as such, insights and approaches from complexity management might be leveraged to help compensate for some of the asymmetric disadvantages endemic to the current adversarial peer competition.

Finally, in the closing chapter, Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois attempts to bring all of the contributors’ insights together to provide a deeper understanding of the complexities of competition between the US and China.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Watch the virtual discussion with the authors here.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Author(s): Jones, R. (United States Special Operations Command)

Invited Perspective Preview

“The most important aspect of our containment strategy is that it serves to contain ourselves,” former President Dwight Eisenhower reportedly observed after he had left office. Perhaps the greatest problem facing the United States in the post-Cold War era is not our waning ability to deter the problematic peacetime activities of others; rather, it is that we have lost sight of the need to deter ourselves. Therefore, any serious look at updating US deterrence going forward must include a serious look at our own missteps. The world is changing rapidly, and we can neither wish nor force it into staying in some form we deem best for us. To truly lead a rules- based system, the US must first understand the world better for what it actually is and then shape changes in directions favorable to us. To lead, we must also pursue our interests in ways others deem appropriate and see as being in their own interests to follow.

Author(s): Giordano, J. (Georgetown University; US Naval War College); DiEuliis, D. (National Defense University)

Invited Perspective Preview

There is increasing interest and effort in developing improved tools and methods through which political, military, and intelligence operations can influence the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns of peer competitors and adversaries.

The brain sciences are affording new techniques and technologies to assess and affect human cognition, decisions, and actions. Global peer competitor nations and non-state actor groups are already invested in engaging these approaches.

Therefore, we argue that it is important, if not necessary, to fully define the capabilities and limitations of these neurocognitive tools, so as to (1) best evaluate their operational viability and value; (2) develop a neurocognitive “toolkit” that is fieldable and scalable for human terrain, psychological operations (PSYOPS), military information support operations (MISO), and both non-kinetic and kinetic military and intelligence missions; and in these ways (3) remain apace and ahead of current strategic competitors’ neurocognitive sciences’ enterprise that could be used to influence and affect global balances of power.

This IP addresses the current and near-term state of this science and technology (S&T), provides understanding about human cognition and behavior afforded by these methods, and offers recommendations for using a neurocognitive S&T toolkit for achieving and sustaining US tactical and strategic capability and hegemony in global influence operations.

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