SMA Publications

Author: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The physical, social, political, economic, and cultural systems that comprise the operational environment interact in complex ways. The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project models this complexity with special relevance to US national security concerns. The AFOE team constructed a generic Global Exploitable Conditions Model (GECM) that captured this complexity as a system of nodes (or variables) and edges, which are the relationships between nodes. The generic model was then tailored to the specifics of the USAFRICOM AOR as the African Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM). This report describes a network analysis of the AECM that provides insight into important conditions and dynamics that impact USAFRICOM’s mission objectives.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: James Giordano, PhD (Georgetown University) & Bob Williams (Georgetown University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Instability of the international system and order is arising from competition among great powers, who possess large, thermonuclear arsenals, and from greater multipolarity of both established and aspirational nuclear weapons states to exercise their own aims for possessing “tactical-size” yields. The capacity of the United States arsenal to deter a nuclear attack on its partners and/or allies—as affirmed in the combined 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review—will be challenged in an emerging Third Nuclear Age by threats of nuclear weapons use with far lower yields (i.e., tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons) than those of the Cold War. The First Nuclear Age clearly began in 1945 and was characterized by the bipolarity of US-Soviet relations. The collapse of the USSR ended this era, but a Second Nuclear Age had already started, overlapping with the first. This intervening period proliferated the bomb to rising powers, regimes with starving populations, and those with revisionist agendas; it began sometime after China’s first test in 1964 and has matured through the present aspirations of North Korea and Iran. Still, the world has remained free of nuclear weapons use in conflict for nearly 78 years, driven by fears of global catastrophe from megaton exchanges.

The emerging Third Nuclear Age, however, will be dominated by more probable threats of low-yield nuclear use in regional conflicts rather than the classic dyadic promise of mutually assured destruction. We predict high-precision, low-yield nuclear weapons that are measurable by the hundreds or even tens of tons will become as strategically important to adversaries engaged in their own violence escalation with neighbors as the existing US nuclear arsenal is to deterrence of city-evaporating power. In the emerging Third Nuclear Age, the capacity for Washington to respond to threats of such limited nuclear use in conflicts that do not directly threaten the homeland will depend on the credibility of strategic messaging for assured US capabilities to respond in kind through retaliatory nuclear use—with conventional force or in other domains, such as cyber. We anticipate the proliferation of low-yield nuclear options during this new era to generate challenges to the credibility of at least in-kind US nuclear response options, given a perceived paradox of American ethics and jus in bello principles entwined in scenarios of strategic nuclear use. We also expect regional belligerents to reconsider limited first-use as viably below the US appetite for an assured, devastating response.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Authors: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.) & Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This report provides a concise, highly visual overview of the food security subsystem of the AECM (AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model). In addition to enabling analysis of causes and consequences of food security (and insecurity) in USAFRICOM’s AOR, it identifies three possible leverage points where interventions by the US could improve food security on the continent:

1. Expanding US support for agricultural training in culturally relevant and sustainable ways.
2. Maintaining government stores and emergency food funds, along with established distribution systems.
3. Expanding US support for public health initiatives in countries experiencing food crises, which could mitigate some of the longer-term physical health impacts on vulnerable populations.

It also takes a more detailed look at the current (as of May 2022) stressors on food security in Africa, identifies vulnerable country locations, and examines factors fueling that vulnerability.

Examination of the implications of food security for competition with China finds that China’s activities in Africa are part of a larger, multi-layered strategy to enhance its international influence, often in direct opposition to that of the US and its partner countries. Though individual Chinese influence activities in this area may appear non-threatening, when combined, they can threaten US or partner interests. NSI’s Quick Looks are concise reports on a specific sub-system of one of our models, in this case the AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM). The analyses in Quick Looks are centered around a focus node (variable) of particular interest. They are designed to present complex information in a highly visual, clear, and consistent format that enables the reader to quickly gain an overview of a concept of interest, as well as its implications— both direct and indirect—for their mission and priorities.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Volume III in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI, Inc.); Hriar Cabayan, PhD (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

Editorial Board: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder (George Mason University); Lt Gen (Ret) Timothy Fay, Robert Jones (USSOCOM), Robert Toguchi, PhD (USASOC)

Contributing Commands: USAFRICOM; USCENTCOM; USCYBERCOM; USEUCOM; USINDOPACOM; NORAD and USNORTHCOM; USSOCOM; USSOUTHCOM; USSPACECOM; USSTRATCOM

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In this report, entitled “Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands,” ten military Combatant Commands provide overviews of the challenges they face in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) and how they plan to ameliorate the risks and maximize the opportunities that these challenges present. The report provides the Commands a platform to articulate how they plan to manage the multiplicity of challenges they face. By doing so, it helps identify the types of capabilities and activities the Services must be able to plan for and field in defense of US interests in a competitive future international environment.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

‍Author: Popp, G. (NSI); Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI); Bragg, B. (NSI)

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In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:

• An overwhelming majority of respondents (79%) believe that some level of expansion of US nuclear force capability is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.
• 38% of respondents believe that the likelihood of US-China or US-Russia conflict with serious consideration of nuclear use falls within the range of quite possible to highly likely over the next 15 years.
• 36% of respondents believe that the likelihood of US vs. regional state conflict with serious consideration of nuclear use falls within the range of quite possible to highly likely over the next 15 years.brag

Author: Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Integrating effectively has always provided a strategic edge, from the ancient world to the present day. Integration is a central theme of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Here we ask: Why is the United States seeking to integrate now—and how can it integrate better? Now, for the first time since winning the Cold War, the United States must respond to a competitor strong across all levers of power—and so if it wants to compete it must integrate for the character of our new era of competition. This report traces integration as a strategic edge from the 1500s to the present, to identify key themes for the success (or failure) of US integration in the 2020s and 2030s. Three overarching sets of issues emerge: integration militarily; integration across multiple sources of power; and civil-military integration within the state. Integrating with allies and integrating technology will also be key for the United States. All are complex, so to help make them more tractable for practitioners we introduce simple concepts to deal with complex environments (e.g. the “adjacent possible”). We also introduce a powerful new field of cognitive science (metacognition or “thinking about thinking”) that can give the United States an edge for developing the humans, and human-machine teams, that will always lie at the heart of integrated US power.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Volume II in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.),
Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI, Inc.)

Contributing Authors: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Mr. Alex Campbell (LLNL), Dr. Zachary S. Davis (LLNL), Mr. Abraham M. Denmark (The Wilson Center), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Elder (George Mason University), Dr. Scott W. Harold (RAND Corporation), Mr. Mark Hoffman (Lockheed Martin), Mr. David Kirkpatrick (LLNL), Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Maj, USAFR) (USINDOPACOM; Stanford University; AEI), Mr. Marshall Monroe (Marshall Monroe Magic; National Center for Soft Power Strategies), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jack Shanahan (USAF, Retired), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), Dr. Yi E. Yang (James Madison University)

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It is not an exaggeration to state that China is and will remain a significant challenge to the US on all aspects of national power for the foreseeable future. This situation has been in the making for quite some time. This SMA Perspectives paper will not delve into the historical roots of why the US got to where it is, however. Nor will it dwell on the purely military aspects of the conflict. These are important considerations that are amply discussed elsewhere in numerous scholarly publications. This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.” It is also a follow-on to a previously published paper, entitled “Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition.” The focus of the previous paper was on the conditions that encourage actors to act in ways that promote cooperation and avoid escalation to conflict. It offered a range of alternative actions that the US and/or another actor can take that will protect the vital interests of both. In the current SMA Perspectives paper, we apply this paradigm and the general insights from the previous paper to the US-China relationship specifically.

In the context of this SMA perspectives paper, “constructive competition” is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issue to be in some degree of non-threatening, non-damaging opposition.” It is “tolerable and productive,” and it is “the ideal mode in a dynamic global system, as it stimulates innovation and movement” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). It assumes that the main actors can cooperate on common interests. It requires agreed upon norms or boundaries of accepted behavior and assumes that there is some degree of agreement between them. In this context, mutualism implies that both sides see the potential for gains.

“Destructive competition,” on the other hand,is a “state in which actors see their interests on a particular issueto be in opposition and potentially damaging to their respective interests. Tactics consistent with destructive competition can range in severity from international rules violations (e.g., stealing intellectual property) to actions seen as sufficiently harmful to necessitate shows of armed force to signal or demonstrate willingness to escalate. Thus, it is possible for two actors to be in a state of constructive competition on some issues and in a state of destructive competition on others” (Astorino-Courtois, 2019; Astorino-Courtois, 2021). In this context, the animosity between the actors is such that they are willing to undermine themselves to take the other down. It is also possible for destructive competition to interfere with constructive competition. This occurs when two actors’ interests do not align. In this context, it is assumed that the US and China will use all forms of competition to include selective use of direct confrontation and/or conflict when a state’s vital interests are at risk or perceived to be at risk.

Maintaining balance among competing interests in international security affairs is both a leadership and a management issue. Major leadership and management objectives include satisfying specific security objectives, while simultaneously 1) avoiding escalation (to the right) on the cooperation-competition-conflict continuum, 2) looking for opportunities to cooperate and compete constructively with long-time partners and competitors alike, and 3) retaining escalation control in the case of destructive competition and conflict. The ideal states are cooperation and constructive competition, given that US security objectives are met. Thus, the US objective would not necessarily be to “gain advantage,” particularly where cooperation better serves overall US interests. “Gaining advantage” implies asymmetry, which in and of itself is the foundation of destabilizing escalatory security spirals. Rather, the US objective would be to defend against disadvantage and seek to “create dilemmas for the adversary,” if these dilemmas would lead to cooperation or de-escalation, but not if the dilemmas would lead to destabilizing choice options. Key to all this is a viable risk management strategy.

There are wide differences in perception between the US and China (and other authoritarian governments) in terms of what is “acceptable” behavior in competition below armed conflict. Examples from China include forced technology transfer, economic and military espionage to fuel China’s military advantage (i.e., military-civilian fusion), influence operations, offensive cyber operations, biological attacks, and the use of non-traditional intelligence collectors. Some of these aspects are examined in this SMA Perspectives paper.

The US perspective of this competition with China is discussed by Lt Gen (Ret) Jack Shanahan, who proposes exchanging a single-note (specifically, containment) strategy for a five “C-note” scale—cooperate, compete, contest, confront, and conflict—to enable the US to tune its policy response to specific issues, approaching each on its merits and allowing progress to be made (or not be made) independently.

China’s perspective of US-China competition is discussed by four respective contributors:

• Dr. Michael D. Swaine argues that China is well aware that the US possesses huge advantages, both internal and through its allies and partners, that make conflict a risky strategy of dubious benefit.
• Dr. Scott W. Harold notes that the Chinese Communist Party has consistently framed the US as a threat to China’s interests and security, and this has enabled them at various times to promote a narrative that places the responsibility for regional tension and instability with “anti-China forces” within the US.
• Mr. Abraham M. Denmark notes that for China’s leadership, competition with the US is not an end in itself, but rather a necessary part of their effort to build an international system in which the CCP can achieve its own interests and objectives.
• Dr. Yi Edward Yang argues that China’s policies are both issue- and domain-dependent and, drawing on a broad literature, presents three models to explain various aspects of China’s behavior: the Social Identity Model, the Opportunistic Multilateralism Model, and the Centrality-Heterogeneity Model.

Other aspects of the US-China rivalry are addressed by several authors throughout the course of the paper:

• Dr. Zachary S. Davis and Mr. Marshall Monroe highlight the scope and purpose of the movie and media aspects of the CCP’s soft power crusade and propose several options for countering it.
• Mr. Alex Campbell and Mr. David Kirkpatrick advocate a regional cyber pact in the Indo-Pacific that suits the nature of cyber competition and builds on a unique American asset.
• Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro states that the US must avoid relying on Cold War tools and strategies of competition. Instead, the US needs to demonstrate to its allies and partners that it can protect them not only from military attacks but against other costly behaviors that Beijing may enact against them, such as economic coercion or diplomatic isolation.
• Mr. Mark Hoffman argues that the nature of peer competition is in essence that of a complex adaptive system, and as such, insights and approaches from complexity management might be leveraged to help compensate for some of the asymmetric disadvantages endemic to the current adversarial peer competition.

Finally, in the closing chapter, Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois attempts to bring all of the contributors’ insights together to provide a deeper understanding of the complexities of competition between the US and China.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Watch the virtual discussion with the authors here.

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Maintaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

Volume IV: U.S. Command Perspectives on Campaigning in Support of Integrated Deterrence

Authors: Dr. Robert Elder (George Mason University)and Dr. Alex Levis (George Mason University)

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This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.

George Mason University (GMU) worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to identify risks to competition effectiveness that could be mitigated through improved integration of information into joint and unified action operations. The initial focus was aligned with evolving Command and Control of the Information Environment (C2OIE) doctrinal concepts, but later shifted from strategic level integration to integration of information into unified action activities at the operational level. It is very difficult to achieve information enabling event alignment across the Whole of Government because there is no one responsible for this alignment at any planning level (Strategic, Operational, or Execution). The U.S. military can improve alignment by incorporating non-military agencies into its traditional planning processes (mission analysis, course of action development, operations orders). This was applied to real-world planning in workshops with Operational Planning Teams where the planners learned that they could coordinate their activities with embassy country teams working through the defense attaché or senior defense official. Although planning teams are much more comfortable planning and executing joint or service military operations, the workshop teams easily adapted legacy mission analysis, Course of Action (COA) development, and orders processes to integrate information effectively into Unified Action operations. Members of country teams can align messaging, engagements, non-military information enabling activities, and perception management with military activities without specific military direction using their own agency and organization guidance, but they need the information the operational planning teams produce during mission analysis and COA development to do their own planning and execution effectively.

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Authors: Dr. John Swegle (National Strategic Research Institute) and Dr. Christopher Yeaw (National Strategic Research Institute)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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In this paper, we reevaluate China’s production of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) in order to estimate the maximum number of nuclear weapons using WGPu that China could build.† This WGPu was produced in the 801 Reactor at the 404 Plant in Gansu Province (or the 404 Plant reactor) and the 821 Plant reactor in Sichuan Province. Both are graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled production reactors that began operation in late 1966 and late 1973, respectively, and both have been shut down for decades (with the date of termination at issue between different authors). We know of no openly available information indicating that China has resumed WGPu production elsewhere.

We review two existing estimates of WGPu production with widely varying methodologies and results: Zhang’s 2017 estimate and Esin and Anichkina’s 2013 estimate. In addition, we provide our own estimate based largely on the information in Zhang’s paper, but with a reconsideration of Zhang’s assumptions about the pace of production for 1980 and beyond and on his assumption about the closure date of the 821 Plant reactor.

Our primary findings are the following:

• Zhang and Esin and Anichkina essentially agree on the WGPu production in the 404 Plant reactor, with a small difference largely due to Zhang’s 600 MWt reactor power, based on a 1990 Chinese-language publication, and Esin and Anichkina’s 500 MWt reactor power, based on proprietary conversations with Russian scientists who claim to have worked with the Chinese prior to a break between the Soviet Union and China.
• Zhang and Esin and Anichkina differ dramatically on WGPu production in the 821 Plant reactor. Zhang relied on information from former plant workers and assumptions based on the political context with regard to nuclear power at the time in China. Esin and Anichkina relied heavily on proprietary discussions with Russian scientists who claimed to have personally participated with the Chinese in developing their nuclear complex. Esin and Anichkina’s estimates were more conditional, and they employed a much higher reactor power and the assumption that the reactor continued to produce WGPu well after former Chinese workers claimed production had ended. Ultimately, we found quantitative elements of the Russian estimate, which was much larger than Zhang’s, to be problematic.
• We reevaluated Zhang’s estimate, focusing on his assumptions about production reductions after 1979 and the termination date for military production at the 821 Plant. This reevaluation resulted in a 50 percent increase over Zhang’s estimate, from 3,450 kilograms to 5,200 kilograms. This increase could permit China to build, or have built, over 1,000 plutonium-based nuclear devices.

Author: Melanie Sisson (Brookings Institution)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.” For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence depends upon mutual confidence in second-strike capabilities – for nuclear deterrence to work, nuclear-armed competitors must all believe that each can absorb a first strike and still return a nuclear response. Emerging technologies being pursued by US competitors that enhance their ability to locate, track, and target nuclear assets, and those that can be used to compromise or to damage components of nuclear communication, command, and control (NC3) erode second-strike and put at risk the future deterrent effectiveness of US strategic forces. The United States can guard against this outcome by modernizing its air- and sea-based nuclear assets, developing resilient and redundant cyber defenses, and actively pursuing international agreements that limit the deleterious effects of ISR and that prohibit kinetic or cyber attacks on terrestrial and satellite-based components of NC3.

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