SMA Publications

Author: Dr. James Sundquist (Yale University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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China does not have an overarching deterrence framework. However, it is possible to identify the primary objects of Chinese deterrence and describe the Chinese playbook. China’s core strategic aims consist of deterring 1) a nuclear attack; 2) conventional, space, and cyber-attacks; and 3) outside efforts to encourage secession or political unrest. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally taken the approach that a secure second-strike capability is sufficient to prevent an adversary from threatening first use. This perspective is still dominant, but heightened worries about American brinksmanship and non-nuclear counterforce have prompted a major nuclear modernization campaign. Chinese conventional deterrence is notable for including an explicit role for compellence and a certain degree of optimism that purely military capabilities and resolve can help solve geopolitical problems. Finally, the Chinese government has long feared separatism and popular revolt at least as much as external aggression. In addition to its internal security apparatus, China deters external provocation on these issues through diplomatic and economic means, which make it costly for other countries to recognize Taiwan or support Chinese dissidents.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (George Mason University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability.
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The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.

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Author: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

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This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

The physical, social, political, economic, and cultural systems comprise the operational environment and interact in complex ways. The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project models this complexity with special relevance to US national security concerns. The AFOE team constructed a generic Global Exploitable Conditions Model (GECM) that captured this complexity as a system of nodes, or variables, and edges, which are the relationships between nodes. The generic GECM was then tailored to the specifics of the USAFRICOM AOR to produce the AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM). A subsystem of the AECM was extracted to align with key USAFRICOM objectives in the greater Sahelian region: a part of the African continent encompassing 24 countries in the Western and Eastern African zones, and two countries from the Central African zone. These countries generally occupy the area between the Sahara Desert and the tropical forest regions of Africa and are the focus of a designated Sahelian system model.

The analytic approach, like the region itself, was multi-faceted. First, empirical data was collected to provide quantitative measures representing the ways that conditions of the operational environment impact USAFRICOM’s key concerns. These data provided key inputs into two types of models: network analysis and system dynamics. Analyses of network models evaluate the potential of a node to influence a system by virtue of its position in the system. System dynamics models simulate the flow of influence throughout a system by virtue of positioning, the functional relationship of the edges that connect nodes, and most important through feedbacks in the system.

It should be noted that the SMA team benefited significantly from close cooperation with its colleagues at USAFRICOM. This report and the accompanying Quick Look describe how these conceptual models were used to provide insights into important conditions and dynamics that impact USAFRICOM’s mission objectives.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Volume IV in the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

Editors: Belinda Bragg, PhD (NSI) & Hriar Cabayan, PhD (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

Contributing Commands: USAFRICOM, USCYBERCOM, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM

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The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states:

The Department will advance our priorities through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. Integrated deterrence entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and our network of Alliances and
partnerships. Tailored to specific circumstances, it applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces prepared to fight and win, as needed, and backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. (Austin, 2022)

The 2022 NDS explains that while the Joint Force seeks to deter aggression, it is also campaigning to counter adversary moves short of armed conflict and build enduring military advantage such that adversaries calculate war to be too risky.

In the previous SMA Perspectives volume, “Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands,” contributors from ten military commands provided overviews of the challenges they face in their respective AORs and how they plan to ameliorate the risks and maximize the opportunities that these challenges present. In particular, contributors noted the need for greater understanding of adversaries’ interests and priorities and better mechanisms for collaboration across the USG and other stakeholders.

This SMA Perspectives volume builds on these observations and focuses more tightly on how some of these Commands are thinking about campaigning in support of integrated deterrence objectives.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Watch the authors speak about their chapters in a Panel Discussion from August 2023

About the SMA Perspectives Series “Emergent Issues for U.S. National Security”

The Joint Staff and the United States military adhere to the maxim that effective strategy formulation starts with a proper diagnosis of the environment. This is particularly true when the operational environment has high levels of interactive complexity across various domains. In these settings there are no easy choices, but we know from centuries of experience that the best plans are informed by thoughtful, disciplined exploration of ideas and diversity of thought. In pursuit of this axiom, the volumes in the SMA Perspectives Series are a concerted effort to harvest the informed opinions of leading experts but do not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. government. Our hope is that the ideas presented in this series expand the readers’ strategic horizons and inform better strategic choices.

Volume I: Present and Future Challenges to Mainaining Balance Between Global Cooperation and Competition

Volume II: US versus China: Promoting ‘Constructive Competition’ to Avoid ‘Destructive Competition’

Volume III: Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Commands

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Author: Dr. Graeme Herd (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,
what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia? The paper argues that western “calibrated escalation” support for Ukraine now poses greater risks regarding Russian collapse than “all-in” support to promote Ukrainian battle-field victories. The sooner Russia is defeated, the greater the chance of a controlled or “soft-landing” post-Putin power transition in Russia. The West needs to develop a theory of managing a defeated, weak, but not-yet-collapsed Russia.

Author: Dr. Kristina Talbert-Slagle (Yale University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Public health experts often approach “deterrence”—or prevention of behaviors and/or decisions that adversely affect health outcomes—by considering the many factors that influence health behaviors and decision-making. These factors, often called “health determinants,” can be divided into three levels: micro- (individual), meso- (social/community), and macro- (systems). Interventions to influence health-related decision-making at each level have been developed, tested, and refined for a variety of public health deterrence efforts. Successful deterrence in public health often requires recognizing the interdependence of multiple factors within these levels and developing adaptive interventions to impact individual and group behavior. This paper describes several academic models and tools for understanding public health deterrence and then examines how those resources have been successfully utilized in an iterative, evidence-informed, adaptive approach to ultimately reduce tobacco smoking in the United States.

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Authors: Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar (NSI, Inc.); Nathan Heath (NSI, Inc.); George Popp (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.

What is strategic culture? After a review of relevant literature, we propose the following definition: An actor’s strategic culture is composed of beliefs, experiences, assumptions, attitudes, and patterned behaviors that shape perceptions and preferences about its security-related interests, objectives, and activities.

This definition reflects the consensus of most scholars. However, key issues remain concerning the relationship of strategic behavior to strategic culture, the social and political levels at which it operates, and how strategic culture can be modeled.

Strategic behavior and strategic culture. Many scholars assert a recursive relationship between strategic culture and strategic behavior. Culture can impact behaviors, and behaviors sometimes reinforce elements of culture. However, if the concept of strategic culture is to be useful for national security analysis, it must predict some amount of an organization’s strategic behavior. Including all strategic behaviors (e.g., nuclear postures, military investments, deployments, military conduct in war, operations under the level of armed conflict) in the definition of strategic culture potentially creates a tautology that undermines prediction. To avoid this tautology, only traditional, repeated, and patterned behaviors are included in our definition of strategic culture, allowing other elements of strategic behavior to emerge independently.

Whether or not strategic culture influences strategic behavior remains an open question. Furthermore, there is consensus among scholars that factors, such as pragmatic material concerns, influence strategic behaviors and may override the effect of strategic culture all together. The influence of strategic culture on strategic behavior should be considered an empirical question to be tested in specific applications.

Whose strategic culture matters? Strategic cultures exist at the international, national, and subnational levels, like political parties, popular opinion, intelligentsia, and powerful stakeholders. Any analysis of an actor’s strategic behavior must identify which stakeholders and their associated strategic cultures actually influence it.

Strategic culture as a complex system. Scholars have proposed that strategic culture is composed of identity, values, perceptions, and patterned behaviors. However, these elements are not independent; they can influence each other, creating a complex system of interrelationships. The complex system model we propose allows for the adaptation of the strategic culture concept to different nations and contexts.

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Author: Dr. Lawrence Kuznar (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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The physical, social, political, economic, and cultural systems that comprise the operational environment interact in complex ways. The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project models this complexity with special relevance to US national security concerns. The AFOE team constructed a generic Global Exploitable Conditions Model (GECM) that captured this complexity as a system of nodes (or variables) and edges, which are the relationships between nodes. The generic model was then tailored to the specifics of the USAFRICOM AOR as the African Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM). This report describes a network analysis of the AECM that provides insight into important conditions and dynamics that impact USAFRICOM’s mission objectives.

This publication was released as part of a formal SMA effort, Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project. For more information regarding this project, please click here.

Author: Dr. Kathleen Kiernan (NEC National Security Systems (NSS))

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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While there are parallels, the environment in which deterrence occurs for the U.S. Military is vastly different in context than for domestic or international law enforcement.

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Police can reduce opportunities for crime by intervening before they arise, and deterrence is an even more efficient means of policing. Deterrence essentially convinces potential offenders that their risk of apprehension and punishment is too high to make committing a crime worth the risk. Visible police presence (actual or apparent), publicized arrests, police successes, and community engagement all affect this perception. Operational, financial, and technical limits on police agencies, however, can make deterrence programs challenging to implement. Technology can be a ‘deterrence multiplier.’ Appropriately regulated and responsibly employed surveillance technologies and sophisticated data analytics can increase criminals’ risk of detection and arrest, amplifying deterrent effects. Program outcomes vary and include crime displacement, deteriorating police-community relations, and public perception of threats to rights. Implementing new methods and technologies, however, requires consideration of privacy and potential biases.

Challenges in implementing deterrence programs include the existence of strategies that may not transfer between locations, the allocation of limited resources, and the lack of accurate, reliable crime data. Implementation and maintenance costs for high-tech, or large-scale, efforts can also be prohibitive. Finally, funding sources may believe funds would be better spent on alternative, or existing, efforts.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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Author: Stefan Lundqvist (Swedish Defence University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This article examines the consequences for Sweden’s state identity by the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO. Taking its starting point in Sweden’s shattering loss of its easternmost provinces in the 1809 Treaty of Fredrikshamn, it explores Sweden’s initial formulations of a policy of neutrality and its evolution until the end of the Cold War. The article then directs attention to how Social Democratic leaders managed to institutionalise a Swedish “active foreign policy”, exerting a lasting, formative influence on Sweden’s state identity. It also addresses the rapprochement of Finland and Sweden after the end of the Cold War and the consequences of the bilateral dynamics that characterised their EU-membership applications. The article critically discusses how Sweden
reformulated its concept of neutrality into a nebulous concept of nonalignment and adopted a security policy rooted in a cooperative security approach. Based on key findings drawn from this historical account, this article addresses the processes that lead to Finland and Sweden unexpectedly deciding on jointly applying for NATO membership. It concludes with a forward-looking assessment of how a Swedish NATO membership will ultimately stabilise Sweden’s adaptable state identity and its implications for the Nordic countries’ regional military strategy.

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